November 2006

SITE NOTE: The initial expectations were that the South would use this latest disaster to rush "humanitarian aid" to the North as an excuse to expand their support to the North. Though the aid to the North has been widely publicized as curtailed, the government subsidized aid to the North through civic and religious groups continued unabated. As of 9 Nov, there was no move by the Unification Ministry to attempt sending aid as its actions have been scrutinized since the 9 Oct nuclear test.

(SITE NOTE: Other newspapers did NOT pick up on this item immediately and only the Korea Herald carried this story initially on 18 Nov. However, Tony Snow's statement does carry some underlying meanings. The implications are that with the South openly providing aid to the North, the US is no longer willing to participate in a charade. Either you are not at war -- or you are at war. You cannot give aid to your enemy where a state of war exists under the pretense that he is your "brother." The Yonhap News on 20 Nov reported on this angle of a peace treaty. Later other ROK papers chimed in, but by that time, the US was backing away from the statement on 21 Nov.

This is NOT the first time this has been mentioned. Gen Burke mentioned this idea of a peace treaty in March 2006 during testimony before Congress. In a nutshell, he stated that as long as a state of war exists, the US must be prepared to fight -- but if a peace treaty ending the Korea Conflict was implemented, the UNC would become a "standing multinational alliance." It was again brought up in June 2006 when it became apparent that the US-ROK alliance was openly in deep trouble. With a peace treaty, the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 would no longer have to remain in effect as the reason for stationing US troops in South Korea. The whole USFK establishment could be removed -- with only a small contingent remaining as the ROK would assume the responsibility for its own defense.

The proposal of a formal end to the Korean War is in line with many pundits and analysts advice that the safety of the North must be guaranteed FIRST before any substantive progress can be made at the six-party talks. In simplistic terms, the North views the possession of a nuclear weapon as a form of defense as its advantage using conventional forces is being eroded with the military upgrades in the South. If there is no war footing, then there is no need for the nuclear device.)

Roh, Bush discussed Korean Peninsula peace treaty at Hanoi summit Washington's intention to replace a cease-fire on the Korean Peninsula with a peace treaty was discussed during last week's summit between South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and U.S. President George W. Bush in Hanoi, a South Korean official said on 20 Nov. Bush, in particular, stated that the U.S., as a signatory to the cease-fire of the 1950-53 Korean War, was willing to declare the formal end to the war and establish a peace treaty, if North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons program.

Song Min-soon, designee for foreign minister, told reporters that the Roh-Bush summit dealt intensively with the establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, along with economic and security incentives, that could be offered to North Korea in return for the verifiable scrapping of its nuclear weapons program. (Source: Yonhap News.)

Peace Treaty Idea Downplayed (Nov 2006) Government officials believe that President Bush' remarks on a peace treaty show that America is emphasizing the potential benefits of nuclear dismantlement for North Korea at the soon-to-be-held six-party talks. However, some U.S. administration officials say that the Korean government's response to Press Secretary Tony Snow's remarks on a peace treaty seems to be "overboard."

One Washington source said, "The U.S. media didn't pay much attention to the remark of Press Secretary Tony Snow because the measure the North will take first matters." It implies that the issue of peace is a just long-term task, and as the North did the nuclear experiment first, it needs to show an active will to dismantle nuclear weapons."

One expert on the Korean Peninsula who requested anonymity said in a telephone interview, "It wasn't the main point," adding, "The main issue was the 'three concrete steps' the U.S. will present simultaneously with the resumption of the six-party talks." The concrete steps are to stop the operation of the 5-megawatt reactor in Yongbyon, North Pyongan Province, to stop plutonium reprocessing, and to allow IAEA inspection team that were expelled in early 2003 to return. (Source: Donga Ilbo.)

US to Sign Official End to Korean War if North Abandons Nuclear Arms (Nov 2006) According to the BBC on 29 Nov, US President George W. Bush said he had an intention to sign a document declaring the end of the Korean War with DPRK leader Kim Jong-il if Pyongyang abandons its nuclear ambitions. The 1950-53 Korean War ended with a cease-fire, not a peace treaty, between US-led United Nations forces and the DPRK. The Korean Peninsula remains technically in a state of war.

According to the report, Bush disclosed the intention during summit talks with ROK President Roh Moo-hyun on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting held in Hanoi in mid-November, said the sources, requesting anonymity. On 18 October, White House spokesman Tony Snow said that the list of what the US might do in return for the DPRK's abandonment of its nuclear programme would include "a declaration of the end of the Korean War and moving forward on economic cooperation, cultural, educational and other ties." (SITE NOTE: The apparent "sources" seem to be coming from the six-party talk negotiating team who want to present the idea of a peace treaty as a means to meet the North's demand for security assurances.)

It is estimated that the U.S. will ensure the end of war by a document containing official signatures of three nations, which is an actual peace agreement, and that it is preparing to make a peace agreement by observing changes in North Korea’s attitude and of the relationship between North Korea and the U.S. North Korea, which has constantly requested the U.S. to establish legal and institutional systems for peace, is not objecting to America’s “provisional peace agreement,” which could be the transition to peace and amity between North Korea and the U.S. As a matter of fact, North Korea suggested a provisional agreement in 1998. It contained several specific provisions that North Korea and the U.S. could establish liaison offices respectively in Pyongyang and Washington before entering into formal diplomatic relations, and that they could replace the Military Armistice Commission, which was in charge of an agreement on peace, with “a commission of cooperative security between South Korea, North Korea, and the U.S.” The problem is China, which seems to be excluded from this agreement. China has claimed that it cannot be left out. (Source: Donga Ilbo.)

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December 2006

Russia Offered Uranium Deal in Exchange for Support at Nuclear Talks (Dec 2006) On 2 Dec Japanese daily Tokyo Shimbun cited Russian government sources as saying that Moscow and Pyongyang had been in secret talks since 2002 over a plan for Russia to import the uranium and enrich it before selling it on as nuclear fuel to China and Vietnam. Russia would need to guarantee any uranium it imported from the DPRK would be used for peaceful purposes, the paper said. Russia, which is already a major exporter of oil and natural gas, is also seeking to position itself as an exporter of nuclear fuel, the paper said.

Associated Press on 3 Dec reported that the DPRK had offered Russia exclusive rights to its natural uranium deposits in exchange for support at the Six Party Talks. The two countries have been in talks since 2002 on a deal for Russia to import uranium, which it wants to enrich and sell as nuclear fuel to the PRC and Vietnam, according to a report in the regional daily, Tokyo Shimbun, citing unnamed Russian officials. Russia, which already exports natural gas and oil, hopes to become a major exporter of nuclear fuel, according to the report.

Reuters on 4 Dec reported that Russia's atomic energy agency declined to comment on Japanese news reports that the DPRK had offered Russia exclusive rights to its natural uranium deposits in exchange for support at six-way talks on Pyongyang's nuclear weapons. "We were surprised to read the information in a Japanese newspaper. We don't know where this information has come from and therefore will not comment on the rumors at this moment," Rosatom spokesman Sergei Novikov told RIA news agency.

However, ITAR-Tass on 5 Dec reported that the Russian Foreign Ministry has called reports that the DPRK would offer Russia exclusive rights to its uranium deposits in exchange for support at stalled talks on Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions, "provocative." "The Russian Foreign Ministry does not consider it necessary to comment on reports by certain mass media that have a provocative character," the ministry said in response to a query from ITAR-Tass, the agency reported. The Interfax news agency cited Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Alexeyev as saying he knew nothing about the purported offer. A spokesman for Rosatom, the country's atomic energy agency, said "the origin of this information isn't known, but on principle Rosatom does not comment on rumors," IITAR-Tass said. (SITE NOTE: This indicates the rumors are true.)

According to RIA Novosti on 29 Nov reported that Russia's Finance Ministry plans to launch talks in a few weeks on writing off a major portion of the DPRK's debt. Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak said the country's debt to Russia was estimated at $8 billion.

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US Trade to North $3000 -- Excluding Humanitarian Aid Yonhap News Agency reported on 4 Dec reported that bilateral trade between the United States and DPRK reached a mere US$3,000 in the first nine months of this year, a sharp drop from a year earlier. In the January-September period, the United States registered no imports from the communist country, with the only export item being publications, the Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) said in a report, citing the U.S. Commerce Department. The U.S. exported humanitarian food aid to the DPRK worth $5.8 million last year.

Strangely, it appears that the North is emerging as a giant in the animation industry and is providing animation to Japan, ROK, and Europe. Studios employing 1,600 people with state of the art equipment are said to produce top quality products. It has worked in the past on Disney cartoons such as Lion King and on the Teenage Mutant Ninja cartoons.

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North Korea Reinsurance Fraud Involvement Suspected Fox News on 4 Dec reported that a growing number of major underwriters around the world strongly suspect that the DPRK is running an elaborate major insurance and reinsurance scam on them, to the tune of tens of millions of dollars or more. The alleged fraud involves a wide variety of DPRK industrial and personal calamities where insurers have been presented with perfect government-controlled documentation of accidents, including deaths, along with carefully gathered photographic evidence, all compiled in a startlingly brief time. That paperwork is coupled with a resistance to letting foreign insurance adjusters examine some of the most crucial physical evidence, except after long delays and under a watchful eye, if at all. To get the DPRK's side of the story, FOX News approached the regime's official insurance representative in London, Song Ryon Ko, at his home. Song refused to discuss the issue. Britain's Foreign Office says the lack of firm proof of fraud is why it hasn't taken action on the reinsurance issue, although British diplomats say they are aware of it. The lack of an official British reaction could be an attempt not to rock the boat, as well as to protect its diplomatic presence in Pyongyang.

In addition, the Donga Ilbo on 4 Dec reported that the European Parliament has begun an investigation in response to allegations that the DPRK government dispatched hundreds of workers to European countries and forced them to send their wages home. It is estimated that the number of workers that the DPRK government sent to overseas countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Russia, the Middle East, and Africa is anywhere from 10,000 to 15,000. Currently, 400 North Korean workers, mostly women, are staying in the Czech Republic and working in sewing factories in the suburbs of Prague, the capital of the Czech Republic. Their monthly salaries are well above the country's minimum wage of about 285,000 won. However, the European Parliament estimated that a large part of their salaries is deposited into a collective bank account controlled by the DPRK government.

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ROK Aid to DPRK in 2006 (Dec 2006) According to the Yonhap News on 3 Dec, the ROK gave the DPRK a record amount of aid in the first 10 months of the year but most of it had been shipped before tension spiked over the country's missile and nuclear tests. The ROK has virtually suspended its regular aid shipment to the DPRK, mostly fertilizer, since Pyongyang test-launched multiple missiles in July. From January to October, Seoul supplied 211 billion won (US$227 million) worth of goods, mostly fertilizer, breaking the previous full-year record of 185.4 billion won in 1995, according to the Unification Ministry report. In 2005, the Seoul government shipped aid supplies worth 135.9 billion won. The cumulative value of ROK aid since 1995 reached 1.2 trillion won as of the end of October, the report said. Private donors gave the North 69.4 billion won worth of aid during the January-October period, pushing their cumulative donations since 1995 to 620.1 billion won.

Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund Plan Developed (Dec 2006) The South Korean government is to provide financial support to North Korea for 2007 similar to the package given this year, despite the North’s missile tests in July and nuclear test in October. However, the Ministry of Unification says that the amount for the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund will decrease 3.5% from this year’s 1.23 trillion won to 1.19 trillion in 2007. The plan needs to be approved by the National Assembly. (SITE NOTE: The decrease is from suspended programs, but there were efforts to reinput the funds in the 2007 budget.)

The government worked to add the funds needed for North’s modernization of Nampo Port and the railways renovation project to next year’s budget. On December 5th, the government reported to the National Assembly that an additional 4.474 billion won is required for the railways and road connection work. The Unification Ministry estimated that 650 billion won of next year’s endowment that will go to aiding the government of North Korea. (SITE NOTE: The railway project to link the North-South railways has failed due to the DPRK military objections. The last failure came after the ROK pumped funds into the North to improve its railway system -- and literally paid for the entire project before the DPRK reneged on its part. Still the ROK wants to pump more money into the North's coffers.)

Under the inter-Korean cooperation funding plan for 2007, the government would allocate 192.5 billion won to increase food aid to the North from around 400,000 tons to 500,000 tons. This increase was for fear that the North’s food situation would worsen due to the suspension of food aid from the international community. In addition, the plan earmarked 140 billion won to provide 350,000 tons of fertilizer to the North. The plan also includes 15 billion won for measurements, environmental service, electricity and materials, in case North Korea agrees to abolish their nuclear facilities and then needs electric power support. A subsidy for the Mt. Keumgang tours, which were suspended after North Korea conducted their missile tests, has been drawn up in next year’s funding plan for inter-Korean cooperation as well. (SITE NOTE: Though the food aid was supposedly suspended, the last shipment of food aid was shipped AFTER the nuclear test. In addition, the subsidized food aid from church groups continued. The aid to the Mt. Keumgang project continued because the ROK stated that there was no proof that the monies was going into the nuclear project -- but there was no proof that it wasn't either.)

The funding plan for North Korean support also included 30.1 billion won to facilitate the North’s international exchanges, 11.5 billion won to assist inter-Korean social and cultural exchanges, and 3 billion won to help more South Koreans come travel and get first-hand experiences of life in North Korea. (SITE NOTE: This is the ill-fated family reunion program bribes to the North, under-the-table subsidies of the Mt. Keumgang project, and hopes of a united Koreas team that the North only agrees to if it gets money.)

An official from the Unification Ministry explained that there were many volatile factors in the inter-Korean relationship. He added that the plan just aims to determine where funds for inter-Korean projects will go, not create conditions for another inter-Korean summit.

The South Korean government was not free from criticism for this budget increase. They cannot ignore the local and international criticism that says nothing has changed in the government’s policies towards North Korea, even though they conducted nuclear tests on October 9th. Conservative groups feel that no matter how benevolent the fund may be toward the North, the South Korean government should not continue to channel money them through the inter-Korean Cooperation Fund, while North Korea still possesses nuclear weapons. North Korea should immediately give up these nuclear threats and participate in the international community again.

The Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund was first created in 1991 with the South giving an endowment of 25 billion won to the North’s government. 164 million won from the fund was used to support a united South and North team for participation in the 41st World Table Tennis Championship. Since then, South Korea has utilized the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund to support the North.

The effectiveness of the South’s so-called “sunshine policy” (currently called "Prosperity Policy") towards the North has been debated since the North’s missile tests. However, by the end of June this year, the South Korean government had already provided 1.72 trillion won to North Korea. In particular, more than half, or about 950 billion won of that support, came from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund.

The Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund is a part of the South Korean government’s budget for human and economic exchanges, aimed at recovering mutual trust between the two Koreas. The administrative personnel who will handle the funds must be approved by the National Assembly. The opposition Grand National Party asserts that all planned funds for inter-Korean support should be slashed in the course of deliberations, as the funds enable the North to carry out their nuclear and missile tests and threaten security on the Korean peninsula. It also said that humanitarian support projects for the North will also be looked into carefully before any approval takes place. (Source: KBS News.)

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NORTH KOREAN "SUPERNOTE" COUNTERFEIT FUROR

Counterfeit "Supernotes" Furor Continues (Jan-Feb 2006) The row over the North's "supernotes" continues. Years of U.S. investigations, involving 14 federal agencies, have found that the illicit activities are now generating more than half a billion U.S. dollars for Pyongyang. North Korea is counterfeiting not only the greenback but also the Japanese yen, and well as producing heroin, methamphetamines, fake pharmaceuticals such as Viagra and Marlboro and other cigarettes brands. The regime was even counterfeiting tax stamps attached to American cigarette packs. "You name it, they are pretty much in it," David Asher, former State Department official who was deeply involved in the North Korean investigations, told National Press Radio on 18 Jan 2006.

The U.S. is seeking the help of other countries, especially China, in combating the problem, but the government there is not likely to help if it sees the U.S. goal as being the demise of Kim Jong-il's regime. The North continued to condemn the US and state that they would not attend the six-party talks unless the sanctions were lifted. However, the US continued to state that the two issues -- counterfeiting and nuclear disarmament -- were not linked. The battle in the US is between hardliners who are seeking to use the sanctions as means to collapse the Kim regime and the moderate elements who seek to use the issue only as leverage at the negotiating table during the six-party talks.


Supernote $100 Dollar Bill

On 19 Feb, it was reported that the eldest son of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il was responsible for spreading fake U.S. dollars through Macau, prompting Washington to slap sanctions on the communist country, a South Korean official said. The U.S. crackdown has not only intensified friction between the two former battlefield foes but also diminished chances for Kim's oldest son, Jong-nam, to succeed his father in a power struggle with his two younger brothers, the intelligence official said, speaking on condition of anonymity. (< a href=http://english.yna.co.kr/Engnews/20060219/430100000020060219083049E0.html>Yonhap News.)

US Briefing to South (Jan-Feb 2006) On 6 Jan it was announced a Secret Service delegation were to visit Seoul to explain to the Roh administration in detail their findings dealing with the North's counterfeiting operations. The Seoul government had requested Washington to pass on specific details of its information on North Korea's alleged counterfeiting activities -- an equivalent statement to "I believe you, but..." The act by Seoul to not disturb their relationship with the North has put further strain on the US-ROK relationship. (See US and ROK at Odds over North Korean Counterfeiting for background.)

Amidst the ROK skepticism, a three-month investigation by China of accusations that North Korea used a Macau bank to launder gains from currency forgery has confirmed the suspicions according to Korean diplomatic sources on 11 Jan. They said South Korea's Deputy Foreign Minister Song Min-soon and his Chinese counterpart Wu Dawei have already met in Beijing to discuss the issue. Both are their country's chief delegate in six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear program, which Pyongyang is boycotting because of U.S. sanctions over the counterfeiting charge. China, the ROK and Japan agree that the counterfeiting issue is a separate issue from the six-party talks. Wu also met with his North Korean counterpart Kim Kye-gwan to inform him in person that China believes Pyongyang cannot escape culpability for its illegal actions. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

On 23 Jan, the visiting U.S. delegation met with Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) and the Korea Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) officials to discuss the counterfeiting issue. A U.S. investigation team headed by the Treasury Department's deputy assistant secretary for terrorist financing and financial crimes, Daniel Glaser, presented Korean officials with its evidence that North Korea is engaged in counterfeiting U.S. dollars. The team was met by Kim Sook, the director-general of the North American affairs bureau in the Foreign Ministry. South Korean officials said the evidence offered by the U.S. team was "pretty convincing." "Both U.S. and Macau authorities are still investigating the issue, and it seems no significant results will be out for several days," a government official said. "Seoul has already stopped raising questions about accusations that the North is involved in illegal financial activities. To our knowledge, the Chinese investigation has confirmed that the North is engaged in wrongdoings." (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

However, the ROK continued to vacillate. Seoul told Pyongyang that it was "deeply concerned" about the U.S. charges, but insists that it needs more evidence that the North is behind the $100 "supernotes" before taking any action. Korean officials called the meetings "a simple briefing" on measures the United States has taken to combat the counterfeiting, but refused to discuss the information provided by the U.S. officials. One denied that Washington had provided further evidence of North Korean complicity or attempted to persuade Seoul to support U.S. attempts to combat it. Referring to Korean officials, a diplomatic source in Seoul said, "I think they had seen enough even before the briefing, but time is needed to figure out how to address the issue while proceeding with the nuclear talks. That is why a clear positioning by Seoul won't take place." (Source: Joongang Ilbo.)

The U.S. Embassy in Korea on 22 Feb 2006 reiterated that Washington had provided the South Korean government with evidence that North Korea forged U.S. dollars and provided it with specimens of the so-called supernotes made by Pyongyang during the briefing. The evidence was presented to South Korean officials by U.S. Treasury investigators. An embassy spokesman said the U.S. government showed Korean officials "superior-quality counterfeit 2001 and 2003 series US$100 notes (supernotes) that our investigations have concluded were manufactured" in North Korea. The spokesman said U.S. investigators concluded that $140,000 uncovered by South Korean police last year were part of a batch made by Pyongyang in 2001. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

Seoul Denies US Asked for Help -- US Says It Did (Jan 2006) Korea denied on 24 Jan that it has been asked to join Washington in penalizing North Korea in connection with the communist country's alleged currency counterfeiting and other illicit financial activities -- while the US Embassy stated in releases that the ROK had been asked TWICE. A South Korean government official denied Glaser asked anything of the government, in blunt contradiction to the US embassy press release, which twice said the U.S. asked Seoul to join in efforts to combat the North's illegal activities. The fact that the embassy took the rare step of distributing its own statement and bypassing the host government smacks of fears in Washington that the South Korean government would present a substantially different version from the U.S.' own. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon told reporters on 23 Jan the Korean government needs to take no further steps. "The nation's financial regulations provide appropriate legal means to conduct investigations and take necessary steps when illegal money laundering or suspected transactions by those connected with terrorist activities occur," a ministry official said. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.) The statements were followed by Roh coming out saying that the ROK would NOT abandon its policy of rapprochement with the North -- and rejected the US plan to isolate and bring about the collapse of the North. (NOTE: In addition, Roh stated that he would push for the return of war-time control from the US WITHIN the year ... an impossibility as stated by ROK officials. However, he is alienating the US in a very direct manner -- supporting openly the North while US troops are stationed in the ROK for its defense from the North.) The American team "has neither officially nor unofficially urged our Government to take specific steps," South Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman Choo Kyu-ho said.

The US stood by the statement released by its embassy. "We stand by the press release issued yesterday and we have nothing further to add," embassy spokesman Robert Ogburn said. In essence, the US will continue its plan of action, while the Korea is free to pursue its path -- though the US is visibly miffed. (NOTE: The ROK has taken the action of providing "observers" to the interdiction training for WMD to be held in Australia instead of actively participating.)


Funny Money

ROK Walks Tightrope (Feb 2006) According to the Voice of America on 2 Feb 2006 ("South Korean Spy Agency Finds "No Evidence" North Korea is Counterfeiting US Dollars") a ROK lawmaker quoted intelligence officials as saying they had no evidence DPRK had recently counterfeited US dollars. ROK lawmakers received a closed-door briefing from ROK intelligence officials on 2 Feb. Afterwards, legislator Im Jong-in said the RO Korean intelligence agency had been unable to substantiate Washington's allegation that Pyongyang is currently counterfeiting US currency.

The NIS has been walking a tightrope as it had previously admitted under the Kim Dae-jung administration that it was monitoring the counterfeiting of monies from the North. The latest position is a turnabout from the previous administration's stance prior to the 2000 summit.

On 13 Feb 2006 it was revealed that the South Korean government concealed the fact that U.S. investigators told it US$140,000 in counterfeit dollars found in Seoul's Namdaemun market April 2005 was made in North Korea, it emerged. Police at the time arrested three people who tried to exchange 1,400 so-called supernotes at a local money changer. They allegedly bought the supernotes from a broker in Shenyang, China. At the time, it was confirmed in the press that the counterfeits were from the North. (NOTE: The 1,369 counterfeit bills are held in storage at the Seoul District Prosecutors' Office.)

A U.S. government source said Korean investigation authorities handed some of the confiscated notes to the U.S. and asked their opinion whether they were made in the North. After comparing them with other counterfeit dollars found elsewhere, the U.S. told Seoul it believed they were made in North Korea. However, the Foreign Ministry denied it received any notification from the U.S. on the issue, while investigators and information officials declined to comment. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

Then the ROK Ambassador to the US supports the evidence of the US. The ambassador stated that aid would be linked to the outcome of the nuclear talks, but local news sources state that he was speaking his own opinion and not that of the government. Many mixed and confused signals as the ROK walks the tightrope -- and basically caught in a blind alley without any options.

On 22 Feb, the Embassy reiterated that the US government showed Korean officials "superior-quality counterfeit 2001 and 2003 series US$100 notes (supernotes) that our investigations have concluded were manufactured" in North Korea. The spokesman said U.S. investigators concluded that $140,000 uncovered by South Korean police last year were part of a batch made by Pyongyang in 2001. This contradicts recent statements by South Korean officials, who have said Seoul has no evidence of North Korean counterfeiting after 1998. South Korean authorities have been reluctant to support U.S. accusations on the sensitive issue. U.S. officials say that North Korea has recently engaged in counterfeiting - and South Korea has seen evidence of it. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

North Korean in Macao Arrested (Feb 2006) A local Internet news site, Daily NK, reported on 28 Jan that a top aide to North Korean leader Kim Jong-il was arrested in Macao earlier this month. Citing Japanese diplomatic sources, the news site claimed Kang Sang-choon, a secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and chief of staff to Kim, was detained in connection to circulation of forged U.S. dollars and money laundering. DailyNK, which specializes in news related to the reclusive communist country, also said the arrest may have taken place on Jan. 11 and that South Korean and Japanese intelligence services are in the process of verifying the information. Regarding the allegations, a source at the National Intelligence Service, South Korea's spy agency, said it received information on the matter. The official, however, said the agency is not in a position to offer a confirmation at this time. Experts here said Kang is not involved in his country's policy-making process.

On 8 Feb 2006, it was reported that Kang Sang Choon (66), Kim Jong Il's chief of staff and secretary of the Worker's Party of North Korea, was arrested by Chinese police in Jan 2006 for illegally transferring real estate ownership in Macau. Kang was released the following day. According to a number of sources familiar with North Korea, shortly before Kim Jong Il visited China (from January 10 to 18), Kang was arrested by the police after it was revealed that he had illegally transferred ownership of a patch of land he owned there three or four years before. The South Korean government has recently confirmed this fact. Kang was known to have been arrested during Kim's visit to China, which led to various suspicions on the background of his arrest. (Source: Donga Ilbo.)

New $100 notes in 2007 (Feb 2006) The United States will roll out newly designed US$100 notes next year to enhance security of American currency, the Treasury Department said in its 2007 budget report. The department issued new $10 bills last year, new $50 notes in 2004, and new $20 notes in 2003. A review of the new currency program found that the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) was "successful in meeting its production and timeline goals for the rollout of the new $20 notes," the report said. "BEP also will continue to work with the Advanced Counterfeit Deterrent Steering Committee to assess the impact of new currency on counterfeiting performance measures across government." (Source: Yonhap News.)

Counterfeits Appear in US (Feb 2006) The "supernotes" have supposedly now shown up in America. The Secret Service confirmed there have been "sporadic activities" in which counterfeit US$100 bills were discovered at the casinos -- "no more than two or three notes a month." It has been only in the last six months that these fake dollars were spotted at casinos and entertainment venues of the city. However, not 100 percent certain, a Secret Service agent said their characteristics were similar to those that were traced to the communist state. However, Jerry Markling, chief of enforcement at the Gaming Control Board in Las Vegas, denied news reports that counterfeit U.S. dollars made in North Korea were in circulation at the city's casinos.

Known as "supernotes," the counterfeit $100 bills are said to appear so genuine that they are not identified by currency detectors. However, the agent said this was not the case. "Lot of them are not coming into the casinos. The bill validators are not taking them," he said.

Counterfeit Supernotes Less than Estimated (Feb 2006) A diplomatic source in Seoul said on 8 Feb that Washington estimates the amount of North Korean-produced counterfeit U.S. currency in circulation at about $50-60 million. He said, evidently taking it for granted that the fake banknotes were produced in North Korea, that the sophistication of the so-called "supernotes" is enough in itself to conclude that the counterfeiting is supported by the North Korean government. An intelligence official here said that North Korea has been faced with a shortage of foreign exchange after U.S. financial sanctions were imposed on some of its trading companies and one bank the government uses in Macao, and has stepped up activities to bring in more foreign currency. The release of this info by Seoul -- instead of the US -- might be an "out" for the North to stop its operations of counterfeiting as it is still "small."

The Mainichi Daily News on 9 Feb 2006 reported that the DPRK said it would join international efforts to fight money laundering amid accusations that it is directly involved in financial crimes. A spokesman from the Foreign Ministry made the announcement, denying allegations that the country has engaged in counterfeiting and money laundering -- an issue that has deadlocked the Six Party Talks. It is apparently the first time the DPRK has publicly voiced its willingness to cooperate with international efforts to crack down on such crimes.

There were unverified reports that Kim Jong-il told Chinese Premier Hu during a recent visit that the financial sanctions could topple his regime.

Immediately following this announcement, there was an unconfirmed report that the US and North Korea would hold a bilateral meeting to discuss the financial and nuclear standoff issues in New York. However, the US remained skeptical of the North's statement that it wanted to hold talks on cooperating to stop counterfeiting. In Seoul, U.S. ambassador Alexander Vershbow said North Korea should hand over all equipment used in making the fake dollars, including the plates, to prove it will stop counterfeiting. Then it was announced that the US would meet with the North Koreans in New York over the counterfeiting issue. However, from the onset, the US stated there would be NO concessions during the talks.

Counterfeit Supernotes Increase in South Korea and GNP Attacks Government over Inaction (Feb 2006) In South Korea, an increasing number of bogus $100 bills are being discovered. There were 189 found here in 2001, 286 in 2002, 544 in 2003 and 667 in 2004. And in 2005 through September, 1,900 fake bills were found in Korea. The 2005 figures include the $140,000 in counterfeit "supernotes" found in Seoul's Namdaemun market in April 2005. Police at the time arrested three people who tried to exchange the "supernotes" at a local money changer. They allegedly bought the "supernotes" from a broker in Shenyang, China. (NOTE: 1,369 counterfeit "supernote" bills are held in storage at the Seoul District Prosecutors' Office.)

Kim Moon-soo, a member of the conservative opposition Grand National Party, on 23 Feb in the National Assembly produced a U.S. $100 note dated 2003 that he said was counterfeit and had been bought from a North Korean intelligence official in Dandong, China, earlier this year. He said the North Korean was working in a cover job as an official at the North's Shinheung Trading Company. Mr. Kim said he paid $70 for the $100 note, which he said had not yet been examined by government officials in Korea.

Another GNP lawmaker, Kim Jae-won, joined the attack. He produced satellite photographs of the Workers' Party supply center in central Pyongyang where, he said, the notes were probably being produced. He said that Kwangmyongsong Trading, which manages the private assets of North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-il, distributes the notes. Mr. Kim also produced a specimen, saying he had gotten it in the North Korea-China border region in mid-January through two South Korean middlemen.

N.Korean Officials Caught Smuggling Currency into Mongolia (Feb 2006) According to the Yomiuri Shimbun on 22 Feb, North Korean diplomats were caught attempting to smuggle US$1 million and 200 million yen into Mongolia on Tuesday, the Mongolian press reported. Reports said the North Koreans told Mongolian authorities they were planning to put the money in a Mongolian bank account. The paper said that it was unclear whether the money was counterfeit or not, and what measures the Mongolian authorities will take. It said the incident revived concerns about North Korean involvement in money laundering. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

Seizure of Bank Accounts in Hong Kong Supposedly Linked to Money Laundering (Feb-Mar 2006) Bank accounts linked to trade in North Korean counterfeit U.S. bank notes surfaced for the first time in Hong Kong. U.S. authorities planned to seize more than US$2.67 million from three frozen bank accounts with Chiyu Banking, a subsidiary of Bank of China Hong Kong. The South China Morning Post reported the funds were believed to be the first known link between a Hong Kong bank and North Korea's underground trade in high-quality fake US$100 bills. The accounts belong to an unemployed mainland Chinese woman named Kwok Hiu Ha who moved to Hong Kong. The U.S. Department of Justice had the money frozen a year ago following undercover work by a private investigator probing a counterfeit cigarette operation. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

On 6 Mar, the Hong Kong South China Morning Post reported yesterday that Hong Kong police found and confiscated supernotes (counterfeit U.S. $100 bills) printed in North Korea. According to the newspaper, Hong Kong police nabbed a middle-aged Chinese American businessman who tried to pass through Hong Kong from Macao last month with a "substantial" amount of forged U.S. $100 bills. The exact amount was not made public. But the man arrested by the police protested that he received those counterfeit bills unwittingly in a complicated commercial transaction in Macao and was released. (Source: Donga Ilbo.)

Japanese Banks and KEB Fall In Line -- and then China (Feb-Mar 2006) Japan's two largest banks, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi and Mizuho Corporate Bank, have voluntarily ceased all transactions with Banco Delta Asia, the Macau-based bank the U.S. has fingered as North Korea's main money-laundering channel, the Mainichi Shimbun reported on 2 Feb 2006. The paper predicted the move to fall in line with U.S. sanctions, though ostensibly the banks' own decision, will affect tentative diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Pyongyang. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.) On 1 Feb, Korea Exchange Bank (KEB) also followed suit and severed ties with Banco Delta Asia. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.) At first, reports said that KEB was the only bank having dealings with the bank. However, soon thereafter Shinhan Bank and the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives followed Korea Exchange Bank in suspending financial transactions with the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia Bank.

As a side note, the money flow to North Korea has been severely restricted as Japan has scrutinized the banks used by North Korean supporters. As a result, Japan has seen a sharp increase in the number of postal remittances to North Korea in recent years according to Japan Post documents. Such remittances came to 1,560 in fiscal 2004 that ended March 31, 2005, up sharply from 383 in fiscal 2002 and 506 in fiscal 2003. (Source: Crisscross News.) In addtion, in March Japan started to check money transfers using the mail system.

Macau's Banco Delta Asia, named in Sep 2005 by the U.S. Treasury Department as a "willing pawn" for the North Korean government, announced on 15 Feb that it had closed all accounts of North Korean and related entities. According to a statement issued by U.S. law firm Heller Ehrman, which represents the bank, it is also "implementing new, enhanced anti-money laundering policies and procedures." It requested the US lift sanctions against the bank. The bank has been under the control of the Macau government after the North Korean use of the bank for money laundering became an international issue under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act because it represents an unacceptable risk of money laundering and other financial crimes. Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) adopted a rule that prohibitted U.S. financial institutions from directly or indirectly establishing, maintaining, administering or managing any correspondent account in the United States for or on behalf of Banco Delta Asia -- and "encouraged" other nations' financial institutions to do so also. The announcement touched off a two-day, HK$300 million run of withdrawals by depositors of the bank. Stung by US government charges of money laundering, Banco Delta Asia's board of directors stepped aside in favor of a team of government appointees in Sep 2005. With assets of $9.8 billion, it is one of the smallest banks in the territory.

The People's Bank of China on 18 March issued a directive to financial institutions there to increase vigilance against fake US$100 bills they says are being smuggled into China. The PBOC did not specify how the notes made their way to China or where they came from. But Chinese experts say the move was made with North Korea in mind, which the U.S. has accused of being behind production of the supernotes. The PBOC said criminal organizations launder their money by a range of means and also asked bank staff to upgrade detection methods for fakes. Banks are advised to keep meticulous records of dollar transaction and the identities of people involved. The Chinese central bank asked branches to be on the alert for any abnormalities in dollar statistics such as imports of greenbacks and report any dubious dollar trade, fakes or suspected money laundering immediately. (SITE NOTE: In Jul 2006, the Bank of China froze North Korean assets in its Macao branch -- but other reports stated that the funds may have already been transferred to Singapore as a "safe haven.")


Funny Money

Bush to Launch Fresh Sanctions (Apr 2006) On 28 Jan the Chosun Ilbo reported that the US was readying fresh sanctions against North Korea over the regime's alleged financial crimes that will be significantly more severe than the ones already in place. Authorities completed a rough draft of an executive order that would stop any financial firms involved in transactions with North Korea from conducting business in the U.S. That will mean all banks, brokerage houses and insurance firms and refers not only to illegal transactions but to any financial deals with the North. Once the regulations are finalized, "the message to financial institutions operating in the U.S. will be that the time has come for them to choose between the U.S. or North Korea," he added. (SITE NOTE: This could be disastrous to the growing business connections between the ROK and North Korea -- especially in the Kaesong area.)

Observers will be watching closely if the draft takes effect since it is far more sweeping than the sanctions already in place. Under the draft order, almost all finance companies would be effectively prohibited from doing business with North Korea. That would also affect international financial institutions outside the U.S. and thus deal a heavy blow to North Korea's overseas trade. Financial institutions would have a choice whether they are with or against the U.S., but given the importance of their U.S. interests, it would in effect force most major international firms to stop dealing with the North. Given that Pyongyang is already boycotting six-party talks aimed at dismantling its nuclear program over the earlier measures, the plan could be the death knell for the negotiations. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

On 11 April 2006, the Chosun Ilbo reported that the US has announced new measures to stop the DPRK's flow of money from alleged illicit activities by banning US citizens and companies from using DPRK vessels. It goes into effect on May 8. The legislation applies to all US citizens and permanent residents anywhere in the world, as well as all companies and organizations based in the US including their subsidiaries. Penalties for breaking the new law are stiff: up to 10 years in prison, and fines of up to US$250,000 for an individual or up to $1 million for a company.

The JoongAng Ilbo on 11 Apr 2006 reported that after publishing a directive in April prohibiting US entities from owning, leasing, operating or insuring any DPRK ship, the US government asked Seoul to take similar measures. An official here said that no ROK companies or individuals have any such connections with DPRK ships, even in inter-Korean trade or when shipping aid goods. Even so, acceding to such a request would send a signal to the DPRK that Seoul would probably consider counterproductive to its reconciliation policies toward the DPRK. That assessment seemed to be borne out by the official's comment that Seoul has told Washington it would "take note" of the US request, but that no action would be taken "in light of the current situation."

Russia not given evidence on N. Korea's counterfeiting (May 2006) On 7 May it was reported that Russian Ambassador to South Korea Gleb Ivashentosov said that his country has no substantial evidence or information on North Korea's counterfeiting alleged by the United States. He stressed that the U.S. should provide concrete evidence for the allegations since Washington raised the suspicions. (SITE NOTE: It is rather strange that a Russian diplomat should make this announcement AFTER China has made its own investigation and allegedly come to the same conclusion. The ROK newspaper reporting continues to allude to the US "evidence" as "circumstantial" -- and not concrete.)

Bank of China Freeze DPRK Accounts over Counterfeiting Chinese Currency (July 2006) It was reported on 24 Jul North Korea is suspected of having printed fake Chinese currency, which prompted the Bank of China (BOC) to freeze all of its North Korean accounts in an apparent retaliation. Quoting a number of unidentified U.S. officials, Rep. Park Jin of the GNP said the freezing of North Korean accounts at the BOC is tantamount to virtual imposition of sanctions by Beijing on the North. The GNP lawmaker claimed Washington may have been aware of the Chinese bank's move as early as late last year when its Treasury Department imposed sanctions on a Macau bank suspected of circulating counterfeit U.S. dollars printed in the North. The ROK Unification Ministry claims no knowledge of any such action by China.

He later claimed Beijing may be working with Washington to crack down on Pyongyang's alleged counterfeiting of Chinese yuan. Following U.S. dollars, North Korea is also counterfeiting China's currency, the yuan. The claim, if found true, is expected to further complicate the stalled negotiations over North Korea's nuclear weapons program as the United States has been looking to China to convince the North to return to the multilateral talks. (Source: Yonhap News.)

Singapore: N. Korea's New Money Haven Recently, a source in Washington D.C. said, "With the American administration raising its pressure on North Korea's funds in Macao, North Korea attempted to change its bank to Singapore, and the new haven is known as a small bank referred to as O Bank."

On August 3, a U.S. government official also said in an interview with Dong-A Ilbo, "O Bank is a problem bank. This bank is on the list of banks related to North Korea, which the U.S. government keeps a close eye on." With the U.S. tracing its funds, North Korea tried to disperse them, and by the official's statement it was officially confirmed that Singapore, an international finance city, has become one of the safe havens." There are also speculations that North Korean Foreign Minister Baek Nam Soon's two visits to Singapore around the time of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, had a connection to the funds. (Source: Donga Ilbo.)

Vietnamese Close Down North's Bank Accounts (Aug 2006) Vietnamese banks have closed down North Korean accounts over the past few weeks, most likely forcing Pyongyang to move its money to its last remaining haven, Russia. Peter Beck, head of the International Crisis Group's Seoul office, said Nigel Cowie, general manager of North Korea's Daedong Credit Bank in Pyongyang, e-mailed him in mid-Aug and said Vietnamese banks had shut down Daedong's and other North Korea-held accounts. Daedong expected such a move by Vietnam after U.S. Treasury Undersecretary Stuart Levey visited Hanoi in early July, and had moved its funds elsewhere, but did not say where the money was moved to. Mr. Beck said it's most likely Russia. (Source: Joongang Ilbo.) The move comes ahead of Vietnam's anticipated entry of the World Trade Organisation later this year and follows the signing of bilateral trade agreement with Washington in May.

New Sanctions Expected (Sep 2006) Ranking South Korean officials in Washington told the Yonhap News Agency that the Bush administration was expected to announce a package of economic sanctions on the North after the planned summit between U.S. President George W. Bush and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun on Sept. 14 in the U.S. capital. However, the new sanctions are expected to center on sales of missiles and weapons of mass destruction following the UN sanctions. The US is looking at reimposing the economic sanctions the US lifted in 1995 and 2000 including a travel ban, a broad trade ban and restrictions on investment and remittances in response to North Korea's missile test on July 5. (Source: Korea Times.)

On 16 Oct the Korea Times reported that the DPRK has opened at least three bank accounts since its account at the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) was frozen in September last year., the reported yesterday. A report by the ROK National Intelligence Service (NIS) said that the three banks are Sberbank of Russia, Vietcombank of Vietnam and Golomt Bank of Mongolia. Stuart Levey, the U.S. Treasury Department's undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence is trying to close the account in Vietnam, the report said. As of the end of August, Asian and European banks, including the Bank of China and the United Overseas Bank of Singapore, suspended the DPRK's accounts. (See this article "Vietnamese Close Down North's Bank Accounts (Aug 2006)" for a conflicting report.)

Lifting Sanctions Denied (Nov 2006) After the North's nuclear test of 9 Oct, there was a concerted effort to bring the North back to the six-party talks. At first the North agreed without preconditions as it was faced with the UN sanctions. However, a day later the North stated it was returning to the six-party talks on the basis that talks would include the lifting of financial sanctions as well. The US stated that there could be financial talks on the "sideline" as part of the talks, but denied rumors that it was lifting sanctions. Instead, there was an announcement in Nov that the US had "new evidence" on the use of the Macao bank for money laundering by the North.

The US stated that it would discuss the sanctions with the DPRK, but it again stressed that the sanctions were part of the US law enforcement issue and not tied to nuclear issues. The position of the US remains the unchanged.

China Lifts Bank Sanctions on DPRK (Nov 2006) The Kyodo News Service reported on 21 Nov that the PRC lifted its freeze on about half of DPRK accounts in the Macao bank that had allegedly been used in money-laundering operations. The PRC lifted the freeze on less than $12 million of the DPRK's holdings "with the understanding of the United States," the report said. The partial lifting of the ban is likely to give a positive boost to the Six Party Talks, observers say. The report quoted an unidentified DPRK official as saying, "That is seen as the U.S. accepting some of our demands." The unfrozen accounts are believed to be those unrelated to the alleged financial crimes, and ones suspected of being linked to the illegal activities are still under restrictions, the report said. The action was done with US approval as a show of good faith in smoothing the way to the resumption of six-party talks in Dec 2006.

U.S. Offers Compromise Over N.Korea's Dollar Forgeries (Dec 2006) The U.S.said the question of North Korea's frozen accounts in the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia could be resolved early if North Korea punished counterfeiters of U.S. dollars and destroyed their equipment. Washington and Pyongyang formed a working group in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing to discuss the issue of North Korea's frozen bank accounts in Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in Macao. Four members of the North Korean delegation, including president of the North's Foreign Trade Bank of Korea O Kwang Chol, arrived in Beijing to take part in the working group discussion. (SITE NOTE: In effect, the US was offering a face-saving move that eliminated the North admitting government involvement. In addition, there was a move to call $12 million of monies from the Hyundai Corporation as being "legal" after transferred to a small holding company and then to the Banco Delta Asia. To outsiders this move is rather strange as the US investigation was based on its "proof" that the monies were part of money laundering.)

The two sides had their first working group meeting on the U.S. financial sanctions at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing on 19 Dec 2006. Sources in Beijing said Daniel Glaser, the U.S. Treasury Department's deputy assistant secretary for terrorist financing and financial crimes, explained law enforcement procedures to the North Korean group chief Oh Gwang-chul and proposed the solution.

The reasons the U.S. was more willing to resolve the matter by this route, pundits said, are that the Treasury had as good as wrapped up its investigation and that Washington felt it needed to make visible progress. Progress in the working group depended on North Korea's willingness to hold those responsible for making the so-called supernotes to account. During the discussion, the U.S. suggested the financial reports done by its Treasury Department to North Korea. The report said the North's bank accounts in BDA have been used to launder money, distribute counterfeit U.S. dollars, and trade weapons. With the report, Washington asked Pyongyang to try to prevent such illegal acts from recurring, but Pyongyang is said to have refused to acknowledge most of the claims.

There was clearly a turning point in Washington's attitude. Ever since it froze the accounts, the U.S. was adamant that the North Korean regime must be held to account for the forgeries and rejected any face-saving solution whereby the North would punish nominal culprits as if they had acted independently -- the very option it proposed. Sources in Beijing noted that Pyongyang too had changed its tune. They said the fact that the North did not insist on China's official Diaoyutai Guesthouse, which is "neutral territory", as a negotiating venue and agreed to meet at the U.S. mission sent a positive signal. They also say North Korea's choice of Oh, a financial expert, to head its delegation showed it was willing to make substantial progress.

North Korea's delegation in a March meeting on the problem in New York was headed by the Foreign Ministry's U.S. chief Li Gun. A diplomatic source in Beijing said the two sides were unlikely to resolve the entire problem in the first meeting, but added it was "safe to say that the atmosphere was not bad" at this early stage. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

At Diaoyutai in Beijing, one-on-one talks between the U.S. and North Korea and talks among envoys from the six countries of the nuclear talks were held separately to discuss the issue of the denuclearization of North Korea. A diplomat in Beijing said, "North Korea's voice among the envoys has toned down at the talks on Tuesday compared to the strong stance it showed during its keynote speech on 18 Dec. During the speech, the North suggested "disarmament talks" -- meaning nuclear disarmament of both North Korea and US. This was immediately rejected by the US. Several diplomats in Beijing stated that although the communist country maintained prerequisites which it demands for denuclearization, such as lifting financial sanctions against the North and dropping the U.S. hostile policy toward Pyongyang, it didn't even mention some of its previous demands and refrained from using strong words. South Korea also held bilateral talks with the North at Diaoyutai on 19 Dec and supposedly "persuaded" Pyongyang to accept programs to implement the denuclearization and related measures altogether. Many anticipate that North Korea will use the working group discussions as the counteracting card until it induces more economic aids including the supply of light-water reactor, even if it comes to a point in the future where North Korea has to back up a step. (Source: Donga Ilbo.)

A diplomatic source in Beijing said the two sides are unlikely to resolve the entire problem in the first meeting, but added it was "safe to say that the atmosphere was not bad" at this early stage. If North Korea welcomes the change in U.S. attitude and cooperates in resolving the problem, the U.S. may agree to lift the sanctions on North Korea's foreign currency supplies and the two sides can make headway on dismantling the North's nuclear program. It remains to be seen if the North will take the bait since it claimed in Tuesday's meeting to have been just another victim of the dollar forgeries. Pundits predict it will take time before Washington's new attitude is delivered to the North Korean leadership and it gives instructions how to respond. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

Suddenly the talks hit a snag. The New York Times on 21 Dec reported that talks between the US and DPRK hit a significant obstacle today, as diplomats said the two sides sharply disagreed over whether relaxing an American-led crackdown on the Pyongyang regime's financial transactions should be part of any deal to roll back its nuclear program. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said today that North Korean negotiators were determined to link the two issues, and that the United States is equally determined not to. The chief envoy of Japan described the situation as "severe" and said that he saw "no prospects for an agreement."

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MISSILE CRISIS

Potential Missile "Test" Launches (May 2006) On 19 May, reports stated that South Korean and U.S. military authorities detected some signs of activity near a missile unit in North Hamkyong Province earlier this week. Korean and American intelligence agencies used high-tech surveillance devices such as spy satellites to capture movements of trailers carrying missile-like objects at a missile test site in Musudan-ri (formerly Daepo-dong), Hwadae-gun, North Hamgyong Province. U.S. spy satellites can differentiate between objects as small as 10 to 15 centimeters from 600 kilometers above ground level, enabling it to survey movements of North Korea's missile activities. "We have been closely watching the North after increased movement of trailers and other materials earlier this week through the Korea-U.S. alliance's KH-11 military satellite," a military official said requesting to remain anonymous.

However, the ROK said they were still analyzing whether North Korea is moving to launch a missile or if it is merely demonstrating against U.S. pressure to give up its nuclear weapons programs. Japan's Kyodo News and public broadcaster NHK, quoting unidentified South Korean sources, said satellite pictures showed there has been activity around a site in northeastern North Korea, such as the movement of trailer trucks carrying what appeared to be missiles. However, a military analyst said, "We cannot confirm that a missile launch is being prepared until North Korea starts putting fuel into the missile," adding that "We see it as North Korea's challenge against pressure asserted by the U.S." North Korea had issued a memorandum in March last year that stated, "We are not obliged to withhold the launching of missiles," leading to speculations that North Korea may be trying to retract an agreement against the test-firing of missiles. (SITE NOTE: That 90 percent of all North Korean intelligence comes from the US, this response is "political" as the ROK tries to play patty-cake with the North. The analogy is that the North Korea has a gun to my head, but I won't know if his intentions are aggressive or not until he pulls the trigger. Thus I'll just wait and see.)

The ROK Ministry of Defense publicly stated that they were checking on the "veracity" of the reports and has played down its significance. South Korea's Defense Ministry said that it was monitoring the situation closely and trying to verify the facts through several channels. Though in the middle of launch preparations, it was uncertain if there would be a launch. ``We are trying to confirm the report's authenticity, but so far I don't believe it is highly trustworthy,'' a senior ministry official said, asking not to be named. (SITE NOTE: If the report supposedly came through the use of THEIR KH-11 military satellite, we wonder why they don't deny that report --.unless the report is true. This same ROK tactic was used on denying the North's counterfeit "supernote" operations -- denying there was proof. The end is to not antagonize the North.)

According to NHK, the missile could be a Taepdong-II ballistic missile that could reach as far as the U.S. mainland, citing unnamed U.S. government sources. The 32-meter-long (115 feet) Taepdong-II has a firing range of more than 6,700 kilometers (4,200 miles), making it capable of hitting Alaska with a light payload, experts say. If the missile was a modified version of the Taepdong-II, it could have a range of 15,000 kilometers (9,300 miles), which would cover the entire United States.


Taepodong I & II

Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe said his government didn't see any imminent danger of a missile launch. ``In fact, we understand that it (the missile) has been brought to the site. But we are not sure about any subsequent moves.''

In 1998, North Korea stunned the region by test-firing a long-range Taepdong-I ballistic missile over Japan into the Pacific Ocean. A Taepdong missile is described as a two or three-stage ballistic missile with an estimated range of up to 4,000 kilometers (2,486 miles). North Korea announced a moratorium on long-range missile tests in 1999 but has since test-fired short-range missiles many times, including two in early March. In testimony to the U.S. Congress in March, Gen. B. B. Bell, USFK commander, said North Korea was believed to be preparing to field a new ballistic missile capable of reaching Okinawa, Guam and probably Alaska.

Tokyo has been in a hurry to bolster its missile defenses ever since and in March hailed the successful testing of an interceptor missile with the United States as part of joint defense research begun in 1999. In December, the Japanese government officially approved a plan to develop a more advanced missile defense system with the United States. (Source: Korea Times and Korea Herald.) (SITE NOTE: What was curious was that the heightened tension comes at a time when the US stated that it might be changing its stance and would consider a change of the armistice to a peace treaty. A missile launch will stiffle any chance of a peace treaty -- and spur on the Japanese preparations for possible preemptive missile strike capabilities (which it is capable of doing very easily) for its own protection. This is suspected as part of the North's brinkmanship strategy. While having talks with the South to ease military tension, North Korea focused on disputing the Yellow Sea boundary and has been preparing in secret to launch a missile. While pretending to be eager to have talks with the South, North Korea is playing a game of brinksmanship in order to survive heavy U.S. pressure, such as economic sanctions, by increasing military tensions. If there is a launch, the US and Japan will act accordingly. China would respond to the North also, because stability on the Korean Peninsula is one of China's major concerns. South Korea, however, seems to continue to support the North with its "look into the veracity of reports" attitude -- the same response to the counterfeit "supernote" issue. It continues to hold high-level military negotiations on measures to ease military tension while North Korea develops nuclear weapons and threatens to fire missiles.)

Imminent Launch??? (June 2006) Pyongyang is in the final stages of launching a Taepdong-2 ballistic missile, the conservative Sankei newspaper reported, citing unnamed government sources. The report did not explain what those final preparations involved. The U.S. military has dispatched a spy plane and the Japanese Defense Agency has sent a destroyer with advanced reconnaissance equipment and an attack aircraft loaded with radar-jamming electronics to gather information, the report said. In Seoul, a senior South Korean intelligence official said his agency knows about the North's preparation of a missile launch through sources other than satellite photos. 'It remains unclear whether North Korea is demonstrating its capability or is really preparing to fire a missile,' the official said on condition of anonymity due to the sensitive nature of the information.

Sankei reported that radio communications intercepted near a missile test-site in northeast North Korea changed in early May, signaling an imminent launch. The newspaper did not elaborate. An advanced version of Taepdong-2, believed to have a range of 9,300 miles, could travel as far as the west coast of the United States, although there are widespread doubts about its reach and accuracy. The North's missile capability is one of the most prominent security concerns in northeast Asia, along with the isolated nation's nuclear program. (Source: Topix.net, Associated Press.)

US says Missile Refueled -- ROK says Missile Not Fueled (June 2006) The New York Times on 19 Jun quoted an unnamed U.S. government official as saying North Korea appears to have completed fueling a long-range ballistic missile, with satellite intelligence suggesting "that booster rockets had been loaded onto a launch pad, and liquid-fuel tanks fitted to a missile at a site in North Korea's remote east coast." Warnings that North Korea appears close to test-firing an intercontinental missile are escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula. North Korea appears to have completed injecting liquid fuel into a long-range ballistic missile, the final stage before the launch, intelligence authorities in the U.S. and Korea said. They stated that the missile should either be fired or the fuel removed within 24 hours of fuel injection. All that remains is "the click of a button," a Foreign Ministry official said. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

However, suddenly the ROK government reversed itself stating the missile was not fueled, that it was most likely a satellite launch -- and takes a stance that the US is wrong. Seoul thinks even if a missile is fired, it is not necessarily a military device, and sees reports in the U.S. and Japanese press that claim a launch is imminent as unreliable. The South Korean government said it cannot conclude that liquid fuel has been injected into the rocket, as U.S. reports claim, nor whether the missile carries a warhead or a satellite. Indeed, authorities here say the fact that the missile launch pad is being put up above ground in full view of the spy satellites makes it more likely that the North aims to launch a satellite. (SITE NOTE: This is the original ROK stance that there is no evidence that the North Koreans intended to fire the missile -- but then they also say the same things about the North's counterfeit operations as well. As the intelligence the ROK uses for its decision-making comes from US satellite imagery, we wonder how they come up with their outlook. The ROK reasoning of "above-ground" equates to a "satellite launch" is so incredibly lame that it insults one's intelligence.) (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

But bad weather near Musudanri, North Hamgyong Province where the launch pad is deployed is reportedly making it difficult to conduct an immediate test launch of the Taepodong 2-type missile. "It's likely that weather conditions will remain unfavorable to a test on Monday," a military official said. Washington said it would not sit idle. "We, of course, will take necessary preparatory steps to track any potential activities and to protect ourselves," State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said. Such "protective steps" are presumed to include intercepting the missile at an early stage with Aegis destroyers in the East Sea. There was no comment as to whether the 7th Fleet Aegis destroyers and Japanese Aegis destroyers were on location in the East Sea.

Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso warned if the missile is dropped on Japan, "it will be regarded as an attack." Tokyo says it will refer the matter to the UN Security Council for sanction. Both the U.S. and Japan are publicly discussing sanctions against the North in the event of a missile test, and even a sea blockade. The Pentagon spokesman and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice again referred to any North Korean launch as 'a provocative act.' And Secretary Rice says she has been coordinating possible responses with allies. Secretary Rice says a launch would violate North Korea's own moratorium, and she says maintaining the moratorium is part of the agreement North Korea signed last September to pursue a diplomatic solution to the dispute over its nuclear program. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

The Defense Department says in the absence of any statement by the North Korean government it will not be possible to know whether a widely expected missile launch is a test or an attack. The Pentagon spokesman hinted to reporters that if North Korea launches a missile the United States might use its new missile defense system (MDS). The MDS relies on radars and other systems on the ground and on satellites to detect missile launches and deploy interceptors to shoot them down. The system has had some recent successes, but is not yet fully operational. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.) (SITE NOTE: If the Aegis SM3 missiles attempt to shoot down the Taepodong missile and fail, it would be a massive public relations blow to the MDS program. If the Aegis do shoot down the missile and it falls on Japanese land, what then? Is the North Koreans at fault for an attack on Japan? Given the options for the US-Japan, there is also the option of simply letting the missile fly. However, once the missile overflies Japanese territory, then what? Japan stated it would go to the UN, but there are other more terrifying options that enter the picture. Whatever happens, it will be messy.)

Japan now appears very likely to accelerate work on implementing recently enhanced security arrangements with the US and bilateral cooperation on a missile defense system. In April 1996, then prime minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and then US president Bill Clinton issued a joint security declaration in Tokyo reaffirming the importance of the bilateral security alliance in the post-Cold War era. The next year, Japan and the US adopted new defense cooperation guidelines to flesh out the declaration.

Beginning in May 1999, Japan set about enacting laws needed to put these agreements into effect. The government initially faced opposition the Diet (Japan's parliament). But the increased sense of crisis among many Japanese over threats posed by North Korea smoothed the way for passage, helped by provocations from Pyongyang.

Heading the list of provocations was the multi-stage Taepodong-1 missile the North sent without warning over Japan into the northern Pacific in August 1998. Also, two North Korean spy ships were spotted in March 1999 in Japanese territorial waters off the Noto Peninsula, central Japan. In December 2001, a North Korean spy ship blew itself up and sank after a fire fight with Japan Coast Guard patrol boats in waters off the Amami Islands, Kagoshima prefecture.

North Korea's 1998 Taepodong-1 missile launch also spurred Tokyo to begin joint technological research with Washington on a missile defense system the following year. In December last year, the Koizumi government formally committed to the joint development of a new sea-based interceptor missile, called the Standard Missile-3 (SM3), as a main pillar of the US-led system. The joint development cost is estimated at a maximum of $2.7 billion, with Japan shouldering up to $1.2 billion and the US paying the rest.

Japan also decided in late 2003 to introduce a defensive system, using existing interceptor missiles, by 2007. Well over 100 Patriot Advanced Capability 3, or PAC3, surface-to-air missiles will be procured by the end of fiscal 2010. PAC3 missiles are intended to hit incoming missiles at an altitude of up to 20 kilometers that have escaped missiles launched from Japanese destroyers.

In July last year, Japan revised the Self-Defense Forces law to allow the Defense Agency chief to order emergency missile interceptions without waiting for approval from the prime minister and the cabinet. Since North Korean missiles would reach Japanese territory in about 10 minutes, the defense chief could not afford to follow normal procedures.

On June 23, Japan and the US signed an agreement to formally begin the joint development of an advanced SM3. And recently, the Bush administration reportedly notified Tokyo that it would deploy PAC3 missiles at a base in Okinawa by year's end. The deployment will be the first time the surface-to-air missiles have been installed to defend US forces in Japan from possible North Korean missile attacks.

On June 22, a US Navy ship intercepted a medium-range missile warhead above the earth's atmosphere off Hawaii in the latest test of the US missile defense program. The US said the test had been scheduled for months and was not prompted by indications that North Korea was planning to test launch a long-range missile. The Japanese destroyer Kirishima practiced tracking the target, marking the first time that a Japanese Aegis destroyer had participated in a US interception test. (Source: Asia Times.)

Roh Moo-hyun Snubbed (June 2006) When the missile issue reached a critical stage, Bush called the leaders of Japan, Russia, and China. He neglected to phone South Korean president Roh Moo Hyun, though South Korea is a key ally in the region. The two presidents haven't talked by phone for nearly a year even though, in addition to the missile crisis, the two countries are in the midst of a major restructuring of the military alliance and a proposed free trade agreement. A summit in Washington was hastily patched together for September, but Bush will not likely escort the South Korean leader to Graceland as he did for Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi. The harshest blow that the Bush administration can strike against the ROK government it doesn't particularly like is to withhold any support for South Korea's policy of engaging the North.

At the same time, the launch preparations came just before the United States conducted one of its largest military exercises in the Asia-Pacific in decades. "Valiant Shield," which had been months in planning, brought together three aircraft carriers, 30 ships, 280 aircraft, and 22,000 troops for five days of maneuvers. More critically, China for the first time had observer status for the exercises. From Pyongyang's point of view, it's bad enough that Japan, South Korea, and the United States all test their toys together. But when they invited China to the playground as well ­- even in the interests of overall conflict management ­- don't expect North Korea to sit quietly on the sidelines. (Source: http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0652Feffer.html.)

North Korea fires Missiles (July 2006) On 5 July North Korea test-fired at least six missiles over the Sea of Japan, including a Taepodong-2 intercontinental missile that apparently failed or was aborted 42 seconds after it was launched. The launches took place over more than four hours. A seventh missile was launched some 12 hours later. At least six missiles were launched early in the morning and a seventh some 12 hours later, officials in Japan and the ROK said. Russia said the DPRK fired 10 missiles, but the report from a senior general could not be immediately confirmed.

The Taepodong-2 was launched in a northern launch site. Further south, the North fired Scud-C and Rodong missiles. Six missiles, of which two are said to be short-range, fell into the East Sea between North Korea and Japan. The missiles that the North fired from southern sites appeared to be a mix of two short-range Scud-C missiles and four intermediate-range Rodong missiles, of the kind that the North has sold to Iran, Pakistan and other nations.

(SITE NOTE: Though not publicly stated, the impression is that North Korea used the tests to show that it had the power to attack Japan at will since the Rodong missile "tested" has the ability to reach anywhere in Japan. The fact that it was a mass of missiles also made it obvious to the Japanese that the North was sending its message directly to the Japanese public -- but also indirectly reminding its "brother" that it could also be a target. Kim Jong Il is not only trying to get the attention of the international community, he is reminding the North Korean military that he has their interests at heart. North Korea is still under a "military-first" regime. This is a dangerous game.)

While the test itself was a sign of North Korea's defiance of the United States, for the administration, the outcome was as favorable as officials could have hoped for: the North's capacity was called into question, and the North's enigmatic leader, Kim Jong Il, has now put himself at odds with the two countries that have provided him aid, China and South Korea. However, this time China may agree to take up the issue because it must be aware of the seriousness of the situation and because of its position as the chair of the six-party nuclear talks. But Beijing's support for sanctions appears unlikely. Among the participant countries in the talks, China, Russia and South Korea have advocated a softer approach to Pyongyang, while the US and Japan have taken a harder line.China and Russia appear unlikely to agree to economic sanctions against Pyongyang despite the tests, thus nullifying the threats of international sanctions by Japan and the US.

In 1999, a year after testing a Taepodong long-range rocket and failing to put an intended satellite into orbit, Kim Jong Il declared a moratorium on all missile testing. North Korea was offered an economic "carrot" package to advance a deal that would have traded its missile program for a package of various goodies. This followed the 2002 moratorium extension. However, since the Bush administration never followed up on this initiative and since rocket launches do NOT violate any international agreements, Pyongyang's decision to abandon its moratorium came as no surprise.


Japan-North Korea (Kagoshima) (Apr 2003)

The launching also makes it difficult for the South Koreans to continue their policy of providing aid and investment to the North, a program that has caused deep rifts with Washington. South Korea expressed ``profound regrets'' at the North's ``unwise act'' that would have negative consequences, saying that it would decide how to respond to the provocation through close consultations with neighboring countries. North Korea watchers in Seoul predicted that the deterioration of the security situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula and a turndown in inter-Korean relations would be inevitable. (Source: Korea Times.)

As expected, the ROK citizenry reacted according to their political bent. While some urge the government to change its North-friendly policies, others say that although the North deserves criticism, the government's pursuit of a spirit of co-existence and inter-Korean cooperation should not be shaken. ROK's business community voiced concerns that the launches of missiles by the DPRK could affect ongoing inter-Korean economic cooperation, but said their impact would not be big enough to change the overall course. The ROK government urged its allies to cope with the DPRK's latest missile launches in a cool-headed manner, questioning the usefulness of adopting a heavy-handed approach to the state. The security policy team at the presidential office Cheong Wa Dae said that the DPRK's move was politically motivated, thus requiring a political and diplomatic response.

Immediately, the United States and Japan condemned the launches. Though the Taepdong missile failure provided the North with information as it will help them diagnose what went wrong with the liquid-fueled rocket. Just hours after North Korea's provocative series of missile launches, Japan has reacted by banning the docking of the Mangyongbyon-92, a ferry that shuttles between Wonson in North Korea and Niigata, and which is the main direct link between the two countries. Additional Japanese sanctions -- including economic and financial sactions -- are in the pipeline. (Source: Asia Times.) (SITE NOTE: In 2004, Japan revised the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law to allow the government to halt trade and block cash remittances to North Korea - or to any other country, without a UN resolution. Japan also enacted a law that year that authorizes the government to ban the docking of North Korean ships, or ships that have visited North Korea, at Japanese ports. The Mangyongbyon-92 ferry had been widely considered to be among the most likely targets.)

Pyongyang has often warned that economic sanctions would be tantamount to a "declaration of war". To be sure, North Korea would suffer if Japan went that far. But the impact of the Japanese punishment would be limited unless other nations, especially China and South Korea, join in the sanctions.

Also on 5 Jul, the United Nations Security Council held an emergency, closed meeting to discuss the issue, after a request to do so by Japan's ambassador to the UN, Kenzo Oshima. The request followed an emergency meeting of Japan's national security council, convened by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. (Source: Korea Times.) Japan, backed by the US and Britain prepared a resolution demanding that nations withhold all funds, goods and technology that could be used for the DPRK's missile program. But Russia said it opposed sanctions and would prefer a statement instead of a resolution as the outcome of the meeting. (Reuters) Even before the missile tests, Japan and the US reportedly had already begun discussions on a prospective Security Council resolution harshly condemning such action. Foreign Minister Aso said recently that it would be "inevitable" for the Security Council to consider imposing sanctions on Pyongyang if a launch went ahead.

THIS MISSILE FIRING IS NOT A STRATEGIC ISSUE -- IT IS A POLITICAL ISSUE. The actual missile firings were really insignificant as there were givens before the missile launch. (1) The North will NOT attack Japan; (2) the US will NOT go to war over these "tests"; (3) China will veto any Article 7 military sanctions at the UN; and (4) South Korea will continue to render aid to the North as long as Roh is in office. The firings allowed the USFK to rub the missile reach in the face of the Roh administration to taunt them that the missile threat is real. The firings allowed the US and Japan to increase sanctions and further isolate the North. The firings allowed the North to intimidate both the South and Japan in showing they possessed missiles capable of reaching into their homelands -- without a provocative act.

The missile firings is a diplomatic GAME of one-upsmanship to apply leverage. The sanctions against the North that are hurting the North are already in place. The world will NOT sign off on a resolution that allows the UN to be drawn into a shooting war -- with all the other shooting wars going on at the time. Thus the only thing will be a "toothless" resolution that condemns the North's actions, but will NOT allow a military solution to the problem.

SITE NOTE: The following was my post on Lost Nomad blog over this incident:

Reason for firing: North had nothing to lose and everything to gain.

1) Threats of Sanctions: All talk without teeth. The US, Japan (backed by England) can't make internal sanctions work through UN. Russia and China will veto it. North knew this going into the fiasco.

The US is all bark without any bite. The US looks like a toothless tiger… This adds much to the prestige of the North's military-first regime who have just faced off against Japan and US — sort of — and won. The resolution called on all members to not support the North Korean missile programs.

(SITE NOTE: Some people took exception with this view, but everyone knew that the US would NOT go to war over this -- nor could it make its UN military action sanctions stick with the Chinese veto. These people view North Korea as the loser in this fiasco. However, all the US threats of expanded financial sanctions could already have been in place with the counterfeit money issue -- but the US does NOT want to implement them because it would shut down trade with China and Korea. In addition, the influx of aid -- though in smaller amounts -- from China, Russia and South Korea has not ceased. China continues to provide 50 percent of the food aid, while South Korea 30 percent. China continues to provide the North with oil, while the South has continued to commit BILLIONS of dollars in loans and grants. Sanctions will NOT topple the North Korean regime.)

For all the rhetoric about the self-imposed moratorium, the US had best realize that it did NOT deliver on the promised economic package that was tied to the moratorium. The 1999 moratorium — and 2002 moratorium extension — was tied to economic packages that were never realized. As there is no violation of any international treaty in testing missiles, the North was well within its rights to test these missiles — no matter how upsetting it was to its neighbors.

(SITE NOTE: The North realizes that the US will NOT negotiate in good faith. This is a given -- though some people seem to have blinders on to the real situation. Though we are not lovers of the North, we also see the situation for what it is.)

2) Threat to Japanese Reinforced: The Missile Defense System is still not developed and though the big talk the tests have only been 50 percent successful. Insiders think that it would be a 22 percent chance of "my bullet hits your bullet" scenario in a real life face off. 22 Jun the Japanese signed on for the SM-3 upgrades and will have the US PAC-3 in place by end of year…but the Japanese people need to know the fear that the North can hit them in their sleep. If I read the reports right, two missiles fired were short-range SCUD-Cs, while four were intermediate range Rodongs.

(SITE NOTE: In July 2006, the announcement that PAC-3 missiles would be set up in Okinawa and elsewhere in Japan was justified by this launch. The only thing that Japanese protestors could do was declare their cities "NO WAR ZONES" -- declaring themselves neutral -- a meaningless tactic as only the Japanese government can make this declaration.)

3) Threat to South Reinforced: Though there is the ongoing "you are my brother" routine between North and South, the idea that if the South stops giving the North blackmail money, it could turn the weapons on the South and again threaten to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire." Underlying all the b.s., the SCUD-C launches reinforce this point.

(SITE NOTE: Editiorial comment following my statement: "Pyongyang launched seven missiles on July 5. Six of them, except Taepodong-2, were either Scuds with a range of 300-500km, or Rodong, with 1,200-1,500km range. In particular, according to the South Korean military authorities, the Scud, along with the long-range guided projectiles dispatched near the truce line, is the most threatening missile to the South with its range that can reach anywhere in the South. North Korea is believed to have produced or possess more than 600 Scuds. In addition, the Scud can carry chemical warheads as well as conventional ones, empowering it to destroy South's major strategic camps or densely populated areas. So experts view that Pyongyang used mainly Scuds and Rodongs in the test to threaten South Korea with mid-and-long range missiles that can reach the South." (Source: Donga Ilbo.)

Gen. B.B. Bell immediately latched upon this item and spoke to the US Congress of the threat. The Roh administration was outraged that the USFK would interpret this in this way -- calling it an over-reaction. But the point is that this launch became a POLITICAL tool of a "perceived threat.")

4) Test Results: Even with the failure, the North gained knowledge from the failure and can improve on the design. With no fear of reprisal, why not go ahead with the tests?

(SITE NOTE: Some say that following their current rate of progress it should be 160 years before they have an operational missile -- noting the poor quality of North Korean technology. However, we can also say their supposed poor technology also gained them nuclear weapons.

Taepodong-2 On 30 Jul, the Japanese government has concluded that the Taepodong-2 missile that North Korea test-fired July 5 exploded in midair within 1.5 kilometers of the launching pad, according to a Kyodo News report. Japan previously estimated the long-range missile flew about 400 kilometers into the sea between Korea and Japan, while South Korea's military said the Taepodong-2 travelled for about 7 minutes after liftoff before it plunged into the East Sea. Tokyo's conclusion that the test was a complete failure has been reached through an in-depth analysis of Japanese and U.S. intelligence reports, Kyodo News said. The midair explosion occurred about 40 seconds after the launch and debris fell almost vertically, the conclusion suggested, according to the report. It also indicated that a booster of the Taepodong-2 failed to separate properly due apparently to an unspecified malfunction that occurred when the booster was activated right after the launch. The findings could enable Japan to release a report on the incident, possibly in early August, the report said. (Source: Yonhap News.)

SCUD-ER Tested??? The USFK reported that the SCUD missiles "may have been" the new SCUD-ER and appeared to be more accurate than the SCUD-C. We don't know how they determined this, but it is interesting how the tone shifted from inaccurate missiles to "threats." Whether a fact or a political lie, the point is that it was made into a political tool to support political objectives. Suddenly the Commander of the USFK was testifying before Congress of the threat -- while the ROK was stumbling and mumbling that it was an "over-reaction." The missile test became a political tool.)

Thus far, the winner of this fiasco is North Korea, with the South Koreans still licking the boots of the North with hog-wash statements that their latest 140 million Nampo port development will be discussed "later." Nothing's changed — only the egg thrown by the North is still running down their faces of Japan and the US.

(SITE NOTE: "Despite the multiple missiles launch of North Korea, the ROK National Red Cross decided to keep sending fertilizer to North Korea. On July 6, 5,000 tons of fertilizer was loaded onto a ship, the Seamaster (a Korean cargo boat of 6,800 tons), which left Ulsan Port on the afternoon of July 7 for Haeju in the North. The fertilizer shipment was the fifteenth to go to the North and was the last share of the promised fertilizer aid of 200,000 tons. The fertilizer was supposed to be shipped to North Korea by June 13, but had been delayed because of the difficulty of finding a ship." (Source: Donga Ilbo.) The Korean government was criticized for its handling of North Korea's large-scale missile test. Critics point out that the government is overemphasizing "careful response" and obsessed with seeking "solutions only through dialogue." President Roh remained silent on the missile tests. Instead, ministerial meetings between the two countries were scheduled to proceed as normal. The strains on the US-Japan relations were obvious. President Roh said an additional 100,000 tons of fertilizer and 500,000 tons of rice would not be sent to the North "until the crisis was over" -- meaning when the heat dies down, we will go back to business as usual.

Some blog commentators took exception with my statement that the US and Japan had "egg ... running down their faces." Though the desired threats of military action under Article 7 of the UN Charter was eliminated, it was a still a minor victory for the US and Japan. The draft of the US-Japan was substituted by the Chinese draft and Resolution 1695 was approved UNANIMOUSLY -- without the Article 7 threat of military action. We admit that the resolution being voted on UNANIMOUSLY was a victory for the US and Japan -- and the resolution did ban member nations from supporting the North Korean missile program. In this case, any sale to Venezuela by the North would be a contravention of the resolution. Yes, it was a success for the US and Japan -- and as the US would never go to war over this issue to start off with, it met their POLITICAL goals.)

(SITE NOTE: The right to give local missile commanders permission to launch missiles in self-defense was granted as the normal procedures would not permit sufficient reaction time also broached this issue. The PAC-3/SM-3 missiles were simply defensive use -- not offensive. A preemptive strike would be an offensive action that would violate the peace constitution intent. The use of the preemptive strike as a "defensive measure" still would have to be debated in the National Assembly. In addition, the coalition government is also made up of a pacifist party which would object to this provision. Preemptive strike capability is an offensive measure and a highly divisive issue.)

The tenuous legal basis for this resolution was that the 2006 tests (as in 1998) "endangered civil aviation and shipping through its failure to provide adequate advance notice without prior notification to the countries in the region." Although the DPRK was allegedly not in compliance with its NPT commitments and IAEA obligations, its withdrawal from the NPT and IAEA have rendered these issues moot from a legal perspective. Linking the DPRK's nuclear weapons program to its missile program is a purely political act by the Security Council as there are no legal restraints on UN member states from developing missiles. The DPRK is legally required to issue notices-to-airmen (NOTAMs) as a signatory to Annex 11 of the Convention on International Civil which contains explicitly international requirements to coordinate such activities well in advance so as "to avoid hazards to civil aircraft and minimize interference with the normal operations of such aircraft." The coordination is specified in Annex 15 and entails establishing dissemination channels to whom DPRK NOTAMS are sent (and from whom the DPRK receives NOTAMS­these are not exactly the same). After the 1998 rocket launch (that like the July 5 firing, failed), the ICAO Council noted that objects fell into the ocean near Sanriku, Japan, and into international airspace through which passes airway A590, the East Asia-North American aviation trunkline over which 180 commercial flights pass per day. It called on all contracting states to comply with the Convention.

The customary practice of states that commandeer international ocean space for short-term military use it to issue warnings called notices-to-mariners (NOTMARs). Under "Navigation Warnings" found in Chapter V, Regulation 4 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, the DPRK is obliged to issue NOTMARS having been a member state since 1986. Its failure to do so when it fired a long-range rocket in 1998 led to IMO Resolution A.706(17) and an MSC Circular 893 issued 21 December 1998. Like the ICAO, these noted that objects from the 1998 DPRK rocket launch fell into waters near Japanese coast that contain major shipping lanes and fishing grounds. The Circular called on member governments to attach the greatest importance to safety of navigation and avoid taking any action which might adversely affect shipping engaged in international trade, and strictly comply with the recommendations contained in the foregoing resolution concerning navigational warnings so that operations do not endanger safety of navigation.

However, the NOTMAR requirement appears to be less stringent than with NOTAMs. The United States, for example, sometimes does not issue NOTMARs for the rockets that launch ostensibly secret satellites. Press reports have also mentioned that the DPRK did advise Russia of pending maritime danger zones which seems likely given the fact that some of the shorter-range missiles did splash down inside Russia's 200 mile exclusive economic zone (although outside the designated danger zones indicating that these rockets may not be very accurate!). (Source: Nautilus: Hayes.)

(SITE NOTE: The resolution: "3. Requires all Member States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to exercise vigilance and prevent missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and technology being transferred to DPRK's missile or WMD programmes; "4. Requires all Member States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to exercise vigilance and prevent the procurement of missiles or missile related-items, materials, goods and technology from the DPRK, and the transfer of any financial resources in relation to DPRK's missile or WMD programmes; (See Resolution.)

This is a major boost to the US attempt to place a financial stranglehold on the DPRK. A major portion of income comes from the sale of the SCUD-Cs overseas. The latest was revealed to be by President Chavez of Venezuela. Other buyers are Iran and a few African countries such as Oman.)

China and Russia, two veto-wielding Council members that strongly opposed earlier drafts of the resolution, both welcomed adoption of the amended measure. Ambassador Wang Guangya of China, North Korea's closest ally, expressed hope that the Council's unanimous action would encourage all parties to act calmly, and continue diplomatic efforts for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

South Korea which did not support any resolution that included the Article 7 provisions for sanctions, was satisfied with the outcome as "an appropriate measure." South Korea expected to resolve various issues on North Korea through dialogue. However, the impact to various programs from Kaesong to the tourism of Mount Kumgang needed to be assessed. The Unification ministry held emergency meetings to review the impacts. (Source: Yonhap News.)

As expected, the North ranted that it would continue its missile tests as its sovereign right. However, to do so would be counterproductive and it would not gain anything. However, it left in suspense what it actually will do.

Roh Silence Over Launches Criticized (July 2006) President Roh Moo-hyun maintained his silence over the row over the handling of the missile launches. He was asleep when the launches took place -- and the the responsible agencies did not opt to wake him up. The case was reported to President Roh at about 5:00 a.m. and the government announced it to the public at 10:10 a.m -- hours after the Japanese and other nations had issued rebukes over the launches. The ROK's belated announcement did not seem to be hard enough to many Korean conservatives. The ROK government stated the situation was "seriously disappointing." When compared with the announcement made by the U.S. and Japan, saying, "We will respond in a quick and decisive way", the ROK statement lacked resolve. (Source: Donga Ilbo.)

Cheong Wa Dae said the lack of response was rooted in a strategic decision. "President Roh's response to the issue is a result of a hard decision not to exaggerate the security tensions the North's missile launches have created in the eyes of the public," said Suh Choo-suk, the senior presidential secretary for security policy. "North Korea's intention is to inflate the issue, and a cool-headed and reasonable response can be a proper and effective way to thwart that intention." Another official close to the matter said the missile test "gave the U.S. a justification to further isolate North Korea, and Japan to pursue military expansion. It's only natural that we take a different position." The South Korean president's office on 9 Jul accused Japan of making a "fuss" over North Korean missile launches, suggesting Tokyo was contributing to the tense situation. "It is not any good to heighten tensions on the Korean Peninsula or aggravate the South-North relations and neither does it help to solve the nuclear issue or the missile issue," said a statement from President Roh Moo-hyun's office. "There is no reason to fuss over this from the break of dawn like Japan, but every reason to do the opposite," the statement said.

It also turned out the ROK was notified by the US of the launches showing the ROK has NO surveillance capability of its own. The ROK military were completely blind to the SCUD and Rodong launches -- giving the impression to the Korean people that the defenders were totally unprepared. Immediately the conservative news papers started to condemn Roh for his handling of the affair.

In response, there was only continued silence from Roh. The opposition GNP launched strong criticism against President Roh on 10 Jul for his ``security insensibility" as Chong Wa Dae defended its coolheaded approach to the DPRK's missile tests on 5 July. But in order to quell criticism of that silence, the Blue House released a statement yesterday which said that the situation was not a national security emergency and that the DPRK wasn't targeting anyone with the missiles. The GNP reacted furiously. "The claim that the missiles were targeting no one is a de facto defense argument for the North," said Lee Jeong-hyeon, vice spokesman of the party. "While remaining silent about the provocation that threatens the people's lives, the Blue House decided to criticize the media and the opposition party instead."

Finally on 12 Jul -- a week after the launches -- Roh broke his silence by stating, "No matter how hard I try, it just eludes my understanding," He said he felt the need to speak about the crisis after a series of high-profile Japanse politicians mentioned the possibility of a "pre-emptive strike" against the DPRK. Mr. Roh said such talk from Japan might "aggravate the situation."

President Roh on 19 Jul expressed concern about intensifying international pressure on North Korea, which he said would "increase unnecessary tensions and confrontation." He also criticized "some of the others" who are raising regional tension levels with confrontational solutions for diffusing the North Korean missile crisis. "The others" are seen to indicate Japan, which has assumed a hard-line stance toward Pyongyang's missile launch earlier this month. "The president made it clear that South Korea will try to solve the North Korean problem through peaceful means and dialogue so as not to aggravate the situation in the aftermath of the U.N. Security Council resolution," said Song Min-soon, the president's top security aide. He added that the president vowed to seek measures for bringing North Korea back to the stalled six-party talks.

Then on 21 Jul the Blue House chief of staff, Lee Byung-wan, slammed Japan, calling its reaction to North Korea's missile launches "truly evil." He labeled Tokyo's talk of a pre-emptive attack on the North's missile facilities as a sign of "militarism and expansionism." Mr. Lee complained that Tokyo was leading the charge to impose international sanctions on Pyongyang.


The Other Non-existent WMDs (Wolverton) (Jun 2003)

North Claims Missile Firings to "Defend" South during Ministerial Meeting (July 2006) The decision to continue with the ministerial meeting between the ROK and DPRK despite the launches irked many -- including Uri Party members. This indicated that though the ROK would continue its rapprochement process at all costs. The ROK said it would "directly challenge" the DPRK about the tests at inter-Korean ministerial talks -- while critics stated that there was no need for the talks at all given the circumstances. Seoul said it would withhold promised aid to the DPRK until the missile crisis is over. However, that decision did not include a delay in the provision of the last promised fertilizer shipment to the DPRK that left port on 8 Jul bound for the DPRK with the last 20,000 tons of that assistance.

North Korea on 12 Jul demanded the South provide it with promised rice aid, apparently oblivious to the international diplomatic tensions it caused by test-firing several missiles only a week ago. The demand came at an inter-Korean ministerial meeting in Busan. North Korea's Senior Cabinet Counselor Kwon Ho-ung in his keynote speech hailed the impoverished country's "Songun" or military-first ideology, which he claimed was helping the South protect its security and benefited "a vast majority" of South Koreans. Kwon Ho-ung said the DPRK's military first policy "makes South Korea safe, and a large number of South Korean people benefit from it." Notable achievements of the Songun policy include Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program and missile tests and mass starvation among its people for the sake of arming the military to the teeth. The JoongAng Ilbo reported that the DPRK's chief delegate to inter-Korean talks said that the ROK should be grateful for the DPRK's emphasis on military preparedness. This was the first time the North has named South Koreans among its beneficiaries. As such, it demanded rice and raw materials aid.

Opening the meeting, Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok said the DPRK's missile salvo was destabilizing, and urged Pyongyang to return to the six-nation nuclear talks as soon as possible to settle missile and nuclear-weapons issues through dialogue. Lee Jong-seok in his speech warned things could "get out of control" if the North launches any further missiles. Lee later gave short shrift to Kwon's claims for the Songun policy. "Has anyone in the South asked the North to protect our safety?" he demanded. "North Korea can help us protect our security when it stops launching missiles and dismantles its nuclear program". Lee stated that no aid will be provided until the situation is resolved. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

Aftermath of Missile "Tests": Five-way Talks, Sanctions, Test of New Scud

• DPRK Mobilizes It was reported that just prior to the UNSC vote, the North implemented a wartime mobilization of its military forces and reserves for an "imminent invasion" -- the first time in 13 years and was not broadcast by radio or TV. In March 1993, readiness was increased when North Korea pulled out of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. (Source: Asia News.) ROK newspapers on 19 Jul reported that DPRK leader Kim Jong-il issued a special decree over the weekend ordering his troops to take emergency maneuvers and civilians to stay indoors because a war was imminent. However, the Chosun Ilbo reported that the Unification Ministry denied that the DPRK had ordered done so. The ministry said it had confirmed that Pyongyang only "heightened" its defense posture to alert level ahead of routine Seoul-Washington military exercises.
  
  
• Five-way Talks South Korea and the US on 18 Jul agreed that five-way talks without North Korea would be the best alternative to the six-way talks. South Korea's chief delegate to the nuclear negotiations, Chun Yung-woo, said, "We will not be discussing (at the five-way talks) how to pressure the North, but will discuss how to offer North Korea the incentives pledged in the Joint Statement." The concept of five-way talks first emerged last year, during another hiatus in the nuclear negotiations caused by North Korea's boycott since 2004, but shelved when North Korea returned to the talks. China has been cool to the idea, but as Chun stated it was better to have five-party talks rather none to keep the momentum of the six-party talks going. China is still concerned that the five-party framework will upset the North. The US hoped that China could be persuaded if it were to become chairman of the five-party talks.
  
  As of 19 Jul it was still not clear whether China had made a decision on whether or not to hold a "five-way" meeting as proposed by the United States and South Korea. China had not yet responded to the proposal formulated by South Korean envoy Chun Yung-woo and his US counterpart Christopher Hill who suggested a new format of talks that excludes Pyongyang. (SITE NOTE: In the end, China did not agree to the five-way talks.)
  
  
• Sanctions To Be Increased The United States may take measures to pressure North Korea should the communist regime continue to boycott six-nation nuclear talks. The frozen DPRK accounts of $24 million from the Banco Delta-Asia (BDA) is the main reason the North is boycotting the six-party talks. If proof surfaces of North Korea's suspected counterfeiting, Washington is most likely to expand its investigation into the so-called "rulers' account." The rulers' account, or ruling account, refers to North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's main money channel. The funds are divided and deposited in various countries around the world. The total amount is estimated at around $6 billion. In addition, a visiting US Treasury Department official, Stuart Levey, described Washington's policy direction to ROK government policymakers during a ROK visit from 16-18 Jul that including reinstating sanctions lifted in 1999. The ROK officials said the US sanctions Mr. Levey mentioned had been lifted in 1999 by President Bill Clinton as US-DPRK tensions eased. They included trade restrictions and licensing requirements and strict limits on the amount of money US travelers to the DPRK could spend there.
  
  International curtailment of the North's money laundering is being curtailed. The North can no longer make money withdrawals from Vietnam and Mongolia. China recently has frozen the North's accounts in its Macao branch. (NOTE: It was rumored in Aug 2006 that the North had moved its money operations to Singapore.)
  
  JoongAng Ilbo on 20 Jul reported that for 10 months, Washington has enforced a systematic plan to clamp down on cash going into the DPRK. The measures are working, experts say. Nam Sung-wook, a DPRK expert at Korea University, estimated yesterday that the recent measures have led to a 40 percent decline in DPRK leader Kim Jong-il's income. Since the 1980s, Kim Jong-il has regularly collected money from four sources: forged bank notes, arms sales, drug trafficking and money coming from ethnic Koreans living in Japan who acquire money by operating legal gambling casinos there. Mr. Kim used the money to cement his hold on the DPRK elite, such as the military.
  
  Washington was concerned about various projects, referring to the inter-Korean industrial park in Gaeseong and the Mount Geumgang tour. Washington's apprehension over South Korea's various financial projects in North Korea was voiced. The United States said the projects could be abused in the communist regime's programs of weapons of mass destruction. The ROK, however, felt that it was operating within the boundary of the U.N. resolution and legally there were no problems in regard to doing business in Gaeseong. In fact, on 21 Jul the Finance Ministry said it was forging ahead with the Ministry of Planning and Budget on a special credit guarantee program to help companies operating in the Kaesong complex take out guaranteed loans of up to W10 billion ($9.5 million). "We know there have been a variety of controversies over the complex recently, but the government plans to provide a sufficient amount of seed money so that companies working there don't suffer difficulties in securing funds," a ministry official said. Though, the ROK unification minister conceded that the North's trade with other countries, including Japan, amounts to US$4 billion every year, large parts of which could also be said to be "funneled" to develop missiles -- his country would not stop its projects with the North. The government apparently opposes any economic sanctions by Japan or suspension of its trade with North Korea.
  
  Japan was also planning to impose its own economic sanctions on North Korea in early August, a news report said. Associated Press reported on 18 Jul that Japan had begun preparations to impose its own economic sanctions on the DPRK after the hardline regime rejected a UN Security Council resolution condemning its ballistic missile tests. Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe said he had instructed officials to prepare measures to ban cash remittances to the DPRK and implement sanctions already called for in the UN resolution. The sanctions should be ready by Aug 2006. However, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said on 19 Jul that Japan would not rush to impose more sanctions on the DPRK, amid reports Tokyo may call for five-party talks on the sidelines of a regional security forum on the DPRK's nuclear ambitions. Koizumi told reporters Wednesday Japan will wait for a further response from the DPRK to a UN Security Council resolution and a Group of Eight summit statement condemning its missile test-launches. (SITE NOTE: The Japanese government had restricted remittances previously and left on mail remittances to the North -- which were monitored. The results showed a dramatic falling off of this source of funds. The other source has been the ships which allegedly smuggle drugs into Japan by dropping off the drugs off-shore prior to landing in Japan. It has yet to be seen if the Japanese will ban all North Korean ships from their waters -- though Japanese naval units have searched North Korean ships in their waters. The ban on the North Korean ferry visits may or not be lifted.)
  
  
• Rumors of a SCUD-ER Test JoongAng Ilbo reported on 18 Jul that some of the Scud missiles touched off by the DPRK among a seven-shot salvo on July 5 appear to be of a new type with longer range, a government official said yesterday. Citing intelligence from Seoul and Washington, the official said the radio signals from those missiles were different from those of a Scud-B or C model or a medium-range Rodong missile. The newer model, called the Scud ER, has an estimated range of 850 kilometers, 528 miles, and improved accuracy over its notoriously wayward predecessor. (SITE NOTE: As this news story did not appear in foreign news sources made this story suspect. The SCUD-ER development had been rumored in the past.)
  
  
• Rumors of Dissention between DPRK-PRC Joongang Ilbo reported on 18 Jul that a diplomatic source in Seoul said that last week, before the resolution was adopted, the DPRK's leader told a US visitor that Beijing was "not to be trusted." Kim Jong Il reportedly told the visitor that he doubted the PRC's willingness to help the DPRK at a "decisive moment." That muttering was probably connected to the visit of a senior delegation from Beijing to Pyongyang last week in a last-ditch effort to head off Security Council action, in which the PRC could have exercised its veto but instead voted for the resolution. (SITE NOTE: Again this story is suspect as it deals with the unsubstantiated report of a "US visitor" and listed as a "muttering".)
  
  Chosun Ilbo reported that Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok said the DPRK should abide by the UN resolution on its missile tests, and that the UN should be strict on how it applies the resolution. He said the UN resolution is about the DPRK's missiles and weapons of mass destruction, and does not prescribe economic sanctions. He said he thinks the council's weapons-related sanctions on Pyongyang should not adversely affect the on-going inter-Korean reconciliation projects, such as the Kaesong Industrial Park and tours to the DPRK's Mt. Kumgang. (SITE NOTE: In other words, the ROK was seeking to go about business-as-usual after the heat dies down. If economic sanctions are enforced by other nations, the entire Kumgang and Kaesong projects may collapse. Resolution 1695 "required all member states, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to exercise vigilance and prevent missile and missile related items, materials, goods and technology being transferred to (the DPRK's) missile or WMD programs." This did not mention economic sanctions -- though it does cut off a major source of income being the DPRK sale of SCUDs internationally.)

IFANS: North Korea using Chinese technology and Iranian assistance on Missile Development (Aug 2006) North Korea has been working closely with Iran to develop its long-range ballistic missiles, possibly using Chinese technology, and is building large bases to prepare for their deployment, a South Korean state-run think tank has said. North Korea is also building new sites near the demilitarised zone with the South for short-range missiles and is deploying missiles with improved precision that can strike most of Japan, the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) said in a report.

"The development of Taepodong-2 is conducted jointly with Iran, and it is possible China's technology is used in the development of the Taepodong-2 engine," said the IFANS report. The collaboration on the long-range Taepodong-2 is part of an international network, including Pakistan, that made it possible for the impoverished North to develop and deploy missiles despite scarce resources and limited testing, the study said. With more than 1,000 missiles of various ranges, North Korea has come to have the world's fourth-largest arsenal.

The Iranian connection in the North's missile programme dates back to the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, when Pyongyang tested and began shipping its Scud-type missiles to Iran, the report said. The Scud-based arsenal continues to be a threat because, through modification, the weapons "have achieved leaping progress in terms of precision, high mobility and quick firing rates", the IFANS report said.

The North's purchase of out-dated Soviet submarines in the 1990s, with launch and stabilisation systems intact, has raised concern that North Korea might be trying to arm them with tactical missiles, it continued. The North is building a missile command base 30 miles north of the demilitarised zone for as many as 30 mobile launch pads for the Scud-type Hwasong missiles that can hit military and industrial targets deep in the South, IFANS said. (Source: Scotsman.)

North Seeking Missile Purchasers: Pakistan (Aug 2006) The North suffering from sanctions may seek sales of its missiles despite the UN resolution that bars member states from aiding the North's missile program -- including sales. Some experts feel the tests were to convince buyers of the accuracy -- as the SCUD and Nodong missiles all landed within the 30 km by 40 km target area. This offsets claims that the SCUDs were inaccurate weapons. Some experts guess that one purchaser could be Pakistan. Pakistan is the competitor of India. International political scientists are assaying that in order for the United States to contain China, the U.S. is pursuing a strategy of augmenting Japan's military power in Northeast Asia and India's military power in Southwest Asia. Beijing is aware of this U.S. strategy toward China, and therefore it is known to be continuing its friendly relations with North Korea to keep Japan in check in Northeast Asia, and likewise cooperative relations with Pakistan to keep India in check in Southwest Asia. Even if there are purchasers, such as Pakistan or other Middle East countries, it does not mean that missiles can be directly exported. The stumbling block is the performance of the North Korean missiles. If the tests were carried out for the sale of missiles, then another crisis looms: That is, the realization of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Most missiles are carried by ship to the Middle East for sale. There is a growing danger that the PSI will become a reality on the Korean peninsula. (Source: "North Korea's Missile Launches and South Korea's Response" by Moo-jin Yang.)


Can You Hear Me Now? (Heller) (Mar 2003)

IFANS: N Korea constructing new missile bases targeting Japan (Aug 2006) On 4 Aug Japan Today reported that North Korea has been constructing new underground missile bases and silos along its east coast to deploy intermediate-range missiles targeting Japan, according to a report compiled by South Korea's state-funded research institute. "The new bases clustered along the east coastal line, in particular, are short-and medium-range missile bases aiming at Japan and U.S. military installations" on the Japanese archipelago, Yonhap News Agency quoted the report by the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) as saying. About 200 Rodong missiles with ranges of up to 2,200 kilometers and 50 SSN-6 missiles with ranges of 2,500-4,000 km are already deployed in the new bases, the report was quoted as saying. (Source: Crisscross News.)

(SITE NOTE: The SSN-6 are sea-launched weapons that have been converted for use on land. This design was refined into the first successful Soviet subarine-launched ballistic missile with MIRV warhead. This was designated as R-27U (also known as RSM-25), which was designed in 1971-72 and tested in 1972-74. This new missile could cary either three individual warheads or a single heavier warhead.

There were also concerns that submarines were bought from Soviets that had the guidance and launch platforms intact that could be converted for SSN-6 use. As of 2006, none of the subs have been converted.)

Some experts are putting out analyses that the launching pad at Anbyeon county in Kangwon province does not point toward Japan. The prediction of the missile's direction, distance, and ultimate ending point can be known through the acute angle of the launching pad. Also, experts have said that the U.S. and Japan know this angle already, but they have not made it clear. In fact, the DPRK direction, distance, and ultimate ending point of the DPRK missiles are far from what the U.S. and Japan have asserted them to be. (Source: "North Korea's Missile Launches and South Korea's Response" by Moo-jin Yang.)

Relocation of Second Missile Uncertain (Aug 2006) North Korea may have relocated a long-range missile from a launch site from which it test-fired a similar missile last month, but the reason for its removal and new location were not immediately known, Yonhap News Agency reported on 4 Aug. The purported missile was one of two Taepodong-2 missiles assembled at the launch site in the eastern district of Musudan-ri, North Hamgyong Province, where the first missile was launched on July 5 along with six other short- and mid-range missiles from other launch sites.

``The (second) Taepodong-2 seems to have disappeared from Musudan-ri in mid-July,'' an official at the Unification Ministry told reporters. The official said it was still ``uncertain'' whether the North has in fact removed the missile, but refused to elaborate where the uncertainties came from, Yonhap reported. Speculation was that it was either moved to ease the tension as North Korea seeks food aid -- or the missile was removed to make adjustments prior to another launch. The ROK government stated that the report was not backed up by "proof." (Source: Korea Herald.)

More Sanctions (Aug 2006) On 10 Aug Yonhap News reported that the US was considering additional punitive sanctions against North Korea according to visiting U.S. Rep. Dana Rohrabacher "We are going to discuss with the regional leaders here and determine what is appropriate (as a sanction) but we'll make sure that North Korea realizes that if they do launch missiles (again) they will be shot down by the U.S.," Rep. Dana Rohrabacher told Yonhap News Agency in an interview.

The key words were that the US will "shoot down" future missiles -- meaning they will test the joing Missile Defense System (MDS). We are not certain if the USFJ and JSDF have been advised of this Congressional plan. In a related story in the Japan Times, the Japanese confirmed that though the Taepodong-2 missile was inaccurate, the six other missiles were accurate in hitting targets within a 30 mile by 40 mile target area.


Isolation (Plante) (Feb 2005)

New Sanctions Expected (Sep 2006) Ranking South Korean officials in Washington told the Yonhap News Agency that the Bush administration was expected to announce a package of economic sanctions on the North after the planned summit between U.S. President George W. Bush and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun on Sept. 14 in the U.S. capital. However, the new sanctions are expected to center on sales of missiles and weapons of mass destruction following the UN sanctions. The US is looking at reimposing the economic sanctions the US lifted in 1995 and 2000 including a travel ban, a broad trade ban and restrictions on investment and remittances in response to North Korea's missile test on July 5. (Source: Korea Times.)

The US announced that the attempt to block the sale of Missiles from North Korea has been pushed forward by the UN sanctions on the sale of DPRK missiles. The only remaining countries relying on North Korean sales are Syria and Iran. Other countries have said they will no longer purchase weapons from the North.

Australia and Japan Institute Sanctions The International Herald Tribune on 19 Sep reported that Australia and Japan imposed new financial sanctions on the DPRK on 19 Sep, as the US dismissed appeals from the PRC and the ROK for a softer approach and rallied more international pressure on the DPRK to return to nuclear disarmament talks or face a slow wilting of its finances. The initial impact of the actions announced Tuesday will be limited because Australia and Japan have little trade with the DPRK, experts said. But the sanctions were another clear sign that Washington and its allies are intent on tightening a financial noose around the DPRK regime, whose conduits of hard currency from abroad the Bush administration is determined to squeeze.

China attacked Australia and Japan's sanctions. The Australian on 20 Sep reported that the PRC had begun backing away from the tough stance it took when it joined the UN resolution in July condemning the DPRK's missile launches and nuclear power bid. The PRC slammed Australia and Japan on 19 Sep for the financial sanctions they imposed on the DPRK. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said the sanctions were consistent with Australia's "strong stand against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction". The sanctions, co-ordinated between Canberra and Tokyo, target about a dozen DPRK trading companies that Australia and Japan believe are involved in Pyongyang's push for nuclear weapons. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang condemned the sanctions as escalating the standoff. "All parties should focus on how to relax the situation," he said.

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NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR TEST AND SANCTIONS

US Warns of Nuclear Test: ROK Says No Evidence (Aug-Oct 2006) According to ABC News on 18 Aug, North Korea seemed to be preparing to conduct a nuclear test in Gilju, North Hamgyeong Province. They said suspicious movements of vehicles and the unloading of large cables that may be used to connect equipment to observe the test had been spotted in the area. ABC quoted the anonymous US officials as saying there was a "real possibility" that the test will be carried out. In May 2005, cement and other materials were spotted being transported into a tunnel in the mountains, sparking fears of a nuclear test.

Korean officials indirectly hinted at the truth of the existence of the cable that the ABC report spoke of. "As of this moment, there has been no confirmation of movements toward a nuclear test," an official here said, but added Seoul considers it "a logical possibility" that the North could carry out a test. "We are closely scrutinizing the situation," he said. "Since excavation is being conducted deep in the mountains, and cable is piling up at the location, these don't seem to be normal military training operations." (Source: Chosun Ilbo editorial.) (SITE NOTE: Experts overwhelmingly agreed that South Korea would lose its power to deter the North after any test and would have to change its policies. All agreed that a nuclear test would end all hopes of normalizing diplomatic relations between the U.S and North Korea. All also predicted a fatal impact on the South Korean economy. U.S investors would naturally leave the South in the face of a security crisis on the peninsula since military strategy and economic policy are inseparable in the U.S.)

Officially, however, Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok said, "We think that the comments from the White House were intended to warn of a possibility." ROK position was that there was no concrete evidence that a nuclear test was being planned by the North. The government believes North Korea will not use its last card soon. The government is rather intentionally exposing suspicious actions of North Korea to pressure the U.S. to come to bilateral talks. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

President Bush refused to comment on a hypothetical situation that might reveal intelligence information. He said, "If North Korea were to conduct a test, it's just a constant reminder, for people in the neighborhood in particular, that North Korea poses a threat; and we expect our friends and those sitting around the table with us to act in such a manner as to help rid the world of the threat." The United States, Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea have been part of stalled talks with North Korea aimed at making the entire Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons -- and the point was made that if the test were done, South Korea rapprochement polices must change and China must consider curtailment of aid to reign in the North. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)


Do as I say, Don't do as I do (Wolverton) (Sep 2003)

Japan Confirms Activity at N. Korea Nuclear Site (Aug 2006) On 24 Aug Japan confirmed vehicle activity at a North Korean nuclear testing site, but it was unclear whether tests were imminent. Vehicles had been seen entering and leaving a nuclear testing site in the northeast of the country, the Associated Press quoted a Kyodo news agency as reporting. Minister of Unification Lee Jong-seok said Seoul has yet to secure any clear evidence, regarding the North's move to conduct what the United States calls a ``red line.'' ``We have yet to secure any clear evidence, but we believe it (a nuclear test) is possible, considering various circumstances,'' Lee told the National Assembly's Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee.

Fears Mount of North Readying for Nuclear Test (Sep 2006) Earlier in Sep, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ban Ki-moon said in Seoul that the government has already begun reviewing its response to a nuclear weapon test. But he said Seoul has not yet detected any concrete signal indicating an imminent test. The US reported that cables had been laid at a nuclear site which may indicate preparations for a nuclear test. Preparatory activities, including movements of vehicles and the unloading of large reels of cable, have allegedly been taking place outside the facility.

North Korea is determined to carry out an underground nuclear test, a British daily reported, quoting diplomats in Pyongyang. Kim Jong-il, the North Korean leader, is said to have made clear his intention to explode a nuclear device during recent talks with Russian and Chinese officials in Pyongyang, the Telegraph reported on its Web site on Saturday. ``Russian diplomats believe it is now highly probable that North Korea will officially join the nuclear club by carrying out its first underground test of an atomic device,'' the daily said.

A Russian diplomat was quoted as saying that Kim has been ``irritated'' by financial sanctions imposed last year by the United States for North Korea's alleged money laundering and other alleged illegal actions such as trade in arms and drugs. (Source: Korea Times.)

ROK "Closely" Monitoring North Activity (Sep-Oct 2006) A South Korean legislator reported that two tunnels were built with one parallel to the other. The Roh government stated that they were "closely monitoring" the situation in the North -- but still maintained that there was no evidence that a nuclear test was planned.

(SITE NOTE: The ROK intelligence is based on debriefings of North Korean defectors but most of it cannot be verified. However, the ROK does NOT share the debriefing information with the US. All other intelligence is received from Japanese or US satellite data.)

Nuke-happy Kim Jong-Il

North States it will Proceed with Test (Oct 2006) The Guardian Unlimited reported on 3 Oct that this is the first time the DPRK has explicitly, publicly announced its intent to conduct a nuclear test. The announcement was a blow to the already beleaguered diplomatic efforts and puts pressure on the US to hold direct talks with Pyongyang. The DPRK's statement gave no precise date as to when a test might occur but said it would be carried out "in a condition where safety is firmly guaranteed". The DPRK has said it has nuclear weapons in the past, but has not conducted any known test to prove its claim.

On 3 Oct, Reuters reported that a statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry said it would conduct its first nuclear test, and Washington warned it would respond to such an "unacceptable threat" to world peace. Pyongyang's announcement was condemned by neighboring Japan, and the ROK heightened its security alert. Britain said it would view a test as highly provocative, while Russia urged the DPRK to show restraint.

"The US extreme threat of a nuclear war and sanctions and pressure compel the DPRK (North Korea) to conduct a nuclear test, an essential process for bolstering nuclear deterrent, as a corresponding measure for defense," said the statement carried by the country's official KCNA news agency. It added that it would never use nuclear weapons first and would "do its utmost to realize the denuclearization of the peninsula and give impetus to the world-wide nuclear disarmament and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons."

In another article on 3 Oct, Reuters reported that US Ambassador John Bolton urged the UN Security Council to respond to DPRK's threat to conduct a nuclear test, saying it would be a grave threat to international peace and security. "Given the very strong action by the council in July condemning the North Korean ballistic missile tests, I think it's important we're prepared to follow up here," Bolton said.

The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation on 3 Oct warned that the threat from the DPRK would only continue to escalate unless the United States pursues a more effective and viable plan to engage in negotiations that will lead to its abandoning its nuclear weapons and missile programs. Leonor Tomero, a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, noted "The Administration's strategy of focusing on form over substance by insisting on negotiations only in the context of the six-party talks has clearly failed to make us safer from the North Korean nuclear threat, instead allowing North Korea to produce enough material for perhaps as many as ten nuclear weapons."

Lt. General Gard (USA, Ret.), Senior Military Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, warned "It is high time the United States negotiate in good faith and put forward a serious proposal, that would include a non-aggression pact, a promise not to threaten the North Korean regime, and economic and energy incentives, in exchange for North Korea dismantling its nuclear weapon program and accepting intrusive inspections."

Market Watch reported on 3 Oct that the yen was broadly pressured after the North Korea announced that it would test its nuclear weapon. It reported that the yen dipped against the dollar and euro on 3 Oct after news from the DPRK that it will conduct a nuclear test sparking concerns over geo-political tensions in the region.

New York Times on 3 Oct reported that DPRK experts inside and outside the Bush administration said DPRK's announcement that it plans to undertake a nuclear test was a negotiating ploy, intended to force the White House into lifting economic sanctions and holding one-on-one talks. American intelligence officials said they saw no signs that a test was imminent. But they cautioned that two weeks ago, American spy satellites picked up evidence of indeterminate activity around what is thought to be the main test site. It was unclear to them whether the activity was part of plans for a test, or perhaps a feint related to last month's visit to Washington by ROK President Roh Moo-hyun. At that meeting, Roh said the event would "change the nature" of the ROK's policy of economic engagement with the DPRK. But the two leaders did not appear to have a coordinated strategy, and a senior Asian diplomat in Washington said Tuesday that "no one is quite sure how to respond" if the test goes ahead.


Direct Talks (Sheneman) (Feb 2005)

Washington Post on 4 Oct reported that the DPRK's announcement came just as the United States, along with the ROK, was launching a new effort to persuade the government in Pyongyang to return to talks. Top aides to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have been shaping the new approach, which began after a summit meeting last month between President Bush and ROK President Roh Moo Hyun. But US officials said on 3 Oct that the government in Pyongyang, which closely monitors US statements, appears to have concluded that there is no benefit in reaching a deal. Some analysts suggested that the DPRK is bluffing to force the United States to begin bilateral negotiations, something the Bush administration has rejected as being a reward for bad behavior. Instead, Pyongyang's gambit could embolden hawks in the administration who advocate confronting the DPRK with a stepped-up campaign of isolation and sanctions, perhaps even a naval blockade. Some officials have privately argued that a nuclear test by DPRK would be a clarifying event that would make the problem apparent to the rest of the world.

On 5 Oct the Washington Post reported that the Bush administration delivered a secret message to the DPRK warning it to back down from a nuclear test, and said publicly that the United States would not live with a nuclear-armed Pyongyang government. The DPRK "can have a future or it can have these weapons. It cannot have both," Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill said on 4 Oct in remarks at Johns Hopkins University's US-Korea Institute. It was the toughest response yet from the Bush administration. Hill did not explain how the administration would respond to a test, but he said it is willing to sit with DPR Korean officials and diplomats from the region to discuss the crisis. Bush's top advisers held an emergency meeting to review a number of strategies under consideration but came away with little agreement.

On 5 Oct the Donga Ilbo reported that reported that stopping the Mt. Kumgang Tourism project and the Kesong Industrial Complex project were under consideration, though the response was still undefined. On 5 Oct Japan stated that measures to be taken in such an event include the expansion of the current ban on port calls by the Man Gyong Bong-92, the passenger-cargo ferry, to include freighters from the DPRK and other countries. Tokyo also will work toward the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution to impose sanctions, based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, and call for the international community to take concerted action on sanctions against the DPRK.

ROK-US Cooperate on Intel (Oct 2006) Korea Herald on 4 Oct 2006 reported that US and ROK intelligence authorities were on alert for any signs of "provocative activities" by the DPRK following its threat to conduct a nuclear test on 9 Oct. Experts and media reports have focused on Gilju in North Hamgyeong Province and Hagap, Mount Mumyeong and Gimdangol in Jagang Province as the renegade stated possible underground test sites. The most feasible candidate is Gilju, which the ROK and the US have kept under close observation since the 1990s, after recognizing the DPRK's construction of a pit in a mountainous valley. Some analysts said the DPRK may conduct nuclear tests in an unknown place other than those widely suspected sites. However, all acquired intelligence has been dependent on statements by DPR Korean defectors without satisfactory verification. What was significant was that in the past, the ROK had NOT shared intel with the US using the information received from North Korea debriefings. It was significant that the ROK would cooperate at this time.

After the 9 Oct test, Grand National Party lawmaker Kim Hee-jeong said on 12 Oct it was highly likely that North Korea' nuclear test was NOT conducted at Sangpeyong-ri, Kimchaek City in North Hamgyeong Province as the government publicly announced. The U.S. Geological Survey and the Japan Meteorological Agency have estimated the site to be at 41.29-N, 129.13-E, but Seoul has plumbed for Sangpyeong-ri at 40.81-N, 129.10-E based on observations by the Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources.

Experts indicate that Seoul's intelligence authorities have failed to locate the North's test site successfully, correcting the location four times. The National Intelligence Agency said initially the test took place at a mountain near the North's missile test site, Musudan-ri in North Hamgyeong Province, from where the militant regime test-fired seven ballistic missiles in early July. However, the NIS later corrected the location to Sangpyeong-ri near Kimchaek City, about 50 kilometers west of the initial location, and again to a remote mountain area in Poonggyeri in Gilju on the northeastern tip of the communist state. On Monday, the state-run Korea Seismic Institute, which had detected the North's blast, adjusted the site again to a mountainous valley in Gilju - a place U.S. intelligence authorities had located right after the nuke test. This was also identified by the NIS, with the help of U.S. intelligence, before the test as the most likely location. (Source: Korea Herald.)

(SITE NOTE: On 16 Oct it was found that South Korea's Arirang-2 satellite launched in July 2006 failed to take any pictures of North Korea at the time the reclusive country said it conducted a nuclear test, it emerged. The satellite launched on July 28 cost W266.3 billion (US$1=W955) and equipped with a precision camera capable of identifying a car on a bridge on the Han River is designed to serve military purposes. Uri Party lawmaker Kang Sung-jong said Sunday in a press release the government would have been able to observe North Korea's nuclear test site with the help of the Arirang-2 satellite but did not take a single picture of North Korea between Oct. 3, when the North announced its test plan, and Oct. 9, when it went ahead.


An artists rendering of a multipurpose satellite called Arirang 2. The satellite was launched at Plesetsk, Russia, in July. [Korea Aerospace Research Institute]

As it happened, the satellite was passing over the Korean Peninsula at around 10:35 a.m. on Oct. 9, when the test was conducted, but it only took pictures of South Korea, Kang said. "This was confirmed by administration documents submitted by the government and answers give by the intelligence authorities," he added. An official with the Korea Aerospace Research Institute said, "When it comes to satellite photos, terrestrial observation centers determine the coordinates where pictures will be taken, and the satellite takes and sends them." He said the government decides the coordinates and sends them to the institute, which has no influence over them. "It was not until the Wednesday morning after the North conducted the nuclear test on Monday that the government started taking pictures of North Korea via the satellite," Kang said. "I put the question why it didn't but could get no clear answer." A senior KARI official told the Chosun Ilbo on the phone there was no order from the government that pictures of North Korea were not to be taken. "The satellite just operated according to its pre-determined schedule," he said. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

It is apparent the intelligence satellite was NOT scheduled to take pictures of the suspected North test area by instructions from the Korean government -- though the ROK government had previously released the suspected area of the test AND stated that they would closely monitor the site. There is an implication that the ROK government knew in advance of the pending nuclear blast and deliberately chose to not monitor the suspected area.


Area of Nuclear Test


Sites calculated as possible sites by Korea, US and Japan.

North Conducts Nuclear Test (Oct 2006) North Korea on 9 Oct declared it had successfully conducted a nuclear bomb test, cementing its isolation at the risk of a security chaos in Northeast Asian region. The North's official Korean Central News Agency announced the test was carried out safely and successfully. There was no radiation leakage, the agency said, adding that it was a successful operation by its science and research center. The White House said there was a "remote possibility" that the world never will be able to fully determine whether the DPRK succeeded in conducting a nuclear test. (Source: Korea Herald.)

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Little Announcement (Stantis) (Feb 2005)

The New York Times on 10 Oct reported that the test appears to have been a nuclear detonation but was fairly small by traditional standards, and possibly a failure or a partial success. Scientists say that throughout history, the first detonations of aspiring nuclear powers have tended to pack the destructive power of 10 to 60 kilotons. But the strength of the DPRK test appears to have been a small fraction of that: around a kiloton or less. It will probably take several days to determine with confidence if the explosion was, in fact, nuclear.

The United States has conducted numerous sub-kiloton tests in its quest to miniaturize atomic bombs to put in artillery shells and other delivery systems. But no nuclear-weapons state - from America's "Trinity" test in July 1945 (20 kilotons) to Pakistan (40 kilotons) - has ever made its world debut with such a low yield. Sensors have not detected radiation leaking from the blast site. Dr. Coyle, the former director of nuclear testing at Livermore, said small tests were more likely to leak radioactivity than large ones, because the intense heat and gigantic shock waves of bigger blasts tended to melt and pulverize nearby rock into impregnable barriers.

The initial speculation that it was a conventional blast -- equivalent of 550 tons of conventional explosives -- masquerading as a nuclear blast has been discounted -- because there were no immediate radioactive isotopes in the air detected. However, experts said it seemed unlikely that the DPRK had faked an underground nuclear blast with a large pile of conventional high explosives.

On Oct. 14 the US stated that radioactivity was detected in North Korea. "The U.S. has admitted that North Korea conducted a nuclear test." But Washington stopped short of providing details on the radioactivity including the amount and method of detection, he added. Earlier on 14 Oct, CNN and Reuters reported, citing an unidentified U.S. official, that the U.S. has preliminary evidence of radioactivity in air samples collected near a suspected North Korean nuclear test site. (Source: Yonhap News.) The United States is believed to have gathered the air sample, which contains radioactive debris, through its WC-135 nuclear detection aircraft. Whether radioactive material called Xenon is detected in the air is crucial to verifying the existence of the test. The WC-135, nicknamed Constant Phoenix, was deployed to the Kadena airbase in Okinawa from the U.S. mainland immediately after North Korea threatened to conduct a nuclear test on Oct. 3. (Source: Korea Herald.)

The detection of radioactivity was formally put on record by the office of John D. Negroponte, director of national intelligence on 16 Oct. It stated, "Analysis of air samples collected on Oct. 11, 2006, detected radioactive debris which confirms that North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of Punggye on Oct. 9, 2006," said the statement, putting on the record a conclusion that officials first disclosed Friday, the night before the United Nations Security Council voted on sanctions. "The explosion yield was less than a kiloton," the statement added.

On 18 Oct it was reported that American intelligence agencies have concluded that North Korea's test explosion was powered by plutonium that North Korea harvested from its small nuclear reactor, according to officials who have reviewed the results of atmospheric sampling since the blast. The intelligence agencies' finding that the weapon was based on plutonium strongly suggested that the country's second path to a nuclear bomb — one using uranium — was not yet ready. The uranium program is based on enrichment equipment and know-how purchased from Pakistan's former nuclear chief. Nuclear experts said that the use of plutonium to make the bomb was important because it suggested that North Korea probably had only one nuclear program mature enough to produce weapons. The supply of plutonium materials is known from the days when international inspectors kept tabs on the fuel rods in the North's reactor, and intelligence analysts estimate that North Korea has enough material to make 6 to 10 plutonium bombs. (Source: New York Times.)

There are several reasons that a nuclear test might fizzle. "Fizzle yield" is a recognized nuclear term, indicating the complexities of igniting a fission bomb, especially one that is made from plutonium. Thus it comes down to two conclusions.

• (1) The blast is a "fizzle" when the bomb literally blows itself apart too fast for the nuclear chain reaction to take place properly and generate the large amount of energy needed for a full-scale explosion. Should that happen, a bomb meant to be in the Nagasaki range (20 kilotons) may yield only about a kiloton. Sub-kiloton nuclear tests are not unheard of. Pakistan set off five bombs in 1998, three of which were supposedly of sub-kiloton yield, although that has never been confirmed.
  
  There are two ways this can happen. One is contamination with plutonium-240. The key ingredient for a plutonium bomb does not exist in nature; it is manufactured in a nuclear reactor when atoms of uranium-238 capture loose neutrons and are converted to plutonium-239, the stuff of bombs. But these plutonium atoms can, in turn, capture neutrons, becoming Pu-240 and even Pu-241. They are not fissionable.
  
  With a bomb contaminated with Pu-240, the probability of a fizzle is very large. The US maintains a standard that none of its bomb-grade plutonium will have more than 6% Pu-240.
  
  The other problem concerns detonation. Plutonium bombs work on the "implosion" principle. A sub-critical core of plutonium about the size of a softball (30 centimeters in circumference) is surrounded by conventional explosives. The pressure from the explosion squeezes the plutonium into a critical mass, setting off the nuclear explosion.
  
  But the shaped charges must be precisely engineered so that they go off simultaneously. If even one charge explodes prematurely, even by a nanosecond, it may blow the bomb apart, cutting short the chain reaction and reducing the yield. (Source: Asia Times.)
• (2) Some speculate that last Monday, North Korea may have skipped the debut stage and moved directly to testing a deliberately weaponized bomb. Such a low-yield bomb would be more suitable for export to terrorists. If that was the case, the test might not have been aimed at world opinion in general but was, in fact, a demo for potential buyers. To experts, a deliberately low-yield test is so difficult to pull off that it would seem to be beyond the competence of North Korea in view of its shortage of top-tier physicists and engineers. (Source: Asia Times.)

Surprise (Parker) (Feb 2005)

South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun called an emergency security meeting just before the North's announcement. South Korean intelligence had reported to the president that a 3.58 magnitude seismic tremor was detected from Hwadaeri near Gilju at 10:36 a.m. "We detected the explosive sound from Hwadaeri near Kilju in North Hamgyong Province at 10:36 a.m.(KST)," a senior Defense Ministry official said, asking to remain anonymous because of the sensitive nature of the information. Officials from the National Intelligence Service (NIS) said the test appears to have been conducted at a mountain close to a missile test site from where the communist state launched seven ballistic missiles in early July. (SITE NOTE: What was significant is that no one could pinpoint the exact location of the test. Immediately after the announcement, the Japanese dispatched three aircraft to take upper air samples, but no radioactivity was detected. Because of the small yield, there was speculation that it may have been a nuclear test of the trigger mechanisms. The bottom line was that there was very little information except for the North Korean admission. On 13 Oct the New York Times reported that traces of radioactivity had been detected from North Korea.)

"We believe a nuclear test was conducted around 10:36 a.m. this morning and the (suspected) location of the test is about 30 kilometers away from Punggye-ri in Kilju" which intelligence officials had previously suspected to be a possible test site, an official from the state spy agency was quoted as telling the National Assembly Intelligence Committee. "We believe the test was conducted under a mountain with an altitude of 360 meters," the NIS official was quoted by Rep. Chung Hyung-keun of the opposition Grand National Party as saying. Considering the low altitude of the mountain, the intelligence office believes the nuclear test was conducted inside a horizontal tube instead of a vertically-dug tunnel, according to Chung.

South Korea's military raised its readiness against possible aggression by increasing the number of troops near land and sea borders, but it has yet to raise its alert level beyond usual defense situations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said. The troops are still maintaining a Watchcon 3 surveillance status and Defcon 4 defense readiness status. "We have yet to detect unusual military movement in North Korea so far. South Korea and the U.S. are closely working together to share intelligence," said Col. Ha Doo-chul, spokesman for the JCS. When tensions rise and provocative acts take place, the alert status is upgraded. In war, it is raised to Watchcon 1 and Defcon 1. In June 1999, when a naval battle between South and North Korea took place, the first of its kind since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War, South Korean forces were put on a Watchcon 2 surveillance status and Defcon 3 defense posture. (Source: Korea Herald.)

On 10 Oct US Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Japan spokespeople declined to comment on reports of the test, which had yet to be independently confirmed late Monday, and they directed queries to the Pentagon and State Department in Washington. The U.S. military in the Pacific showed no outward signs of increased force-protection status. According to the USFK Web site, all U.S. troops on the peninsula remained at Force Protection Bravo on Monday, with most of the U.S. community off to celebrate Columbus Day. In Japan, Yokota Air Base — headquarters of USFJ — remained at its lowest force-protection status.

SITE NOTE: The world asked the question: "Why would the North defy China and the world to conduct a test that ensured world wide condemnation?" Our opinion is that the North felt that if it possessed a nuclear weapon, it could force the US to deal seriously with the North. The North realized that its crumbling 1.2 million man army no longer provided the initimidation power it once had at the negotiations table. In addition, its economic situation continued to worsen with sanctions worldwide. This meant they could no longer upgrade their military equipment to compete with the modern weaponry of the US and South Korea. Whether realistic or not, the North viewed the possession of a nuclear weapon as a tool for removing its sanctions and forcing the US to hold one-on-one talks. In other words, it was a new weapon in its old game of political blackmail and brinksmanship. In our opinion, Kim Il-sung realized this cost-effective way to play the brinksmanship game the North is so good at. Regardless of the risks, the North had no other choice except to pursue this avenue. The North was being cornered -- and its supporters in China and the ROK were drawing away.

There is speculation that the Chinese are openly debating "regime change" in Pyongyang after the nuclear test. On 16 Oct an article appeared in The Australian: The Sunday Times. The Chinese Government has been ultra-cautious in its reaction. Some in Beijing argued against heavy sanctions on North Korea for fear that these would destroy what remains of a pro-Chinese "reformist" faction inside the DPRK. "In today's DPRK Government, there are two factions, sinophile and royalist," one Chinese analyst wrote online. "The objective of the sinophiles is reform, Chinese-style, and then to bring down Kim Jong-il's royal family. That's why Kim is against reform. He's not stupid."

The balance of risk between reform and chaos dominated arguments within China's ruling elite. The Chinese have also permitted an astonishing range of vituperative internet comment about an ally with which Beijing maintains a treaty of friendship and co-operation. Academic Wu Jianguo published an article in a Singapore newspaper - available online in China - bluntly saying: "I suggest China should make an end of Kim's Government." "The Chinese have given up on Kim Jong-il," commented one diplomat. "The question is, what are they going to do about it?"

Hinting at the options, Chinese online military commentators have exposed plots and purges inside North Korea that were previously unknown or unconfirmed. They have described three attempted coups that ended in bloodshed. In 1996, the Sixth Field Army was planning to revolt but the scheme was betrayed by a new commander. One or two plotters got away but Kim Jong-il's personal guards arrested senior officers and the Sixth Field Army's political commissars. On March 12, 1998, Kim suddenly announced a martial law "exercise" in Pyongyang and there was gunfire in the streets of the city. The Chinese later learned that two ministries were involved in a coup attempt, and that more than 20 ministerial-level officials were killed after it was crushed. In October 1999, a company of the Third Field Army rebelled in dissatisfaction over grain distribution during the nation's prolonged famine, which may have killed a million people.

There are rumours that Kim's eldest son, Jong-nam, is estranged from his father and living in the Chinese capital, where he enjoys a reputation as a capricious imbiber of whisky. A younger son, Jong-chol, has emerged as heir apparent. Meanwhile, some of the North Korean elite are seeking their boltholes in China. Xin Cheng, an estate agent in the high-rise district of Wang Jing, which is popular with resident South Korean businessmen, said many high-ranking North Koreans were buying property there. (Source: The Australian: The Sunday Times.)

The DPRK military under the North's "military first" policy is still wasting away. Chronic food shortages and outdated equipment means that it will not be able to face the South on "equal" terms. It simply doesn't have the resources to maintain a fighting force -- and without military might, it is open to a coup. North Korea knows it would not last a day in a full-scale war with the US. It's 1.2 million fighting force effectiveness has been reduced significantly in recent years with the introduction of the Patriot system to dull its SCUD threats, the ATACMS missiles that are targeting the North's artillery, and now the native-grown ROK cruise missiIes that are capable of targeting Pyeongyang. The usefulness of a large standing army as a tool of intimidation was slipping away. However. just one nuclear weapon would be enough to deter any preemptive attack and be an effective tool for blackmail. It skillfully exploits an American weakness when it stirs fears about its potential to sow havoc among America's Northeast Asian allies and crucial trading partners — Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China.

Given its conventional military bargaining chip losing its potency, it is our opinion that Kim Jong-il played the only card he had left to remain in power. Without a nuclear weapon, the Kim Jong-il regime was in jeapordy of collapsing. The bottom line is that in a despotic regime, any sign of weakness from the leader of the pack will result in a challenge for leadership. Coups d'etat are the standard result. Kim Jong-Il was being ridiculed as "an evil midget" by President Bush -- a term that belittled the person as well as his position. If Kim Jong-il was not treated seriously in the international arena, he would soon lose face in his domestic affairs. He is only maintained in power by his position as "Great Leader" through the support of the military. With the economic crisis and food shortages, the military was slowly slipping into the morass.


(Peter Lewis) (Sep 2006)

However, the possession of a nuclear weapon card halts all thoughts of any preemptive strikes, while at the same time bolstering the military's prestige. Even if the North is years away from developing a warhead to fit on its missile or use as a suitcase weapon, the mere existence of a crude nuclear weapon will stop any use of force against the North. The historical examples of Russia versus China and their border disputes of the 1960s illustrates the point. If China did not possess nuclear weapons, the Russians would have overwhelmed the border areas. However, with the Chinese nuclear weapons, the Russians dared not attack.

This is what the North is attempting to do. The military can no longer protect the nation -- but a nuclear weapon will stop any nation from launching an attack to breach the borders. The weapon is not to be used against the attackers, but to be used as a blackmail weapon aimed at the attacker's homeland. This is what Kim Jong-il is counting on. In this way, his regime is preserved and the military now has a weapon that can protect the borders without massive expenditures of manpower and equipment. Though it is obvious that the weapon "fizzled," the fact that the North is pursuing this avenue is the same as stating they intend to possess such a weapon regardless of the world's attempts to stop it. The world is in a massive game of poker where the North may be bluffing or actually possess the weapon. Would the US be willing to risk calling such a bluff? It is doubtful.

At the same time, the North Korean people saw a tangible result of their suffering. Though it is a negative event, the nuclear test is analgous to the US first landing on the moon. The world was mesmerized by the event, but every American felt that the lunar accomplishment was theirs personally. This vision of President Kennedy solidified the nation as no other event had ever done -- without the patriotic rally around the leader of WWII or the 9-11 threat to America. This nuclear test allowed the miniscule nation to thumb its nose at a superpower -- and other powerful nations.

At home, Kim Jong-Il was watching his prestige slip. The nuclear trump card gave him prestige internationally -- while at the same time increasing his cult following support at home. A North Korean diplomat was quoted as saying "What I hear is Big Brothers saying to Little Brother "don't do that"; but we are not a little boy, we have nuclear weapons." (http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/nuclear_brother_3761.jsp) It was an effective tool by which he could manipulate the "big boys" game of "carrot and the stick" -- and extort promises (carrots) without fear as any threat of reprisal (stick) was empty. Some would suggest that Kim is seeking autonomy from his "big brother" (China) as well as the stature of getting the US to capitulate with either a permanent peace agreement or at least paying him off for his bad behavior.

Whether the US can be blamed for forcing the North into a corner to make this decision or not was irrelevant. A ROK Ministry of Unification official stated, "We called on the U.S. to have the bilateral talks with North Korea many times. No condition on the form of the dialogue. We focused on the dialogue since we thought that the sanctions would lead to the nuclear test. But the effort failed." He mentioned the U.S. responsibility for the nuclear test. The ROK government's inability to bribe the North to not have a test with Roh's engagement policy was a fact. The only one responsible for the test was the North.

(SITE NOTE: In a 11-12 Oct survey, four in 10 South Korean adults or forty-three percent of the respondents aged over 19 picked the United States as the country most responsible for the North's nuclear test. The survey of 500 adults was conducted by Research Plus, a local research firm, by telephone Oct. 11-12. North Korea was chosen as the second most responsible country with 37.2 percent, followed by South Korea with 13.9 percent, China with 2.4 percent and Japan with 1 percent. (Source: Korea Times.)

Within the US, there was a useless finger-pointing exercise going on whether Clinton or Bush was more responsible. It was a political exercise that solved nothing and was only something to score political points in the upcoming elections.)

The bottom line is the it was the North alone that decided to follow this path. Kim Jong-il is not irrational as some claim. In fact, his attempt to gain a nuclear weapon is very logical to us. It lost its chemical warfare threat when the South Koreans simply refused to buy gas masks for self-protection. It lost its biological warfare threat when it became self-evident that if it were waged on the peninsula, it would spread back to the North. Its conventional forces were no longer a threat that could be used as leverage as the crisis of feeding the troops and upgrade the arms became an impossibility. It needed the nuclear weapon. The sanctions were starting to hurt it as countries joined in freezing the North's assets. Indeed, the Japanese and US were tightening sanctions -- especially with the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) pointed to interdict its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that is a primary export of the country -- as the UN resolution prevents member countries from buying WMD equipment after it shot off its SCUDs and failed Taepodong II missile in July 2006.


Playing with Matches (Ramirez) (Mar 2003)

Internationally, the North knew that the US was in no position to attack as it was deeply committed in Iraq and Afghanistan -- with a potential hot spot in Iran looming on the horizon. The US would NOT attack -- it would only talk and attempt to put "teeth" into its Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The ROK was already in its hip pocket and would NOT cut off its aid. It too would talk a harsh story, but it would continue its aid uninterupted. The Chinese though condemning it could NOT afford to have the North Korean regime falter for its own reasons. Thus despite the test, the Chinese would continue to provide support. With this justification in mind, the North had a free hand to conduct such a nuclear test. Thus the stage was set as perfectly aligned to play the nuclear trump card. If international sanctions were attempted in the US, the North was counting on China and Russia to blunt any moves to put "teeth" (Article 42, Chapter 7) in the sanctions from the UN. And even if "teeth" were put into the sanctions, without China's support on implementing the resolution, the resolution would become worthless.

But there is one hiccup that the North did not think of when it was focused on the US. China is concerned that North Korea can just as easily aim their nuclear weapons at China at anytime. THE CHINESE WILL NEVER TOLERATE A THREAT ON ITS BORDERS. The North has survived because it provided a buffer-zone between China and the "west" (Japan and South Korea). However, with the opening of China to the benefits of international trade, the idea of a buffer zone was rendered obsolete -- but a traditional defensive concept dating back to the Great Wall of China remains in the minds of the Chinese people. It has been exhibited with the use of military force in Tibet, Nepal, the Indian/Pakistani border, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and the Russo-Sino border -- and stands as proof of how deeply entrenched this defensive idea is.

By pursuing a nuclear weapon over the protests of the Chinese, the North has made itself a target of the Chinese. North Korea has viewed the Chinese as their "money tree" in the past, but this new wrinkle may cause the Chinese to rethink their policies towards the North. China invested about $113 million in the North last year, about 97 percent of the foreign capital invested there. The North depends on China for about half of its oil products and food. The trick for the Chinese now is how to squeeze Kim Jong-il by the throat without killing him. In other words, Kim Jong-il is now a liability, but the alternatives of a replacement are few. Kim Jong-Il's alcoholic eldest son in "exile" in China is out. His youngest son as appointed heir is still too weak. KIM JONG-IL NEEDS TO WORRY NOW ABOUT A COUP -- ONE FINANCED BY THE CHINESE.

Test for the world

North Korea's nuclear defiance demands an effective common response

Kim Jong Il has gone for broke. North Korea's claim to have conducted its first nuclear test has yet to be fully verified. It is still unclear whether the country is years, or perhaps only months, away from developing a missile-delivered nuclear warhead. But by declaring itself to be set on being a nuclear-armed power, North Korea has gone past the point of brinkmanship, leaving no shred of doubt about its intentions — and no room for ambiguity in the international response.

As the new Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe grimly observed yesterday, Asia's most untrustworthy regime has launched the region into "a new, dangerous nuclear age". North Korea could not have been more sternly warned that if it went ahead with the test, it would find itself in a break-hold from which it could not escape. The regime has escaped total isolation until now, mainly because of the reluctance of China, North Korea's economic lifeline and ultimate protector, to admit to, or use, its considerable economic and political leverage. But even China's patience has been wearing thin. It pointedly declared at the UN last week that "no one is going to protect . . . bad behaviour". To underline that message, Beijing told Pyongyang that it might drop the "automatic intervention" clause in the friendship treaty that commits China to come to the regime's defence.

China has cut back food aid to North Korea in recent months and quietly co-operated with US efforts to destroy the regime's lucrative counterfeiting industry, which includes renminbi as well as dollar notes. Now, faced by the embarrassing and undeniable failure of its strategy, China must take the lead in ensuring that defiance does not pay — which means demonstrating that North Korea has made itself more, not less, vulnerable by going nuclear. The shock of what is perceived as "betrayal" has forced South Korea to abandon its so-called sunshine policy; where others lead, Seoul will perhaps follow, though it will still be tempted to play a role as a "go-between", even though it is really between a rock and a nuclear place.

The question is what will work. The regime, interested only in its own survival, is prepared to let millions starve. Yet North Korea, as Beijing understands better than most, is vulnerable to sustained pressure. The $2.5 billion a year in Chinese and South Korean trade and aid is critical to the elite's comfort. Mr Kim must have known that North Korea would be severely squeezed, at least in the short term, by external financial, trade, aid and investment sanctions, not least a cut-off of Chinese oil. That suggests that this decision, like the conducting of missile tests earlier this year, may have been dictated by even greater pressures building up internally. The regime has always relied on a siege mentality to rally loyalty and keep its all-powerful military in line; this signal act of defiance may be aimed at compelling the military to close ranks.

The generals must be given fresh reasons for discontent. There will be members of the elite whose stomach is turned by Korean suffering and the crass Kim personality cult. China knows who these leaders are. Beijing would balk at "regime change"; but perhaps not at edging out the Dear Leader in favour of pragmatists ready to risk accommodation and cautious reform. Mr Kim's departure is the neatest way out of crisis. He may have hastened the forced exit he is desperate to prevent. (Source: Times Online.)

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See After Nuclear Test, ROK Changes Policy on DPRK -- then Waffles -- and then Goes Back to Business-as-Usual (Oct-Nov 2006) for South Korean Actions following the nuclear test.

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Korean Public Apathetic over North's Nuclear Test The bottom line is that the general populace seem unperturbed by the nuclear issue. North Korea's repetitious nuclear threats have caused South Koreans to not take them seriously, almost becoming insensitive to them. ``Especially among young people who are indifferent to politics, there seems to be a great level of insensitivity toward national security,'' said Yoon Hee-kyong, a student at Yonsei University. Michael Breen, president of public relations agency Insight Communications Consultants and author of ``The Koreans,'' said that it is an issue of blood. ``The post-war generation, reacting against the propaganda it grew up with, does not really feel that North Korea is nasty,'' he said. ``They feel that nuclear weapons are an issue for America to deal with. They feel North Korea is bluffing and making noise. Also, South Korea is a mercantilist state that has subordinated all other concerns to national economic self-interest.'' ``Until now, no one has really demonstrated how North Korean nuclear weapons affect what's important to South Koreans _ their economic well-being,'' he said. ``Add this all up, and the result is that Koreans don't feel substantial concern. This is a profound mistake, and it is one that, given the nature of this society, should be laid at the doorstep of political leaders who have failed to communicate the real, strategic meaning of the North acquiring WMDs.'' (Source: Korea Times.)

Even the National Assembly was wishy-washy on their response. The National Assembly on 12 Oct finally managed to pass a resolution condemning North Korea's announced nuclear test, but not until after several delays and rounds of bickering between the two major parties in the legislature. The final resolution "strongly deplores" the "unpardonable" nuclear test, urges North Korea to "abandon nuclear weapons and all related programs" and calls on Pyongyang to return to the stalled six-party nuclear disarmament talks and to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. North Korea renounced the treaty in 2003 and expelled international monitors at its nuclear site in Yongbyon, north of Pyongyang. The resolution also calls on the Roh administration to cooperate closely with other nations in coping with the crisis that resulted from the nuclear test. The conservatives attempted to cancel the Kaesong project and have the Kumgang tourism project scrapped. The attempts were stymied.

The Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula OFFICIALLY Rendered Worthless (Oct 2006) Not only experts but also both the ruling and opposition lawmakers all agreed in chorus that the joint denuclearization agreement was abrogated by North Korea's nuclear test on 9 Oct. Some argued that the denuclearization agreement had already been broken by Pyongyang's declaration of having a nuclear arsenal in February last year. However, as it was a mere declaration of possessing nuclear weapons, the situation was much different from now. (SITE NOTE: The Roh government now has been caught in a trap of its own making. The continued support of "humanitarian aid" and the Kaesong industrial area operations are in trouble. The parceling out of Gaesong Industrial Complex site seemed to be once again put off. The selling of lot was first planned in June, but later postponed to mid October. The Korea Land Corporation (KLC), which oversees the operation of Gaesong complex, had planned to encourage companies to invest in the plant lot for development this month. Of the total 79.2 hectares, KLC was to sell 9.9 hectares of an apartment-style plant site and 29.7 hectares of an ordinary plant site. Companies stated that on worst case scenarios they would move to China or Hong Kong. Even the most ardent supporters of reunification have been dumfounded by the North's actions -- which none wanted to believe would ever take place. The Kumgang Tourist Hotel operations in the short term will be shut down as there will be no Korean visitors wanting to sign up for tours -- and its long-term operations are seriously jeapordized. However, most of 1,100 tourists who reserved a three-day Mt. Kumgang tour on 9 Oct left for the North with only 10 cancellations. Future tours were uncertain.)

South Korea and North Korea signed the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on December 31, 1991. The joint agreement contained following details: a prohibition on the production, emplacement and use of nuclear weapons; use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; non-possession of nuclear reprocessing and enrichment facilities; and joint inspections on facilities both parties agreed to.

North Korea's nuclear test certainly violates the clauses that stipulate prohibitions on making a nuclear arsenal and possessing nuclear reprocessing and enrichment facilities. After signing the denuclearization treaty, the US removed all nuclear weapons from the ROK and President Bush declared the ROK nuclear free in 1992. However, North Korea kept developing nuclear weapons and declared withdrawal of its membership from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993 and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1994.

North Korea's nuclear crisis appeared to turn a corner in October 1994 when the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework. The communist regime declared to halt its nuclear activities in November 1994 and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was launched in March 1995 to fulfill the Geneva agreement and provide light-water reactors to the North. (SITE NOTE: KEDO was officially declared defunct in 2006 -- and the last of the ROK workers recalled in 2006. The ROK will have to absorb a massive financial loss as it was the one that demanded sole construction rights. See KEDO Project Finally Dead!! (Jan 2006) for details.)

The nuclear problem resurfaced in October 2002 when the U.S. questioned about Pyongyang's development of nuclear weapons through a uranium enrichment program. Pyongyang acknowledged restarting its nuclear facilities in December 2002 and declared secession from the NPT once again in January 2003. Although six-party talks followed between the two Koreas and neighboring countries to resolve North Korea's nuclear issue, the North announced its possession of two nuclear weapons in February 2005 and eventually has pushed ahead with the nuclear test.

With abrogation of the denuclearization agreement on the Korean Peninsula, some may raise their voices that South Korea should also acquire uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology for peaceful use, though it should not develop or possess nuclear weapons. However, quite a number of analysts believe such move will trigger a series of negative ripple effects in neighboring countries like the U.S., Japan, and China and its loss will be greater for South Korea than gain. (SITE NOTE: Such a move would start a Northeast Asia nuclear arms race. The Japanese already possess plutonium enrichment facilities and any move by the ROK to become a nuclear power will result in the Japanese becoming nuclear. Some feel the Japanese already have the capability to simply assemble the components to make a bomb. It is known that Japan does possess the critical trigger mechanisms and nuclear material stockpiles.)

UN Sanctions (U.N.S.C.R. 1718) (Oct 2006) President Bush on 9 Oct condemned North Korea's purported test of a nuclear weapon as a "provocative act" that demanded "immediate action" by the United Nations Security Council. While stopping short of confirming that a nuclear test had taken place, Bush said North Korea's claim "constitutes a threat to international peace and security. In New York, John Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said the United States would move quickly to seek a Security Council resolution condemning and possibly sanctioning North Korea.

The UN Security Council started drawing up a resolution to respond to North Korea's nuclear test based on drafts submitted by the U.S. and Japan on 9 Oct. The U.S. version would call on Pyongyang to return to six-party talks on its nuclear problems, provide for forcible inspections of vessels and airplanes, and a freeze of North Korean assets and other financial sanctions. It invokes Chapter 7 of the UN Charter that permits both economic and military sanctions. The U.S. made it clear it will gradually strengthen sanctions against the North, saying it will see how the communist country responds to the resolution 30 days after it is adopted. China's UN ambassador Wang Guangya also said Tuesday there should be "punitive" measures over the North's nuclear test. The final Security Council resolution was expected after a compromise with China and Russia, who have demanded diplomatic solutions instead of sanctions. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

A United States-drafted U.N. resolution called for a total arms embargo, a freeze on any transfer or development of weapons of mass destruction and a ban on luxury goods, among other measures, as well as interdiction of Pyongyang's cargo. Japan's U.N. Ambassador Kenzo Oshima proposed even more stringent measures in amendments to the U.S. draft. These included banning all North Korean ships and planes from ports and imposing a travel ban on high-level Pyongyang officials. But diplomats doubted anything beyond a possible travel ban would be approved. China has stated that it will not accept any resoluton with a military action clause. (Source: Star Online.)

Japan on 11 Oct decided to slap additional economic sanctions on North Korea, including a total ban on all products from the country, Japanese government officials said. The measures decided on at a meeting of the Security Council of Japan also call for banning North Korean ships from entering Japanese ports and barring North Korean nationals from entering Japan, the officials said. (Source: Yonhap News.)

On 12 Oct the UN Security Council agreeded 15-0 to a resolution condemning the North Korean nuclear test that invoked Chapter 7 of the UN charter, which permits coercive measures. The UNSC will refer to Chapter 7 for the first time since the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993. However, the council has reportedly decided not to invoke Article 42 of Chapter 7, which allows military action. The resolution did NOT give authority to use military force to stop ships in international waters. To win over China, the US agreed to drop the reference to Article 42 of Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter that authorizes the possible use of military power to enforce sanctions. The resolution bars the sale or transfer of material that could be used to make nuclear, biological and chemical weapons or ballistic missiles, and it bans international travel and freezes the overseas assets of people associated with the North's weapons programs.


Nuclear Test Sanctions (Harville) (Oct 2006)

In its most debated clause, the resolution authorizes all countries to inspect cargo going in and out of North Korea to detect illicit weapons. The Chinese ambassador, Wang Guangya, said China would not participate in the inspection regime because it would create "conflict that could have serious implications for the region." But China's refusal to take part in searches, and Russia's seeming annoyance at the end of the process, immediately raised questions about how effective the resolution's execution could be. After the vote, John R. Bolton, the American ambassador, insisted that China was bound by the resolution's terms and would have to find a way to comply with the inspection provision. (Source: New York Times.)

The resolution includes economic and weapons sanctions against North Korea, including a travel ban and financial restrictions. It specifically rules out the use of force in what is seen as a concession to China and Russia. Meanwhile, Russian news agencies quoted Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov as saying that any UN sanctions should be withdrawn if North Korea agrees to return to six-party talks on its nuclear program.

The clause imposing sanctions on export and import goods was amended from "all goods may be checked if deemed necessarily" to "collaborative measures will be taken such as checking goods if possible." However, clauses such as banning exports on luxuries, specific war supplies including tanks, components related to nuclear, mobile rocket launchers, freezing financial assets of individuals and groups related to weapon or missile programs in North Korea, and calling for the ban of its nuclear program remained the same. (Source: Donga Ilbo.) The final draft dropped a broad arms embargo in favor of one just on heavy equipment like battle tanks, artillery systems, missiles and warships.

Immediately after the test, the US remarked that a "suspicious ship" had left North Korea, but that it would not be intercepted. Rather it would be searched at the first port it landed at. On 24 Oct it was reported that a North Korean cargo ship was inspected and detained by Hong Kong authorities for maritime safety violations, the government of the special administrative region of China on 23 Oct. The action, coming on the heels of a visit by U.S. officials to urge cooperation in enforcing United Nations sanctions against North Korea, seems to suggest that U.S. efforts to isolate North Korea and end its nuclear ambitions are bearing fruit. The Hong Kong government said that the Kang Nam I, a 2,035-ton cargo ship, arrived on 22 Oct from Shanghai. It was inspected on 22 Oct, and sufficient safety and procedural violations were found during the course of the inspection to justify detaining the ship. But no suspect cargo was discovered. Indeed, the ship, which was heading from North Korea to Taiwan via Shanghai and Hong Kong, was almost empty of cargo. Crew members said that the ship was on its way to Taiwan to pick up a cargo of scrap metal. It was also loading scrap metal in Hong Kong. (Source: Joongang Ilbo.)

Dealing with the travel ban, the resolution says, "All member states shall take the necessary steps to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated by the committee or by the Security Council as being responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, [North Korea's] policies in relation to [its] nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related and other weapons of mass destruction-related programs, together with their family members." What this means is that IF the UNSC committee designates Kim Jong-il directly responsible for the nuclear test, WMD production or missile-related programs, he could be banned from travel to member nations -- including China as a "member nation." Again IF the committee targets Kim Jong-il, then the next step would be to see if China recognizes such a provision. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

The South Korean government planned to announce its sanctions on the North before 14 Nov. In accordance with article 11 of Resolution 1718, member countries must submit a report on their intended measures within 30 days of the date the resolution was adopted.

While the sanctions did not go as far as Washington wished, they probably gave it and Japan the legal means to squeeze the country. They provide the basis to inspect ships in ports around the world — though not necessarily on the high seas — and gives Washington a way to expand a program to force banks to halt dealings with the country. In Washington, President Bush signed a law allowing the United States to impose sanctions on any foreigner who provides weapons technology to North Korea.

After imposing additional sanctions on North Korea, Japan has started reviewing laws to reflect the fact that it views North Korea's possible nuclear armament as "the gravest danger" to Japan's peace and security. That will enable Tokyo to search North Korean vessels in international waters or to support U.S. searches of North Korean ships. Japanese Defense Agency chief Fumio Kyuma said it was difficult to designate the current situation as "the gravest danger," but Prime Minister Shinzo Abe told his Cabinet to consider the designation. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

It was reported on 17 Oct that China had erected a fence in Dandong along its border with NK where North Koreans waded across and stopped cash remittances to NK in Dandong. The fence was placed some 20km northeast of the Chinese border city of Dandong. It's the first fence ever constructed along the border of the two allies. The fence is built along an embankment of the Yalu River, blocking would-be refugees from coming ashore. The fence is concentrated along shallow and narrow spots in the river. So far, some 20km of fence has been installed, but authorities have informed local residents that more fencing is on the way. Trucks to NK were being stopped and "inspected" but observers stated none of the trucks were opened. Australia will ban NK ships from entering Australian ports, "except in dire emergencies." (Source: Associated Press.) Reports reveal that the DPRK has received 40,000 tons of crude oil as humanitarian aid in the past year -- with the latest 20,000 tons shipped in September.

On 3 Nov Yonhap News reported that the UN sanctions committee finalized a list of items denied to the DPRK, the first action by the committee that oversees implementation of the resolution against the country. But the members could not agree on operational guidelines, especially how the sanctions should be adjusted according to improvements in the situation.

North Preparing for Second Test (Oct 2006) American officials have reported recent activity at the test site, leading some to believe that another test might be carried out soon. The New York Times on 17 Oct reported that ROK and Japanese officials said today that they believe the DPRK may be preparing for a second test. American officials on 16 Oct confirmed for the first time that the DPRK did set off a nuclear explosion on Oct. 9, as it claimed, but that the blast was far smaller than would normally be expected, suggesting that the test may have misfired. That could give the DPRK two motives for a second test, nuclear scientists and security analysts said: To proclaim defiance of the sanctions and to show that it is capable of a successful nuclear detonation. (Source: New York Times.)

Nuclear experts said that the analysis of atmospheric samples taken after the test shed new light on the factors that could lead to a second demonstration. American officials who reviewed the results of atmospheric sampling said on 16 Oct that the material used for the test appeared to have been plutonium harvested from the DPRK's small nuclear reactor. Because the material came from the reactor, which operated under international inspection between 1994 and 2003, and not from a uranium-enrichment program that the DPRK began in secret, nuclear experts said that it was easier to gauge how much weapons material it may now have on hand. Most intelligence analysts estimate that the country has enough plutonium for 6 to 10 bombs.

North Korea said on 18 Oct that a second nuclear test was "natural" and should come as no surprise. The North Korean Foreign Ministry's U.S. chief Li Gun made the remarks in an interview with ABC anchor Diane Sawyer in Pyongyang. "We already announced that we have a nuclear -- nuke last year. But we just simply demonstrated peacefully that we have these nuclear weapons." The interview aired as part of Sawyer's live report from the North Korean capital on Wednesday afternoon. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)


Little Nuke (Patrick Corrigan) (Sep 2006)

Supposedly Kim Jong-il told a ranking Chinese envoy that his country has no plan to conduct additional nuclear tests, the Yonhap News Agency reported on 20 Oct. Quoting an "unnamed diplomatic source" in Seoul, Yonhap said Kim made the promise in his meeting with Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan, who visited Pyongyang as Chinese President Hu Jintao's special envoy. "Kim was known to have clarified his stance that there will be no additional nuclear test," the South Korean news agency quoted the source as saying. (Source: Korea Times.)

On 28 Oct Yonhap News reported that South Korean military officials had observed activities at the North's suspected nuclear test site that may be preparations for a second test. Yonhap news agency, citing several unidentified military officials, said Seoul is keeping a close watch on the movements of trucks and soldiers at the Punggye-ri site in the country's remote northeast. South Korean officials have said they have no intelligence suggesting another test is imminent. Meanwhile, more unidentified South Korean government officials said they are trying to confirm whether a new facility that has been built at the site could be part of preparations for a second nuclear test, the JoongAng Ilbo newspaper reported on 28 Oct. South Korea's Defense Ministry said it could not confirm the reports, and the U.S. State Department refused to comment.

Kim Jong-Il Expresses "Regret" Over Test (Oct 2006) Kim apologized to Beijing for going ahead with its threatened nuclear test on Oct. 9, the source said. Tang returned to Beijing from Pyongyang on Thursday night after delivering Chinese President Hu Jintao’s message to the North Korean leader, the Chosun Ilb reported on 20 Oct. North Korean leader Kim Jong-il told a special Chinese envoy on Thursday the hermit nation will only return to six-party talks on its nuclear program if the U.S. lifts sanctions, according to a Chinese diplomatic source. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

However, the Yahoo News article "reinterpreted" the meaning to indicate the DPRK regretted the nuclear incident, while the Chosun Ilbo story indicated that the DPRK only regretted that it offended its chief benefactor, China. It stated that Kim Jong Il expressed regret about his country's nuclear test to a Chinese delegation and said Pyongyang would return to international nuclear talks if Washington backs off a campaign to financially isolate the country -- quoting the Chosun Ilbo story. "If the U.S. makes a concession to some degree, we will also make a concession to some degree, whether it be bilateral talks or six-party talks," Kim was quoted as telling a Chinese envoy, the mass-circulation Chosun Ilbo reported, citing a diplomatic source in China. Kim told the Chinese delegation that "he is sorry about the nuclear test," the newspaper reported. The delegation led by State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan met Kim on Thursday and returned to Beijing later that day — ahead of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's arrival in the Chinese capital on 20 Oct. (Source: Yahoo News.)

(SITE NOTE: Whether the "regret" of Kim Jong-Il was to be believed -- or simply perceived as bait for the wishful thinkers who want to get back to the non-negotiations of the six-way talks -- was still to be seen. The DPRK nuclear test was a tactical mistake as the Chinese will NEVER tolerate a nuclear threat on its border. The question is not whether the US will buy off on his "regret" but if the Chinese buy off on it. It is fairly certain the US will press forward with its strangle-hold approach to North Korea. It is unlikely that the US will make a "concession" on the financial sanctions claiming they are part of the counterfeiting claims. It will also not back off the PSI moves claiming they were UN-initiated. The Chinese want breathing room so they do NOT have to impose the sanctions on their borders -- if they can get the US to make a "token" concession and get the North back to the negotiating table.)