Japan Expands Mutual Security Definition The Washington Post ("JAPAN TO JOIN U.S. POLICY ON TAIWAN ", 2005-02-18) reported that the United States and Japan will declare for the first time in a joint agreement that Taiwan is a mutual security concern, according to a draft of the document. Analysts called the move a demonstration of Japan's willingness to confront the rapidly growing might of the PRC. The United States has long focused attention on the PRC government's threat to use military force against Taiwan if the island, which the PRC views as a renegade province, moves toward independence. Until now, Japan has been content to let the United States bear the brunt of Beijing's displeasure.

At the same time, Japan is becoming more active in its territorial disputes with its neighbors. The issue of Takeshima (Tokdo) by the Japanese causes great ire on the part of the Koreans who seized the island in 1954. (See Tokdo Dispute History for historical data and information on Tokdo.) This has caused some to call for the abrogation of the 1999 fisheries agreement with Japan that concluded after the Japanese government unilaterally canceled a 1965 pact, announcing an EEZ after the United States and the Soviet Union in 1977 declared their seas as EEZs. The Korean government had been blamed previously for making too many concessions to Japanese government demands during the negotiations, a situation which fueled fierce national antagonism at the time toward Japan. (NOTE: The row escalated in March 2005 to a level of great friction between the two countries. See March 2005)

Japan is also now openly confronting Russia and China over disputed islands taken from it at the end of WWII. Activists invaded a lighthouse maintained by the Chinese on a disputed island and set up a Japanese flag on it. To the north, the Japanese refused the offer of the Russians to split four islands between the two and negotiate on the two in its possession at a later date.

NEW WORRY: IMPROVED SCUD The Chosun Ilbo on 15 Feb reported that the North had developed a new SCUD missile. According to the report, the DPRK developed an upgraded Scud missile, dubbed the Scud-ER, with an estimated range of 600 - 1,000 kilometers. The missiles have a longer range and are more accurate than existing Scud missiles. A government source that US spy satellites discovered the new Scuds one or two years ago, and were currently trying to determine whether they have been deployed. The source said the missiles are capable of striking targets in nearly all of the ROK even from bases in rear areas of the DPRK. The missiles have longer ranges than North Korea's existing arsenal of 600 Scud B (300km) and Scud C (500km) missiles.

Accuracy has always been the weak point of existing Scud missiles. Rumors of the upgraded Scuds E-R (for "extended range") spread among some specialists in the latter half of the 1990s, but their existence was never confirmed.

But the range of the new Scuds is considerably shorter than that of Pyongyang’s arsenal of Rodong missiles (1,300km) and newly designed intermediate-range ballistic missiles (3,000 - 4,000km), which have already been deployed; its Taepodong-1 missile (2,500km), which was test-fired in 1998 but never deployed; and the Taepodong-2 missile (6,700km), which is currently under development. However, they are reportedly all aimed at Japan and the U.S. rather than South Korea.

Taepodong 2

The Scud upgrades, by contrast, were designed with South Korea in mind, and intelligence authorities believe they represent a greater threat than the long-range missiles.

Joint Close Air Support Exercise Korea Times ("CFC PROPOSES ROK-US JOINT MILITARY DRILL", 2005-02-16) reported that the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) recently proposed to the ROK military a joint special forces training drill with troops from the US, the US Forces Korea (USFK) said Wednesday. The CFC made the proposal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army, asking if the military drill could be held next month and open to the news media, said Kim Young-kyu, spokesman of the USFK. The military drill will be focused on "close air support" in which aircraft are mobilized to support nearby ground combat operations by launching air strikes against the ground enemy.

The A-10 Warthogs of Osan AB have trained in Korea primarily as "tank-killers" though it is a primary weapon for Close Air Support (CAS) as seen in Desert Storm and in the Iraq War. However, there has not been much interface in the past with the USAF and its ROK counterparts who would be the primary recipients of any CAS in case of a North Korean breakout. For as long as there has been an Army and an Air Force, there have been differing definitions of what is CAS. Even now in the US military, there are differing definitions of CAS for the Marines versus Navy and Air Force. It will be interesting for the ROKAF and USAF to compare notes on their respective definitions.

In March 2005, there was to be a "small scale" joint exercise with only dozens of soldiers. Most likely computer interface for Command Post functions such as in Ulchi Focus Lens.

USS Pueblo Return Demanded??? In a propaganda move, Congressional Record (Senate) ("SENATE RESOLUTION 53--DEMANDING THE RETURN OF THE USS "PUEBLO" TO THE UNITED STATES NAVY", 2005-02-14) Whereas the USS Pueblo, which was attacked and captured by the North Korean Navy on January 23, 1968; Whereas the capture of the USS Pueblo resulted in no reprisals against the Government or people of North Korea and no military action at any time; Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the Senate--(1) demands the return of the USS Pueblo to the United States Navy; and (2) directs the Secretary of the Senate to transmit copies of this resolution to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State.

The USS Pueblo is now a floating museum in Wonson to recall the DPRK "victory."

Two Aegis Destroyers to Yokosuka The Japan Times on 17 Feb 2005 reported that the US Navy in Japan has said it will replace a cruiser and a destroyer forward-deployed here with two Aegis-equipped destroyers later this year. With its ability to acquire and track ballistic missiles by radar, the vessel is expected to operate as part of the US-led missile defense shield, which Japan joined in December 2003, against possible missile attacks by the DPRK.

The Stars and Stripes on 18 Feb stated the guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes is expected to depart in April after nearly eight years in Yokosuka. The Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS Lassen will arrive to replace it around June, Navy officials announced. In June, the Spruance-class destroyer USS Cushing is expected to depart, to be replaced in September by the guided missile destroyer USS Stethem, commissioned in 1995.

“The big difference is they have a greater combat capability,” said Cmdr. John Wallach, spokesman for Commander, Naval Forces Japan. “Newer, advanced Aegis combat systems and better capabilities.” "Both USS Cushing and USS Vincennes are nearing the end of their service lives," stated a Navy release. "These ship rotations are part of the Navy's long-range plan to routinely replace older ships assigned to the Navy's Forward Deployed Naval Forces with newer or more capable surface combatants."

The Vincennes, the Navy’s first Ticonderoga-class Aegis cruiser to operate in the Pacific Fleet, was commissioned in 1985 and holds a crew of about 362. The Lassen, commissioned in 2001, will bring a crew of 317. The Cushing, commissioned in 1979, carries a crew of 345 and has been based at Yokosuka for eight years. The Stethem carries a crew of 317. The new ships have fewer personnel aboard, and therefore fewer families will be moving to Yokosuka.

This action also places Korea on the outside of this Missile Defense Shield. Korea recently backed off on the purchase of used PAC-2 Patriots from Germany to fill the void in its missile defense, instead opting to use the U.S. Patriot missile defense umbrella that was expanded with upgraded PAC-3 Patriots in 2004 and positioned in Kwangju and increased at Osan AB.

US, Japan to Develop Missile Shield in FY 2006 According to Seoul Times. citing a Kyodo News report, Japanese Defense Agency Director General Yoshinori Ono and U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld agreed in Feb 2005 to advance ongoing bilateral research on a missile defense system to the development stage in fiscal 2006. In a Washington date lined story, Japan news agency reported that the two nations are expected to move swiftly to the production and deployment stage as Japan has already paved the way for exporting related components to the United States by relaxing in December its ban on arms exports.

The agreement came days after U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director Porter Goss said North Korea could be ready to test-fire a new long-range Taepodong 2 ballistic missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to the United States 'at any time.' Goss was referring to an upgraded version of the Taepodong 1 missile fired by North Korea in August 1998, part of which flew over Japan into the Pacific. The incident led Japan and the United States to begin their joint missile defense system research in 1999. The following is from the Seoul Times article:

Pyongyang maintains the launch was of a rocket for sending a satellite into orbit. But it has agreed to halt the launching of ballistic missiles, and has kept to the moratorium to date. Uncertainties have grown over North Korea since Pyongyang declared Feb.10 its possession of nuclear weapons and an indefinite boycott of six-party talks on its nuclear ambitions.

... Rumsfeld proposed upgrading the missile shield research to the development stage in fiscal 2006, and Ono welcomed the plan, the official said, adding that they also agreed to step up cooperation on information and other aspects to make the missile defense system effective.

The proposal came after the U.S. Defense Department decided recently to develop a bigger enhanced version of its independently developed sea-based Standard Missile 3 interceptor to defend against ballistic missiles. The Japan-U.S. joint research involves key components of the enhanced SM3 interceptor. The U.S. Navy has strongly pressed for its development despite skepticism expressed by some experts about its effectiveness. The Japanese officials said Ono and Rumsfeld also agreed to accelerate bilateral consultations on the realignment of the U.S. military presence in Japan with the aim of maintaining the deterrence provided by U.S. forces and reducing the burden on local hosts, including Okinawa. BACKGROUND: Prior to 1998, Japan backed a "vital" defense system in the east Asian region but has stopped short of expressing support for U.S. plans to set up a new missile defense shield. Then the North fired a Taepodong-1 missile across Japanese airspace claiming it was a satellite launch. N. Korea flight-tested its Taepodong 1 missile, which could presumably haul a 1,000-kilogram nuclear bomb about 2,500 kilometers. The same missile might carry a lighter biological or chemical warhead 4,100 kilometers — just shy of the two closest parts of the US: the tip of Alaska's Aleutian Islands and the western end of the Hawaiian Islands. This caused the Japanese to view the North in a completely different light -- coupled with the nuclear threats the North had made against Japan.(NOTE: In Mar 2005, the ROK government's "left-leaning" NIS director stated to the National Assembly it was a satellite launch -- though how he came to that conclusion without any external intelligence sources is unknown.)

In December 2003, Japan decided to introduce a missile defense shield to deal chiefly with the possibility of ballistic missile attacks from North Korea. The government asked for 100 billion yen in the budget for fiscal 2004 to cover the costs of implementing the system up until 2007, with 15 billion slated for use in fiscal 2004. The envisaged shield combined the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) to be launched from Aegis-equipped destroyers to intercept ballistic missiles at midcourse in space and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles to shoot down any remaining missiles from the ground. (The two new destroyers in 2005 fulfill this portion of the Missile Defense Shield.) According to the Mainichi Shimbun, Japan, Dec. 19, 2003, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda added that existing defensive steps were not fast enough to adequately cope with the threat of ballistic missile attacks, which can be completed within minutes. However, others pointed out that becoming involved in the missile defense shield would violated the government's interpretation of the Constitution, which it claimed forbids Japan from being involved in a collective defense agreement. But Fukuda stressed that Japan's role in the system was entirely for its own self-defense. China's successful launching of a manned space capsule in 2003 and the increasingly frequent movement of Chinese naval vessels near Japan's territorial waters have also unnerved the Japanese. Japan has stressed the North Korean threat, trying to persuade a skeptical China that the shield would be purely defensive.

China has warned that Japan's adoption of an antimissile system would disrupt the global strategic balance and set off an arms race. An effective shield would challenge China's military power by curbing the effectiveness of its missiles, which can now strike Taiwan or American forces stationed in Okinawa and elsewhere. Russia said in February 2004 that it was developing a so-called hypersonic missile technology capable of piercing the United States' system.

Japan would spend $10 billion in this decade to develop a two-layer shield. In the 10 minutes or so that it would take a ballistic missile fired from North Korea to reach Japan, one of Japan's advanced destroyers with the Aegis weapons system would try to intercept it by firing ship-to-air missiles. If that failed, Patriot missiles based around key cities would have a second chance to knock down the enemy missile.

To build the shield, Japan plans to modify its four Aegis destroyers by adding the interceptor, the Standard Missile-3, and by purchasing 16 new versions of the Patriot missiles. To track incoming missiles, Japan would rely on intelligence from United States satellites, but it also plans to construct a land-based radar network and a command and control system.

In the last two years, the United States has conducted five tests of its Aegis-based Standard Missile-3, completing four successfully. The United States and Japan are expected shortly to conduct joint tests of an upgraded version of the missile that would incorporate four components developed together: an infrared seeker, kinetic warhead, rocket motor and nose cone. The first joint test is to take place in late 2005, followed by another in early 2006, said Lt. Cmdr. Alvin Plexico of the Navy, a spokesman for the Defense Department.

Now that Japan is an ally of the US, Washington regrets that its US sponsored constitution contains a pacifist clause and is using pressure to have it modified. It has urged Japan to forge closer ties on missile defense and said US-made missile defense systems would be useful for Japan to shield against possible attacks. Visiting US missile defense chief Lieutenant-General Ronald Kadish told Japanese Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba that Washington wanted to secure closer cooperation from Japan on its planned missile defense shield. Kadish told Ishiba that the US combination of an Aegis ship-based interception system and Patriot ground-to-air system would be useful for Japan. Ishiba told Kadish that Japan would need more discussions on the missile defense system before making any concrete decision. Japan has been considering introducing the two US-developed missile defense systems to cope with possible attacks by a third country, notably North Korea. Ship-based missile defense (SMD) using Aegis-equipped destroyers is designed to intercept short- and mid-range ballistic missiles at mid-course. The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) ground-to-air system is designed to shoot down missiles that the ship-based system fails to intercept. In August 1998, North Korea alarmed the world by launching a Taepodong-1 missile that passed over Japan, demonstrating that areas with large populations including Tokyo were within the weapon's estimated 1'000-km range. The surprise test-firing of the North Korean missile prompted Japan to start studying with Washington a theater missile defense system, a variant of the US national missile defense system, aimed at shielding US troops and allies in Asia. (Reuters, 6/16/03).

According to Voice of America on 17 Dec 2004, Japan and the US signed an agreement to encourage cooperation on developing a missile defense system. Japanese Defense Minister Yoshinori Ono signed a memorandum of understanding Friday in Tokyo with U.S. Ambassador to Japan Howard Baker. Under the agreement, Japan and the United States will exchange information on research, deployment and operations of a missile shield. The agreement comes one week after Japan adopted new defense policy guidelines that would allow the joint development of a missile defense system with the United States.

In December 2004, the Asahi Shimbun, a Japanese daily, said the US and Japan signed a contingency plan in 2002 to respond to a possible crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The Asahi Shimbun said that the plan, code-named "Operation 5055," calls for Japan's self defense forces to assist American troops in combat if war breaks out on the peninsula. The scenario also envisages Japan guarding against possible invasion by hundreds of North Korean agents. Under the plan, Japan's military would join search and rescue operations for U.S. troops missing in action and also guard 135 possible military targets such as U.S. bases and nuclear power plants along its northwestern coast. The paper also said Japanese maritime forces with minesweepers would keep open shipping lanes between the Korean Peninsula and the northern coast of Japan's main island of Kyushu. The report comes comes days after Japan unveiled a new defence policy that calls for a shift from the purely defensive posture in place since its defeat in World War Two

The five-year defense outline allows the sale of missile defense components to the United States for production of a missile shield. Japan says other arms export cases will be considered on a case-by-case basis. The change in the production of these MDS components — and the likelihood that they will eventually be sold to other nations joining the network — forced Japan to abandon one of the cherished tenets of its postwar pacifism: a ban on arms exports. Although Japan has long had one of the world's largest military budgets, its arms industry has been barred from exporting since 1967. Currently the Patriot Missile components are manufactured and assembled in Japan under license for domestic use only.

Another necessary change might be a redefinition of Japan's concept of collective self-defense. Japan has maintained that it has that right, but chooses not to exercise it because it is not allowed under its Constitution, which was imposed by the United States during the postwar occupation. The government has argued that intercepting a missile aimed at Japan amounts to a pure act of self-defense and emphasizes that the shield will be a Japanese one. But others point out that Japan will be part of a system linking the continental United States and other friendly nations. This leads up to the current situation where the Japanese are being lobbied to change Article 9 of the Peace Constitution to allow the expanded role for Japan's self-defense -- including the right to preemptive strikes if necessary to protect itself.

In Feb 2005. Japan's cabinet voted on a bill to revise its Self-Defense Force Law. The revision is designed to permit a field commander to launch anti-ballistic missiles at his own discretion. Currently, Japan much first receive approval from the U.N. Security Council, the Cabinet and the Prime Minister before it could launch such a missile. The problem is that there is NOT enough time to obtain this permission before missile impact with a missile launched from North Korea.

The four-step process had been designed to prevent such an important decision from being made independently by the military, experts said. The bill, was expected to be delivered to parliament for review, stipulates that the ballistic missile interception procedure is an administrative order rather than a legislation, therefore dispensing with recognition from parliament. Japan enacted a series of laws over the past two years, considerably enhancing the administrative bodies' power in national defense. The legislation has raised severe concerns that the war-renouncing constitution is increasingly ignored and Japan's self-defense-oriented force is gravitating towards that of an offensive capacity.

The question the ROK really needs to start asking itself is IF the US pulls back its Patriots if Roh escalates the tensions again between the US-ROK military question, what protection does it have against its "friends" in the North? It has delayed its procurement of even used PAC-2 Patriots to defend against SCUD attacks, it has no ATCMS missile launchers (though on order but unfunded). It has recently developed a home-grown cruise missile, but it is primarily for sea-launch and has not been fielded as of this date. In essence, the ROK has NO missile defense or counter-attack capability of its own. However, its NGO groups -- led by the anti-War faction -- have staged violent protests against the adoption of the MDS system in Korea.

The concern is that the MDS will create a network that will eventually require the sharing of critical information and coordination among its members, which could split Asian nations into two camps: those inside and those outside the system. Those inside the system say the shield will be a defense against the missile buildup by nations like China and North Korea; those outside say it will destabilize the region and start an arms race. Australia has signed on to the MDS and negotiations were on-going with India. Taiwan will receive missile tracking equipment to identify inbound missiles from China. China, already displeased with Japan's decision, said that the radar sale to Taiwan sent the "wrong message," and it reiterated its opposition to America's selling "advanced weapons" there. The United States has vowed to protect Taiwan against an attack by China, which has 500 missiles pointed at the island.

But the ROK is not the only nation opting out of the MDS. Canada in Feb 2005 publicly stated it would not support the "weaponization of space." Though the Prime Minister Paul Martin initially supported joining the program when he was a candidate for the Liberal leadership, Martin has retreated, since polls indicate that a majority of Canadians oppose it. Many believe that the umbrella, when fully implemented, could lead to an international arms race. The Bush administration has tried to make a public show of understanding that Martin heads up a minority government that could fall over such a contentious debate, but it is a great blow to the US when its neighbor would not stand with it on this pivotal issue. In Europe, Britain has signed on, but interest there has been generally tepid compared with the reception in Asia, where the missile buildup in China and North Korea, and the proliferation of nuclear technology from Pakistan, are driving the rise in the region's military spending.

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Seoul to Finish S-N Railroad by Dec. South Korea plans to finish connecting an inter-Korean railroad on the east coast by the end of the year to support a Mt. Kumgang tourism project in North Korea, Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young said on 24 Feb. The government would negotiate with the North to guarantee travelers' safety on their way to the scenic resort area through the heavily fortified Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The east coast road, linking the South's Kangwon Province to Mt. Kumgang, has been open to the public since September 2003. Currently, travelers are only allowed to use shuttle buses.

Up until January this year, 872,332 tourists have visited the special tourism zone in the North. The tourism program, designed by Hyundai Asan, began in November 1998. An excursion ship has been used to transport tourists.

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ROK "Admits" to North Korean Satellite Launch Yonhap News reported on 25 Feb 2005 that the National Intelligence Service admitted that the DPRK launched a satellite in 1998, overturning a previous assessment that the communist country fired a long-range missile. In a parliamentary report, Ko Young-koo, head of the NIS, said that a "Daepodong-1" missile was used in launching the satellite in August 1998.

The significance of this is that this supports the North Korean claim -- which in turn slaps the U.S. and Japan in the face as they claim the missile was a test of the long-range Taepodong-1 ICBM which overshot the Japanese territory and landed in the sea in 1998. The Japanese public reacted in an uproar to this missile incident and public sentiment shifted dramatically. The long-range missiles would be capable of carrying warheads to Japan. As a result the Japanese have joined the controversial Missile Defense Sheild Initiative (MDS) promoted by the US. PAC-3 Patriot missiles and new Aegis destroyers of the SDF -- along with added US Aegis destroyers add to this shield to protect Japan.

Taepodong 1 missile (From DPRK TV)

The latest worry is that the North with its admitting to having nuclear weapons can install the weapons on a long range missile aimed at Japan. Commonsense dictates that the North cannot use the nuclear weapon on the peninsula without destroying itself -- so the only country that the North would target would be Japan (or China its ally).

As a sidenote, Ko Young-koo, head of the NIS, was appointed to the NIS by President Roh over the objections of the National Assembly who called him "left-leaning" individual. Roh appointed him anyway to "reform" the NIS in 2003. The National Assembly voiced strong opposition as his nominee was considered as having no experience for the top intelligence job. Roh did not need the National Assembly approval and Roh angrily appointed him despite the opposition. What made matters worse was that the National Assembly stated that the proposed appointee to the NIS policy and planning seat was a "North Korean supporter." Roh appointed him anyway as well. The aim was to gut the National Security Law which Roh continues to push for.

This revelation from the NIS seems to verify that the ROK intelligence has now been "reformed" and now openly supports the North Korean views. The point is that the ROK has NO external intelligence capability in the form of spy satellites or other means. Therefore, its intelligence is based on US-provided intelligence. How it came about this conclusion that the North launched a satellite is therefore based solely on ROK-inspired interpretation.

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Japanese Start to Work on Constitutional Reform The Yomiuri Shimbun on 25 Feb 2005 reported that the Liberal Democratic Party's committee on constitutional reform is involved in heated debates over whether the party should maintain its conservative stance or work with other parties to devise constitutional amendments that are feasible. Arguments have erupted in the committee, chaired by former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, in debates aiming to complete a draft of amendments by April. The points of dispute include Article 9 and the status of the emperor.

The emperor portion is to allow a women to inherit the title of Empress. However, the important issue for the ROK is the Article 9 of the Peace Constitution. The US is lobbying heavily for a change to Article 9 which would allow it to remove its troops from Okinawa/Korea/US and relocate them to the Japanese mainland. It would allow Japan to become a true nation with its own defense and give it the right to protect itself against aggression -- including first-strike capabilities. To be truthful, the Japanese have most of the armament in place and the SDF is currently realigning itself to ensure that it has this war-fighting capability. The focus of course is North Korea as the tensions between the two countries continue to escalate.

The following is an editorial by Park Cheol-hee in the Joongang Ilbo on 25 Feb 2005:

Spurning the U.S. alliance foolish

The United States and Japan have been building a bilateral alliance for the 21st century. If the U.S.-Japan alliance during the Cold War focused on the defense of Japan, it has attempted to form a regional one after the Cold War.

Since the Sept 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Japan has pursued the globalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi suggested making the bilateral alliance "the U.S.-Japan alliance in the world" as soon as U.S. President George W. Bush was re-elected.

The revised strategy of the U.S.-Japan alliance was laid out concretely in a joint statement issued after the two-plus-two talks between foreign and defense ministers of the United States and Japan on Feb. 19. The two countries set, in the joint statement, the "common strategic goals" for stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community.

What is remarkable first of all is "the globalization of the alliance." The two countries emphasized partnership to improve the international security environment, including the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the prevention and eradication of international terrorism. The countries confirmed their view that stability in the international community is directly connected to Japan's peace and prosperity. They agreed to jointly contribute to peace-keeping activities in Afghanistan and Iraq and international disasters, including the recent tsunami disaster. They also confirmed their support for a democratic community through a joint pursuit of basic values, including democracy and human rights.

This means that the joint statement stressed strategic cooperation between the two countries that goes far beyond the framework of the existing U.S.-Japan alliance.

"Sharing a common regional strategy" is also particularly noteworthy. The United States and Japan urged China to resolve the Taiwan problem peacefully, and on the other hand asked the country to enhance transparency in its military and play a responsible and constructive role in the stability of the region and the world.

As common strategic goals, the two countries clearly stated latent threats from China and suggested the possibility of joint intervention in the Taiwan problem. They pressed North Korea for the peaceful resolution of specific current issues, including nuclear weapons, missiles and Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea. This is an extension of Japan's new "Outline of Defense Plan" announced last year in which Japan named North Korea and China as possible threats.

The United States and Japan also agreed to review the joint use of military bases as part of defense cooperation following the relocation of U.S. military forces. This means that they began to introduce integrated operating roles, duties and capabilities while strengthening the ability of mutual cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. military forces in Japan.

They have sought stable stationing of U.S. military forces in Japan through a proposal of cooperative realignment of military forces, including reducing burdens on military base areas, improvement of relations with the regional community and consideration of environment.

As such, Japan aims to transform its alliance with the United States facing up to the trends of the new international order that has developed since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and reinforcing and deepening the bilateral alliance.

As far as the maintenance of alliance is concerned, Japan is a level ahead of us. Japan is worried over if it might be abandoned by the United States. But Japan is not a mere tool of the United States. Japan acts knowing that it can have more space for international activities and raise its voice within the framework of the bilateral alliance. Japan praises the United States in front of others and delivers its requests quietly if it has any. For this reason, trust is accumulated between the two countries. When Japan, whose national strength is 10 times larger than our country, acts this way, South Korea has no reason to abandon its alliance with the United States. If it discards the alliance with the United States, South Korea will hardly be able to avoid being treated coldly by China, North Korea and Japan. The argument for abolishing the alliance is not realistic.

While being cautious of China, Japan chose the United States. Will South Korea opt for China as an alternative? No, it won't. When China does not contend that the country is an alternative to the United States, South Korea does not need to choose China first. Even if South Korea relies on China, there is no guarantee that its security will become solid.

Therefore, we should pursue cooperation with China from many aspects, but China is not an alternative for our security strategy. Standing alone in the international community is even more difficult. Neutrality or self-reliance is a term that sounds good, but its creation and maintenance alike are not easy. Taking a lesson from the example of Japan, South Korea should find a shortcut to maintaining a mature and balanced relationship with the United States. Raising our voice unconditionally and arguing for the difference in opinions will not strengthen South Korea's stance. South Korea, still divided with North Korea, has no reason to distance China either.

South Korea had better deepen social, economic and diplomatic cooperation with China while remaining with the United States for military cooperation.

It will be beneficial to national interests to strengthen the U.S.-South Korea alliance until a framework of stable peace is formed by multilateral security in Northeast Asia.

* The writer is a professor of political science at the Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University. Translation by the JoongAng Daily staff.

by Park Cheol-hee

The main point is that in 2005, the US aims to lobby for the change of Article 9 of the Japanese Peace Constitution. If this is done, the headquarters for the USFK's UN function, the CFC could be moved out of Korea and into Camp Zama in Japan with I Corps returning to fulfill the overhead "administrative" role. Right-leaning Japanese politicians and military planners in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), led by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, want Japan to assume a more assertive (they would say rightful, while critics would say aggressive) role on the world stage and change its low profile in international politics by shedding its strong pacifism enshrined in the post-World War II US-imposed constitution in the future. Washington has urged Tokyo to amend Article 9 and to authorize the right to collective self-defense. (Japan's current official stance is that it has this right, but cannot invoke it under the current constitution.) US military planners clearly want Tokyo to expand the SDF's activities to support US-led operations in Asia and elsewhere in the future.

Japan still cannot fully be involved in US military operations. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution prohibits the use of force as a means of settling international disputes, and the SDF is authorized to fight only if Japan itself is invaded, and then only on Japanese territory or in the surrounding sea and air. For this reason, Japanese troops were deployed to Samawah, a southern Iraqi city, which the Japanese government claims as non-combat zone, strictly on a "humanitarian" mission. The 2003 Special Measures Law stipulates that the SDF can only be sent to areas where hostilities are not under way. To send troops into a combat zone would violate this law.

Article 9 of the constitution, the "war-renouncing" provision, states:

• 1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
• 2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of aggression of the state will not be recognized. (NOTE: For years the Japanese have played the "rename game" of redesignating their destroyers and cruisers with names that indicate coastal defense. In truth, Japan has a full-blown blue water navy that is only missing a carrier to make a carrier battle group.)

(Ref: The Asia Times, Japan to become 'Britain of the Far East' on 24 Feb 2005)

Forces could be relocated to Camp Fuji and the Japanese SDF and USFJ would become the "defense line" against North Korea. The MDS for Japan (Aegis destroyer with Patriot 3) is anticipated to be in place by 2006. The 5th AF that moved to Guam with the 13th AF could return to Yokota to assume the new air component headquarters for the region. According to The Asia Times, Japan to become 'Britain of the Far East' on 24 Feb 2005, "For ordinary Japanese, the issue of the consolidation and reduction of US military bases in Japan, especially in Okinawa, is more important than anything else. The two nations agreed to accelerate consultations based on the objectives of realigning US military forces in Japan, committing themselves to reduce the burden on local communities hosting US forces while maintaining effective deterrence. Still, the relocation of US military units such as those in Okinawa to other local cities and towns could trigger strong opposition from concerned local governments and communities in the coming months." The two countries agreed to look into handing over to Japan US-held base management and air-traffic-control rights in order to expand the joint use of the facilities, including Yokota Air Base in Tokyo. If this new arrangement is realized, the SDF would manage the bases and use them in conjunction with the US military. By reducing the current footprints of US bases, Washington appears to seek those bases being made permanent but less offensive, despite strong anti-base movements such those as in Okinawa. (Ref: The Asia Times, China seethes at US-Japan 'meddling' (24 Feb 2005))

At the same time, the threat of the Chinese invasion could be increased. In Feb 2005, China pushed through anti-cessation law pointed at the Taiwan independence movement. Japan has openly come out to state that the Taiwan Straits are in its strategic interests in backing the US position. Currently the 7th Fleet operating out of Yokosuka are a major deterent to Chinese aggression against Taiwan dating back over 50 years. China looks to the new US-Japan alliance as a threat. First, Beijing considers the revitalized US-Japan military alliance as part of Washington's containment strategy against China. Second, the new defense guidelines extend the alliance's defense perimeter to include the Taiwan Strait. Third, the revitalized alliance allows the Japanese Self-Defense Force to take on additional responsibilities. Beijing is increasingly worried that a more assertive Japan actively involved in the region's security affairs and seeking to be a "normal" power will emerge as a result of the US-Japan accord. (Ref: The Asia Times, China seethes at US-Japan 'meddling' (24 Feb 2005))

The new Japanese defense guidelines and the recent defense white paper in effect give Japan the green light to go beyond the original mandate exclusively of self-defense to a broader collective defense function, therefore providing justification for Japan to intervene in regional security affairs. Japan already has one of the largest defense budgets in the world and has a reasonably sized (given its Peace Constitution) but best-equipped military in the region. In addition, Japan's industrial and technological wherewithal will provide it with ready resources should it decide to become a great military power at short notice, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons. (Ref: The Asia Times,China seethes at US-Japan 'meddling' (24 Feb 2005))

Given Korea's phobia that Japan will again once again become a military power in the region, the US move closer to Japan starts to create problems. The US secretaries of state and defense met with their Japanese counterparts in Washington, DC, at the Security Consultative Committee (more commonly known as the "2+2 meeting") in Feb 2005. The joint statement released after the session on February 19 applauds the cooperation between the two countries, reaffirms the significance of the US-Japan security relationship to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, and articulates a set of common strategic goals for the alliance. The joint declaration also notes Japan's efforts to take a more active role in international security affairs. That was it in a nutshell, but it also meant that the US-Japan were "locking-in" the progress made in the US-Japan solidarity as Prime Minister Koizumi's tenure is drawing to a close. The joint statement laid the foundation upon which Koizumi's successor will have to operate - preventing a potential regression of Japanese security policy following Koizumi's departure. The 2 plus 2 meeting joint statement was to first and foremost, show that the US-Japan alliance continues to evolve towards a global strategic alliance. Second, the joint statement was an effort by both governments to "lock in" the progress that has been made within the alliance to date. Third, the joint statement signaled that Tokyo is consolidating its national-security policy priorities around the US-Japan alliance. (Ref: The Asia Times, Devil in the details of US-Japan pact on 12 Mar 2005)

Meanwhile, Japan's media has saturated the public with the "getting tough" rhetoric, fashioned by its right-wingers and endorsed even by socialists and communists: rhetoric to impose economic sanctions against North Korea (not so easy); to end Japan's official development assistance (ODA) to China; to launch preemptive strikes against North Korea; to identify "enemies" and "threats" (China and North Korea) in its most recent "Defense Outline"; to rearm Japan even with nuclear weapons (see Ayako Doi, "Unforeseen Consequences: Japan's Emerging Nuclear Debate," PacNet Newsletter, #12, March 13, 2003, www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0312.htm); and to blame Asian nations for their displeasure with Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's repeated visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, where the class-A war criminals are enshrined. (Ref: The Asia Times, The fault lines that could shake Asia on 13 Mar 2005)

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North Signals "CONDITIONAL" return to Nuclear Talks Kim Jong-il signaled to Chinese envoy Wang Jiarui that Pyongyang was ready to return conditionally to the six-party talks on 23 Feb, appearing to back away slightly from the North's stunning Feb. 10 declaration that it possessed nuclear weapons and would indefinitely boycott the discussions. Kim Jong Il has effectively presented four conditions for returning to the six-way talks on its nuclear programs, including a demand for a security guarantee from the US. Kim also told a senior PRC official on Feb. 21 that he wants the US to give its reasons for describing the DPRK as one of the world's "outposts of tyranny," provide an assurance that it will negotiate with the DPRK on an equal basis and show by actions that it can be trusted.

On 26 Feb, South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Song Min-soon and his new six-party talks counterpart, U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill, will be joined by Kenichiro Sasae, chief of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Asia-Oceania bureau who arrived in Seoul on 25 Feb for the strategy session. The three men are expected to discuss the results of Wang's meeting with the North's leader, following individual briefings from China.

Though the meeting signals the onset of a tri-party agreement on the North's nuclear stance, there are serious issues pending on how to handle the North. The ROK continues with signals for reapproachment, aid and increased "carrots" for the North. The Japanese are ready to levy sanctions over the abductee issue -- that Kim Jong-il called the DNA tests that proved the returned remains of one of the abductees as not the persons fabrications by the Japanese. The first of the sanctions takes place in March as all ships entering Japanese ports must show proof of insurance to cover oil spills, etc. Only 2.5 percent of the North Korean ships that visited Japanese ports in 2004 possessed such insurance. The US has announced its position to control tyrannies worldwide -- an oblique reference to North Korea -- thus supporting regime change. These are all disparate positions and need to be resolved. In our opinion, the US and Japan are in-sync as the sanctions support the US idea of regime change if the fragile economy of the DPRK collapses. Perhaps wishful thinking, but nevertheless it has been the course the US has chosen for the past four years.

PRC asked Japan to help convince the US to soften its stance over the DPRK in order to bring Pyongyang back to the six-way talks, a move that could put Tokyo in an awkward position. Beijing made the request to Japan following a visit to Pyongyang by Wang Jiarui, head of the PRC Communist Party's International Department, in late Feb. The US ambassador and negotiator Christopher Hill stated "We have a full intention to meet North Korean representatives separately and discuss if it is within the framework of the six-party talks." (NOTE: This a different stance as the US up to this point has been "moderate" -- even in making contact between the DPRK and the US within the framework of six-party talks. "What we mean by a wide-ranging forum of discussions is that it would include the format that North Korea wants," ROK negotiator Song said on KBS radio.)

In the first meeting, the US and Japan stated that North Korea should return to the negotiating table WITHOUT CONDITIONS. The ROK didn't comment. Instead, the ROK announcement was that the three countries agreed that the delivery of fertilizer as humanitarian aid to the North was a ROK perogative, though the ROK stated that it would not do so without a new inter-Korea agreement on the subject. If you read between the lines, there is a big difference between "the ROK said" and "the three countries said." In other words, the ROK simply stated its view and the others did not comment. The ROK has continued with its intent to open the Kaesong industrial area with KEPCO (Korean Electric Power Company) supplying the electricity for the South Korean companies starting operations there in March 2005. The railroad connections between the North and South are to be completed by Dec 2005.

On 15 March, KEPCO will start transferring power after it succeeded in testing the supply of electricity to the complex. The corporation set up 220 power poles in the 25 kilometers between South Korea's Munsan substation and the complex for the electricity supply. Currently, three small and medium sized South Korean companies which have established operations in the complex use electricity from their own generators. KEPCO is to supply 15,000 kilowatts of electricity but plans to increase the power to 100,000 kilowatts by 2007 when 300 more companies are expected to be operating production facilities in the complex. The supply will pave the way for running production lines in the industrial park on a stable basis.

The Kaesong complex, which aims to combine the South's capital and entrepreneurial expertise with the North's cheap labor, is considered the crowning achievement of the June 2000 summit between then South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. Companies in the 28,000-pyeong (92,400-square-meter) pilot complex that began operations late last year are currently running at about 30-percent capacity, largely because of electricity shortages. The state-run Korea Land Corp., which is in charge of the distribution of the complex, is set to distribute 50,000 pyeong and bring more small- and mid-sized firms into the complex within this year. The size of the complex in the first stage of development amounts to 1 million pyeong, with the total size expected to reach 20 million pyeong. South Korean officials hope the Kaesong project will help prod North Korea into opening up to the outside world and lead to an easing of tension over the North's nuclear arms program.

In actuality, the ROK is about to blow its foot off with its continued support of the North. IF the Article 9 constitutional amendment passes in Japan, there will be a immediate move to relocate the CFC functions to Camp Zama with a relocation of the I Corps from Washington state to oversee the combined forces. The UNC functions will remain in Korea as a contingency unit -- and much smaller. Mobility forces can be relocated to Camp Fuji -- and the Marines can relocate out of Okinawa. The combined 5th/13th AF can be reestablished in Japan again. Things would change in a hurry and Korea will see its comfortable economic climate disappear. Investment in Korea will no longer be "safe." Everything will be rearranged...including the power structures.

Currently the ROK must rely almost solely on the US for intelligence. However, Japan has successfully launched a weather satellite that put its spy satellite program back on track. The New York Times ("AFTER FAILURES, SPACE EFFORT IN JAPAN GETS A LIFT", 2005-03-01) reported that a 16-story-high rocket blasted into the tropical night on Saturday, firmly placing Japan back in Asia's space race. The successful launch and deployment of a weather satellite over the Pacific from this remote island 650 miles southwest of Tokyo restored morale to a rocketry program battered by its rival in the PRC. Japan's rocket program is seen increasingly to have military applications. Japan launched its first military spy satellite from here in March 2003. The November 2003 launch that failed was an effort to orbit two more. These spy satellites are intended to give Japan "shutter control," the independent ability to photograph its neighbors, notably the PRC and DPRK, at will and in secret. At one time the ROK had lofty dreams of a space program as well with a launch base in the Cholla provinces in 2003, but that was shelved simply because the realities of budget concerns came to the forefront. In 2005, it was talking of placing a satellite in space with the aid of Russia.

On 28 Feb the conservative Sankei Shimbun reported that the DPRK had told officials in the ROK it was willing to take part in six-party talks on its nuclear arms program in June and offer to suspend the program in hopes of aid and a US pledge not to invade. Pyongyang also said in its message, which was conveyed to the ROK by unofficial routes and then to Japan by Seoul, that it was willing to sign a treaty with the US by October. A Japanese Foreign Ministry official denied the report.

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IS THERE REALLY A NUKE??? US Military Action against North Limited This is a rehash of what we have said all along and the world knows -- but deserves being retold again. Wall Street Journal ("OPTIONS WITH IRAN, NORTH KOREA ARE LIMITED; U.S. MILITARY'S AVAILABLE CHOICES TO CURB SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CARRY HAZARDS", 2005-02-28) reported that an American strike on the DPRK or Iranian nuclear facilities seems far from likely. In both countries, Mr. Bush lacks good military options to eliminate or significantly degrade nuclear ambitions. If the DPRK isn't bluffing, the nuclear weapons and the weapons-grade plutonium could be hidden almost anywhere in the country, making it harder for the US to destroy them. The US also believes that the DPRK has developed a separate, uranium-based effort, but officials say they have no idea where those facilities may be hidden. The US does seem better equipped today than before to respond to a DPRK conventional military attack thanks to precision-guided munitions and better intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, said Thomas Mahnken, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington. Still, he said, the damage to Seoul with conventional artillery cannons would likely be vast if the DPRK attacked, so initiating hostilities "is not an attractive option in the least."

Map of North Korea Missile and Nuclear facilities

Jane’s Digest ("IS NORTH KOREA BLUFFING AGAIN?", 2005-02-28) reported that given the almost complete absence of reliable intelligence and the virtual impossibility of access to the DPRK, any assessment of the 'Hermit Kingdom's' nuclear program is necessarily based on incomplete and unverifiable information. However, there are some points of agreement among Western and ROPK intelligence analysts. The most important fact is that, to date, no nuclear test has been carried out by Pyongyang. As a result, ROK and other international officials stressed that it is still too early to declare that the DPRK is now a nuclear power. They add that the alleged weapons have neither been tested, nor have their existence been confirmed beyond doubt.

However, it was reported in Asahi Shimbun on 27 Feb 2005 that the PRC had dropped its initial doubts and now agrees with the US that the DPRK has a uranium-based nuclear program. The PRC had long questioned the US accusation, saying Washington had not shown conclusive evidence that a uranium program existed. But Beijing in recent months has edged toward the US position. However, soon after the announcement, there were indications that the PRC was vacillating as an official stated that he did NOT believe the DPRK had nuclear weapons.

The ROK continues its skepticism. Agence France-Presse ("‘N. KOREA HAS NO WORKING FACILITY FOR ENRICHED URANIUM?, 2005-02-28) reported that the ROK National Intelligence Service (NIS) told the National Assembly that the DPRK has some components of an atomic program but is unlikely to be able to produce nuclear weapons. The NIS said Pyongyang probably purchased materials in 2000 to produce the prototypes for centrifuges needed for an enriched uranium program that would be the first step towards building a nuclear arsenal. But tight international surveillance had prevented the DPRK from obtaining other key equipment. This stance places it on the opposite side of the table from the US with the PRC skeptics.

Gary Milhollin, the director of the U.S.-based Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, said the statement may simply be a way for North Korea to attract attention. "This statement by North Korea that it has nuclear weapons, and it doesn't want to talk to us anymore, what I think you could say about this is that they are trying to get our attention," he says. "They would like to get money from us, and if they don't, then we have to worry about what they might do next -- and that could include selling nuclear weapons to people we don't like, such as terrorists. That's the concern that we should have at this time."

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MARCH 2005

AWSJ Accuses Seoul of Propping Up Kim Jong-il and Others Join In The Asian Wall Street Journal (AWSJ) said on 11 Mar 2005 that the gap between the U.S. and South Korea over how to deal with the North Korean nuclear threat was growing wider. The AWSJ article, "North Korea Finds Unlikely Ally: Seoul," the conservative paper said that while the U.S. was trying to increase economic pressure on Pyongyang, block nuclear proliferation and reduce the North Korean military threat, South Korea was busy keeping its former enemy afloat with aid and economic cooperation. Currently civic groups have started sending food and other donations to the DPRK. But this is the small time aid, the items needed are tons of fertilizer and food/rice which the South pays for out of a special fund claiming it is for "humanitarian" needs. However, at the same time, the ROK does NOT monitor the distribution of these goods so they may end up for military purposes for all that is known.

While the UN Food Program is scaling back its food distribution because the North will not allow it to monitor the distribution in certain areas, the South continues its humanitarian aid WITHOUT monitors. In fact, the North asked the UN to close its Humanitarian Aid office in Pyongyang -- with no reason given. On 29 Mar 2005, Itar-Tass reported that the DPRK had tightened restrictions on the traveling inside the country for staffers of international humanitarian organizations, a spokesman for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said in Beijing. The government has cut the number of visits that Red Cross officials are allowed to make to North Korean hospitals by 30 percent-50 percent in recent months without any explanation to authorities, said John Sparrow, a Beijing-based spokesman for the agency. Since late 2004, a third to half of the federation's requests for random visits to 2,300 Red Cross-equipped hospitals, routine trips to 120 communities with Red Cross-backed water sanitation projects and checks of disaster preparedness sites have been turned down. Representatives of international organizations have no opportunity now to control how humanitarian aid arriving in the DPRK from abroad is used, which may make donor countries reduce the financing of humanitarian aid or refuse aid altogether. The comments echo reports by other aid groups that they face new restrictions. Donors have warned the Red Cross that if agencies are not given access to monitor how aid is used, "it could have serious consequences to the effect that certain programs will no longer be funded."

The video tape of the summary executions in the North was taken by hidden camera on 1 and 2 March and smuggled out of the DPRK by underground human rights groups. (See Christian Science Monitor on 29 March 2005 for article.) The Christian Science Monitor reported that at the time its release, refugee groups in Seoul were ecstatic. It looked like a human rights slam-dunk: yet in a twist not anticipated by underground groups that carried off the filming, ROK TV authorities have not let the video be broadcast. The only public airing of the tape in Korea came March 25 in a basement room of the Seoul National Assembly Library. However, the video tapes have NOT been released for broadcast by ROK TV authorities though still shots have been seen. Korean execution tapes, purportedly of "middlemen" who help refugees escape to China, are not yet available for viewing by Koreans in the South. The indirect censure adds to frustration among those documenting the gulags and torture in the North.

It also raises anew questions about a five-year policy in Seoul of studiously avoiding acts that might upset Pyongyang, for fear of harming fragile North-South relations. South Korea's ambivalence about a get-tough policy with North Korea may also factor into the mechanics of the six-party talks over the North's recently declared nuclear program. "We have told of many public executions [in the North]. But officials in Seoul always ask us for material evidence," says Pak Sang Huk, an escapee from the North. "Now that we have evidence, they don't want to see it.... The people who brought this tape through China were speechless when they visited KBS [Korean Broadcast Service] studios, and were shunned." Mr. Pak claims those who filmed the executions risked their lives to do so.

Of late, the South has stopped raising the North's abuses in international bodies. In 2003, South Korea withdrew from a UN Geneva process when it required a vote on North Korea's human rights record. In 2004, Seoul abstained from voting. On 7 Apr 2005, the Chosun Ilbo reported that the Seoul government had decided again to abstain from voting on a UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) resolution condemning violations of human rights in the DPRK. The resolution expresses concern about human rights abuses in the DPRK such as concentration camps for political prisoners. It calls on Pyongyang to ratify the Convention Against Torture and guarantee that the UN special rapporteur on human rights in the DPRK is allowed to operate freely.

Humanitarian and Unification groups in the ROK take the position that the fastest way to resolve the worsening tension between South and North Korea amid the North Korean nuclear crisis is through increased exchanges and humanitarian aid.

The Tongil News on 10 Mar showed photos of the trucks loaded with vinyl for "farmers" receiving a sendoff by well-wishers. The ROK NGO activists provided DPRK farmers with vinyl used for rice seedbeds to coincide with the spring planting season. Twelve NGOs, including "the South-North Sharing Campaign," donated about 48.4 million square meters of vinyl for seedbeds to grow rice seedlings in the impoverished DPRK. Another photo showed ministers at the port blessing the humanitarian goods headed north.

Yonhap news on 22 Mar 2005 reported that the ROK's two umbrella labor groups will deliver 200 tons of free fertilizer to the DPRK on Wednesday, officials said Tuesday. The aid will be shipped in eight 25-ton trucks to the DPRK's Mount Geumgang resort. A 16-member delegation from the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) will accompany them, officials said.

Later on 25 Mar it was reported that a Christian student group sent 120 sheep and hay via ship to North Korea as aid. On 29 Mar 2005, Yonhap news reported that four opposition legislators left for the DPRK to support an aid project by a ROK civic group. Representatives Lee Jae-oh, Kim Moon-soo, Bae Il-do and Kim Ae-sil of main opposition Grand National Party are on a three-day visit to the DPRK to support the project that will provide DPRK homes with some 50,000 heaters before the end of next year.

The ROK stated on 14 Mar that they were going to import 40 tons of North Korean chicken after the sites passed South Korean health standards. The chicken was to be tested and released, but the shipments were halted on 16 Mar after a North Korean defector stated that there had been outbreaks of Avian Flu in the North. South Korea was first hit by bird flu in December 2003, suffering serious damage to its poultry industry. Late last year, it saw another, less deadly bout at a duck farm in Gwangju before taking swift emergency measures. On 28 Mar 2005, the Wall Street Journal reported that the DPRK acknowledged for the first time an outbreak of bird flu at poultry farms near its capital, in a sign that the deadly avian virus endemic in Southeast Asia could be greatly expanding its geographic reach. Pyongyang's official news agency reported Sunday that hundreds of thousands of chickens had been destroyed in an effort to curb the spread of the disease, which had killed birds at "a few chicken farms." The Korea Central News Agency report also said that no people were known to have been infected with the virus. On 28 Mar 2005, the BBC News reported that the ROK has said it is ready to help the DPRK combat bird flu, after the DPRK publicly admitted on Sunday that it was fighting the virus. Pyongyang has not asked Seoul for assistance, but a ROK official said the official announcement appeared to indicate the DPRK would accept aid. "North Korea, plagued by food shortages, has struggled to modernise and build facilities for the breeding and processing of chicken, a main source of animal protein," Kwon Tae-jin, an expert on DPRK agriculture based in Seoul, told the ROK Munhwa Ilbo newspaper. On 29 Mar the Donga Ilbo reported that the DPRK had slaughtered around 10 million chickens nurtured in the Pyongyang region after the outbreak of bird flu in the area's chicken farms. About 18.73 million chickens are raised all across the country. The Joongang Ilbo on 29 Mar reported that ROK intelligence sources said yesterday that the DPRK was apparently afraid of the spread of bird flu to top officials when it canceled an annual meeting of its highest legislative body scheduled to take place on March 9. Japan and Hong Kong have stopped the import of live birds from the DPRK until the outbreak is contained.

The AWSJ said Seoul was providing aid to the North because it believed that if the economically destitute and heavily armed North Korean regime were to collapse, the economic and political costs for South Korea would be enormous. It said most South Korean officials were opposed to measures that could destabilize Kim Jong-il's regime. This is true as in the 1990s, the Koreans were accusing the Americans of stalling the process, but when they found out that it could become a reality, they started to propose a ten-year "phase-in" period for unification. The South fears the collapse of the North will release a flood of North Koreans over the border into the South. Much like the American border with Mexico, only a thousand times worse.

The paper said in a situation where military action was unrealistic, South Korea's policy of reconciliation tied Washington's hands. It said Pyongyang's two patrons, Seoul and Beijing, were hesitant to even consider economic sanctions out of fear of a North Korean collapse. In fairness, it should be said that Bejing has used its oil as a leverage to coerce the North into attending the talks -- and has moved troops to the border to attempt to stem the massive flow of North Koreans across the border.

The ASWJ said friction between Seoul and Washington was particularly intense over the joint North-South Kaesong Industrial Project. In the first stage of the project alone, 300 Korean companies were scheduled to employ 75,000 North Korean laborers and invest US$9.6 billion over nine years. The first of the companies has started operations in 2005. Along with international aid and trade, this would greatly ease North Korea's economic difficulties. The paper quoted Institute for International Economics senior fellow Marcus Noland as saying US$1-2 billion in funds a year was sufficient to keep the North Korean regime afloat.

What is frightening is that the ROK has opened its "copyright" of "Made in Korea" to be applicable to North Korean goods manufactured in Kaesong -- or the use of "Made in Korea (Gaesong)." This will allow the North to gain a foothold in receiving much needed foreign capital infusions. The US is also very concerned of the transfer of "dual-use" technology to the North and held heated talks with the South over this issue. Though there was an agreement, the impression was that it was not one that was in full agreement -- and rather one the US is taking a wait-and-see attitude for the first sign that the South violates its treaty responsibilities. The South is footing the bill for providing electricity to the Kaesong area through KEPCO -- and the railroad to the Kaesong area is expected to be in full operation by December 2005. (NOTE: Yonhap ("SOUTH KOREA TO EASE RESTRICTIONS ON CROSS-BORDER TRAFFIC", 2005-03-23) reported that the ROK will ease regulations on inter-Korean trade and cross-border traffic as the two Koreas move towards greater economic cooperation, the Unification Ministry said Wednesday (23 March). Under the new regulations, which are expected to go into effect next week, the ROK will abolish military inspections for its vehicles crossing over to the DPRK border town of Kaesong. In addition, ROK citizens will be allowed to visit the Kaesong industrial park simply by undergoing inspections at immigration and the quarantine offices. The ROK also plans to simplify the procedures for bringing goods produced in the DPRK's industrial park across the border, the officials said.)

On 13 March, the ROK stated that it would ease regulations on organizations that provide humanitarian assistance in North Korea. The Unification Ministry said would remove a guideline mandating at least one year of consistent dealings or contact with North Korea before an aid body can apply for a government-issued license. The license that designates an organization as a "North Korea support group" entitles the holder to receive assistance from a government fund set aside to facilitate South-North cooperation. Another rule demanding verification of the source of the funding to conduct humanitarian programs in North Korea will also be abolished. (NOTE: In other words, if you wanted to aid North Korea as the US and Japan tighten the noose on transactions with the North, the ROK won't check as is mandated by the National Security Law -- but that just got bypassed.) "The scrapping of the 'one-year' clause should allow more groups to take part in helping North Korea," said a government policy maker. He added that the Unification Ministry will move to ease further restrictions hindering humanitarian assistance from moving across the border. Seoul will work to ensure the aid reaches those most in need, and that humanitarian efforts provide a steady and consistent flow of relief, according to government authorities. (NOTE: We wonder how since there is no mechanism and the ROK government refuses to push the matter.)

Then on 29 Mar 2005, Asia Pulse/Yonhap News reported that the ROK and DPRK are working to set up another joint industrial complex, this time in Pyongyang and for small- and medium-sized companies, a business association in Seoul said. "We have forged an agreement with representatives from the North to push for the construction of an industrial complex in Pyongyang," said Kim Young-il, who heads an inter-Korean business investment association. "The North will provide the site, labor, and raw materials, while the South will supply capital, technology and other facilities." This is the same proposal that the ROK had made when it first started the idea of industrial free economic zones. At that time the DPRK offered an area to the north that was totally unsuitable because of inaccessibility, lack of infrastructure, and other problems. The ROK business conglomerates proposed a site near Pyongyang instead. The DPRK refused and instead launched its own version of a free autonomous economic zone on the border with China and appointed a flamboyant Chinese (of Dutch nationality) entrepenuer as the head. However, the zone idea soon turned into a fiasco where the entrepenuer was imprisoned by China for embezzlement and fraud. Nothing has mentioned of this zone since. This may be simply a pipe dream as the DPRK still remains fearful of the "contamination" of foreign elements -- especially so near to its center of power.

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Congressman slap at Korea; Korea slap at Congressman Chosun Ilbo ran a story on the "U.S. Congress Catches South Korea Chill." In it the story stated that "The chairman of the U.S. House International Relations Committee said Thursday South Korea must make up its mind who the enemy is before it can expect U.S. help in an emergency. Rep. Henry Hyde, during a House hearing on the North Korean nuclear issue, was referring to the omission of the term "main enemy" for North Korea in the 2004 Korean Ministry of Defense white paper despite the fact that continued hostility from the North was a major basis of the Korea-U.S. alliance. Hyde said the white paper nonetheless counted on some 690,000 U.S. soldiers being deployed to Korea in the event of a conflict.

But the remark has been read in a much broader context as indicating "Washington's discontent over Seoul's handling of the North Korea issue has made its way into the U.S. Congress." Hyde said it was only appropriate to ask for a clear definition of who South Koreas enemy is if it wants U.S. help. The new chillier atmosphere was palpable when both houses of the U.S. Congress unanimously passed the North Korea Human Rights Act late last year despite opposition in South Korea. It has been admitted that Korea and the U.S. were experiencing difficulty over the disappearance of the "main enemy" concept.

The article stated, "Hyde's statement reflects what many within the U.S. Congress have been silently thinking. Both Washington and Seoul have been stressing the solid nature of the alliance through summits and discussions between foreign ministers, but congressional conservatives - and especially Korea experts with civilian think tanks - say fundamental disagreements lie just below the surface."

The article stated, "Even though the U.S. Congress, like the National Assembly, is divided into hawks and doves, conservatives and progressives, it is no exaggeration that the entire U.S. legislature has fallen in with the hard line when it comes to North Korea's nuclear program. Hydes comments are emblematic of the dissatisfaction with Seoul spreading in Washington as a sense of crisis over North Korea deepens."

In other words, the US Congress conservatives are not happy that the ROK wants to pursue reapproachment with the North while at the same time retaining the US troops in the ROK. However, at the same time the ROK wants these troops to NOT be used as part of a regional force. He said Seoul was sending mixed signals in security matters and thereby making the North Korea issue more difficult.

Visiting politicians have stated that the mood of the U.S. Congress had gotten very hardline after Pyongyang's Feb. 10 declaration that it has nuclear arms. Despite the political correct statements of praise for the Iraq support and kudos on the US-ROK alliance, in a roundabout way, U.S. lawmakers and government officials have been complaining about Seoul's policy of engagement with Pyongyang. There is concern about South Korean fertilizer aid to the North and intra-Korean economic cooperation continuing regardless of the nuclear crisis.

In response to Rep. Hyde's statements of the ROK needing to designate its "main enemy," Unification Minister Chung Dong-young on on 14 Mar 2005 dismissed as "inappropriate" a taunt from a U.S. lawmaker that Korea should make up its mind who the enemy is before it can rely on U.S. help. According to the Chosun Ilbo Chung said Northeast Asia was trying to move from hostile confrontation to coexistence, reconciliation and cooperation and Hyde's confrontational thinking was not helpful in resolving problems. The statements was made in Chung's capacity as chairman of the National Security Council and was likely to cause tremors in the Korea-U.S. relationship. In effect, Chung slapped Hyde across the mouth in his contemptuous remark.

As Unification Minister, Chung said Seoul would "consider several situations and independently decide how to proceed with aid" to the North. In other words, the Seoul government would proceed with reapproachment -- a signal that there may be discord ahead in the "unified stance" of the US/Korea/Japan in dealing with North Korea. In effect, Chung said that Korea will do whatever Korea thinks best -- and the US opinion is not needed.

Unfortunately the game is not over and President Roh has increased the ante. The relationship between the US and Korea is at the crossroads -- and Roh and his Unification Minister (who views himself as a potential Presidential candidate and thus must make the appropriate Presidential-like posturing). Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Ban is running around like crazy trying to mend fences.

According to the article, "Chung retorted that to call for Korea to first designate an enemy before it receives U.S. help is a misunderstanding of the object and spirit of the alliance. He said no nation in the world, the U.S. included, designates enemies in its defense ministry white papers. He added there was no change in Seoul's position that the U.S. is an ally and North Korea an ethnic brother." This should cause some Americans in power to start to reevaluate their support of the ROK -- because Chung was simply playing two sides against the middle. (NOTE: We beg to differ with the concept that no nation has designated a specific nation as its main enemy as Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union, "The Evil Empire." "Glasnost" and Gorbechov changed that image of Russia as the MAIN enemy. The Cold War was based on two designated enemies, the Russians facing Europe and NATO -- while China had been flagged as a target ever since it became a nuclear power with the aid of the Russians. Only after Nixon did tensions ease.)

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US-Korea relations at Crossroads Richard Halloran is a writer we respect highly. He was one of the few who flagged the anti-American campaign in Korea in 2002 while the respect of the world's journalists chose to look the other way. Richard Halloran also was the first to "pop the cork" on the potential reorganization of the USFK and PACAF. At the time, the USFK denied his article was based on fact and claimed it was speculation. However, the gist of the reorganization DID COME TRUE -- the US pulled out a significant amount of troops and attempted to move the "administrative function" of the USFK to Camp Zama in Japan. It was only when the Japanese whipped out the Peace Constitution that the US backed off. However, it does not mean that it is over -- just delayed. Richard Halloran has been "on center" more times than not -- and the USFK really doesn't like his prognostications (forecasts of the future of the USFK). The point is that Korea must decide -- looking forward in decades and not short term -- whether it wants to have China or the US as its ally.

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) senior fellow Derek J. Mitchell said that while the alliance has ostensibly strengthened due to the deployment of Korean troops to Iraq, there were doubts about its long-term and strategic perspective. He said differences in perception over the North Korean threat had shaken the very raison d'etre of the alliance, and Seoul's continued support of and assistance to Pyongyang "confused" Washington. The following is an article by him in the Washington Times on 14 Mar 2005.

U.S.-Korea relations at crossroad

By Richard Halloran
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

HONOLULU -- South Korea is fast approaching a critical decision as to whether to try to revive its troubled alliance with the United States or dissolve their joint security treaty, expel American forces from the peninsula and seek an alliance with China.

At a gathering of South Korean and American scholars and officials, all experienced in U.S.-South Korea matters, there was general agreement that the future of the alliance was open to question, but disagreement on whether it was on the verge of dissolving. Some said it was ready to wither and die, while others contended that the alliance had weathered equally serious storms.

Adm. Thomas Fargo, former commander of U.S. forces in Asia and the Pacific, agreed before the conference that South Korea would need to make a decision regarding the alliance soon. In an interview just before he retired, Adm. Fargo said: "Of course, we watch these things, just as we watched Japan some years ago go through a similar debate. The way it turned out is what you see today."

He was referring to the increasingly strong alliance between Tokyo and Washington.

The Japanese, he said, "decided it was clearly in their interest to have that kind of relationship with us. My instinct is that is the way this [debate in Korea] will come out, too."

Others are not so sure.

A year ago, Lee Chung-min, a scholar at Yonsei University in Seoul, articulated the issue: "The question for South Korea in the beginning of the 21st century is whether it should strive to prolong, strengthen and modernize its maritime alliance with the United States or strive to seek 'strategic accommodation' with its traditional, pre-20th-century patron, China."

South Korea, he said, must take "a long and hard look at its core security options and attendant consequences for at least the next two or three decades."

In the conference here, a Korean scholar, who could not be identified under the rules of the meeting in order to encourage candor, posed the same question: "Who constitutes South Korea's natural ally -- a democratic America or an Asian China?"

In arguing that the alliance was in danger of collapsing, speakers variously pointed to large anti-American demonstrations, the anti-American rhetoric of President Roh Moo-hyun and comments by South Korean leaders that their country might not fight alongside Americans to repel a North Korean attack.

Similarly, when the United States asked South Korea to send 12,500 troops to Iraq to support the counterinsurgency there, President Roh grudgingly sent 3,500. Several speakers said Mr. Roh ignored the advice of South Korea's military leaders on this and other issues.

Other speakers mentioned polls showing that South Koreans consider the United States to be more of a threat than North Korea, contentions that the division of Korea into North and South was the fault of Washington and a rash of articles in the Korean press critical of American policies.

One Korean participant offered perhaps the most incisive assessment of his country's attitude: "South Koreans fight over what they hate, not over what they stand for."

That seems to be particularly true of the younger generation in South Korea, which was portrayed at the conference as anti-government, anti-business, anti-status quo and especially anti-American.

The main positive sentiment among young Koreans appeared to be pro-North Korea and to advocate policies that would accommodate Pyongyang. Young Koreans also were said to be pro-China, but with reservations, because of ancient Chinese claims to parts of Korean territory.

One American participant suggested that the United States should disengage itself from the Korean Peninsula because of North Korean refusal to give up nuclear ambitions and South Korean anti-Americanism. Seoul and Pyongyang then could settle their disputes between themselves.

No South Korean government official or scholar objected. The Americans, however, were divided. Some contended that withdrawal was a "nutty" idea that would encourage North Korea to subvert South Korea and cause political turmoil as Asians saw the United States abandoning them.

Other American participants thought it was a good idea. One said there was "no reason to keep American forces in Korea," while South Korea is able to defend itself and those troops are needed elsewhere. Suggesting that the Americans in South Korea are being held hostage, he concluded: "Let my people go."

The Joongang Ilbo on 23 Mar 2005 reported that on her return from an eight-day trip to the US, Park Geun-hye, chairwoman of Grand National Party, told reporters that relations between the ROK and the US were far worse than Koreans imagine they are. "I met various politicians," said Ms. Park. "If the mistrust that prevails among the politicians spreads to the general public of the United States, bilateral ties between the two countries will face greater problems."

But the Chosun Ilbo on 23 Mar 2005 reported that the ROK's Ambassador to the US Hong Seok-hyun said that GNP chairwoman Park Geun-hye's comments on the DPRK nuclear dispute during her recent US visit left Americans confused. Hong said Park's call for the US to make the DPRK "a bold offer" and deploy a special envoy to the DPRK to resolve the dispute seemed to have left US figures baffled at how little the DPRK policies of the ROK's opposition party differ from those of the government. But he added Park's comments highlighted the importance of bipartisan diplomacy. (NOTE: This is politics to downplay the significance of Park's visit -- which is seen as a prelude to her opening a future bid for the Presidency seat.)

To add more garbage to the game, the Korea Times on 23 Mar 2005 reported that in what may be an apparent shift in policy, President Roh Moo-hyun indicated that the nation would no longer be locked into its alliance with the US and Japan. Roh was seeking to maintain closer relations with the PRC instead of sticking to the trilateral alliance in a bid to more efficiently cope with the changing security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula, government sources said. "We will play a `balancing role' to help ensure peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia and on the Korean Peninsula," Roh said in his speech delivered at a commencement ceremony of the Korea Third Military Academy. The significance is that this statement undermines the Japan-US-ROK agreement that the three countries would act in concert in dealings with the DPRK. The US-Japan alliance is being solidified, but the ROK is pursuing its own path of support for its "ethnic brother" -- while paying lip service to its military alliance with the US. The impacts in the US Congress will be significant over Roh's choice of alliances dealing with the DPRK. (NOTE: The ROK is basing its alliance viewpoint on the fact that all think-tanks agree that the PRC is the natural partner for the ROK in the next twenty years in terms of economic development. However, business think tanks also see China as Korea's super business rival in the future.)

Then on 23 Mar 2005, President Roh President Roh Moo-hyun said in an open letter on the Cheong Wa Dae website, “We can no longer overlook Japan’s intention to justify the history of colonial rule and to enhance hegemony again.” He also stressed, “I will not leave the problem in a question and eradicate it this time, no matter how difficult.” After insulting Koizumi on his Yasukuni Shrine visits and stirring the pot on the Tokdo Issue in his letter, he went on to state, "We cannot help regarding these actions as Japanese because all these things are occurring with the support of the Japanese government, which has closed its eyes on this issue. They are not isolated incidents by mere local governments or irrational nationalists. Such attitudes are nothing but the nullification of apologies and self-examinations done by Japan in the past."

President Roh mentioned three countermeasures: "a strident diplomatic response to ask for a correction from the Japanese government; to call on Japan to regain credit in the international community as a firm peaceful nation by appealing to the international community; and to persuade the Japanese public." At the Foreign Ministry, officials complained that Mr. Roh did not consult with them before verbally attacking Japan. "It is risky for the president by himself to judge diplomatic affairs," one ministry official said. "It is not domestic politics." Other officials said moreover that Mr. Roh did not consult Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon or National Security Council chief Chung Dong-young when he prepared for his speech.

The letter was from a speech made at Independence Hall located in Cheonan, South Chungcheong Province, on February 27 to mark the March 1st Independence Movement day. Roh's remarks reflect how he perceives the current Northeast Asian situation as being similar to the fierce competition among world powers at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. According to a Cheong Wa Dae official, Roh sees the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance geared to the recent changes in the U.S. world policy and Japan`s rise as a leading nation to be unusual. Roh views Japan`s rise as likely and inevitably to be followed by a hegemonic competition between China and Japan in Northeast Asia. Thus, situation similar to what took place a century ago could replay itself and could have a grave influence over the Korean Peninsula.

SITE NOTE: The following is from the Cheong Wa Dae site entitled "A Message to the Nation Concerning Korea-Japan Relations" dated 23 March.

The document is listed as an "Unofficial translation." As in the past, the "translations" on this website at times are "edited" later to include statements or change statements that were embarassing. A good example is the the remarks made during the March 2003 National Assembly speech over the Iraq Troop Deployment was made crying how he was forced to send troops to Iraq and only did it to protect Korea -- meaning the US blackmailed him. In the speech on the Cheong Wa Dae site later, these references were "translated" out of the text. This appears to be the same case as the Korean media translations of statements and what appears below are slightly different. Though most of the comments remain -- the "sting" of the comments are toned down. (Compare the Korean media statements above with the translations below.) The translations appearing in the Japanese media contain the "sting" of the comments which have insulted many Japanese politicians and the populace.

My fellow Koreans,

I am fully aware of your anger as I have been reading and watching various media reports. Besides, I share the frustration weighing heavily upon the hearts of many of you who have remained silent.

I am releasing this message to the nation to help ease the indignation and heavy feelings that Korean citizens must have.

What you are frustrated with may be that it is hard to predict a happy ending despite your great indignation and protests. I know that when the Government reacted tepidly or seemed to have generated few results after taking tough responses, the Korean people swallowed their anger, knowing that there was no really effective means by which to carry through their will.

You may feel the same way about the Government’s reaction this time as you did before—maybe a little bit better, but still frustrated because you think it would be difficult to expect any satisfactory outcome from the current issue.

My fellow Koreans,

It will be different this time, however. The Government will handle this issue in a proper manner. Of course, the Government will not take a hard-line stance emotionally. It will have a strategy to cope with the issue, carefully but actively. It will not back down in the middle of the process. It will look far and act steadily.

Citizens,

Japan is proceeding with lively discussions about rearmament, after laying the legal foundation for overseas deployment of the Self-defense Forces. All of this reminds us of our painful past and causes us anguish about the future.

When Japan offered apologies in the past, we accepted them and pledged a partnership; at that time we did so because we thought it might be hard for the Japanese people to understand us if we denied them recognition of their country as an ordinary nation state. Based on such a judgment, we have held our tongues, repressing our worries—all for the sake of the future of Korea-Japan relations.

Given that an apology presupposes sincere reflection and corresponding actions, Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the Shinto shrine undermine the sincerity of reflection and apologies made by former Japanese leaders.

Nevertheless, the Korean Government went no further than implicitly urging him to refrain from the visits, without raising any direct diplomatic issue or taking countermeasures. That was indeed for the sake of a forward-looking bilateral relationship, which Japanese leaders had always urged repeatedly. However, we have come to the point where we can no longer overlook the situation in silence.

The Russo-Japanese War was not a conflict between the two countries over territory, as the name implies, but one of aggression into the Korean Peninsula that Japan started for the complete dominance of Korea. In fact, a victorious Japan immediately stripped Korea of its diplomatic authority and began de facto colonial rule.

During the war, Japan incorporated Dokdo island into its own territory. Indeed, it robbed us of Dokdo with military might. Japan’s Shimane Prefecture declared so-called “Takeshima Day” on February 22, the very day when Japan incorporated Dokdo into its territory 100 years ago. That is an act justifying its invasion and denying Korea’s independence.

The same goes with the textbook issue. In the past, when distorted textbooks were adopted by only a few Japanese schools, we placed high expectations on the conscience of Japan and had an optimistic outlook for the future of Northeast Asia. But now, those distorted textbooks are about to be revived. That, too, is an attempt to justify Japan’s history of aggression.

We cannot help but regard these acts as those of the Japanese nation because they are not simply committed by a local government or a group of thoughtless ultra-nationalists; they are being done with implicit support from the country’s ruling group and the central government. These acts nullify all the reflection and apologies Japan has so far made.

Now, the Korean Government has no choice but to respond sternly. We can no longer stand by and watch Japan’s attempts to justify its history of aggression and occupation and its intention to achieve hegemony again, because this is a matter that will determine the future of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia.

It is true that such acts by Japan do not correspond with the intention of the majority of the Japanese people. But, things could change any time if Japan keeps distorting history, instigated by its political leaders.

Fellow citizens,

The Government will act resolutely. It is true that even though the Government had something to say and arguments to make, it has so far been biting its tongue, leaving them in the hands of nongovernmental organizations or the victims of Japan’s colonial rule.

Neither did the Government listen carefully to the painful outcries from the victims nor offered proper help to them even when they were hitting the streets struggling to find the truth. It must have refrained from doing so in consideration of the diplomatic burden or possible impact on the economy caused by an inter-governmental conflict. More than anything else, however, it must have exercised self-restraint for the sake of a forward-looking Korea-Japan relationship.

But what came back to us in return is Japan’s behavior that does not seem to show any consideration for the future. Now, some people are asking if the Korean Government’s inaction has led Japan to become so inconsiderate. We cannot let that happen. From now on, the Government will do everything it can.

First of all, the Government will take resolute diplomatic action. The core of our diplomatic responses will be to sternly demand that the Japanese Government correct the wrongs. It is doubtful that the Japanese Government will make a sincere response. But we will not stop exerting our claim until Japan says what we deserve to hear.

The next thing is to make our case to the international community. It is a reality that international order is basically founded on power and that national interest comes first in international relations. However, the international community is progressing step by step toward emphasizing universal values and order that all members should respect. If Japan wants to play a role beyond that of an ordinary nation and become a leader in Asia and the world, it must behave in accordance with the just causes learned from history and regain the trust of the international community as an indisputable peace-loving nation

The international community is also obligated to urge Japan to behave in accordance with the conscience of humanity and the norms of international society. We will try to persuade the international community to never forget those norms.

More important than anything else is to persuade the Japanese people. In order for the issues to be solved ultimately, it is essential for them to face history as it was and understand correctly what their country needs to do for the future of the two countries and Northeast Asia. Only then can the Japanese Government’s policy take the right direction.

These tasks will not be easy to achieve. It is not only a tough but also uncomfortable thing to try to find fault with and point fingers at others. The two countries may confront each other more often than they did. It could also be very embarrassing to quarrel with each for the whole world to see.

There could probably be a tough diplomatic war(conflict). And that may adversely affect exchanges in economic, social, cultural and various other sectors, especially causing concern about possible economic difficulties.

But we do not have to worry too much about it. I believe that we are capable of enduring a great many difficulties. And we must be determined to bear the hardship on our shoulders if we have to for the sake of our nation. But I will try to manage the situation judiciously so as to prevent unbearably difficult burdens.

Fellow citizens,

No matter what difficulties I may face, I will not back off or obscure the issue, but will continue to deal with the problem until I see a result the Korean people find acceptable. This time, I will never fail to resolve this problem at its core. I will ask for your help, when the going gets tough. I will listen to your voices whenever new things come up.

Now, I would like to ask you to keep several things in mind as I report my determination to you.

First, we must never condone the aggressive intent of some Japanese ultra-nationalists, but this does not mean that we should distrust or antagonize the entire Japanese people. We cannot avoid the fact that we are neighbors. If the people of the two countries harbor distrust and hatred against each other, we would not be able to avoid another enormous misfortune.

Second, I ask you to keep calm and respond with composure. Act sternly, but persuade with reason and dignity. There may be times when there are unpleasant emotions expressed, but never lose control of your emotions. This is not a fight that requires physical power. If we fail to maintain our good cause properly, we are likely to be counterattacked. Please refrain from provoking or insulting the Japanese people.

Third, I ask you to have perseverance and patience. If this is to be called a fight, this fight will not be over in just a day or two. It will be an endurance game. Be determined to endure any difficulties but be wise and patient enough to minimize the consumption of your energy so that it lasts long.

Fourth, look far and act strategically. Judge with prudence. Speak and act slowly. Do not overreact over minor developments or voice too many opinions. I am a bit concerned if we have spoken too much and acted too much.

My fellow Koreans,

Our claim is based on a great, just cause from history. We have never made outrageous demands. Nor have we demanded that Japan make a new apology. We are just asking Japan to correct the wrongs that nullify even the insufficient apologies some Japanese have made. And we are simply calling on the country to recognize the truth about issues that have not been addressed so far and to take proper measures.

I firmly believe that justice will prevail in the end. I will handle this issue with conviction, with strategies and in a proper manner. I will never let you down.

I ask you to have faith in me and support me. Do not lose courage and self-confidence. Our calls will surely be answered by a just history.

On March 24, the Japanese government showed a wait-and-see attitude without making any official comments on Roh’s message. Despite Roh’s direct criticism of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi for paying homage to war criminals, Koizumi is provokingly calm, requesting cool-headed approaches from both sides. Instead, lower-echelon officials are venting their discontent. The reaction in Japan from the government was that Roh "meant the letter for internal publication" as it was an internet message -- not a formal press release or news release through other government sources. Some say that Roh as a leader of his country is "easily swayed by the public" meaning that he is not much of a leader. Koizumi said that Japan will react with calm. However, many Japanese politicians were incensed. Some Japanese politicians and government officials did not hide their anger at Roh's remarks. Some of them likened the remarks to a statement from North Korea, saying the speech contained a lot of ``emotional expressions.’’ Democratic Party lawmaker Gen Nakatani (former director general of the Japanese Defense Agency) criticized President Roh’s message, saying that the president’s concern regarding the Japan`s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and its rearmament is hard to understand because the SDF will not use military force overseas.” Shingo Nishimura, an opposition lawmaker, described Roh's statement as something that puts the two countries' relations ``in a ditch.’’ He said North Korea will benefit if the Seoul-Tokyo dispute continues. The Japanese press noted that the letter is full of language no diplomat would have used, and concluded, "It is not the Foreign Ministry but the National Security Council that briefs President Roh about the state of Korea-Japan relations." For now the official Japanese government stance is to show that Japan behaves in a civilized manner -- meaning that the ROK is behaving in an (...you draw your own conclusions).

Roh in trying to extract the foot from his mouth from the flap said on 24 March, ""Relationships between countries have their ups and downs. It is important to correspond with firm principles while actively trying to continue with economic and cultural exchanges." He added, "Some media outlets are urging extreme measures, such as summoning the Japanese ambassador or terminating the interchanges between the two heads from the countries, but that will not be our response," Roh said. "Cultural exchanges and expressions of opinion should be approached from separated perspectives. I do not think Japan will reject this approach." Let's see. He pokes Japan in the eye in an emotional outburst over territorial disputes and history, then I say it's "an expression of opinion" so its alright. Then Roh says it's ok to calmly continue with cultural exchanges after insulting the Japanese people. The Japanese didn't see it that way.

On the history text book issue, the ROK said it would take a "measured approach" -- not a "line-by-line" approach and "lobby" for limiting the textbooks distribution in Japan. On the territorial issue, the ROK still refuses to address any form of international arbitration. The matter can only be sent to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) if BOTH nations agree. The Japanese asked for this in 1954 and the Korean media fears that it will again. Photo op sessions of political leaders on the islet hit the media as a proclamation that Tokdo was Korean territory. Korean scholars are being asked to provide research and historical precedents on the issue instead of emotional outbursts.

However, the Donga Ilbo on reported that Japanese education minister Nariaki Nakayama said on March 29 that Dokdo Island and the Senkaku Islands should be described as Japanese territory in "Teaching Methods," which provides standards for writing textbooks, according to the Kyoto news agency. Nakayama insisted that "the existing teaching methods do not cover what territories belong to Japan. The revised method should not fail to include that point," in a meeting of the Council for Culture, Education, and Science held on the same day. Instead of dying down, the controversy took a step up. In response, President Roh stated the Tokdo issue was one of "sovereignty."

On the occasion of the “Korea-Japan Friendship Year 2005,” the Japanese Embassy in Seoul had contacted concerned Japanese parties and were worried that several cultural and sporting events between the two nations would not be held. The plan for the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between South Korea and Japan, supposed to be completed within the year, would not make progress either. They also talked about possibility that the Korean “wave” in Japan might rapidly subside.

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June Deadline for 6-way Nuclear Talks? Reuters on 23 Mar 2005 reported that the US had set a de facto deadline of late June for the DPRK to return to six-party talks on ending its nuclear arms program "Obviously, one of the options that the United States has in mind beyond that is to refer the matter to the U.N. Security Council," the source added. Rice gave her strongest hint yet on Monday that Washington might resort to sanctions against the DPRK, telling a news conference in Beijing that it would have to consider other means if Pyongyang continued to prevaricate over the talks.

However, President Bush said no deadline has been set to conclude the talks have failed on 23 Mar 2005. "We didn't set deadlines," Mr. Bush said. "What we said is what we've said to North Korea, if you want to ? if you want the way forward, if you want to be accepted by the world, if you want not to be isolated, get rid of your weapons programs."

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APRIL 2005

DPRK Agree In Principle to Resume Nuke Talks The Korea Times reported on 4 Apr that a high-level DPRK official visiting the PRC showed Pyongyang's "strong will" to return to the six-party talks on its nuclear weapons program, while asking for a "face-saving exit" from the other nations in the disarmament talks, diplomatic sources said. First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju and four other DPRK officials was said to be on a secretive visit to Beijing since in early April to discuss ways to reopen the stalled negotiation as soon as possible with senior PRC officials and have agreed "in principle" to the restart of six-party nuclear disarmament talks. The International Herald Tribune on 4 Apr reported that the DPRK's Foreign Ministry has requested that talks to end its nuclear weapons program be transformed into regional disarmament negotiations that also address US deployments in Northeast Asia. The DPRK said a US buildup in the region was a threat to its survival and had prompted it to develop nuclear weapons. An undentified ministry spokesman said, "Now that the DPRK has become a full-fledged nuclear weapons state, the six-party talks should be disarmament talks where the participating countries negotiate the issue on an equal footing."

In response to the DPRK attempt to change the talks to "disarmament talks," the US rejected off-hand. It holds that the North must give up its nuclear weapons. It holds firm to its statement that the North is an "outpost of tyranny" which the DPRK protested in the UN.

ROK Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon on on 3 Apr held out little hope for the success of six-party talks on the DPRK's nuclear program after the DPRK said the talks must deal with the disarmament of all participants. If the six-party talks collapse as Ban expects, the US is likely to take the dispute to the UN Security Council immediately.

The DPRK said the Japanese government should not be a part of the talks because of what it called Japan's "cunning and vulgar" intention to exploit the process for its self-interest. "Japan's participation in the six-party talks only complicates the problem more and leads to a failure of coming to a resolution," the DPRK's state-run Minju Joson newspaper said in a commentary. The move is in response to the sanctions that the Japanese are quietly imposing in the form of insurance on DPRK ships. The Joongang Ilbo on 4 Apr reported that nearly 400 DPRK-registered freighters arrive here on the east coast of southern Honshu island every year, delivering crabs in exchange for Japanese bicycles and refrigerators. But with the February 2005 ship insurance law, port authorities expect the amount of DPRK goods imported this year will drop to a quarter of last year's amount because only 2.5 percent of the DPRK ships are insured.

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N. Korea Conducted 140 Nuclear Detonation Tests: Expert Ambassador Christopher Hill stated on 7 Apr that the US had "strong" evidence that the North sold fissionable materials to Libya through an "arms dealer" in Pakistan. Officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency have said that Libya obtained nuclear material from Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. The U.N. agency said its inspectors are still interviewing Libyans about the atomic weapons work, but all Libya's nuclear equipment has been destroyed or dismantled and removed from the country. In addition, there are no inspectors in North Korea so Ambassador Hill's statements cannot be verified.

On the heels of this, Chun Sung-hoon, a researcher at the state-run Korea Institute for National Unification, stated that the North had tested triggering devices. This contradicts the US and ROK positions that states that there is no proof of any test, therefore they cannot react. The expert also stated that the North may have "first generation" bombs that require no tests. The following article was in the Yonhap News on 7 Apr:

N. Korea Conducted 140 Nuclear Detonation Tests: Expert

SEOUL, April 7 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has successfully completed testing a triggering device for an atomic bomb, a North Korea expert here said Thursday.

According to Chun Sung-hoon, a researcher at the state-run Korea Institute for National Unification, the North has secured between 24.5 kilograms to 39.5 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium as of July 2003.

The North has also conducted at least 140 high-explosives tests, according to the South Korean researcher. A high explosive is a detonation device for a conventional explosive that triggers the explosion of an atomic bomb.

His claims came in the spring edition of the National Strategy, a quarterly magazine published by the state-run Sejong Institute.

Chung was scheduled to repeat his claims in a discussion session to be held later in the day at the National Assembly Memorial Hall. The session comes as part of a ceremony to mark the 10th anniversary of the founding of the Yoido Institute, a think tank of the main opposition Grand National Party.

Chun claimed the North conducted some 70 detonation tests between 1983 and 1994 when the first North Korean nuclear standoff ended with an agreement with the United States, also known as the 1994 Agreed Framework.

The North resumed testing of detonation devices in 1997 and completed 70 explosion tests by September 2002, he claimed. The second and ongoing standoff over the North's nuclear weapons program erupted that year when the United States accused Pyongyang of running a clandestine nuclear weapons program based on highly enriched uranium.

The North announced in February that it possesses nuclear weapons and will boycott six-party talks aimed at resolving the nuclear standoff.

Seoul and Washington were initially shocked at the announcement, but soon claimed the North cannot be considered a nuclear state, arguing that there has been no verification of its nuclear capability such as a nuclear test.

The South Korean researcher, however, claimed the North may have already produced one or two nuclear bombs with yields equivalent to what he called "first generation" atomic weapons, but do not require nuclear tests.

"A U.S. claim that the North may have developed a nuclear device based on simple nuclear fission that does not require an actual nuclear test is gaining more credibility because the North has been continuously carrying out these high-explosive tests over a number of years," he said in the article.

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US Running Out of Options North Korea claimed in February to possess atomic weapons and said it would indefinitely boycott international disarmament talks. It also has demanded that Washington apologize for remarks by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice describing the North as one of the world’s "outposts of tyranny.’’ Following its February announcement, the North claimed last month that it had bolstered its nuclear arsenal. The North feels it can best get concessions by NOT returning to the negotiations. However, the US has refused North Korea's demands and instead has put pressure on Beijing to bring its ally back into the process without preconditions. The North's meeting with China in early April failed to bring about a return to the 6-party negotiations. As a result, Chinese President Hu Jintao put his scheduled visit to North Korea on a hold indefinitely. Christopher Hill, the new assistant secretary of state for East Asia and chief negotiator on North Korea, said this week that no deadline had been set for North Korea to co-operate, but signalled US patience with the stalled negotiations was running thin. The North said it would not return to the six-party talks, citing what it calls "hostile" U.S. policy. Top U.S. officials have repeated that they do not have any intention to invade the communist state. Instead the North returned to its position that it would INCREASE its nuclear weapons in the face of threats from the US who sought regime change in the North. Following this President Roh stated that he would offer economic incentives for the North to return to the negotiations, but at the same time stated during a visit to Germany that the ROK did NOT support regime change. He stated that he did not want the North to collapse and such an event was unlikely, and that the two Koreas would only reunite "in a very stable process after predictable stages.’’

The options are limited for the US with only the taking of the matter to the UN in the offing. North Korea can face a variety of sanctions if the Council takes up the nuclear problem. The communist state was referred to it two years ago, but the U.N. body has not acted yet in order to give time for diplomacy to work. The ROK opposes taking the matter to the UN. On 15 Apr, the North stated that it was going to remove spent fuel rods to gain more materials that could be used to increase its nuclear arsenal -- and pushing the envelope again. The Korea Times reported on 16 Apr:

`US Out of Options on NK'

By Reuben Staines
Staff Reporter

The United States is running out of options in the North Korean nuclear standoff as it has failed to bring real pressure on the reclusive communist nation to return to the bargaining table, according to American experts.

Frustrated with Pyongyang’s continued stalling, Washington officials are hinting at taking a harder line, but given the current situation, the warnings have no bite, the North Korea watchers said.

Balbina Hwang, Northeast Asia analyst at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, said a lack of support from other participants in the six-party nuclear talks is undermining the U.S.’ ability to coerce the North.

``The reality is that China, Russia and South Korea are not doing enough to put tangible pressure on North Korea,’’ she said in an e-mail interview with The Korea Times. ``As long as this continues, whatever nominal pressure the U.S. can muster... is important, but not enough to substantially change North Korea’s position.’’

Washington finds itself increasingly out of step with Seoul and Beijing in its approach to bringing Pyongyang back to the nuclear negotiations.

Of the nations involved in the six-way talks, only Japan has been prepared to support the U.S.’ isolating tactics, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an interdiction regime targeting North Korean vessels suspected of carrying items that could be used to produce weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

According to an article in the New York Times last week, U.S. officials are looking at boosting military exercises with South Korea and reconnaissance missions to pressure Pyongyang, but such a proposal would almost certainly meet opposition in Seoul.

Paul Chamberlin, adjunct fellow to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said even if tough measures were taken, they would not likely elicit cooperation from Pyongyang.

``Such activities seem unlikely to induce tacit surrender, which is how certain North Korean officials would likely see a return to the six-party talks under those conditions,’’ he told The Times.

Chamberlin also doubted the chances of a possible visit to the North by Chinese President Hu Jintao bringing a breakthrough in the stalemate. ``Absent a credible change in U.S. policy, North Korea’s return to talks at any time is not likely to be productive,’’ he concluded.

Hu had reportedly been planning to travel to Pyongyang during the first half of this year for a return summit following North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s visit to Beijing last year. The Chinese government, however, has not yet made the concrete schedule public.

In a paper presented to a peace forum in Seoul on Wednesday, Peter Beck and Meredith Sumpter of the International Crisis Group argued that ``the six-party talks are much closer to collapse than breakthrough.’’

North Korea is taking advantage of differences in approach between the U.S. and other nations to find reasons to boycott the nuclear negotiations, they said.

Perhaps the strongest card Washington has still to play _ short of military action _ is referring the North’s nuclear programs to the United Nations, something John Bolton, U.S. ambassador-designate to the U.N., threatened again just this week.

Experts said a U.N. Security Council (UNSC) referral is inevitable if North Korea continues to reject talks, though it also may not have the desired effect.

More than 30 months into the nuclear dispute, Pyongyang seems in no hurry to make a deal. As Beck and Sumpter argue, it may be the U.S. rather than North Korea that is feeling pressured and isolated as it searches for a way out.

On 20 Apr, the Chosun Ilbo reported that the US on 18 April for the "first time directly threatened to drag North Korea before the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) if it keeps refusing to come back to six-party nuclear disarmament talks." The US feels that though the six-party framework is the best way of dealing with Pyongyang’s atomic ambitions, “failure to follow through on that commitment and its provocative words and actions” could only isolate it further. Previously President Bush said there was no "deadline" on returning to the negotiations, but the North's refusal to return to negotiations could not be tolerated indefinitely.

Referring the North Korean nuclear issue to the UNSC would mean that the U.S. would abandon the framework of six-party talks that has existed since 2003. But at the same time, it would be able to discuss measures to impose sanctions against North Korea, including resorting to legal armed force through the U.N. resolution.

The tough talk is suspected to have been because of the news that the North shut down its Yongbyon reactor and planned to reprocess the spent fuel rods to make nuclear warheads. The South Korean government confirmed on 18 Apr that North Korea's five-megawatt reactor was shut down sometime this month. The action escalates tensions on the Korean Peninsula, as it implies an imminent upgrade of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programs. USA Today reported in its online edition 19 Apr. North Korea's U.N. deputy ambassador Han Song-ryol confirmed his country had shut down its Yongbyon reactor. "The ball is in the U.S. court,” Han told the daily. “We asked the United States to change its hostile policy. Then we can believe the United States and enter the disarmament process." It wanted the US to be "sincere" instead of simply stating it would not attack the North.
As expected, China and South Korea oppose the imposition of sanctions from the UNSC. The Korean government and ruling Uri Party came out on 19 Apr against taking the North Korean nuclear dispute to the U.N. Security Council and slapping economic sanctions on the North. They said such measures would be counterproductive. Seoul downplayed the statements from Washington. Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon said there had been no consultations with South Korea on the matter, adding that he thought it was just a "reminder" to the North. The United States can demand that the UNSC consider economic sanctions, which North Korea vowed to take as a "declaration of war."

China continued to hold out for the resolution of the problem through "dialogue" and asked all parties to "show flexibility and sincerity to resume the talks at an early date." It also asked the major parties to respect the "reasonable security concerns" expressed by the DPRK. Also as expected, Japan Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura expressed regret over the stalled disarmament talks on the DPRK's nuclear ambitions and suggested it might be necessary to bring the issue to the UN Security Council.

However, the Joongang Ilbo reported on 20 Apr that mixed messages regarding the six-party talks came out of Seoul, with ROK Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon refusing to rule out referring the DPRK nuclear issue to the UN Security Council, while Unification Ministry officials said they would oppose such a course of action. Mr. Ban said, "That is a strategic problem that will be discussed between South Korea and the United States in accordance with developments of the situation." But also in a meeting with Uri Party members, ROK Unification Ministry officials said the ministry opposes a move to refer the DPRK nuclear issue to the UN Security Council.

According to the Joongang Ilbo, "A U.S. State Department official spoke of tougher options. Speaking to the JoongAng Ilbo on condition of anonymity, the official said Washington believes that Pyongyang, if left alone, will eventually conduct a nuclear test. He said the United States would likely impose economic sanctions against North Korea in a few months, adding that Washington will have to act, rather than "bluffing," during the summer to cope with the worsening situation. He said the United States will seek cooperation with Japan on economic sanctions, and that it expects opposition from China and South Korea. While the actual impact of economic sanctions imposed by the United States alone will be relatively small, Japan-led sanctions could be damaging. China is North Korea's largest trade partner, followed by South Korea and then Japan. ... The State Department source also mentioned the possibility of increasing military pressure on the North, including sending more U.S. troops and an aircraft carrier to the Korean Peninsula. He said, however, that the United States will wait until June to observe the North's moves."

Japan, on the other hand, is experiencing a grass-roots campaign to impose economic sanctions on the North in response to the North's "insincerity" in the abduction issue. About 6,000 people gathered at a rally hosted by the families of abducted Japanese citizens in Tokyo's Hibiya Park on 24 Apr.

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ROK-US-Japan Agree on Unified Stance After the UN threatened to take the failure of the North to negotiate, the South balked at the issue. However, after the failure of Roh to gain public support for his "balancer" plan for the ROK, he was forced to reconsider the ROK approach. In mid-April, the US-Japan-ROK agreed to a unified stance on the handling of the North nuclear issue -- with respect to getting the North back to the negotiation table at least. However, it is not all smooth in the relations. The Donga Ilbo reported on 27 Apr that the ROK government had officially asked Washington to hold ROK-US summit talks around June in the US during the visit of Christopher Hill, US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs to Seoul. Some diplomatic sources in the US said, the offer for Hill was formally accepted by the US State Department.

Reuters reported on 27 Apr that the top US diplomat on the DPRK nuclear crisis said on that the fate of six-party talks on the issue was in doubt, signaling a limit to Washington's patience. US Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill arrived in Tokyo from Beijing as part of a whirlwind tour of the region aimed at finding a way to bring the DPRK back into talks on its nuclear programs. "The future of talks is very much uncertain at this point," Hill told reporters as he left his hotel in Beijing. "We continue to have a North Korean regime that is very ambivalent about whether it wants to find a negotiated settlement to this," said the US point man on the DPRK, who was also in Seoul prior to Beijing.

The Joongang Ilbo reported on 27 Apr that ROK Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon said that the DPRK should not expect more concessions before it makes a decision to return or not to the six-party talks, organized to end the DPRK nuclear crisis. "We have explained well enough to the North through the previous three rounds of talks what sort of inducements we can offer," Mr. Ban said. "Under the current situation, with the talks halted, to put additional inducements forward through the media or public statements is inappropriate." This response is due to the heightened threat of the North performing a nuclear test -- the final step in verifying its nuclear weapon. The US voiced concerns that the North MIGHT be making preparations for such a test.

However, Yonhap news reported on 27 Apr that the ROK's national security adviser said there have been no signs of the DPRK preparing to conduct a nuclear weapons test. Concerns surfaced recently that the DPRK might test an atomic bomb to prove its possession of nuclear weapons to the outside world. However, Seoul's National Security Adviser Kwon Jin-ho has dismissed such concerns as unfounded. "So far, no unusual moves have been detected," he told CBS radio, a local Christian broadcaster. "Such talk stems from misgivings or apprehensions in a corner of the US. We don't need to take it seriously."

During talks between Christopher Hill and the ROK, the options have been kept close to the chest. However, the fact that the US is fed up with the stalling is apparent. On 29 Apr, President Bush leveled a broadside at Kim Jong-il. He called Kim Jong-il a “dangerous man,” a person who “starves his people” and runs “huge concentration camps.” He said, “There is concern about his capacity to deliver a nuclear weapon. We don't know if he can or not, but I think it's best, when you're dealing with a tyrant like Kim Jong-il, to assume he can.” After seemingly restraining himself for so long bodes ill and shows that the North Korean nuclear dispute is coming to a head. The ROK media speculated that perhaps Washington thought that it was no longer possible to restart dialogue with the North or to goad the reclusive country back to the negotiating table. The U.S. was not retreating in the face of North Korean brinkmanship, nuclear weapons or no nuclear weapons.

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US: North has Nuke Missile Capability The following is from CBS News on 29 Apr 2005:

U.S: N. Korea Nuke-Missile Capable

WASHINGTON, April 29, 2005

(AP) North Korea theoretically can mount a nuclear weapon on a long-range missile, a Pentagon spokesman said, providing more details than congressional testimony delivered a day earlier by a top intelligence official.

Defense Department spokesman Bryan Whitman said Friday the military has no evidence that the communist nation has actually put such a warhead atop a missile that could travel many thousands of miles.

If it can, it would mark a significant advance in Pyongyang's ability to threaten the United States at a time when the two countries are at a standoff over U.S. efforts to curtail North Korea's nuclear program.

On Thursday, Defense Intelligence Agency chief Vice Adm. Lowell Jacoby told a Senate committee that North Korea can arm a missile with a nuclear device. He had left unclear, however, whether he was referring to a short- or long-range missile, nor did he specify whether he believed North Korea had already done so.

The Pentagon statement, issued Friday evening, marked its latest attempt to explain and in part soften Jacoby's testimony. It pointedly used the term "theoretical capability" to describe North Korea's capacity to produce a nuclear-armed missile. On Thursday, Jacoby had said he believed "they have the capability to do that."

"North Korea has a theoretical capability to produce a warhead and mate it with a missile, but we have no information to suggest they have done so," said the statement.

The finding is "based upon the fact that information concerning weapons design has been readily available for decades in unclassified literature, that North Korea has access to nuclear material and an assessment that North Korea has the capability to engineer a weapon based on those designs," the statement continued.

The U.S. intelligence community believes North Korea has one or more nuclear weapons, and has untested two- and three-stage missiles capable of reaching U.S. soil.

But it has been unclear whether Pyongyang has yet developed the technology to miniaturize a nuclear weapon so it fits on a missile, and provide it with the guidance systems so it can hit a target.

Pressed on the matter Friday, Lawrence Di Rita, the chief spokesman for Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, said the United States does not know whether the North Koreans have a nuclear warhead small enough to be carried by a missile that could reach U.S. territory.

The Pentagon also said Jacoby's statement marked no new assessment, but simply restated remarks he made in March. Jacoby's previous statements, however, left unclear whether the U.S. believes the North Koreans had developed the necessary warhead technology.

Two defense officials said they believe it will be several years before North Korea can deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead. They discussed the intelligence analysis Thursday on the condition of anonymity.

In the exchange Thursday, Jacoby was asked by New York Democrat Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton whether "North Korea has the ability to arm a missile with a nuclear device?"

Jacoby answered, "My assessment is that they have the capability to do that."

Clinton called Jacoby's testimony "troubling beyond words."

U.S. intelligence believes a two-stage North Korean Taepo Dong 2 missile could hit Alaska, Hawaii and perhaps parts of the West Coast. North Korea also has shorter-range missiles that, some officials have said, may be able to carry a nuclear warhead as far as Japan.

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MAY 2005

North Tests Anti-Ship Missile On 2 May, North Korea may have test-fired a short-range missile into the East Sea on Sunday morning, the Japanese press reported. One report quoted a Japanese government official as saying, “U.S. early warning satellites detected a North Korean missile launch from its East Sea coast, and the information was conveyed to the Japan Defense Agency.” Reports said the missile had a range of 100-150 km and apparently fell into the sea. The ROK played down the significance by stating that it was part of a military exercise.

Joongang Ilbo ("NORTH'S MISSILE A MODIFIED SS-21", 2005-05-04) reported on 5 May that the Defense Ministry briefed lawmakers on the new missile fired by the DPRK, saying that it was an upgraded version of its Soviet-era SS-21, with a longer range. The upgraded surface-to-surface missile reportedly has the capability to reach the locations south of Seoul where US military bases are to be relocated. According to members of the National Assembly's Defense Committee, ministry officials told them that the North had fired a KN-02 missile, a modification of the USSR-built SS-21. The improved missile has a range of up to 120 kilometers (75 miles); the officials said the DPRK test-fired the same type of missile in April of last year, but the test failed.

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US Warns IAEA of North's Nuclear Test On 1 May the Kyodo News reported that the U.S. told the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its allies that North Korea has been preparing for an underground nuclear test since March and could conduct a test as early as June. Quoting diplomatic officials in Vienna, the site of IAEA headquarters, AP on Saturday also said the U.S. was “warning” its allies that a nuclear test could be in the offing. “The intelligence was obtained through satellite photos and South Korean and American intelligence operatives within North Korea,” Kyodo said quoting sources. “North Korea is preparing to test a small-scale plutonium device, and … the equipment needed for the test [is] already in place.” The agency said IAEA officials “estimate that the warhead North Korea is preparing to test is a 20 kiloton plutonium device like the one dropped on Nagasaki, Japan in 1945... IAEA officials believe that if North Korea attempts a nuclear test, it would very likely be successful.” “An underground nuclear test would use existing tunnels or caves, and in a closed society like North Korea, it’s tough to come across signs of an impending test ahead of time.” He said having built all kinds of underground facilities, “North Korea can conduct a test any time it makes up its mind to do so without any outward signs” that preparations are underway. But he added the actual test would be impossible to hide because tests are discovered by monitoring seismic waves.

On the other hand, the Korean government said it had seen no evidence supporting international reports that North Korea was preparing for a nuclear test, and had not been briefed on suspicions by Washington. “We haven’t heard any explanation from the United States concerning a North Korean nuclear test, and we don’t have any intelligence concerning the possibility,” the Foreign Ministry said on 1 May. However, there is official concern that Pyongyang could conduct a test at some stage. A South Korean official dealing with North Korea’s nuclear program said, “When you look at it theoretically, it’s likely that a nuclear test would come before or after a declaration that a state has nuclear weapons. Since North Korea has already said it has nuclear arms, it’s always possible that it could conduct a test.” On April 25, Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon said, “If North Korea conducts a nuclear test, it would start along a path where the future could not be guaranteed.”

On 11 May 2005, the Joongang Ilbo reported that speculation among experts is rife as to when and where a DPRK nuclear test might take place. Some experts have said that Kilju in the north-eastern part of the DPRK is a possible candidate, but the ROK Defense Ministry recently called that unlikely. In recent days, overseas media have reported tunnel digging and other unusual construction activity in Kilju, quoting US officials who said they were briefed about satellite photos. The news reports linked the work to the possibility of a nuclear test but the ROK has been dismissing the connection. According to the experts to test a nuclear explosive device of 10 to 20 kilotons they would need to carve a vertical, underground tunnel out of base rock that has a width of one to three meters and is 300 meters deep. Japanese media report that the test is "inevitable."

The Donga Ilbo reported on 11 May 2005 that it is generally presumed that the DPRK may have six to eight nuclear warheads. The US currently has a total of 10,350 nuclear weapons, however the New York Times recently concluded that the threatening powers of the two counties' weapons are similar. The newspaper pointed out that the logic that was prevalent in the Cold War era when power and authority used to depend on the size of a nation's "nuclear arsenal" no longer applies to the present time. From this point of view it said, the DPRK's six to eight nuclear warheads have as much power as the US nuclear arsenal. It added that if the DPRK succeeds in testing a nuclear device it would increase the political weight of the rest of its nuclear arms. On May 8, in response to the question of whether the IAEA estimates the number of DPR Korean nuclear weapons to be six to eight, Mohammed ElBaradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), stated in an interview with CNN, "Those numbers are close to our estimates."

North Food Shortage On 11 Mar 2005 Yonhap News reported that the DPRK could face its worst food shortage if its nuclear issue is not solved soon according to Kim Woon-keun head of the Korean Peninsula Agro-fishery Policy Research Institute. "(Without a quick resolution of the nuclear problem), the North could experience extreme food shortages as seen in 1997," he said. Kim also said the DPRK problem will become worse IF the ROK decides to stop its fertilizer aid to the DPRK. The ROK is reviewing the DPRK's request for 500,000 tons of fertilizer aid this year, after having given 1.55 million tons of free fertilizer since 1999. The DPRK is also estimated to require 1.65 million more tons of food aid to feed its 23 million people, according to the ROK's intelligence agency. Annually, it needs 6.45 million tons of food, but the current food supply is just 4.8 million tons.

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