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This page is graphically intense with long load times due to photos. However, the photos and narratives by the men who served at Osan Air Base makes the wait well worthwhile. The opinions expressed are those of the author and in no way represents any official statement of Osan AB or the USAF.

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NORTH KOREA NUCLEAR TEST 2006-Present

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RETURN TO MAIN TABLE OF CONTENTS

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NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR TEST AND SANCTIONS

(SITE NOTE: Experts overwhelmingly agreed that South Korea would lose its power to deter the North after any test and would have to change its policies. All agreed that a nuclear test would end all hopes of normalizing diplomatic relations between the U.S and North Korea. All also predicted a fatal impact on the South Korean economy. U.S investors would naturally leave the South in the face of a security crisis on the peninsula since military strategy and economic policy are inseparable in the U.S.)

Officially, however, Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok said, "We think that the comments from the White House were intended to warn of a possibility." ROK position was that there was no concrete evidence that a nuclear test was being planned by the North. The government believes North Korea will not use its last card soon. The government is rather intentionally exposing suspicious actions of North Korea to pressure the U.S. to come to bilateral talks. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

President Bush refused to comment on a hypothetical situation that might reveal intelligence information. He said, "If North Korea were to conduct a test, it's just a constant reminder, for people in the neighborhood in particular, that North Korea poses a threat; and we expect our friends and those sitting around the table with us to act in such a manner as to help rid the world of the threat." The United States, Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea have been part of stalled talks with North Korea aimed at making the entire Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons -- and the point was made that if the test were done, South Korea rapprochement polices must change and China must consider curtailment of aid to reign in the North. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)


Do as I say, Don't do as I do (Wolverton) (Sep 2003)

Japan Confirms Activity at N. Korea Nuclear Site (Aug 2006) On 24 Aug Japan confirmed vehicle activity at a North Korean nuclear testing site, but it was unclear whether tests were imminent. Vehicles had been seen entering and leaving a nuclear testing site in the northeast of the country, the Associated Press quoted a Kyodo news agency as reporting. Minister of Unification Lee Jong-seok said Seoul has yet to secure any clear evidence, regarding the North's move to conduct what the United States calls a ``red line.'' ``We have yet to secure any clear evidence, but we believe it (a nuclear test) is possible, considering various circumstances,'' Lee told the National Assembly's Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee.

Fears Mount of North Readying for Nuclear Test (Sep 2006) Earlier in Sep, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ban Ki-moon said in Seoul that the government has already begun reviewing its response to a nuclear weapon test. But he said Seoul has not yet detected any concrete signal indicating an imminent test. The US reported that cables had been laid at a nuclear site which may indicate preparations for a nuclear test. Preparatory activities, including movements of vehicles and the unloading of large reels of cable, have allegedly been taking place outside the facility.

North Korea is determined to carry out an underground nuclear test, a British daily reported, quoting diplomats in Pyongyang. Kim Jong-il, the North Korean leader, is said to have made clear his intention to explode a nuclear device during recent talks with Russian and Chinese officials in Pyongyang, the Telegraph reported on its Web site on Saturday. ``Russian diplomats believe it is now highly probable that North Korea will officially join the nuclear club by carrying out its first underground test of an atomic device,'' the daily said.

A Russian diplomat was quoted as saying that Kim has been ``irritated'' by financial sanctions imposed last year by the United States for North Korea's alleged money laundering and other alleged illegal actions such as trade in arms and drugs. (Source: Korea Times.)

ROK "Closely" Monitoring North Activity (Sep-Oct 2006) A South Korean legislator reported that two tunnels were built with one parallel to the other. The Roh government stated that they were "closely monitoring" the situation in the North -- but still maintained that there was no evidence that a nuclear test was planned.

(SITE NOTE: The ROK intelligence is based on debriefings of North Korean defectors but most of it cannot be verified. However, the ROK does NOT share the debriefing information with the US. All other intelligence is received from Japanese or US satellite data.)

Nuke-happy Kim Jong-Il

North States it will Proceed with Test (Oct 2006) The Guardian Unlimited reported on 3 Oct that this is the first time the DPRK has explicitly, publicly announced its intent to conduct a nuclear test. The announcement was a blow to the already beleaguered diplomatic efforts and puts pressure on the US to hold direct talks with Pyongyang. The DPRK's statement gave no precise date as to when a test might occur but said it would be carried out "in a condition where safety is firmly guaranteed". The DPRK has said it has nuclear weapons in the past, but has not conducted any known test to prove its claim.

On 3 Oct, Reuters reported that a statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry said it would conduct its first nuclear test, and Washington warned it would respond to such an "unacceptable threat" to world peace. Pyongyang's announcement was condemned by neighboring Japan, and the ROK heightened its security alert. Britain said it would view a test as highly provocative, while Russia urged the DPRK to show restraint.

"The US extreme threat of a nuclear war and sanctions and pressure compel the DPRK (North Korea) to conduct a nuclear test, an essential process for bolstering nuclear deterrent, as a corresponding measure for defense," said the statement carried by the country's official KCNA news agency. It added that it would never use nuclear weapons first and would "do its utmost to realize the denuclearization of the peninsula and give impetus to the world-wide nuclear disarmament and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons."

In another article on 3 Oct, Reuters reported that US Ambassador John Bolton urged the UN Security Council to respond to DPRK's threat to conduct a nuclear test, saying it would be a grave threat to international peace and security. "Given the very strong action by the council in July condemning the North Korean ballistic missile tests, I think it's important we're prepared to follow up here," Bolton said.

The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation on 3 Oct warned that the threat from the DPRK would only continue to escalate unless the United States pursues a more effective and viable plan to engage in negotiations that will lead to its abandoning its nuclear weapons and missile programs. Leonor Tomero, a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, noted "The Administration's strategy of focusing on form over substance by insisting on negotiations only in the context of the six-party talks has clearly failed to make us safer from the North Korean nuclear threat, instead allowing North Korea to produce enough material for perhaps as many as ten nuclear weapons."

Lt. General Gard (USA, Ret.), Senior Military Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, warned "It is high time the United States negotiate in good faith and put forward a serious proposal, that would include a non-aggression pact, a promise not to threaten the North Korean regime, and economic and energy incentives, in exchange for North Korea dismantling its nuclear weapon program and accepting intrusive inspections."

Market Watch reported on 3 Oct that the yen was broadly pressured after the North Korea announced that it would test its nuclear weapon. It reported that the yen dipped against the dollar and euro on 3 Oct after news from the DPRK that it will conduct a nuclear test sparking concerns over geo-political tensions in the region.

New York Times on 3 Oct reported that DPRK experts inside and outside the Bush administration said DPRK's announcement that it plans to undertake a nuclear test was a negotiating ploy, intended to force the White House into lifting economic sanctions and holding one-on-one talks. American intelligence officials said they saw no signs that a test was imminent. But they cautioned that two weeks ago, American spy satellites picked up evidence of indeterminate activity around what is thought to be the main test site. It was unclear to them whether the activity was part of plans for a test, or perhaps a feint related to last month's visit to Washington by ROK President Roh Moo-hyun. At that meeting, Roh said the event would "change the nature" of the ROK's policy of economic engagement with the DPRK. But the two leaders did not appear to have a coordinated strategy, and a senior Asian diplomat in Washington said Tuesday that "no one is quite sure how to respond" if the test goes ahead.


Direct Talks (Sheneman) (Feb 2005)

Washington Post on 4 Oct reported that the DPRK's announcement came just as the United States, along with the ROK, was launching a new effort to persuade the government in Pyongyang to return to talks. Top aides to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have been shaping the new approach, which began after a summit meeting last month between President Bush and ROK President Roh Moo Hyun. But US officials said on 3 Oct that the government in Pyongyang, which closely monitors US statements, appears to have concluded that there is no benefit in reaching a deal. Some analysts suggested that the DPRK is bluffing to force the United States to begin bilateral negotiations, something the Bush administration has rejected as being a reward for bad behavior. Instead, Pyongyang's gambit could embolden hawks in the administration who advocate confronting the DPRK with a stepped-up campaign of isolation and sanctions, perhaps even a naval blockade. Some officials have privately argued that a nuclear test by DPRK would be a clarifying event that would make the problem apparent to the rest of the world.

On 5 Oct the Washington Post reported that the Bush administration delivered a secret message to the DPRK warning it to back down from a nuclear test, and said publicly that the United States would not live with a nuclear-armed Pyongyang government. The DPRK "can have a future or it can have these weapons. It cannot have both," Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill said on 4 Oct in remarks at Johns Hopkins University's US-Korea Institute. It was the toughest response yet from the Bush administration. Hill did not explain how the administration would respond to a test, but he said it is willing to sit with DPR Korean officials and diplomats from the region to discuss the crisis. Bush's top advisers held an emergency meeting to review a number of strategies under consideration but came away with little agreement.

On 5 Oct the Donga Ilbo reported that reported that stopping the Mt. Kumgang Tourism project and the Kesong Industrial Complex project were under consideration, though the response was still undefined. On 5 Oct Japan stated that measures to be taken in such an event include the expansion of the current ban on port calls by the Man Gyong Bong-92, the passenger-cargo ferry, to include freighters from the DPRK and other countries. Tokyo also will work toward the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution to impose sanctions, based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, and call for the international community to take concerted action on sanctions against the DPRK.

ROK-US Cooperate on Intel (Oct 2006) Korea Herald on 4 Oct 2006 reported that US and ROK intelligence authorities were on alert for any signs of "provocative activities" by the DPRK following its threat to conduct a nuclear test on 9 Oct. Experts and media reports have focused on Gilju in North Hamgyeong Province and Hagap, Mount Mumyeong and Gimdangol in Jagang Province as the renegade stated possible underground test sites. The most feasible candidate is Gilju, which the ROK and the US have kept under close observation since the 1990s, after recognizing the DPRK's construction of a pit in a mountainous valley. Some analysts said the DPRK may conduct nuclear tests in an unknown place other than those widely suspected sites. However, all acquired intelligence has been dependent on statements by DPR Korean defectors without satisfactory verification. What was significant was that in the past, the ROK had NOT shared intel with the US using the information received from North Korea debriefings. It was significant that the ROK would cooperate at this time.

After the 9 Oct test, Grand National Party lawmaker Kim Hee-jeong said on 12 Oct it was highly likely that North Korea' nuclear test was NOT conducted at Sangpeyong-ri, Kimchaek City in North Hamgyeong Province as the government publicly announced. The U.S. Geological Survey and the Japan Meteorological Agency have estimated the site to be at 41.29-N, 129.13-E, but Seoul has plumbed for Sangpyeong-ri at 40.81-N, 129.10-E based on observations by the Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources.

Experts indicate that Seoul's intelligence authorities have failed to locate the North's test site successfully, correcting the location four times. The National Intelligence Agency said initially the test took place at a mountain near the North's missile test site, Musudan-ri in North Hamgyeong Province, from where the militant regime test-fired seven ballistic missiles in early July. However, the NIS later corrected the location to Sangpyeong-ri near Kimchaek City, about 50 kilometers west of the initial location, and again to a remote mountain area in Poonggyeri in Gilju on the northeastern tip of the communist state. On Monday, the state-run Korea Seismic Institute, which had detected the North's blast, adjusted the site again to a mountainous valley in Gilju - a place U.S. intelligence authorities had located right after the nuke test. This was also identified by the NIS, with the help of U.S. intelligence, before the test as the most likely location. (Source: Korea Herald.)

(SITE NOTE: On 16 Oct it was found that South Korea's Arirang-2 satellite launched in July 2006 failed to take any pictures of North Korea at the time the reclusive country said it conducted a nuclear test, it emerged. The satellite launched on July 28 cost W266.3 billion (US$1=W955) and equipped with a precision camera capable of identifying a car on a bridge on the Han River is designed to serve military purposes. Uri Party lawmaker Kang Sung-jong said Sunday in a press release the government would have been able to observe North Korea's nuclear test site with the help of the Arirang-2 satellite but did not take a single picture of North Korea between Oct. 3, when the North announced its test plan, and Oct. 9, when it went ahead.


An artists rendering of a multipurpose satellite called Arirang 2. The satellite was launched at Plesetsk, Russia, in July. [Korea Aerospace Research Institute]

As it happened, the satellite was passing over the Korean Peninsula at around 10:35 a.m. on Oct. 9, when the test was conducted, but it only took pictures of South Korea, Kang said. "This was confirmed by administration documents submitted by the government and answers give by the intelligence authorities," he added. An official with the Korea Aerospace Research Institute said, "When it comes to satellite photos, terrestrial observation centers determine the coordinates where pictures will be taken, and the satellite takes and sends them." He said the government decides the coordinates and sends them to the institute, which has no influence over them. "It was not until the Wednesday morning after the North conducted the nuclear test on Monday that the government started taking pictures of North Korea via the satellite," Kang said. "I put the question why it didn't but could get no clear answer." A senior KARI official told the Chosun Ilbo on the phone there was no order from the government that pictures of North Korea were not to be taken. "The satellite just operated according to its pre-determined schedule," he said. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

It is apparent the intelligence satellite was NOT scheduled to take pictures of the suspected North test area by instructions from the Korean government -- though the ROK government had previously released the suspected area of the test AND stated that they would closely monitor the site. There is an implication that the ROK government knew in advance of the pending nuclear blast and deliberately chose to not monitor the suspected area.


Area of Nuclear Test


Sites calculated as possible sites by Korea, US and Japan.

North Conducts Nuclear Test (Oct 2006) North Korea on 9 Oct declared it had successfully conducted a nuclear bomb test, cementing its isolation at the risk of a security chaos in Northeast Asian region. The North's official Korean Central News Agency announced the test was carried out safely and successfully. There was no radiation leakage, the agency said, adding that it was a successful operation by its science and research center. The White House said there was a "remote possibility" that the world never will be able to fully determine whether the DPRK succeeded in conducting a nuclear test. (Source: Korea Herald.)

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Little Announcement (Stantis) (Feb 2005)

The New York Times on 10 Oct reported that the test appears to have been a nuclear detonation but was fairly small by traditional standards, and possibly a failure or a partial success. Scientists say that throughout history, the first detonations of aspiring nuclear powers have tended to pack the destructive power of 10 to 60 kilotons. But the strength of the DPRK test appears to have been a small fraction of that: around a kiloton or less. It will probably take several days to determine with confidence if the explosion was, in fact, nuclear.

The United States has conducted numerous sub-kiloton tests in its quest to miniaturize atomic bombs to put in artillery shells and other delivery systems. But no nuclear-weapons state - from America's "Trinity" test in July 1945 (20 kilotons) to Pakistan (40 kilotons) - has ever made its world debut with such a low yield. Sensors have not detected radiation leaking from the blast site. Dr. Coyle, the former director of nuclear testing at Livermore, said small tests were more likely to leak radioactivity than large ones, because the intense heat and gigantic shock waves of bigger blasts tended to melt and pulverize nearby rock into impregnable barriers.

The initial speculation that it was a conventional blast -- equivalent of 550 tons of conventional explosives -- masquerading as a nuclear blast has been discounted -- because there were no immediate radioactive isotopes in the air detected. However, experts said it seemed unlikely that the DPRK had faked an underground nuclear blast with a large pile of conventional high explosives.

On Oct. 14 the US stated that radioactivity was detected in North Korea. "The U.S. has admitted that North Korea conducted a nuclear test." But Washington stopped short of providing details on the radioactivity including the amount and method of detection, he added. Earlier on 14 Oct, CNN and Reuters reported, citing an unidentified U.S. official, that the U.S. has preliminary evidence of radioactivity in air samples collected near a suspected North Korean nuclear test site. (Source: Yonhap News.) The United States is believed to have gathered the air sample, which contains radioactive debris, through its WC-135 nuclear detection aircraft. Whether radioactive material called Xenon is detected in the air is crucial to verifying the existence of the test. The WC-135, nicknamed Constant Phoenix, was deployed to the Kadena airbase in Okinawa from the U.S. mainland immediately after North Korea threatened to conduct a nuclear test on Oct. 3. (Source: Korea Herald.)

The detection of radioactivity was formally put on record by the office of John D. Negroponte, director of national intelligence on 16 Oct. It stated, "Analysis of air samples collected on Oct. 11, 2006, detected radioactive debris which confirms that North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion in the vicinity of Punggye on Oct. 9, 2006," said the statement, putting on the record a conclusion that officials first disclosed Friday, the night before the United Nations Security Council voted on sanctions. "The explosion yield was less than a kiloton," the statement added.

On 18 Oct it was reported that American intelligence agencies have concluded that North Korea's test explosion was powered by plutonium that North Korea harvested from its small nuclear reactor, according to officials who have reviewed the results of atmospheric sampling since the blast. The intelligence agencies' finding that the weapon was based on plutonium strongly suggested that the country's second path to a nuclear bomb — one using uranium — was not yet ready. The uranium program is based on enrichment equipment and know-how purchased from Pakistan's former nuclear chief. Nuclear experts said that the use of plutonium to make the bomb was important because it suggested that North Korea probably had only one nuclear program mature enough to produce weapons. The supply of plutonium materials is known from the days when international inspectors kept tabs on the fuel rods in the North's reactor, and intelligence analysts estimate that North Korea has enough material to make 6 to 10 plutonium bombs. (Source: New York Times.)

There are several reasons that a nuclear test might fizzle. "Fizzle yield" is a recognized nuclear term, indicating the complexities of igniting a fission bomb, especially one that is made from plutonium. Thus it comes down to two conclusions.

• (1) The blast is a "fizzle" when the bomb literally blows itself apart too fast for the nuclear chain reaction to take place properly and generate the large amount of energy needed for a full-scale explosion. Should that happen, a bomb meant to be in the Nagasaki range (20 kilotons) may yield only about a kiloton. Sub-kiloton nuclear tests are not unheard of. Pakistan set off five bombs in 1998, three of which were supposedly of sub-kiloton yield, although that has never been confirmed.
  
  There are two ways this can happen. One is contamination with plutonium-240. The key ingredient for a plutonium bomb does not exist in nature; it is manufactured in a nuclear reactor when atoms of uranium-238 capture loose neutrons and are converted to plutonium-239, the stuff of bombs. But these plutonium atoms can, in turn, capture neutrons, becoming Pu-240 and even Pu-241. They are not fissionable.
  
  With a bomb contaminated with Pu-240, the probability of a fizzle is very large. The US maintains a standard that none of its bomb-grade plutonium will have more than 6% Pu-240.
  
  The other problem concerns detonation. Plutonium bombs work on the "implosion" principle. A sub-critical core of plutonium about the size of a softball (30 centimeters in circumference) is surrounded by conventional explosives. The pressure from the explosion squeezes the plutonium into a critical mass, setting off the nuclear explosion.
  
  But the shaped charges must be precisely engineered so that they go off simultaneously. If even one charge explodes prematurely, even by a nanosecond, it may blow the bomb apart, cutting short the chain reaction and reducing the yield. (Source: Asia Times.)
• (2) Some speculate that last Monday, North Korea may have skipped the debut stage and moved directly to testing a deliberately weaponized bomb. Such a low-yield bomb would be more suitable for export to terrorists. If that was the case, the test might not have been aimed at world opinion in general but was, in fact, a demo for potential buyers. To experts, a deliberately low-yield test is so difficult to pull off that it would seem to be beyond the competence of North Korea in view of its shortage of top-tier physicists and engineers. (Source: Asia Times.)

Surprise (Parker) (Feb 2005)

South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun called an emergency security meeting just before the North's announcement. South Korean intelligence had reported to the president that a 3.58 magnitude seismic tremor was detected from Hwadaeri near Gilju at 10:36 a.m. "We detected the explosive sound from Hwadaeri near Kilju in North Hamgyong Province at 10:36 a.m.(KST)," a senior Defense Ministry official said, asking to remain anonymous because of the sensitive nature of the information. Officials from the National Intelligence Service (NIS) said the test appears to have been conducted at a mountain close to a missile test site from where the communist state launched seven ballistic missiles in early July.

(SITE NOTE: What was significant is that no one could pinpoint the exact location of the test. Immediately after the announcement, the Japanese dispatched three aircraft to take upper air samples, but no radioactivity was detected. Because of the small yield, there was speculation that it may have been a nuclear test of the trigger mechanisms. The bottom line was that there was very little information except for the North Korean admission. On 13 Oct the New York Times reported that traces of radioactivity had been detected from North Korea.)

On 10 Oct US Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Japan spokespeople declined to comment on reports of the test, which had yet to be independently confirmed late Monday, and they directed queries to the Pentagon and State Department in Washington. The U.S. military in the Pacific showed no outward signs of increased force-protection status. According to the USFK Web site, all U.S. troops on the peninsula remained at Force Protection Bravo on Monday, with most of the U.S. community off to celebrate Columbus Day. In Japan, Yokota Air Base — headquarters of USFJ — remained at its lowest force-protection status.

SITE NOTE: The world asked the question: "Why would the North defy China and the world to conduct a test that ensured world wide condemnation?" Our opinion is that the North felt that if it possessed a nuclear weapon, it could force the US to deal seriously with the North. The North realized that its crumbling 1.2 million man army no longer provided the initimidation power it once had at the negotiations table. In addition, its economic situation continued to worsen with sanctions worldwide. This meant they could no longer upgrade their military equipment to compete with the modern weaponry of the US and South Korea. Whether realistic or not, the North viewed the possession of a nuclear weapon as a tool for removing its sanctions and forcing the US to hold one-on-one talks. In other words, it was a new weapon in its old game of political blackmail and brinksmanship. In our opinion, Kim Il-sung realized this cost-effective way to play the brinksmanship game the North is so good at. Regardless of the risks, the North had no other choice except to pursue this avenue. The North was being cornered -- and its supporters in China and the ROK were drawing away.

There is speculation that the Chinese are openly debating "regime change" in Pyongyang after the nuclear test. On 16 Oct an article appeared in The Australian: The Sunday Times. The Chinese Government has been ultra-cautious in its reaction. Some in Beijing argued against heavy sanctions on North Korea for fear that these would destroy what remains of a pro-Chinese "reformist" faction inside the DPRK. "In today's DPRK Government, there are two factions, sinophile and royalist," one Chinese analyst wrote online. "The objective of the sinophiles is reform, Chinese-style, and then to bring down Kim Jong-il's royal family. That's why Kim is against reform. He's not stupid."

The balance of risk between reform and chaos dominated arguments within China's ruling elite. The Chinese have also permitted an astonishing range of vituperative internet comment about an ally with which Beijing maintains a treaty of friendship and co-operation. Academic Wu Jianguo published an article in a Singapore newspaper - available online in China - bluntly saying: "I suggest China should make an end of Kim's Government." "The Chinese have given up on Kim Jong-il," commented one diplomat. "The question is, what are they going to do about it?"

Hinting at the options, Chinese online military commentators have exposed plots and purges inside North Korea that were previously unknown or unconfirmed. They have described three attempted coups that ended in bloodshed. In 1996, the Sixth Field Army was planning to revolt but the scheme was betrayed by a new commander. One or two plotters got away but Kim Jong-il's personal guards arrested senior officers and the Sixth Field Army's political commissars. On March 12, 1998, Kim suddenly announced a martial law "exercise" in Pyongyang and there was gunfire in the streets of the city. The Chinese later learned that two ministries were involved in a coup attempt, and that more than 20 ministerial-level officials were killed after it was crushed. In October 1999, a company of the Third Field Army rebelled in dissatisfaction over grain distribution during the nation's prolonged famine, which may have killed a million people.

There are rumours that Kim's eldest son, Jong-nam, is estranged from his father and living in the Chinese capital, where he enjoys a reputation as a capricious imbiber of whisky. A younger son, Jong-chol, has emerged as heir apparent. Meanwhile, some of the North Korean elite are seeking their boltholes in China. Xin Cheng, an estate agent in the high-rise district of Wang Jing, which is popular with resident South Korean businessmen, said many high-ranking North Koreans were buying property there. (Source: The Australian: The Sunday Times.)

The DPRK military under the North's "military first" policy is still wasting away. Chronic food shortages and outdated equipment means that it will not be able to face the South on "equal" terms. It simply doesn't have the resources to maintain a fighting force -- and without military might, it is open to a coup. North Korea knows it would not last a day in a full-scale war with the US. It's 1.2 million fighting force effectiveness has been reduced significantly in recent years with the introduction of the Patriot system to dull its SCUD threats, the ATACMS missiles that are targeting the North's artillery, and now the native-grown ROK cruise missiIes that are capable of targeting Pyeongyang. The usefulness of a large standing army as a tool of intimidation was slipping away. However. just one nuclear weapon would be enough to deter any preemptive attack and be an effective tool for blackmail. It skillfully exploits an American weakness when it stirs fears about its potential to sow havoc among America's Northeast Asian allies and crucial trading partners — Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China.

Given its conventional military bargaining chip losing its potency, it is our opinion that Kim Jong-il played the only card he had left to remain in power. Without a nuclear weapon, the Kim Jong-il regime was in jeapordy of collapsing. The bottom line is that in a despotic regime, any sign of weakness from the leader of the pack will result in a challenge for leadership. Coups d'etat are the standard result. Kim Jong-Il was being ridiculed as "an evil midget" by President Bush -- a term that belittled the person as well as his position. If Kim Jong-il was not treated seriously in the international arena, he would soon lose face in his domestic affairs. He is only maintained in power by his position as "Great Leader" through the support of the military. With the economic crisis and food shortages, the military was slowly slipping into the morass.


(Peter Lewis) (Sep 2006)

However, the possession of a nuclear weapon card halts all thoughts of any preemptive strikes, while at the same time bolstering the military's prestige. Even if the North is years away from developing a warhead to fit on its missile or use as a suitcase weapon, the mere existence of a crude nuclear weapon will stop any use of force against the North. The historical examples of Russia versus China and their border disputes of the 1960s illustrates the point. If China did not possess nuclear weapons, the Russians would have overwhelmed the border areas. However, with the Chinese nuclear weapons, the Russians dared not attack.

This is what the North is attempting to do. The military can no longer protect the nation -- but a nuclear weapon will stop any nation from launching an attack to breach the borders. The weapon is not to be used against the attackers, but to be used as a blackmail weapon aimed at the attacker's homeland. This is what Kim Jong-il is counting on. In this way, his regime is preserved and the military now has a weapon that can protect the borders without massive expenditures of manpower and equipment. Though it is obvious that the weapon "fizzled," the fact that the North is pursuing this avenue is the same as stating they intend to possess such a weapon regardless of the world's attempts to stop it. The world is in a massive game of poker where the North may be bluffing or actually possess the weapon. Would the US be willing to risk calling such a bluff? It is doubtful.

At the same time, the North Korean people saw a tangible result of their suffering. Though it is a negative event, the nuclear test is analgous to the US first landing on the moon. The world was mesmerized by the event, but every American felt that the lunar accomplishment was theirs personally. This vision of President Kennedy solidified the nation as no other event had ever done -- without the patriotic rally around the leader of WWII or the 9-11 threat to America. This nuclear test allowed the miniscule nation to thumb its nose at a superpower -- and other powerful nations.

At home, Kim Jong-Il was watching his prestige slip. The nuclear trump card gave him prestige internationally -- while at the same time increasing his cult following support at home. A North Korean diplomat was quoted as saying "What I hear is Big Brothers saying to Little Brother "don't do that"; but we are not a little boy, we have nuclear weapons." (http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/nuclear_brother_3761.jsp) It was an effective tool by which he could manipulate the "big boys" game of "carrot and the stick" -- and extort promises (carrots) without fear as any threat of reprisal (stick) was empty. Some would suggest that Kim is seeking autonomy from his "big brother" (China) as well as the stature of getting the US to capitulate with either a permanent peace agreement or at least paying him off for his bad behavior.

Whether the US can be blamed for forcing the North into a corner to make this decision or not was irrelevant. A ROK Ministry of Unification official stated, "We called on the U.S. to have the bilateral talks with North Korea many times. No condition on the form of the dialogue. We focused on the dialogue since we thought that the sanctions would lead to the nuclear test. But the effort failed." He mentioned the U.S. responsibility for the nuclear test. The ROK government's inability to bribe the North to not have a test with Roh's engagement policy was a fact. The only one responsible for the test was the North.

(SITE NOTE: In a 11-12 Oct survey, four in 10 South Korean adults or forty-three percent of the respondents aged over 19 picked the United States as the country most responsible for the North's nuclear test. The survey of 500 adults was conducted by Research Plus, a local research firm, by telephone Oct. 11-12. North Korea was chosen as the second most responsible country with 37.2 percent, followed by South Korea with 13.9 percent, China with 2.4 percent and Japan with 1 percent. (Source: Korea Times.)

Within the US, there was a useless finger-pointing exercise going on whether Clinton or Bush was more responsible. It was a political exercise that solved nothing and was only something to score political points in the upcoming elections.)

The bottom line is the it was the North alone that decided to follow this path. Kim Jong-il is not irrational as some claim. In fact, his attempt to gain a nuclear weapon is very logical to us. It lost its chemical warfare threat when the South Koreans simply refused to buy gas masks for self-protection. It lost its biological warfare threat when it became self-evident that if it were waged on the peninsula, it would spread back to the North. Its conventional forces were no longer a threat that could be used as leverage as the crisis of feeding the troops and upgrade the arms became an impossibility. It needed the nuclear weapon. The sanctions were starting to hurt it as countries joined in freezing the North's assets. Indeed, the Japanese and US were tightening sanctions -- especially with the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) pointed to interdict its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that is a primary export of the country -- as the UN resolution prevents member countries from buying WMD equipment after it shot off its SCUDs and failed Taepodong II missile in July 2006.


Playing with Matches (Ramirez) (Mar 2003)

Internationally, the North knew that the US was in no position to attack as it was deeply committed in Iraq and Afghanistan -- with a potential hot spot in Iran looming on the horizon. The US would NOT attack -- it would only talk and attempt to put "teeth" into its Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The ROK was already in its hip pocket and would NOT cut off its aid. It too would talk a harsh story, but it would continue its aid uninterupted. The Chinese though condemning it could NOT afford to have the North Korean regime falter for its own reasons. Thus despite the test, the Chinese would continue to provide support. With this justification in mind, the North had a free hand to conduct such a nuclear test. Thus the stage was set as perfectly aligned to play the nuclear trump card. If international sanctions were attempted in the US, the North was counting on China and Russia to blunt any moves to put "teeth" (Article 42, Chapter 7) in the sanctions from the UN. And even if "teeth" were put into the sanctions, without China's support on implementing the resolution, the resolution would become worthless.

But there is one hiccup that the North did not think of when it was focused on the US. China is concerned that North Korea can just as easily aim their nuclear weapons at China at anytime. THE CHINESE WILL NEVER TOLERATE A THREAT ON ITS BORDERS. The North has survived because it provided a buffer-zone between China and the "west" (Japan and South Korea). However, with the opening of China to the benefits of international trade, the idea of a buffer zone was rendered obsolete -- but a traditional defensive concept dating back to the Great Wall of China remains in the minds of the Chinese people. It has been exhibited with the use of military force in Tibet, Nepal, the Indian/Pakistani border, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and the Russo-Sino border -- and stands as proof of how deeply entrenched this defensive idea is.

By pursuing a nuclear weapon over the protests of the Chinese, the North has made itself a target of the Chinese. North Korea has viewed the Chinese as their "money tree" in the past, but this new wrinkle may cause the Chinese to rethink their policies towards the North. China invested about $113 million in the North last year, about 97 percent of the foreign capital invested there. The North depends on China for about half of its oil products and food. The trick for the Chinese now is how to squeeze Kim Jong-il by the throat without killing him. In other words, Kim Jong-il is now a liability, but the alternatives of a replacement are few. Kim Jong-Il's alcoholic eldest son in "exile" in China is out. His youngest son as appointed heir is still too weak. KIM JONG-IL NEEDS TO WORRY NOW ABOUT A COUP -- ONE FINANCED BY THE CHINESE.

Test for the world

North Korea's nuclear defiance demands an effective common response

Kim Jong Il has gone for broke. North Korea's claim to have conducted its first nuclear test has yet to be fully verified. It is still unclear whether the country is years, or perhaps only months, away from developing a missile-delivered nuclear warhead. But by declaring itself to be set on being a nuclear-armed power, North Korea has gone past the point of brinkmanship, leaving no shred of doubt about its intentions — and no room for ambiguity in the international response.

As the new Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe grimly observed yesterday, Asia's most untrustworthy regime has launched the region into "a new, dangerous nuclear age". North Korea could not have been more sternly warned that if it went ahead with the test, it would find itself in a break-hold from which it could not escape. The regime has escaped total isolation until now, mainly because of the reluctance of China, North Korea's economic lifeline and ultimate protector, to admit to, or use, its considerable economic and political leverage. But even China's patience has been wearing thin. It pointedly declared at the UN last week that "no one is going to protect . . . bad behaviour". To underline that message, Beijing told Pyongyang that it might drop the "automatic intervention" clause in the friendship treaty that commits China to come to the regime's defence.

China has cut back food aid to North Korea in recent months and quietly co-operated with US efforts to destroy the regime's lucrative counterfeiting industry, which includes renminbi as well as dollar notes. Now, faced by the embarrassing and undeniable failure of its strategy, China must take the lead in ensuring that defiance does not pay — which means demonstrating that North Korea has made itself more, not less, vulnerable by going nuclear. The shock of what is perceived as "betrayal" has forced South Korea to abandon its so-called sunshine policy; where others lead, Seoul will perhaps follow, though it will still be tempted to play a role as a "go-between", even though it is really between a rock and a nuclear place.

The question is what will work. The regime, interested only in its own survival, is prepared to let millions starve. Yet North Korea, as Beijing understands better than most, is vulnerable to sustained pressure. The $2.5 billion a year in Chinese and South Korean trade and aid is critical to the elite's comfort. Mr Kim must have known that North Korea would be severely squeezed, at least in the short term, by external financial, trade, aid and investment sanctions, not least a cut-off of Chinese oil. That suggests that this decision, like the conducting of missile tests earlier this year, may have been dictated by even greater pressures building up internally. The regime has always relied on a siege mentality to rally loyalty and keep its all-powerful military in line; this signal act of defiance may be aimed at compelling the military to close ranks.

The generals must be given fresh reasons for discontent. There will be members of the elite whose stomach is turned by Korean suffering and the crass Kim personality cult. China knows who these leaders are. Beijing would balk at "regime change"; but perhaps not at edging out the Dear Leader in favour of pragmatists ready to risk accommodation and cautious reform. Mr Kim's departure is the neatest way out of crisis. He may have hastened the forced exit he is desperate to prevent. (Source: Times Online.)

(SITE NOTE: The Roh government now has been caught in a trap of its own making. The continued support of "humanitarian aid" and the Kaesong industrial area operations are in trouble. The parceling out of Gaesong Industrial Complex site seemed to be once again put off. The selling of lot was first planned in June, but later postponed to mid October. The Korea Land Corporation (KLC), which oversees the operation of Gaesong complex, had planned to encourage companies to invest in the plant lot for development this month. Of the total 79.2 hectares, KLC was to sell 9.9 hectares of an apartment-style plant site and 29.7 hectares of an ordinary plant site. Companies stated that on worst case scenarios they would move to China or Hong Kong. Even the most ardent supporters of reunification have been dumfounded by the North's actions -- which none wanted to believe would ever take place. The Kumgang Tourist Hotel operations in the short term will be shut down as there will be no Korean visitors wanting to sign up for tours -- and its long-term operations are seriously jeapordized. However, most of 1,100 tourists who reserved a three-day Mt. Kumgang tour on 9 Oct left for the North with only 10 cancellations. Future tours were uncertain.)

(SITE NOTE: KEDO was officially declared defunct in 2006 -- and the last of the ROK workers recalled in 2006. The ROK will have to absorb a massive financial loss as it was the one that demanded sole construction rights. See KEDO Project Finally Dead!! (Jan 2006) for details.)

(SITE NOTE: Such a move would start a Northeast Asia nuclear arms race. The Japanese already possess plutonium enrichment facilities and any move by the ROK to become a nuclear power will result in the Japanese becoming nuclear. Some feel the Japanese already have the capability to simply assemble the components to make a bomb. It is known that Japan does possess the critical trigger mechanisms and nuclear material stockpiles.)

UN Sanctions (U.N.S.C.R. 1718) (Oct 2006) President Bush on 9 Oct condemned North Korea's purported test of a nuclear weapon as a "provocative act" that demanded "immediate action" by the United Nations Security Council. While stopping short of confirming that a nuclear test had taken place, Bush said North Korea's claim "constitutes a threat to international peace and security. In New York, John Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said the United States would move quickly to seek a Security Council resolution condemning and possibly sanctioning North Korea.

The UN Security Council started drawing up a resolution to respond to North Korea's nuclear test based on drafts submitted by the U.S. and Japan on 9 Oct. The U.S. version would call on Pyongyang to return to six-party talks on its nuclear problems, provide for forcible inspections of vessels and airplanes, and a freeze of North Korean assets and other financial sanctions. It invokes Chapter 7 of the UN Charter that permits both economic and military sanctions. The U.S. made it clear it will gradually strengthen sanctions against the North, saying it will see how the communist country responds to the resolution 30 days after it is adopted. China's UN ambassador Wang Guangya also said Tuesday there should be "punitive" measures over the North's nuclear test. The final Security Council resolution was expected after a compromise with China and Russia, who have demanded diplomatic solutions instead of sanctions. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

A United States-drafted U.N. resolution called for a total arms embargo, a freeze on any transfer or development of weapons of mass destruction and a ban on luxury goods, among other measures, as well as interdiction of Pyongyang's cargo. Japan's U.N. Ambassador Kenzo Oshima proposed even more stringent measures in amendments to the U.S. draft. These included banning all North Korean ships and planes from ports and imposing a travel ban on high-level Pyongyang officials. But diplomats doubted anything beyond a possible travel ban would be approved. China has stated that it will not accept any resoluton with a military action clause. (Source: Star Online.)

Japan on 11 Oct decided to slap additional economic sanctions on North Korea, including a total ban on all products from the country, Japanese government officials said. The measures decided on at a meeting of the Security Council of Japan also call for banning North Korean ships from entering Japanese ports and barring North Korean nationals from entering Japan, the officials said. (Source: Yonhap News.)

On 12 Oct the UN Security Council agreeded 15-0 to a resolution condemning the North Korean nuclear test that invoked Chapter 7 of the UN charter, which permits coercive measures. The UNSC will refer to Chapter 7 for the first time since the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993. However, the council has reportedly decided not to invoke Article 42 of Chapter 7, which allows military action. The resolution did NOT give authority to use military force to stop ships in international waters. To win over China, the US agreed to drop the reference to Article 42 of Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter that authorizes the possible use of military power to enforce sanctions. The resolution bars the sale or transfer of material that could be used to make nuclear, biological and chemical weapons or ballistic missiles, and it bans international travel and freezes the overseas assets of people associated with the North's weapons programs.


Nuclear Test Sanctions (Harville) (Oct 2006)

In its most debated clause, the resolution authorizes all countries to inspect cargo going in and out of North Korea to detect illicit weapons. The Chinese ambassador, Wang Guangya, said China would not participate in the inspection regime because it would create "conflict that could have serious implications for the region." But China's refusal to take part in searches, and Russia's seeming annoyance at the end of the process, immediately raised questions about how effective the resolution's execution could be. After the vote, John R. Bolton, the American ambassador, insisted that China was bound by the resolution's terms and would have to find a way to comply with the inspection provision. (Source: New York Times.)

The resolution includes economic and weapons sanctions against North Korea, including a travel ban and financial restrictions. It specifically rules out the use of force in what is seen as a concession to China and Russia. Meanwhile, Russian news agencies quoted Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov as saying that any UN sanctions should be withdrawn if North Korea agrees to return to six-party talks on its nuclear program.

The clause imposing sanctions on export and import goods was amended from "all goods may be checked if deemed necessarily" to "collaborative measures will be taken such as checking goods if possible." However, clauses such as banning exports on luxuries, specific war supplies including tanks, components related to nuclear, mobile rocket launchers, freezing financial assets of individuals and groups related to weapon or missile programs in North Korea, and calling for the ban of its nuclear program remained the same. (Source: Donga Ilbo.) The final draft dropped a broad arms embargo in favor of one just on heavy equipment like battle tanks, artillery systems, missiles and warships.

Immediately after the test, the US remarked that a "suspicious ship" had left North Korea, but that it would not be intercepted. Rather it would be searched at the first port it landed at. On 24 Oct it was reported that a North Korean cargo ship was inspected and detained by Hong Kong authorities for maritime safety violations, the government of the special administrative region of China on 23 Oct. The action, coming on the heels of a visit by U.S. officials to urge cooperation in enforcing United Nations sanctions against North Korea, seems to suggest that U.S. efforts to isolate North Korea and end its nuclear ambitions are bearing fruit. The Hong Kong government said that the Kang Nam I, a 2,035-ton cargo ship, arrived on 22 Oct from Shanghai. It was inspected on 22 Oct, and sufficient safety and procedural violations were found during the course of the inspection to justify detaining the ship. But no suspect cargo was discovered. Indeed, the ship, which was heading from North Korea to Taiwan via Shanghai and Hong Kong, was almost empty of cargo. Crew members said that the ship was on its way to Taiwan to pick up a cargo of scrap metal. It was also loading scrap metal in Hong Kong. (Source: Joongang Ilbo.)

Dealing with the travel ban, the resolution says, "All member states shall take the necessary steps to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated by the committee or by the Security Council as being responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, [North Korea's] policies in relation to [its] nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related and other weapons of mass destruction-related programs, together with their family members." What this means is that IF the UNSC committee designates Kim Jong-il directly responsible for the nuclear test, WMD production or missile-related programs, he could be banned from travel to member nations -- including China as a "member nation." Again IF the committee targets Kim Jong-il, then the next step would be to see if China recognizes such a provision. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

The South Korean government planned to announce its sanctions on the North before 14 Nov. In accordance with article 11 of Resolution 1718, member countries must submit a report on their intended measures within 30 days of the date the resolution was adopted.

While the sanctions did not go as far as Washington wished, they probably gave it and Japan the legal means to squeeze the country. They provide the basis to inspect ships in ports around the world — though not necessarily on the high seas — and gives Washington a way to expand a program to force banks to halt dealings with the country. In Washington, President Bush signed a law allowing the United States to impose sanctions on any foreigner who provides weapons technology to North Korea.

After imposing additional sanctions on North Korea, Japan has started reviewing laws to reflect the fact that it views North Korea's possible nuclear armament as "the gravest danger" to Japan's peace and security. That will enable Tokyo to search North Korean vessels in international waters or to support U.S. searches of North Korean ships. Japanese Defense Agency chief Fumio Kyuma said it was difficult to designate the current situation as "the gravest danger," but Prime Minister Shinzo Abe told his Cabinet to consider the designation. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

It was reported on 17 Oct that China had erected a fence in Dandong along its border with NK where North Koreans waded across and stopped cash remittances to NK in Dandong. The fence was placed some 20km northeast of the Chinese border city of Dandong. It's the first fence ever constructed along the border of the two allies. The fence is built along an embankment of the Yalu River, blocking would-be refugees from coming ashore. The fence is concentrated along shallow and narrow spots in the river. So far, some 20km of fence has been installed, but authorities have informed local residents that more fencing is on the way. Trucks to NK were being stopped and "inspected" but observers stated none of the trucks were opened. Australia will ban NK ships from entering Australian ports, "except in dire emergencies." (Source: Associated Press.) Reports reveal that the DPRK has received 40,000 tons of crude oil as humanitarian aid in the past year -- with the latest 20,000 tons shipped in September.

On 3 Nov Yonhap News reported that the UN sanctions committee finalized a list of items denied to the DPRK, the first action by the committee that oversees implementation of the resolution against the country. But the members could not agree on operational guidelines, especially how the sanctions should be adjusted according to improvements in the situation.

North Preparing for Second Test (Oct 2006) American officials have reported recent activity at the test site, leading some to believe that another test might be carried out soon. The New York Times on 17 Oct reported that ROK and Japanese officials said today that they believe the DPRK may be preparing for a second test. American officials on 16 Oct confirmed for the first time that the DPRK did set off a nuclear explosion on Oct. 9, as it claimed, but that the blast was far smaller than would normally be expected, suggesting that the test may have misfired. That could give the DPRK two motives for a second test, nuclear scientists and security analysts said: To proclaim defiance of the sanctions and to show that it is capable of a successful nuclear detonation. (Source: New York Times.)

Nuclear experts said that the analysis of atmospheric samples taken after the test shed new light on the factors that could lead to a second demonstration. American officials who reviewed the results of atmospheric sampling said on 16 Oct that the material used for the test appeared to have been plutonium harvested from the DPRK's small nuclear reactor. Because the material came from the reactor, which operated under international inspection between 1994 and 2003, and not from a uranium-enrichment program that the DPRK began in secret, nuclear experts said that it was easier to gauge how much weapons material it may now have on hand. Most intelligence analysts estimate that the country has enough plutonium for 6 to 10 bombs.

North Korea said on 18 Oct that a second nuclear test was "natural" and should come as no surprise. The North Korean Foreign Ministry's U.S. chief Li Gun made the remarks in an interview with ABC anchor Diane Sawyer in Pyongyang. "We already announced that we have a nuclear -- nuke last year. But we just simply demonstrated peacefully that we have these nuclear weapons." The interview aired as part of Sawyer's live report from the North Korean capital on Wednesday afternoon. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)


Little Nuke (Patrick Corrigan) (Sep 2006)

Supposedly Kim Jong-il told a ranking Chinese envoy that his country has no plan to conduct additional nuclear tests, the Yonhap News Agency reported on 20 Oct. Quoting an "unnamed diplomatic source" in Seoul, Yonhap said Kim made the promise in his meeting with Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan, who visited Pyongyang as Chinese President Hu Jintao's special envoy. "Kim was known to have clarified his stance that there will be no additional nuclear test," the South Korean news agency quoted the source as saying. (Source: Korea Times.)

On 28 Oct Yonhap News reported that South Korean military officials had observed activities at the North's suspected nuclear test site that may be preparations for a second test. Yonhap news agency, citing several unidentified military officials, said Seoul is keeping a close watch on the movements of trucks and soldiers at the Punggye-ri site in the country's remote northeast. South Korean officials have said they have no intelligence suggesting another test is imminent. Meanwhile, more unidentified South Korean government officials said they are trying to confirm whether a new facility that has been built at the site could be part of preparations for a second nuclear test, the JoongAng Ilbo newspaper reported on 28 Oct. South Korea's Defense Ministry said it could not confirm the reports, and the U.S. State Department refused to comment.

Kim Jong-Il Expresses "Regret" Over Test (Oct 2006) Kim apologized to Beijing for going ahead with its threatened nuclear test on Oct. 9, the source said. Tang returned to Beijing from Pyongyang on Thursday night after delivering Chinese President Hu Jintao’s message to the North Korean leader, the Chosun Ilb reported on 20 Oct. North Korean leader Kim Jong-il told a special Chinese envoy on Thursday the hermit nation will only return to six-party talks on its nuclear program if the U.S. lifts sanctions, according to a Chinese diplomatic source. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

However, the Yahoo News article "reinterpreted" the meaning to indicate the DPRK regretted the nuclear incident, while the Chosun Ilbo story indicated that the DPRK only regretted that it offended its chief benefactor, China. It stated that Kim Jong Il expressed regret about his country's nuclear test to a Chinese delegation and said Pyongyang would return to international nuclear talks if Washington backs off a campaign to financially isolate the country -- quoting the Chosun Ilbo story. "If the U.S. makes a concession to some degree, we will also make a concession to some degree, whether it be bilateral talks or six-party talks," Kim was quoted as telling a Chinese envoy, the mass-circulation Chosun Ilbo reported, citing a diplomatic source in China. Kim told the Chinese delegation that "he is sorry about the nuclear test," the newspaper reported. The delegation led by State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan met Kim on Thursday and returned to Beijing later that day — ahead of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's arrival in the Chinese capital on 20 Oct. (Source: Yahoo News.)

(SITE NOTE: Whether the "regret" of Kim Jong-Il was to be believed -- or simply perceived as bait for the wishful thinkers who want to get back to the non-negotiations of the six-way talks -- was still to be seen. The DPRK nuclear test was a tactical mistake as the Chinese will NEVER tolerate a nuclear threat on its border. The question is not whether the US will buy off on his "regret" but if the Chinese buy off on it. It is fairly certain the US will press forward with its strangle-hold approach to North Korea. It is unlikely that the US will make a "concession" on the financial sanctions claiming they are part of the counterfeiting claims. It will also not back off the PSI moves claiming they were UN-initiated. The Chinese want breathing room so they do NOT have to impose the sanctions on their borders -- if they can get the US to make a "token" concession and get the North back to the negotiating table.)

(SITE NOTE: Reading between the lines, the Port Authority has military hand-held radiation detection devices -- used since the 1950s by the ROK military -- that measure background radiation levels. These are not effective unless you are looking for the devices close up -- and even then may not be effective due to sensitivity. The US proposal was for special docking facilities which would measure the radioactivity of a suspect vessel with sensitive detection equipment -- which could be a very expensive proposition. The question amounts to (1) is this worth doing and (2) if so, who pays for it. The US probably will not...so objections by the ROK are valid.)

(SITE NOTE: This heart-wrenching decision making process on12 Nov by the ROK was all for show. The decision was a forgone conclusion since Roh has decided to continue with his rapproachment policy towards the North. The Foreign Ministry and Unification Ministry were already in sync, and only the dissidents in the Uri Party needed to be silenced.)

(SITE NOTE: The luxury sanctions is all show and nothing of any consequence. If the North wants the goods, they simply will buy them on the black market in China.)

(SITE NOTE: The US stated that between 8-12 million "might" be legitimate funds. The US said that the five accounts are not evidently related to the drug trade, money laundering, U.S. dollar counterfeiting or other illicit activities.

On 23 Jan, long after the US announced that some of the monies might be negotiable, the Seoul government took the bows -- perhaps unjustly -- for this item. Supposedly South Korea recently asked the U.S. to consider selectively unfreezing at least five of North Korea’s 50 accounts with the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia, saying part of the US$24 million North Korean accounts were acquired legitimately. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.))

(SITE NOTE: The North has long wanted diplomatic relations with the US for direct talks -- but the US has refused because it realizes that diplomatic relations would impede its efforts to isolate the North economically and politically. The North in the past has stated before that it was amenable to the idea of a peace treaty, but it wanted to keep its nuclear programs intact. This was unacceptable to the US.)

Despite the agreed principle of "even sharing of the burden," some critics argue that Seoul will have to shoulder the largest share because it is likely to chair a working group on economic and energy assistance to the North under the agreed six-nation resolution framework. Analysts say if the North is given 500,000 tons of heavy oil, South Korea and other four parties should pay $30 million to $40 million respectively. In addition, South Korea will spend another 8 trillion won ($8.5 billion) over 10 years following its 2005 offer to supply the North with 2 million kilowatts of electricity in return for abandoning its nuclear ambitions, they said. The 2 million kilowatts of electrical power is equal to the amount which two light-water reactors that were to have been built under a 1994 accord between the United States and North Korea would have generated. (Source: Korea Herald.)

(SITE NOTE: The exact terms of how each of the parties will share the costs equally was unclear as of 13 Feb.)

In Shift, Accord on North Korea Seems to Be Set

The United States and four other nations reached a tentative agreement to provide North Korea with roughly $400 million in fuel oil and aid, in return for the North’s starting to disable its nuclear facilities and allowing nuclear inspectors back into the country, according to American officials who have reviewed the proposed text.

While the accord sets a 60-day deadline for North Korea to accomplish those first steps toward disarmament, it leaves until an undefined moment in the future — and to another negotiation — the actual removal of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and the fuel that it has manufactured to produce them.

Bush administration officials said they believed that the other nations participating in the talks — China, Japan, South Korea and Russia — would consent to the tentative agreement as soon as Tuesday. The parties still await a final confirmation from the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il. The tentative agreement was forwarded to the respective national capitals Tuesday morning.

In essence, if the North agrees to the deal, a country that only four months ago conducted its first nuclear test will have traded away its ability to produce new nuclear fuel in return for immediate energy and other aid. It would still hold on to, for now, an arsenal that American intelligence officials believe contains more than a half-dozen nuclear weapons or the fuel that is their essential ingredient.

The accord also leaves unaddressed the fate of a second and still-unacknowledged nuclear weapons program that the United States accused North Korea of buying from the Pakistani nuclear engineer Abdul Qadeer Khan in the late 1990s, in what appeared to be an effort to circumvent a nuclear freeze the North negotiated in 1994 with the Clinton administration.

North Korea has strongly denied the existence of any uranium program, and the omission of any mention of it appeared to some observers as a flaw in the new deal. Until that issue is resolved, the US is not seen as likely to go along with any deal for energy aid beyond the heavy fuel promised on Tuesday. North Korea’s refusal to talk about the uranium program contrasts with its boasts of having gone back to producing warheads with plutonium at their core at Yongbyon after expelling inspectors sent by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at the end of 2002. North Korea, under the latest agreement, must agree to invite IAEA inspectors to return, giving them the right to traipse around Yongbyon as they were doing from 1994 to 2002, making certain the freeze remains in place. The production of warheads at Yongbyon raises yet another issue - will North Korea be willing to see them destroyed under terms of the agreement, and will the IAEA inspectors be able to travel to test storage sites outside Yongbyon? (Source: Asia Times.)

Negotiations had appeared near collapse on Sunday over North Korea’s demands for huge shipments of fuel oil and electricity. Under the new tentative agreement, the oil and aid for North Korea would be provided by South Korea, China and the United States — meaning that President Bush would need to win Congressional approval. That proved difficult for the Clinton administration, which constantly fought hawks in Congress over providing fuel oil to the impoverished nation under the earlier accord.

Japan has declined to participate in providing oil or aid until it resolves separate issues with North Korea about the abduction of some of its citizens by the North, American officials said.

In Washington on Monday night, administration officials declined to call the first phase of the new agreement a “nuclear freeze.” The term has echoes of the Clinton accord, which Mr. Bush had criticized because it failed to force the North to ship its nuclear fuel out of the country before it received significant aid. The officials insisted that the current agreement was different because the North will not receive light-water nuclear reactors, like the ones it was promised in the 1994 agreement, and because the agreement will also be signed by the North’s immediate neighbors, including China.

Beijing was the North’s ally in the Korean War and its protector for decades, but relations have been strained and the Chinese leadership was apparently pressuring the North to accept the new agreement. “If they renege on this,” said one senior administration official, who would not speak on the record because the deal had not been signed, “they are sticking their fingers into the eyes of the Chinese.”

Nonetheless, some administration officials acknowledged that they had concluded that a step-by-step accord was their only choice and that it would be impossible to set a schedule for the North’s disarmament without taking initial steps to build trust. “Everybody had to make some changes to try to narrow the differences,” the chief American negotiator, Christopher R. Hill, told reporters as he returned to his hotel at 2:41 a.m. on Tuesday.

Mr. Hill was expected to meet again on Tuesday in Beijing with envoys from China, South Korea, Japan, Russia and North Korea to learn if each nation has approved the deal. He said he had been in frequent contact with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during the late-night negotiations and that he believed the Bush administration would support the agreement. “We feel it is an excellent draft,” he said. “I don’t think we are the problem.”

If Mr. Hill is correct, it marks a major change of course for an administration that has been beset by six years of virulent internal arguments over whether to negotiate with North Korea or squeeze the government of Mr. Kim until it collapses. Hawks in the administration, including many allies of Vice President Dick Cheney, have opposed any deal that would provide aid to the North before it disgorges its arsenal.

Even before the preliminary agreement was signed in Beijing, one of Mr. Cheney’s protégés, John R. Bolton, who left his post as American ambassador to the United Nations just two months ago, denounced the accord. “This is a very bad deal,” he said on CNN, urging President Bush to reject it. He added that “it contradicts fundamental premises of the president’s policy,” and he said that it made the administration “look very weak.” Gary Samore, who was the top nonproliferation official in the Clinton White House and who negotiated with North Korea, commended the Bush administration for negotiating an accord with the North, but said: “Unfortunately, it is three years, eight bombs and one nuclear test too late. But better late than never.”

Under the details of the deal, as described by American and Asian officials, the $400 million in aid would be disbursed to the North as it meets its initial commitments, probably over the course of a year. The first of those must be completed in the next 60 days, including the “permanent disablement” of the country’s existing nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, its main nuclear complex north of the capital, Pyongyang.

The International Atomic Energy Agency, whose inspectors were kicked out of North Korea four years ago, also would need to be invited back in. And the North would have to prepare a “complete declaration” of all its nuclear facilities, turning that over to all of the parties in the talks and the I.A.E.A.

That would pave the way for a second phase, in which “working groups” would negotiate the details of disarmament, including turning over weapons and fuel. Other groups would explore normalization of relations, a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War, and other economic aid in return for disarmament.

But the disarmament process promises to be enormously complex, far harder than dismantling Libya’s comparatively small nuclear complex three years ago. Libya never produced nuclear material. North Korea is believed to have made one or two weapons, or the fuel for them, nearly two decades ago, and perhaps a half-dozen or more since 2003. But American officials are uncertain exactly how many weapons the North possesses, and in the second phase of the accord, the North would have to explain what it did with the uranium-enrichment equipment that it is said to have purchased from Dr. Khan.

“We don’t know what state that program is in,” one senior official with access to the intelligence information said Monday. “We only know what they appear to have bought,” based in part on Pakistani interrogations of Dr. Khan.

United Nations sanctions against North Korea put into place after last year’s nuclear test are expected to remain in effect for the next year, American officials said.

Some experts doubt that the North will ever agree to turn over its weapons, which it considers its main bargaining chip with the West, and Mr. Kim’s only insurance policy against being toppled. “This is a freeze with a promise to negotiate subsequent disarmament,” said Mr. Samore. “And a North Korean promise to negotiate later is pretty worthless.”

Mr. Hill acknowledged that he had a lot of negotiating ahead of him. “This is only one phase of denuclearization,” he said. “We’re not done.”

If the deal is approved, Mr. Hill added, the new working groups could be quickly established while chief negotiators would likely reconvene in Beijing as soon as next month. He said the tentative agreement would create a succession of deadlines that would need to be met as a precondition of the deal.

North Korea had nearly scuttled the negotiations in recent days by insisting on a huge energy aid package. Varying reports in Asia suggested that North Korea had demanded two million tons of heavy fuel oil and two million kilowatts of electricity in exchange for its approval of any new agreement, far less than it got. (Source: New York Times.)

I. Introduction

The Third Session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America from 8 to 13 February 2007. The delegations agreed on this joint statement on February 13th, 2007.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.

II. Joint Statement from the Third Session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks

-"Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement" Joint Statement from the Third Session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks

The Third Session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing among the People's Republic of China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States of America from 8 to 13 February 2007.

Mr. Wu Dawei, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK; Mr. Kenichiro Sasae, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Mr. Chun Yung-woo, Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs of the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Mr. Alexander Losyukov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; and Mr. Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Department of State of the United States attended the talks as heads of their respective delegations.

Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei chaired the talks.

I. The Parties held serious and productive discussions on the actions each party will take in the initial phase for the implementation of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005. The Parties reaffirmed their common goal and will to achieve early denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner and reiterated that they would earnestly fulfill their commitments in the Joint Statement. The Parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the Joint Statement in a phased manner in line with the principle of "action for action".

II. The Parties agreed to take the following actions in parallel in the initial phase:

1. The DPRK will shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK.

2. The DPRK will discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods, that would be abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement.

3. The DPRK and the US will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving pending bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations. The US will begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.

4. The DPRK and Japan will start bilateral talks aimed at taking steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.

5. Recalling Section 1 and 3 of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the Parties agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. In this regard, the Parties agreed to the provision of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK in the initial phase. The initial shipment of emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) will commence within next 60 days.

The Parties agreed that the above-mentioned initial actions will be implemented within next 60 days and that they will take coordinated steps toward this goal.

III. The Parties agreed on the establishment of the following Working Groups (WG) in order to carry out the initial actions and for the purpose of full implementation of the Joint Statement:

1. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

2. Normalization of DPRK-US relations

3. Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations

4. Economy and Energy Cooperation

5. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism

The WGs will discuss and formulate specific plans for the implementation of the Joint Statement in their respective areas. The WGs shall report to the Six-Party Heads of Delegation Meeting on the progress of their work. In principle, progress in one WG shall not affect progress in other WGs. Plans made by the five WGs will be implemented as a whole in a coordinated manner.

The Parties agreed that all WGs will meet within next 30 days.

IV. During the period of the Initial Actions phase and the next phase - which includes provision by the DPRK of a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities, including graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plant - economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), including the initial shipment equivalent to 50,000 tons of HFO, will be provided to the DPRK.

The detailed modalities of the said assistance will be determined through consultations and appropriate assessments in the Working Group on Economic and Energy Cooperation.

V. Once the initial actions are implemented, the Six Parties will promptly hold a ministerial meeting to confirm implementation of the Joint Statement and explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

VI. The Parties reaffirmed that they will take positive steps to increase mutual trust, and will make joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.

VII. The Parties agreed to hold the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks on 19 March 2007 to hear reports of WGs and discuss on actions for the next phase.

• North Korea: Before the ink was even dry on the agreement, the Joongang Ilbo reported on 14 Feb that Pyongyang's state-controlled media had given what may could have been a signal that Pyongyang is prepared to reinterpret Tuesday's agreement at the six-party nuclear talks in Beijing. The Korean Central News Agency reported that participants had agreed to supply the DPRK with 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil in return for a "temporary" suspension of operations at the DPRK's nuclear facilities. It was not clear, however, whether the reports were intended as a definitive statement of the DPRK's interpretation of the agreement or, as one ROK official suggested, a bit of domestic propaganda to demonstrate to its populace that its nuclear programs had boosted the nation's prestige. The government had previously hyped up its achievements of its less-than-successful nuclear test as a major feat propelling the DPRK into a nuclear state status. This may be the let-down portion to the populace.
  
  Korea Times reported on 20 Feb that the National Intelligence Service (NIS) on Tuesday confirmed that the DPRK recently enacted a law that prohibits money laundering. The standing committee of the DPRK's Supreme People's Assembly adopted the legislation last October to ban financial transactions involving illegal earnings, the agency said in a press release. The enactment apparently aimed at settling the US financial sanctions on a bank in Macau that was blacklisted by Washington in September 2005 for its suspicious role in helping the DPRK conduct illicit financial activities, it said.
  
  
• United States: Immediately Bush came under attack for the agreement. New York Times on 14 Feb reported that the six party accord came under fast criticism from right and left that it was both too little and too late. For years, Mr. Bush's administration has been paralyzed by an ideological war, between those who wanted to bring down DPRK and those who thought it was worth one more try to lure the country out of isolation. In embracing this deal, Mr. Bush sided with those who have counseled engagement, notably his secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, and her chief negotiator, Christopher R. Hill.
  
  Mr. Bush took the leap in the hope that in a few months, he will be able to declare that DPRK can no longer produce fuel for new nuclear weapons, even if it has not yet turned over its old ones. As the White House took credit on Tuesday for what it called a "first step", it found itself pilloried by conservatives who attacked the administration for folding in negotiations with a charter member of what Mr. Bush called the 'axis of evil' and for replicating key elements of Mr. Clinton's agreement with DPRK. At the same time, Mr. Bush's advisers were being confronted by barbs from veterans of the Clinton administration, who argued that the same deal struck Tuesday had been within reach several years and a half-dozen weapons ago, had only Mr. Bush chosen to negotiate with the DPRK rather than fixate on upending its government.
  
  In two respects, however, the new accord is different: DPRK does not receive the incentives the West has offered "in this case, about a year's supply of heavy fuel oil and other aid" until it "disables" its equipment at Yongbyon and declares where it has hidden its bombs, nuclear fuel and other nuclear facilities. And the deal is not only with Washington, but with Beijing, Moscow, Seoul and Tokyo.
  
  A report titled "The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020," issued by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) was skeptical of the agreement and urged Washington and Tokyo to be "prepared for all scenarios." Richard Armitage, former deputy secretary of state, and other authors of the report are pessimistic about "the ability or willingness of the DPRK to come entirely clean." "Of course, our calculus must also include the possibility that North Korea will continue to build nuclear weapons to 2020 and beyond," it said, and the nuclear issue may be resolved only upon Korean reunification, as was the case of Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The report cautioned viewing the agreement as a "first step" as Bush referred to it.
  
  But the administration was clearly taken aback by the harshness of the critique from the right, led by its recently departed United Nations ambassador, John R. Bolton, who charged that the deal "undercuts the sanctions resolution" against the North that he pushed through the Security Council four months ago. Democrats, in contrast, were caught between enjoying watching Mr. Bush change course and declaring that the agreement amounted to disarmament-lite. "It gives the illusion of moving more rapidly to disarmament, but it doesn't really require anything to happen in the second phase," said Joel Wit, who was the coordinator of the 1994 agreement.Asked in 2004 about DPRK, he said, "I don't think you give timelines to dictators and tyrants." Now he appears to have concluded that sometimes the United States has to negotiate with dictators and odious rulers, because the other options "military force, sanctions or watching an unpredictable nation gain a nuclear arsena" seem even worse.
  
  President George W. Bush said his former ambassador to the UN John Bolton's was "flat wrong" in criticizing the agreement. Bush explained, "At the second phase is to disable and abandon their facilities. If they do the second phase ... there will be about the equivalent of a million tons, minus the 50,000 tons [from South Korea] available [in] food, economic assistance and fuel. Now, that's not going to happen until there's some verifiable measures that have been taken."
  
  Apparently Bush directly instructed U.S. delegates in negotiating over North Korea’s nuclear program in six-nation talks in Beijing. Abandoning pressure and hostility for dialogue and negotiations, Bush was briefed about the development and results of the nuclear negotiations in detail and approved every move. He explained in detail how North Korea will receive 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil first and the remaining 950,000 tons in rewards depending on how far it goes toward disabling its nuclear facilities. The U.S. president called the Beijing agreement “a continuation of one first proposed in September 2005,” to be implemented on “a step-by-step basis,” which he said was a “unique deal.” (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)
  
  However, the Bush administration is likely to act promptly lest Pyongyang has a change of heart. Washington will want to rid Pyongyang of a justification to retreat by easing financial sanctions and unfreezing part of North Korea’s accounts in Macau’s Banco Delta Asia. The U.S. is also expected to act swiftly in removing North Korea from the list of states sponsoring terrorism and in terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act, the foundation of sanctions against the North. There is a chance that the frozen assets of 12 North Korean businesses in the U.S., a largely symbolic measure, will be freed. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)
  
  However, many pundits are quick to point out that this agreement is far from the nonproliferation model set by Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi in the wake of Saddam Hussein’s ouster in 2003. Gadhafi relinquished his entire nuclear program up front, and only later–once compliance was verified and the nuclear materials removed from the country–did the U.S. take Libya off the terror list and provide other rewards. Perhaps Mr. Bush feels this is the best he can do in the waning days of his Administration. Or perhaps, in the most favorable interpretation, he wants to clear the decks of this issue in order to have more political capital to control Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Iran may look at this deal, however, and conclude it has little to lose by raising the nuclear stakes. (Source: Wall Street Journal.)
  
  
• China and Russia: President Bush wants the sanctions to remain in place until more substantive actions have taken place on the part of the North. Bush reportedly asked China's Hu to keep the DPRK sanctions in place to maintain pressure on the North. Interfax on 15 Feb reported that Russia felt that it would be premature to discuss a possible lifting of sanctions regarding the DPRK. "The international community applied the sanctions in a broader format, and their possible lifting must be considered in a broader format as well. It would be premature to speak about a possible lifting of the sanctions," said Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov.
  
  
• South Korea: Chosun Ilbo on 14 Feb reported that the agreement offers the two Korea a chance to resume bilateral contacts, which have been on ice since the DPRK's missile tests in July. President Roh Moo-hyun hailed the conclusion of the talks and pledged that the ROK will do its best to implement its part of the Beijing agreement, taking "prompt measures" to ensure a "smooth implementation." The remarks hint that the government plans to resume rice and fertilizer aid to the DPRK immediately and reopen inter-Korean talks. On 15 Feb, it was announced that South and North Korea agreed to hold cabinet-level talks in Pyongyang later in Feb, setting up the stage for resuming aid to the North and putting other inter-Korean projects back on track. North Korea confirmed their will to promote the inter-Korean relationship and agreed to hold the 20th ministerial talks in Pyongyang from Feb. 27-March 2." The likely agenda of the ministerial meeting will include resuming rice and fertilizer aid to North Korea and reunions of separated families across the border, the opening of cross-border railways and the South's provision of raw materials in return for the North's minerals, according to officials.
  
  However, a Chosun Ilbo editorial on 15 Feb said that the government was too anxious to make a hasty decision, while it would not take long to find out if the DPRK will keep its words. It criticized the government for not allowing the next President to determine the relationship with the North. The majority of the populace feel the government should take a cautious approach with the North. In the poll of 1,000 people over 19 conducted by the Korea Society Opinion Institute on 15 Feb, 65 percent of respondents said the South should resume talks with the North depending on Pyongyang’s moves to dismantle its nuclear weapons and programs. About 31 percent of respondents supported an early resumption of inter-Korean talks, which have been suspended for seven months since the North’s missile tests in July. The GNP's Park Geum-hee said, that South Korea should reach out to the North, but only when the Stalinist state proves itself to be ``genuine’’ in its commitment for peace and reconciliation through the dismantlement of nuclear programs.
  
  The ROK will foot the bill for the initial 50,000 barrels of crude oil -- as President Bush pointed out in his news conference on 16 Feb. In disbelief, many were stunned by President Roh Moo-hyun remark that his government was ready to offer whatever aid North Korea demanded to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons programs. Roh also said South Korea's "unlimited" aid for North Korea will help create another efficient market in Northeast Asia, calling it a Marshall Plan-like investment. (Source: Yonhap News.)
  
  

  (SITE NOTE: This swift return to inter-ministerial talks is too convenient -- almost like Roh is contriving to find ANY excuse to start aid backup for the North. Even before the North had delivered anything on shutting down the nuclear reactor, the ROK was talking of resuming rice and fertilizer aid -- not excluding energy aid above the 50 million tons that must be delivered immediately. AND Roh was attempting to make the aid offer IRREVERSIBLE. The conservative GNP stated that the ROK should not resume aid until denuclearization steps had occurred in the North -- but though they held a majority of votes in the National Assembly, the deal made it more unlikely that South Korea would be able to alter its policy even if the conservative opposition were to win in next December's presidential election. In the Presidential Campaign, this will become a hot potato as the South Korean populace supports rapproachment, but they also want to see the North disarm. Candidates straddled the fence.)

  On 15 Feb the Joongang Ilbo wrote that the 13 Feb agreement had a critical weak point. Because the agreement did not mention any reference to the nuclear weapons on which the U.S. based its actions toward the DPRK, Pyongyang can always come up with other agreements asking for more compensation for the abrogation of nuclear weapons and the whole nuclear weapon programs. It must be kept in mind that the DPRK will not easily give up its weapons considering the fact that for it, maintaining its system is more important than its economy. The normalization of US-DPRK relation is crucial in achieving the goal of abrogation of DPRK nuclear weapons. South Korea must also focus on bettering the relation between the two. Other conservative media reports criticized the agreement as saying the few nuclear weapons DPRK already has are enough to hold the ROK hostage. Unless the weapons, facilities, and nuclear materials are revealed and abrogated, the Korean Peninsula will not be safe. However, progressive media acclaimed the agreement as opening dialogue between the two countries and considered the accusations as "nitpicking."
  
  Xinhua News on 26 Feb reported that the ROK had begun internal preparations to provide 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil worth 20 billion won ($21.3 million) to the DPRK as part of a recent nuclear agreement. Details were to be worked out at a futureworking group meeting on energy aid. The government was to commission the Public Procurement Service to choose a local oil refinery for the project. It would cost about $350 per metric ton, and incidental charges of delivery will constitute about 20 percent, the Unification Ministry said.
  
  
• Japan: Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came under attack from members of the opposition and his own party for his government's refusal to provide assistance to the DPRK over what it says are unresolved cases of Japanese abductees. Critics said Tokyo's narrow focus on this issue, seemingly at the expense of regional stability, would leave it isolated. Mr. Abe made his political career by championing the abduction issue, which critics say he has exploited to stir nationalist sentiments. Analysts say it would be difficult for Mr. Abe, whose approval ratings have plummeted after a series of scandals and gaffes, to compromise on the issue. The issue of the abductees is likely to be tackled in the working group, but Japan's emphasis is likely to bring forth a long list of historical grievances on the DPRK's part.
  
  Kyodo reported on 20 Feb that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe told the families of Japanese nationals abducted by the DPRK that Japan will not normalize ties with Pyongyang until all those abducted by its agents are returned, reassuring them over concerns that the abduction issue may be sidelined as denuclearization negotiations proceed. "The agreement (at the six-nation talks) is an important step toward resolving the abduction issue," Abe told the families at his office.

(SITE NOTE: The International Herald Tribune reported on 12 Mar that the investigation ordered by the Macao government of a bank accused by the United States of helping the DPRK launder the proceeds of illicit activities has found no evidence of criminal misconduct by any bank employees. In letters that were sent to the U.S. Treasury Department and made available by the department, the American lawyers of Banco Delta Asia said that a review of all the bank's accounts related to the DPRK failed to turn up anything other than lax record-keeping. Joseph McLaughlin, of the law firm Heller Ehrman, in San Francisco, wrote to Treasury officials last October that the Macao government "has not yet found evidence of money laundering" and was "not currently planning to bring any criminal proceedings for money laundering." Thus the fox said as he counted the chickens. An in-house inquiry was useless -- and only a Chinese government inquiry would have sufficed. As a result, this inquiry to the U.S. was irrelevant.

There is a problem that the DPRK has chosen to link the unfreezing of the assets to the Feb 13 denuclearization agreement. The unfreezing of North Korea's US$24 million at the bank, Banco Delta Asia (BDA), is expected to set the stage for the North to begin shutting down its key nuclear reactor and a reprocessing facility at Yongbyon. These funds were NOT part of the 13 Feb agreement. This action by the US Treasury Department is nothing more than a face-saving move for the DPRK -- but it unleashes criticism for the US as the choke hold on Korea was eliminated. However, at the same time, the US has a trick card up its sleeve using the Anti-Terrorist List to block US businesses from dealing with a bank proven to have links to countries identified on the anti-terrorist list.)

• Denuclearizaton Working Group: DPRK Shutdown of Yongbin Reactor: Timed with the arrival in Pyongyang on 13 Mar of International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei, signs were detected that North Korea had started shutting down its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. Reuters quoted a U.S. official as saying that North Korea was apparently preparing to shut them down, and a diplomatic source in Seoul said Pyongyang probably did so to negotiate with the IAEA director-general in compliance with the Feb. 13 six-party agreement. A South Korean official said, "If North Korea has suspended operation of its nuclear facilities, it’s a very positive step indeed." The six-party agreement stipulates that North Korea shuts them down under IAEA supervision by April 13. Meanwhile, ElBaradei is accompanied by IAEA Deputy Director-General Olli Heinonen, who has dealt with the North Korean nuclear issue since the first crisis in the 1990s. Since 1992, Heinonen has visited North Korea several times, pointing out significant inconsistencies in North Korea's initial statement on its nuclear facilities by using cutting-edge equipment. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)
  
  On 17 Mar in Beijing, chief nuclear envoys from South Korea, the U.S. and Japan and International Atomic Energy Agency Secretary General Mohamed ElBaradei discussed consultations to carry out the Feb. 13 nuclear agreement. ElBaradei briefed the envoys on his trip to Pyongyang and explained his agency's procedures to seal and inspect the Yongbyon nuclear plant once it is shut down.
  
  Nuclear negotiators from six nations began discussing details of North Korea's disarmament plans on 17 Mar while the DPRK said it will not implement the agreed plans until all of its financial assets at a Macau bank are released. "If the United States does not remove all of its restrictions on our funds at Banco Delta Asia (BDA), we cannot shut down our nuclear facilities at Yongbyon," Kim Kye-gwan, the North's top nuclear envoy, told reporters upon arrival here Saturday.
  
  Christopher Hill, chief U.S. negotiator in international talks over the North's nuclear ambition, said the BDA issue "will not pose an obstacle to the six-party talks." Basically the US Treasury simply washed their hands of the BDA issue and told all US banks not to deal with the BDA. The US position is the BDA can do what they want with the DPRK monies -- but the charge that the BDA was used for money laundering stands. "I'm quite sure we will not be talking about the BDA issue any more in a couple of days," Hill said as he headed to the venue of Saturday's working group meeting.
  
  

  (SITE NOTE: Unfortunately, the DPRK is still holding to the BDA release of funds BEFORE it halts its nuclear activities -- even though the whole matter has been turned over to Macao -- and ultimately China. "If the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) issue is completely resolved, (North Korea) will halt its nuclear activities at Yongbyon," Kim Kye-gwan was quoted as saying in a keynote speech at the opening of the latest round of international talks over the North's nuclear weapons program.)

  On 19 Mar it was reported that North Korea had agreed to shut down five nuclear facilities that were reactivated in 2002, a diplomatic source in Beijing said. The five nuclear facilities were frozen in 1994 but the North resumed activities there in 2002 after kicking out the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency or IAEA.
  
  According to the source, the North Koreans and Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the IAEA, decided to shut down and seal the five nuclear facilities while he was in the North on 13-14 Mar. The five facilities to be shut down include the 5-megawatt nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel rod production facility in Yongbyon.
  
  The scope of shutdowns will be endorsed at the new round of six-nation nuclear talks scheduled to begin on 19 Mar in Beijing, the source said. The North and the IAEA have also agreed that the role of IAEA inspectors will be limited to monitoring the five nuclear facilities after their shutdown, unless separate agreements are reached on the matter.
  
  
• Energy and Economic Cooperation Working Group: On 15 Mar, a working-group meeting on energy and economic cooperation will be held in the Chinese capital under the chairmanship of South Korea. South Korea plans to send its first shipment of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil promised to North Korea when the communist country lets in U.N. nuclear inspectors. "We are mulling a one-time shipment of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea in three vessels," the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity. "The shipment will coincide with the entry of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors" into the North. The South Korean government plans to send the oil to North Korea in three shipments in late March or early April, when International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors return to the North. The energy aid is a reward for North Korea's promised steps to shut down its main 5-megawatt nuclear reactor and other key weapons-related facilities and re-allow in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. The U.S. is considering purchasing the power generators with money from the federal budget and delivering them to the North via NGOs that conduct humanitarian work there like the Eugene Bell Foundation.
  
  
• Peace and Security Working Group: A working-group meeting on peace and security in Northeast Asia is scheduled for 16 Mar, to be followed by a working-group meeting on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on 17 Mar.
  
  
• Normalization Talks between US-DPRK: The highlight of the series of meetings will be a working group on normalizing relations between the U.S. and North Korea on 18 Mar, a follow-up to similar talks held in New York on March 6 and 7.
  
  

  (SITE NOTE: The 6-7 Mar meetings were simply a preliminary meetings to set out the ground rules. The 18 Mar will be the first substantive meeting.)

  A topic of cardinal concern is the partial or total release of US$24 million of North Korean funds from the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in Macao. Kim Kye-gwan, North Korea's vice foreign minister, had said that the North would take only limited steps if the U.S. leaves some of the funds frozen. In light of this, the BDA issue may affect the upcoming meetings.
  
  

  (SITE NOTE: As explained in previous articles, the DPRK is violating the Feb 13 agreement as these funds are not tied to the agreement. The issue was addressed in Berlin between the US-DPRK where the US agreed to release some of the "legitimate" funds, but not the total amount. Instead of declaring the North as absolved, the Treasury Department simply washed their hands of the Macao bank -- and walked away barring all US banks not to deal with the BDA. The bank can give the funds or do whatever it pleases according to the US. As of mid Mar, it was most likely the BDA would ask for an extension of the oversight period freezing the assets as it is due to expire at the end of this month. This is NOT what the DPRK wanted -- which was absolution from the accusation as counterfeiters. This may be a deal breaker. The Chinese "regret" the decision because the monkey has now been placed on their back to assure the Macaonese government returns the money as it is an autonomous Chinese region.)

  In addition, North Korea will not be easily removed from the U.S. list of states that sponsor terrorism. U.S. State Department spokesman Tom Casey said that taking North Korea off the terrorism blacklist is a process that will require a lot of time and careful reviews. He also made it clear that the process to normalize diplomatic ties between the U.S. and North Korea can move forward only when the North takes steps to make the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free. The six-nation agreement reached in Beijing on Feb. 13 requires the U.S. to start the process to remove the North from the terror list in the initial 60-day stage. The U.S. government must report to Congress 45 days before it removes a country from the list. A U.S. lawmaker said that the Bush administration could be flexible in implementing the Feb. 13 agreement, but removing North Korea from the list might take considerable time. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.))
  
  One of unsettled issues in the nuclear talks is whether the communist nation has a weapons program based on highly enriched uranium (HEU), an accusation made by Washington in late 2002, triggering the eruption of the ongoing crisis. Christopher Hill told Yonhap News Agency on Friday that his country would press the communist nation "in a couple of weeks" with its gathered evidence on the North's suspected HEU program. Kim Kye-gwan said Pyongyang was willing to work with Washington, but repeated his country's denial of having a uranium program, saying he will "explain" if the U.S. produces evidence. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)
  
  
• Plenary Session: On 19 Mar, the six participating countries will hold a plenary session, also in Beijing, to discuss in detail how to shut down North Korea's nuclear facilities.

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(Mar 2007)

US to Offer "Face-saving" Plan (Mar 2007) New York Times reported on 5 Mar that Bush administration officials said they plan to tell the DPRK negotiators on Monday that Washington's doubts about how much progress the country has made in enriching uranium gives it a face-saving way to surrender its nuclear equipment. The new approach to solve a dispute over the existence and extent of a uranium program, which intelligence agencies say could have been developed using equipment that the DPRK purchased from Pakistan, will come at a meeting at the United Nations. On 4 Mar, Christopher R. Hill, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, said that at the meeting he planned to form an agenda to work on our bilateral relationship: "what's involved in the establishment of diplomatic relations, what's involved before North Korea can get off the state-sponsor-of-terrorism list, and how to get them off the Trading with the Enemies Act." He said he would be "pressing for disclosure of all their nuclear programs, including highly enriched uranium."

But skepticism lingered on whether North Korea will faithfully implement the Feb. 13 agreement, given its breach of a 2002 pact that froze Pyongyang's nuclear activities. That year, the U.S. accused the North of hiding a secret nuclear weapons program using highly enriched uranium (HEU), commonly referred to as the HEU program. The New York Times reported Hill's delegation would provide Pyongyang with a "face-saving" way out of the HEU issue, citing ambiguity in the U.S. intelligence assessment on the program and thus allowing Pyongyang to simply explain that the HEU was a failed attempt to produce energy.

However, there might be differing views in the State Department of this "face-saving" plan. "I just don't know where that came from," said State Department spokesman McCormack. "We've said from the beginning, and it still stands that North Korea needs to come clean on all its nuclear programs, and that includes the HEU program."

Pyeongyang Ready to "Counter" US HEU Program Claims (Mar 2007) Yonhap News reported on 5 Mar that the DPRK was ready to counter allegations that it is developing a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program at an upcoming meeting for normalizing ties with the United States. "Foreign Affairs Vice Minister Kim Kye-kwan [Kim Kye Gwan] expresses intent to counter the US evidence on the HEU program and is confident of solving the problem," said the Choson Sinbo, a Korean-language newspaper published by the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan.

(SITE NOTE: This report had been surfaced in Feb as well. This move would seem to be aimed at pressing its advantage when the US admits its doubts of the 1994 revelation of the HEU programs based on the procurement of aluminum tubes.)

(SITE NOTE: This agreement was between governments, but the key player was not involved -- the DPRK military. North and South Korea agreed to conduct test-runs on two inter-Korean railways -- the Gyeongui railway in the west and Donghae railway in the east -- in May. The military blocked the tests claiming military secrets were involved. That has NOT been resolved so this is simply another propaganda ploy to gain the peoples' approval of the rice aid BEFORE the North has denuclearized -- and then feel free to blame the DPRK military for its failure AFTER the concrete, rice and fertilizer aid has all been off-loaded in the North. In the past the ROK has used unsubstantiated reports from NGO groups who would not provide their sources, to ship unmonitored "humanitarian" aid to North. This was simply another contrived excuse to continue the food shipments. The UN World Food Program has fallen short of its donations goal indicating that the world's nations aren't going to play the DPRK game of food shipments without monitoring.

Even worse are the implications that the ROK is undermining the six-party agreement by providing aid without any actions to dismantle the nuclear facilities. The ROK has only stated that the North was "serious" about doing so, but there has been no action since the DPRK will not pick up the money from the Banco Delta Asia (BDA). Thus the ROK has undermined the bargaining pressure being exerted by the US. To view the Roh administration as an open supporter of the DPRK is obvious -- to view it as an ally is dubious with all the dire implications.

A Chosun Ilbo editorial stated, "This administration wasted W3.6 billion (US$1=W928) in taxpayers' money on an oil tanker contract and heavy oil storage, just because it couldn't wait and see whether the North was abiding by the agreement before rushing to provide the 50,000 tons of heavy oil in reward. What kind of an agreement were we expecting in a relationship where South Korea is invariably pushed around by North Korea? And how can we trust any agreement we make?")

In other words, the North did not have to do anything on the denuclearization issue to gain what it needed from the South. The South has again cut the legs out from under the US which now has a weakened position in dealing with the North.)

(SITE NOTE: This is hype to convince the ROK populace -- and the world -- that it is taking a hard line with the DPRK, while in fact the ROK agreed to the aid with "no strings attached" in the 13th Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion Committee talks concluded in Pyongyang on 22 Apr. However, the heat was cranked up by the US to have the ROK deny the aid. In an interview aired 24 Apr on PBS, President Bush said that the U.S. cannot directly prod Pyongyang to shut down its reactor by way of withholding monetary aid, "because we don't have any aid." But, added Mr. Bush, "the Chinese can, or the South Koreans can." The president thanked South Korean leader Roh Moo-Hyun for being "so stalwart" in denying millions of dollars in aid to the North as a means of prompting the reclusive communist government to comply. If the aid goes through, the ROK will appear to the world as undermining the six-party agreement. It was also noted in the news that China had not shipped oil to the North for the second consecutive month.)

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Seoul 'Wasting W75 Million a Day' on N.Korea Delay (Apr 2007) Seoul is wasting W70-80 million a day on an oil tanker it rented in expectation of North Korea shutting down its nuclear facilities under a Feb.13 six-nation agreement by Saturday, it emerged Tuesday. The tanker is to transport the 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil worth W20 billion (US$1=W933) North Korea can expect as a reward under the agreement.

However, North Korea is unlikely to meet the deadline, 60 days from the original agreement, having delayed implementing its side of the deal due to wrangles over frozen funds of US$25 million in the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia.

But the South Korean government decided on Feb. 26 to spend W20 billion from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund on purchasing the 50,000 tons of heavy oil. One week later, it signed the purchase contract with GS Caltex and borrowed an oil tanker from a Chinese company. The purchase was approved in a security policy meeting and by the National Security Council.

A government source said top officials made the decision and no suggestion of a delay in the oil purchase was reflected. A senior oil industry insider said there was no reason to hurry to borrow an oil tanker so early in the day, since this could have been contracted two weeks before shipment. The 50,000 tons of heavy oil is now stored in a GS Caltex refinery in Yeosu, South Jeolla Province. According to a government source, the oil storage costs W15 million a day and the lease of the oil tanker W60 million. Although the government has not revealed the lease period, sources presume that the oil tanker is contracted from mid-March to April 20 when the ship was expected to arrive in North Korea. Therefore, the expense will have been completely pointless unless North Korea shuts down its nuclear facilities by then. A government official said the government had expected the Feb. 13 agreement to be implemented as scheduled without being hampered by the BDA issue. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

Contract Cancelled (Apr 2007) On 16 Apr it was reported that the Unification Ministry decided to cancel contracts to buy 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil from GS Caltex and rent an oil tanker from a Chinese firm it had signed in expectation of North Korea meeting the deadline. The ministry will make fresh arrangements when North Korea takes concrete measures. The cost of borrowing the tanker and other expenses have meant a loss of some W3.6 billion (US$1=W929). Seoul is wasting W100 million a day due to expenses incurred from the pre-purchase of the oil and the hasty lease of the tanker. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

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US Turned Blind Eye to North Korea Arms Deal (Apr 2007) Reuters reported on 9 Apr that the Bush Administration allowed Ethiopia to complete a secret arms purchase from the DPRK in an apparent violation of a UN Security Council sanctions resolution passed months earlier over its nuclear test. Citing unnamed United States officials from a number of agencies, the New York Times said the US allowed the January arms delivery in part because Ethiopia was fighting Islamic militias in Somalia in an offensive that aided US policies of combating religious extremists in the Horn of Africa. A State Department spokesman declined to comment on the specifics of the shipment, but said the US was "deeply committed to upholding and enforcing UN Security Council resolutions", the newspaper reported. No response from the Ethiopian Embassy was available.

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DPRK Still on Terrorist Sponsor List (Apr 2007) On 24 Apr Yonhap reported that the US will likely continue to designate the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism this year despite efforts to improve bilateral ties underway. The North was designated as a supporter of terrorism for the first time in January 1988, right after the bombing of a Korean Air jet by North Korean terrorists the previous year. Since 1987, the communist country is not known to have committed terrorist acts. According to the report, North Korea continues to sell ballistic missile technology to countries designated by the U.S. as state sponsors of terrorism, including Syria and Libya.

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Gen Bell: DPRK to Become Moderate Nuclear Power by 2010 (Apr 2007) On 24 Apr, U.S. Army Gen. B.B. Bell, the head of U.S. forces in South Korea, told lawmakers that North Korea could become a "moderate nuclear power" by 2010 if current disarmament negotiations fail. Leader Kim Jong Il's government, Bell told the Senate Armed Services Committee, views its ballistic missile program as a source of international prestige and regional influence, a deterrent against attack and a means of generating money from exports. As a result, he said in testimony, the North continues to produce missiles "and may ultimately aim to develop nuclear armed missiles to threaten regional countries and even the U.S."

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Bush, Abe Warn of Tougher Stance on NK (Apr 2007) On 27 Apr President Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Shinjo Abe threatened stronger punitive actions against North Korea if it does not follow through on a promise to shut down its nuclear reactor. In a joint news conference on 27 Apr after talks with the Japanese leader, Bush said their patience regarding North Korea was not limited. Abe said that if the North fails to keep its promise, the two countries will step up pressure on Pyongyang, and that they see eye to eye on that point.

Asked if he has softened his policy toward North Korea compared with the past, Bush denied it, describing his North Korea policy as "wise," not "soft." Bush warned that if North Korean leader Kim Jong-il finds another reason to backtrack on the February 13th six-way nuclear agreement, the United States will seek more sanctions against the North. Abe also joined the warning, saying that existing Japanese food and economic sanctions will worsen if North Korea continues to defy the international community.

This announcement was preceded on 25 Apr by Victor Cha, President Bush's top adviser on North Korea, when he told North Korean officials in New York City that frustration is rising 10 days after the North missed a deadline to shut down its main nuclear reactor. He urged them to act on a nuclear disarmament pledge and telling them that U.S. patience is limited. The officials stated they would forward the message to their superiors in North Korea. The State Department occasionally sends messages to Pyongyang through North Korean officials at the United Nations in New York, but it is unusual for a White House official to make the trip and indicates the importance the Bush administration attaches to making progress on the issue.

The North Korean stall rotates around its insistence of regaining "normal transactions" in the international banking system. North Korea "did not place its primary goal on withdrawing the frozen US$25 million," said the Choson Sinbo, a pro-DPRK newspaper based in Tokyo. The North's demand for resolving the issue requires that "normal transactions take place with the funds according to the international financial regime," the paper said. The US freed up the funds on 21 Apr, but it did not lift its accounts that it is "tainted money." As a result international banks do not wish to touch it -- even the Chinese. Thus the agreement of 13 Feb remains in limbo -- though some construction has been observed via satellite at the Yongbin Reactor site.

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N.Korea 'Used Political Prisoners to Dig Nuke Test Shaft' (May 2007) North Korea used political prisoners from a concentration camp to prepare for its underground nuclear test on Oct. 9 last year, a federation of North Korean refugee organizations in South Korea alleged Monday. In a briefing in Seoul co-sponsored by the U.S. rights watchdog Freedom House, the Committee for Democratization of North Korea said it has testimony that North Korea was able to keep its nuclear test secret even from citizens because it used prisoners from a concentration camp in Hwaseong, North Hamgyeong Province.

Evidence that Pyongyang mobilized political prisoners to dig an underground shaft near Mount Mantap where it conducted the nuclear test, comes from Ahn Myong-chol, a former guard at the concentration camp, it said. Some 10,000 people were taken to Mount Mantap between 1987 and 1994. "Testimony that the nuclear test was closely linked with a political prison camp is backed by reports that North Korea frequently mobilizes political prisoners for medical experiments or dangerous construction projects,” a spokesman for the organization said. The concentration camp in Hwaseong reportedly houses mainly senior political prisoners. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

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Russia Joins in UN Sanctions (May 2007) RIA Novosti reported on 30 May that Russia had agreed to impose UN sanctions on the DPRK following its nuclear bomb test last October. President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on 27 May prohibiting Russian state and government agencies, industrial, commercial, financial and transport companies, and enterprises, firms and banks from exporting or transiting military hardware, equipment, materials, or know-how which could be used in the DPRK's nuclear or non-nuclear weapons programs. It also prohibits any financial operations with legal entities or individuals who have been identified by the UN as being directly or indirectly involved in the nuclear arms program. This was a U-turn on Russia's previous stance and will bring more pressure on the DPRK which has stalled on implementing denuclearization steps due to its insistence on accepting its money through a banking channel.

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June 2007

N.Korea Reactor Inactive 'for About a Month' (June 2007) North Korea’s nuclear reactor in Yongbyon has been out of operation for about a month, but intelligence officials are sharply divided whether that means the North is implementing a Feb. 13 denuclearization agreement. North Korea missed the April 13 deadline to shut down the reactor under the six-nation agreement due to a delay in the transfer of funds unfrozen in a Macau bank. Since the agreement was reached, the Yongbyon reactor had been out of work for two to four days at a time on three or four occasions.


Yongbyon Reactor (2003)

South Korean and American intelligence analysts are divided in their views on this. Some of them believe that to pressure South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, North Korea is showing off its ability to reprocess spent fuel rods to extract weapons-grade plutonium. The reactor has to be shut down to extract the fuel rods. Others believe that North Korea has started to implement the Feb. 13 agreement. Government sources on 3 Jun said Seoul is conducting a precise analysis since the 5 megawatt reactor has not been in operation since early May. One official at the NIS stated, "We believe the operation of the reactor was halted because of a mechanical problem," the official said. "It is not seen as having anything to do with the North's commitment to the Feb. 13 deal."



Yongbyon Reactor Complex (2003)

If North Korea has suspended the reactor's operation to extract plutonium, it could throw back the six-party negotiations. According to some experts, North Korea is probably suspending the reactor's operation to pressure South Korea, the U.S. and Japan to keep up their end of the bargain and finally transfer the US$25 million from Banco Delta Asia. Intelligence authorities point out that the reactor, whose operation has been suspended at intervals of a year to two years and six months since 1986, resumed full operation in July 2005. They believe that North Korea may have suspended operation to take out the spent fuel rods to extract plutonium, a raw material for nuclear weapons. However, the reprocessing facility at Yongbyon has shown no signs of operation yet.

The Feb. 13 agreement envisages compensating the North with 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil in step with its implementation of the agreement once the reactor has been shut down. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

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DPRK Invites IAEA Inspectors (Jun 2007) On 17 Jun it was reported that North Korea invited U.N. nuclear inspectors in the first concrete sign of a breakthrough in a stalemate over its nuclear program, as the transfer of frozen North Korean funds at the center of the dispute neared completion.

The North sent a letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency, inviting inspectors to discuss shutting down its nuclear reactor, because "it is confirmed that the process of de-freezing the funds ... at Banco Delta Asia in Macau has reached its final phase," the country's official Korean Central News Agency reported. It said a "working-level delegation" from the U.N. nuclear watchdog had been invited to discuss procedures for the IAEA's verification and monitoring of the Yongbyon reactor's shutdown. In Vienna, IAEA spokesman Ayhan Evrensel said the agency had not yet received a letter from North Korea. He declined to comment further.

South Korea's chief nuclear envoy, Chun Yung-woo, also welcomed the development as "good news." "As we watch how the discussions between North Korea and the IAEA proceed, we will start preparations for implementing our own obligations as outlined by the Feb. 13 agreement," Chun told The Associated Press by telephone. Chun was referring to the shipment of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil the North Korea is to receive in return for shutting down its reactor and allowing U.N. inspectors back into the country to verify the closure and seal the facility. North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors in December 2002. (Source: International Herald Tribune.)

On 18 Jun Reuters reported that according to Russia's Interfax news agency, the DPRK planned to seal its nuclear reactor, the source of weapons-grade plutonium, in the second half of July, citing an unidentified DPRK diplomatic source. Despite more than two months of delay in beginning the dismantlement of the DPRK's atomic program, it would still be possible to complete the nuclear disarmament of the communist state by the end of the year, the chief US nuclear envoy said. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN nuclear watchdog, said a senior delegation would visit the DPRK next week to agree on details for a return of its inspectors to monitor Pyongyang's promised nuclear shutdown. "So we are counting on sealing it in the second half of July, in accordance with the agreements reached at the six-party talks," the source said. "We plan to invite the experts of the IAEA a second time, when the reactor is fully sealed in order to convince them of that," the DPRK source was quoted as saying.

More progress over the DPRK's nuclear program is possible after Pyongyang agreed to let in UN inspectors to monitor the shutdown of its nuclear reactor, ROK Prime Minister Han Duck-soo said. "We hope that from now on the speed will be more accelerated and we hope that the first phase of the measures that should be taken by North Korea should be done very quickly," Han said. He said the recent unblocking of millions of dollars in DPRK funds frozen in Macau at the request of the US appeared to have persuaded Pyongyang that it was in its interests to work with the international community. "Once this ... issue ended, right away, North Korea actually invited the IAEA surveillance team. So let's see," he said. "North Korea now knows that it can get real help from the six party talks. So I think the reaction will be promising." "It's a very big step in a way and they can boost the confidence in countries among the six-party talks," he said, adding that mutual suspicions between the participants was one of the biggest problems dogging the issue. "Now this kind of action taken by six party members and North Korea will enhance the credibility and standards of our six party talks," he said.

IAEA Visit Put on Hold (Jun 2007) Reuters reported on 21 Jun that a visit by UN nuclear monitors to the DPRK set for the week of 26 Jun had been put on hold. The signs of movement in a long stalled process faltered when the DPRK embassy in Vienna, headquarters of the IAEA, said Pyongyang had not received any of $25 million released from frozen funds. "As of now, the frozen funds had not reached our bank account. Nobody knows why the remittance is delayed," said Hyon Yong Man, counsellor at Pyongyang's embassy in Vienna. "So our side has informed the IAEA that we have no objection to them preparing the visit as a plan, but we are not ready to give our official confirmation for the visit as scheduled by the agency," he said. However, Interfax reported on 21 Jun that the transfer of $25 million from a Macau-based bank to the DPRK had almost been completed, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak said. "All the necessary agreements have been reached, all the guarantees have been given, and, in my opinion, the problem has been resolved," he said. "It is now the question of pressing buttons, rather than making political decisions. The money is being transferred while I am speaking to you," he said.

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BDA Holdup Finished (Jun 2007) North Korea on 25 Jun reconfirmed its pledge to denuclearize under a February agreement, saying its funds held in a Macau bank have been transferred to the North to clear away the major obstacle to the implementation of the nuclear disarmament deal. In an interview carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), a spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry also said the funds will be used for humanitarian purposes, as promised.

The announcement came one day before a delegation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is scheduled to arrive in Pyongyang on 26 Jun for discussions on shutting down and disabling the North's nuclear facilities as the first step in the denuclearization program. The spokesman confirmed that the North would soon get on with implementing the six-nation agreement signed on Feb. 13 in which the communist nation promised to shut down and seal its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. "As part of efforts to that end, (North Korea) is set to start negotiations on the shutdown of the nuclear facility and its verification with a working-level delegation of the IAEA in Pyongyang from June 26," the spokesman said.

The spokesman confirmed the transfer of the funds to North Korea. "As the money frozen in Macau's Banco Delta Asia has been transferred as we demanded, the troublesome issue of the frozen funds has been resolved." The released money is planned to be used to improve the livelihood of the people and other humanitarian purposes as agreed between the North and the United States, added the unidentified spokesman.

North Korea's US$25 million in the Banco Delta Asia had been frozen since late 2005, when the U.S. blacklisted the bank as a "primary money laundering concern" because of its alleged link to the North's alleged illicit financial activities that included counterfeiting U.S. bills and money laundering. Washington finalized the ruling earlier this year, but agreed to the release of the North Korean funds in March on condition that the money be used for humanitarian purposes.

The transfer of the money to a North Korean account in a Russian bank was completed Saturday, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry. This is the first time for Pyongyang to acknowledge the end of the banking dispute, which Washington had declared over in March, then again in April when the Macanese financial authorities unblocked the BDA funds for withdrawal.

North Korea refused to honor the February agreement until the money was released. "The reason we were so serious about the (release) of the frozen funds was not because it's a large amount but because it is the key symbol of (U.S.) hostile policy toward us," the North Korean official said. In a statement carried by the KCNA Saturday, an unidentified spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry said the country has agreed to "start implementing the (Feb. 13) agreement" as soon as the BDA issue is settled. The statement followed a two-day trip starting on 21 Jun by Washington's chief nuclear negotiator Christopher Hill to Pyongyang where he held "comprehensive and productive" discussions with his North Korean counterparts on the nuclear issue. (Source: Hankyoreh News: Yonhap News.)

(See BANCO DELTA ASIA MONEY TRANSFER FIASCO for details of the fiasco that accompanied the transfer of funds.)

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DPRK Hopes 6-Party Ministerial Talks in August (Jun 2007) Donga Ilbo reported that the DPRK said on June 23 that it is talking with the US to hold a six-party foreign ministers' meeting in early August. A spokesperson for the DPRK Foreign Ministry said in an interview with the Korean Central News Agency, the country's official news agency, that, "The two sides (Pyongyang and Washington) agreed to check the possibility of holding a six-party foreign ministers' meeting on the sidelines of the ministerial meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum scheduled for early August in the Philippines, and to cooperate to successfully hold the meeting." Christopher Hill remained confident that if all goes well, the reactor could be shut down by Dec 2008.

(SITE NOTE: President Roh still hopes to conduct an Inter-Korean summit at Kaesong in Aug 2007 as well. This is all dependent upon the cooperation of the DPRK to restart the six-party talks process. With this in mind, the ROK will ship rice to the DPRK at the end of June using the justification of the DPRK "willingness" to restart the six-party talks, even though no steps for denuclearization have taken place. The ROK first promised to send the rice aid, but then refused because of popular protests. The Roh government has now claimed that it consulted with the "people" and NGO groups before making this decision -- though that is questionable. (See South Korean Events: 2007: Humanitarian Aid: Rice for details.)

(SITE NOTE: This is the problem that many find with the 13 Feb agreement. It only addressed the plutonium threat, but not the enriched uranium threat.)

(SITE NOTE: Very little changed between July and Sept 2007, as Christopher Hill bounced back and forth between capitals saying he was confident that the North would shut down its nuclear programs by December and reveal the full extent of its nuclear warhead programs. On the other hand, the North kept stating that it "intended" to shut down its nuclear programs -- but never putting anything in writitng. In Sep 2007, it stated that it was near being removed from the US terrorist list, but Christopher Hill rebutted that statement saying it was far into the future.

This is from a 1999 book by Chuck Downs who believed the US should treat North Korea with a "Stick-and-Stick" negotiating policy. Instead, the US is pursuing a "carrot-and-stick" process that Downs felt was counter-productive after it caved in on the BD. For 50 years, the North has followed the same pattern of negotiating. According to Downs, any negotiating relationship with the DPRK follows a standardized pattern of behavior that focuses on two specific goals: "[First,] the North Koreans negotiate to win concessions that strengthen the communist regime's political control. Second, they pursue objectives designed to enhance their military capabilities". For more than 50 years this isolated, perpetually failing regime has consistently achieved those two goals through manipulating US and -international fears of war and through pursuing its bullying style of negotiation. Five clearly identifiable stages mark the DPRK negotiating strategy. First, the regime will use or instigate a crisis to coerce ROK or US negotiators to the bargaining table. The second phase of the DPRK negotiating strategy usually culminates with an agreement that includes statements of guilt, apology, or major concessions from the United States, ROK, or UN participants to the negotiations. Third, after some time passes, North Korea will begin to dispute the terms of the agreement. Fourth, the DPRK will pull out or otherwise break the agreement (often sparking another crisis). And finally, the North attempts to shift blame for breaking the agreement to a third party—usually the ROK or the United States. (Source: Chuck Downs, Over the Line: North Korea's Negotiating Strategy, 1999..) In this current, six party process, the process is stuck at the second phase -- with the ROK giveaways and US concessions. The DPRK still "promises" to shut down its nuclear programs by the end of the year -- without any time-lines in writing. As of 2005, we are still awaiting the "denial stage" of Phase 3.)

(SITE NOTE: The oil shipment was delivered on 19 Sep 2007)

(SITE NOTE: The removal from the terrorist list is a controversial item -- if President Bush has evidence of a Syria-DPRK connection as suggested in Sept 2007, this may be a hot potato if he does so and the facts are revealed by the Israelis. The statement may be more wishful thinking by the Joongang Ilbo based of vague wordings by Christopher Hill in the joint statement that said it would do so AFTER the denuclearization process.)

(SITE NOTE: The removal from the terrorist list is equivalent to the counterfeit money fiasco that stalled the denuclearization before. The North is mixing an issue not directly related to the nuclear issue to achieve leverage. The US has just about had enough of the DPRK tactics and this can backfire big time if the DPRK presses it to the extent that it did the Banco Delta account. George Bush has issued a preparatory warning to the DPRK to NOT try the same shenanigans as it did before to stall the denuclearization process. Japan is highly critical of this step without the resolution of the abduction issue.

By law, the U.S. administration has to submit to Congress a letter of certification 45 days before North Korea is removed from the list to prove that the communist country has changed. Some officials say this procedure can be omitted.

Once struck from that list, North Korea can be also be taken off the various blacklists of international financial organizations including the IMF. Embargoes on exports of dual-use technology to North Korea will also likely be removed, which could include state-of-the-art computers or chemicals.And once the Trading with the Enemy Act, which has included North Korea since 1950, no longer applies, North Korea will be able to get its U.S. assets unfrozen and do business with U.S. banks. When the Korean War broke out, the U.S. Treasury imposed a total ban on trading and financial transactions with North Korea. North Korea’s assets in the U.S. are estimated at about US$14 million.)

(SITE NOTE: Unfortunately, the US has NOT promised this removal immediately -- only that it would START work on the removal. The question of the NK reporting its nuclear programs "completely" still hangs in the air. In addition, hardline conservatives are pointing to the Syria-NK connection -- though it is still a vague area.)

(SITE NOTE: NK has refused to disclose locations of its nuclear weapons as part of the disclosure.)

(SITE NOTE: It was the first time Bush directly communicated with the reclusive North Korean leader, although his predecessor Bill Clinton sent three direct letters to the North Korean leader while in office.)

(SITE NOTE: This can be viewed as another attempt by the Roh administration to claim credit for something it had nothing to do with -- or atleast appear to be a participant in the decision. Previously letters were sent on 1 Dec to other parties of the six-party talks by Bush to clarify the US stance.)

(SITE NOTE: Technicians disabling the plant have completed or nearly completed seven of the 11 key tasks expected under the agreement. A key factor in the delay is that officials discovered that water in a cooling pond for spent fuel rods is contaminated, a potentially dangerous situation that North Korea was willing to ignore to meet the deadline. But U.S. officials objected and insisted that the water must first be filtered.

Four key steps in disabling the plant have been completed, and three are nearly completed, administration officials said, citing reports from U.S. observers at the site. At the reactor, the concrete bottom of its cooling tower has been broken through, rendering it unusable. A secondary cooling loop has also been severed. At the reprocessing plant, workers have removed machinery that helped transfer spent fuel rods into hot cells and have severed steam-line valves used to heat the reprocessing areas of the building. In the fuel fabrication facility, workers are close to removing casting furnaces and uranium metal reduction furnaces necessary to shape the fuel rods. )

(SITE NOTE: This conflicts with other reports that there is trouble in the deadline on full-disclosure of nuclear assets.)

(SITE NOTE: The DPRK-Syria connection may lead to contacts BEFORE the six-party agreement and may fall short of a smoking gun proof. In Feb 2008, U.S. chief nuclear negotiator Christopher Hill told the U.S. Senate he believes North Korea does not have the capability to produce uranium for nuclear operations. Hill stated that according to inspection results of North Korea's facilities, the aluminum tubes suspected of being used for uranium enrichment have been cleared of those allegations, although the inspection was only carried out on a number of the tubes. [KBS Global.] This report is being challenged. In Chris Hill's testimony he did state that the North did show the inspectors where the tubes had been used, but this was only a partial explanation. Hill said that a small number of samples tested did not show traces of enriched uranium. The previous Washington Post report said that samples of smelted-down aluminum tested positive for enriched uranium. The [intelligence community] continues to assess that North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment capability at least in the past, and judges with at least moderate confidence that the effort continues today. [DNI, National Threat Assessment, 5 Feb 08.])

(SITE NOTE: Though the ROK media publicized that the US had set a deadline, the US official stance is that no firm deadline was set. Hill's statement only reflect a "wish" -- and the six-party process will continue.)

(SITE NOTE: The reference to "simultaneous action" was to the Russians providing oil -- though the Russians felt that the DPRK had to fulfill its part of shutdown of the reactors first. In the end, Russia relented and sent the oil. As to the removal from the list or terrorist sponsors, the DPRK is not going to see that anytime soon. The DPRK is back to its old negotiating strategy of promise and renege. Unfortunately, the world is now turning against the DPRK -- and patience even with the Chinese is running out. The Chinese stated that they would coordinate with the UN if the DPRK collapsed in sending forces into the North to "stabilize" the country.)

(SITE NOTE: The ping-pong ball is now back in the DPRK's court. The US wants a complete "and verifiable" list of nuclear actions and the shutdown of nuclear reactors.)

(SITE NOTE: Promise everything...deliver nothing. NK says the same bull again...and again...and again. Only the Roh administration believes this garbage...)

(SITE NOTE: At the same time, the human rights issues of North Korea continue to vie for time but has received a cold should by the State Department as it adds more problems to the six party process. Jay Lefkowitz, President George W. Bush's special envoy on North Korea human rights, said on 17 Jan that Pyongyang's failure to meet a key deadline in the nuclear agreement "signals that North Korea is not serious about disarming in a timely manner." He called for a reassessment of the six-party talks in which the United States and four regional powers since 2003 have been trying to persuade North Korea to abandon a nuclear weapons program it had secretly pursued for decades and which culminated in a nuclear bomb test in late 2006.

Lefkowitz also faulted South Korea and China for continuing heavy flows of unconditional bilateral aid to North Korea even as Pyongyang escalated the nuclear crisis. But State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said Lefkowitz, while an envoy for human rights, was not authorized to speak for the government about the six-party talks. (Source: Yahoo: Reuters.))

(SITE NOTE: The DPRK is playing a dangerous game -- that everyone, meaning China, Japan, US, Europe, Russia, are just about fed up with their antics. This is exactly what was warned by conservative DPRK watchers when the "agreement" was reached. They said that the DPRK would promise the world, and then renege. The worst case scenario could be that the progress of "rewards" could be similarly "slowed" in response. The best case scenario is that the six-party process continues on with a lot of talk but no results.)

(SITE NOTE: We are wondering if the US was conveying its "impatience" with the North on its planned slow-down of the denuclearization of the Yongbin reactor. The North is anticipating a famine condition and needs foreign aid from the ROK and other countries. This might be on the table for arm twisting -- and now that the ROK has declared that under the Lee administration, it will resume the tri-party agreements that existed back in the 1990s before Kim Dae-jung where the ROK will coordinate its actions with the US and Japan. These pressures may have been placed on the table. Lee Myung-bak, has pledged to scrutinize inter-Korean economic cooperation by taking into account its feasibility and progress in North Korea's nuclear disarmament. "Even if the two Koreas have agreed on certain projects, it is necessary to consider the progress in North Korea's nuclear problem and judge through feasibility studies whether they are economically reasonable," Lee, 67, said in an interview with the mass-circulation Donga Ilbo.)

(SITE NOTE: The bottomline is that the DPRK is stalling -- not making any commitment, while making it appear that the US has NOT fulfilled its end of the bargain. In Feb, the US blinked and stated that "perhaps" it appeared that it was not in sync with the North -- meaning that the agreement suddenly became reciprocal when it wasn't before. The US stated it would send oil. BOTTOMLINE: The DPRK has won again without giving anything.)

(SITE NOTE: Of the 950,000 tons of fuel oil, only one-fifth has been delivered. Hill blamed the antiquated system in the North as a reason for the slow-down.)

(SITE NOTE: Hill stated that the plutonium issue will be resolved, but that the Highly Enriched Uranium program remains in limbo. CIA has "high confidence" that such a program was in existence at some point. This needs clarification. In Feb 2008, U.S. chief nuclear negotiator Christopher Hill told the U.S. Senate he believes North Korea does not have the capability to produce uranium for nuclear operations. Hill stated that according to inspection results of North Korea's facilities, the aluminum tubes suspected of being used for uranium enrichment have been cleared of those allegations, although the inspection was only carried out on a number of the tubes. [KBS Global.] This report is being challenged. In Chris Hill's testimony he did state that the North did show the inspectors where the tubes had been used, but this was only a partial explanation. The [intelligence community] continues to assess that North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment capability at least in the past, and judges with at least moderate confidence that the effort continues today. [DNI, National Threat Assessment, 5 Feb 08.])

(SITE NOTE: Chris Hill's use of words such as "nearly" or "almost" or "underway" have taken on a new meaning of putting the best spin on a bad situation. The bottomline is that the DPRK is stalling and the US wants the six-party talks to continue.)

(SITE NOTE: The North Korean threat is to implement a "certain measure" -- an ambiguous threat that could be anything. However, it is apparent that the US -- with the change in the ROK government -- is about to call the bluff. The worry is the reaction of the Chinese if this happens. They are already planning for the DPRK collapse and this might make things all the more sticky.)

(SITE NOTE: The ROK has stated that human rights will not deter inter-Korea relations. However, the US has shown a willingness to NOT press the human rights issues -- nor the Japanese abduction issues -- to keep the six-party process going.)

(SITE NOTE: The North also said it will have no choice but to "take a certain measure "provided the U.S. warmongers keep taking a tough stance" against the communist state." This is the typical North Korean strategy of promising, negating, blathering with threats, awaiting appeasement (which the US did by promising to send oil), pushing for more concessions, renegotiating and starting all over -- basically promise everything and deliver nothing.)

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US Eased Sanctions on North in 2007 (Feb 2008) Korea Times reported that Voice of America (VOA) said on 12 Feb that U.S. President George W. Bush approved the lifting of some sanctions imposed on the DPRK under an act governing human trafficking in mid-October, 2007. Washington notified the DPRK of the decision. The easing allowed the US to provide assistance in educational and cultural exchanges to the extent that the aid doesn't damage its national interest. Though Washington wants to expand exchanges in various fields with Pyongyang, in reality, all the efforts are affected by the results of the six-party talks," a State Department official said on condition of anonymity. "The lifting of sanctions indicates the U.S. intention to open its doors for more exchanges and better relations with North Korea."

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NK Responsible for Proving Uranium Issue (Feb 2008) Korea Times on 13 Feb reported that Chun Yung-woo, ROK chief representative to the six-party talks, said that the DPRK not the United States is responsible for proving whether it has a uranium enrichment program (UEP) for nuclear weapons. "We demand North Korea gives a full account 15 whether the account is about past equipment, materials, technology and purchasing activities related with UEP or about all suspicions that have been raised, or whether it is an activity that the North stopped doing or continues to do," he said. "The disablement process is not satisfactory but overall most goals in the disablement were realized," he continued. "It would take over one year to resume operations of the nuclear facilities if North Korea completes disabling of the facilities. But the declaration process is by nature very difficult because North Korea needs to change its position and make a political decision, and that's why the declaration process takes much more time than disablement," he added.

(SITE NOTE: Most people were surprised that the ROK representative would take a "tough talk" stance after all the years of the Roh administration's appeasement policies. However, this is what will be the "new" voice of the ROK government once Lee Myeong-bak conservatives take over. Unfortunately, most experts feel that the North will be taking a delaying tactic on any declaration and hope to find more furtile ground with the next US administration next summer. Everyone is now focused on the the US demanding full disclosure over the UEP reporting issue.

An editorial in the Segye Ilbo by Koh Yoo-hwan, professor of DPRK studies at Dongguk Univ stated that if the US assertion about the DPRK's development of uranium enrichment is revealed as untrue, it is highly likely that the US will be criticized for inducing the DPRK nuclear crisis and nuclear test. In fact, some parties are now saying they have never seen the "incomplete" list the DPRK provided to the US in Nov 2007. For the DPRK, if it admits to a UEP program, the admission would mean a violation of Geneva agreement. They are concerned about whether it will make it becomes less likely for the light-water reactor to be provided to them. Also, the admission can make the US conservative resolve become even more firm. Bush's lame duck status seems to make the problem even worse. The DPRK has chosen to wait for the next administration hoping for a return of their old buddy Bill Clinton-style Democratic Party to negotiate the problem.)

(SITE NOTE: What is "material that was nuclear related" mean?)

The attack was launched with American approval on September 6 after Washington was shown evidence the material was nuclear related, the well-placed sources say. They confirmed that samples taken from Syria for testing had been identified as North Korean. This raised fears that Syria might have joined North Korea and Iran in seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. Israeli special forces had been gathering intelligence for several months in Syria, according to Israeli sources. They located the nuclear material at a compound near Dayr az-Zwar in the north.

Evidence that North Korean personnel were at the site is said to have been shared with President George W Bush over the summer. A senior American source said the administration sought proof of nuclear-related activities before giving the attack its blessing. Diplomats in North Korea and China believe a number of North Koreans were killed in the strike, based on reports reaching Asian governments about conversations between Chinese and North Korean officials. (Source: Times Online.)

(SITE NOTE: According to globalsecurity.org, Syria is not a signatory of either the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), - an international agreement banning the production, stockpiling or use of chemical weapons - or the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Syria began developing chemical weapons in 1973, just before the Yom Kipper War. Globalsecurity.org cites the country as having one of the most advanced chemical weapons programs in the Middle East, JPost.com reports.)

(SITE NOTE: The reported dialogue between Bush and Roh on 7 Sep summit now takes on new meanings: President Bush was most certainly briefed of the suspicions of this. NK-Syria connection before the 6 Sep raid in Syria because he would have had to give the go-ahead for support of the raid. The results of the raid would not have been ascertained by the time of his meeting with Roh. Bush was telling Roh that he would wait and see if the North was clean … or whether they were simply playing a game as they have done so often in the past.

But as to this "proof" from Israel, I still don't know what "nuclear related materials" means. Also how did they ascertain it was from North Korea? Also will there be damning proof of photographs of dead DPRK workers lying strewn around nuclear equipment. Also what happens to the ROK-DPRK summit if the DPRK is proven to be a liar about their denuclearization intentions? What are the impacts to the six-party talks resumption next week? Bottom line: NEED MORE SOLID, IRREFUTABLE PROOF — SOMETHING THE WORLD CAN AGREE ON. All this is still in the "he said" stages of media reporting.)

The Sunday London Times
September 23, 2007
Snatched: Israeli commandos 'nuclear' raid
Uzi Mahnaimi, Tel Aviv, Sarah Baxter, Washington, and Michael Sheridan

ISRAELI commandos from the elite Sayeret Matkal unit – almost certainly dressed in Syrian uniforms – made their way stealthily towards a secret military compound near Dayr az-Zawr in northern Syria. They were looking for proof that Syria and North Korea were collaborating on a nuclear programme.

Israel had been surveying the site for months, according to Washington and Israeli sources. President George W Bush was told during the summer that Israeli intelligence suggested North Korean personnel and nuclear-related material were at the Syrian site.

Israel was determined not to take any chances with its neighbour. Following the example set by its raid on an Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak 1981, it drew up plans to bomb the Syrian compound.

But Washington was not satisfied. It demanded clear evidence of nuclear-related activities before giving the operation its blessing. The task of the commandos was to provide it.

Today the site near Dayr az-Zawr lies in ruins after it was pounded by Israeli F15Is on September 6. Before the Israelis issued the order to strike, the commandos had secretly seized samples of nuclear material and taken them back into Israel for examination by scientists, the sources say. A laboratory confirmed that the unspecified material was North Korean in origin. America approved an attack.

News of the secret ground raid is the latest piece of the jigsaw to emerge about the mysterious Israeli airstrike. Israel has imposed a news blackout, but has not disguised its satisfaction with the mission. The incident also reveals the extent of the cooperation between America and Israel over nuclear-related security issues in the Middle East. The attack on what Israeli defence sources now call the "North Korean project" appears to be part of a wider, secret war against the nonconventional weapons ambitions of Syria and North Korea which, along with Iran, appears to have been forging a new "axis of evil".

The operation was personally directed by (former Prime Minister) Ehud Barak, the Israeli defence minister, who is said to have been largely preoccupied with it since taking up his post on June 18.

It was the ideal mission for Barak, Israel's most decorated soldier and legendary former commander of the Sayeret Matkal, which shares the motto "Who Dares Wins" with Britain's SAS and specialises in intelligence-gathering deep behind enemy lines.

President Bush refused to comment on the air attack last week, but warned North Korea that "the exportation of information and/or materials" could jeopardise plans to give North Korea food aid, fuel and diplomatic recognition in exchange for ending its nuclear programmes.

Diplomats in North Korea and China said they believed a number of North Koreans were killed in the raid, noting that ballistic missile technicians and military scientists had been working for some time with the Syrians.

A senior Syrian official, Sayeed Elias Daoud, director of the Syrian Arab Ba'ath party, flew to North Korea via Beijing last Thursday, reinforcing the belief among foreign diplomats that the two nations are coordinating their response to the Israeli strike.

The growing assumption that North Korea suffered direct casualties in the raid appears to be based largely on the regime's unusually strident propaganda on an issue far from home. But there were also indications of conversations between Chinese and North Korean officials and intelligence reports reaching Asian governments that supported the same conclusion, diplomats said.

Jane's Defence Weekly reported last week that dozens of Iranian engineers and Syrians were killed in July attempting to load a chemical warhead containing mustard gas onto a Scud missile. The Scuds and warheads are of North Korean design and possibly manufacture, and there are recent reports that North Koreans were helping the Syrians to attach airburst chemical weapons to warheads.

Yesterday, while Israelis were observing Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, the military was on high alert after Syria promised to retaliate for the September 6 raid. An Israeli intelligence expert said: "Syria has retaliated in the past for much smaller humiliations, but they will choose the place, the time and the target."

Critics of Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian president, believe he has shown poor judgment since succeeding his father Hafez, Syria's long-time dictator, in 2000. According to David Schenker, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, he has provoked the enmity of almost all Syria's neighbours and turned his country into a "client" of Iran.

Barak's return to government after making a fortune in private business was critical to the Israeli operation. Military experts believe it could not have taken place under Amir Peretz, the defence minister who was forced from the post after last year's ill-fated war in Lebanon. "Barak gave Olmert the confidence needed for such a dangerous operation," said one insider.

The unusual silence about the airstrikes amazed Israelis, who are used to talkative politicians. But it did not surprise the defence community. "Most Israeli special operations remain unknown," said a defence source.

When Menachem Begin, then Israeli prime minister, broke the news of the 1981 Osirak raid, he was accused of trying to help his Likud party's prospects in forthcoming elections.

Benjamin Netanyahu, who leads Likud today, faced similar criticism last week when he ignored the news blackout, revealed that he had backed the decision to strike and said he had congratulated Olmert. "I was a partner from the start," he claimed.

But details of the raid are still tantalisingly incomplete. Some analysts in America are perplexed by photographs of a fuel tank said to have been dropped from an Israeli jet on its return journey over Turkey. It appears to be relatively undamaged. Could it have been planted to sow confusion about the route taken by the Israeli F-15I pilots?

More importantly, questions remain about the precise nature of the material seized and about Syria's intentions. Was Syria hiding North Korean nuclear equipment while Pyongyang prepared for six-party talks aimed at securing an end to its nuclear weapons programme in return for security guarantees and aid? Did Syria want to arm its own Scuds with a nuclear device?

Or could the material have been destined for Iran as John Bolton, the former US ambassador to the United Nations, has suggested? And just how deep is Syrian and North Korean nuclear cooperation anyway?

China abruptly postponed a session of the nuclear disarmament talks last week because it feared America might confront the North Koreans over their weapons deals with Syria, according to sources close to the Chinese foreign ministry. Negotiations have been rescheduled for this Thursday in Beijing after assurances were given that all sides wished them to be "constructive".

Christopher Hill, the US State Department negotiator, is said to have persuaded the White House that the talks offered a realistic chance to accomplish a peace treaty formally ending the 1950-1953 Korean war, in which more than 50,000 Americans died. A peace deal of that magnitude would be a coup for Bush – but only if the North Koreans genuinely abandon their nuclear programmes.

The outlines of a long-term arms relationship between the North Koreans and the Syrians are now being reexamined by intelligence experts in several capitals. Diplomats in Pyongyang have said they believe reports that about a dozen Syrian technicians were killed in a massive explosion and railway crash in North Korea on April 22, 2004.

Teams of military personnel wearing protective suits were seen removing debris from the section of the train in which the Syrians were travelling, according to a report quoting military sources that appeared in a Japanese newspaper. Their bodies were flown home by a Syrian military cargo plane that was spotted shortly after the explosion at Pyongyang airport. In December last year, the Kuwaiti newspaper Al Seyassah quoted European intelligence sources in Brussels as saying that Syria was engaged in an advanced nuclear programme in its northeastern province.

Most diplomats and experts dismiss the idea that Syria could master the technical and industrial knowhow to make its own nuclear devices. The vital question is whether North Korea could have transferred some of its estimated 55 kilos of weapons-grade plutonium to Syria. Six to eight kilos are enough for one rudimentary bomb.

"If it is proved that Kim Jong-il sold fissile material to Syria in breach of every red line the Americans have drawn for him, what does that mean?" asked one official. The results of tests on whatever the Israelis may have seized from the Syrian site could therefore be of enormous significance.

The Israeli army has so far declined to comment on the attack. However, several days afterwards, at a gathering marking the Jewish new year, the commander-in-chief of the Israeli military shook hands with and congratulated his generals. The scene was broadcast on Israeli television. After the fiasco in Lebanon last year, it was regarded as a sign that "we're back in business, guys". (Source: Times Online.)

(SITE NOTE: After denouncing North Korea as an "evil nation" before the UN in Sep 2007, Pres Bush fell silent on the North Korea "nuclear" link to Syria. Then he approved a $25 million bill to provide oil to North Korea to further the six-party process. There is something going on behind the scenes that seems to mean that the US wants the six-party talks to go ahead -- even if there is a good chance that the North will renege -- but the US does not want to upset the "progress" made so far. As of Oct, a "time-table" supposedly is in the offing, though the North said it wasn't going to reveal the numbers of its nuclear weapons "at this time."

Later an unsubstantiated report said, "The Dair el Zor raid in Syria on Sept. 6 was not against a nuclear facility but a major arms depot… "Dair el Zor houses a huge underground base where the Syrian army stores the long and medium-range missiles it mostly buys from Iran and North Korea," the newsletter reported. "The attack by the Israeli air force coincided with the arrival of a stock of parts for Syria's 200 Scud B and 60 Scud C weapons." The raid was carried out after a North Korean container ship, flying a Panamanian flag, shipped missile parts to Syria… "The trucks and their loads were destroyed the moment they arrived at the underground base. A unit of military police that escorted the convoy was also wiped out in the attack."

It now appears that the US (and others) may be trying to gloss over the incident for the sake of the Peace Agreement in Korea that will allow the US to slip out of Korea after over 50 years of trying to do so. The incident if true would destroy the agreement if the DPRK is denounced. If the US keeps quiet -- but holds the evidence over the DPRK's head (a bargaining chip as a threat) -- the six-party talks may press forward. HOWEVER, the DPRK's latest insistence to NOT reveal the number of nuclear weapons it possesses -- because it transferred some of its 55kg of plutonium to Syria (or Iraq) -- does not bode well for the peace process because the DPRK still is refusing to denuclearize in a "tangible and provable" way.)

(SITE NOTE: The US has basically backed the six-party process as this has tangible results of "verifiably" shutting down the nuclear reactors -- however, the next step is crucial if the North will NOT come clean on the numbers of nuclear weapons it possess that is "verifiable." In other words, the US still does NOT trust the North. In fact, according to the White House spokesman, increased North Korean aid is to be based on whether the North upholds its end of the denuclearization process.)

Analysts State Israel Struck a Nuclear Project in Syria (Oct 2007) According to the NY Times on 14 Oct, Israel's air attack on Syria last month was directed against a site that Israeli and American intelligence analysts judged was a partly constructed nuclear reactor, apparently modeled on one North Korea has used to create its stockpile of nuclear weapons fuel, according to American and foreign officials with access to the intelligence reports.

The description of the target addresses one of the central mysteries surrounding the Sept. 6 attack, and suggests that Israel carried out the raid to demonstrate its determination to snuff out even a nascent nuclear project in a neighboring state. The Bush administration was divided at the time about the wisdom of Israel's strike, American officials said, and some senior policy makers still regard the attack as premature.

The New York Times reported this week that a debate had begun within the Bush administration about whether the information secretly cited by Israel to justify its attack should be interpreted by the United States as reason to toughen its approach to Syria and North Korea. In later interviews, officials made clear that the disagreements within the administration began this summer, as a debate about whether an Israeli attack on the incomplete reactor was warranted then.

The partly constructed Syrian reactor was detected earlier this year by satellite photographs, according to American officials. They suggested that the facility had been brought to American attention by the Israelis, but would not discuss why American spy agencies seemed to have missed the early phases of construction. While the partly constructed Syrian reactor appears to be based on North Korea's design, the American and foreign officials would not say whether they believed the North Koreans sold or gave the plans to the Syrians, or whether the North's own experts were there at the time of the attack. It is possible, some officials said, that the transfer of the technology occurred several years ago.

Nuclear experts say that North Korea's main reactor, while small by international standards, is big enough to produce roughly one bomb's worth of plutonium a year. In an interview, Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker of Stanford University, a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, said building a reactor based on North Korea's design might take from three to six years. (Source: NY Times.)

High-level N. Korean official launches visit to Syria, Italy (Oct 2007) It was reported on 13 Oct that Choe Tae-bok, chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly, left Pyongyang for a visit to Syria and Italy, the North's Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) reported. The KCNA, however, did not provide further details about the visit, including the schedule or the purpose of the visit.

Syria-NK link divides Administration (Oct 2007) The neocon hardliners in the Republican Party are also moving to hold Rice in check. The former U.S. ambassador to the UN John Bolton, a hardliner on Pyongyang, has taken the lead in drumming up support from Republican congressmen . Meanwhile, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the senior Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has submitted to the committee "an opinion article questioning the White House approach, which offers incentives to North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program."

The Times and Newsweek magazine on 27 Oct carried copies of a satellite image showing that progress had been made in the construction of a building suspected to be a nuclear facility in Syria in 2003. This satellite image was taken by GeoEye, a private organization, on Sept. 16, 2003. It suggests that construction started around 2000.

The NYT predicted that the image may give ammunition to those in the administration who call for diplomacy. If North Korea started its Syrian aid so long ago, the officials could argue that the assistance was historical -- in other words, before the six-party talks on North Korean nuclear program started in August 2003, and that diplomacy should move ahead.

Still, North Korea will not be immune from responsibility. In its agreement with Washington during the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994, North Korea promised to stay in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty -- and that bans the proliferation of uncontrolled nuclear programs. It would be possible to argue that the North Korea attempted to transfer a nuclear program and technology to Syria in breach of the agreement, which envisaged giving Pyongyang a light-water reactor in return for the freezing of its nuclear facilities. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

Bombed Site Wiped Clean (Oct 2007) New commercial satellite photos show that a Syrian site that Israel bombed last month no longer bears any obvious traces of what analysts said appeared to have been a partly built nuclear reactor. Two photos, taken on 24 Oct from space by rival companies, show the site near the Euphrates River to have been wiped clean since August, when imagery showed a tall square building there measuring about 150 feet on a side.



These two satellite images made available by DigitalGlobe shows a suspected nuclear facility site in Syria before and after a Sept. 6, 2007 Israeli airstrike. The image at left is from Aug. 5, 2007, and the image at right is from Oct. 24, 2007. A U.S. official said 23 Apr that U.S. intelligence officials will show members of Congress a videotape laying out the evidence that Syria was building the nuclear reactor pictured here with North Korean assistance before it was bombed by Israeli planes in September 2007. /AP

Senior Syrian officials continue to deny that a nuclear reactor was under construction, insisting that what Israel hit was a largely empty military warehouse. But the images, federal and private analysts said on 25 Oct suggest that the Syrian authorities rushed to dismantle the facility after the strike, saying its removal could be interpreted as a tacit admission of guilt.

Any attempt by Syrian authorities to clean up the site could make it harder for international weapons inspectors to determine the exact nature of the activity there. Officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna have said they are analyzing the satellite images and ultimately want to inspect the site in person. (Source: NY Times.)

Syrian Site NOT nuclear related, but PROBABLY dealt in DPRK military hardware -- HUH??? (Feb 2008) The New Yorker on 4 Feb reported that sometime after midnight on September 6, 2007, at least four low-flying Israeli Air Force fighters crossed into Syrian airspace and carried out a secret bombing mission on the banks of the Euphrates River. However, in three months of reporting for this article, I was repeatedly told by current and former intelligence, diplomatic, and congressional officials that they were not aware of any solid evidence of ongoing nuclear-weapons programs in Syria. A similar message emerged at briefings given to select members of Congress within weeks of the attack. A legislator who took part in one such briefing said afterward, according to a member of his staff, that he had heard nothing that caused him "to have any doubts" about the DPRK negotiations--"nothing that should cause a pause." Whatever was under construction, with DPRK help, it apparently had little to do with agriculture--or with nuclear reactors--but much to do with Syria's defense posture, and its military relationship with the DPRK. And that, perhaps, was enough to silence the Syrian government after the September 6th bombing.

N. Korea admits to sending engineers to Syria -- BUT NOT FOR NUKES (Mar 2008) According to Kyodo News, North Korea admitted to sending engineers to military- related and other facilities in Syria during its recent talks with the United States over its nuclear program, diplomatic sources in New York said 8 Mar. Pyongyang, however, denied its involvement in Syrian nuclear development, according to the sources. The dispatch of engineers and other personnel for bilateral cooperation, including on the military front, started in around 2000, North Korea told the United States in their talks from the end of last year to January. The North also exported materials to Syria, the sources said. Pyongyang claimed most of the personnel worked at civilian facilities, according to the sources. (Source: BreitBart.com.)

U.S. 'Called N.Korea's Bluff Over Syria' (Apr 2008) The U.S. in recent bilateral talks reportedly gave Pyongyang a list of North Korean officials involved in the supply of nuclear technology to Syria, a suspicion the North denies. A high-level diplomatic source on Monday said that the U.S. obtained the list of officials including nuclear engineers, who were involved in the supply of nuclear technology to Syria, through various intelligence networks. This persuaded the U.S. that the North Korea-Syrian nuclear connection did exist.

According to the source, it was chief U.S. nuclear negotiator Christopher Hill who gave the list to his North Korean counterpart Kim Kye-gwan during their latest nuclear talks. Kim denied knowing anything about it. Japan's Asahi Shimbun on Sunday reported Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, during a visit to Japan last month, told Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda that attacks by Israeli warplanes inside Syria in September last year targeted a suspected nuclear facility where North Korean agents were reportedly operating.

The daily quoted Olmert as telling Fukuda that Israeli air strikes in Syria last September attacked a facility being built with a blueprint and technicians provided by North Korea. North Korea denies any past or present involvement in nuclear development abroad. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.) (SITE NOTE: Bottomline is the US will still do nothing because of fear of destroying the already stalled six-party talks. There are also reports that Rice is seemingly positioning herself as being opposed to the original Feb 13 agreement -- thus leaving Hill out to dry. At the same time, Bush has also decided on the hardline stance with North Korea -- saying "see I was right all along." This leaves Hill in a very bad position -- hanging there out on a limb while Rice and Bush chop it off. There is also indications that the newly appointed Ambassador to Korea, Kathleen Stephens, has her nomination held up in Congress and the State Department has yet to exert pressure. It is significant that Stephens is a friend of Chris Hill and supported his efforts. Whether Hill and Stephens troubles are related is yet to be seen.)

Congress getting evidence on suspected nuclear facility (Apr 2008) The facility was mostly completed but still needed significant testing before it could be declared operational, the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter. However, no uranium — needed to fuel a reactor — was evident at the site, a remote area of eastern Syria along the Euphrates River.


Similarity of DPRK and Syrian building before "curtain face" added


Supposedly a "curtain face" was constructed on the building to conceal how similar in construction it was to the DPRK design



The Syrian reactor was similar in design to a North Korean reactor at Yongbyon that has in the past produced small amounts of plutonium, U.S. officials said. Plutonium is highly radioactive and can be used to make powerful nuclear weapons or radiological bombs. Top members of the House intelligence committee said on 24 Apr after being briefed on the facility by intelligence and administration officials that the reactor posed a serious threat of spreading dangerous nuclear materials.

"This is a serious proliferation issue, both for the Middle East and the countries that may be involved in Asia," said Rep. Pete Hoekstra, R-Mich. CIA Director Michael Hayden, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell and National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley briefed lawmakers, who were shown a video presentation of intelligence information that the administration contends establishes a strong link between North Korea's nuclear program and the bombed Syrian site. It included still photographs that showed a strong resemblance between specific features of the plant and the one near Yongbyon. The photographs taken inside the reactor before it was destroyed in an air raid Sept. 6 clearly show the rods that control the heat in a nuclear reactor, one of many close engineering similarities to a reactor halfway around the world, where North Korea produced the fuel for its nuclear arsenal. While the photographs were not dated, it seemed that some of the photos taken on the ground go back to before 2002.


Outer piping to cool concrete in fusion tank


Concrete forms for fusion tank

According to officials familiar with the presentation, it did not show moving images inside the facility or any North Korean workers, but included photographs that depict similarities between the North Korean and Syrian reactor designs. Hoekstra and Intelligence Committee Chairman Silvestre Reyes, D-Texas, told reporters after the closed meeting that they were angry that the Bush administration had delayed briefing the full committee for eight months. "It's bad management and terrible public policy to go for eight months knowing this was out there and then drop this in our laps six hours before they go to the public," Hoekstra said. President Bush's failure to keep Congress informed has created friction that may imperil congressional support for Bush's policies toward North Korea and Syria, he said. "It totally breaks down any trust that you have between the administration and Congress," Hoekstra said. "I think it really jeopardizes any type of the agreement they may come up with" regarding North Korea. (SITE NOTE: This is politics. The informaton was out in the open. Even Canada's Prime Minister reported that Isreali Prime Minister gave him a full run-down on the Syria-North Korean connection.)

The Syrian site has been veiled in secrecy until this week, with U.S. intelligence and government officials refusing to confirm until now suspicions that the site was to be a nuclear reactor. White House press secretary Dana Perino said Bush stood by the statement he made in October 2006 when he described North Korea as one of the world's leading proliferators of missile technology, including transfers to Iran and Syria. "The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable of the consequences of such action," Bush said then. Perino refrained from describing what she thought the consequences could be. "Let's let the briefings take place and the declaration take place and we'll move on from there," she said. Perino said that the information being provided to lawmakers today will not come as a surprise to any member of the six-party talks.

The administration has thus far refused to reveal why it chose to release the information now, but the briefings come at a critical time in the diplomatic effort to get North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons. As part of that process, the North is required to submit a "declaration" detailing its programs and proliferation activity, but the talks are stalled over Pyongyang's refusal to publicly admit the Syria connection. However, officials say the North Koreans are willing to accept international "concern" about unspecified proliferation. By disclosing North Korean-Syrian cooperation to Congress, the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog and the public, the administration may have overcome that impasse by giving North Korea a "concern" that it can acknowledge in the declaration. North Korea was aware that the administration would be releasing the information and its Foreign Ministry said 24 Apr that a visit to Pyongyang this week by a U.S. delegation to discuss the declaration made progress. It did not elaborate.

At the same time, the administration's release of the intelligence shines light on alleged malfeasance by Syria, which has signed an international treaty requiring it to disclose nuclear interests and activity, and makes it easier for Israel to explain its decision to destroy the site. Syria has not declared the alleged reactor to the International Atomic Energy Agency nor was it under international safeguards, possibly putting Syria in breech of an international nuclear nonproliferation treaty. In the Syrian capital of Damascus, legislator Suleiman Haddad, who heads the parliament's foreign relations committee, told The Associated Press that the videotape does not deserve a response. "America is looking for any problem in order to accuse Syria," Haddad said by telephone. "Do we need Korean workers to work in Syria?" "It is regretful to say that America is putting us among its enemies and therefore this talk (at Congress) does not deserve a response. America is trying to create an atmosphere of war in the region," Haddad said. He did not elaborate. (SITE NOTE: Some feel that this demolition by the Israelis were also a warning to the Iranians with their nuclear program. The Syrians used the same SAM defenses as the Russians and the Israelis were able to penetrate without being detected until too late. The same warning goes to the Iranians that they destroyed one reactor in Iran years ago -- and it can happen again.)


Bombed out building


Internal structure of building

Israeli warplanes bombed the site in Syria on Sept. 6, 2007. A new, larger building has been constructed in its place. U.S. officials were also briefing members of the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, at its Vienna headquarters. (Source: Yahoo News.)

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U.S. to Release Video 'Proving' Syria Connection (Apr 2008) U.S. intelligence authorities will on 24 Apr release video footage they say is evidence that North Korea assisted Syria in building a nuclear reactor. Intelligence officers are also to brief the House and Senate intelligence, armed services and foreign relations committees on suspected nuclear transactions between North Korea and Syria. The Washington Post on 23 Apr said a video “taken inside a secret Syrian facility last summer convinced the Israeli government and the Bush administration that North Korea was helping to construct a reactor similar to one that produces plutonium for North Korea's nuclear arsenal." Israel “shared the video” with the U.S. before bombing it on Sept. 6 “after Bush administration officials expressed skepticism last spring," the daily said. "The video of the remote site, code-named Al Kibar by the Syrians, shows North Koreans inside. It also shows that the Syrian reactor core's design is the same as that of the North Korean reactor at Yongbyon, including a virtually identical configuration and number of holes for fuel rods."

AFP quoted an unnamed senior U.S. government official as claiming the reactor, if completed, “would have been capable of producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. It was not designed to produce electricity."


Old building bulldozed and new structure built on top following footprint of old structure

Syria “bulldozed the area and constructed a building on the exact footprint of the old one” after the Israeli bombing, the New York Times said. The Times said the timing of the decision to declassify information about the Syrian project “has raised widespread suspicions, especially in the State Department, that Vice President Dick Cheney and other administration hawks were hoping that releasing the information might undermine a potential deal with North Korea that would take it off an American list of state sponsors of terrorism."

North Korea is reluctant to disclose how much assistance it gave to Syria in building the nuclear reactor, and the deal, flagged in Singapore earlier this month, was to bypass that problem with a U.S. note on the North’s behalf.

The video, which chief U.S. nuclear negotiator Christopher Hill is said to have shown to senior South Korean officials, “shows Korean faces among the workers at the Syrian plant," the daily added. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

"N.K., Syria Began Nuke Cooperation in 1997": CIA (Apr 2008) The U.S. Central Information Agency unveiled some documents, substantiating a suspicion that North Korea supported Syria’s secret nuclear weapons development, along with pictures containing both the North Korean envoy to the six-party talks and a Syrian nuclear committee member to Congress on 24 Apr (local time).


Among the photographs shown to members of Congress and reporters on 24 Apr was one of the managers of the North Korean Yongbyon nuclear plant with the director of Syria's nuclear agency. A car in the background has Syrian license plates. Some people are questioning whether the photo was "photoshopped" to add the North Korean

The figure in the picture, released by the CIA as decisive evidence, is known to be the person in charge of the nuclear fuel manufacturing facilities in Yongbyon.

According to the media, the U.S. administration announced that the nuclear facilities in northeastern Syria, which was bombed by Israel last September, began to be built in 2001 and was about to begin operation, and North Korea is suspected to have cooperated with Syria from 1997.


Nuclear complex before the bombing

In an interview with a Japanese broadcasting network, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said, “The nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Syria is a thing of the past and the United States thinks that they are not cooperating now.” As the fact that North Korea and Syria cooperated for nuclear development is disclosed, a backlash from U.S. right-wing hawks and North Korea is expected. But the United States and the communist regime have reportedly made advancements in reaching an agreement in regard to verifying the nuclear program that the North will report and had an in-depth discussion in the plutonium-related issue.

Accordingly, it is expected that the North will soon submit the report to China, the chair of the six-party talks, and finalize reporting the nuclear program by May, and the six-party talks will resume to prepare for the phase of nuclear abandonment. A U.S. official said that John Rood, the U.S. State Department’s undersecretary for arms control and international security, briefed on the North Korea-Syria issue to International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Mohamed El Baradei and that the United States hopes the IAEA would launch a probe into the problem. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman said, “That should not have an impact on the progress of the six-party talks.” Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda said, “In terms of nuclear non-proliferation, it is a serious issue. We are concerned about it.” (Source: Donga Ilbo.)

US chided for delaying data (Apr 2008) The United Nations nuclear monitoring agency pledged on 25 Apr to investigate accusations that Syria secretly built an atomic reactor with North Korean help but criticized the United States for delaying intelligence information, news agencies reported from Vienna.

"The director general deplores the fact that this information was not provided to the agency in a timely manner, in accordance with the agency's responsibilities under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to enable it to verify its veracity and establish the facts," a statement from the International Atomic Energy Agency said. Mohamed ElBaradei, director of the IAEA, also assailed Israel for the airstrike, saying his inspectors should have been able to verify beforehand whether undeclared nuclear activity had been going on. (SITE NOTE: Since Sep 2007, the IAEA could have investigated, but did nothing. The IAEA has become ineffective and simply a political whitewash tool.)

On 24 Apr, The Bush administration said that it withheld the pictures for seven months out of fear that Syria could retaliate against Israel and start a broader war in the Middle East. But after a full day of briefing members of Congress, two senior intelligence officials acknowledged that the evidence had left them with no more than "low confidence" that Syria was preparing to build a nuclear weapon. President George W. Bush ordered last year that knowledge of the Syrian reactor project be closely held to a few crucial officials, and put the CIA in charge of marshaling the assets of other intelligence agencies. Still, the Americans were somewhat blindsided.

By their own account, they suspected that North Korea and Syria were at work together in Syria, but only identified the plant at Al Kibar, named for the nearest town, after they received photos of the interior of the plant last spring from Israel, U.S. and Israeli officials said last year. Only selected pictures were released by the intelligence agencies on Thursday, including a video that combined still photos and drawings and had a voice-over that gave the presentation the feel of a Cold War news reel about the Korean War. In fact, it was intended in part, officials said, to try to draw that war - in which the United States and North Korea never signed a peace treaty - to a close. When asked about North Korea's motivation for the project, one of the intelligence officials said simply, "Cash."

Inside the administration, the battle over whether to try to strike a deal with North Korea or keep it under sanctions in hopes of triggering its collapse continues into the last months of the Bush presidency. (Source: International Herald Tribune.)

As expected Yonhap News reported the DPRK stating, ""Explicitly speaking, the DPRK has never enriched uranium nor rendered nuclear cooperation to any other country. It has never dreamed of such things," a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman told the country's official news agency. "Such things will not happen in the future, either." North Korea kept silent a day after the Bush administration provided the Congress with the clearest explanation yet on why it has claimed the North engaged in nuclear proliferation, although the Syrian government issued a statement denying the allegation. U.S. intelligence officials released video clips and photos as evidence. Some US officials said they hoped it would embarrass the North Koreans into admitting to nuclear proliferation activities and others said that it could prompt them to walk away from the negotiating table - and collapse the deal President George W. Bush was hoping to reach by the end of his term. In return for North Korea's declaring all its nuclear activities, the United States would lift sanctions and begin to negotiate the prize for North Korea's turning over its fuel and weapons.

(SITE NOTE: My commentary on Marmot's Hole: Most commentary on the blogs were supporting the Cheney neo-con plot to disrupt the six-party talks. I wonder why no one will accept the idea that Bush wanted a coup with some movement on the six-party talks while he was still in office. To this end, he was willing to allow the DPRK-Syrian issue to be “forgiven” as the start date was in 1997 before the most recent agreement — and therefore could be “overlooked.” These and more incentives were dangled in front of them, but Bush was stuck with his statement that the revelation by the DPRK would have to be “complete and verifiable.” All the DPRK had to do was come clean — but it refused.

Chris Hill was said to have persuaded the White House in 2007 that the six-party talks offered a realistic chance to accomplish a peace treaty formally ending the 1950-1953 Korean war. A peace deal of that magnitude would be a coup for Bush – but only if the North Koreans genuinely abandoned their nuclear programs. In Dec 2007, it was said that Chris Hill’s job was hanging in the balance if he didn’t deliver.

The Singapore agreement was the result — something so ludicrous that it insults people’s intelligence. It was sort of like the Banco Delta agreement where the US ended up with egg on its face after the North got its money — AND the promise that the US would open up its financial channels — the first step being removed from the terrorist list.

This time, I believe Bush said he had been yanked along enough. He and dear Ms. Rice have left poor Chris Hill out on a limb — and have started to saw it off. One Free Korea blog reports that "Kathleen Stephens’s nomination seems less certain now. There’s a Senate hold on her nomination, and her close association with Hill may harm her chances that State will push hard to have it lifted." State isn't battling all that hard to get Stephen's nomination passed so far.

The release of this briefing material — which has been available to the world for a long time as the Israeli Prime Minister released it to Canada’s PM in March — and to every world leader he has talked to since Sep 2007. Even early on Turkey showed the Israeli dossier to Syria in 2007. This stuff in the CIA briefing is more media hype than news.

The media seems to be trying to make a neo-con connection that just doesn't seem to fit. Some suspect the announcement is the work of Vice President Cheney and other administration neocons who are trying to upset those negotiations — and further ratchet up tensions with Iran. I don't believe that is true.

Maybe I’m just too naive compared to all the worldly viewers of these events…)

Eventually, Yun -- who earlier served as the head of North Korea's United Nations delegation in Vienna, the home of the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency -- struck a deal with a Bavarian company to obtain 22 tons of British-made tubes. They were placed on an Asia-bound ship in April 2003 and made it as far as the Suez Canal before German authorities ordered the cargo seized. A subsequent investigation by nuclear weapons experts, including several at the International Atomic Energy Agency, concluded that the tubes were not suited for aircraft.

The Chinese company named by NCG as the intended user denied ordering such tubes, U.S. and European investigators said. In court documents and interviews, German officials alleged that NCG had operated as a front company for years and had sought to buy a wide range of sensitive equipment from European firms, including oscilloscopes and other electronic gear used in making and testing nuclear detonators. Neither Yun nor NCG was charged with wrongdoing in Germany, but the owner of the company that sold the tubes was sentenced to four years in prison for his role in the sale.

The discovery of a series of attempted purchases prompted the CIA to predict that North Korea could have an operational uranium enrichment facility by 2005. But no such facility has ever been identified, and North Korea insists the tubes were meant for other programs, including missile production. North Korea has allowed U.S. officials to take smelted aluminum it purchased from other countries back to the United States for analysis. U.N. Resolution 1718 stipulates that all member states must "prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer" to North Korea "through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories" any material or technology that would contribute to a nuclear weapons program.

White House and State Department officials have declined to comment on whether the Bush administration is trying to get China to act against NCG. "We have nothing to add beyond what has already been said about North Korean nuclear cooperation with Syria," said State Department press officer Gonzalo Gallegos. "As the White House said last week, the United States is . . . committed to ensuring that North Korea does not further engage in proliferation activities." (Source: Washington Post.)