JANUARY 2003:

U.S. withholds food aid for the North Koreans

Steven R. Weisman/NYT

The New York Times

WASHINGTON For months, President George W. Bush has pledged not to use food as a weapon against North Korea. But as the confrontation deepens over the country's nuclear weapons program, the United States has continued to withhold approval of grain shipments sought by humanitarian groups to avert starvation on the Korean Peninsula.

.The World Food Program, an arm of the United Nations, says that food aid suspensions by the United States and Japan, and severe cutbacks by South Korea, have meant that for the first time in many years, it will miss its food-distribution targets in North Korea this winter "by a wide margin."

."We're very concerned about it," a World Food Program official said. "We understand that there are political considerations. But this is a population that is suffering, with women and children the most vulnerable."

.The Bush administration says it has been withholding food, not to pressure North Korea, but because of lapses in the mechanisms monitoring where it gets distributed.

."Our intention is to go forward, but we do need to solve these monitoring problems first," an administration official said. He added that food could not be distributed until Congress approves the State Department budget for it this year.

.But World Food Program officials say that they have "no hard evidence" that food intended for starving civilians has been diverted for other uses, such as the military.

."We have relatively good confidence that the food is reaching the people who need it," he said.

.Whatever the reasons for it, the food crisis has thrust itself into the middle of urgent meetings by the United States and its regional allies - China, Japan, Russia and South Korea - on how to handle North Korea's decision to reactivate its nuclear weapons program.

.Senior U.S., Japanese and South Korean envoys are to meet in Washington on Monday to decide the next steps, including whether, and by what means, to reach out diplomatically to North Korea to head off its nuclear weapons buildup - and whether to tighten or ease the economic pressures on it.

.On the food issue, diplomats say there will be pressure on the United States to avoid a new round of pressure on President Kim Jong Il, who has nonetheless not voiced any views on the matter. Although South Korea has cut back its food shipments, officials in Seoul criticized the Bush administration for forcing an early cutoff of fuel oil shipments to North Korea last year, even though the shipments had been arranged as part of the 1994 agreement, now broken, under which North Korea agreed not to make nuclear weapons.

.In a separate action, the International Atomic Energy Agency is to meet Monday to discuss what to do about North Korea's dismantling of the inspections equipment at its nuclear reactor at Yongbyan, where weapons-grade plutonium is manufactured and possibly used for at least two nuclear weapons.

.Agency inspectors were expelled from North Korea at the end of 2002, raising anxiety throughout the West and complicating U.S. attempts to mobilize a worldwide coalition against Iraq, whose nuclear weapons program is considered far less advanced.

.The three-way negotiations in Washington have been roiled, in part, by the fact that South Korea is undergoing a political transition, with President Kim Dae Jung preparing to yield power next month to his successor, Roh Moo Hyun.

.Both are strong advocates of maintaining diplomatic and economic ties with North Korea. In the last few days, Roh's advisers have begun floating ideas about how to break the impasse that has arisen over the U.S. policy of not negotiating with North Korea until it disavows its nuclear program, and Roh's call for such negotiations. One of Roh's transition advisers said last week that the incoming president wants the United States to go along with a proposal by North Korea that the United States commit itself to a nonaggression pact, as part of a deal in which Pyongyang would back away from its nuclear program.

.In Washington, Bush administration officials have not rejected this idea out of hand. The president, they noted, has repeatedly declared that the United States had no intention of attacking North Korea. Therefore, they said, some agreement of nonaggression might well be part of an eventual deal on weapons.

The following is from The Washington Times on 2 Jan:

U.S. to maintain N. Korean food aid

From combined dispatches

The Bush administration plans to continue humanitarian food shipments to North Korea in the new year, U.S. officials said, despite Pyongyang's continued belligerence in pursuit of its nuclear ambitions.

"We expect to continue providing the same level of aid to the [United Nations] World Food Program in Korea as we have in the past," a senior administration official said in reply to questions from Reuters news agency. "We don't use food as a political weapon."

But North Korea appealed yesterday to widespread anti-American sentiment among South Koreans by seeking support in its confrontation with the United States over nuclear weapons.

"It can be said that there exists on the Korean peninsula at present only confrontation between the Koreans in the North and the South and the United States," the communist state said in its New Year's message.

It is North Korea's long-standing strategy to drive a wedge between Seoul and its chief ally, Washington.

A senior South Korean diplomat arrived in Beijing yesterday to seek China's support in persuading North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions.

Lee Tae-sik, South Korea's deputy foreign minister, will meet Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing today, South Korean officials said.

South Korea also plans to send a vice foreign minister to Moscow later this week. China and Russia maintain friendly ties with the communist North, and they have urged a peaceful solution to the rising tension.

On the issue of food aid, the United States has argued in the past that such aid should be isolated from geo-strategic considerations — an idea summed up by former President Ronald Reagan's dictum that "a hungry child knows no politics."

But the timing of a U.S. food-aid announcement was up in the air while Washington pressed to reverse the North's recent steps toward restarting a nuclear program frozen in a 1994 nonproliferation deal with the United States.

The aid would come at a time when the reclusive communist state — long considered by Washington as one of its most dangerous enemies — is perhaps more vulnerable to outside pressure than ever.

In the mid- to late 1990s, as many as 2.5 million North Koreans, or about 10 percent of the population, died in a famine. North Korea, which can not feed its 22 million people without outside help, risked losing key sources of aid in the recent weeks by moving to restart its mothballed nuclear program, expelling U.N. inspectors and threatening to pull out of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

One of the two nuclear inspectors expelled by North Korea, Missak Demirdjian, arrived yesterday in Vienna, Austria, on a flight from Beijing. He fended off all questions, saying only: "We, of course, hope to go back as soon as possible." The United States has already cut off monthly fuel oil shipments it had been making since 1994, worth about $75 million annually.

In a Dec. 3 appeal, the U.N. agency urged donor nations to help feed 6.4 million "particularly vulnerable" North Koreans among a population of 22 million, as part of a $201 million emergency operation this year.

The main beneficiaries would be children from ages 6 months to 10 years, pregnant and nursing women, the elderly, and those particularly affected by natural disasters and the country's dire economic straits, said Rick Corsino, the group's country director for North Korea.

The senior official who responded to Reuters' queries said the administration would not know how much it will contribute until the fiscal 2004 budget was completed. It is due to be sent to Congress next month.

Rep. Mark Steven Kirk, an Illinois Republican who toured North Korea in the 1990s as a House International Relations Committee staffer, said North Korea's behavior had already cost it food aid from Japan and Europe.

"No matter how incompetent the regime may be, it's critical that we step in to save the next generation," Mr. Kirk said, adding that the administration was loath to make a food-aid announcement in the same week that Pyongyang was expelling the last two U.N. nuclear monitors.

North Korea's emphasis on "cooperation" with South Korea comes at a time when Seoul is criticizing a U.S. push to isolate North Korea in the standoff over Pyongyang's nuclear program.

North Korea's overtures are also driven by economic needs, analysts said.

Under President Kim Dae-jung's "sunshine policy" of engaging the North, South Korea has begun a series of unfinished inter-Korean projects, including a cross-border rail link, and tourist and industrial parks, that would bring the impoverished North badly needed cash.

Although North Korea's recent decision to reactivate its nuclear program angered much of the world, it provoked little reaction among most South Koreans.

Both Mr. Kim and President-elect Roh Moo-hyun, who will take office in late February, insist that North Korea not develop nuclear weapons.

But they have vowed to press on with an engagement policy toward the North and have expressed concern that Washington might impose heavy economic pressure on Pyongyang.

Nearly 2 million troops are massed on both sides of the Korean border. About 37,000 U.S. soldiers back the South Koreans. Anti-U.S. sentiment is evident on the streets of Seoul. Thousands of South Koreans have joined street rallies to protest the deaths of two teenage girls accidentally killed in June by a U.S. military vehicle.

The following is an article on Korea.com in 10 Jan:

Famished and ill, children suffer most in North's food crisis

The U.S. government repeated that it would not cut off or reduce food aid to North Korea for "political reasons," as tension between Washington and Pyeongyang grew over the North's nuclear program. The announcement was largely taken as an attempt to separate the nuclear issue from humanitarian aid to the North, out of consideration for the children, who are often hit the hardest by food shortages there.

Reports by international aid agencies forecast continued food shortages in the North, although not approaching the levels of the worst years, from 1995 to 1997. The executive director of the World Food Program, James Morris, said after his visit to the North in November that about 4 million North Korean children could die of starvation this year. The organization's spokesman, Gerald Bourke, reported that nearly all of the 25 students in a third-grade class at a primary school in Gimchaek, North Hamgyeong province, were eating mostly maize. Only three of them reported having eaten meat in the previous month, and the rest had eaten an egg and some vegetables on just one occasion during the month.

The World Food Program tried to address the situation by asking Tuesday for urgent donations. It asked for 80,000 tons of food for distribution to the areas suffering the most. The European Union said Wednesday that it would pay for 39,000 tons of food to be distributed primarily to children and pregnant women.

An official report by Pyeongyang in May 2000 said 45 percent of children 5 years old or younger suffered from chronic malnutrition. A survey by the World Food Program, the United Nations Children's Fund and the European Union conducted in September and October 1998 painted a similar picture throughout North Korea. Nearly two-thirds of the country's children aged between 6 months and 7 years old were reported to be suffering chronic malnutrition at the time. Sixteen percent of them suffered from dangerous degrees of malnutrition.

One in three orphans, aged 12 to 24 months, suffered from acute malnutrition.

In June, North Korea had a bumper crop of row vegetables, wheat and barley, and raised daily food rations from 250 grams to 350 grams -- still far short of the World Health Organization's recommended 700 grams.

The situation has reportedly deteriorated following economic reform measures adopted in July. The changes practically ended rationing, making food that much harder to come by. The secretary-general of the Korean Welfare Foundation, Kim Hyoung-suk, said inflation in the North has skyrocketed since then, worsening the pain and suffering for children. Hundreds of thousands of people, including many children, are believed to be wandering the forests and coasts looking for food, Mr. Bourke of the World Food Program said.

Two-thirds of the North's one million children under age 5 are believed to be infected with respiratory diseases and 20 percent with intestinal ailments, said Medical Aid for Children of DPRK, a private organization here. These types of diseases have increased sharply since 1995 and their mortality rate is believed to be nearly 80 percent, according to at least one study.

Only about a third of North Korean infants younger than a year old received a full inoculation regime last year, the group said. Very few children brought into hospitals are given intravenous drips because little medicine is available.

Lee Dong-hyun jackkim@joongang.co.kr - Internet Media Company Joins.com, 2003 Joins.com

North Holds Massive Rally to Show Resolve: On 12 Jan, North Korea held a public rally of one million people at an anti-American rally. The central news agency also reported on Saturday, one million people, almost half of the population of Pyongyang appeared at an anti-American rally. The people were reported to be supporting the government statement on its nuclear program, and that they "were burning with hate for the one hundred year's enemy, the US, and will block the US maneuvering of nuclear war, together." It stated that it felt a declaration of war by the U.S. was imminent.

The U.S. condemned North Korea for dropping out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and backed sending the matter to the UN Security Council. In response stated that any UN sanctions would be considered an "act of war."

U.S. and North Korea Stance As the New Year opened, President George W. Bush was facing questions as to why Iraq was more important than North Korea. He stated that the current standoff with North Korea was sharply different from the confrontation with Iraq. Bush told reporters in Crawford, Texas the case with Pyongyang is not a military showdown, rather a diplomatic one. However, continuing disclosures about the North's nuclear program made administration officials fearful they will undermine Bush's plan to build an international coalition against Iraq.

President Bush reaffirmed that he was confident a peaceful conclusion can be reached in the nuclear standoff on the Korean Peninsula. He also criticized the North Korean government for starving its people. Bush blamed North Korea for the starvation of its own people. He stated he had no affection for Kim Jong-Il, someone who starves his own citizens.

On 3 Jan North Korea again urged the United States to have unconditional dialogue with Pyongyang to discuss issues such as the scrapping of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework. This is the same as it was before and the U.S. response was the same as before.

On 6 Jan, the U.S. agreed to unconditional talks with North Korea on how it will meet international obligations over its nuclear weapons development. The offer was included in a joint statement with South Korea and Japan after two days of a Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group meeting in Washington.

The US side said, "North Korea's relations with the entire international community hinge on its taking prompt and verifiable action to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons program and come into full compliance with its international commitments. That's what we mean by North Korea meeting its obligations. We're willing to talk with North Korea about how they can do that." However, the US did add that it would NOT give additional compensation to North Korea if it stopped its nuclear weapons program. It referred to the pledge North Korea made in 1994 to freeze its nuclear ambitions in exchange for energy supplies. Analysts viewed this as a softening in Washington's stance of rejecting any talks with Pyeongyang.

On 11 Jan North Korea threatened to abandon a moratorium on ballistic missile tests, further escalating a confrontation with its neighbors and the US one day after withdrawing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). North Korea's ambassador to China, Choe Jin Su, issued the threat in which he defended his impoverished nation's right to possess "devices to save us from a nuclear attack" and accused the United States of adopting "hostile policies." "The development, test, deployment and export of our missiles entirely belong to our sovereignty," he said. "Because all agreements have been nullified by the United States' side, we believe we cannot go along with the self-imposed missile moratorium any longer."

On 14 Jan Bush offered food and energy aid to North Korea as an incentive to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. The promise was a u-turn in the Bush administration's hardline approach which had ruled out any negotiations to reward Pyongyang's "nuclear blackmail" and ended three months of stonewalling. The reversal of US policy came when Bush said that Washington was prepared to hold "technical" talks with junior North Korean officials as a prelude to more serious negotiations.

On 15 Jan North Korea flatly rejected an offer by President Bush to hold talks and provide possible economic support if the North agreed to scrap its nuclear plans. In response, Japan and the US weighed the possibility of a new pact with Pyongyang, similar to the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework solely based on the condition that North Korea surrenders its nuclear ambitions.

On 21 Jan, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il was interested in a "multilateral security guarantee" under which several countries guarantee the North's security, in return for giving up its nuclear ambitions.

On 23 Jan U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton reiterated Washington's policy towards North Korea. When asked as for whether Washington will provide a written guarantee, or a non-aggression pact for the Stalinist state, the under secretary said the US has, "No plans to invade North Korea," and "that is the strongest assurance the United States is capable of giving." "But we will not negotiate with them in a fashion that rewards bad behavior or amounts to submission to blackmail. That has been the policy and that remains the policy."

U.S. Backdoor Diplomacy: Other avenues of diplomacy was being explored. On 26 Jan Bill Richardson, Democratic Governor of New Mexico -- and a former UN Ambassador -- was the first US contact point with North Korean diplomats since the rise of the nuclear crisis. The U.S. allowed the envoys who are normally restricted to New York City to meet with Richardson. Negotiating at his ranch in New Mexico, Richardson stated Washington needs to come forward and push for direct talks with Pyongyang. He also believed the Bush administration should make efforts as soon as possible to have direct talks with the North.

North Korean envoys who met with Gov. Richardson in Santa Fe complained that they have tried for weeks to arrange talks with the Bush administration but have been constantly rebuffed. North Korea's deputy ambassador to the United Nations, Han Song Ryol, asked Richardson to set up meetings with the administration to discuss Pyongyang's nuclear program, these sources said. Han said that no member of the U.S. mission to the United Nations will talk with any member of the North Korean delegation, although the two countries' U.N. ambassadors met regularly during the Clinton administration. Richardson passed along the request for dialogue to Secretary of State Colin L. Powell.

A retired U.S. Senator was sent to North Korea on a fact-finding mission on behalf of the U.S. senate. His responses were guarded optimism stating that the North truly desired to open a dialogue. Again this contacts was not an official mission.

Another Democrat, former President Bill Clinton said it was urgent for Washington to reach a deal with Pyongyang before poverty drives the impoverished nation to sell its nuclear weapons. During an interview at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland Clinton said North Korea's bombs and missiles are its only cash crop, because the country has greater capacity to produce atomic weapons than Iraq, while less capacity to feed its people. He described North Korea's behavior as a form of attention-seeking and stressed the need for a comprehensive agreement sooner than later.

Former President Jimmy Carter again offered his services to mediate the dispute, but was politely disregarded.

According to CNN News on 6 Mar, "U.S. and North Korean representatives met secretly and informally last month to discuss Pyongyang's nuclear program, a Japanese newspaper has reported. But U.S. officials in Washington have played down the report, saying the Americans involved were private citizens and did not represent the Bush administration, Reuters news agency says. The talks -- the first meeting between representatives of both nations since January -- centered on how North Korea could verify abandoning its nuclear program, the Asahi Shimbun newspaper report. The meetings, held at the North Korean embassy in Berlin on February 20 and 21, failed to reach agreement on how a dismantlement of Pyongyang's uranium enrichment program could be proved, Asahi reported. Pyongyang proposed U.S. inspectors visit its facilities, but the Asahi report said the U.S. representatives wanted U.N. nuclear inspectors to verify any shutting down. Washington has thus far ruled out direct bilateral talks with North Korea, a demand Pyongyang says is the only way to resolve the four-month nuclear dispute. The U.S. says it wants multilateral talks and will not be blackmailed into face-to-face discussions."

Roh: South Korea to Act as Mediator: On 14 Jan, President-elect Roh stated that South Korea would act as a mediator to US-North Korea relations as it was an involved party in the crisis. Assistant Deputy Secretary of State James Kelly stated that it was "inappropriate" for the South to do so. However, Roh's transition team set about a whirlwind tour to meet with all the surrounding neighbors.

Roh continued his efforts to act as a mediator to the nuclear crisis. He urged North Korea to consider scrapping its nuclear program for energy. Roh urged the U.S. to open a dialogue with the North. In an interview with the New York Times, Roh pledged to continue dialogue with North Korea under any circumstances, and insisted on a peaceful resolution to the four-month old nuclear crisis. Roh said he believes North Korea will abandon its nuclear aspirations, once security and aid are guaranteed to the North.

On 23 Jan it was announced that a Presidential envoy, Special Adviser on Diplomacy, Security and Unification Lim Dong-won was scheduled to visit the North Korean capital Pyongyang. The visit was agreed on with North Korea and Lim was to discuss pending issues such as the North's nuclear program and inter-Korean projects. Hopes were built up in the press for the success of this envoy.

On 27 Jan Presidential envoy Lim Dong-won left for Pyongyang on a three-day mission. Again the North rebuffed the South on its attempts to be a intermediary. Delivering a personal letter from President Kim, he said "I will explain in detail the South Korean people and international community's interest and concern regarding the nuclear issue and will seek a solution." However, this time Lim was stood up by Kim Jong-Il who was "busy" elsewhere. At this point, the world media began to wonder if the Roh administration diplomacy was being run by amateurs.

There was a dramatic breach in the "unified policy" on North Korea. The following article in the New York Times on 23 Jan covers the breach where the U.S. laid out the policy and Seoul followed blindly. This is no longer the case.

Seoul Looks to New Alliances

By HOWARD W. FRENCH

SEOUL, South Korea, Jan. 23 — For five decades, Washington's leadership in its alliance with South Korea went unchallenged. With 37,000 American troops in South Korea, many of them along the world's most heavily armed frontier, the United States called the tune and this country followed along.

With startling speed over the last several weeks, that pattern has dissolved. The breach between Washington and Seoul could be seen on Wednesday, when John R. Bolton, the under secretary of state for arms control and international security, forcefully announced that he had forged a consensus that the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons programs should be referred to the United Nations Security Council. Within hours, South Korean officials said just as forcefully that they had agreed on no such thing.

The talk in Seoul in recent weeks has been of emerging from the shadow of the United States and of refocusing South Korea's foreign relations within its own region. Moreover, in violation of the ultimate taboo, there have been increasingly strong hints of interest here in a substantial reduction of the American military presence.

In one recent speech, President-elect Roh Moo Hyun, whose election in December has driven much of the talk of change, said: "Although we don't know if it might take 10, 20 or 30 years, someone has to consider an independent defense. Senior military officials have to prepare a plan for a special emergency situation when the U.S. Army moves away."

Washington appears to have been taken aback by the changing language in Seoul, just as it was by the weeks of anti-American demonstrations that swept this city during the election campaign and its aftermath. Looking back, Western diplomats and Korea analysts said that plenty of warning signs pointed to serious problems in the relationship, but that the United States, fixated on Iraq and inflexible in its approach to North Korea, paid them little heed.

Now, American experts in East Asian affairs say, pique over South Korea's sudden assertiveness and umbrage over the long season of protests against the American troop presence have caused people in the Pentagon, and elsewhere in Washington, to contemplate a smaller force here.

"There are major reports under preparation in the Pentagon about how to transform our presence," said Kurt M. Campbell, a former deputy assistant defense secretary who is an East Asia specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "Generally speaking, it is hard for our senior military people to believe that we are not loved. We are doing God's work, and if people don't appreciate it there is something wrong with them."

Some regional diplomatic analysts go so far as to compare the shifting relationship between the two countries to a runaway train, and to criticize each side for losing sight of its long-term interests, failing to hear its ally and falling prey to emotionally seductive ideas without thinking through their potentially monumental consequences. These analysts say the Bush administration is conspicuously lacking in high-level Korea experts, while Mr. Roh has never been to the United States.

On the South Korean side, a weariness with being the seemingly always put-upon junior partner in a three-way alliance that includes Japan has driven plans for closer relations with China, a country with which Koreans have deep cultural links.

While no one here speaks of cutting economic ties with the United States, the vision Mr. Roh brings to office is one of a regional economic community, or union, much as in Europe. Significantly, it would include North Korea, which Washington has been working hard to isolate because of its weapons programs. Inevitably, China would be the community's superpower.

In immediate diplomatic terms, whatever Washington has in mind, Mr. Roh seems determined to accelerate the engagement strategy toward North Korea that was begun under the current president, Kim Dae Jung, and has been called the sunshine policy. Already, Mr. Roh plans to invite the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, for a second North-South summit meeting, and to seek ways to establish military confidence-building by scaling back the armed forces and examining each other's drills.

"If North Korea responds to the outside world and abandons its nuclear program, South Korea will reward them beyond their own expectations," a senior adviser to the president-elect said this week.

Scott Snyder, Korea representative of the Asia Foundation, a San Francisco-based research group that is partly financed by the United States government, said there had been a "paradigm shift" that revolved around two issues: "a changed South Korean view of the North, since sunshine policy, and a changing view of China."

If South Koreans are feeling more self-confident, many experts warn against allowing giddiness to lead the country down the wrong path.

"This is a real misreading of history," said Victor D. Cha, a Korea specialist at Georgetown University in Washington. "U.S.-Japan-Korea was a pretty winning formula for South Korea's development. Koreans are feeling assertive and are not in a mood to acknowledge this at the moment, but to place their bets on China, whose domestic institutions are not exactly transparent or stable, is wishful thinking."

If anything, experts in Northeast Asian affairs are more scathing in their reaction to the calls in the United States to simply reduce the number of American troops here or withdraw them altogether.

Less than four years ago, William S. Cohen, then the defense secretary, created a stir here when he proclaimed in a speech that the United States would like to retain a military presence in Korea, even after the North and South eventually unified. Mr. Cohen's remarks offended some Koreans at the time, but regional experts say they grew out of a sober assessment of the United States' interests in this part of the world.

In terms of military doctrine, the 37,000 American troops here serve as a tripwire, meant to dissuade a North Korean attack more than to fight a war. Their presence radiates symbolic value, however, throughout the region, especially toward a fast-rising China.

"This administration came into office warning about the rise of China, and we are stumbling into a situation where American interests throughout East Asia risk being compromised," said Joel Wit, a former State Department official who helped negotiate the 1994 arms control agreement with North Korea. "If America is seen as playing an active, positive role, it will be possible to contain these trends. That means dealing with the North Koreans in a way that tells the South Koreans that we have their interests at heart, too," Mr. Wit said. "In the absence of that, there will be more of a drift away from the United States."

Ministerial Talks Continue Between the 24-27 Jan, cabinet-level talks were held in Seoul between the two nations on Red Cross reunification of families, ministerial talks on the nuclear crisis and the project to connect the roads and railroads across the DMZ. Roh expressed his willingness to meet with the North Korean delegation. Unfortunately, the end result of the talks was that the South was rebuffed -- politely -- by the North. Their line had not changed. They would only talk with the U.S. The Korean government ended up with egg on their faces as they promised more to the Korean people than what was delivered. The Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) stated later that South and North Korea failed to agree on definitive timetables to push forward key economic cooperation projects. (See Ministerial Talks for more information.)

IAEA Forward Nuclear Issue to UNSC: On 20 Jan the Choson Shinbo, the Japanese pro-North Korea organization Chosensoren's newspaper reported that as well as reactivating its 5MW Yongbyun nuclear reactor to counter oil shipment suspension, Pyongyang also started preparations to restart construction for its 50MW and 200MW nuclear reactors.

On 22 Jan the U.S. again requested the nuclear issue be forwarded to the UNSC. A day later North Korea stated that the two Koreas should cooperate in dealing with the United States with regard to Pyongyang's nuclear issue in "inter-Korean cooperation to serve peace and security."

On 23 Jan it was reported that U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton was keen on bringing the North Korean nuclear issue to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Bolton said the matter is "appropriate" for the council because Pyongyang's nuclear program is clearly a threat to international security. Beijing said on Monday it will not object to such a referral. Once the matter is referred, Bolton said the UNSC will have many options including political and economic sanctions to deal with the already isolationist state.

On 26 Jan the UN indicated that the South Korean government has asked the IAEA to postpone the 3 Feb meeting to apply for sanctions so that Seoul could have ample time to resolve the nuclear standoff through more diplomatic channels. In the meantime, the United States Undersecretary of State John Bolton said the Bush Administration will not rush to impose sanctions against Pyongyang.



Key member nations of the IAEA met to discuss the North Korean situation. It was expected that there would be action to forward for UNC action on sanctions as the the failure of special envoy Lim indicated that the North was holding out for talks with the U.S. only.

On 29 Jan President Bush again repeated that the U.S. would not be blackmailed. In his State of the Union address, President Bush said the biggest threat the United States faced were outlaw regimes seeking to possess nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. On North Korea Bush commented that it was using the fear of nuclear weapons to gain concessions, but the US and the world would not be blackmailed. He added Washington would seek a peaceful solution to this crisis in cooperation with South Korea, Japan, China and Russia.

On 31 Jan IAEA Director General Mohammed El Baradei requested authorization from the IAEA board of governors to submit a report concerning the North Korean nuclear problem to the UN Security Council. Upon arrival in Geneva, Director General El Baradei stated that he had submitted a report to the board on North Korea's failure to follow the regulations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). A special board meeting to decide whether to deliver the issue to the UNSC will be held on February 12.

Anti-Americanism Backlash Begins: At the same time, the anti-American demonstrations of 2002 were starting to gain attention in the U.S. Discussions were held in Congress and there was a growing fear that there would be a backlash. The NGO groups were again told to NOT be anti-American. Business leaders and conservatives warned the public of the dangers of such demonstrations. Suddenly all the "Yankee Go Home" disappeared -- or at least were not reported outside of Korea. However, the anti-War movement was picking up in Korea as well as the Americans prepared to attack Iraq. In Korea, government and police sought to suppress any demonstrations that showed anti-Americanism. Roh visited Yongsan Garrison on 15 Jan and stressed the strengths of the ROK-USFK alliance.

However, Roh had asked the ROK military chiefs of staff in December 2002 if they had plans for the removal of the USFK forces. However, he backpedalled on his initial question stating he was misunderstood by the media. On 17 Jan, Roh announced that he would seek an alliance change to one of a true partnership between "equals." Roh sought to have a horizontal relationship with the USFK -- not a vertical relationship as he perceived it. There was a lot of whispered comments about the future turmoil this policy will cause in U.S.-ROK relations.

Anti-War Protests: Go to Protests: January 2003 for information on growing anti-war movement as the NGO groups change their strategy and put the anti-War NGO group in the forefront of the anti-America campaigns. The rhetoric of "Yankee Go Home" is buried, but the effigies of Bush and Rumsfield are still there.

Bush State of the Union Address: On 28 Feb in his State of the Union address, Bush again warned of Korea while at the same time preparing for war with Iraq. He said,

Different threats require different strategies. In Iran, we continue to see a government that represses its people, pursues weapons of mass destruction and supports terror. We also see Iranian citizens risking intimidation and death as they speak out for liberty and human rights and democracy. Iranians, like all people, have a right to choose their own government and determine their own destiny and the United States supports their aspirations to live in freedom.

On the Korean peninsula, an oppressive regime rules a people living in fear and starvation. Throughout the 1990s, the United States relied on a negotiated framework to keep North Korea from gaining nuclear weapons. We now know that the regime was deceiving the world and developing those weapons all along. And today, the North Korean regime is using its nuclear program to incite fear and seek concessions. America and the world will not be blackmailed. America is working with the countries of the region — South Korea, Japan, China and Russia — to find a peaceful solution, and to show the North Korean government that nuclear weapons will bring only isolation, economic stagnation and continued hardship. The North Korean regime will find respect in the world and revival for its people only when it turns away from its nuclear ambitions.

Our nation and the world must learn the lessons of the Korean peninsula and not allow an even greater threat to rise up in Iraq. A brutal dictator with a history of reckless aggression, with ties to terrorism, with great potential wealth, will not be permitted to dominate a vital region and threaten the United States."

FEBRUARY 2003:

U.S. Buildup Viewed as Threat by North Korea On 2 Feb CBS and CNN reported that Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, the head of the United States Pacific Command, had asked Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield to allocate 24 B1 and B52 bombers to Guam, and for eight F15s and several U2s to be sent to bases in Korea and Japan. Fargo also requested 2,000 support staff for the aircraft. The media groups reported that the move was to prepare for the departure of the USS Kitty Hawk, based in Yokosuka, to the Gulf in case a war is declared on Iraq. Kitty Hawk, America's only forward-deployed aircraft carrier, deployed to the Gulf region in Feb.

The U.S. told Japan of dispatching a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the Carl Vinson, from its base in Hawaii to seas near Japan to fill the "gap." The aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson continues to maintain a presence in the region within striking distance of North Korea.

In Guam are two nuclear-powered submarines, the USS City of Corpus Christi and the USS San Francisco, moved their home ports to Guam late last year. A third submarine is expected to arrive by the end of 2003 or early 2004.

However, the media claimed the deployments were linked to the North Korea nuclear issue, although the Pentagon denied this. It stated that the same actions were accomplished during the Gulf War and Bosnia when the Kitty Hawk carrier group was sent to the Middle East. The ROK Ministry of National Defense also denied any consultations to increase troops in Korea. The New York Times quoted a Pentagon official who said the plan was a considered and cautious one, which did not mean any military action. The New York Times said the aircraft could provide back up if President Bush ordered a preemptive strike on Yongbyon. Despite the truth that the U.S. were filling the void left by the Kitty Hawk it is readily apparent that the forces are also aimed at the North. For the first time since 1993, F-117A Stealth bombers were scheduled for joining the Foal Eagle exercises in Korea. (NOTE: It is significant to note that 1993 was the date of the last nuclear standoff with North Korea when the F-117A appeared unannounced.)

An article in Japan Today state that the U.S. was to build up forces in Japan to counter North Korea. Washington has told Tokyo of its plan to beef up its military forces in Japan to prepare for a possible emergency on the Korean Peninsula as tensions rise over Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program and it focuses attention on Iraq. The Japanese government has welcomed the U.S. government's plan. The buildup concerns F-15 fighter bombers and U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, among others.

The U.S. government expressed strong concern about North Korea making a provocative military move, such as lifting a freeze on missile launch tests. Japan, as well as other nations in the region, is increasingly concerned about North Korea's provocative behavior and the growing threat it poses to its neighbors. However, in response to the South Korean concerns, the B-1 and B-52 deployment was put on a hold with the units on alert in the CONUS ready for deployment. Its support elements were deployed to Guam.

Japan warned North Korea on 14 Feb that it would launch a pre-emptive strike if Tokyo found evidence that Pyongyang was about to attack with a ballistic missile. Shigeru Ishiba, the Japanese Defence Minister, said that he would be seeking parliamentary approval for “crisis legislation”, which would broaden Tokyo’s ability to act militarily.

He also suggested that Japan would be interested in collaborating with the United States on a missile defence system to protect itself.

Although Tokyo is restrained from using force by its constitution, Mr Ishiba, who is regarded as a hawk, said that this would be purely an act of self-defence and rejected the accusation that Tokyo would be taking action “pre-emptively”. He stated that Japan will use military force as a self-defence measure if (North Korea) starts to resort to arms against Japan." He added that Japan would regard the loading of fuel on a ballistic missile aimed at Japan as a justification for attack.

In Korea in February, the USFK prepared for two defensive exercises. The North criticized the routine Reception Staging and Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) and 'Foal Eagle' exercises as preemptive strike attempts. According to the USFK, the joint drills are designed to improve the joint U.S.-South Korea forces' ability to defend South Korea against ``external aggression.'' In addition, the 2nd Infantry Division announced that its 'Iron ARTEP' exercise, to evaluate readiness will be held from February 21 to March 10 in Ilwon, Gyeonggi Province. The division said that although there will be military and Korean police to guide traffic, it wanted people within the vicinity to be especially vigilant of the convoys.

Roh Draws Line on Military Response Option: On 19 Feb, President-elect Roh said South Korea's opinion on the North Korean nuclear issue can be different from that of the United States, only if it is intended to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Roh called for the United States yesterday to rule out any possibility of Washington considering a military option to resolve North Korea's nuclear issues. He said he would oppose any U.S. military strike against North Korea's prohibited nuclear-weapons programs, saying the South must not be afraid to express differences with Washington if it means preventing a war. "It is impossible not to have differences [with the United States, and I cannot agree to attacking North Korea." "We can fully cooperate, but not on this issue." "(The United States') military strike against North Korea is an extremely serious matter that could lead to a war on the peninsula. So I oppose even a review of such a possibility," he said. "It is a matter of which tactic to choose: whether to cooperate with the United States and risk a military attack (on the North), or to speak out so that there is a different opinion in the international community," Roh said. "I think I am right." He also stressed that the most important thing in dealing with the North's nuclear issue is the people's resolve to cope with the worst-case scenario patriotically.

Roh also made it clear that he objects to the U.S.' reported plans to impose sanctions on the North, reiterating that the nuclear standoff should be settled through peaceful means such as dialogue and diplomacy.

Conservatives in the South have pressed reformer Roh to respect the U.S. approach toward the North, underlining the importance of a 50-year-old military alliance between Seoul and Washington. But Roh, a strong advocate of the "sunshine policy" pushed by President Kim Dae-jung, said, "We can express a different view if doing so will prevent a war."

President Bush has said repeatedly he has no plans to invade North Korea in the escalating dispute about Pyongyang's clandestine nuclear programs. A slew of administration officials, led by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, told Congress yesterday that the United States is pursuing a multilateral, diplomatic solution, although Mr. Bush has not ruled out any option. Despite the pledge, there have been some news reports in South Korea and the United States that Washington will eventually consider a military option if the North pushes ahead with its nuclear arms programs. A New York Times report said the Bush administration is mapping out plans for sanctions against the North that may include cutting off money sent there by Koreans in Japan and halting its weapons shipments.

The White House confirmed on 20 Feb that the Pentagon is discussing reducing the U.S. military contingent in South Korea and elsewhere. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, the department's point man on East Asia, told Congress that the U.S. and South Korean approaches on the North largely "overlap." "We can work out the differences we do have as we have in the past," he said.

Secretary of State Powell attended Roh's inauguration on 25 Feb and met with Roh to "strive to construct a general basis for an united view" on North Korea. The U.S. position was that it would be premature to discuss a "united view" so shortly after his inauguration. Thus the U.S. will give time for the President Roh`s administration to "construct a fundamental frame of the North Korean policy." Only then will the U.S. sit down and discuss the issue. He also made ti clear that the military option should remain "on the table."

Gen. Myers, Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in an interview with NBC on 28 Feb that if President George W. Bush decided to use military force to resolve special issues, U.S. troops are ready to operate in a flexible and effective manner, adding that North Korea is one of the targets of nuclear attack. He also said that the U.S. maintains and updates all military options -- including preemptive nuclear attacks against North Korea.

North Korea starts Military Preparations for Attack: On 5 Feb, Kim Jong Il was reported reviewing his bases. On 6 Feb the North reactivated its nuclear facilities claiming they were for power generation, but the U.S. and Korea discredited these statements stating that they were for converting the spent rods into weapon grade plutonium. The North issued a threat of a preemptive strike against "US TROOPS." They promised that they would strike without warning. The tensions increased a notch.

North Korea warns of pre-emptive attack on US troops: BBC

SEOUL, Feb 6 (AFP) - North Korea has warned it would launch a pre-emptive attack on United States forces if Washington sends more troops to the Korean peninsula, the BBC said Thursday.

The threat to strike first against US troops in the region came from North Korea's foreign ministry deputy director, Ri Pyong-Gap, in response to US moves to reinforce its military presence around the Korean peninsula. US officials have said the Pentagon ordered B-52 and B-1 bombers to prepare for deployment in the western Pacific to back up US forces in South Korea. They say the reinforcements would help signal that a possible war with Iraq was not distracting the United States from a nuclear stand-off with North Korea.

North Korea's 1.2-million-strong armed forces have been on alert since the crisis escalated in December when the Stalinist country expelled monitors from the United Nations' atomic agency.

Speaking to a visiting BBC correspondent in Pyongyang, Ri said his government was becoming increasingly alarmed at signs that Washington planned to bolster its military firepower in South Korea.

North Korea will regard such actions as an invasion or attack against it, he said, adding that Pyongyang would not just sit and wait and could decide to strike first if necessary.

Tension over North Korea's nuclear ambitions mounted Thursday after Pyongyang's announcement that a nuclear plant capable of making plutonium for nuclear weapons had begun producing electricity.

The announcement came as Washington stepped up war preparations against Iraq, with US Secretary of State Colin Powell unveiling a dossier on Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction at the UN.

The United States branded North Korea's announcement "blackmail" after Pyongyang justified the move to restart its reactor as vital for the energy-starved nation.

The BBC said tensions on the streets of Pyongyang are tangible. Air raid drills and blackouts are becoming twice-daily rituals and huge posters calling for courage in the fight ahead cover billboards and walls.

In Washington, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfield, referring to a "dangerous" situation," said North Korea would be making a mistake if it felt it could exploit US preoccupation with Iraq.

"To the extent the world thinks the United States is focused on problems in Iraq, it's conceivable someone could make a mistake and believe that's an opportunity for them to take an action which they otherwise would have avoided, " he told members of the US Congress.

The Pentagon has ordered two dozen long-range bombers -- an equal number of B-1s and B-52s -- to prepare to deploy to Guam as a check against North Korea while it masses forces in the Gulf for a possible war against Iraq, US officials have said.

Rumsfield said North Korea could add to the one or two nuclear weapons it is currently assessed to have by making nuclear material for six to eight more in a relatively short period of time.

"Our forces are arranged around the world -- not in a threatening way but in a way that demonstrates that we do in fact have the capability to act in more than one theater at one time," he said.

US officials reported that spy satellites over North Korea had detected what appeared to be trucks suspected of moving some of 8,000 spent fuel rods out of storage at the Yongbyon nuclear complex.

Bush aides have said they are willing to talk to North Korea -- but only about how it can end its twin nuclear programs, which sparked the crisis. The United States has been seeking to bring the issue before the UN, which could impose sanctions, an act Pyongyang says it would view as a declaration of war.

South Korea opposes the imposition of any sanctions against North Korea and has stressed the need for time to allow diplomacy to work.

N. Korea Vows to Win Standoff With U.S.

JAE-SUK YOO
Associated Press

SEOUL, South Korea - North Korea defiantly declared Monday that it would triumph in its nuclear standoff with the United States, and South Korea's president warned that Pyongyang's weapons program could start an atomic arms race in Northeast Asia.

The North's state-run Central Radio said the world was watching the Pyongyang-Washington standoff "with sweating hands," and vowed that the Stalinist state would maintain its "mighty army-first policy."

"The victory in the nuclear conflict is ours, and the red flag of the army-first policy will flutter ever more vigorously," said the broadcast, monitored by South Korea's Yonhap news agency.

Washington and its allies are pressuring North Korea to abandon its suspected nuclear weapon programs. The North has insisted on direct talks first with the United States, from which it wants a nonaggression treaty. The bluster from the North came as South Korea's outgoing president warned that Pyongyang's production of atomic weapons could force his country and Japan to built nuclear bombs as well.

"If North Korea has nuclear weapons, South Korea could possess such weapons ... and Japan could arm with nuclear weapons. This is what a lot of people worry about. This cannot be tolerated," Kim Dae-jung told tourism officials.

Kim, whose term ends Feb. 25, did not clarify whether he thought North Korea already has such a weapon. Prime Minister Kim Suk-soo has said he believed Pyongyang does not have nuclear weapons.

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfield has said that North Korea has one or two nuclear weapons and could extract enough plutonium within months to make six to eight more.

North Korea had never admitted or denied having nuclear weapons, but has said it has the right to develop nuclear weapons.

Pyongyang's declaration of ultimate victory in the nuclear standoff came a day after it hosted national celebrations for reclusive leader Kim Jong Il's 61st birthday on Sunday.

Kim rules the communist country as supreme commander of the nation's 1.1 million-member armed forces, and state-run media marked his birthday with anti-U.S. diatribe and hyperbolic praise of his pro-military policy.

In his comments to tourism officials, Kim Dae-jung - who has championed a policy of engagement with North Korea - said he believes there is "no possibility" of U.S. military action against Pyongyang, and called for talks.

"North Korea-U.S. talks are important because the problem can only be solved there," he said.

The U.S. military said Monday it will conduct two joint military exercises with South Korea next month, but said the annual maneuvers are not related to the North Korean nuclear dispute. There are 37,000 American troops in South Korea.

The joint drills are "defense-oriented" and designed to improve the joint U.S.-South Korea forces' ability to defend South Korea against "external aggression," the U.S. military command in Seoul said in a statement.

North Korea had no immediate response to the upcoming exercises, but the communist country has routinely denounced past joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises as preparations for an invasion.

Last week, the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency referred the issue to the U.N. Security Council. The council could consider economic sanctions against North Korea. The North has said it would consider any sanctions a declaration of war.

The crisis began in October when U.S. officials said North Korea admitted having a covert nuclear program. Washington and its allies suspended fuel shipments, and the North retaliated by expelling U.N. monitors, taking steps to restart frozen nuclear facilities and withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The 2d ID announced an exercise from Feb. 21 to March 10 in Gyeonggi Province, known as Iron ARTEP (Army Readiness Training and Evaluation Program), During the exercise, U.S. military and South Korean police will form a convoy for the U.S. Army vehicles being used. In addition, in February, the USFK prepared for two other defensive exercises the routine Reception Staging and Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) and 'Foal Eagle' exercises as preemptive strike attempts. The RSOI is to practice procedures to accept the "follow-on" forces which would beef up the USFK/ROK forces in case they come under attack by the North. "Foal Eagle" is an defensive exercise that has gone on for years. As to the USAF portion, it alternates between Osan and Kunsan as the exercise bases under siege.

In February, the USFK announced that some 2,800 American officers and soldiers in Korea who had finished their tour of duty had been issued with three month retention orders. According to the USFK, this was not the result of actions by North Korea, but rather a potential conflict in Iraq. A USFK official said that the retention orders were issued to prepare for an attack on Iraq and the Reception Staging and Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) and 'Foal Eagle' exercises to be held in March

Tensions remain high though amongst the USFK forces though there has not been any heightened alerts.

Tensions Remind U.S. Troops in South Korea of Their Mission

By HOWARD W. FRENCH

SEOUL, South Korea, Feb. 22 — It was not all that long ago that Capt. Andre Toussaint assumed that for the next few months, at least, his assignment here would be just about the safest overseas posting in the United States Army.

This line of thinking was an article of faith among the 37,000 American troops stationed here, who reasoned that with the United States braced for a war with Iraq there was little likelihood of a simultaneous fight on this peninsula.

"I shipped out from Fort Bragg, and had I been there one month longer, I would have probably been on the list for Iraq," said Captain Toussaint, 31, a transportation specialist. "I told myself they're not going to pull us out of here because of the Middle East. In fact some of my enlisted men have been calling this the safest place on earth."

But lately, since North Korea's rejection of international controls on its nuclear weapons program, that sort of talk has died down. North Korea's propaganda machine has threatened to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire," while Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfield has put American bombers on alert for possible deployment to the region and asserted that the United States is capable of waging two wars at once.

All of this has caused Captain Toussaint, who is an avid follower of the news, to begin factoring the unforeseeable into his calculations of the risks that come with his job.

"Before, whenever we trained, my soldiers would complain, `Why are we doing this, standing out in the cold for four hours at a time,' " Captain Toussaint said. "But for the last few weeks, the mission has been obvious to everyone, and I don't hear anyone complaining anymore. Nobody here wants a war, but all of a sudden, people understand they must be prepared for the worst."

At a recent briefing for journalists, senior officers at the Yongsan Army Garrison, the headquarters of United States forces in Korea, made it painstakingly clear just how horrific things could get here.

If a full-scale war were to break out between North and South, American military planners say, there could be more than a million casualties in the first two weeks. Most of the dead and wounded would be civilians in and around Seoul, a dense and sprawling metropolitan area of more than 15 million inhabitants.

The 37,000 American troops stationed in South Korea, some within a few miles of the demilitarized zone, would be priority targets for North Korea's huge and robustly equipped army. "You can assume that the building where we are sitting wouldn't be a very good place to be," said a major, who conducted the briefing at the Yongsan base, in the heart of Seoul.

With 13,000 artillery pieces and countless rocket batteries and mortars ranged along the demilitarized zone, American officers said North Korea could rain as many as 500,000 rounds an hour on South Korea. "The idea is to lay down so much fire that the enemy is too staggered to respond," an American colonel said. The American officers said North Korea's forces were densely arrayed along the demilitarized zone and an impending attack would come with little warning. Evacuating the tens of thousands of American civilians — so-called nonessential personnel — from South Korea, they said, would require at least 21 days. Mindful, perhaps, of the potential dangers, Mr. Rumsfield told the Senate Armed Services Committee this week that he was considering plans to reposition United States forces farther from the demilitarized zone and even to reduce their numbers.

For South Koreans, there is nowhere to go but as far south as possible, and in a reflection of that predicament, the steadily mounting crisis has affected everything from the stock market to the country's international credit risk ratings.

North Korea's news media convey the government's contempt for the United States. One recent broadcast likened the United States to a disoriented dog that "knows no fear of the tiger." Another said that "even the mud in the fields" hates America. Washington, meanwhile, recently called the North Korean government a "terrorist regime."

But despite the spike in tensions, American military officials say there have not been any recent signs of worrisome military activity by North Korea near the demilitarized zone. Likewise, they say, there have been no special American precautions for war.

An American military spokeswoman chuckled wryly when asked if American forces had been ordered into a higher state of readiness along the demilitarized zone since December, when North Korea expelled international observers from its nuclear reactors, aggravating the current crisis. "We are always at the highest state of readiness," she said. "There is no way to be any more prepared."

Among the troops stationed closest to the demilitarized zone, the possibility of war, and the certainty of heavy casualties, has always taken a toll in stress. In their twitchy, sometimes pained way, several soldiers claimed gamely that the increasingly heated atmosphere between the United States and North Korea made little difference.

"It's mostly my family that worries about the situation," said Joon Jung Hi, 20, a baby-faced American infantryman of Korean descent whose unit is based at Camp Casey, close to the demilitarized zone. "I try to tell them there is no point in worrying. My commander keeps us motivated by telling us that we have the best team in the world, with a force that nobody else can match, and I believe it."

On 20 Feb a North Korean fighter briefly crossed into South Korean airspace over the Yellow Sea Thursday before being chased back a few minutes later. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) the North Korean MiG-19 fighter flew some 13 km south of the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the de facto maritime border between the divided Koreas, at 10:03 a.m. but retreated at 10:05 a.m. after two South Korean F-5E fighters were scrambled to intercept it.

Some suspected that the MiG-19 border violation may have been intended to cause the ROK to scramble fighters so that north Korea could verify the effectiveness of the MIG-31 Radar that the North allegedly has obtained. The MIG-31's radar is the first MIG radar with a "look down shoot down" capability and is said to be the most powerful fighter radar in the world. CyberNews 24 reported in Nov 2002 that north Korea has deployed 20 Mig-31 aircraft. The article quotes the MND as saying: "It is now confirmed that North Korea's Air Force has deployed and conducting operations with 20 Russian Mig-31 Fighter aircraft and we have confirmed the heads of the Air Force are currently visiting Russia." The article then went on to talk about how south Korea's Sunshine Policy has made this possible.

North Korea Missile Threat On 9 Feb Professor Hideshi Takesada at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo said North Korea's first known launching of a rocket capable of striking Japan was a dramatic reminder of his nation's military vulnerabilities. Takesada said North Korea's Daepodong 1 could deliver a 450-pound warhead up to 1,250 miles; far enough to reach any target in Japan and he expected a ballistic missile tests sometime this year. This raised the possibility Friday that North Korea could test-fire long-range missiles this year capable of striking the United States. In December 2002, the North Koreans had threatened the Japanese that they may reopen their missile testing program. In its last missile test, in 1998, North Korea launched a missile that flew over Japanese territory, setting off a crisis between the countries.

In a December 2001 report, the CIA estimated a 10,000 km (6,200 mile) range for the two-stage version of the Taepyongdong -- enough to hit Alaska, Hawaii and Guam and, 15,000 km (9,300 miles) range for the three-stage version, enough to hit any point in North America.

North Korea openly threatened to turn the U.S. into a sea of fire. Then an Associated Press article stated on 12 Feb that a North Korean three-stage TaepyongDong 2 missile had the potential to strike the U.S. mainland though it remained untested. This was from Vice Adm. Lowell Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and CIA Director George Tenet in briefing the Senate Armed Services Committee. A 2001 U.S. government report said a three-stage Taepo Dong could deliver a several-hundred-pound payload from North Korea to targets about 9,300 miles distant -- sufficient to strike all of North America. A two-stage Taepo Dong 2, which would be easier to use successfully, may be able to reach Alaska or Hawaii. Tenet also said North Korea probably has one or two nuclear weapons. The revelation was certain to raise questions about Bush's priorities -- and whether North Korea or Iraq pose a greater threat to the United States. Baghdad does NOT possess weapons that can strike America. The hysteria in America was just cranked up a notch.

On 24 Feb, North Korea launched a ground-to-ship missile Monday into the East Sea. The Ministry of Defense attempted to determine whether it was a test-firing of a new weapon or part of a winter drill by the North Korean army. The unidentified North Korean rocket -- probably a surface-to-vessel short-range Silkworm with a 60-mile range -- was fired into the sea between Korea and Japan, but it landed in North Korean waters. North Korean missiles are considered to be highly accurate, and the move seemed carefully calibrated to draw attention without being highly provocative — a flashing signal rather than a red light. Later it was reported that this might have been a cruise missile based on a long-range variant of China's HY-2 Silkworm missile and dubbed the AG-1 by the Pentagon. The first test launch was May 23, 1997, from a military base at the Angol army barracks in northeastern North Korea.

Then on 28 Feb, it was announced by the Japanese daily Yoimuri Shimbun that North Korea conducted an engine test for its Daepodong ballistic missile at a launch site in Musudan-ri last month. The newspaper said that this had been confirmed by U.S. reconnaissance satellite photos. The paper said the photos showed the launch site's fiber optics network under maintenance and a roof had been placed over the launch pad apparently to conceal newly-installed equipment and materials, prompting Japan and the United States to increase surveillance on the site.

According to the Daily Yoimuri on 1 Mar, the next move would probably be to test-launch a ballistic missile. The official indicated that recent events are part of a strategy of intimidation on the part of Pyongyang. Reactivating a nuclear reactor is the least dangerous of Pyongyang's three diplomatic cards. The remaining two cards were activating a nuclear plant to extract plutonium by reprocessing used nuclear fuel rods and test-firing a ballistic missile.

N. Korea next move test-firing missile?

Tetsuo Hidaka and Takuji Kawata Yomiuri Shimbun Staff Writers

Following North Korea's reactivation of a nuclear reactor and the test of a Taepodong 2 missile engine, both of which were revealed Thursday, a government official said Pyongyang's next move would probably be to test-launch a ballistic missile.

The official indicated that recent events are part of a strategy of intimidation on the part of Pyongyang. It was reported Thursday that a 5,000-kilowatt graphite-moderated reactor in Yongbyon was reactivated and that a Taepodong 2 rocket booster was tested in January at a missile launch site.

On Thursday morning, after the reactivation of the nuclear reactor was reported, Mitoji Yabunaka, director general of the Foreign Ministry's Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, briefed Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi on the situation.

"Reactivating a nuclear reactor is the least dangerous of (Pyongyang's) three (diplomatic) cards," Yabunaka said.

He told Kawaguchi that the remaining two cards were activating a nuclear plant to extract plutonium by reprocessing used nuclear fuel rods and test-firing a ballistic missile.

"If North Korea takes one of the two other actions, Japan will have to start discussing sanctions against the country," he said.

By reactivating the reactor, North Korea will be able to obtain an additional 8,000 used nuclear fuel rods in about a year.

As Pyongyang already has 8,000 used fuel rods, it is possible that North Korea will be able to produce enough weapons-grade plutonium to build more than 10 nuclear bombs.

Pyongyang is urging the United States to open a dialogue by indicating that it could produce a large number of nuclear bombs.

Reactivating a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant is a risky option for North Korea as it will upset Washington. "North Korea seems to believe reactivating the reactor is an action that will fall just short of drawing sanctions," a senior Defense Agency official said.

Govt may consider sanctions

"We are developing missiles to protect the country's rights, safety and socialism from enemy attack," Pyongyang Broadcasting Station said Thursday.

Japan is worried North Korea will next test-fire a ballistic missile, since if the North follows Japan's "three cards" scenario, a test-launch would be a safer option than reactivating a fuel reprocessing plant. The government fears North Korea will choose to test-launch a Rodong missile--which can hit Japan but not the United States--over a Taepodong 2, which is believed capable of reaching the U.S. West Coast. If North Korea launches a Rodong, Washington may not treat the situation as seriously as Japan, and a rift may develop between the allies.

When U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell met with Kawaguchi on Feb. 22, the two agreed not to respond to North Korean provocations.

However, Kawaguchi told Powell, "I want you to understand the difference between Japanese and U.S. public opinion. If a Rodong is fired, Japanese people will panic."

During a Feb. 23 meeting with the U.S. secretary of state, Liberal Democratic Party Secretary General Taku Yamasaki said, "If North Korea fires a Rodong at Japan, the Self-Defense Forces can't intercept it, as Japan doesn't have the ability to defend itself against such a threat."

The government believes it is legally permissible to attack enemy missile launch sites if this can be considered as exercising Japan's individual right to self-defense.

However, as Japan is bound by the principle that the use of force can only be used to defend against an actual attack, the SDF possesses no air-to-surface missiles able to hit targets more than 40 kilometers away. In addition, Air Self-Defense Force fighter jets are not capable of making a round-trip bombing run to North Korea due to their short range.

The Maritime Self-Defense Force's Aegis-equipped destroyers would require cruise missiles--such as Tomahawks, with a range of 2,500 kilometers--to attack a site in North Korea. However, the only countries possessing Tomahawk missiles are the United States and Britain.

The government has started discussing a missile defense system--which would shoot down ballistic missiles with interceptor missiles--as the U.S. government has repeatedly asked Tokyo to obtain one as soon as possible.

Although the United States plans to start deploying such a system in fiscal 2004, it is not expected to be completed until two years after that. Therefore, the system is unlikely to play a role in the ongoing North Korean crisis.

Therefore, in the event North Korea launches a missile, the government will demonstrate a readiness to impose strict sanctions to deter Pyongyang from firing more.

The government is considering restricting money transfers to North Korea, restricting trade with the country and reviewing its contributions to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization.

Trade restrictions could be a severe blow to North Korea as Japan is the country's second-largest trading partner after China. Trade with Japan "is an important source of foreign currency (for North Korea)," a Foreign Ministry official said. "So the measure will have a large impact."

On 8 Mar CNN stated that U.S. officials believed North Korea would conduct another test of its KN-01 short-range anti-ship missile, which is under development. The KN-01 is the same missile that was tested just prior to President Roh's inauguration on 24 Feb. On 10 Mar the North tested a shore-to-ship cruise missile over the Sea of Japan in the same area as the last test. According to South Korean officials, the anti-ship cruise missile that the North test-fired on 10 Mar from a beach in Sinsang-ri, South Hamgyong Province, failed to hit its target in the East Sea.

On 1 Apr the Japanese government said North Korea fired a ground-to-ship missile but could not confirm the information. The Japanese media reported earlier in the day North Korea fired a missile with a range of 60 kilometers into the Yellow Sea from a site in western South Pyongyang Province around 10:15 a.m. on 1 Apr. On 4 April, South Korea stated that it and the United States had debunked the report made by Japan's Jiji News Agency -- but there is some controversy over this.

Seoul Continues to Pursue Role as Mediator On 11 Feb the Choson Ilbo reported that the Seoul administration was still pursuing its role as a mediator. This made the U.S. very uncomfortable as the South has agreed to the tri-national statement of solidarity, but was openly going in another direction.

Minister Says Seoul Mediates in NK Nuke Issue

by Kim In-ku (ginko@chosun.com)

Minister of Unification Jeong Se-hyun declared Tuesday that the government's role in the North Korea nuclear crisis was that of a mediator

At a Millennium Democratic Party Democratic and Peaceful Unification Committee meeting, Minister Jeong said the South is a mediator in the nuclear tension, and its position is different from the US, the directly concerned party. Jeong added not siding with the North doesn't mean Seoul is necessarily with Washington, and pressuring the North in line with the US is not a wise policy.

Bush Administration officials have been expressing discomfort regarding Seoul’s assuming the mediator's role. Jeong also said not to regret pouring too much money into the North, insisting Pyongyang's increasing dependence on the South would lift inter-Korean tension and contribute to an upgrade of its sovereign rating.

On 13 Feb Roh defended the differences in the North Korea policies between the U.S. and Korea before a body of the Korean Federation of Trade Unions (KFTU). He stated that the differences were exaggerated by the Korean media.. Roh questioned whether they wanted him to follow the US into a war. He said that he as President would not have any say over Korean forces in time of war. Immediately after this the Ministry of Defense corrected his statement in that he DID have an input to control of the actions of the COMMANDER of the CFC. In addition, he said that assisting North Korea was not giving money away and the country should invest more if it was required. He added that it would be better to have a difficult life than for everyone to die -- meaning the South should be willing to sacrifice for the North. Roh commented that even if there were difficulties in the economy, hard decisions had to be made.

However, though Roh kept saying that "South Korea stands by U.S. side in nuclear standoff," he also kept saying that he wanted to contribute to a peaceful resolution to the dispute. In other words, he was going to continue to attempt to mediate regardless of the rift it was causing in U.S.-ROK relations. On 14 Feb, he stated, "Our government is not trying to mediate between North Korea and the United States," Roh was quoted as saying recently in an written interview with BusinessWeek. "but we're trying to contribute to peacefully resolving the issue, standing by the U.S. side based on the close Korea-U.S. alliance." In the interview, Roh also presented several "principles" he sticks to in resolving the nuclear issue, including not allowing the North to go nuclear, peacefully resolving the issue and working closely with the United States and Japan as well as Seoul playing a greater role.

Secretary of State Powell will attend Roh's inauguration on 25 Feb and meet with Roh to "strive to construct a general basis for an united view" on North Korea. However, it would be premature to discuss it so shortly after his inauguration. Thus the U.S. will give time for the President Roh`s administration to "construct a fundamental frame of the North Korean policy." Only then will the U.S. sit down and discuss the issue.

U.S. Aid to Food Program Cut On 12 Feb the Choson Ilbo reported that the U.S. was holding back on its food pledges to the north because the North was diverting its food to the military. The North spurned this action. However, the U.S. stresses that it does not use food as a tool of politics -- it was just concerned over the control of the food aid by the World Food Program.

US Delays Food Aid Pledge to North

by Kim Yeon-kuk (yk-kim@chosun.com)

The Associated Press reported Tuesday that Tony Hall, the United States ambassador to the United Nations food agencies, said the US was delaying 2003 food pledges to North Korea because of "credible" reports that the government was reallocating food aid to its soldiers and political elite. Ambassador Hall was reported to have said that the US would probably deliver food to the UN World Food Program (WFP), when the agency received further assurances it can get food to the people it is intended for.

He said that there were reports that after WFP staff had gone from the food distribution sites, government officials collected the distributed food and reallocated it to soldiers and the political elite. "We are going to continue to be there because we don't use food as a weapon," Hall told reporters. "But we are going to be darn sure that if we tell you where the food is supposed to be and you give it to someone else, then we're going to wait, and we're going to be darn sure that our food is getting through to the right people."

AP said that Washington had been the largest donor to the agency's North Korea projects, providing about US$61 million worth of aid equal to 172,700 tons, last year.

The agency has appealed for US$201 million for North Korea for 2003, but less than US$15 million has been pledged from the European Union and Italy. And although Japan provided US$14 million worth of aid in 2001, it did not provide any aid last year. According to Ministry of Unification (MOU) statistics, yearly North Korean food consumption requirements are six million tons, but it produces on average only four million tons each year, resulting in a chronic shortage. This year, 76 tons of food aid has been pledged by South Korea and the international society.

Sunshine Policy Programs Progress On 14 Feb, a pilot overland tour to North Korea's Mount Geumgang was initiated with the opening of a temporary road through the heavily fortified demilitarized zone (DMZ) five months after construction began. Hopes brightened again for the Sunshine Policy in South Korean eyes.

North Korea's Kaesong Special Economic Zone was being examined closely. The northern economic zones seemed to be considered a bust due to lack of infrastructure and untrained labor forces. For the complex to succeed, it appeared that electric power supply problem is a priority. The city was experiencing its worst power shortage ever. The North wants the South to build a power plant or supply electricity. North Korea labor officials have visited the South looking for industries that are suitable for the technological level of their people. Basically, all industries in the north will have to be low-tech in the initial phases.

The North and South continued to hold ministerial talks. Though the participants to the talks engaged in "sincere discussions on cross-border cooperation and the tensions surrounding the North's nuclear ambitions," they were unable to make a meaningful breakthrough.

Kim Dae-jung and Hyundai Merchant Marine Scandal & More: Also in the midst of the North Korean crisis, the flap over Kim Dae-jung using the Hyundai Merchant Marine (HMM) to funnel about $250 million to the North Koreans has raised a hornet's nest. Allegedly at least $500 million was transferred to Pyongyang through Hyundai Construction, Hyundai Electronics and Hyundai Merchant Marine. The Wall Street Journal went so far as to publish an article that said Kim Dae-jung "bribed" the North to hold his historic meeting with Kim Jong-Il that led to his Nobel Peace Prize. Kim stated that funds that were used to further inter-Korean relations were "outside the law" as it was the use of "discretional presidential power" and those involved should not be prosecuted. Kim said this was a "supra-legal action in which the laws of South Korea were inapplicable, as they define the North as an anti-government (South) organization." Kim said to reveal everything about this would not help the national interest or inter-Korean relations.

Kim Dae-jung

The Public Prosecutor's Office stated it was postponing an investigation into HMM's allegedly illegal fund transfer to North Korea until a "political solution" is reached. In other words, it wants instructions from the incoming President-elect as to which direction to take -- but the Roh team has been vacillating. Many Koreans still feel an independent counsel should be appointed. However, Former president Kim Young-sam and twenty "elder statesmen" in various fields announced on 7 Feb that President Kim Dae-jung should be prosecuted according to the law for secretly giving financial assistance to North Korea. In a statement to the press, they stated that the assistance by Kim Dae-jung turned out to be "an act of treason" because it helped the North develop nuclear technology and missiles with South Koreans' taxes. "President Kim Dae-jung brought about the nuclear crisis of today," they said.

On 14 Feb, President Kim Dae-jung apologized for the incident, but stated that the payments were part of a "payment schedule" that was prearranged between Hyundai and the North. It was admitted that the NIS -- Korean equivalent of the CIA -- aided in the transfer of the funds, but again stated that there was no illegality in the act. Despite President Kim Dae-jung's apology for Hyundai's illegal transfer of money to North Korea before the summit in June 2000, the rival parties continued their dispute. While the opposition Grand National Party (GNP) insisted on a special counsel being appointed for a criminal investigation, the ruling Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) resolutely called for a political settlement.

Suddenly the support for the "sunshine policy" is not too popular. And then the Chairman of Hyundai, Chung Mong-hun, came forward with a televised statement. According to a Newsday.com report, he admitted that $500 million had been transferred to North Korea to secure exclusive rights to "avoid unnecessary competition and disputes with Japan, Germany, Australia and the United States, which showed interest in North Korean projects." "Hyundai projects in the North include tourism, railways, an industrial park, a sports complex, dams, an airport, telecommunications infrastructure and power generation. And Chung said his group would consult with other companies in pushing ahead with investments there.

In other words, the South Korean government funded a secret deal to give "exclusive rights" for a specific chaebol who is now willing to share its largesse with other KOREAN companies. "We have been promoting inter-Korean economic projects with the belief that balanced growth on the Korean Peninsula would help movement toward reunification," he said. Nice bucket of worms.

Chung also said he brokered the summit by setting up a meeting between government officials from the two Koreas in March 2000. He said "government understanding and cooperation" was an inevitable result of the money transfer because of the special nature of relations between the two Koreas, divided since 1945.

Sanctions for North Korea Held Off: Choson Ilbo on 17 Feb repeating the New York Times stated that the U.S. was still developing plans for sanctions, but was holding off because its Pacific allies do not support it at this time.

NYT: US Has Not Ruled Out Sanctions

by Kim Jae-ho (jaeho@chosun.com)

NEW YORK - The New York Times, quoting senior administration officials, reported on Monday that the United States is developing plans for possible sanctions against North Korea that include halting the country's weapons shipments, and prohibiting money being sent to North Korea by pro-North Koreans living in Japan, the US and other countries, if it continues to develop nuclear weapons.

The NYT quoted senior officials as stating, "The Pentagon and State Department are developing detailed plans for sanctions, and perhaps other actions, so that the United States has a forceful response ready in case North Korea takes aggressive new steps toward developing nuclear weapons."

The NYT also said, "Because Russia and China, as well as South Korea and Japan, have been unwilling to support cutting off trade with North Korea, the US is looking at more tailored sanctions that will focus on banned activities like smuggling drugs, or proliferating weapons of mass destruction." It also stated that, "For instance, Pentagon planners are looking closely at using American military forces to stop, turn back or seize ships and aircraft from North Korea that are suspected of carrying missiles or nuclear weapons materials."

According to the NYT, despite the Bush administration's policy against using food aid for political purposes, there is a high possibility that it will cut down last year's 230,000-ton food aid to North Korea this year.

Japanese media reported on Monday that if the US is planning to push for sanctions on Pyongyang, Koreans living in Japan will be asked to stop sending money to North Korea.

They predicted Tokyo would go along with the US sanctions against North Korea as Japan has been discussing cutting off trade and remittances to the North, and banning the entry of the North Korean cargo vessel Mankyungbong since early this month.

The Mainichi News reported Sunday that once the UN Security Council decides on issuing economic sanctions on North Korea, the Japanese government will participate in inspecting North Korean vessels.

Anti-Americanism Backlash Begins: The NGO groups were again told to NOT be anti-American. Most of the major Korean corporations (chaebols) have started plans to have massive road shows in America to publicize their wares to hopefully offset any negative images from the recent rise in anti-Korean feelings in the U.S. In February the anti-Korean product campaigns were still at a grassroots level and not organized. However, letter writing campaigns to the Congressmen had been successful causing many negative comments from Congressmen on Korea's political climate.

60-Minutes aired a segment on the anti-Americanism in Korea that shocked many Americans. They watched in horror as an American General teared up when asked about the American flag-burning in Korea. Response in America was to view the Koreans as "ungrateful." However, as the war on Iraq attracted the attention of the Americans, the furor over Korea died very quickly.

The Senate Armed Services Committee questioned CIA Director Tenet and Defense Secretary Rumsfield on the North Korea situation and the situation in the south. Rumsfield answered that the U.S. was considering relocating the USFK forces south away from the DMZ and starting a new strategy based upon locating troops around a sea hub and air hub. With this strategy forces in Korea could be reduced. These words sent the Korean politicians into a frenzy of action to show their Pro-U.S. colors. Unfortunately, they are from the same parties that joined the anti-American cause for political reasons making them appear slightly tarnished in their support.

Anti-War Protests: Go to Protests: February 2003 for information on growing anti-war movement. Small anti-war demonstrations definitely anti-American in tone. Large rally held in Seoul and throughout the country on 15 Feb in conjunction with world-wide anti-War movement against war with Iraq. The outward signs of anti-Americanism are hidden, but the Hangul (Korean) signs still say "Yankee Go Home" and other anti-American slogans.

U.S. Hits Setback on North Korea Policy by Allies: On 25 Feb, Secretary of State Colin Powell was in Asia to meet with China and attend the inauguration of President Roh. However, he suffered a setback as officials in China, Australia and South Korea urged the United States to begin direct talks with North Korea about its nuclear weapons programs -- something that Washington has rejected. This latest setback gives ammunition to opponents of Bush's North Korea policy which has come under fire from Democrats and some Korea experts as ill-defined and contradictory.

Powell has been urging North Korea's neighbors to hold a "multilateral forum" during which the United States and other countries could pressure the North to dismantle its weapons programs. The Bush administration contends that a group of nations could place far greater pressure on North Korea to abandon its programs than one nation alone. China is the leading provider of food and fuel aid to North Korea and would have greater leverage, but was not prepared to take on a more active role. The U.S. has also called on Russia and Japan to play larger roles in pushing North Korea to disarm.

Unfortunately, Australia feels that it must be resolved bilaterally. China wants the U.S. to hold "direct dialogues." Korea will continue with former President Kim Dae-jung's "sunshine policy" of engagement with North Korea and feels a dialogue is essential. North Korea itself has refused to attend a multilateral forum, asserting that its effort to develop nuclear weapons is an issue that must be resolved through direct, one-on-one talks with Washington. The North continues to demand that the United States agree to a nonaggression pact.

North Korea Restarts Nuclear Plant: On 28 Feb, U.S. and Japanese media reported that North Korea had restarted a suspended 5 megawatt nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, which is capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium from spent fuel. The IAEA and other nations previously had implored the North to not start their reactor. "Any moves by the North Koreans to reprocess spent fuel would be a matter of deep concern to the entire international community," U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher.

Yongbyon Nuclear Facility

Yongbyon Nuclear Facility Satellite Photo

On an international scale, the reactivation of the nuclear reactor was the least dangerous of Pyongyang's three diplomatic cards. The remaining two cards were activating a nuclear plant to extract plutonium by reprocessing used nuclear fuel rods and test-firing a ballistic missile. If North Korea takes one of the two other actions, Japan will have to start discussing sanctions against the country. (NOTE: If North Korea test launched a Rodong missile capable of reaching Japan, the Japanese people will "panic" according to Japan's Foreign Minister Kawaguchi. However, the options are limited as the Japanese Self-Defense Force does not have any weaponry to combat the threat. The only countries with Tomahawk missiles are the U.S. and Britain. The largest concern will be that if that happens, the Japanese would abrogate the Peace Constitution and rearm in "self-defense.")

By reactivating the reactor, North Korea will be able to obtain an additional 8,000 used nuclear fuel rods in about a year. As Pyongyang already has 8,000 used fuel rods, it is possible that North Korea will be able to produce enough weapons-grade plutonium to build more than 10 nuclear bombs.

Pyongyang is urging the United States to open a dialogue by indicating that it could produce a large number of nuclear bombs. Reactivating a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant is a risky option for North Korea as it will upset Washington. North Korea seems to believe reactivating the reactor is an action that will fall just short of drawing sanctions.

The nuclear power plant under the 1994 accord remains on a hold. The executive board members of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) agreed to put off some immediate actions they need to take for the project to build two light-water nuclear reactors in North Korea. The three key KEDO members -- South Korea, Japan and the United States -- decided at an unofficial meeting in early January to postpone making purchase deals to acquire some parts that are required immediately for the project.

The reactors are being built in North Korea's Kumho district in South Hamkyung province. The Bush administration's view that the Geneva Agreed Framework, which called for the reactors to be built, was wrong from the start implying that the administration wants the construction stopped. At present, Seoul is against scrapping the project, while Japan is taking a cautious stance. Groundbreaking work for the project was finished at the end of last year, and nearly 30 percent of the construction has been done. Korea has so far invested $765 million in the work, out of a total of $1.1 billion invested in the project.

MARCH 2003:

RSOI and Foal Eagle Combined: For the sake of efficiency, the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) exercise and Foal Eagle have been combined for the second time. The following is a USFK News Release:

RSOI AND FOAL EAGLE EXERCISES COMBINED

SEOUL, Republic of Korea (USFK) February 17, 2003 – The Republic of Korea and United States Combined Forces Command (ROK/US CFC) announced today that the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration exercise, referred to as RSOI 03, will be held 19 to 26 March in Korea.

Along with RSOI 03, the joint and combined field training exercise referred to as FOAL EAGLE (FE) will again be linked with RSOI as it was last year. FOAL EAGLE training events will begin on 04 March and continuing through 02 April.

RSOI/FE 03, like all other CFC exercises, is defense-oriented and designed to improve the command's ability to defend the ROK against external aggression. United Nations Command has informed the Korean People's Army in North Korea about the exercise.

As in past exercises, RSOI/FE 03 will include a full range of equipment, capabilities, and personnel including reconnaissance, Special Forces, and air, land, and sea assets.

RSOI is a scheduled annual combined/joint command post exercise first held in 1994 and used by CFC, ROK and U.S. forces commanders to train and evaluate command capabilities to receive U.S. forces from bases outside the country.

FOAL EAGLE is the command's theater-wide joint and combined field training exercise focused on rear area security and stability operations, onward movement of critical assets, and select war-fighting training events across all ROK and U.S. service components. The exercise will involve ROK forces and a number of U.S. military units assigned on the Korean Peninsula, as well as a small number of U.S. forces deploying to Korea.

This will be the 42nd time Foal Eagle has been conducted, yet only the 2nd time it has been linked with RSOI. A primary benefit of linking the two exercises is select field training exercises tie directly into the command post exercise, providing more realistic training opportunities. These exercises are designed to help teach, coach and mentor younger soldiers while exercising senior leaders' decision-making capabilities.

U.S. Policy: "No-Nukes" or "No Nuke Exports"? "Sanctions" or "Military Option"? A Joongang Ilbo article on 9 Mar stated that there might be a fundamental shift in the nuclear policy. Instead of barring the manufacture of nuclear materials, there may be a shift to allowing the North nuclear material and barring any export. These reports in the media were "categorically denied" by the White House.

U.S. said to amend North policy

It may accept Pyeongyang as nuclear state, try to bar sales

The United States has begun shifting its North Korea policy from preventing it from acquiring nuclear arms to preventing it from exporting them, U.S. media said Wednesday. The shift, if true, is a revolutionary swing from Washington’s official stance of zero tolerance for the North’s nuclear development.

The Washington Post quoted unnamed officials and analysts in Washington and Tokyo as saying that the United States and Asian countries have begun to accept the idea of North Korea becoming a nuclear power. “Increasingly, the Bush administration is turning its attention to preventing the Communist government in Pyeongyang from selling nuclear materials to the highest bidder,” the newspaper said.

Bush administration officials told the daily that it has no good military options for eliminating the North’s nuclear capability. “A surgical strike might neutralize the plutonium plant, but the country’s effort to enrich uranium is proceeding at another, unknown site,” it reported. The newspaper said Russia, China and South Korea would try to isolate North Korea, if it possesses nuclear weapons, seeking to prevent further proliferation.

The Los Angeles Times reported Wednesday that Washington has concluded that it probably cannot prevent Pyeongyang from developing nuclear weapons. It quoted Capitol Hill sources. The administration indicated such a possibility in closed briefings and private conversations with congressmen over the last several weeks, the newspaper reported. A Senate staff member was quoted as saying that Washington was “preparing people up here for a de facto, if not declared, North Korean nuclear state and saying that this is something we can deal with through isolation, sanctions, deterrence and national missile defense.”

As of Monday, it still appeared that Washington was not planning to resign itself to a nuclear North Korea. In a press briefing with 14 U.S. newspapers, Mr. Bush said a military option should be used to prevent the North’s nuclear development, if diplomatic efforts fail. It was the first time he had publicly mentioned the possibility of military action. “The military option is our last choice,” Mr. Bush said, adding that Washington was still counting on diplomacy.

Asked about the reports, a senior Seoul official said the government was making inquiry to Washington through diplomatic channels. “Still, we believe that such a change in U.S. policy is unlikely,” the source said. Other South Korean experts echoed this skepticism. A nuclear domino effect whereby Japan, South Korea and even Taiwan follow into the nuclear camp is possible, Kim Sung-han, professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, worried. The military balance between the two Koreas would collapse at once and Seoul’s engagement policy would falter, the experts said.

Military experts here sketched out four possible scenarios for the South in the changed security climate of the peninsula.

It might follow the North’s example, walking away from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and developing its own nuclear weapons. Washington, Beijing, Moscow and Tokyo as well as anti-nuclear groups in South Korea would all strongly protest.

Second, Seoul could seek shelter under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which would heighten its military dependence on the United States.

Third, it could join the U.S.-led missile defense program, a costly option.

Finally, it could accept the North’s military predominance. Such an option is unlikely, military experts said, as it would amount to surrendering national security.

“No scenario is easy for us,” said Hwang Byong-moo, a professor at Korea National Defense University. “So putting the best efforts to urge the North to respect the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be our first step.”

by Ser Myo-ja 2003.03.06

In response to this report, the White House categorically denied reports that the United States had shifted its position and would tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea. "The position of the United States, along with our allies in the region, is just the opposite, that it's important to make certain that there is a denuclearized peninsula," said spokesman Ari Fleischer in response to a question if Washington is resigned to seeing the North develop nuclear weapons.

However, columnists also picked up on this idea and there was much discussion in the press over the options that the U.S. faced. The Bush had said that if diplomacy didn't work, the military option was available. The White House clarified the statement that the military option was NOT being considered, but it still was an option. However, it was strongly leaning towards sanctions, though it was holding off pursuing this option at the request of North Korea and Japan. David Sanger wrote in an article, "Next Question: How to Stop Nuclear Blackmail" in the New York Times on 9 Mar:

Next Question: How to Stop Nuclear Blackmail

By DAVID E. SANGER

WASHINGTON — Imagine this scene in the Oval Office three weeks from now. At the daily intelligence briefing, George J. Tenet, the director of central intelligence, opens with some highly unpleasant but hardly unexpected news. The North Koreans have started up their nuclear reprocessor, and will be churning out a bomb's worth of plutonium every month, until summer.

By the time President Bush cleans up in Iraq, Mr. Tenet would likely tell him, North Korea will probably produce enough bomb-grade material to produce five or six weapons that can be added to the one or two the C.I.A. believes the North probably produced in the early 1990's. That is enough, as one of Mr. Bush's top aides says, to "hide three, conduct an underground test of one and offer to sell the rest."

In fact, last month, Mr. Tenet and the deputy secretary of state, Richard L. Armitage, told Congress that North Korea might not even bother to turn all the plutonium it is likely to produce into warheads. To achieve its objectives — getting Washington's undivided attention, diplomatic recognition and aid — all North Korea really has to do is hide a few nukes and leave Americans to wonder what they've got, and whether they are offering it to customers like Al Qaeda or Hamas. Call it the virtual nuclear deterrent. To Mr. Bush's mind, this is why it makes sense to take on Iraq first — before it gets what North Korea already has. Yet if confronting Iraq is the first step in Mr. Bush's war on rogue states with nuclear ambitions, North Korea is the first in his war against nuclear blackmail. And those are very different campaigns.

In Iraq, Mr. Bush vowed to disarm the regime. Even if it takes a war, the big question is how to minimize the casualties, the backlash and the damage to American alliances. In North Korea, the question is whether the country can be disarmed at all, because the president's options range from bad to awful to incredibly dangerous.

Put another way, North Korea may be the far more challenging test of the notion that the United States right now has an opportunity to reorder the world so that it will never again face these kinds of threats.

Successfully facing down North Korea would send a message that the world will not tolerate nuclear blackmail. Failing to do so would send a very different message to rogue states — that if you don't want to be treated like Iraq, get your bomb before facing off against Washington.

"Kim Jong Il thinks that was Saddam's big mistake," said Gary Samore, an expert on nonproliferation in the Clinton administration who is now a scholar at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. So when Mr. Kim flips on that reprocessor, what are Mr. Bush's options?

The first is to ignore the issue — always a favorite choice in Washington. Few in the administration believe Mr. Kim will start a nuclear war, because he values survival. And as Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said, "You can't eat plutonium."

True, but as Mr. Powell's own deputy pointed out to Congress, North Korea has sold just about everything it has ever developed, including ballistic missiles. No one knows just what a few baseball-sized lumps of plutonium would bring, but it would bring a lot — with plenty left over to perfect those missiles until they can reach Los Angeles. And the exports would be nearly impossible to stop: someone could just walk the plutonium over the Chinese border in an ox-cart, assuming that no starving North Koreans eat the ox first. Ashton B. Carter, a Harvard scholar who worked on the now-failed 1994 nuclear freeze agreement with the North, points to another problem: If North Korea collapsed, there would be a scramble for the loose nuclear material. "The half-life of Plutonium-239 is 24,400 years," he said. "What is the half-life of the North Korean regime?"

Sooner or later, North Korea's neighbors would see its arsenal as a reason to rethink their own policies.

On Thursday, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld surprised the South Koreans by talking about pulling out most of the 37,000 American troops in the country, where they have been increasingly unwelcome. If that happened, could the United States dissuade South Korea, Taiwan and even Japan from seeking their own nuclear deterrents?

Then there is option No. 2: turning up the heat a notch on the North. This is where the administration is now focused, and it has compiled a list of ways to meet every escalation from North Korea with an escalation from Washington. The ideas range from cutting off the cash sent to North Korea by Koreans in Japan, to ending South Korean investment in the North, to sealing off aid and fuel from China, to intercepting outbound North Korean ships, particularly those bearing missiles.

Mr. Bush has warmed to this option because, in his words, it avoids "rewarding bad behavior." The North has said sanctions would mean war, but it could be bluffing. The administration's problem is that tightening the noose requires the help of North Korea's neighbors — as Mr. Bush said at his news conference Thursday. None of them wants to see a nuclear North Korea, he said. That is right, but those nations' interests are not America's.

The new South Korean government wants to steam ahead with investment, family exchanges and modest trade. Its interest is preventing a collapse of the North Korean regime, which the South would have to pay for. And one day, the South assumes, it will inherit all that is built in the North, perhaps including that nuclear arsenal.

The Chinese fear collapse, too, because even more starving refugees would cross their border than do now. And the Japanese are consumed with the fate of their nationals who were kidnapped by North Korean agents, a few of whom the North released last year.

To Mr. Bush, however, blackmail is blackmail, and so he refuses even to sit down and talk to the North Koreans. Talks, his aides say, would only lead to pressure for concessions — diplomatic recognition, an agreement to "freeze" rather than dismantle nuclear activity. The president refuses to go that route.

So it sent a chill through the air when Mr. Bush suggested last week, for the first time, that if his options "don't work diplomatically, they'll have to work militarily." The North Koreans denounced the statement, saying it proves that after Baghdad, they are next. The White House rushed out to say military options are not on the table now. But no one said the North Korean prediction of the post-Iraq future was wrong.

North Korean Situation elevated to a Crisis: After the reports of the Yongbyon reactor was restarted, President Roh instructed his foreign policy team yesterday to devise a response to North Korea's reactivation of a nuclear reactor. The intent was to prepare "countermeasures" -- whatever that might be. Roh continued his position that his government will not tolerate the North's nuclear development but that the issue should be resolved peacefully through dialogue.

After the reports of the Yongbyon reactor was restarted, President Roh instructed his foreign policy team yesterday to devise a response to North Korea's reactivation of a nuclear reactor. The intent was to prepare "countermeasures" -- whatever that might be. Roh continued his position that his government will not tolerate the North's nuclear development but that the issue should be resolved peacefully through dialogue. Roh, in his first policy speech since taking office, warned of a "calamity" from the standoff over North Korea's nuclear program unless a peaceful resolution is found quickly. In response, Pyongyang issued a dispatch threatening that nuclear war could break out on the Korean Peninsula at "any moment," an escalation of the communist North's hostile rhetoric as international pressure grows for it to disarm.

North Korea continued to accuse the U.S. of triggering a nuclear crisis by failing to provide promised energy, disrupting inter-Korean reconciliation and plotting war against the North. There are a few Americans -- mainly Democrats -- who also are voicing this same story saying that Bill Clinton was on the right track. They view the correct approach as the U.S. sit down at the negotiating table to one-on-one talks. They feel that the Bush options are either now being trapped to allow the North to retain its nuclear weapons AND negotiate a normalization treaty. President Bush has been reported to have "bounced off the walls" when this was reported to Congress.

Pyongyang continued to state that that the only way to resolve the nuclear standoff on the Korean Peninsula was through direct talks with the United States. Bush on the other hand says ties can only improve if North Korea first abandons its nuclear ambitions. The U.S. feels the multinational approach is the correct way to force the North to give up its nuclear weapons program. The collective sanctions are the only leverage the West has. Unfortunately, South Korea under Roh is committed to deeper engagement.

However, besides the high-powered rhetoric, there seems to be groundwork afoot by experts. The Asahi Shimbun of Japan reported in March that nuclear experts from North Korea and the United States met in Berlin late last month to discuss ways of scrapping the North's enriched uranium-based nuclear weapons program in a verifiable manner. Among the U.S. participants in the meeting, held at the North Korean Embassy in the German capital Feb. 20-21, were a former U.S. government official, a scientist at a U.S. state-run research center and a nuclear expert, the daily said.

The administration's options, a senior official acknowledged, "range from the deeply unsatisfying to the incredibly risky." Several Korea experts note that the Bush administration's guarantee against "invasion" is not the same as a guarantee against a precision attack. This is the reason the Bush administration has stated to Roh that the military option must remain on the table.

But the administration considers an attack on Yongbyon a risk that would require huge reinforcements to the 37,000 American troops already on the Korean peninsula in case North Korea responded by launching a general war. In internal meetings at the White House and the State Department, several officials have cautioned that any unilateral strike over South Korea's objections could terminate the 50-year alliance between Washington and Seoul. It is a risky proposition that could backfire and cause the destruction of Seoul.

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld put American bombers on a special "alert" status, for possible deployment to Guam, if tensions with North Korea rise during the Iraq confrontation. North Korea was alarmed by this development, though it was the same when the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk carrier group deploy for Aghanistan, Bosnia and the Gulf War. As a result, the aircraft were kept on alert but remained in the continental U.S. because of South Korea was opposed to any hint of military action against the North. U.S. officials also said then that they did not want to give North Korea a propaganda tool, at a time that radio broadcasts from the North claim that the United States is preparing to strike the country.

The North has complained that a US RC-135 reconnaissance plane had intruded into North Korean airspace over its east coast almost daily since Feb. 21 and that U2 overflights have increased indicating the U.S. preparations for war. The United States has stationed special reconnaissance planes and submarines near Korea. The E6B planes and the missile chaser Invincible are equipped with wide area radars that can detect missile launches and nuclear tests. Placement of these assets and other military moves increase the potential for a war in Korea. The North stated it will take "a self-defensive measure when it thinks that the US pre-emptive attack is eminent."

RC-135S Incident on 2 March: On 2 Mar the four North Korean fighters intercepted an RC-135S flying orbit 150 off the coast of North Korea. The area is claimed to be international waters, but the North claims it is their territorial waters. The four North Korean planes "shadowed" the American plane over international waters for about 20 minutes before breaking off. Two North Korean MiG29 fighters and two aircraft that appeared to be MiG23 fighters intercepted the Air Force RC-135S reconnaissance plane, which was conducting a routine intelligence mission over the Sea of Japan about 150 miles off North Korea's coast. The closest the fighters came was about 50 feet. The standard crew is 17, including two pilots. At one point one of the fighters used a radar system to "acquire" the U.S. plane, meaning it identified it as a target. The Korean fighter did NOT "lock on" to the RC-135 as the fighters were equipped with heat-seeking missiles that did not require lock-on. There was no hostile fire.

According to New York Times, ""This had to be well planned on their part," the military official said. Military officials said there were no radio communications between the American and North Korean aircraft during the tense standoff. A senior military officer said tonight that the American flight crew reported that one of the North Korean pilots gestured to them to leave the area, and "he was waiving at them to get out of there."" Later the story changed as "the (North Korean) pilot made internationally recognized hand signals to the American flight crew to follow him, presumably back to his home base." The new interpretation then was that they intended to force the plane to land in North Korea and hold the crew hostage. Korean Minister of Defense Cho Yung-kil stated to the National Assembly that the North Korean MiG signaled by "shaking its wings."

Defense Minister Cho Yung-kil said on 7 Mar that North Korea's interception was deliberate and planned. Mr. Cho said that the North had moved MiG-23 and MiG-29 fighter jets to its Eorang Base in North Hamgyeong province, disguising the move as a training operation, in preparation for the incident. Additional fuel tanks were added to the jets to extend their range so that the interception could be carried out. The radar system the North's planes used to lock on the U.S. plane used the High Lark system.

After the incident, the U.S. plane broke off its mission and returned to its home station at Kadena AB. The American reconnaissance missions were being reviewed as of 6 Mar and it was likely that future flights would be accompanied by fighter aircraft. It was the first such incident since April 1969 when a North Korean plane shot down a U.S. Navy EC-121 surveillance plane, killing all 31 Americans aboard. (NOTE: The American plane is a highly specialized version of the RC-135 series of reconnaissance planes. This version, nicknamed "Cobra Ball," is loaded with electronic receivers and features large circular windows in the fuselage for the photography of foreign ballistic-missile tests at long range. The intelligence equipment aboard includes multiple infrared telescopes.)

This incident caused the U.S. to deploy the B-52 and B-1 bombers held in reserve in the U.S. to Guam. A senior military officer said the 24 bombers being sent to Guam were part of a "flexible deterrent" to influence North Korean actions, but with vastly different weapons systems or troop levels than were normally based in the region, some of which have moved toward Iraq. The additional bomber force will join maintenance and logistics crews that had already moved to Guam, Pentagon officials said. A number of additional surveillance planes based in the United States also moved to Guam ahead of the bombers. Each B-1 bomber can carry up to two dozen one-ton, satellite-guided bombs. The payload of the giant B-52 is 70,000 pounds of bombs and missiles.

However, after all the dust settled, there was concerns whether the RC-135S was really over "international waters" and warnings that a second time, the North Koreans will shoot down the aircraft. An article in the Washington Post showed the North Korean viewpoint to this incident...and possible dangers in the future.

N. Korea Reaction to U.S. Spy Plane Purposely Forceful, Analysts Say

By Doug Struck and Joohee Cho
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, March 4, 2003; 12:35 PM

TOKYO, March 4-The interception of an American reconnaissance plane by North Korean MiGs this weekend followed repeated alarms from North Korea that it expected to be attacked during the military exercises that U.S. and South Korean forces began today.

North Korea applied surprising force, sending out four aircraft, two of them modern versions of the MiG. The distances that U.S. officials say the jets flew and the closeness they maintained to the American plane suggested a performance difficult for the enfeebled North Korean air force, military analysts said.

Some experts here said the distances that the United States cited raised questions as to whether the spy plane was really well outside North Korean air space. But they agree the North Korean response was purposely forceful to show that its military will not just roll over in the event of conflict. And those experts predict furthe such incidents during the month-long U.S.-South Korean mock war games.

"If an encounter like this happens again, I think they will shoot down the U.S. plane," said a former North Korean general who defected to Seoul. "North Koreans don't have any fear of war. All the people are trained to be prepared for it."

Asian governments today studiously presented a low-key reaction to the event Sunday. The North Korean jets trailed a U.S. RC-135S for 22 minutes, at one point coming to within 50 feet of the aircraft, according to the Pentagon account.

China urged that "all sides keep calm and exercise restraint." South Korea's new government remained largely mum. Japan demurred over "unfavorable actions" by Pyongyang. Australia's foreign minister called the incident "part of a pattern of attention-seeking" by Pyongyang.

North Korea made no comment directly on the incident. But in recent days, its official media outlets have been at high pitch over the annual military exercise in which U.S. and South Korean forces are conducting mock battles, some of them near the Demilitarized Zone. A majority of North Korea's forces are poised just beyond the zone.

Although North Korea protests the exercises each year, analysts here say the United States may have underestimated how genuinely threatened North Korea feels by military maneuvers.

"They are very alarmed by 'Foal Eagle,'" the code name for one of the two simultaneous exercises, said Pyon Jin Il, managing editor of the "Korea Report," a journal of critical analysis of North Korea published in Tokyo.

They believe that the United States often uses exercises as a cover to aggressive action, he said. "They are afraid the United States might make an air strike against their missile launching sites" during these exercises, he added.

The spy plane flights may well have been seen as preparation for that, he noted. The interception should be seen by the United States against the backdrop of that fear, he said.

North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency today said the gathering of military forces for Foal Eagle is "driving the situation to the brink of a war" and is part of a "plan for preemptive attack" by the United States.

Some analysts expressed caution about accepting the U.S. version that its plane, a modified Boeing 707, was deep in international airspace 150 miles from North Korean shores. They note U.S. spy craft routinely fly close to North Korean airspace. And they say the United States claimed the Pueblo spy ship was in international waters when it was captured by North Korea in 1968, but later acknowledged it was in North Korean waters.

"There's always competing claims, and it's difficult to know," said Pyon.

On three other occasions in the past 35 years, North Korea has demonstrated its willingness to use lethal force against the United States. In 1968 it captured the Pueblo, killing one sailor and imprisoning 82 others for 11 months. In 1969 it shot down an American EC-121 reconnaissance craft, killing 31 Americans in what has been called the worst single loss of U.S. servicemen in the Cold War. In 1976, two more American soldiers were killed by North Koreans in the Demilitarized Zone.

The North Korean officer said he is skeptical that the U.S. plane, which took off from Okinawa on patrol to intercept North Korean communications, was so clearly in international airspace.

"Normally, North Korea does not care what happens outside their country. But when it comes to an intrusion, they are very, very sensitive," said the defector. One of the highest ranking officers to flee from North Korea, he still is under partial protection by the South Koreans and asked that his name not be made public.

"They really think that the United States plans to attack and invade their country," he said. "It links directly to their survival issue. That's probably why the pilot went so close."

Other analysts also noted that the North Koreans are desperately short of fuel for their aircraft, and to have four MiGs fly 150 miles from shore for the interception of the spy craft is unexpected.

"North Korean pilots only fly on average 20 hours or less" per year because of the fuel shortage, said Motoaki Kamiura, a Japanese military analyst. "So this was not just a provocation; it was beyond that. It was very dangerous."

"I'm very surprised there were two MiG-29s," he added. "Even in Russia, the MiG-29s are the newest, latest model."

"This was just a warning to the United States. Be careful," said Kim Myong Chol, who directs a pro-Pyongyang organization in Tokyo and frequently speaks for North Korea in Japan. "During the American military war games, the spy planes are provocations."

U.S. officials have repeatedly said there are no plans to attack North Korea, but the message has been mixed. President Bush, in an interview Monday with the Baltimore Sun and other newspapers, said diplomatic efforts are "in process. If they don't work diplomatically, they'll have to work militarily. And military option is our last choice."

The North Korean officer, who defected eight years ago, said his countrymen truly believe they must eventually fight the United States to defend their country, and they act out of a deep nationalistic zeal. "When North Korea does things that are provoking, the Western countries and South Korea may think it's absurd or foolish. But North Korea thinks very differently," said the general.

"For them, flying close to a spy plane like that is justifiable as something they ought to do," he said in an interview today. "North Korea is a very proud country especially when it comes to security and independence. Such xenophobic attitude is the basis of their mentality."

"Strategically, North Korea may be planning to provoke the United States and lure them into picking . . . a fight first, so that they could put the burden of responsibility on the Americans," he said. North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Il, "is in a good position to sacrifice the people, who are ready and willing, when it comes to the last resort."

Another defector, Paek Soon-Bok, left North Korea two years ago. She said relatives in North Korea reported that air raid drills have recently been stepped up amid a general sense expectation of war with the United States.

"North Koreans are trained and exercised to be ready for war, like robots," she said today. "They really think that war is an inevitable future. We grew up saying over and over again that we need to protect our country. We will fight to death if the evil Americans invade our territory."

Special correspondent Cho reported from Seoul.

RC-135S Incident Stirs up Democratic Demands for Talks: Democrats continue to urge Bush to start direct talks with North Korea -- stating that Bill Clinton's approach to seek normalization was "right." According to CBS News on 3 Mar, leading Democratic senators urged President Bush to begin direct talks with North Korea. "The Democrats said the White House has been paralyzed by divisions within the administration on what to do about Pyongyang and by the distraction of a likely war with Iraq. Meanwhile North Korea is moving ahead so rapidly in developing nuclear weapons, it could have enough not only for its own use, but also to sell to terrorists, the senators said. "The White House continues to sit back and watch, playing down the threat and apparently playing for time," said Senate Democratic Leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota. "But time is not on our side." Daschle and other senators spoke at a news conference with members a newly formed group advising Senate Democrats, headed by former Defense Secretary William Perry, former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and former national security adviser Samuel R. Berger.

The group urged Mr. Bush to work closely with U.S. allies in the region to pursue direct talks with North Korea, with the goal of reaching a verifiable agreement to stop its nuclear and missile programs. Dealing with North Korea and Iraq, Mr Berger said, was not an either/or choice. It was "essential" for the US to hold direct talks with North Korea to determine whether a negotiated settlement was possible, and if it was not, then "more robust" action could be considered, along with the US' regional allies, Mr Berger said. But he warned that as long as Washington shied away from face to face discussions with the North, then the Bush administration would remain divided from its allies, "and that means we have no real leverage" over Pyongyang. Furthermore, Mr Berger said, the continuing stand-off could have a "cascading effect" on security in the region and give North Korea a chance to enter into "the deadly commerce of terrorism."

Yongbyon Nuclear facility

Even U.S. editorials are now also voicing the same concerns. According to New York Times editorial, "It's time to stop quibbling about the format and start talking, with North Korea suspending all nuclear weapons work once discussions begin. Broad regional participation in these talks is desirable, but for the moment it is unrealistic. Given the current policy differences between Washington, Seoul, Beijing and Moscow, that may be just as well. China's attitude has been particularly disappointing. Beijing wants to be taken seriously as a regional and world power. Yet on North Korea, it has been narrowly parochial, appearing more concerned about the economic burden of more North Korean refugees than the destabilizing consequences of more North Korean nuclear bombs. On his trip to Asia last week, Secretary of State Colin Powell heard repeated pleas for Washington to begin direct talks with Pyongyang. Those should begin swiftly. China, South Korea and other countries can help by pressing North Korea to freeze its nuclear programs during the talks. The economic aid and security assurances North Korea seeks should be firmly linked to a permanent and verifiable end to all of its nuclear weapons, long-range missiles and exports of dangerous weapons. The place for insisting that bad North Korean behavior will not be rewarded is at the negotiating table."

A curious report appeared on 19 Mar from Yonhap News. It claimed that the Clinton administration knew about North Korea's enriched uranium project as claimed by the former U.S. special envoy to the Korean Peninsula Robert Gallucci. In a special lecture at Korea University in Seoul, Gallucci said Washington was aware Pyongyang was cheating and had planned to bring up the matter, but lost the opportunity to do so, and the information was passed on to the next administration.

RC-135S Incident Widens Split: The incident also showed how far apart the two sides of the "alliance" are on the North Korean issue. The Seoul government at first acted said it would not comment on a matter between North Korea and the United States. The U.S. was shocked by the Seoul government's response and undoubtedly voiced strong dissatisfaction at the cabinet-level. Then President Roh shocked the U.S. in an interview with a British daily to "not go too far" in pressuring the North. Washington rejected any notion that that U.S. spy planes in Korea are solely for U.S. interests. The information obtained is shared with the Korean military.

A 5 Mar article from the British Times Online stated that Roh thought that Tony Blair could play a role in brokering a solution by getting the U.S. and the North to sit down and talk. It talks of an interview by Roh where he felt that the action of the North was a direct consequence of American actions. This will undoubtedly cause some very negative reactions in the U.S.

'Don't go too far' South Korea leader tells Bush

By Robert Thomson and Richard Lloyd Parry

In his first interview as President, Roh Moo Hyun says that Blair has a role in the Korean conflict

TONY BLAIR could play a vital role in the stand-off between North Korea and the United States, the new President of South Korea told The Times yesterday.

Tensions rose on the Korean Peninsula after it was revealed that North Korean fighter jets threatened to attack a US naval spyplane. But President Roh said that the high-altitude encounter was predictable, because the United States had increased its aerial surveillance of North Korea’s reopened nuclear facilities. “It was a very predictable chain of events,” he said in his presidential palace, the Blue House. “A very strong threat against a counterpart can be a very effective means of negotiation,” he said, of the increased US surveillance. “I am urging the US not to go too far.”

The United States is preparing to lodge an official protest with North Korea over the harassment.

In an outspoken interview, which highlights the gaping differences between Seoul and Washington, the South Korean President insisted that the dispute over North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons programme will be resolved only if America and North Korea engage in direct talks — something that President Bush has ruled out. He also said that Tony Blair would make a suitable intermediary to begin the process of negotiating an end to the present deadlock.

“Ultimately, this problem has to be resolved by President Bush and Chairman Kim Jong Il, and they have to be moved to solve the problem,” he said. “In this regard I believe Prime Minister Blair’s role is very important.”

Mr Roh made clear that building a personal relationship with Kim Jong Il would be a priority. He said that he supported the establishment of a hotline with the North Korean leader to avoid the misunderstandings that have dogged relations between the two countries for half a century.

President Roh’s Government agrees with the Bush Administration that North Korea must abandon its suspected nuclear weapons programmes, but the two leaders differ on the best means of reaching such a goal.

The Americans insist that it can be achieved only in a multilateral forum, and in the past few weeks several proposals have been floated and rejected by North Korea. But, since his election last December and his formal inauguration eight days ago, President Roh has called for a policy of openness and engagement. His comments to The Times show that the gap between the two is as wide as ever.

“When I meet President Bush I will convince him by saying that although North Korea does not meet the values of the US and may not be likeable from their stand-point, there is a possibility to improve the relationship,” said Mr Roh. He is expected to visit Washington in the next three months. “I’d like to highlight the benefits of a dialogue with North Korea. When we look at history, the greater a leader is, the more effort he makes to create dialogue.”

President Roh was at pains to point out that it was up to Kim Jong Il to abandon his nuclear programme. But US officials are exasperated by his eagerness to engage a Government that devotes resources to its million-strong army, but where as many as three million people have died of starvation.

His failure to condemn unequivocally North Korea’s interception of the spyplane will only add to the edginess between Seoul and Washington. A senior Western official said: “There are a lot of people in the US who find South Korean nonchalance off-putting. To tolerate that kind of human rights violation without wanting to change it — to tolerate all the heavy artillery pointing at Seoul.”

But all sides agree on the gravity of the spyplane incident, which occurred on Sunday but was announced by the United States on late on Monday. Four North Korean fighter jets — two MiG29s and two MiG23s — surrounded and followed the US Boeing RC135S, a converted Boeing 707 passenger jet known as the Cobra Ball, which was forced to return to its base in Japan.

The RC135S is based at Kadena Air Force Base, in Okinawa in Japan. Such aircraft routinely fly missions close to the North Korean coast monitoring communications, radar emissions and the deployment of forces.

The MiGs “locked on” their attack radar and flew within 50ft of the unarmed aircraft, in a high-risk manoeuvre similar to the one in 2001 when a Chinese fighter downed a US Navy Orion spyplane over Hainan Island in the South China Sea. The incident took place 150 miles from North Korea in international air space over the Sea of Japan.

US officials said that they would make a formal protest.

Washington: The US is sending 24 bombers to the island of Guam in the western Pacific to deter any aggression by North Korea. Defence officials said the move was a prudent measure to keep peace on the peninsula, but was not prompted by the weekend interception of a US spyplane by four North Korean fighters.

It was not until 7 Mar that Seoul condemned the incident claiming it took several days to make out the North's intentions. However, an official statement was made only after Defense Minister Cho Yung-kil strongly voiced the need for one during the national security meeting on 6 Mar presided over by President Roh. Officially, the Ministry of National Defense apologized on 7 Mar for waiting five days before making an official statement on the 2 Mar incident. The ministry said that a statement was delayed because North Korea's intentions had not been determined. However, the reason was unconvincing and duly noted by the U.S. -- especially after President Roh's statement that the high-altitude encounter was "predictable" after the U.S. increased its aerial surveillance.

The chill with the Roh administration could be felt when Ambassador Hubbard stated on 7 Mar at a luncheon that while he intends to respond to calls voiced for "fairer relations" between the US and Korea, the demands were rather "abstract and vague." He said that he thought the two countries presently have "a mature and fair relationship based on mutual respect," while acknowledging that many people would be disappointed with that opinion. He went on to state that disagreements between Seoul and Washington on goals and policy were inevitable. However, a mature relationship does not make disagreements disappear, but helps them be managed more systematically.

However to the grunt in the field it was business as usual in the Foal Eagle/RSOI exercises. The only change was reflected in the pro-US efforts after the threat of pulling the US off the DMZ. But as a soldier said that he didn't have to make policy, just enforce it. The following is a 9 Mar article from the New York Times:

Military Exercises in South Korea Shed Light on Shifting Outlook

By DON KIRK

SAEMAL, South Korea, March 9 — Along this rocky stretch of land beside the Imjin River, six miles south of the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea, American and South Korean armored vehicles crunched across a bridge hastily pieced together by United States Army engineers. War games like these, on the historic invasion route to Seoul and where some of the fiercest battles of the Korean War took place, normally go almost unnoticed.

But these exercises, involving tens of thousands of American and South Korean troops, point to the shifting outlook of Koreans as they wonder about the role of the 37,000 Americans troops and the impact of their possible withdrawal from bases between the demilitarized zone and Seoul, 40 miles south of here.

"We have a bond of blood over the past 50 years," Maj. Gen. Yoon Il Yong, commander of South Korea's 28th division, said today. "It should strengthen now."

Koreans have been muting their criticism of the United States military presence lately as talk about moving American troops far south gets louder and tensions with the North increase. It was revealed over the weekend that the North Korean fighter jets that intercepted an unarmed American spy plane over international waters last week were trying to force the aircraft to land in North Korea and seize its crew.

"As long as there's a crisis, it's safer if they stay here," Pfc. Yeon Kyu Young, 23, said of the American troops.

To South Korean officers, the current exercises offer the best insurance for defense of the terrain and of the vibrant society that has grown here over a half-century of peace.

"We want U.S. forces to stay here, symbolically, psychologically, politically," said Col. Kim Ki Ho, chief of staff of South Korea's 28th division, as a battalion of troops marched across the bridge behind a column of South Korean Army tanks. "During the Korean War we fought together. For 50 years we have been together. We want to keep U.S. soldiers here."

The local mayor, Kim Kyu Bae, looking over the operation after donating a truckload of bottled water for the troops, saw the operation as insurance for the immediate survival of several thousand local citizens living in villages several kilometers away.

"People want the U.S. troops to stay here for our national security," he said. "We believe this kind of exercise keeps our freedom. We all worry about what will happen."

American troops appeared unconcerned about the greater issues of the debate over their presence — or, for that matter, the rhetoric from North Korea.

"That's one of the privileges of being a soldier," said Staff Sgt. John Honeycutt, 31, of Houston. "We don't make policy, we just enforce it."

Staff Sgt. Steven Willey, 30, of Leoti, Kan., who was in charge of the boats as they pushed together the pieces of the bridge, was hardly worried.

"They do some crazy stuff," he said of the North Koreans. "To me, it seems like something is always going to happen." Occasionally, he said, the troops talked about the chances of a second Korean War. "I don't think there's going to be one," he concluded. "I think it's just a bunch of hype."

The brigade sergeant-major, Gerald Battey, watching his troops from the causeway, said he had seen the same exercise numerous times in his 30 years in the Army, 11 in Korea. "It's insurance," he said. "We constantly train for this."

Were the troops training harder with war fears in mind? "Of course, we think about it," he said, "but it hasn't caused us any extra training."

Military Buildup The reconnaissance flights resumed on 12 March after a brief pause. Reuters story on 12 Mar stated that RC-135S reconnaissance planes would be watched over by AWACS radar planes and high-tech U.S. Navy warships in the information-gathering missions over the Sea of Japan. On 13 Mar the U.S. Navy announced plans to send the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson to South Korea to participate in a major U.S.-South Korean Foal Eagle exercise. The U.S. Air Force is sending six F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighters from their home base in New Mexico to South Korea to participate in the exercise as well. In response to the exercises, anti-war groups focused on the exercises as proof of the ROK-US were preparing for war. A protest was staged against the exercises at Yongsan -- as part of the overall NGO group protest against war with Iraq and North Korea.

Anti-Exercise Protest by Anti-War group in Seoul (12 Mar 03)

An article in the Daily Yomiuri on 16 March it stated that "U.S. military bases across Japan also have upgraded their readiness for a possible missile launch. For example, a missile-tracking ship, the USS Invincible, is stationed at Sasebo Naval Base in Nagasaki Prefecture, and an RC-135S electronic reconnaissance plane, known as a Cobra Ball, has been dispatched to Kadena Air Base in Okinawa Prefecture. The plane uses sensors to determine a missile's capability." In addition, it said, "The Self-Defense Forces have dispatched the Myoko, an Aegis-equipped destroyer, to the Sea of Japan. The SDF also has beefed up intelligence-gathering activities by aircraft, including EP-3 electronic data-gathering planes."

The Daily Yomiuri continued, "However, even the U.S. forces are not capable of shooting down an incoming ballistic missile. The government plans to use a modified PAC2 ground-to-air missile, to be deployed this summer, to intercept a Rodong missile with new Patriot missiles. Ishiba said: "No country has an antimissile system that can intercept a Rodong missile with 100 percent certainty. We'll work on developing such capability while deploying our current system." If a North Korean missile hits Japan, the government plans to immediately enforce economic sanctions and undertake other measures against North Korea in cooperation with the United States and other countries. Restrictions on the import and export of missiles and other weapons of mass destruction, and the suspension of all money transfers to North Korea are among measure the government is likely to implement."

The USS Carl Vinson arrived at Pusan on 14 Mar to take part in two joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises. The nuclear powered carrier is to participate in the ongoing Foal Eagle exercise, which began March 4 and ends April 2, and the RSOI (Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration) exercise slated for March 19-26.

USS Carl Vinson at Pusan (15 Mar 03)

With the carrier USS Vinson's visit to Pusan, it seemed that there is a distinct impression given to the North that the U.S. was no longer taking a hands-off role favored by South Korea. There may be some truth that the U.S. was positioning its forces for a war footing. However, on 13 Mar Admiral Fargo of the Pacific Command told Congress that the possibility of war was "low." New York Times story on 13 Mar Admiral Fargo said, "We've arrayed forces to deter, not provoke a conflict." The following is a story from Korea Herald on 15 Mar:

U.S. carrier, fighters arrive for yearly drills

The aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson has arrived at the southern port of Busan to participate in a joint military exercise with South Korea amid a tense nuclear standoff between the United States and the North. The port call, the first such visit in four years, followed the U.S. deployment of six F-117 stealth fighters Thursday to Gunsan Air Force Base in North Jeolla Province.

"The Carl Vinson will engage in a maneuver from March 19. So until then, the aircraft carrier will be anchored in Busan," said an official at the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC).

The Carl Vinson, the U.S. Navy's third Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, will be open to the media this morning, the official said.

He said the aircraft carrier, which can maintain about 75 combat and support planes, will participate in "Foal Eagle," the largest joint military drill between the United States and South Korea. The drill began March 4 and will continue until April 2.

"How long the aircraft will stay here is confidential," the official said.

Yesterday, the CFC invited a pool of media representatives to Gunsan Air Base, where the F-117s are moored. It is the first time in seven years that F-117s have made a landing in South Korea.

Officials said the F-117s will play a part in Foal Eagle and another joint military exercise, the RSOI (Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration), which will run from March 19-26.

Military experts noted that the visit by the Carl Vinson is aimed in part at compensating for the absence of aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk, which is now anchored in the Gulf region.

In addition to sending the Carl Vinson and the F-117s, the United States has taken a set of measures aimed at beefing up its military posture against North Korea.

On Thursday, the U.S. Air Force resumed reconnaissance flights in international airspace off North Korea's eastern coast, 11 days after a spy plane was intercepted by four North Korean planes. Following the incident, the United States dispatched two dozen long-range bombers to the island of Guam in the West Pacific.

North Korea test-fired two short-range missiles into the East Sea in recent weeks. The first launch of an anti-ship missile was on the eve of President's Roh Moo-hyun's inauguration Feb. 25.

According to Japanese media reports, the North may be preparing for the launch of a medium-range missile that can reach almost every part of the archipelago. Tokyo sent an Aegis-equipped destroyer to the East Sea to monitor the North's moves.

(khj@koreaherald.co.kr) By Kim Hyung-jin Staff reporter 2003.03.15

UN body cites 'concern' on North

Security Council agrees to let diplomacy continue The 15 members of the United Nations Security Council agreed yesterday morning to voice the council’s concern about North Korea’s nuclear program, but stopped short of condemning it. China spoke strongly against any tougher action in an attempt to keep the council at arm’s length from the issue.

An official in Seoul, however, cautioned that the decision is just the start of a process and does not mean that the Security Council is washing its hands of the matter.

Given Chinese and Russian opposition to stronger measures, the result of the debate was widely expected, the official here said. He added that because the North had taken no further steps in the past three weeks to again ratchet tensions upward, the council members were inclined to let other diplomatic efforts, mainly stimulated by China, proceed.

Seoul encouraged that Chinese role yesterday when Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan met his Chinese counterpart, Li Zhaoxing, in Beijing. Mr. Yoon said before the meeting he would ask the Chinese for their assessment of Beijing’s position. Publicly, Pyeongyang has been increasingly belligerent in the face of the United States’ war in Iraq, saying that the lesson from the war there is that only overwhelming might can shield a country from an outside military threat.

After the Security Council meeting, Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations, Sergey Lavrov, repeated that Washington and Pyeongyang must start bilateral negotiations. That position was echoed by Russia’s defense minister, Sergei Ivanov, who is now in Seoul. According to Hwang Yeoung-soo, the defense ministry spokesman, Mr. Ivanov said Russia was willing to join in formal guarantees of North Korea’s regime if the United States and China agreed to them.

In Washington, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly reiterated U.S. assurances that the United States does not plan the rough handling it has used in subduing Iraq. He said the United States wants peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, not a regime change.

Speaking to Korean correspondents stationed in Washington, Mr. Kelly repeated the U.S. commitment to a diplomatic and peaceful approach to the North Korean nuclear problem. Dialogue within a multilateral framework would benefit the North, he said, but it may be some time before Pyeongyang awakens to that realization.

by Kim Young-sae

The UN Security Council refused to act on a US request to condemn the communist country for pulling out of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty because of strong opposition from China and Russia. Instead, council members said they were worried by the situation. The withdrawal from the global nuclear arms-control treaty officially took effect yesterday, three months after the North announced it was pulling out.

Emboldened by the weak UN action, the North declared that the fate of Iraq shows that if it had a nuclear bomb (alluded to as a "physical deterent force" but not specifically mentioned), it would not have fallen to the U.S. invasion. The North Korean Foreign Ministry suggested that it was closing off previously suggested options. "Only the physical deterrent force, tremendous military deterrent force powerful enough to decisively beat back an attack supported by any ultra-modern weapons, can avert a war and protect the security of the country and the nation," the statement said.

However, it appeared to withdraw North Korea's long-standing demand for a non-aggression pact from the United States. "Even the signing of a non-aggression treaty with the United States would not help avert a war," said the statement, distributed by the official Korean Central News Agency.

Unlike Iraq, North Korea is believed to have the material for several nuclear weapons. This will make military enforcement action even more hazardous than the operation under way in the Middle East. The Korean peninsula, moreover, is a greater strategic flashpoint, with great-power interests more closely involved.

U.S. Condemns North Korea as "Hell on Earth": The United States branded North Korea a "hell on earth" and demanded the U.N. Commission on Human Rights confront Pyongyang over what it called an abominable rights record. A Reuters article on 1 April stated, "It is hard to imagine the possibility of a country whose citizens endure a worse or more pervasive abuse of every human right," U.S. envoy Jeane Kirkpatrick said in a speech to the commission. EU diplomats have said the 15-nation bloc plans to introduce a resolution condemning North Korea for major abuses, including killings and torture, in the first such move against Pyongyang.

It was noted that the U.S. shied away from strong condemnation of Russia on Chechnya and China on its "abuses" because it needed them in the U.S. plan for resolving the nuclear issues with the North. In response, the North mentioned the U.S. war on Iraq, which it said gave the United States no right to discuss the affairs of other nations.

The European Union on 10 April submitted a resolution to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights denouncing North Korea's human rights abuses. The commission is in session in Geneva. The resolution is the first in the history of the commission to accuse North Korea of human rights infringements. In the three-page-long resolution, the EU expressed concerns about reports of systematic, comprehensive and serious human rights abuses, and said the violations included torture, public executions, political killings, forced labor and cruel, inhumane and dirty treatments and punishments.

The EU pointed out that many North Korean refugees left the country for humanitarian reasons but were often sent back and imprisoned, treated inhumanely or killed for treason. The resolution called for such punishments to stop. International human rights groups in Geneva welcomed the EU resolution. The New York-based Human Rights Watch said that it was time for the UN Human Rights Commission to handle the serious case of North Korea.

Chosun Ilbo on 15 Apr reported that foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan would be absent when the United Nations Commission on Human Rights voted on a resolution to censure DPRK for its human rights violations. Yoon's decision indicated that ROK will abstain from the vote. Yoon explained at the National Assembly's Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee that the situation on the Korean peninsula and the strategic implications of such a resolution must be considered. The resolution was submitted by the European Union on April 10. This is the first time a resolution on the DPRK human rights issue was put to vote.

The United Nations brought the issue of North Korea's dismal human rights record to the attention of the international community Wednesday by adopting a resolution criticizing the Pyongyang regime's human rights conditions. The 53-member U.N. Human Rights Commission passed the resolution by a small margin -- 28 in favor, 10 against and 14 abstaining. South Korea controversially chose to skip the vote altogether in fear of damaging ties with Pyongyang before dialogue begins on easing nuclear tension on the Korean Peninsula.

South Realigns its Stance and Relations with North Cools: As South Korea once agains draws towards the U.S.-Japan view of multilateral talks with North Korea, the exchange between the two Koreas has become strained. In March, the historic joining of the two railroads was cancelled. Then in March, Korea and Japan agreed to "close cooperation" on the North Korean issue. This was followed by changes in the South Korean stance on North Korea. In early April South Korea and Japan signed an agreement on the exchange of cultural properties and mutual cooperation. All of this was done against the backdrop of the North's missile firings and Japan launching of two spy satellites over the North.

On 4 Apr President Roh and President. Bush agreed that South Korea and the United States will work closely to cope with North Korea's nuclear development program. In a 20-minute telephone talk, Roh repeated Seoul's position to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully through dialogue. Bush promised to resolve the nuclear issue through diplomacy and said a peaceful solution would be possible. The U.S. president said that he was looking forward to meeting Roh during the latter's visit to Washington in May. President Bush expressed gratitude for South Korean parliament's passing of a bill on sending noncombat troops to support the U.S.-led war in Iraq.

On 4 April the Blue House announced that the cabinet-level talks from 7-10 April between the two Koreas would not likely take place as North Korea failed to confer on preparations. The inter-Korean ministerial meeting was to be held in North Korea, but North Korea kept mum on South Korea's proposal for preparatory talks between working-level officials. The talks were to be the first for the Roh administration.

Fifteen ruling and opposition lawmakers of South Korea suggested that Seoul consider economic sanctions against Pyongyang. The proposal came as North Korea showed no indications that it would attend Cabinet-level talks with South Korea, scheduled to begin in Pyongyang on 7 April. South Korean officials had hoped to use the talks to try to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions in return for aid and better ties with the outside world.

On April 7 the four-day cabinet-level talks with the DPRK scheduled for that week in Pyongyang had been scrapped, effectively freezing ties and deepening a rift over six-month-old nuclear issues. Government officials said the talks were the last official channel of communication between the ROK and the DPRK. The report said ROK has been seeking for several days to contact DPRK to discuss the scheduled talks, but the approaches were met with a wall of silence from the DPRK. Analysts said the DPRK decision reflected anger in Pyongyang over the ROK's decision to send non-combat troops to help the US-led war on Iraq, an "unpardonable criminal act," according to the DPRK's state media. DPRK has also criticized Seoul's decision to launch a probe into allegations that Pyongyang received illicit payments from the ROK Government in return for staging an inter-Korean summit in 2000. A Unification Ministry official said that for now all lines of official communication between the North and the South were cut. (NOTE: A opposition party politician was sent to the North to talk with the leaders in a thinly veiled attempt by the Roh government to restart the dialogue. The fact that he was not prosecuted makes it evident that this was a quasi-official visit sanctioned by the government. He returned with the promise of a joint sports event.)

On 9 Apr the Russian Defense minister Sergei Ivanov arrived for ministerial-level talks with the Koreans over a broad spectrum of issues -- including the opening of a gas line through North Korea to Pyongtaek. The South viewed it as a possible incentive to the North to shelve its nuclear program. The Russians agreed that the approach to peace should be through multilateral negotiations. Russia was ready to participate with the United States and China in a multilateral system that guarantees security in the region. Regarding the proposed connection of a trans-Korean railroad to the trans-Siberian, Ivanov said, “Russian experts have made inspections of North Korea's system and found that its railroad maintenance technology, equipment and tools were very shoddy - so we concluded that large-scale investment is unavoidable. We will go over the economic details with South Korea.” Defense Minister Cho Yung-gil and Ivanov agreed that an increase of cooperation in military technology and munitions would be helpful in increasing military trust between Seoul and Moscow.

On 10 April Vice President Dick Cheney met in Washington with the speaker of the National Assembly, Park Kwan-yong. Cheney repeatedly said that Washington would NOT begin dealing with North Korea until Pyongyang gives up its nuclear ambitions. Based on that hard-line attitude, the issue is unlikely to be settled soon. Cheney also agreed with the Assembly’s proposal to use both carrots and sticks to resolve the nuclear crisis, and to seek out a peaceful solution. On the Korea-U.S. alliance, Cheney said that such partnerships often need adjustments, and the adjustments should be based on the principles of friendship and mutual cooperation. On the “road map” for a solution of the crisis, proposed by Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan during his Washington visit last month, Park said Washington objects to some of the points, such as the proviso to supply heavy oil. Yoon suggested that heavy oil be provided if Pyongyang agrees to give up its nuclear program, but Washington is hesitant. The following article is from the Joongang Ilbo on 12 April:

Speaker sees U.S.-Korea impasse

Cheney pours cold water on ‘road map’ for North

WASHINGTON - The speaker of the National Assembly, Park Kwan-yong, said yesterday that the United States did not appear willing to accept Seoul’s proposal of a multi-phased approach to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear weapons problem.

Mr. Park was speaking to reporters after his meeting with Vice President Dick Cheney. The U.S. position on North Korea was considerably harsher than he expected, he said, adding, “They [the United States] are not going to be rewarding the North even if the North gives up its plan to develop a nuclear capability.”

Seoul’s initiative, dubbed “the road map” by Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan, was described to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell during his visit here in late March. Mr. Powell said it was “an interesting approach” that Washington would examine.

Foreign ministry officials have said the initial stage of the plan called for some kind of conciliatory move by the United States if North Korea agreed to take no further steps beyond those it has already made on the road to nuclear weapons development.

Mr. Park said the Korean proposal specifically included a requirement for a North Korean announcement that it would abandon its nuclear weapons program; the United States would respond by resuming heavy crude oil shipments to the North. Those shipments, a part of the energy assistance agreed to by Washington in 1994 in return for North Korea’s promise to suspend its nuclear development, were ended last November.

Mr. Park said the U.S. vice president was clear in laying out Washington’s demand that North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons program and not just suspend it, as Mr. Yoon, the foreign minister, had proposed. Mr. Park said he was pessimistic about the chances of breaking the deadlock.

The National Assembly’s position is that both carrots and sticks be used to address the North Korean situation, Mr. Park said, adding that Mr. Cheney agreed with that position.

Separately, the Central Intelligence Agency told the U.S. Congress yesterday in a report on weapons of mass destruction around the world that North Korea’s new uranium-based nuclear weapons program began early last year and could eventually produce two nuclear devices per year. The report assessed weapons development efforts by several countries during 2002. The report said U.S. suspicions about a North Korean uranium enrichment program for weapons had not been confirmed until last June.

The report also said North Korea possesses significant stocks of chemical weapons and that its research on biological weapons has probably reached the point where it is capable of producing them.

by Kim Chong-hyuk

What South Korean National Assembly Speaker Park Kwan-yong didn't publicize at home when he returned was that he met with New York Sen. Hillary Clinton to discuss the North Korean nuclear crisis and the war in Iraq after his frustrating meeting with Vice President Cheney. Sen. Clinton has been harshly critical of the Bush administration's handling of relations with Pyongyang, charging in January that the president had "mishandled" the situation. (Go to Audio for tape of Sen. Clinton's remarks.)

In the first week of April, her husband, former President Bill Clinton, told a University of Florida audience that President Bush was seeking multilateral support for a possible invasion of North Korea. In fact, the Bush administration has repeatedly assured Pyongyang that they have no plans whatsoever for an attack. Mr. Clinton's statement was condemned Sen. Jon Kyl, R-Az, who complained, "That is the kind of thing that goes beyond just criticism of the administration. It actually can affect the behavior of a belligerent foreign power to our detriment."

The "experts" continued to try to analyze how to resolve the situation.

North Korea next? Not likely

North Korea Blinks? ABC News reported on 12 April that "North Korea hinted Saturday that it would accept U.S. demands for multilateral talks to discuss the communist country's suspected nuclear weapons program. "If the U.S. is ready to make a bold switchover in its Korea policy for a settlement of the nuclear issue, the DPRK will not stick to any particular dialogue format," a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman was quoted as saying by the official KCNA news agency. DPRK stands for Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, the North's official name. Until now, Pyongyang has insisted on direct talks with Washington to negotiate a nonaggression treaty." The following article appeared in the Strait Times on 12 April:

N. Korea mulls multilateral talks option

SEOUL - North Korea hinted yesterday it would accept US demands for multilateral talks to discuss the communist country's suspected nuclear weapons programme.

'If the US is ready to make a bold switchover in its Korea policy for a settlement of the nuclear issue, the DPRK will not stick to any particular dialogue format,' the North's KCNA news agency quoted a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying.

DPRK is the abbreviation of North Korea's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The announcement might herald a dramatic change in policy in North Korea.

Until now, the North has insisted only on direct talks with Washington to negotiate a non-aggression treaty. US officials have refused, saying the standoff over the North's nuclear ambitions must be solved in a multilateral format.

'The solution to the issue depends on what is the real intention of the US,' the spokesman said. 'It is possible to solve the issue if the US approaches the dialogue sincerely,' the spokesman added. He was not identified by name.

The comments were made in a much softer tone than other remarks from North Korea in recent weeks.

It has repeatedly accused the United States of planning to invade the communist country once it is done fighting in Iraq, and warned this would lead to nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula.

US President George W. Bush has previously dubbed North Korea as part of an 'axis of evil' with Iraq and Iran over the development of weapons of mass destruction.

The first UN Security Council talks on the crisis ended in deadlock on Wednesday, with Russia and China blocking attempts by other permanent members - Britain, France and the US - to condemn North Korea's suspected weapons drive which could pave the way for UN sanctions.

Meanwhile, South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun indicated he will visit Japan, China and Russia to seek a peaceful end to the row over North Korea's suspected nuclear ambitions, after a trip to Washington next month.

'I plan to meet leaders of Japan, China and Russia at the earliest possible date,' Mr Roh told 150 foreign political and business leaders attending yesterday's annual Trilateral Commission meeting in Seoul.

He also said he did not want North Korea to collapse and urged a peaceful end to the stand-off. -- AFP

The effects of the U.S. victory in Iraq was sinking in. Maurice Strong, a special adviser to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, said on 9 April that he was in Pyongyang for discussions with North Korean leaders on March 20, when the US-led assault was launched. "They told us it was a confirmation the United States does intend to act and confirm their beliefs that they are next on the list," he said today. "North Korea is concerned by the threat they feel from the United States. For them security is the main issue." With the swift victory in Iraq, the implications to the survival of the regime darkened. It was time for North Korea to blink in this standoff.

Michael Ramirez, Los Angeles Times (Apr 03)

Part of this decision is possibly attributable to the pressure applied by China and Russia. Allegedly Kim Jong Il paid a secret visit to China in March according to a US-based global intelligence consultancy, citing Russian spy sources. During his visit, Mr Kim met new Chinese President Hu Jintao, who said China would not 'stand idle' if relations worsened between Pyongyang and Washington, according to Strategic Forecasts.

On 12 April Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao told visiting South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young-Kwan that Beijing would make efforts to resolve the simmering North Korean nuclear crisis and urged a peaceful solution to the issue. China hoped that the concerned nations would remain calm and restrained and refrain from adopting any measures that will lead to the further deterioration of the situation. Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing insisted during talks with Mr Yoon that any resolution of the nuclear issue must also take into account North Korea's security concerns. North Korea has demanded a non-aggression treaty with the United States to guarantee that Washington will not attack the Stalinist regime. Mr Yoon urged China to press Pyongyang to take part in a multilateral forum on resolving the six-month-old nuclear crisis.

Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov, who was the Kremlin's emissary to North Korea during a diplomatic mission in January, said on 11 April that a nuclear-armed North Korea was against Russian national interests and that the Kremlin would re-evaluate its opposition to international sanctions should the North Koreans develop nuclear weapons. The statements amounted to a warning to North Korea that patience was ebbing in one of the few nations that has offered it sympathy during a five-month nuclear crisis with the United States.

Marshall Ramsey, Jackson, Mississippi (Apr 03)

N.K. Remains Silent on Downfall of Iraqi Dictator

By Kim Kwang-tae

Seoul, April 14 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has kept mum about the collapse of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, a move that indicates a growing sense of insecurity about the regime's survival amid its nuclear endgame with the United States.

The conspicuous silence of Pyongyang's official media marks a stark contrast with its coverage of the U.S.-led military campaign until Baghdad fell to American and British troops.

Hussein's sudden downfall seems to have sent shivers through the spines of the North Korean leadership, especially its reclusive leader Kim Jong-il.

"The shock the North felt over the swift end of the Iraqi regime must have been enormous," Paik Hak-soon, a research analyst at the Sejong Institute, told Yonhap News Agency, noting they appeared to realize the high-tech military prowess of the United States.

Analysts also pointed out the collapse appeared to have reminded the North of the disintegration of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s.

"Kim Jong-il and the North Korean leadership were unnerved when communist regimes such as Ceaucescu's in Romania collapsed. For them, now it must be disquieting to see what happened to Saddam Hussein," Marcus Noland, a senior fellow of the Institute for International Economics in Washington, said in an e-mail interview with Yonhap.

The media coverage of a giant statue of Hussein in Baghdad being pulled to the ground by U.S. forces and destroyed by oppressed Iraqis has no doubt petrified the North's leaders and made them scurry to find a way out of the current impasse without losing face.

As in the case of Hussein in Iraq, towering statues of late North Korean president Kim Il-sung, father of current leader Kim Jong-il, are scattered across the isolated country.

It would be fair to say that just thinking about those statues being toppled by angry citizens might keep the junior Kim awake at night.

"Kim probably had a vision of the same thing being done to the many statues and posters of himself and his father and began concentrating on how to prevent the same thing from happening in North Korea," Noland noted.

In an apparent effort to rally the public behind its leader, the isolated country has recently heightened fear among its people that it could be next in Washington's sights.

Last week, thousands of North Koreans held rallies in Pyongyang and resolved to safeguard their "revolutionary" leadership.

After the fall of Baghdad last week, North Korea began stressing the need for strong military deterrence to avert a U.S. attack.

"The lesson of the Iraq war is that peace lies in having a strong military deterrence which can repel attacks by any high-tech weapons," the North's state-run Korea Central News Agency (KCNA), said last week.

The sense of insecurity among the North Korean leadership is not surprising, considering that the communist country was included in U.S. President George W. Bush's "axis of evil," along with Iraq and Iran, due to its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

So far, President Bush and senior administration officials have not ruled out military action against Pyongyang's suspected nuclear weapons program, touching off rampant speculations on both sides of the Korean Peninsula that the reclusive country may be the next target.

Iraq became the first "axis" country to be subjected to American military action for its alleged pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Against this backdrop, the North's security concerns are not totally ungrounded as the CIA reportedly suspects it already has one or two nuclear weapons.

Adding fear to their concerns is Bush's negative perception of Kim Jong-il. In 2001, he expressed skepticism about the North Korean leader, which froze the dialogue between the two countries for almost two years.

In a thinly veiled warning to Pyongyang, Washington also warned last week that countries seeking weapons of mass destruction should draw the appropriate lesson from Iraq that the pursuit of those weapons is not in their national interest.

Recently, the United States seemed to have softened its stance toward North Korea, saying that the situation is different from Iraq and that it would seek a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the standoff.

In an apparent change of heart after witnessing how the absolute military supremacy of the U.S. unseated Hussein, the North said Saturday it could accept American demands for multilateral talks to address its suspected nuclear arms ambitions.

"If the U.S. is ready to make a bold switchover in its Korea policy for a settlement of the nuclear issue, the DPRK will not stick to any particular dialogue format," the KCNA quoted a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying.

Until then, the reclusive regime had rigidly insisted on having bilateral talks to address the nuclear row, a demand rejected by the United States.

With the North's new proposal, the ball is in America's court.

entropy@yna.co.kr

N.K. wants Japan, Russia out of talks

Despite North Korea's apparent warming toward the notion of multilateral dialogue to resolve its nuclear standoff with the United States, any such discussion is likely to be held back by arguments over which countries will participate, officials said yesterday.

South Korea prefers the so-called "two plus four" model, featuring the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan and Russia.

But North Korea and China are opposing the participation of Japan and Russia, insisting that they are not directly related to security concerns on the Korean Peninsula, said Seoul officials.

"The North sees no reason for Japan and Russia to join the multilateral talks because it wants to discuss the abolition of the armistice pact and the signing of a nonaggression pact with the United States during the forum," said a ranking official at the Foreign Ministry.

The armistice agreement, which ended the three-year Korean War in 1953, was signed by four combatants - the United Nations, the United States, North Korea and China.

"Instead, the North wants the European Union (EU) to participate in the multilateral forum in an apparent hope that the EU may play a leading role in providing economic aid to Pyongyang," the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

Seoul officials have said the multilateral talks, if opened, will incorporate not only the North's nuclear arms program but also whether the international community should provide economic support to the destitute communist state.

The United States has advocated a broader multilateral setting to include both Koreas, five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, Australia, Canada, and the EU. But Seoul officials said the North is uncomfortable with such a format.

Washington has persistently rejected Pyongyang's demand for direct negotiations to address the nuclear standoff and discuss other security issues.

In a significant turnaround, North Korea said Saturday it would consider any form of dialogue with the United States if Washington agrees to discuss economic aid and security assurances.

South Korea and the United States welcomed the North's softening of its demand for bilateral talks, regarding it as a positive development in resolving the nuclear issue.

The nuclear dispute started after the United States said last October that the North admitted to having a nuclear program using enriched uranium.

Since then, the North has expelled U.N. inspectors monitoring sealed nuclear reactors, declared that it was withdrawing from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and begun to reactivate its nuclear plant.

Pyongyang's changes in attitude came days after U.S.-led forces toppled the Saddam Hussein regime in a war against Iraq which South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun said had "petrified" the North.

(shinyb@koreaherald.co.kr) By Shin Yong-bae

On the week of April 20th, senior officials from the U.S., China and North Korea are to meet in Beijing for talks on a simmering nuclear crisis. The meeting excludes Japan and South Korea from the initial talks. The meeting appears to be a compromise between the US demand for multilateral discussions on the crisis, and Pyongyang's insistence on a one-on-one dialogue with Washington. President George W. Bush approved a plan for the U.S/ to begin negotiations with North Korea in Beijing. White House officials refused to comment, but officials in several countries said China would act as a full participant in the talks rather than just convening them. The talks are the first between the two countries since the government of Kim Jong Il threw out international weapon inspectors and restarted its main nuclear weapons plant.

In an ironic twist, the US represenattive at the talks will be Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly, who precipitated the North Korean crisis when he accused the North of its nuclear program. South Korea has agreed on trilateral talks on North Korea's nuclear issue, even though it is excluded from them, in order to facilitate the launching of dialogue between the North and the United States.

The officials confirmed that multilateral talks on the North's suspected nuclear program will start with a three-way forum among Pyongyang, Washington and Beijing, and that South Korea may join the envisaged talks later because the North insisted on the trilateral format. The U.S. wants South Korea and Japan to engage in multilateral dialogue to resolve North Korea's nuclear issue, when talks are held to discuss economic aid to Pyongyang.

President Roh was under severe pressure from the public and media because of the slight from North Korea in the talks not including them. The main opposition Grand National Party (GNP) berated the government for Seoul's exclusion from the multilateral dialogue. "The government has brought this on itself," said the party's acting Chairman Park Hee-tae. On 17 Apr National Assembly Speaker Park Kwan-yong said he regretted South Korea's exclusion from negotiations between North Korea, the United States and China on Pyongyang's pursuit of nuclear weapons. "This will be a good lesson because it made us realize that despite our one-sided support, the North has something different in mind than we do," Park told reporters at Incheon International Airport after returning from the United States. The announcement that the talks would exclude South Korea came shortly after the South offered fertilizer to the North and the North accepted in a response that "asked Seoul to provide rice and fertilizer aid."

U.S. State Department said that the U.S. would make it a priority to include South Korea and Japan in nuclear talks as their participation is "essential to reach substantive results." The U.S. position is that Seoul and Japan should be included in the discussions as the economic packages they bring to the table are integral to the negotiations. According to Seoul, the U.S. was prepared to suspend tripartite talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons programs with Pyongyang and Beijing if the North continues to block Seoul's participation. According to Seoul, both Seoul and Washington consider the upcoming trilateral talks in Beijing as a preliminary step, adding the United States will try to persuade North Korea to allow South Korea to join further rounds of talks on issues related to Pyongyang's suspected nuclear weapons programs. Korea's position is that that essential discussions on the nuclear problem should wait until after the South joins the dialogue.

President Roh tried to defend his government from rising public criticism of South Korea's exclusion from the three-way nuclear talks. "We should not be preoccupied with saving face when it comes to participating in the talks. What is important are the results of the talks ... Many people are unhappy with the fact that we failed to become a main player. But if we insist on participation belatedly, it could derail the talks," Roh said.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION:
U.S.-NORTH KOREA MEETING: APRIL 23

The following article by Peter Hayes is from the NAPS NET -- the anti-nuclear Nautilus Organization -- on 19 April and explains much of the confusing nuclear issues and options dealing with these nuclear negotiations. Our comments or clarification notes to this report are in gold as SITE NOTE.


SARS, Signe Wilkinson, Philadelphia Daily News (Apr 03)

This meeting as a start in the dialogue to defuse the nuclear crisis affects the lives of all living and working in Korea. This is posted here to assist members of the Kunsan AB community understand what is at stake with the F-117s parked on the end of their runway -- and the impacts if the USS Carl Vinson does NOT return to the Pacific after the USS Kitty Hawk carrier group returns to Yokosuka, Japan. There is a lot at stake in the month of April-May that could result in peace or mushroom clouds along the DMZ. Though there is minimal expectations for the intial meeting, it atleast is a start.

The tri-lateral talks were welcomed by all. However, there was a problem with the South being cut out of the negotiations -- with a resultant loss of face both domestically and internationally. The Roh government came under immediate fire as Roh made a public statement that Korea would play a "leading role" in future negotiations. Miffed, the Roh government stated that it would continue its FINANCIAL aid, but other aid (food, fertilizer, etc.) was dependent on its inclusion in the nuclear talks. To appease the South, the North stated it would resume the inter-Korea ministerial talks -- AFTER the nuclear talks between April 27-29. These talks will AGAIN try to drive a wedge in the tri-national alliance on a unified policy in dealing with the North. On 17 April, the United States stated that it would insist in its nuclear talks with China and North Korea that Seoul and Tokyo should be included in the dialogue, as their participation would be essential to achieving substantive results -- meaning they will bring the lucrative economic packages to the table. Then on 18 April, North Korea claimed that its forthcoming talks with the United States and China are basically bilateral talks with Washington over its suspected nuclear weapons program. The White House simply reiterated its stance that multilateral talks over North Korea's nuclear weapons program should include South Korea and Japan. It stated that it will not offer any incentives during its upcoming talks with North Korea in exchange for the communist state's abandonment of its nuclear development efforts. However, the White House added that the purpose of including Seoul and Tokyo in multilateral talks is to seek a verifiable dismantlement of the North's nuclear weapons program, but everyone knows that they offer the "incentives" that the White House is refusing to offer. The only "incentive" the U.S. is offering so far is no preemptive strike.

Going into these negotiations, it appears that the U.S. has hedged its bets by smuggling out as many as 20 top elite (military) and scientists from North Korea through embassies in China. Strait Times story on 19 April stated that these defectors were whisked to the island nation of Nauru and included Kyong Won, the father of North Korea's nuclear program. The operations, dubbed Operation Weasel, began on October 2002 after 11 countries agreed to offer protection and haven for the North Koreans who had made known their intentions to defect from hiding places in China. The North in response said that Kyong Won was only a minor scientist so they didn't worry about when they found out he was missing in early 2002.

The last sentence of this report says what is at stake. It says, "the DPRK will likely continue low-level, active military actions and high-level nuclear provocations to remind everyone that it exists, that the DMZ is hazardous to your health, and the DPRK may blow apart what's left of the Non Proliferation Treaty." These are tense times.

"NORTH KOREA'S NEGOTIATING TACTICS AND NUCLEAR STRATEGY"

By Peter Hayes Friday, April 18, 2003

A world wide web version of this report can be found at: http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/sr/index.html Nautilus invites your contributions to this forum, including any responses to this essay. Copyright (c) 2003 Nautilus of America / The Nautilus Institute

---

In this Special Report I analyze North Korea's military and nuclear options as it commences negotiations with the United States (and China) over whether it will give up its nuclear capacities.

First, I outline the dilemma that faces North Korea at this time when it must choose between having nuclear weapons and having an economy. Second, Peter review the impact of the Gulf and Iraq Wars on North Korean threat perceptions in light of their past history and current circumstances. Third, I outline North Korea's military options to probe and pressure the United States and its allies in Korea over the coming months of what will be arduous and confrontational negotiations. And next, Peter analyze North Korea's nuclear options in the context of these talks.

I conclude that whether the reprocessing plant has been turned on or not today (April 18, 2003) is simply a question of degree and therefore of tactics in the pending negotiations. I argue that North Korea took a fundamental strategic decision to obtain nuclear weapons in late March and essentially voided its previous offers to explore trading them in for security guarantees from the United States. However bizarre it appears to Americans, today's reprocessing threat signals that the North is still willing to bargain because if it is committed to nuclear weapons under all circumstances, then it would have been more prudent and potent to pursue this strategy by silent, secret uranium enrichment while engaging in endless talks than by undertaking public reprocessing that would simply isolate the regime.

(SITE NOTE: The article on 18 April read, "We are successfully reprocessing more than 8,000 spent fuel rods at the final phase." However, on the same day, the U.S. announced that the translation of the Korean text stated that the North would SOON reprocess the fuel rods -- FUTURE TENSE. This backed up this paper's statement that if the North were going to reprocess fuel rods, it would have been better to do it in silence rather than announce it publicly. On 21 April, the North reworded the text. It stated, "We are successfully going forward to reprocess work more than 8,000 spent fuel rods at the final phase." This indicates that the North is not yet at the reprocessing stage, but is close to it.)

At this stage, therefore, the Bush Administration must table a stark, credible, and dramatic roadmap that outlines what the DPRK could obtain for which it would be worth giving up its nuclear program. Nothing less will reverse North Korea's nuclear trajectory.

Kim Jong Il's Strategic Dilemma

I haven't been to Pyongyang for three years. But I was in Pyongyang just after the first Gulf War. As in 1991, the pending American occupation of Baghdad confirms the worst fears of the North Korean leadership. The war on Iraq sends an unmistakable signal of American intention to other current or potential adversaries such as North Korea. As noted above, for some in Washington, this impact is intended and desirable, putting Kim Jong Il on notice that he is next in line. All that differs is the means-slow strangulation combined with external political and military pressure to exhaust the DPRK into collapse or submission.

Faced with this unpleasant prospect, Kim Jong Il has two simultaneous overarching goals that contradict each other. The first is to deter and defend against American attack, and to that end, obtain nuclear weapons. The second is to rebuild his defunct economy to support his conventional military forces, his primary means of deterring and defending against American and South Korean attack and projecting threat for compelling allies and enemies alike to attend to DPRK demands. The conventional military are also the wherewithal by which the leadership occupies and runs the DPRK-that is, the military is the only remaining national institution that works. The party and the economic agencies have failed miserably to deliver the means of national power. The conventional military need an economy to sustain and modernize their forces.

Kim Jong Il's dilemma is that he can have the first, but only at the cost of the second-with the negative consequence of an increasingly alienated and unhappy conventional military. He can only obtain the second at the cost of the first, by acceding to American demands. If he did so, then the DPRK runs the risk of American attack without nuclear weapons. To run this risk, he would have to believe that the Bush Administration is willing to rebuild the DPRK's economy and the regime's longevity-contrary to the lethal intention of the Bush Administration towards "evil states" as just evidenced in Iraq which merely underscores the public and private statements of many Bush appointees about the DPRK.

It is true that the United States Government has never declared "regime transformation" or "regime termination" to be its official objective towards North Korea. Rather, a durable elimination of the DPRK's nuclear threat via peaceful means is President Bush's declared objective. But given the evidence, Kim Jong Il is unlikely to believe that this formula means acceptance of his regime. Rather, he would likely infer that the Bush Administration's intention is to square the circle-that is, to contain and squeeze Kim Jong Il's DPRK so hard over the coming months and years that it simply collapses without the United States having to use military force.

(SITE NOTE: The U.S. did not use the phrase "regime termination" in the initial phases of the Iraq War -- though everyone knew it was so. The people who most fear the collapse of the North is the South and China who will have to deal with a massive refugee problem as they flee North Korea. It is to their advantage to keep the North on its feet. However, it has been the U.S. contention -- and some high ranking DPRK defectors -- that without the South Korean financial aid the North would have collapsed already. On 21 April, the New York Times reported that U.S. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld recently sent a memo to top officials at the Pentagon suggesting that the United States, with China's help, should try to oust the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il from power. That is in contrast with Washington's official policy objective - to disarm North Korea of its weapons of mass destruction. However, it stated that Rumsfeld's team was not proposing a military solution to depose Kim, but diplomatic pressure. This report is supposedly based on a "classified" memo is suspect.

The U.S. does NOT want the North to collapse. It is NOT willing to foot the bill for the North's reconstruction and would rather have the wealthy South handle the payments. The North's economy is a basket case. To rehabilitate the North to a market economy will require immense financial help from the EU, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea. The South though does not want to do this at this time. It would rather gradually assimilate the North by bringing the North into the global economy with their assistance -- and to their profit with an ample cheap labor source.)

Faced with this reality, the North Koreans appear to be hedging. They are attempting to avoid the hard choice between these goals for as long as possible and to gain time by taking small military risks while taking reversible steps to obtaining nuclear weapons as fast as possible. In fact, until last month, they were vacillating between the strategy of obtaining nuclear weapons as fast as possible while keeping open the option of trading in their nuclear weapons over time in return for an economy. This indecisive behavior was mirrored all the way down to tactical levels, as we shall see below. Now, it appears that they are obsessed with obtaining nuclear weapons and have made a strategic decision to commit to this course. It will take a miracle of adroit American diplomacy to avoid this outcome.

Not surprisingly, the North Koreans have interpreted the situation in Iraq to justify obtaining nuclear weapons. They have stated publicly that allowing inspections led to the occupation and dismemberment of Iraq and imply thereby that no inspections will resume in the DPRK in the near future-a crucial element of any realistic phased approach to meeting the Bush Administration's demands to dismantle verifiably their nuclear weapons program. They have asserted that making missiles and nuclear weapons is a sovereign right and they have left the Non Proliferation Treaty to set the scene for proliferation. And they have stated that the DPRK may preempt the United States if convinced it is being attacked, turning the tables on the United States and its allies by reminding everyone of its ability to "shock and awe" the city of Seoul.

But more concretely, what conclusions would they draw from the first and second Gulf Wars for their military strategy, and how might this shape their current strategy to keep pressure on the United States to negotiate on their terms or to otherwise keep it at bay?

The Impact of the First Gulf War

The DPRK military drew clear conclusions from the Gulf War in 1991. They made a number of adjustments intended to defeat American communications and signals intelligence and to offset the ability of precision-guided munitions. The strategic implication of the Gulf War was that aiming to occupy South Korea via maneuver warfare was not possible. Rather, they emphasized extreme forward deployment, underground fortifications, pre-positioned food and fuel, and concentration of artillery and rocket fire on Seoul and the insertion of special forces into South Korea to create havoc and to attack US bases. In the nineties, they focused on modernizing this offensive deterrent while trying to keep the rest of their military-industrial complex from rusting out from inside as the non-military economy collapsed.

(SITE NOTE: The North also switched their command and control to fiber optic cables to prevent EMF disruptions/interception of signals. However, the idea that they could break through the DMZ in a blitzkrieg strike would not be possible with the increased capabilities of the ROK. (See Korea Marching to its own drum for details.) Also breaking through the FEBA-A/B/C (Forward Battle Area defense lines) posed new difficulties with the USFK A-10s and Apache attack helicopters and increased amounts of M1-A1/KM1-A1 main battle tanks facing them. (See North Korea Strategy for details.))

Even before the attack on Baghdad, tensions between North Korea and the United States had escalated to levels not seen since the last crisis in 1994. Many North Korean statements, including public statements aimed at their own population, assert that the United States intends to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against the DPRK and that North Korea must mobilize to deter and defeat such an attack. Given that the objective risk of US attack is likely lower today than any time since the Korean War-due to Washington's pre-occupation with Iraq and its thinly stretched logistics and forces-one could view these statements simply as purposeful and rabid propaganda aimed at domestic and international constituencies.

(SITE NOTE: There is an additional point that the U.S. does NOT want to go to war because it is basically strapped with a $20 billion-plus bill for the Iraq War. First, though 39 percent of America still feels that North Korea is a threat, the American public overwhelmingly want a UN mandate before they go after another "evil threat." North Korea is wretchedly poor. And since a war would likely ravage South Korea (with its 11th largest world economy), it would probably leave Washington with the reconstruction bill in the North. The costs would be staggering. Second, it will take a long time to pacify Iraq and take at least six months to get the military ready for another conflict. The U.S. has expended a great deal of its smart-bomb weaponry and needs to "rearm" before it engages in another "shock and awe" campaign. The U.S. will not enter another conflict unless it has the same overwhelming superiority that it had in the Iraq war. HOWEVER, the danger is that North Korea may force world events -- i.e., carry out any of its military threats -- that dictate that the U.S. do the unthinkable.)

However, discounting and ignoring North Korean rhetoric at this moment is dangerous. The fact that statements have propaganda value does not mean that they do not represent genuine threat perceptions. And the propaganda of many totalitarian regimes has often reflected accurately the intentions and views of the leadership. In World War II, for example, Nazi propaganda proved an important indicator of strategic intention to allied analysts who hypothesized that Goebbels had to sustain an image of Hitler's absolute power which meant in turn that words and action had to be kept consistent (at least most of the time)-and indeed, these analysts correctly interpreted Nazi propaganda about 80 percent of the time. There is no reason to believe that North Korean propaganda is any different in this regard-especially when one person, Kim Jong Il, personifies absolute power and articulates and choreographs its basic propaganda strategies.

North Korean Threat Perceptions

The key to understanding the impact of the current war in Iraq in Pyongyang lies in understanding North Korean threat perceptions. The starting point for such an understanding is the recognition that the threat of strategic and aerial bombardment is deeply imprinted on the leadership and the population's psyches. Not only were thousands of Koreans killed at Hiroshima, but many returned to live in the North after World War II. Unlike those in the South, these nuclear survivors were revered in the North, and also used in anti-Japanese propaganda (they are quick to say that the United States should have used more nuclear weapons against Japan). Most Americans have forgotten about this Korean exposure to the first use of nuclear weapons-but Koreans haven't.

(SITE NOTE: I agree that the North has a air-raid shelter mentality dealing with conventional bombing, but I disagree with the author that the North fears nuclear weapons. I believe the North Korean populace have NO understanding of the threat nuclear weapons pose to their society. If they did, they wouldn't be threatening Japan with a potential nuclear strike with their Rodong and Taepyong missiles. A nuclear retaliatory strike would mean the elimination of 50 percent of their population in one flash. Those who say "Nuke 'em till they glow" or "Nuke 'em back to the stone age" are talking emotional claptrap and have no comprehension of the horror of which they speak. Neither do the South Koreans who complain that the U.S. is keeping them from having an atomic weapon as well. All these people see is that the nuclear weapon equates to POWER. These nuclear toys will make their second-rate armies into world-class nuclear powers. The insanity is that when you play the nuclear game, sooner or later someone will call your bluff. Then what??? Nukes aren't the wave of the future. They are an anathema of the past.)

During the Korean War, the North was so heavily bombed that US bombers were grounded for long periods due to the lack of targets. North Koreans have already lived through one of the most intense aerial bombardments in history-and one in which the bombs were dumb and the effects on populations indiscriminate, unlike the current air campaigns that employ smart delivery platforms and precisely guided munitions.

Although no nuclear weapons were deployed in Korea during the Korean War, North Koreans were also subjected to intense nuclear threat during the war as part of an attempt to determine the coercive value of nuclear threat for the US military. The North Korean military developed doctrine in the war to fight on in the face of nuclear attack. "[W]eapons emplacements and communication trenches," states a DIA handbook on the North Korean military, "would be used as the basic field defense-both dug 1.5 to 2 meters deep and covered where possible." .

Nuclear threat did not induce them to introduce any radical alterations in terms of the significance of infantry for the North Korean army-perhaps because there wasn't much they could do about, and perhaps because they believed that Soviet nuclear weapons already deterred the United States from escalating to nuclear first use. Thus, other than recognizing that they were vulnerable to nuclear attack and directing troops to prepare fortified positions with concrete walls and gasketed steel doors to stop the blast of nuclear weapons, they told their commanders to duck, cover, and then return to their mission.

(SITE NOTE: There were nuclear weapons in Korea from 1958 through 1992, North Korea was NEVER the primary target. The North knew this and reacted accordingly. Their people were taught to fear the nuclear threat, but never felt in their heart that it applied to them. It is much the same way as the North having massive chemical capabilities, but the South Korean populace in their hearts cannot believe that the north will use it on them. Ask the common Korean man on the street if he has a gas mask for him and his family and he will look at you like you are an idiot. And it is not for lack of capabilities as a company in Korea was the major supplier to the Kuwaiti government which supplied gas masks to their populace prior to the Iraq War.)

According to DIA, small units engaged in an attack were told to decontaminate after nuclear attack by "shaking, dusting, scrubbing with grass, twigs, etc, or by any other improvised methods, so that combat missions can be continued without delay." Conversely, states DIA, "If a unit is threatened by nuclear warfare while it is in a defense situation," then "troops are ordered to take cover in tunnels and underground fortifications, trenches, or low places on the ground. If caught in an open field, they lie prone, facing away from the point of impact and remain that way for approximately 3 seconds. They then rise, don gas masks and protective clothing, and return to their normal defensive duties."

This approach may seem desirable in light of the annihilative power of nuclear explosions and if put to the test, it likely would have failed pathetically. But millions of North Koreans passed through military training learning that they were nuclear targets. The current North Korean political and military leadership lived through this inferno as children and inherited both the threat perceptions and were deeply indoctrinated as to the on-going nature of this threat.

During the Cold War, the United States projected nuclear threat against the North continuously and explicitly by deployments of nuclear weapons, and by asserting that the North would be reduced to a radiating, smoking ruin if it ever attacked South Korea or if the United States went to war with the Soviets or with China. This threat perception drove North Korea to construct an underground world that makes North Korea's surface existence epiphenomenal and bizarre to the outsider. But viewed from Pyongyang, it is explicable. Indeed, one would have to question the rationality of the North Koreans if they hadn't somehow responded to American nuclear threat projection in some genuine fashion, no matter how pathetic compared with the threat itself.

In fact, internalization of nuclear threat is what was intended by its makers, and the evidence of it is clear not only their military doctrine as outlined above, but also in the vast subterranean North Korea that they have built since 1953.

(SITE NOTE: As was said before -- NORTH KOREA WAS NEVER A PRIMARY TARGET. As to the real targets from 1958-1992, it is fairly easy to figure out which two nuclear powers had bases with nuclear capabilities or nuclear weapons test facilities nearby. Though these targets will NEVER be officially released as there still is a nuclear SIOP on the books, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out what the targets were.)

Over this period, various crises erupted that reinforced North Korean perceptions of being the aggrieved victim of American aggression and subject to strategic bombing at the drop of a hat-whatever the reality. The August 1976 "poplar tree" crisis at the DMZ was the most important single event in sustaining this perception for the current military leadership. At the time, the United States almost went to war when North Korean soldiers attacked American and South Korean soldiers to stop them from the cutting down a poplar tree at Panmunjon in the Joint Security Area. During this month-long crisis, US-ROK forces went onto high alert, an aircraft carrier was deployed offshore, as today, and B52 bombers flew from Guam up the Korean Peninsula at right angles to the DMZ veering off only at the last moment.

(SITE NOTE: This incident was shocking because of the brutality, but it was part of the overall picture of mounting aggression. The tensions on the peninsula had been increasing because of the North's aggression. It was NOT simply one trivial event. In 1974, President Park Chung Hee proposed signing an inter-Korean nonaggression treaty. However, North Korea rebuked the idea and unilaterally stopped negotiations between the countries. Then in 1974, North Korean armed agent Mun Se-kwang attempted to shoot President Park Chung-hee, and the first lady was killed. To add to the tensions, Tunnel No. 1 aimed at infiltrating into the ROK was discovered under the DMZ. On March 19, 1975 Tunnel No. 2 was discovered. As a result, the ROK took measures to bolster their defense posture and on June 30 the ROK Combat Reserve Forces was created. On Sept. 22, 1975 the Civil Defense Corps was created. On June 7, 1976. the Team Spirit Exercise was first carried out. This type of exercise had been carried out for years in Korea testing the forces from Japan, Okinawa and stateside. However, this was the first time they were tied together into an all-encompassing scenario that tasked various units in the war skills that they would be expected to perform in the event of an invasion by North Korea. Instantly, North Korea rattled its sabre threatening violence. On Aug. 18, 1976, two U.S. Army officers attempting to cut down a tree in the demilitarized zone were attacked and killed by North Korean border guards. Known as the "tree-cutting incident," it triggered a quick build-up of forces as tensions with North Korea increased. The 12th and 67th Tactical Fighter Squadrons from the 18th TFW were temporarily assigned to the Wolf Pack as augmenting forces until easing tensions sent them home to Kadena, Japan on Sept. 6, 1976. Camp Bonifas was named for a Captain killed in this incident. Go to Operation Paul Bunyon for Gary Travis' account of the Operation Paul Bunyon. Go to 1976: Life in 1976 for Gary Travis' account of conditions in Korea in 1976.)

On October 4, 1991, Major General Kim Yong Chol, Director, General Staff Committee, Ministry of Defense told me in Pygongyang that they were particularly concerned about B52s deploying from Guam. "What is most interesting," he said, "is that B52 bombers in Guam fly over Korea twice a week. We see these aimed at nuclear delivery."

By 1991, these B52s had already been decertified from conducting nuclear operations - as I told General Kim. But from his perspective, the B52s represented a past, present and future nuclear threat to his forces. North Korean military leaders assume the worst about American capacities and intentions. The Pentagon's deployment of 12 B1 and 12 B52 bombers to Guam, about 2,000 miles from North Korea, after DPRK MIGs intercepted a US spyplane undoubtedly demonstrated US resolve to the North Koreans. But it may also have pushed their paranoia buttons--especially since stealth bombers have remained in Korea after recent exercises.

(SITE NOTE: This is a rather strange comment as in 1991, the SAC B-52s were transitioning to the new command structure (and the death of might SAC), but were never decertified. The nuclear AGM cruise missiles that they carried were simply put into storage -- for the time being but still on-hand with the wiring in the B-52s intact. The mission changed, but the nuclear weapons were still inplace.)

Thus, war on Iraq likely has Kim Jong Il and his generals genuinely alarmed about US attack although having seen it before as children, they are not novices at being shocked and awed. For these leaders, the American attempt to decapitate Iraq by killing Saddam Hussein is especially unsettling. Kim Jong Il must now assume that he is targeted 24/7 as he moves around North Korea giving on-the-spot guidance.

(SITE NOTE: Go to N.K. Remains Silent on Downfall of Iraqi Dictator for 14 April article on North Korea's perception of the events in Iraq and its sudden willingness to negotiate.)

North Korean Military Options Given this external threat and their perceptions, what might the North Koreans do? To get a grip grounded in history, it is worth running the clock back to 1976. After the United States pulled-out from Vietnam the previous year, American leaders worried that North Korean might misinterpret American resolve to defend South Korea. On June 17, 1976, as Jimmy Carter's withdrawal policy (later reversed in 1978) went into effect-and only a month before the August crisis erupted-the US Defense Intelligence Agency analyzed the generic military options available to the DPRK to stress the US-ROK alliance, to probe US intentions, and to seek external support for its grievances. DIA listed twelve options that constituted a rough "escalation" ladder at the time as what the DPRK might do with conventional military forces. These were:

• 1. Show of naval force
  (SITE NOTE: This has been done in testing the northern boundary in the unresolved demarcation line between North and South. In June 2002, a naval gun battle of sank on South Korean ship, but left many North Koreans dead or wounded. Soon after the North opened its "dialogues" with the South, thus saving Kim Dae-jung's "sunshine policy" from a humiliating demise.)
• 2. Air or naval attack on South Korean target of opportunity-especially an errant vessel or aircraft that strays into DPRK territory, either one or a series of such attacks
• 3. Air feint
  (SITE NOTE: This was done in early 2003 when a MiG 19 "strayed" across the demarcation line in what appeared as a test of ROK defense responses.)
• 4. Artillery attacks on selected South Korean observation posts, bunkers or outposts on the DMZ or west coast islands
• 5. Attack a US reconnaissance aircraft in international waters [sic, airspace]
  (SITE NOTE: In March 2003, two North Korean MiG29 fighters and two aircraft that appeared to be MiG23 fighters intercepted the Air Force RC-135S reconnaissance plane, which was conducting a routine intelligence mission over the Sea of Japan about 150 miles off North Korea's coast. On 20-21 Apr North Korean fighters undertook long-distance flights to counter American and Russian spy planes. South Korea confirmed that a North Korean squadron of MiG-21s and MiG-23s was sent on navigation exercises over the Sea of Japan. The sortie appeared to be aimed at deterring surveillance planes spying on North Korea, and were also thought to be training to counter the tactics used by the US-led air forces over Iraq.)
  RC-135S Cobra Ball
  

• 6. Launch a limited joint naval, air, and ground attack
• 7. Insert special mission forces to conduct special operations to destabilize or to disrupt South Korea
  (SITE NOTE: These operations continue till today with impunity as there is no way to protect the South Korean coastline. In fact, in 1992, the South Korean government started to remove the barbed wire fences from most of the coastline.)
  (Anticipated North Attack Plan. See FAS: OPLAN 5027 Major Theater War - West.)
• 8. Attack against west coast islands
• 9. Air attack against selected targets although DIA judged this to be unlikely unless the DPRK were prepared for a strong response [presumably because war is imminent and viewed as inevitable]
• 10. Surface-surface missile attack that might reach Seoul from pre-selected firing positions
  (SITE NOTE: Starting in early February, the North restarted its missile testing program and threatened to test the Taepongdo-2 missile. missiles. However, it has limited its tests to surface-to-ship missiles with limited range.)
  (Anticipated North Attack Plan.. See FAS: OPLAN 5027 Major Theater War - West .)
• 11. Covert mining, for example, of South Korean ports
• 12. Full-scale attacks which are possible with little warning.
  (SITE NOTE: North Korea has 2 artillery corps and 30 artillery brigades equipped with 120mm self-propelled guns, 152mm self-propelled mortars, 170mm guns with a range of 50 km, 240 mm multiple rocket launchers with a range of 45 km, and other heavy guns. North Korea has about 18,000 heavy guns. North Korea's 170mm Goksan gun and 240mm multiple-tube rocket launchers are the most powerful guns of the world. These guns can lob shells as far south as Suwon miles beyond Seoul. The big guns are hidden in caves. Many of them are mounted on rails and can fire in all directions. They can rain 500,000 conventional and biochemical shells per hour on US troops near the DMZ. The US army bases at Yijong-bu, Paju, Yon-chun, Munsan, Ding-gu-chun, and Pochun will be obliterated in a matter of hours. The US army in Korea is equipped with Paladin anti-artillery guns that can trace enemy shells back to the guns and fire shells at the enemy guns with pin-point accuracy. However, it takes for the Paladins about 10 min to locate the enemy guns, during which time the Paladins would be targeted by the enemy guns Gen. Thomas A Schwartz, a former US army commander in Korea, stated that the US army in Korea would be destroyed in less than three hours.)
  (Anticipated North Attack Plan. See FAS: OPLAN 5027 Major Theater War - West .)

At the time, DIA stated that "the exact form and nature of potential North Korean provocations remain difficult to predict" but they advised that "None, [security deletion one phrase, possible qualifier or exception], is expected to materialize in the short term." DIA judged the likelihood that North Korea would risk a major confrontation to be "remote." Yet only a month later, the North Korean and US allied forces were trading blows at the DMZ!

These twelve options remain available to the DPRK today plus other options that it has obtained since the mid-seventies (of which, see below). Of these twelve options, the North has already used three in recent months: in early February, surface-surface missile firings (twice, one exploding in mid-air, over international waters); aerial feint (over contested waters and airspace to the west of the Peninsula; and on March 2, intercepting a US RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft over international waters (rather than attacking as in 1969 when the North Koreans shot down an EC121 aircraft in a similar position).

With hindsight, it is obvious that these three options represent the least provocative and most controllable of the twelve generic options. None were on the DMZ and none involved actual use of military force. These steps seem to have been calibrated and ratcheted up quite precisely, and were planned well in advance and implemented in a disciplined, controlled fashion.

Other Escalation Options

Given that they have already used the three low-level military options, what else could they do at this stage to send a message back to Washington that they do not intend to be the next in line for regime termination?

They could send covert agents to exploit anti-American sentiment in the South-but they already have a good thing going in this regard without any North Korean instigation. Discovery of North Korean provocateurs would undermine South Korean anti-Americanism and would be a clumsy move.

(SITE NOTE: The refers to the NGO activist groups anti-Americanism demonstrations that were rampant in 2002 -- and still going on in 2003, but not as pronounced.)

It could arrest a stray South Korean vessel or aircraft-but again, that might defeat its political strategy of separating the allies and put paid to any possibility of engaging with the South Korea's new president, an untested quantity from the DPRK's perspective.

The DPRK could also reactivate its bad old habits of launching international terrorist attacks. But terrorist attacks on South Korea's leadership would be politically counter-productive and militarily suicidal. Attacks on overseas North Koreans opposing the regime-something that the DPRK has not done for some years-would only strengthen American hardliners commitment to regime transformation in the DPRK.

Supporting non-state terrorist networks and actions attempting to divert the United States into dead-end interventions in Africa, South Asia, or the Middle East are possible, but contrary to DPRK proclivity to control its own terrorists and would be actions of last resort undertaken in all-out war with the United States. The DPRK's connections with organizations such as the Hezbollah and the IRA are strictly venal, to do with trade in counterfeit dollars and other hot items, not political in nature.

As is obvious, the other nine options all entail direct combat or a high risk of military retaliation from US or South Korean forces and are much more risky. The North could try a repeat run of the three lower-level options, but that seems unlikely to impress Washington, especially in its current mood.

Setting Up The DMZ?

What can they do if conventional military provocations are too dangerous? They already threatened to abandon the Armistice. Acting on this threat would remove their obligations to play the DMZ game by the Armistice's rules. Practically speaking, this threat doesn't make much difference as they pulled out of the Military Armistice Commission in 1994. More important, the DPRK has now shut off military-military officer level talks. This action shuts down the only military crisis-management channel and does increase the risk of uncontrolled escalation at the DMZ. Provided neither side makes a rash move, this is a game that has been played before. Tacit understandings struck over half a century of military management at the DMZ will play a stabilizing role.

(SITE NOTE: It has been a great concern that the North is simply playing games with the South. The hotline was cut after the 1975 tree-cutting incident and was never reinitiated. President Kim Young-sam first proposed such a hotline to prevent the near disaster of 1993, but it laid unfulfilled. At the end of the Kim Dae-jung administration, a hotline between the two Koreas was supposed to be set up with the thawing of North-South relations. However, suddenly there were "technical" problems on the North Korean side and the line hookup was never completed.)

Nonetheless, the North Koreans could introduce heavy arms into the DMZ or create some other small-scale crisis at the DMZ to sound a very loud alarm bell. This step could be aimed at increasing pressure on South Korea by underscoring the threat from the North to the DPRK's credit rating and economic growth-a cost already measurable in billions of dollars per year to the South. The danger is that a US or South Korean response to such a move could be amplified by the centralized North Korean command system already on a state of high alert and trained and mobilized to expect the worst. Of course, North Koreans control this option and if they are not suicidal, they will sit on their hands whatever the US-ROK response to an incident induced by the North.

(SITE NOTE: What is bothersome to the U.S. is the attempts by the North to turn the newly cleared road/railway corridor to Kaesong into a non-militarized zone, thus cutting the UNC out of the picture. The reconnecting of the railways and roads may be a great boon, but militarily for the UNC/U.S. it could turn into an invasion route -- though not likely as it would be a bottle-neck that would make the North's invading forces subject to an allied turkey shoot.)

They may also be setting up an opportunity to capture any American or South Korean inadvertent DMZ crossing, as occurred with the US helicopter that strayed north and was shot down in December 1994 and then exploit the subsequent crisis.

(SITE NOTE: The greatest worry at this time is that the U.S. may be the one "setting up the DMZ" -- NOT the North. The USS Carl Vinson was sent to Korea from Guam to replace the USS Kitty Hawk which deployed to the Persian Gulf. In addition, F-15s were brought down from Elmendorf to make up for the air losses due the missing carrier group. The F-117As were brought in from Holloman. This was an exact repeat scenario -- including the F-117As -- that happened in 1993. Then after the RC-135S incident in March, the B-52s and B-1s were brought to Guam. There were two nuclear submarines in Guam, but they haven't been heard from since the USS Carl Vinson was deployed to Korean waters. The USS Carl Vinson and F-117As were supposedly here for the RSOI/Foal Eagle 03 exercises, but when the exercises were over, they were remained in Korea for "training." As of 16 May, they remained at Kunsan. Now the USS Kitty Hawk has returned to Yokosuka, Japan after leaving the Gulf on 16 April. The USS Carl Vinson remained in the Korea area supposedly to fill in for the Kitty Hawk as it underwent "repairs." It appears that the U.S. is setting up the situation and daring the North to pick a fight. To make it much more interesting the U.S. wants to remove the 2d ID off of the DMZ as soon as possible signalling that they wish to remove the "tripwires" -- and move south of the Han. With the U.S. troops distanced from the immediate onslaught and the release of the U.S. troops from being held "hostage," the U.S. has many more options available in negotiations. The second round of negotiations on the future alliance was scheduled for May 7-8 in Hawaii, but was postponed when the issue of troop relocations was elevated to the Presidential level. The time suspense is September to come up with an agreement.)

Other Threats

Assuming that the DPRK leadership is not so deluded as to run serious military risks at the DMZ or elsewhere, what else can it do to maintain pressure on the United States?

At lower levels of threat, the DPRK could "occupy" the KEDO construction site at Sinpo and evict the KEDO workforce. It could take "hostage" the workforce at the site which even includes an American, not to mention the (?) However, it would be politically smarter to let the United States make this move at KEDO rather than incur the wrath of South Korea for having done so. Alternately, if the United States attacks the DPRK's nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, evicting KEDO from North Korea is indeed a symmetrical response and can be anticipated today - but effectively, this would be an American choice, not a North Korean first move.

The DPRK could evict international aid agencies from some or all countries, both governmental and non-governmental. This move, however, would undermine the residual external support for Kim Jong Il's reform effort and would be a self-imposed form of "tailored containment" that the Bush hardliners would simply cheer. It could shut down travel across its borders as it almost did in mid-1994-but that would not put pressure on Washington.

This leaves the nuclear fuel cycle and missiles as means of pressuring the United States.

In the 1976 crisis, the DPRK did not have medium-range missiles to test over Japan. It did not have a nuclear fuel cycle with which to send shivers up the spine of the international community. If the DPRK is largely checkmated at the DMZ by the overwhelming military power of the US-ROK alliance, as was suggested above, then how might it use missile and nuclear activities to communicate its anger and resolve in the midst of negotiations with Washington and given its need to hedge against different outcomes that might arise from these talks? As noted above, it could fire another long-range missile over Japan. But this step would shut down any hope of reactivating talks with Japan. It would also offend its major ally, China, which has been crystal clear with the DPRK about the importance of not risking war in Korea.

Nuclear Options

The DPRK has many options and combinations of nuclear options. It can deepen nuclear opacity; it can shift from opacity to ambiguity by allowing some transparency on one or other part of its fuel cycle; it can declare and test nuclear weapons; and it can deploy nuclear weapons. It is conceivable that the DPRK might do everything in as short a time as possible (or to get more if they already have some primitive devices) so as to later engage the United States from a position of nuclear strength, and then rebuild its economy, thereby resolving the dilemma described at the outset of this essay.

However, going for broke on nuclear weapons now would stress the DPRK's relationship with Russia and alliance with China. Russia it can do without, but not China. Just as there are limits to China's ability to translate its apparent leverage over the DPRK into actual influence (due to the incredibility of forcing the collapse of the regime which would hurt vital Chinese interests even more than a nuclear-armed DPRK), so there are limits to the DPRK's ability to stand up against American power alone without Chinese oil or food. This constraining and a-symmetrical dependence on China suggests that the DPRK will opt for deepening opacity with regard to its nuclear intentions and capacities; and, it will seek to maintain the option of translating its small near-term nuclear potential into more, medium-term, actual weapons. This strategy implies not turning on the reprocessing plant except for stop-start tactical pressure in negotiations but accelerating the clandestine enrichment track.

(SITE NOTE: China's government, conscious of its international image, has not really cracked down on the North Korean refugees periodically assaulting foreign diplomatic compounds in Beijing. It has half-heartedly repatriated refugees discovered in China's northern regions. China disapproved of Kim Jong Il's economic restructuring blueprint for the special administrative region in Sinuiju and arrested Mr. Yang Bin, Kim's personal choice for region governor in September 2002. Beijing gradually shut down fourteen out of fifteen pipelines transporting heavy fuel oil from China to North Korea in the course of the past year. The last operational pipeline was reportedly taken out of service for technical maintenance for three days last February. This pipeline shutdown was said to drive the point home to North Korea that it should come to the negotiations table.)

In March and early April 2003, the DPRK published extraordinary official texts on its "military first" policy. The leadership stated explicitly that it had given up hopes of economic reforms and instead placed first priority on the military in all respects. This statement will be hard to reverse for the leadership and suggests that it has opted for nuclear weapons-no economy option as its fundamental course. And, on April 6th just as the United States entered Baghdad, it declared that it needs "Only the physical deterrent force, tremendous military deterrent force powerful enough to decisively beat back an attack supported by any ultra-modern weapons" was sufficient for the DPRK. The reference to "tremendous military deterrent force may prefigure actions by the DPRK over the coming months to reveal or declare actual nuclear weapons capacities. North Korea will then abandon its strategy in which the nuclear threat was "the barrier that makes the water flow" in US-DPRK relations.

Given the tremendous uncertainty surrounding how the United States will act after the Iraq War, it would be prudent and rational for the DPRK leadership to behave very conservatively, and seek to deter the United States with slowly increasing nuclear capabilities while isolating it politically.

Indeed, the DPRK cannot quickly develop and deploy usable nuclear weapons in the next few months. Not only would this exceed their likely technical capacity, but doing so would undermine its political strategy to reassure its only ally and would increase American determination to transform/terminate the regime. In the worst case, therefore, redoubling their effort to openly obtain a latent/virtual/actual nuclear weapon option and then hunkering down Spartan-like behind a nuclear shield would not be rational in the short-term-no matter how threatened the North Koreans feel by the war in Iraq or its aftermath. As noted above, it would be better to leave most of the spent fuel unreprocessed as a symbol of American impotence while accelerating their clandestine enrichment program, which could realize weapons-grade material in one-three years.

However, exporting nuclear-related materials or cooperation with another proliferating state would present the United States with a gigantic dilemma. For example, if the DPRK were to export uranium yellow-cake to Iran, would the United States interdict this entirely legal shipment? What would the United States do to counter DPRK export of design information related to missiles or nuclear weapons to Iran? Currently, it seems unlikely that Iran would seek uranium from a politically charged supplier in a surplus uranium world market. But if Iran proves to be the next American target, Iran may need ways to threaten American interests and North Korea may prove useful in this regard. One might well ask what were Iranians doing on the Air Koryo flight between Beijing and Pyongyang in March.

Positive Surprises

It is easy to fall into the trap of assuming the worst about the DPRK, not least because DPRK constantly reinforces this expectation. With Iraq is occupied quickly and the resistance fading quickly, American engagement of North Korea could move quickly ahead provided the Bush Administration generates a credible roadmap and a clear statement of the down payment it is willing to make to purchase the DPRK's nuclear weapons with Chinese and other great power guarantors.

The pending dialogue in Beijing between China, North Korea and the United States shrinks the Bush formula of multilateralism down to its bare bone reality: North Korea and its main great power adversary and ally. Far from capitulating to a Bush hard line, the DPRK's sudden agreement to talk bilaterally with another great power in the room to insist that the United States adjust its position is tactically smart. It places maximum onus on the United States to adopt a more flexible position than dismantle verifiably first and only then will we talk. Their acceptance was conditional -- "if the US is ready to make a bold switchover in its Korea policy for a settlement of the nuclear issue" by showing "a political willingness to drop its hostile policy toward the DPRK," then and only then are they are willing to talk. The talk of reprocessing today was to reinforce this position: they are willing to walk if the United States does not deal which puts tremendous pressure on China to bring Washington (not Pyongyang) to heel.

Assuming that the United States meets the DPRK halfway in the pending talks, then the DPRK might suddenly re-suspend its departure from the Non Proliferation Treaty or, as it did after the May-June 1994 crisis between the United States and North Korea, freeze some or all of its fuel cycle activities and allow international inspectors to reenter the DPRK. It could also create mixed and difficult combinations by firing up and shutting down the reactor and/or the reprocessing plant or displaying its enrichment capacity with allowing the inspectors back in-taking a leaf out of the Iranian book.

If the United States refuses to shift to a more flexible position - for example, by committing to enter into a true dialogue if the North Koreans unilaterally and verifiably freeze and refreeze their fuel cycle activities - then the DPRK and others (including China) will blame the United States for the failure of the talks. Provided the DPRK does not declare that it is a nuclear state and does not justify an attack by starting to reprocess, it can clandestinely pursue a slow enrichment strategy to obtaining more fissile material and eventually, uranium-based nuclear weapons.

Unless something truly remarkable happens to snap the White House into reality, North Korea will try to shape an international milieu that rejects American unilateral action against it while moving deliberately and slowly to acquire nuclear weapons and short of all-out war, it cannot be stopped. I did not expect the Bush Administration to shed so quickly its illusion that Security Council multilateralism was the right framework to deal with North Korea, nor did I anticipate that it would shed its rigid policy of "no-talks-without-verifiable-dismantlement-of-enrichment" overnight. These pragmatic moves made possible the talks next week. Thus, for its part, the Administration has begun to build a bridge across the abyss to North Korea. Like a Roman arch, this bridge can be built only from both ends at once. These will meet in the middle only at the very end of the process or not at all.

In short, it may be easier at this late stage in the game for a Kim Jong Il to go through the eye of a needle than for him to trade in his nuclear option, absent a fundamental change in US stance. But a negotiated end to North Korea's nuclear program is urgent. It is not too late to test North Korea's intentions by diplomatic probe. In the meantime, the DPRK will likely continue low-level, active military actions and high-level nuclear provocations to remind everyone that it exists, that the DMZ is hazardous to your health, and the DPRK may blow apart what's left of the Non Proliferation Treaty.

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Sources Cited in this Special Report

US Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea: A New Look at Military Options, June 17, 1976, DIAAPPR 195-J6. Released under US Freedom of Information Act request to Nautilus Institute. The twelve options here combine two figures presented in the DIA report. The options are described on pages 4-9. The quotations are all from p. 3.

US Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korean Armed Forces Handbook, July 1977, DDI-2689-37-77. Released under US Freedom of Information Act request to Nautilus Institute. The three quotes concerning North Korean nuclear doctrine are from pages 2-33, 38, 45.

On reading totalitarian propaganda, see F. Stech, Political and Military Intention Estimation: A Taxonomic Analysis, final report to Office of Naval Research by MATHTECH Inc, November 1979, pp. 236-237, released under US Freedom of Information Act request to Nautilus Institute.

NAPSNet Special Report, April 11, 2003, Military-First Ideology Is an Ever-Victorious, Invincible Banner for Our Era's Cause of Independence At http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/sr/index.html

H. French, "Uncertainty in North Korea, The Watchword is Restraint," New York Times, April 13, 2003, on-line at: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/13/weekinreview/13FREN.html?tntemail0

J. Brooke, North Korea Shifts Stance on Nuclear Talks, New York Times, April 13, 2003, on-line at: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/13/international/asia/13KORE.html

Mike Allen, "Bush: Iraq War Drove N. Korea to Concede," Washington Post, Monday, April 14, 2003, Page A11, on-line at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A19690-2003Apr13.html

H. French, "Confusion Over North Korea Statement on Nuclear Program," New York Times, April 18, 2003, on-line at: http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/18/international/asia/18CND-KOREA.html

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Mike Thompson, Detroit Free Press, MI (Apr 03)

On 24 April according to NAPS NET, the outlook for the negotiations were not promising. Alexandre Y. Mansourov argued Kim Jong Il's game plan in Beijing included a) treating the Chinese intermediaries as a pro-American party at the talks, which are best approached as a two against one boxing match; b) giving both, the PRC and the United States, an advance notice about pending initiation of reprocessing operations; c) tying down Washington at the negotiation table and buying time for military build-up at home; d) watching for the "canary in the mine" to die as an early warning signal about possible American attack; and e) framing the United States up in a way delegitimizing any U.S. unilateral military action against the North in the eyes of the international community.

He further argued that the trilateral talks offer the United States a venue to present a real ultimatum to North Korea in the presence of Chinese witnesses - disarm and open up or else, with China's tacit support behind the scenes for further enforcement action in case of the North Korean non-compliance. Dr. Mansourov concluded that the Beijing trilateral talks were likely to end up with a spectacular diplomatic disaster and might lead to further escalation of nuclear tensions on the Korean peninsula. (NOTE: Alexandre Mansourov's article drew the attention of the OhMy News site which keyed in on the idea that the North Koreans had crossed over the "Nuclear Rubicon" and were looking at the "canary in the mine" to see if the U.S. would attack.)


John Trever Albuquerque Journal (Apr 03)

On 25 Apr North Korea wanted the 1994 accord reinstated, which the U.S. flatly refused. This impasse effectively ended the meeting early. What still remains murky yet is what North Korean chief delegate Li Gun privately told his U.S. counterpart, James A. Kelly, outside the conference hall during dinner on the first day of their talks. Li reportedly said that his country could either hold "physical demonstrations" or "transfer" its nuclear weapons, "depending on actions of the United States." The American news media interpreted this to mean that the North Koreans indicated that Pyongyang could test, export or use their atomic bombs, depending on the response from Washington.

That the North had nuclear weapons was not a surprise. That the North ADMITTED IT was. Even more surprising was the veiled threat of the next North Korean action with the weapons -- export them or test them??? (NOTE: On 29 April, Secretary Powell clarified that the North never said the word "test" -- implying that the media invented this rumor.)

North Korea has never tested a nuclear device, and it is unclear whether it could make one small enough to deliver on one of its ballistic missiles. People are recommending caution over the remarks and it appears that the talks never got to discussing nuclear disarmament. Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the U.S. will not bow to nuclear blackmail. U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said, "We've made clear we're not going to pay for elimination of the nuclear weapons that never should have begun in the first place. That remains our policy, a very clear policy that we've taken."

One analyst said North Korea may have miscalculated because its belligerence will encourage China and Russia to fall in line with the United States in pushing hard for an end to the North's nuclear ambitions. China faced a dilemma as it cannot accept a nuclear North Korea, which poses a risk to its own security, but neither can it press so hard that the North Korean government collapses. That could flood China with refugees and bring U.S. troops now based in South Korea to its border. The first meeting was a disaster, both sides agreed to meet again to find a "peaceful" solution. (The official say-nothing State Department report by Richard Boucher can be viewed at Report.)

On 27 Apr the MDP called for the Roh government to CONFIRM North Korea's alleged comment on its possession of nuclear weapons. They stood in shocked disbelief that their brothers in the north could have somehow deceived them. One Roh administration official who stated in relief that they could now "not deny its existence." However, a lot of politicos in the ruling Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) have egg on their faces as they took a public stance that called the U.S. negotiators liars and stated that the North did not have nuclear weapons because they said so. The crux was that the U.S. had no "proof."

This latest admittal by the North violates the 1992 pact between North and South Korea on a nuclear-free peninsula. Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan said, "If North Korea indeed has nuclear weapons, it is a serious violation of the North-South Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and other international agreements. This is why the South must ask the question about the weapons face-to-face. The response of the North to the question will determine the future ties between the two nations including the opening of a road crossing the DMZ; the North Korean request for fertilizer; future food aid; etc.

On 27 April Kim Jong-il visited a military unit along the border with South Korea and ordered the military to enhance its combat strength.

On 28 April, the 10th round of inter-Korean ministerial talks was scheduled to start to discuss the stalled inter-Korean reconciliation process in Pyongyang. The South vowed that it would also address the North's nuclear weapons program. (See S.Koreans to Urge North to Shift Nuclear Stance (April 26).) However, in the past, the North has bluntly told the South that the nuclear row is strictly a U.S.-DPRK issue and it was none of their business. This slap in the face caused the Roh administration a great loss of face as Roh promised to take the lead in the negotiations. After this affront, the Roh administration tried to mend the fences it had smashed and tried to smooth things over with the U.S. and Japan.

On 28 Apr again the North told the South the nuclear issue was strictly between the DPRK and U.S. It would not be discussed. South Korea reiterated its call for North Korea to "respect the spirit of a bilateral pact on a nuclear-free peninsula." Delegates of the two Koreas wrangled over the wording of a joint press statement related to the North's nuclear weapons issue. Other facets of the meeting dealing with inter-Korean relations continued.

North Korea had just opened its embassy in London. However, because of the latest revelation, Britain is considering joining other nations in diplomatically isolating the DPRK. British officials will hold talks with North Korea when a delegation led by the Vice-Foreign Minister, Choe Su-hon, visits London. A spokesman said: "It's important to remain engaged with North Korea and we want to use every opportunity to urge them to comply with their international obligations." British Foreign Office Minister Bill Rammell said the North's proposal offers a possible starting point. He was expected to press North Korea for clear information about its nuclear capability during high-level talks with the North in London on 30 April.

The Sunday Telegraph reported that the U.S. was planning a permanent selective blockade of North Korean shipping, to prevent the country's threatened export of nuclear materials to other rogue states and terrorist organisations. The move, nicknamed "Cuba Lite" for its echoes of the tactics used during the 1963 Cuban missile crisis, is America's first reaction to last week's warning by a North Korean envoy that Pyongyang intends to "transfer" nuclear devices or other material overseas. Attempts to export nuclear devices would now result in routine "interdiction" and seizing of ships suspected by US intelligence of carrying such material. Under the new plans, nuclear "spot-checks" would be more aggressively pursued closer to North Korea. It is aimed at increasing pressure on the North Korean regime, and would use American ships stationed in the Pacific region, without mounting a total blockade, which Pyongyang would regard as an act of war.

Another option being considered is a precision strike on North Korean nuclear facilities. However, such a move would not be worth the risk of an unpredictable North Korean response. A full-scale military conflict on the Korean peninsula could result in an estimated million casualties on the first day.

North Korea has demanded a written non-aggression pact with America as a condition for giving up its nuclear program, said the US had "simply repeated hackneyed claims without setting forth any new proposals". The Communist state's aggressive negotiating tactics have put the Bush administration in a quandary. The State Department has backed continued negotiations but has been dismayed by Kim Jong Il's intransigence. Officials at the Pentagon, including the Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, doubt the value of talks but fear the potential military cost of a war. "This isn't Iraq and there is no serious hawk-dove divide here," said an American government official. "The doves know they are being messed around by North Korea. The hawks are not prepared to go to war any time soon. For the moment the administration is pretty unified on this." There is growing tension within the Bush administration between the State Department and Defense Department over how to handle the North Korean situation. The infighting was reported in the Newsweek Magazine article on 28 April.

Nuclear Chicken

The hawks have their own plans for Pyongyang

By Richard Wolffe NEWSWEEK

May 5 issue — "What are they smoking?" asked one exasperated State Department official after last week's abrupt and abrasive talks with North Korea. "Which alternative universe do they inhabit?" He wasn't talking about the eccentric North Koreans and their nuclear brinkmanship. Instead the senior diplomat was frustrated by an equally tenacious foe: the conservative in-house critics of Secretary of State Colin Powell.

IT'S A MARK of just how deep the wounds go inside George W. Bush's supposedly self-disciplined administration. While Kim Jong Il pushes Asia to the brink of a nuclear arms race, Washington's best and brightest push each other over the edge of patience and civility. Of course, friendly fire between the State and Defense departments has ricocheted around the Bush administration for the past two years. But after the failure of the latest attempt to negotiate with the Stalinist regime in Pyongyang, the administration faces its worst infighting to date—worse even than the prewar skirmishes on Iraq.

The latest squabbling began with Powell's secretive planning for the North Korean talks held in Beijing last week. For more than a month, after his brief trip to China in February, Powell worked to stage a three-way session with the mercurial North Koreans and their longtime Chinese backers. Powell toiled outside the usual National Security Council meetings to deal directly with the White House. Key conservatives, who oppose negotiating with the North, were clueless until it was too late and Bush had already agreed. Many hawks, including Pentagon officials close to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, only heard about the talks from midlevel Japanese officials, NEWSWEEK has learned.

Rumsfeld struck back with two memos outlining the Pentagon's policy prescriptions. At their heart, the Rummygrams argue for an unlikely alliance with China to force the collapse of the North Korean regime. It was that suggestion that prompted the outburst by the senior State Department official about the smoking habits of his counterparts at the Pentagon. Why would China want to topple its own ally in Pyongyang and trigger a massive refugee crisis on its border? "This is total fantasy," he said.

Fantasy or not, the hawks are winning. In their view, the only benefit of talking to Kim is to prove to the world how belligerent he can be. That strategy seemed to succeed last week in Beijing, where the North threatened to test or export its nukes. Ultimately, the hawks want to bleed Kim's regime by closing down his illicit trade in drugs and arms. A blockade could trigger a military response from the North, and even the hawks admit they're not ready for war any time soon (certainly not in a presidential election year). Still, their hard-line policy seems to be heading in that direction. "Things spiral down from here," admits one. The remaining question is whether the doves—and the Chinese—are ready to take the dive, too.

© 2003 Newsweek, Inc.

On 29 Apr South Korean officials claim that North Korea had softened its demand for a non-aggression pact from the US and offered to scrap its nuclear program in return for normalised diplomatic and economic relations with Washington. They said that the talks were not the failure that had been widely portrayed. North Korean delegates had NOT confirmed a US claim that during talks in Beijing last week they told an American envoy that they might test, sell or use atomic weapons, depending on Washington's actions. South Korean officials endorsed North Korea's claim it had made a "bold new proposal" saying Pyongyang had indicated that a formal non-aggression pact was unnecessary if the US promised not to attack the country. The North also hinted it was prepared to scrap its nuclear program, rather than freeze it, if an agreement was reached.

Secretary Powell acknowledged that North Korea had floated a plan that would "ultimately" scrap the nuclear program. "But they of course expect something considerable in return." Washington said during the meeting that North Korea must scrap its nuclear program before an agreement could be negotiated. Pyongyang said the two things must happen simultaneously.

Neither Powell nor the diplomats in China spelled out what Pyongyang sought in return for its offer but a senior US official said it included economic exchanges, oil, energy and normal relations with the United States. "It basically listed everything they have ever asked for," said the US official. North Koreans renewed previous demands, including a U.S. pledge not to attack North Korea and a resumption of U.S. fuel oil deliveries. North Korea had asked for a step-by-step package under which it would receive oil shipments, food aid, security guarantees, energy assistance, economic benefits and construction of a light-water nuclear reactor. In return, they said, North Korea had offered to take very small steps -- starting with a promise to end its nuclear program.

Foreign Affairs-Trade Minister Yoon Young-kwan said on 30 Apr that North Korea had put forward a four-step proposal. Sources said North Korea pledged it would accept international inspections of its nuclear facilities once the U.S. restarts its provision of heavy oil and guarantees the regime's survival. It also promised it would begin dismantling its nuclear weapons with the possible normalization of diplomatic relations with the U.S.

Divisions within the Bush administration between those who believe a deal is possible and those who do not want to extend the life of a repressive regime are also likely to prevent a deal. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Undersecretary of State John Bolton and other administration hard-liners have argued successfully so far against making any concessions, which has required Powell and the State Department's East Asia bureau to demand upfront North Korean concessions but offer nothing explicit in return.

Powell clarified that the North NEVER said it was possibly going to test its nuclear weapons. "It was useful to get it all out on the table and see where we go from here," Powell said. "They've never used the word 'testing.' You suggest that they threatened to test, but they never used the word 'test.'

According to China, North Korea had offered to scrap its nuclear program if Washington dropped its hostile attitude. North Korea also offered to let nuclear inspectors into the country. At the same time, China stated that the North never specifically said they had nuclear weapons during the discussions.

The South-North ministerial-level talks in Pyongyang struggled to make progress going into their final session. The North continued to refuse to discuss its nuclear activities with the South, insisting that only the US could resolve the crisis, but was happy to talk about boosting North-South "economic cooperation" and staging festivals together. Pyongyang demanded greater cross-border "economic cooperation" - a euphemism for "aid." But Seoul is under pressure not to offer more support unless the communist state bends on the nuclear issue. President Roh's president intent to strengthen ties with the North under his "peace and prosperity policy" -- a rehash of the Kim Dae-jung "Sunshine Policy" -- is politically impossible while Pyongyang develops nuclear weapons. In the early morning hours of 30 Apr, it was announced that the two sides had come to an agreement on the wording of the joint press release. The joint statement said. "South and North Korea will thoroughly consult each other's position on the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and will continue cooperation to resolve their issue peacefully through dialogue."

In essence, it means that North Korea said the South had no business in the nuclear issue and the South to save face said "ok." Critics said that the statement confirmed that North Korea was sticking with its strategy to exclude South Korea from participating in talks to resolve the matter. However, it also shows the South will continue its aid packges with the continuation of family visits and cross-border cultural events. As expected, North Korea asked South Korea again to provide rice and fertilizer. Kim Ryong-song, head of the North's delegation to the talks, made the request to Jeong Se-hyun, chief of the South's delegation at their meeting on 29 Apr. The South agreed to send the fertilizer out of humanitarian concerns, but withheld its decision on the rice request because of the situation caused by the North's nuclear issues.

On 29 Apr President Roh to President Bush on the phone and reaffirmed they would seek a diplomatic solution on the nuclear standoff with North Korea. In the 10-minute talk, the two leaders shared the opinion that the recent trilateral talks among the United States, North Korea and China was "useful" in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, while reaffirming the importance of maintaining close coordination between the two countries on North Korean policies. However, Bush did not commit the U.S. to a second round of talks -- especially after making the remark that the North was up to its old game of "blackmail.".

On 29 April signatory states to the NPT opened a two-week meeting in Geneva on Monday to review implementation of the 1970 pact, highlighted by a sharp U.S. attack on the nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran.

Dana Summers Orlando Sentinel (May 03)

On 30 Apr the U.S. suggested elevating the matter to the UN Security Council. In a report from the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), North Korea also warned Washington not to internationalize the "nuclear issue" or seek United Nations sanctions against the communist nation, which would give "the green light to a war." The U.S. dismissed this as "absolutely nothing new" as the North continually issues inflammatory statements. Later in May, the U.S. announced that it was NOT going to elevate the matter to the U.N.

South Korea announced that it will not insist on participating in the multilateral talks to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue according to National Security Advisor Ra Jong-yil on 30 April. "Regardless of whether it is three-way, two-way or other multilateral formats, what is important is to achieve substantive progress. We don't care about whether we participate or not or about whether we have a leading role." Ra said it is legitimate for Seoul to have a seat at the talks, but it would be better not to do so if insistence on participation impedes their progress. Bottomline is that North Korea told the South not to meddle in the talks -- and it is responding in the only face-saving manner possible.

The U.S. on 30 April kept North Korea on its "state supporters of terrorism" list amid the ongoing standoff over Pyongyang's suspected nuclear weapons program. In the annual "Patterns of Global Terrorism," the State Department included the North and six other countries -- Iran, Cuba, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria.

Sinuju Special Economic Zone Revived: North Korea's capitalist experiment at Sinuiju has apparently received a new lease of life with Mr Jang Song Thaek, brother-in-law of the country's leader Kim Jong Il, now in charge. The project was launched with much fanfare last September but it ran aground two months later when the Chinese government arrested Mr Yang Bin, a Chinese-Dutch businessman who was North Korea's first choice to administer the special economic zone near the Chinese border. After Mr Yang's arrest, Mr Jang was put in charge of Sinuiju, the Joong Ang Ilbo on 11 April cited a source in Beijing as saying. 'After Mr Jang toured Seoul and South-east Asian countries last November, he took over the responsibility for the Sinuiju district.' The zone will have independent economic, political and judicial systems. Mr Jang, who is in charge of North Korea's public security organizations, has reportedly met potential investors from Canada, Hongkong, Australia and Taiwan.

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MAY 2003

Roh Attempts to Deflect Lack of Involvement in Talks According to a Korea Times article, President Roh supposedly is feeling increasingly frustrated at the "lack of enthusiasm" by the U.S. on continuing the dialogue with North Korea over the latter's nuclear programs. Supposedly "in what appeared to be an act of desperation due to a series of negative remarks by senior U.S. officials that are darkening the prospect of the peaceful resolution of the North Korean crisis, Roh called up Chinese President Hu Jintao and spoke about his wish for Washington to continue dialogue with Pyongyang." In addition, the U.S. seems to be taking its time to investigate the asking the CIA to reaffirm the presence of nuclear weapons in North Korea through surveillance methods. (There is a chance the North is bluffing.)

The level of frustration in the Roh administration is rising fast, as the U.S. has been sitting on the North Korean proposal. Part of this frustration comes from the North telling the South that the nuclear talks were none of their business causing many Koreans to question the aid to the North. Although the South was stonewalled on the question of the presence of nuclear weapons, the South will STILL send 200,000 tons of fertilizer worth 65 billion won ($53.58 million) in May -- though the rice aid is undecided at this time because of the nuclear issue.

According to Seoul officials, Seoul asked U.S. Assistant Secretary James Kelly to promptly hold the second round but Kelly "avoided a forthright answer." Then, Seoul made a request for a meeting of officials from Seoul, Washington and Tokyo in the format of the Trilateral Oversight and Coordination Group (TCOG) but the U.S. was reluctant to schedule one soon, saying that Kelly's calendar is booked up for May. Bush is scheduled to hold five meetings with foreign heads of state, most of them from in Asia, in May, preoccupying Kelly with preparatory work.

Australia Drug Bust Another nail has been added to North Korean isolation coffin. The Australians warned the North over drug smuggling after they boarded a state-owned ship on the high seas. BBC News ("NORTH KOREA ACCUSED OVER DRUGS HAUL," 05/02/03) reported that Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer expressed concern over the DPRK's possible role in trafficking drugs to Australia. Downer's comments came after an official from the DPRK's ruling Worker's Party was found on board a state-owned ship accused of bringing A$80m (US$50m) worth of heroin into Australia.

"Whilst we can't prove that the government made the decision to send this ship... we are concerned that instrumentalities of the government may have been involved in this," Downer said. "We are concerned because the ship is DPRK-owned and it's a totalitarian state, so in effect it is government-owned," he added. Downer said he had arranged a meeting with the DPRK ambassador to Australia, Chon Jae-hong, to discuss the issue. Australian intelligence services raided the Pong Su freighter last month, off the country's east coast. The Australian forces seized the heroin and arrested approximately 30 crew members, most of whom are now awaiting trial in Melbourne.

On 27 May, CNN reported that Australian police had found another 75 kilograms of heroin that were smuggled into the country by a DPRK ship seized in a raid last month. Australian special forces boarded the freighter, the Pong Su, after 50 kg of heroin were found in a vehicle in April, sparking a diplomatic row between the two countries. A police spokesman says the 75 kg of heroin were found buried in bushes on the south-east coast of Australia. It is the same area in which 50 kg of heroin were seized from a vehicle in April. Diplomatic row The spokesman says this latest batch appears to be identical in form and packaging. Together the drugs haul is one of the biggest ever recorded in Australian history. Police believe the drugs came from the Pong Su, which was raided by Australian special forces after the first batch of heroin was discovered. About 30 crew members were arrested and charged with drug smuggling. They included an official from the DPRK' ruling Workers' Party, which led to a diplomatic row after the Australian Government issued a protest to the DPRK. Australia is one of the few Western countries to maintain formal contacts with Pyongyang, but this incident has tested that relationship. It has also been cited by officials in the US, who say it is evidence the DPRK Government is involved in illegal activities, including drug smuggling.

The DPRK has been quietly involved in the drug trade since at least 1976, when a DPRK diplomat in Egypt was arrested with 880 pounds of hashish. Since then, there have been at least 50 arrests or drug seizures involving the DPRK in more than 20 countries, William Bach of the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs told a Senate Governmental Affairs subcommittee. In the past several years, most DPRK trafficking has involved methamphetamine and heroin destined for Japan, Taiwan, China and Russia, Andre D. Hollis, a Pentagon counter-narcotics official, testified at the hearings. The DPRK government has denied allegations that it was involved in the heroin delivery and says the charges are part of a US "smear campaign" to increase international pressure on the regime to shut down its nuclear program. An estimated $1 billion in hard currency is earned from these transactions.

The DPRK earns about 60 percent of its foreign currency by running narcotics, said a former high-ranking DPRK official who defected to ROK in 1998, according to a report in the Japanese daily Yomiuri Simbun in mid-May. The defector, who was not identified, said that the founder of DPRK, Kim Il Sung, first ordered that opium poppies be grown in 1991, and the current leader Kim Jong Il had every collective farm allot 10 hectares for poppy cultivation. The mountainous Hamgyong province is the hotbed of poppy growing, the defector said. According to the article, "Room 39 at the headquarters of the North's Workers Party" is in charge of producing, processing, transporting and exporting opium, and payments are received on the open seas at times and places arranged by phone. Payments are always cash. The defector reportedly said the customers include Koreans, Japanese, residents of Hong Kong, Chinese and Russians, but that Japanese buyers constitute the largest group. According to the article, Jang Song Taek, the first deputy director of the Workers Party Central Committee and the closest confidant of Kim Jong Il, oversees DPRK's narcotics operations.

Sakai, Kagoshima Prefecture, Japan (May 03)

Japanese React to North Korean Threats: On top of the surface-to-ship missile tests that have upset Japanese so much, on 1 April a North Korean jet left Japanese air space before interception by the two F-15 fighters that had been scrambled. It was a deliberate act of confrontation. News of the incident came as North Korea warned Japan that it was "within striking distance" of the communist state's weapons.

As a direct result of the North Korean provocations and threats, the Japanese are starting to react. The Japan Times reported that the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) aims to amend the Japanese Constitution to state in explicit terms the legitimacy of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), party lawmakers said. The party's Research Commission on the Constitution will formulate an outline for a draft amendment during the current Diet session, which is scheduled to end in June. The panel also envisages an outline enabling the SDF to take part in UN peacekeeping activities to do away with the ban on exercising its right to collective-self defense or fighting back against a foreign military attack on an ally of Japan, the sources said. The Japanese amended their constitution for war-powers contingencies because of the North Korean threat in May -- a preliminary step to amending the "peace" constitution altogether. This is as a direct result of the North Korean missile threat. The major worry was to ensure that no "human rights" were violated by the emergency powers.

In addition, the threat from North Korea's missiles has caused a hysterical response from the Japanese. The debate over Japan introducing missile defense systems is heating up. The government has, however, also decided to study the introduction of the missile defense system based on the Aegis destroyer, separate from the joint research with the US on a Missile Defense system. The Defense Agency is now studying the introduction of two types of system to knock down incoming ballistic missiles. One is a sea-based system and makes use of Aegis-equipped destroyers; the other is a ground-based PAC-3 system, an advanced version of the Patriot missile defense system. With the two proposals in mind, the agency is preparing its budget requests for fiscal 2004. But there are many hurdles -- both legal and budgetary.

ROK-US Summit (May 14) and Impacts: President Roh's White House summit skimmed over differences in how to thwart the DPRK's nuclear quest. The joint communique stressed the U.S. and South Korea were united on the fundamentals of the DPRK question, despite clear differences of approach. It was issued after discussing issues of ROK-US alliances, the US Army resided in ROK, the DPRK nuclear issue, and establishing the "Entire Partnership" between two countries. (See Relocation of USFK for details confused wording of USFK relocation from summit.) The statement consisted of four parts.

Roh-Bush at Summit (15 May 03)

On the DPRK nuclear issue, the two sides decided to reinforce negotiations and strive to resolve the issue peacefully, while stressing the principle of multi-lateral channels. Both sides agreed that the "Beijing Talk" channel should be continued. The statement stressed that ROK and Japan are indispensable roles in resolving the nuclear issue, and PRC and Russia should play a constructive role. The statement forbids DPRK from developing nuclear weapons. On issue of DPRK-ROK communications and co-operations, the statement said they will adjust measures according to the development of the DPRK nuclear issue. The summit did not address policy differences, nor did it touch on tough questions that might arise if diplomacy with the North fails.

The following is the full text of a statement issued Wednesday by South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and U.S. President George W. Bush after their summit meeting at the White House.

* * * * * * * * * *

On May 14, 2003, President George W. Bush of the United States of America and President Roh Moo-hyun of the Republic of Korea held a summit meeting at the White House in Washington, D.C. Noting that 2003 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, the two leaders pledged to work together to promote the values of democracy, human rights and market economy shared by the people of both nations and to build a comprehensive and dynamic alliance relationship for continued peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

The U.S.-ROK Alliance

President Bush and President Roh welcomed the fiftieth anniversary of the U.S.-ROK alliance and paid tribute to those who have contributed to the alliance, particularly the Korean host communities and the members of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) who have devoted themselves to the defense of peace and freedom on the peninsula. President Bush reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to a robust forward presence on the peninsula and in the Asia- Pacific region. The two leaders pledged to work closely together to modernize the U.S.-ROK alliance, taking advantage of technology to transform both nations' forces and enhance their capabilities to meet emerging threats.

In the context of modernizing the alliance, the two leaders agreed to work out plans to consolidate U.S. forces around key hubs and to relocate the Yongsan garrison at an early date. President Bush pledged to consult closely with President Roh on the appropriate posture for USFK during the transition to a more capable and sustainable U.S. military presence on the peninsula. They shared the view that the relocation of U.S. bases north of the Han River should be pursued, taking careful account of the political, economic and security situation on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia. The two leaders also noted the opportunity provided by the Republic of Korea's growing national strength to continue expanding the role of the ROK armed forces in defending the Korean Peninsula.

President Bush and President Roh welcomed the growing bilateral U.S.-ROK cooperation on international security challenges beyond the Korean Peninsula. President Bush thanked President Roh for his support on Iraq and welcomed the Republic of Korea's decision to deploy medical and construction units and undertake other efforts to assist with post-conflict humanitarian assistance and reconstruction in Iraq. President Roh expressed his support for U.S. and international efforts to establish lasting peace and security in the Middle East. The two leaders also reviewed progress and cooperation in the war on terror, noting the contribution of ROK forces to Operation Enduring Freedom and Afghan reconstruction.

To commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the alliance, the two Presidents welcomed the convening of forums of experts to conduct discussions on the future of U.S.-ROK relations and to generate fresh ideas for both governments.

North Korea

President Bush and President Roh reaffirmed that they will not tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea. They noted with serious concern North Korea's statements about reprocessing, possession of nuclear weapons, and its threat to demonstrate or transfer these weapons. They stressed that escalatory moves by North Korea will only lead to its greater isolation and a more desperate situation in the North.

Both leaders reiterated their strong commitment to work for the complete, verifiable and irreversible elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program through peaceful means based on international cooperation. They welcomed the role played by China at the April 23-25 trilateral talks in Beijing. They agreed that the Republic of Korea and Japan are essential for a successful and comprehensive settlement and that Russia and other nations can also play a constructive role in multilateral diplomacy. While noting that increased threats to peace and stability on the peninsula would require consideration of further steps, they expressed confidence that a peaceful resolution can be achieved.

Noting that the United States and the Republic of Korea are the two leading donors of humanitarian food assistance to North Korea, the two Presidents reaffirmed that humanitarian assistance is provided without linkage to political developments and noted the need to ensure that the assistance goes to those in need.

President Bush stressed that North Korea's nuclear programs stand in the way of the bold approach and the ability of the international community to consider comprehensive steps to assist the many needs of the North Korean people.

President Roh outlined his Peace and Prosperity Policy and President Bush reiterated his support for the process of South-North reconciliation. President Bush noted that the Republic of Korea has used this dialogue channel to call upon the North to resolve the nuclear issue. President Roh stated that future inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation will be conducted in light of developments on the North Korean nuclear issue. The two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining close coordination between the U.S. and ROK governments on this issue as well as in trilateral consultations with Japan.

Economic Relations

The two leaders agreed on the importance of working together to promote prosperity in their two countries, in the region, and around the world. They agreed that Korea's economic fundamentals are strong and expressed high confidence in the prospects for continued increases in trade, investment and growth in the Republic of Korea. President Bush welcomed and supported President Roh's commitment to continued structural reform of the Korean economy and his goal of making Korea a regional hub for trade, finance, and investment in Northeast Asia. The two leaders agreed that progress on open trade, investment, and transparency are essential to making this hub concept a reality, and recognized the important role of the private sector in this effort.

The two leaders expressed a desire for enhanced bilateral economic cooperation and reaffirmed their commitment to resolve bilateral trade issues through consultation, and agreed to explore ways to further strengthen the already close economic and trade partnership. Recognizing the importance of global trade liberalization, the two leaders expressed their determination to work together to achieve a successful conclusion of the Doha Development Agenda. The two leaders also agreed to strengthen cooperation in the APEC forum.

Toward a Full Partnership

Taking note of the one hundredth anniversary of Korean immigration to the United States, President Bush conveyed his deep respect not only for the contributions of Korean-Americans to American society but also for the ideals of democracy, peace and prosperity realized by the citizens of the Republic of Korea. President Roh extended his appreciation to the U.S. government and its people for all that has been done to help Korean-Americans realize their dreams in American society.

President Bush and President Roh highlighted the importance of increasing bilateral cooperation across a broad range of global issues. In this context, the two leaders welcomed U.S. and ROK cooperation in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project, in the Global Forum on Corruption to be held in Seoul later this month, and on other efforts to improve the environment and combat crime and infectious diseases around the globe.

The two leaders agreed that their frequent telephone calls since President Roh's election in December and their substantial discussion in Washington have built a personal foundation of mutual trust and respect that will enhance U.S.-ROK coordination on North Korea and other challenges in the months and years ahead.

President Roh thanked President Bush for his hospitality and invited him to make a return visit to Seoul at his convenience. President Bush said he looked forward to another visit to the Republic of Korea.

Can a Leopard Change its Spots? The summit seemed to be more fluff than substance. Roh went to the U.S. to do some serious fence-mending and hopefully to repair his image as an anti-American radical. The Korea Times stated, "The opposition parties applauded Roh's adoption of pro-American agenda with a great dose of surprise, but those who supported Roh for his progressive agenda were rightfully disappointed with Roh and resented their political idol. Internet users, mainly young and progressive people, posted angry remarks and attacked Roh on the Internet for going back on his word and kowtowing to the U.S. His fans' reactions were understandable because they had expected Roh to be a James Dean but found a Cary Grant in him, instead. Questioned on how he felt about public wrath raised for his political transformation during a press conference on his way back, Roh said he didn't care, wondering aloud what if he had spoken ill of U.S. and his summit with Bush proved to be less successful than it was." Only time will tell whether he succeeded, but to many they feel that Roh was only making empty promises as a politician.

Korea Herald stated that Roh's statements during his U.S. visit took a dramatic turn from his past comments emphasizing an independent stance on the key ally of South Korea, has perplexed his supporters and critics as well. Many of his supporters have expressed their anger with Roh's pro-American remarks, denouncing them as departing from his professed principles and threatening inter-Korean relations. Experts indicate Roh appears to have chosen a realistic solution to the North Korean issue to secure national interests, based on the acknowledgement of U.S. power. However, young supporters of Roh have condemned him for "kowtowing" to the U.S.

President Roh defended his turnaround in his stance toward the United States as "necessary to fit reality." On May 18, the 23rd anniversary of a pro-democracy civic uprising in 1980 in Kwangju, about 100 students at Chonnam National University shouted slogans denouncing the pro-American statements Roh made during his first U.S. visit. "You may have something to criticize about the United States but the reality required me to forge friendly ties between South Korea and the United States," Roh said during a lecture at a university in Gwangju. "The South Korea-U.S. relations should go on smoothly in the coming period," he said.

Defending his pro-U.S. statements during the lecture at the university, Roh said he had been concerned a rift between Seoul and Washington could heighten tension on the peninsula and complicate the relationship between him and the South Korean people. "It was the most urgent task to lay the groundwork for solving problems by settling concerns about the South Korea-U.S. alliance and economic uncertainties stemming from such concerns," he said. Roh said he now thinks he has changed, noting a president is required at every moment to make a choice. But Roh added he will never easily give up his long-held values of reconciliation and integration (with North Korea).

Hanchongnyeon Students Protest Roh's Pro-US stance in Kwangju (18 May 03)

Inter-Korean talks following Summit: After the 15 May summit there were still differences of opinion about economic aid given to the North, though the U.S. did not object to humanitarian aid. Roh said on PBS Newshour. "That is if the North Korea receives security guarantees and if it receives an opportunity to reform and open up its economy, then there is a high likelihood that it will be willing to renounce its nuclear program." However, US national security advisor Condoleezza Rice said before Bush and Roh met that the administration was opposed to such an approach. "Our policy toward North Korea can really be summed up as follows: no one should be willing to give into the kind of blackmail that the North Koreans have been practicing on the world for a number of years now, especially not the U.S."

Though Roh continued with the fifth economic talks with North Korea in May, there was a change as in the ROK strategy. In the past, the ROK took a conciliatory position of overlooking the nuclear problem to further inter-Korean dialogue. However, in the ministerial-level economic discussions in May, the ROK tied the request for food aid to the nuclear issue and accountability for the food. In a sign of hardening ROK public opinion, a poll of 1,000 people published on 20 May by the Korea Information Service said 88.5 percent backed linking economic aid to the DPRK nuclear impasse. It also appears that the Kim Jong-il's Seoul visit card appears to be dead as President Roh no longer sees any political value to the visit.

As was expected when the South tied economic packages to the nuclear crisis, the inter-Korean talks on economic cooperation came to a standstill after North Korea threatened to bring an "unspeakable disaster" to South Korea accusing it of siding with the United States in the dispute over the North's nuclear programs. The South demanded explanation of the threat of "unspeakable disaster" or an apology. The joint economic projects, including inter-Korean cross-border rail and road links, joint flood prevention systems and a plan to build an industrial park in Kaeseong were shelved. Also as expected, the South continued to provide aid to the North. A shipment of 400,000 tons of rice was made to fill a North Korean request to cope with its poor harvest, but "South Korean negotiators made it clear that the rice was not being sent for free, but on a long-term loan basis." The end result is that North Korea still got what it wanted knowing that "long-term loan" is negotiable.

The Associated Press on 27 May reported that the South was toughening its stance on the North and that it would delay shipments of badly needed rice aid for the DPRK if Pyongyang escalates tensions over its nuclear ambitions. Asked by ruling party lawmakers if the rice shipments would continue even if the nuclear standoff deteriorated, Vice Finance and Economy Minister Kim Gwang-lim the shipments would have to be delayed.

The ROK had previously said shipments of humanitarian aid should not be linked to political tension. The ROK expressed regret over the DPRK's threats of "unimaginable disaster" if it confronts the DPRK. The DPRK was upset over a recent US-ROK summit that called for consideration of "further steps" if the DPRK escalates nuclear tensions. Despite the threat of delays, the ROK's Red Cross said it will ship the DPRK 15,000 tons of fertilizer this week. The delivery is the first of 200,000 tons the ROK has promised to donate to the DPRK by the end of June.

North Ready to Talk Again...BUT...: During May both China and the U.S. hinted that further talks were proposed for June under the tri-national format. The U.S. continued to suggest a multi-national framework. As an incentive the U.S. backed away from its stance to elevate the matter to the UN Security Council, but rather to seek to resolve the matter diplomatically. However, the North suggested that multinational talks were possible AFTER bilateral talks were held between the U.S. and the North. The U.S. has flatly refused to this format in the past as the nuclear issue concerns all the nations in the area -- not only the U.S. The North on the other hand stated, "There are issues that concern purely North Korea and the United States," DPRK said in a statement carried by the Korea Central News Agency. "The two countries should sit down to hold honest discussions about the other's policy."

China at this point is reluctant to invite others to the table. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue said the first step must be another round of three-way talks in Beijing. ROK officials have pointed out that US has also backed off its earlier position that it would not talk about its relationship with DPRK until DPRK shed its nuclear ambitions and programs, but suggested that the backpedaling was only enough to get some form of talks going.

Summit between U.S. and Japan: Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and President Bush planned to meet at the Camp David, Md., presidential retreat sometime between May 20 and May 22 and discuss the DPRK and postwar Iraq's reconstruction. The one-day summit comes before the June 1-3 Group of Eight summit in France. Later the summit was moved to Bush's Texas ranch in Crawford, Tex.

Koizumi and Bush stood side by side at a meeting in Texas this week to take a tough stance against the DPRK -- a much harsher stance than the outcome of the ROK-US summit. The summit was a photo-op that Koizumi needed to deflect disappointment in his sagging record of reform at home. Koizumi came into office as a fiery populist promising to shake up Japan's clubby political system and revive the economy. While he has largely failed to deliver on those pledges, nervousness about world affairs and the DPRK's emerging nuclear threat have helped keep his popularity high.

The two leaders discussed measures to tighten an economic noose around the DPRK to try to curb the communist state's pursuit of nuclear weapons. Bush and Koizumi concluded their discussions in Texas and called for "tougher measures" against DPRK if it takes any steps to worsen the present situation. US and Japanese leaders said the international community would have to apply "tougher measures" if the situation worsens. Speaking after a two-day meeting at Mr. Bush's ranch, the two leaders did say they were confident that diplomacy now under way would lead to a peaceful resolution. They also called for the expansion of that diplomacy to include ROK and Japan in formal meetings with DPRK. Japan appears to be insisting on a seat at the table; ROK has said it would not insist on being included if the question of its attendance interfered with substantive discussions.

Such unity with the US -- and Koizumi's vague image as a hawk -- played well in Japan, despite his limited success in charting an independent foreign policy and his failure to reverse the country's more than decade-long economic malaise. Koizumi's continuing popularity -- the latest polls give him an approval rating around 50 percent -- baffles critics looking at his record.

Smuggled Missile Technology from Japan: According to the Japan Times on 21 May, a North Korean defector identified as a former DPRK missile scientist told a US Senate hearing that more than 90 percent of the components used in the DPRK's missile program were smuggled in from Japan. The man, who has assumed the name Lee Bok Koo, said the components were smuggled out by the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryun) aboard a passenger-cargo ship that plies between Japan and the DPRK. He also said was deeply involved in test-firing Pyongyang's missiles in Iran. "I worked for nine years as an expert in the guidance system for the North Korean missile industry, and I can tell you definitely that over 90 percent of these parts come from Japan," Lee told the Financial Management, the Budget and International Security Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. "The way they bring this in is through . . . the North Korean association inside Japan, and they bring it by ship every three months." Lee identified the ship as the Man Gyong Bong-92, which sails between the North Korean port of Wonsan and Niigata port.

In Tokyo, Chongryun denied the man's allegation as groundless. Lee was one of two men identified as high-ranking DPRK defectors who spoke at the Senate session. Led into the hearing wearing black hoods, they spoke from behind a screen to conceal their identities. In Tokyo, Chongryun released a statement saying the association has never been involved in shipping missile parts. "(The testimony) is a total fabrication," the statement says. "Chongryun has never been involved in anything like that, nor is it directly engaged in any export-related matters. It is commonly known that the Man Gyong Bon legitimately transports export goods and humanitarian aid supplies based on Japan's laws." The association also accused the US of trying to use the testimony to step up its anti-North Korean campaign.

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JUNE 2003

U.S. Congressmen Visit: N.K.: Reprocessing Almost Done North Korea informed a U.S. congressional delegation that it had almost completed reprocessing spent fuel rods and already has nuclear weapons. The bipartisan congressional delegation included Eliot L. Engel, Joe Wilson, Silvestre Reyes, Jeff Miller and Solomon P. Ortiz and were NOT official envoys of the U.S. government. The five U.S. lawmakers made a three-day visit to North Korea. "They admitted to currently having nuclear capability and weapons. They admitted to having just about completed the reprocessing of 8,000 rods. They admitted to an effort to expand their nuclear reproduction program," said Rep. Curt Weldon, vice chairman of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee. While in Pyongyang, the American contingent held talks with North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun, Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan and Choe Thae-bok, chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly, the North's rubber-stamp legislature. DPRK parliamentary speaker Kim Yong-Nam opened the meetings on a bluntly confrontational note by asking Weldon, "Do I really look like I'm a part of an axis of evil'?" This set the tone of the meetings.

According to Weldon, Pyongyang said it was developing nuclear weapons as "a response to what they saw happen in Iraq, with the United States removing Saddam Hussein from power." The lawmaker said Pyongyang officials responded positively to his ideas about ways to settle the nuclear tension, which include setting up a natural gas supply to the North from Russia, medical assistance, and economic investment in the impoverished country.

Weldon pointed out, describing the trip as "very productive and very positive," despite Pyongyang's expressed determination to build up its arsenal of nuclear arms. The group was told the DPRK government had decided to make more nuclear weapons by reprocessing 8,000 spent fuel rods from the Yongbyang plutonium production plant, according to Weldon. The rods could produce enough plutonium to make more nuclear weapons in a few months. The DPRK has also designated its Vice Foreign Minister, Kim Kye Gwan, as chief negotiator for nuclear issues, said Weldon. "We learned that the present DPRK nuclear weapons stockpile is subject to negotiation -- along with their nuclear facilities and materials," Weldon pointed out.

Democrat Congressman Eliot Engel said he believed North Korea was willing to end its nuclear program for assurances from the US Government it was not seeking a regime change. Mr Engel said North Korean leaders believed they could be next on the US list of Axis Of Evil nations following the toppling of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein earlier this year.

TCOG: ROK-Japan-US Meet on North Korea The Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) consisting of South Korea, the U.S. and Japan were scheduled to hold a meeting of senior officials June 12-13 in Honolulu, Hawaii, to discuss joint measures regarding North Korea's nuclear weapons development. North Korea and the U.S. have failed to hold follow-up talks to the first round of trilateral nuclear talks held in Beijing in April. Washington has insisted the next talks should consist of at least five countries, including China, South Korea and Japan, as well as the United States and North Korea. North Korea said it would agree on multilateral talks only after holding prior bilateral talks with the United States. The TCOG will review possible "face-saving measures" in which a second round of nuclear talks under the trilateral format could be held, and then include more countries for a third round.

The key issue is to enter the negotiations with a firm commitment by all three nations refuse immediate aid to the DPRK and make future aid conditional on verifiable nuclear disarmament. This is a stumbling block as Korea continues its "Peace and Prosperity Policy" dealing with engagement of the North. President Roh said on 1 June that he would consult closely with the United States and Japan to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, according to a Japanese daily. "South Korea is the most moderate country to judge the situation and to choose an option, while the United States seems to be more hawkish," Roh said in an interview with Yomiuri Shimbun ahead of his state visit to Japan Friday. "We can reach an appropriate compromise as we recognize (the differences) and coordinate them."

On 2 June, Malaysia offered to host a meeting of five nations -- the PRC, Japan, the DPRK, the ROK, and the US -- to discuss Pyongyang's nuclear program, according to the Japanese Sankei Shimbun newspaper. The PRC has showed intention of attending the proposed five-way meeting and is now urging the DPRK to participate. However, according to the Chinese Ambassador to Seoul, the three-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue that began in April should continue in the same format before opening up to include other relevant parties at a later date. Kuala Lumpur has emerged as a potential venue of the proposed talks because Beijing, which often hosts talks over the DPRK is under fire for the SARS outbreak. The Malaysian capital is seen as a favorable location for such meetings on the DPRK because it has an embassy there. During the planned talks, the US and its two allies -- Japan and the ROK -- are expected to refuse any economic assistance to the DPRK until Pyongyang gives up its nuclear program.

G-8 leaders joined forces on 2 June to urge North Korea and Iran to abandon their ambitions to develop nuclear weapons and abide by international nuclear safeguards. U.S. President George W. Bush and other leaders at the G8 summit adopted a declaration at the end of the second day of talks in this French resort city to "strongly urge North Korea to visibly, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle any nuclear weapons programs, a fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution." "North Korea's uranium enrichment and plutonium production programs and its failure to comply with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement undermine the nonproliferation regime and are a clear breach of North Korea's international obligations," the declaration noted.

Major Nuclear Arms Race in Far East Possible: US and its allies have months, not years, to prevent the DPRK from becoming a serious nuclear power and sparking an atomic arms race in East Asia, former Defense Secretary William Perry said on 3 June. He said, "The worst-case scenario I see is a major nuclear arms race unfolding in the Pacific. That's not a forecast, that's a logical train of events." Perry stated. "We have maybe half a year; the first month or two are more important than the last month or two in that half-year period," he said. "We loose leverage each month that we delay." Perry said Washington and its allies should designate the completion of reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel by the DPRK as a "red line" that could warrant the use of force. "Once the reprocessing is completed, our options of how to deal with the problem are considerably narrowed and considerably more unattractive," Perry said.

Japan to Expand Missile Defense by 2006: As a direct result of the rising tension over the North Korean crisis, Japan aims to deploy a new US-made missile defense system as early as 2006 according to Japanese media. Japanese officials have repeatedly said Japan lacks the capability to defend itself from the DPRK, which launched a ballistic missile over Japan in August 1998 and is suspected of developing nuclear weapons. Japan in the past had delayed signing on to the Missile Defense System (MDS) proposed by President Bush, but the North Korean missile situation prompted them to action.

The defense system would be linked to a revision of Tokyo's National Defense Program Outline, likely to be carried out by the end of the year. The program was last updated in 1995. Japan intends to deploy the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile system, an upgraded version of the PAC-2 system that Japan's air force currently possesses. It also would upgrade its four Aegis destroyers, currently equipped with hi-tech missile detection systems, with a US-made missile defense system. The new deployment would not come cheaply. According to Defense Agency estimates, the minimum cost for the two new systems is likely to run around 500 billion yen ($4.23 billion).

Government endorsement is required for the new deployment to proceed, but such approval is likely to be difficult to obtain due to Japan's nervousness of anything that threatens to exceed the limitations of its pacifist constitution. Japan's postwar constitution bans war as a means of settling international disputes, and that has been interpreted to mean the nation's military must be restricted to self-defense. However, in May the government amended the laws outlining wartime powers in case of contingencies in case of attack -- viewed by some as a prelude to modifying the "Peace Constitution."

South Investigates North Korea Drug Link On 4 Jun the ROK is investigating whether a huge seizure of the drug methamphetamine, or speed, may have originated from the North after it was found aboard a Chinese container ship. According to Reuters ("SOUTH KOREA INVESTIGATES NORTH DRUG LINK," Seoul, 06/04/03), "The seizure comes as the US and its allies have been contemplating tightening checks on cargo from the North -- proposed measures to squeeze the communist state's revenues and press it to abandon its attempts to build nuclear weapons. North Korea has since the 1970s been accused of trafficking illegal narcotics to prop up its decrepit economy. Two exiled former DPRK officials told a US Senate subcommittee last month of a 15-year-old state-run opium production program. Media and official accounts of Tuesday's drug seizure in the ROK port city of Pusan varied on the details in a case that could further undercut Seoul's attempts to reconcile with Pyongyang by extending economic aid to its poor neighbor. Yonhap news agency quoted sources familiar with the raid as saying police and customs officials seized 176.4 pounds of the banned stimulant philipon from a ship that originated in China and called at North Korea en route to Pusan. But a prosecution official gave a different account. "The ship is Chinese, but we have not confirmed whether it departed from China and stopped by North Korea," said Kim Myoung-jin, who estimated the drug haul at 88-110 pounds. "We cannot confirm that the drugs are from North Korea at this moment," he said by telephone. "We are investigating sources and relevant people now." South Korea's MBC television news showed film clips of police and customs officials inspecting sacks of the drug, which was mixed in a container of sugar on a cargo ship that the report said had called at the DPRK port city of Rajin recently. Yonhap said initial intelligence tip-off that triggered the raid put the methamphetamine haul at 242.5 pounds and valued at $250 million. Last month Pyongyang angrily denied that its government was involved in a shipment of 110 pounds seized in April in Australia after being dropped ashore from a DPRK-owned ship. Thirty crew members from the DPRK-owned and Tuvalu-registered vessel Pong Su were accused of aiding and abetting the import of heroin and taken into custody in Australia. Some were thought to be communist party officials. Pyongyang's ruling party newspaper said on Wednesday that it was "ridiculous and preposterous" for Washington to talk of an economic blockade over the nuclear crisis that began last October with North Korea's admission of a covert nuclear arms program. "Any sanctions against the DPRK means a war," said the daily Rodong Sinmun, using the acronym for North Korea's official title, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea."

U.S. Takes its Case to the UNSC: In June, the U.S. called on the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) to adopt a statement urging North Korea to scrap its nuclear arms program. "We have been exploring the possibility of a presidential statement, as a means to convey authoritatively and unequivocally, the international community's concern to Pyongyang," said State Department spokesman Philip Reeker. The U.S. believes a strong public statement from the U.N. Security Council would strengthen diplomatic efforts to reach a peaceful solution on the North Korean nuclear issue. According to a draft document obtained by The Associated Press, Washington will ask the council to condemn Pyongyang's nuclear program and insist it be immediately and permanently dismantled.

However, South Korea on the five permanent members of the UNSC, including the United States, to be "cautious in the timing" of a UNSC presidential statement on North Korea's nuclear arms program. The Seoul government has reaffirmed its stance that while it recognizes the need for the U.N. Security Council to discuss the standoff over the North's nuclear ambitions, its timing should be carefully considered. In other words, the Roh administration still doesn't want anyone to upset its "dialogue" with the North and wants to stall the UNSC declaration.

North Korea in response warned that it will take a "strong emergency measure" if the United States takes the dispute over the communist state's nuclear weapons program to the U.N. Security Council. The North threatened to accelerate its nuclear weapons program, saying increasing US pressure leaves it with no other option.

North Korea has warned that a blockade by the United States and its allies against the communist state could lead to war and Japan would not be safe from "the flames of war". The warning came as the US and its regional allies, most notably Japan and Australia, have begun cracking down on North Korean trade in illicit drugs, weapons and counterfeit money - believed to be key sources of hard currency for Pyongyang to buttress its regime and its suspected nuclear weapons programs. Pyongyang's main state-run newspaper Rodong Sinmun yesterday charged that the US was "laying an international siege to the North and putting a blockade against it as a premeditated scheme to start a new war on the Korean Peninsula".

North Korea will take "physical retaliation", including "all means and methods an independent country can take", once it concludes that the recent moves by the allies violate its sovereignty, Rodong said in a commentary monitored by South Korean news agency Yonhap. "There is no guarantee that this blockade will not lead to such a serious condition as a full-scale war," said Rodong.

The U.S. response was a reply that the U.S. would use "all means" at their disposal if the North attacked Japan or South Korea. The implication was that if the North so much as launched one rocket against Seoul or Tokyo, the North would cease to exist as a nation.

---

JULY 2003

U.S. Case for Sanctions Stalls at UNSC North Korea started July with the usual warning that it would immediately retaliate if the United States imposes sanctions or a naval and aerial blockade against it over its program to develop nuclear weapons. The warning was issued at Panmunjom. The North accused the U.S. of reinforcing the military hardware for its troops stationed in the South, claiming that the U.S. war preparations on the Korean peninsula have reached their final stage under the new strategy of unleashing a preemptive strike against the North.

The U.S. was dealt a political setback when China and Russia blocked a US-proposed statement condemning the DPRK nuclear weapons program in a meeting of the UN Security Council's 5 permanent members on 2 July. Though some countries supported sanctions, others - including the key players of China, Russia, South Korea and Japan - were afraid of North Korea's response. China and Russia feel that all diplomatic avenues have not been taken as yet.

Though South Korea is against the sanctions -- it uses the terminology that "the timing is not correct." Surprisingly, Japan uses the same terminology urging caution, but is NOT opposed to the sanctions. According to Kyodo News on 12 July, Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi called on her British counterpart, Jack Straw, to be cautious on the timing of adopting a UNSC statement denouncing North Korea's nuclear weapons development program. However, she went on to state that Japan is not opposed to the UNSC's adoption of the statement to express the international community's concerns over the North's nuclear weapons development program.

North Conducted High-explosive Tests for Nuclear Testing After months of denying U.S. intelligence reports claiming that there was no evidence that the North was planning high-explosive tests, the NIS director Ko Young-koo announced on 9 Jul that that the DPRK had carried out some 70 high-explosive tests linked to nuclear weapons development. Ko told the National Assembly's intelligence committee there had been some 70 high-explosive tests at Yongdok, 40 kilometers (25 miles) northwest of Yongbyon, the DPRK's nuclear complex north of the capital city Pyongyang, from 1997 to September 2002.

Seoul has been aware of Pyongyang's moves since April 1998. Experts said conventional high-explosives are used to trigger atomic blasts by compressing the plutonium core. "We have also noticed high-explosive tests being conducted in Yongdok district in Gusong City in (the northwestern province of) North Pyongyang and we have been keeping track of the movement." said Ko. He said that the ROK's NIS also suspected that the DPRK had reprocessed part of its stockpile of spent nuclear fuel rods that will yield plutonium for nuclear bombs -- also after past denials of similar U.S. reports stating there was no proof that the rods were reprocessed.

North Korea Starts Reprocessing Fuel Rods A U.S. government source confirmed on 12 July that North Korea has begun reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods at its Yongbyon facilities because the United States has detected krypton 85, a reprocessing byproduct, in air samples. However, Japan reacted with skepticism stating that North Korea has yet to cross a critical line in its nuclear weapons program. ''North Korea is playing a really dangerous game,'' Abe said in a speech in Sendai, Miyagi Prefecture. ''But we think that the country has yet to cross the line it is not supposed to cross. Korea was silent at first, but on 14 Jul, it stated that there was no proof that North Korea had completed a key step toward the production of nuclear weapons --regardless that the North reportedly claimed that it had. According to Kyodo News on 12 July:

U.S. source confirms N. Korea nuke fuel reprocessing

WASHINGTON, July 11, Kyodo - A U.S. government source confirmed Friday that North Korea has begun reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods at its Yongbyon facilities because it has detected krypton 85, a reprocessing byproduct, in air samples.

It is almost certain that the new finding will heighten the already tense relations between the United States and North Korea over Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program because the reprocessing would enable the North to make more nuclear arms.

The latest move will also make it difficult to resolve the nuclear standoff through U.S.-proposed five-way talks also involving Japan, China and South Korea.

The U.S. government source did not elaborate on the new intelligence.

Earlier in the day, NBC television network quoted U.S. government officials as saying air samples collected from the vicinity of the Yongbyon nuclear complex and tested this week contain traces of krypton 85.

This is the first physical evidence indicating that North Korea has begun the reprocessing.

Krypton 85 is released into the atmosphere when spent fuel rods are reprocessed into weapons-grade plutonium.

The new intelligence was reported to the White House in a report delivered Thursday, NBC said.

The nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula emerged last October, when North Korea told U.S. officials in Pyongyang that it has a secret program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.

North Korean then announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and resumed operations at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, which was shut down under a 1994 U.S.-North Korean agreement.

At China-brokered talks with the U.S. in Beijing in April, North Korea claimed to possess nuclear weapons and have reprocessed spent fuel rods.

NBC said the air samples, normally collected by surveillance planes, were gathered in a new top-secret procedure that the U.S. officials refused to reveal.

The U.S. officials believe North Korea already has two to three nuclear weapons and about 8,000 spent fuel rods stored at the Yongbyon complex that could provide enough plutonium for an estimated six to 12 nuclear weapons, it said.

The report came after South Korea's National Intelligence Service said in a briefing to the parliamentary intelligence committee Wednesday that North Korea is believed to have reprocessed a small amount of the 8,000 spent fuel rods.

NBC also said U.S. intelligence reports show North Korea has also been conducting rigorous tests with conventional explosives, apparently testing designs for a new variety of nuclear warheads.

The U.S. is also concerned that North Korea may have obtained designs from Pakistan for a nuclear warhead small enough to fit in a foot locker, it said.

The detection of krypton-85 gas by a U.S. "sniffer" intelligence aircraft was evidence that North Korea had begun producing plutonium from spent nuclear fuel rods. The detection of the gas, which is a byproduct of the reprocessing method, and limited vehicle and human activity at the Yongbyon reprocessing facility fueled speculation among some officials that North Korea has a second nuclear reprocessing facility hidden underground in the mountainous communist state. However, it was later reported that this was most likely not true.

The North supposedly told the U.S. that it had "completed" processing spent fuel rods. However, there is great skepticism. Bush administration officials said it was unclear whether North Korean officials were bluffing or telling the truth when they claimed to have finished producing enough plutonium for about a half dozen nuclear bombs. North Korea declared completion of the plutonium extraction in New York last week at a meeting of North Korean diplomats with Jack Pritchard, a State Department official who handles North Korean issues. A Pentagon official said Tuesday it was unlikely that the North had completed processing the fuel rods at its Yongbyon nuclear complex, although officials from the United States and South Korea have said they believe the process has begun. The CIA and other intelligence agencies were forced to review their intelligence on North Korea's nuclear reprocessing after a Pyongyang diplomat said in Beijing in April that reprocessing of the 8,000 stored nuclear fuel rods was nearly finished. The review concluded that some reprocessing is under way but that it could not have been completed without extremely dangerous efforts that would have endangered the lives of the workers involved, officials said.

According to a 15 Jul Washington Times article, a former United Nations nuclear weapons inspector who had visited North Korea's main nuclear complex said he doubted recent reports that the communist state had reprocessed ALL of its 8,000 spent fuel rods. If that major step toward producing plutonium had indeed been taken, "there is a risk that personnel and parts of the reprocessing facility could have been exposed to hazardous amounts of radiation," said the anonymous inspector. However, he went on to say, "It could be done if [the North Koreans] used shortcuts and wanted to risk [nuclear] contamination." According to AFP on 13 July,

North Korea has told the United States it has completed reprocessing of spent fuel rods to extract plutonium for nuclear weapons, reports said on Sunday, but Washington expressed doubt over the claim.

UN-based North Korean envoys confirmed at talks with US officials last week in New York that the reprocessing operation was completed on June 30, South Korea's Yonhap news agency said. It quoted Chang Sung-Min, a former South Korean ruling party lawmaker, as saying that the informal meeting was attended by North Korea's UN Representative Park Gil-Yon and US State Department official Jack Pritchard.

In Washington, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said it was unclear whether North Korea's claim was true, telling the NBC network: "They have told us they have nuclear weapons, they have also made assertions with respect to the pace at which they're reprocessing." "Some people believe what they are saying, other people don't belive what they are saying," he said.

According to Yonhap, Chang reportedly said that North Korean envoys disclosed Pyongyang's plan to extract more plutonium from a five-megawatt reactor and to resume the construction of new reactors at its Yongbyon nuclear complex.

The envoys also noted that Pyongyang would use the reprocessed material as 'nuclear deterrents', Chang was quoted as saying. South Korean officials declined to confirm the report.

CIA Finds Secret Nuclear Test Site? On 1 July, U.S. media reported that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had located an advanced testing site in North Korea used to make small nuclear warheads. North Korea's government knows that U.S. intelligence agencies use aircraft, ships and satellites to conduct almost round-the-clock surveillance and has reacted by hiding some facilities and deceiving U.S. intelligence agencies. U.S. intelligence agencies discovered an underground complex near Kumchangri, 25 miles north of Yongbyon, that was suspected of being an underground nuclear facility.

An official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) said Seoul was not in a position to comment on what was written on the New York Times. However, agencies of the Roh administration unofficially released statements that "doubted" the intelligence as it prepared to open the Kaesong Industrial zone and sign agreements for clearing operations for two railroads. Though Korea has reinstated phrasing of North Korea as its "main enemy" for defense purposes, it is reluctant to upset its "dialogue" with the North According to a Blue House spokesman, "The president expressed concern about the phenomenon of unclear and groundless media reports."

Supposedly the detection of kyrpton 85 by sensors on the North Korean border indicates that there may be a nuclear reprocessing site separate from the Yongbin nuclear site. As there is a multitude of underground tunnels and locations, it is impossible to verify a specific location. One U.S. official said North Korea has numerous underground weapons and military facilities in the mountains throughout the country, and suspicions of more facilities have dogged the U.S. government for years. "They keep a lot of bad things underground," the official said. According to analysts this complicates the matter of any anticipated pre-emptive strike by the U.S. as a threat in negotiations. The presence of such a facility was mentioned by IAEA inspectors prior to the 1994 accord as a means for the North to allow inspections at Yongbin but still pursue their nuclear programs elsewhere.

What concerns US, ROK and Japanese analysts, however, is not simply the presence of the hard-to-detect gas but its source. While US satellites have been focused for years on the DPRK's main nuclear plant, at Yongbyon, the computer analyses that track the gases as they are blown across the Korean Peninsula appeared to rule out the Yongbyon reprocessing plant as their origin. Instead, the analysis strongly suggests that the gas originated from a second, secret plant, perhaps buried in the mountains. US officials have long suspected that the DPRK would try to build a second plant to protect itself against a pre-emptive strike by the US. The US even demanded an inspection of one underground site five years ago, only to find it empty, but this is the first time evidence has emerged that a second plant may be in operation. "This takes a very hard problem and makes it infinitely more complicated," said one Asian official who has been briefed on the US intelligence. "How can you verify that they have stopped a program like this if you don't know where everything is?" Indeed, there may now be at least two hidden facilities with the capacity to produce material for nuclear weapons.

After years of negotiation, the North Koreans agreed in 1999 to an inspection of the facility in exchange for U.S. food aid. The facility, believed to be either a nuclear production or storage facility, had been emptied in advance. No nuclear material was detected during the inspection. Also in 1999, U.S. officials learned that parts for North Korea's 50-megawatt nuclear reactor were missing and they may have been diverted to help construct another reactor in secret.

Later according to the Washington Times, it was reported that the kyrpton 85 radioactive gas was likely to have originated from the Yongbyon reprocessing plant and not from a separate, secret nuclear site. The New York Times reported Saturday that an intelligence analysis of where the krypton-85 originated suggested that the gas did not come from Yongbyon but a hidden underground plant in the mountains. However, the New York Times reported that U.S. intelligence agencies have no knowledge of a second plant, and the likeliest source for the gas is Yongbyon.

U.S. sets plan just in case North sits at larger table The United States has decided that it needs to have a detailed counterproposal ready in the event North Korea decides to attend expanded negotiations. If held, the talks would be over how to dismantle the North’s nuclear program, South Korea’s foreign minister. An agreement was reached in Washington on 3 July, where Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Soo-hyuck met with his counterparts from Washington and Tokyo in meetings that officials characterized as “brainstorming” to coordinate strategy on North Korea issues. The meetings ended a series of consultations, following bilateral meetings between the leaders of the three countries over the last two months, in which they agreed to let diplomacy run its full course, but did not rule out the use of additional measures to pressure the North to give up its nuclear program. China played a role in the diplomatic effort by sending envoys to Washington and Moscow for consultations.

There was a report that North Korea indirectly proposed a 4-way talk (China, U.S., North Korea and South Korea) through a Chinese delegate to the U.S. The U.S. denied this report, but a few days later there was a report that Japan objected to a 4-way talk that excluded Japan. This move was viewed as a North Korean move to split the tri-lateral (U.S.-Korea-Japan) alliance.

On 15 Jul, China sent a ministerial-level official to confer with the North. It said the meeting was "substantive." Later it was learned that China was to provide oil to the North for free, but in return the North announced it would be willing to return to three party talks IF the U.S. dropped its demands for Japan and Korea to join the negotiations. On 18 Jul the U.S. countered that this was the return to the ORIGINAL format that included the U.S. insistence that future talks include other nations. The DPRK offered a proposal to end the crisis at the last meeting, so the US would be expected to make a counteroffer at any future encounter. Bush administration officials, however, have not agreed on a precise formula, and in fact have resisted the idea that they are engaging in any negotiations with the DPRK.

Japan can accept a three-nation framework involving the US, PRC and DPRK for talks aimed at breaking the impasse over the DPRK's nuclear weapons program on the condition that it and the ROK are allowed to join later talks. The South continues to engage the North in dialogue that amounts to "incentives."

KEDO Nuclear Plant Parts Undelivered The deadline for the delivery of a key component for the construction of light-water reactors in North Korea arrives in August. But whether the parts will be shipped to the North as scheduled remains uncertain because of the absence of an agreement between Pyeongyang and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, or KEDO, which is building the power facilities. Japan has agreed with the U.S. on suspending the construction of the light-water nuclear reactors in the North temporarily. The Japanese proposal was intended as a compromise to U.S. calls for an immediate halt to the KEDO project to build the two reactors in exchange for Pyongyang freezing and dismantling its nuclear arms program. The Executive Board of KEDO was to meet to decide the fate and the U.S. was optimistic that a decision to kill the KEDO project would be made before the Congress convened to fund the project on 1 Oct.

As a side note, in 1999 U.S. officials learned that parts for North Korea's 50-megawatt nuclear reactor were missing and they may have been diverted to help construct another reactor in secret. With the latest nuclear material reprocessing uproar, the shipping of critical nuclear parts to continue construction would be viewed as unwise.

Defector Hwang Jang-yop Urges Pressure on North For the first time, the senior most defector from North Korea, Hwang Jang-yop, the former North Korean Workers Party secretary who defected to the South in 1997, spoke out publically at a seminar on Human Rights. He discussed the nuclear crisis, human rights concerns and ways to change the North Korean regime at a forum at Assemblymen's Hall in the National Assembly on Friday. He has stated that the Korean people have been misled to follow the North Korean propaganda -- and therefore reject the U.S. He supported the U.S. stance of isolation in order to effect the toppling of Kim Jong-Il. Surprisingly, he stated that in the early/mid-1990s, 90 percent of the North Korean people supported a war as the conditions were WORSE than war. Previously he had spoken behind closed doors on similar topics. He has stated that in the past he has been under the protection of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) in an attempt to muzzle him. He had requested to go to the U.S. soon after his arrival, but was prevented by the NIS for security reasons. Later a "hit squad" assassinated a relative of his in the South in what was believed to have been a blatant attempt to ensure his silence. He is scheduled to speak in the U.S. after a written guarantee was made for his protection by the U.S.

Hwang told of how he learned before his defection of the presence of the North's nuclear weapons program from Kim Jong Il and other insiders. According to Chosun Ilbo on 6 Jul:

"He said he was told that Pyongyang signed a contract with Pakistan in the summer of 1996 to import technology to enrich uranium-235, and had been testing nuclear weapons in an underground lab since 1992. Hwang said he did not know exactly how far Pyongyang had come in its nuclear program. "But Kim Jong Il will never use the nuclear weapons because he knows that he will meet his end the moment he pushes the button,” Hwang said. Hwang also said that it would be nearly impossible to conclude a military campaign against North Korea in a short period of time, because Pyongyang has put all its efforts into war preparedness, and the whole country is a virtually impregnable fortress. On who Kim Jong Il is grooming to succeed be the next leader of North Korea, Hwang said that Chang Sung-taik, Kim's brother-in-law, would likely rise to the top spot, not Kim’s sons such as Kim Jong-nam and Kim Jong-un. Hwang said that Chang is already the virtual No. 2 in power, with his older brother Chang Sung-won No. 3 and in charge of defending the capital. As the first deputy director of the Central Committee, the higher-ranked Chang knows the organization better than anyone.

During the seminar, Hwang talked at length about how to change the North. He characterized North Korea as part of the axis of evil that defies democracy of the world. "He said that defining a just cause to change the North and damage its political and moral stances were necessary to resolve the crisis. In addition, Hwang said that it was necessary to win the cooperation of China in order to lead Pyongyang in the direction of reform. However, Beijing is worried that the unification of the Korean Peninsula would mean expansion of American influence to the Yalu River, so the United States and its allies need to resolve such concerns in order to win the support of Beijing, Hwang said."

He supported the view that the North's economy could be reformed, but that if that happens the collapse of the regime would collapse as the card house of lies come crashing down on the regime. Ultimately he supported the U.S. opinion of isolation as the means to bring about the removal of Kim Jong-Il from power. He stated, "Within a range that would not offend Kim Jong-il's leadership, it is essential to stimulate the North to reform its economy." He suggested that the South could push the North for agricultural reform in return for economic aid and exchanges. While elementary-level economic reforms might temporarily strengthen the Kim regime, they will eventually let North Koreans contact and exchange opinions with the outer world and lead to disintegration from within. Hwang insisted that if Pyongyang takes the reform steps China did, the regime would collapse within three years.

Defector asks, 'Step up pressure'

Says North was deterred by U.S. force

Hwang Jang-yop, the most senior North Korean official to defect to Seoul, said yesterday that he had been told by North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-il, that the North had nuclear weapons. Mr. Hwang came south in 1997.

The defector, once the North’s senior ideological official, also said Mr. Kim should be removed from office. He called the North Korean regime “a criminal organization that abuses human rights and opposes democracy,” and urged more pressure on Pyeongyang to change its ways.

Mr. Hwang spoke at a seminar on human rights in North Korea at the National Assembly building; the session was open to the public. He said Pyeongyang’s nuclear researchers had completed preparations for nuclear weapons testing in 1992 and told Kim Jong-il, who was his father’s heir apparent at the time, that they were ready to proceed with such tests.

But he said he had never seen the nuclear weapons nor did he know how many were made.

“It does not matter how many there are,” he continued. “Why would they use them when it would be the end of the country?”

The seminar was the first public appearance by Mr. Hwang; he had spoken in closed-door meetings with government officials on similar topics.

He labeled Mr. Kim a coward who would not have the courage to commit any sort of violent act that would put his regime in jeopardy. “He wouldn’t know what to do with nuclear weapons,” Mr. Hwang said. Speaking of the situation in the early and mid-1990s, he said more than 3 million people died of starvation and hundreds of thousands wandered the Chinese border region seeking food.

“I know that 90 percent of the North Korean people wanted war,” he said, “because their conditions were worse than war.”

The presence of U.S. military forces in South Korea acted as a deterrent to North Korea’s military ambitions, Mr. Hwang said. He quoted Kim Il-sung, North Korea’s ruler from the end of World War II until his death in 1994: “He said the North Korean army would have no problem pushing south to Busan,” Mr. Hwang said “But the problem would be what came next.”

The United States is the only country that can solve the North Korean nuclear problem, he continued, recommending that more pressure be applied to the regime in Pyeongyang.

There would be no reason to remove Kim Jong-il, Mr. Hwang said, if he chose to open the country and undertake reforms. “But there is no chance of that, and therefore it is right to remove him,” he continued. The United States must work on building the justification to topple the regime by confirming the presence of nuclear weapons there.

“Some people in the South get talked into the North Korean unification strategy,” he said, and reject the United States. “That is a problem,” he said.

by Lee Sang-il, Shin Yong-ho

Kim Dae-jung & Kim Jong-Il (13 May 2000)

Investigators identified the North Korean bank accounts to which money from a South Korean conglomerate was deposited, possibly as a payoff for an inter-Korean summit three years ago. The Joonang Ilbo reported on 14 May that $200 million wired by Hyundai Merchant Marine just before the June 2000 inter-Korea summit went to three accounts held by DPRK, including one owned by Workers' Party, at the Macao branch of the Bank of China. This contradicts the statements made by senior aides to former President Kim Dae-jung, who said that ROK government merely facilitated a transfer by Hyundai to win development projects. The Hyundai transfer was allegedly funded by Korean Development Bank, a state institution, and former Hyundai and bank officials have alleged that the loan to Hyundai had merely been a cover for ROK government's payment to DPRK.

Kim Dae-jung

Investigators stated that it is certain that $100 million was earmarked as an incentive for the historic summit meeting. Lee Ki-ho, then a senior secretary for economic affairs, suggested a special loan to a Hyundai Group affiliate shortly before the 2000 summit according to Lee Keun-young, former chairman of the Financial Supervisory Commission and former governor of the Korea Development Bank. It was the first direct indication that the Blue House orchestrated the events that led to a large money transfer to North Korea -- money alleged to have in effect purchased the summit a few days later. Lee Ki-ho said that he was misunderstood. On 30 Jun he was arrested for abusing his power by pressuring a state-run bank to extend loans to Hyundai subsidiaries in June 2000. The investigation ended in June as Roh would not extend the time limit for the special prosecutor's investigation. Kim Dae-jung was not investigated -- and in point of fact, the investigation deliberately shied away from implicating him in the matter.

On 24 Jun, the independent counsel team indicted three more high-profile figures, including a former presidential chief of staff and Hyundai firm chairman, Former Chief of Staff Park Jie-won, then Director of National Intelligence Service (NIS) Lim Dong-won, and Hyundai Asan Chairman Chung Mong-hun were indicted on charges varying from influence peddling to violations of foreign exchange control and inter-Korean exchanges laws. Independent Counsel Song Doo-hwan claimed on 25 Jun that the former Kim Dae-jung administration paid North Korea US$100 million to participate in the historic June 2000 inter-Korean summit. In concluding the 70-day probe into the payoff scandal, Song said former Culture and Tourism Minister Park Jie-won pledged to provide $100 million to the North on April 8 in 2000 when he was negotiating the summit with North Korean officials.

However, Lim Dong-won, former head of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), said, "It was not a reward for the summit but economic assistance our government decided to provide to the North in consideration of North Korea's difficult situation at the time the agreement was reached to hold the inter-Korean summit." Regardless the Kim administration shifted the payment burden onto Hyundai while arranging for the business group to obtain huge amounts of loans from the Korea Development Bank and remit the money to North Korea in an illegal manner.

Song said former presidential adviser Park Jie-won had asked Chung Mong-hun, the chairman of Hyundai Asan, for help in making a $100 million payment to the DPRK a month before the summit in June 2000. Park was charged with abusing his authority, while Chung and Lim Dong-won, the previous head of the ROK's spy agency, were charged with violating foreign currency regulations, a statement from the special prosecutor's office said. The charges will be brought before a court. The summit between the then ROK president, Kim Dae-jung, and the DPRK leader Kim Jong-il helped earn the ROK's Kim a Nobel peace prize. But critics, in particular the opposition, have said the DPRK's Kim only agreed to the summit because of the payments. The investigation ended when President Roh refused to extend the independent counsel investigation past its 70-day limit. However, the GNP has entered a bill to continue the probe into leads developed during the investigation in July. This be a head-on confrontation with the Roh administration who wishes that the probe would go away.

On 3 July, the three indicted former officials started their trial.

Kim aide balks at testifying on cash to North

The trial of the eight men indicted for their alleged roles in the cash-for-summit scandal began yesterday in Seoul District Court. The trial is expected to go on for perhaps three months, with hearings taking place only every two weeks.

Park Jie-won, President Kim Dae-jung’s Blue House chief of staff, refused to say whether the Kim administration promised $100 million to the North and Hyundai an additional $400 million.

“I will not answer,” he said, “considering diplomatic and inter-Korean relations.”

But during the first day, most of the other seven defendants admitted in varying degrees to their roles in the transactions. The independent counsel says there were payments totaling $450 million in cash and an additional $50 million in goods to North Korea in connection with the June 2000 inter-Korean summit, the first-ever meeting of the two Koreas’ leaders.

Mr. Park and Chung Mong-hun, the chairman of the Hyundai subsidiary that manages the conglomerate’s North Korean interests, gave conflicting answers about the allegation that Seoul had promised a direct payment of $100 million.

Mr. Park denied that he had asked Hyundai to pay that sum to North Korea on the government’s behalf, while Mr. Chung said, “I was asked to pay $100 million on behalf of the government. Hyundai sent a total of $450 million in cash.” Mr. Chung and Mr. Park studiously avoided looking at the other during the proceedings.

Kim Woon-kyu, the president of Hyundai Asan, admitted to the cash transfers and that they were illegal, saying, “I think it would have been difficult for us to have taken the necessary legitimate transfer procedures for the cash we sent to the North.”

Documents presented to the court by the independent counsel also charged that Mr. Chung of Hyundai had ordered Kim Woon-kyu to send the money north before June 9, 2000, saying that the summit would be in jeopardy if the transfer were not made by then. Choi Gyu-baek, a senior National Intelligence Service official who is charged with having handled the actual cash transfer, told the court, “I just helped in the cash transfer. I did not know the money was going to North Korea.”

Other defendants present at yesterday’s session were Lee Keun-young and Park Sang-bae, former presidents of the Korea Development Bank, Lim Dong-won, the former head of the National Intelligence Service and Lee Ki-ho, a former Blue House economic aide.

by Kim Hyeon-gyeong

Prosecutors Grab Baton to Chase the W15 Billion

by Park Se-yong (se@chosun.com)

Prosecutors said Sunday that they would pick up where the independent counsel left off in trailing the flow of the W15 billion ($13 million) slush fund that emerged at the end of the counsel's probe into the cash-for-summit scandal.

The central investigation department of the Supreme Prosecutors Office has received seizure and search warrants from the court to investigate related accounts. Moon Hee-nam, who is in charge of the investigation, said that it was necessary to examine the financial accounts because evidence could be destroyed if the investigation is idled too long. The prosecutors office has not begun a full-scale investigation, Moon pointed out, and if the National Assembly decides to allow a new special prosecutor team, the investigation will be handed over to the new investigators.

Nevertheless, the prosecutors office received full documents on the W15 billion investigation last Thursday from the just-disbanded special prosecutor's team and are currently examining them. The office will summon the debenture holders involved in the money laundering within this week, it said, which would signal the start of another investigation.

The special prosecutor's team headed by Song Doo-hwan revealed right before the end of its investigation that Lee Ik-chi, former chairman of Hyundai Securities, handed over certificates of deposit worth W15 billion to former Culture Minister Park Jie-won in April 2000 at the Seoul Plaza Hotel. The special prosecutor's team found the connecting account, which could prove that the W15 billion was laundered through the debenture trading market and flew into the political and official world. However, the investigation was halted when its designated term expired.

Recently, the prosecutors office banned 10 officials implicated in the scandal from leaving the country, including Hyundai Asan Chairman Chung Mong-hun and the former secretary of Park. It also demanded that the president of Hynix Electronics Park Jong-sup and two other officials who are currently traveling abroad notify the authorities when they return to Korea. Further exit prohibitions are being examined for several related officials.

Upon my arrival, I was debriefed by South Korea's National Intelligence Service, and occasionally put in the hands of unsophisticated American questioners in Seoul. Remarkably, the South Korean officials made it clear to me that I would be in danger if I were to speak out about the WMD programs I had worked on or the atrocities I had witnessed. It soon became obvious that they feared my testimony because it might jeopardize South Korea's "sunshine policy," which seeks to keep the North's repressive regime in power in order to avoid the economic consequences to the South were it to collapse.

Last year, facing increased pressures from the South Korean Intelligence Service to remain an invisible man, I decided to do all I could to escape from South Korea's hands. I obtained a passport under the pretense of traveling to Japan, and, with the aid of an underground-railroad activist, obtained a visa that brought me to the U.S. last month. While here, I put on a hood to protect my identity, held a press conference in Washington and testified before the Senate in open and closed sessions about what I know about Pyongyang's weapons of mass destruction.

The reaction to my activities on the part of the South Korean intelligence was immediate. My wife, a North Korean escapee who'd been captured by the Chinese and sent to a North Korean prison before escaping again, was subjected to threatening phone calls from police and intelligence officials that so terrorized her as to cause her collapse and hospitalization. Thanks to the intervention of Sens. Richard Lugar, Peter Fitzgerald and Daniel Akaka--to whom I shall remain forever grateful--South Korean officials have since been contacted about the treatment of my wife, and the harassment and intimidation have, for the moment, ceased.

Former defense secretary William Perry warned that the US and the DPRK are drifting toward war, perhaps as early as this year, in an increasingly dangerous standoff that also could result in terrorists being able to purchase a DPRK nuclear device and plant it in a US city. "I think we are losing control" of the situation, said Perry, who believes the DPRK soon will have enough nuclear warheads to begin exploding them in tests and exporting them to terrorists and other US adversaries. "The nuclear program now underway in North Korea poses an imminent danger of nuclear weapons being detonated in American cities," he said in an interview. Perry added that he reached his conclusions after extensive conversations with senior Bush administration officials, ROK President Roh Moo Hyun and senior officials in the PRC. Perry is the most prominent member of a growing number of national security experts and Korea specialists who are expressing deep concern about the direction of US policy toward the DPRK. Only last winter Perry publicly argued that the DPRK problem was controllable. Now, he said, he has grown to doubt that. "It was manageable six months ago if we did the right things," he said. "But we haven't done the right things." He added: "I have held off public criticism to this point because I had hoped that the administration was going to act on this problem, and that public criticism might be counterproductive. But time is running out, and each month the problem gets more dangerous." In a two-hour interview in his office at Stanford University, Perry said that after conversations with several senior administration officials from different areas of the government, he is persuaded that the Korea policy is in disarray. Showing some emotion, the usually reserved Perry said at one point, "I'm damned if I can figure out what the policy is." Nor, having had extensive contacts with Asian leaders, does Perry believe that the multilateral diplomatic approach is working. "I see no evidence of that," he said. "The diplomatic track, as nearly as I can discern, is inconsequential." Perry's comments, while unusually blunt from a former senior policymaker, reflect an increasing consensus among other specialists that the administration, distracted by Iraq, has allowed the DPRK crisis to spiral out of control. Rather than escalate in this way, Perry said, the administration should engage in "coercive diplomacy," which he explained as, "You have to offer something, but you have to have an iron fist behind your offer." He didn't specify what should be offered, but others have suggested that the DPRK would like economic aid, trade deals, diplomatic recognition or a nonaggression pact.

AUGUST 2003

In a 14 Aug Armed Forces Radio and Television Service interview, President Bush said, "I'd like to solve this diplomatically and I believe we can." But "it's going to take a lot of persuasion by countries besides the US to convince him," said Bush. "We believe he (Kim Jong-Il) has got a warhead. We know he's got rockets. And we know he's a dangerous man. And that's why we take his threats seriously," said Bush. "He loves the idea of, you know, making people nervous and rattling sabres and getting the world all anxious." The US will continue dialogue with DPRK and make it clear that not only US, but also all the neighboring countries wants firmly a nuclear-free peninsula. Bush stated, "And my job is to tell others that, let's speak with one voice and convince this man that developing a nuclear weapon on the Korean Peninsula is not in his interests." The reason for US sticks to the multilateral framework in the discussions, lies in the fact that history proved once again that dialogues don't work, said Bush.

Reuters ("N.Korea May Return Japan Abductees' Children," Tokyo, 08/20/03) reported that the DPRK has offered to return the children of five Japanese it abducted decades ago if Tokyo provides food aid and agrees that the abduction issue is closed, the regional daily Tokyo Shimbun said on Wednesday. Japan is pushing for the unconditional return of the offspring, who are now in their teens and twenties, the paper said, citing diplomatic sources. The DPRK admitted in September to the abduction of 13 Japanese in the 1970s and 1980s to help train spies. Five of the abductees returned to Japan last year after about a quarter of a century in the communist state, leaving behind seven children. North Korea said the remaining eight abductees were dead. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun reported on Tuesday that Pyongyang wanted Tokyo to pay one billion yen ($8.44 million) for the return of each child. Tokyo is unlikely to accept the conditions, partly because it wants an investigation into other suspected abduction cases. Abductee support groups say more than 100 people may have been abducted by North Korea over the past 40 years or so.

Nations Divided On N. Korea As Threat

Associated Press
August 26, 2003

SEOUL, South Korea - The United States, Japan, China, South Korea and Russia agree that a nuclear armed North Korea could upset the delicate balance of power in Asia. But they remain divided over just how much of a threat it would pose to the rest of the world.

Many South Koreans, who are in close range of the North's massive arsenal, have grown immune to the potential threat. Japanese fear a North Korean nuclear-armed missile strike. U.S. officials are concerned that Pyongyang will sell weapons or nuclear materials to terrorist organizations.

China and Russia want a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula but also fret about U.S. influence in the region, or even an attack on North Korea. The conflicting views could complicate Washington's agenda of pressing North Korea to give up its suspected nuclear weapons programs, dispose of its arsenal and grant access to international inspectors during this week's meetings in Beijing.

Experts say North Korea has only one interest in possessing a nuclear arsenal: to deter a U.S. invasion. After witnessing the U.S.-led ouster of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il hopes even more fervently that being a nuclear power might save his regime - and recognizes that selling such weapons to terrorists would spell its end, they say.

"Transferring nuclear weapons or to a lesser degree biological or chemical weapons to a terrorist group ... would only give the U.S. an excuse to attack," said Timothy Savage, a security analyst and visiting fellow at Kyungnam University's Institute for Far East Studies in Seoul. "I think the possibility of that is extremely low."

Washington has said it wants to solve the problem through diplomacy but has insisted that North Korea must first give up its nuclear program. South Korea, eager to reconcile with North Korea, favors a more flexible approach that would involve simultaneous concessions by both sides. Tokyo wants to confront North Korea over Japanese nationals abducted by the North's spies decades ago.

China and Russia have frowned on the U.S. portrayal of North Korea as part of an "axis of evil." They may side with the North in trying to soften U.S. demands and securing promises before Pyongyang scraps its nuclear programs, experts say.

North Korea is believed to possess one or two nuclear weapons, and experts believe it could produce five to six more in a few months. The United States says North Korea is also major distributor of missile technology to clients like Yemen and Iran, and has accused the communist regime of importing materials to produce chemical or biological weapons, which Washington fears might be sold to terrorist groups.

Pyongyang earns badly needed hard currency from weapons sales and illicit drug deals.

However, last week's truck bombing attack on the U.N. headquarters in Iraq and a string of devastating bombings and terrorist plots from Jakarta to New York in the past two years shows that the threat is more likely to come from radical Islamic groups, such as Al-Qaeda, experts say.

North Korea hasn't been implicated in terrorist activities since 1987, when a South Korean airliner crashed near Myanmar, killing all 115 people on board. A North Korean agent, who was arrested after getting off the flight, later testified that she and another agent put two time bombs on the plane on orders by Pyongyang's then-heir apparent, Kim Jong Il.

The incident landed North Korea on the U.S. list of countries sponsoring terrorism, along with Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria. U.S. officials say the isolated regime continues to harbor Japanese ultra-leftists accused of hijacking a Japanese airliner in the 1970s. Despite the lack of evidence of any North Korean terrorist acts or links in recent years, some U.S. officials believe it's only a matter of time. Earlier this month, Taiwanese authorities temporarily detained a North Korean freighter carrying 156 barrels of materials the United States said could be used to make chemical weapons. After unloading the chemicals, the ship continued on to North Korea. The ship's owner said the chemicals were for fertilizer.

Unwilling to rely entirely on dialogue, the United States and some allies - Australia, Japan and eight European nations - plan exercises in the Coral Sea near Australia with North Korea in mind. They will practice interdicting and boarding vessels, part of a policy to stem the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles technology.

Under a separate program, known as the D.P.R.K. Illicit Activities Initiative, referring to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name, there has been a quiet crackdown by many nations against the North's narcotics trade, counterfeiting, money laundering and other efforts to earn hard currency.

Among the recent actions under this initiative was the seizure of a North Korean freighter by the Australian authorities in April off Brisbane on suspicion of smuggling heroin and Japanese efforts to shut down a large trading company involved in illicit trade with North Korea.

Organized crime syndicates in Japan have long been believed to be involved in sending remittances to North Korea, money that in many cases generated at pinball casinos that are popular in Japan. In addition, in early August, the Taiwan authorities boarded a North Korean freighter on a technical customs violation and then found and seized barrels of phosphorus pentasulfide, a lethal material that the United States later said could be used to make chemical weapons.