The following is from the conditions faced in 2002 -- and reflect the changes in activist thinking from the 1990 SOFA period. (Go to 2002: Protests for 2002 activists perspective of the plan)

In 1990, America started to make plans to disassemble its forces. In April 1990, the senior Bush administration sent a troop reduction plan, based on the Nunn-Warner East Asia Strategy Evaluation Report, to the US Congress. At first, the American forces were slated for a 25% reduction, but the South Korean government still feared North Korean intentions and was opposed to the 'high' rate of reduction. It preferred instead a more gradual rate of reduction. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was renegotiated in 1990 with a significant increase in the Korean portion of the defense expenditures. Seoul accepted Washington's intention to withdraw about 5,000 noncombatant troops from the American force of more than 43,000 soldiers in South Korea as part of Phase One of its plan. At the end of 1990, 39,317 American military remained in Korea. The original plan called for 2,000 Air Force and 5,000 non-combat ground troops would be withdrawn from Korea starting in 1991 and completed by 1993. Since 1993, the troop strength has remained at about 37,000 without further talks of troop withdrawals.

The cancellation of the orginal plan was due in part to the Korean government's opposition, but also because there was a change in the US policy in East Asia. The US policy makers had decided to maintain a minimum force level of 100,000 troops in East Asia. Thus the orginal plan stopped implementation after Phase One.

Phase Two of the original plan planned to reduce the troop strength in Korean to about 30,000 between 1994-1995. Unfortunately, the North Korean nuclear crisis that pushed the peninsula to the brink of war stopped the implementation. This crisis shelved any further troop reduction plans and since that time there have been no changes to the manning in Korea.

To many activists, this is looked upon as a lost opportunity to rid the peninsula of the Americans. (See The 'Crisis' on the Korean Peninsula and the US Troops in Korea .) Under the original plan, upon completion of Phase One and Phase Two, Phase Three would be implemented to turn over the defense of Korea to the Korean military. They envisioned the withdrawal of troops from Korea starting in 1996 and completing in 2000. The dream of being rid of the Americans evaporated when Kim Il-Sung practiced his brand of brinksmanship and brought the peninsula to the brink of war. Phase Two never materialized -- and with it no Phase Three.

A growing number of Americans legislators have come to believe that America has been footing the defense bill for Korea for too long. More and more pressure was brought to bear as Korea progressed up the ladder to a G-12 nation. Feeling the pressure, Korea started on an ambitious military upgrade program in the 1990s and continues to progress towards weening itself away from America. (NOTE: Unfortunately it was not the total picture. To ween itself completely away, some experts felt that $65 billion was required -- which the ROK could not afford. In addition, the ROK was forced to see that its spending of 2.8 percent of its GDP was NOT reality. Other nations that are "hot spots" spend a minimum of 6 percent of their GDP. The ROK had been cheating by shifting its "protectionist" funding to the chaebols at the expense of the military funding. In 1980 the percentage was 8 percent of GDP, but by 2002 the funding was down to 2.8 percent. In 2003, the funding increased to 3.4 percent of GDP -- only after the U.S. jabbed the ROK with a stick over its "fair share" in funding the defense of their country. (See Korea Continues to March to Its Own Drummer for ROK military hardware programs.)

As of 2002, the disparity between the two Koreas has begun to embarrass even some ROK analysts. Privately, many acknowledge that the American presence no longer is needed to deter the North.

Some activists state that the belief that US troop withdrawals from Korea will destabilize the region is a myth. The activists believe that the North is too weak to pose a danger to the military might of the South and the Americans are just scaring up boogie-men to justify their presence in Korea. The USFK view agrees with them somewhat, but points out that North Korea is really not interested in conquest -- it is interested in staying in power, even if it must sacrifice its people. (See Mythical North Korean Threat for details.)

The activists feel that entrenched military and industrial interests in Washington wish the military levels to remain the same -- and there is some truth in this as military hardware sales is a very profitable business. You can't sell fighters without a spectre of war around the corner -- and the Koreans understand this point very well as they anticipate a booming export business with their new Golden Eagle advanced trainer/fighter. However, all the key political figures -- both Korean and American -- keep mouthing the appropriate phrases of "mutual defense," "shared security concerns," and "provide stability in the region" to maintain the U.S. forces in Korea.

Activists proudly point to a 2002 MBC Poll that shows only 27.5% of Koreans want the Americans to stay while 16.8% say "leave now" and 55.6% say "start packing up." (NOTE: In the 1995 Sejong Poll, 41.5% wanted the Americans to stay.) Activists seem blithely unaware that there is a growing grassroots movement to disengage from Korea -- that has been slowly increasing momentum since 1978 when Jimmy Carter was elected President based upon that promise. The activists may not be watching the U.S. polls on CNN that showed 65 percent of the Americans favored disengagement from Korea. Less than one-third of Americans support the current Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and Korea. The American movement for disengagement proposes that Seoul and Washington should negotiate a phased withdrawal of American forces and termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty, replacing them with a cooperative military and political relationship among equals. In other words, the Americans want out!!!

The activists say, "If Korea is reunited and the Cold War ends in the Korean peninsula, the public opinion in the US would shift toward US disengagement from Korea and Korea will soon be forgotten. The American people would demand their troops out of Korea." The answer to is YES!!! Given the opportunity, the U.S. would be out of the door in no time flat -- without one shed tear and no looking back. More and more Americans are now seeing the Korean situation as simply that a KOREAN situation -- without any national security interests for America involved. For most Americans, a war between North and South Korea would be just that--a war between North and South Korea. The obvious humanitarian tragedy would generate few security concerns for the U.S. Presumably, it is for this reason that a majority of Americans oppose the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea; less than one-third support the current defense guarantee. Indeed, the U.S. ultimately will be more secure if its allies take the lead in dealing with potential conflicts that have minimal relevance to America.

In the foreseeable future, America will remain the largest trading partner with the region; retain significant cultural, historical, and political ties; and will cooperate militarily with allied states. The U.S. even could intervene militarily if it believed American vital interests were threatened--say by a potential hegemon that could not be contained by allied powers. To do so, Washington need NOT maintain an alliance and force structure created in a different era to achieve different ends. Nor need it intervene promiscuously in response to every instance of instability in a world in which some instability is inevitable. In other words, the U.S. will continue to exert influence throughout Asia, but as the only super-power left in the world, it need not stay in Korea to protect its interests. If you look closely at George Bush's vision for a 21st Century fighting force, having a stationary target on Korean soil (2d ID) is really not part of the stripped down mobile force that he envisions.

However, the activists may be right on one point. Though some analysts contend that America's presence in Korea offers an important base to promoting regional stability, others feel the ROK has just MODEST strategic value for the U.S. To many analysts it is felt that Washington could maintain whatever air and naval forces it desired in the region without bases in Korea, as well as a cooperative relationship with South Korea even in the absence of a defense guarantee and units based on Korean soil. (See Korea Marches to Its Own Drummer for details.)

Unfortunately, despite all assurances to the contrary, the activists feel that the U.S. wants to remain in Korea forever -- and has done everything to ruin the North-South reconciliation in order to retain its foothold in Korea. The logic here does not seem reasonable. Simple weight of numbers of the North could lead to the destruction of Seoul even if North Korea ultimately (and quickly) lost the war. There are a lot of safer ways to maintain your influence in the region than to risk the lives of tens of thousands of Seoul civilians -- as well as the bulk of your military force.

SOFA The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was renegotiated in 1990 to increase the Korean portion of the defense expenditures. As Korea had a favorable balance-of-payments ratio in foreign trade starting in 1986 that was rapidly increasing, it was certain that Korea could afford the cost.

This FIRST renegotiation of the SOFA created a storm of protests as it was the first to recognize Korea as being able to afford its share. Up to this time, the Koreans had been under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and used the U.S. as their defense shield. The money saved was pumped into the Korean "chaebol" conglomerate protectionist system. This economic aid was what made possible the Miracle of the Han and transformed Korea into one of the Four Dragons of Asia. Korea did not start its modernization programs in the 1990s until almost 12 years after North Korea started its upgrade programs.

This renegotiation put Korea on notice that America was serious about leaving. It made the point that though all the folks could mouthe words like "regional stability" and "mutual defense," the truth was that any war between the Koreas had very little to do with the U.S. security risks in the region. Only North Korea with its nuclear capability was a concern for the US -- NOT the potential war between the Koreas.

Initially, the Koreans ran around crying "Why is my BIG BROTHER doing this to me?" and "We are a POOR country. Why are you doing this to me?" After many months, these cries diminished and soon the Koreans started to get a different world view. They started to reconsider their place in the world -- and never looked back. After 1990, when the costs of a military program was discussed, you would never hear a Korean saying "We are a poor country. We can't afford it. " Instead, they would comment on programs with "It costs too much!"

After this time, Korea started on an ambitious hardware upgrade program to gain technology and build up its own home-grown defense. Though it had entered many high-tech high value added industries such as microchip production, it had not geared up for military buildup. Its shipyards were still cranking out tankers, but it lacked the technology to start a buildup of its military hardware. It looked to Germany, France, Russia, Japan and the U.S. for its technology transfers. In 1900, the plant at Sochon started up the production lines for the KF-16s. The Germans were approached for submarine designs. By 2002, it was building its own destroyers, cruisers, submarines, KMA-1 Main Battle Tanks, launched its KR-III sub-orbital "research" rocket, possessed OFFENSIVE missile capabilities with the ATACMS, and so forth. The 1990 renegotiation forced Korea to march to its own drummer.

The SOFA's legal provisions of allowing the Korean police for the first time to demand jurisdiction over crimes that were committed off-base was the first opening of a highly bothersome issue. Prior to this negotiation, the USFK basically had all the control. Minor crimes occurring on-base or were line-of-duty accidents remained under the jurisdiction of the USFK. For major crimes, the wording was that the ROK COULD demand the jurisdiction rights over cases involving serious crimes (murder, rape, arson), but the US at this time still retained custody of the suspect until tried. Though the ROK police COULD demand jurisdiction for minor crimes, they never did. This is a key difference as the Korean system allowed questioning of the suspect without charges or presence of a lawyer -- and without this provision, the prosecutor's office's found it hard to conduct their style of investigation.

The activists despised this SOFA calling it "unjust" but at this time the majority of Koreans believed the U.S. forces were essential to the defense of Korea. Only years later would the Koreans start to feel that they did not need the U.S. for their defense -- and in fact started to feel the U.S. was blocking their unification efforts.

The following is from the conditions faced in 2002 -- and reflect the changes in activist thinking from the 1990 SOFA period. (Go to 2002: Protests for 2002 activists perspective of the plan)

Many activists view the increased cost-sharing for Korea as some sort of insult and any increases are labeled "protection money" as though the U.S. were a thug. To the activists, the US is "demanding more money from Seoul so that the doves who oppose US presence in Korea for economic reasons may be silenced. In 1989, Seoul paid the US 45 million dollars for its presence in Korea. This was the first time Seoul had to pay the US for protection. This protection money increased to 70 million dollars in 1990, 150 million dollars in 1991, 180 million in 1992, 220 million in 1993, 260 million in 1994, and 300 million in 1995. The protection money stayed at the 1995 level for awhile because of the economic meltdown in the late 1990's."

The activists fail to mention that the "Miracle of the Han" was made possible when Korea followed the Japanese "kiretsu" conglomerate model and built up their "chaebol" conglomerates while living under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The ROK Ministry of National Defense acknowledges that Seoul did not begin its "force improvement program" until "12 years later than North Korea." Instead, South Korea "concentrated on its economic and social development" despite the dire military threat from the North. Instead of funneling its monies into military buildup, it funneled it into its designated "chaebols." This protectionist economic strategy worked. The ROK has about 24 times the GDP of North Korea.

However, there was growing resentment from the American taxpayers after Korea became one of the "four dragons of Asia" and STILL would not pay what America considered its fair share for its defense. As late as 1986, Washington still was providing significant amounts of security-oriented aid. On top of this was the direct American military subsidy in the form of the defense commitment and troop deployments. All the while, the ROK invested the cash that it saved into the South Korean economy. In 1990, the U.S. demanded the Korea start paying its way as their economy could easily afford it. The SOFA was renegotiated and their share significantly increased. When the "IMF Crisis" hit in 1995, the Koreans immediately started to "poor mouth" and the costs remained static at 1995 years until 2001. After the IMF had given Korea a clean bill of health, the U.S. again readdressed the cost-sharing formula.

The activists complain that the US "demanded" 440 million dollars in 2001 and wants to increase the share by 10% per year to 600 million by 2004. To Americans, the activists are using a different accountant than the U.S. side. The activists claim that "Seoul's share of the US expenses in Korea was less than a third of the total direct costs in 1990 but it will shoot up to more than 50% by 2004-2005. Here we are addressing direct costs only. When indirect costs - such as land use and subsidized utilities - are added on, Seoul's share of the costs amounts to more than three billion dollars a year."

Unfortunately their viewpoint is a bit skewed. (See Korea Should Start Paying Their Own Way for an enlightening 1999 article that covers the inequity of the ROK cost sharing.) The U.S. pays about $15 billion dollars annually to maintain their troops in Korea -- with Korea reaping the benefits. The article states, "All told, Americans spend as much to defend the ROK--about $15,000,000,000 annually--as the South Koreans do." When you talk about percentage of GNP for defense from a developed nation, you will see that Korea is getting better, but is STILL SIGNIFICANTLY behind such countries as Finland who have no enemies now that Russia is gone.

However, when we start comparing Japan and Korea dealing with the SOFA costs, we see a facet of the Koreans that is very irksome. The activists complain that in the 1990s, "the U.S. troops in Japan and Korea cost about 30 billion dollars a year. Korea and Japan paid the U.S. about 2 billion dollars and 20 billion dollars, respectively." Though we may quibble with the figures here, the point is the disparity in the payments between Korea ($2 billion) and Japanese ($20 billion). The Koreans constantly complain about the inequity of the Korean SOFA when compared to Japanese SOFA, but they REFUSE to pay the same percentage as the Japanese. The activists when confronted with the question as to why they shouldn't increase their share, one usually hears a cop-out response like "Americans are here to further their national interests in Asia, so why should we pay for them." The topic is always closed at that point.

Relocation of USFK Forces in Future:

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JANUARY 2004

First Land Returned under LPP (30 Dec 2003) In its first move to consolidate its bases in South Korea, the U.S. military closed an installation in Seoul on 30 Dec and returned its granted land to South Korean authorities. The return of the Arirang Taxi Compound in Seoul, a taxi service annex for U.S. personnel and their family members, is the first consolidation of American installations under a 2002 land partnership plan (LPP) ratified by the National Assembly on October 30, 2002.

On 30 Dec the USFK Website had an article on the Environmental Survey being completed on Yongsan Garrison's "Taxi Annex" near Itaewon. It stated "a three step environmental survey was performed on the Yongsan Taxi Compound in preparation for USFK's return of the property to ROK MND. This environmental survey involved the following steps.

• On January 28, 2003, USFK provided basic information relevant to the environmental condition of the Arirang Taxi Compound. This included items such as a list of facilities, history of the site, location of utilities, and a map of the site. It also addressed actions taken in preparation for release such as removal of heating fuel, disconnecting utilities, and removal of equipment and materials related to facilities.
• An initial joint site visit was conducted on February 18, 2003 to familiarize experts with the site prior to detailed survey.
• Technical experts from ROK Environmental Management Corporation conducted the ROK portion of the detailed environmental for ROK Ministry of National Defense from April 3, 2003 through May 28, 2003. The survey pointed out small areas of surface contamination where petroleum products had been spilled, but not detected prior to the survey. USFK used a Korean contractor to remove 78 cubic meters of soil for treatment by incineration and disposal. Concentration of petroleum after cleanup was reduced to approximately 1000 parts per million which is half the ROK standard requiring action.
• After the joint environmental survey and the actions above, ROK and US agreed that there were no other environmental conditions that required corrective action.

The procedures listed here can be expected to be followed in upcoming property transfers under the LPP and following the Environmental Impact/Clean up procedures agreed upon in mid-2003.

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Sixth Round of Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative in Jan 15-16 South Korean and U.S. military officials were scheduled to meet in Hawaii on Jan. 15-16 to discuss a range of issues which will likely include a plan to realign American troops stationed in South Korea. These meetings were to resolve these issues BEFORE the annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in November, but the failure to reach agreements on many key issues have led to these meetings.

Originally, Seoul offered 170,000 pyeong of the 810,000-pyeong (320 hectares) Yongsan base to be used by the UNC and CFC. One pyeong equals 3.3 square meters. On the other hand, the U.S. side reportedly sought to keep 280,000 pyeong or some 30 percent of the total Yongsan plot, to build large-scale lodging facilities, hospitals and schools to support 1,000 personnel affiliated with the CFC and UNC, as well as their family members whose number could rise as high as 6,000. Koreans offered some 17 million pyong, while Americans want more than 28 million. The U.S. response was simply that if the land was not granted ALL of the functions will move to Pyongtaek.

Going into Seoul reportedly was going to offer 200,000 pyong versus the 280,000 that the USFK demands. The ROK is still trying to negotiate everything in its reluctance to have the USFK move. Unfortunately, the ROK has very little leeway. The U.S. has made some major concessions, but the ROK has delivered nothing.

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U.S. Prefers Relocation of Seoul Facilities to Pyeongtaek (13 Jan) The U.S. wants all of its facilities in the Yongsan Garrison in Seoul to be relocated to Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, 70 kilometers south of Seoul, to prevent "problems and inconveniences for Koreans in the center of the nation's capital," according to U.S. Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on 13 Jan.

Within this utterance, we also see a veiled threat over the recent protests over the lands where the Embassy seeks to construct their new housing units and administrative center. The protests from activists have been very unsettling as accusations fly over the historical significance of the proposed site.

The Ministry of Defense entering the Jan 15-16 meeting of the Future of the ROK-US Alliance Meeting in Honolulu was set to "increase" the offer of lands at Yongsan to 200,000 pyong. However, it was wishful thinking that they would succeed in keeping the USFK in Seoul. Though the ROK was putting on "smiley faces" on the upcoming meetings in January, the Ambassador's word give a foretaste that the meeting would NOT be a happy one. It will most certainly be contentious with the U.S. making demands -- and the still ROK attempting to negotiate. The ROK couldn't seem to understand that their broken promises on the USFK movement -- starting with their 1990 MOA -- did not make them a reliable ally.

Under terms agreed to in 2003, the two allies signed a plan to eventually close about half of the U.S. bases in South Korea, moving most troops to new military hubs near Osan Air Base and Camp Humphreys under the Land Partnership Plan (LPP). Many of the 2nd Infantry Division units would consolidate at Camp Red Cloud and Camp Casey before moving further south from the DMZ and out of North Korea's long-distance artillery range.

U.S. officials in 2003 touted some $11 billion in upgrades to military hardware as a way to keep a strong deterrent force while moving forces to different locations. However, many of the $11 billion upgrades were already in the works such as the Apache Longbow upgrades so it might be a little deceptive. The bottomline is that the high-tech hardware improvements are things that the ROK does NOT possess.

However, there is a lot of dissention over the Roh administration's policy to be "independent of the U.S." The Foreign Minister resigned and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) announced yesterday that Cho Hyeon-dong, director of the North America Division III who had been investigated by Cheong Wa Dae for his "infelicitous words," will not attend the sixth ROK-US alliance meeting held during January 15-16 in Hawaii. A MOFAT authority said, “We judged it difficult for Director Cho to leave for overseas business since Cheong Wa Dae’s investigation is in progress.”

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Yongsan Garrison Aerial View

Yongsan Garrison to Relocate (19 Jan) The USFK and CFC will relocate completely to Pyongtaek by "mutual agreement" following the 6th Round of the Future of the ROK-US Alliance in Hawaii. However, the ROK continues to attempt to "control" the situation by claiming the the USFK cost estimate of $9.5 billion would be as low as $3 billion. The Munhwa Ilbo reported that it seems the costs of the move, originally calculated to be around US$9.5 billion according to American estimates, "will be directly regulated by the Korean government and may fall as low as the US$3 billion level." The USFK has assumed the burden of contractor losses and will invest in Camp Humpherys infrastructure BUT it had also a promise from the ROK National Assembly on land availability and monetary support for the move in 2003. If the ROK attempts to "renegotiate" it will be in for more nasty surprises. The mood within the Department of Defense towards Korea is definitely reaching below-zero temperatures.

The 18 Jan Chosun Ilbo stated "The Yongsan Garrison will be moved completely to the Osan-Pyongtaek area. During the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative talks held in Hawaii on Saturday, the two negotiating teams, headed on the Korean side by Assistant Defense Minister Cha Young-koo and the American side by Deputy Assistant U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Lawless, agreed to a comprehensive Yongsan Garrison relocation agreement and implementation plans."

The article continued, "The Americans, however, insisted on moving the Yongsan Garrison completely out of the city. It is known that the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, taking into account anti-American feelings in South Korea, order the move to be carried out regardless of land offers from the Korean side. He asked whether Americans would accept a foreign army camped out in New York's Central Park.

Stars and Stripes Pacific Edition on 20 Jan stated, "The announcement was made at a joint press conference with South Korean Lt. Gen. Cha Young-koo and U.S. Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Lawless, the chief negotiators for each side. "We shared the view that the relocation of the CFC and UNC will further strengthen the bilateral alliance and pave the way for creating a stable environment for the U.S. military presence in South Korea for the long term," Cha said. Cha and Lawless said Saturday there had been no discussions about reducing the overall number of U.S. troops in South Korea."

The article continued, "Both sides said talks will continue throughout this year to hammer out unresolved issues, including how to pay for the move. Under previous agreements, South Korea would bear all of the estimated $3 billion cost of moving troops from Seoul to Pyongtaek. The decision came as a result of larger negotiations to reshuffle the 37,000 U.S. troops in the country, including the eventual move of forces away from the Demilitarized Zone." The damages to the concessions lost business will be compensated by the USFK, but it probably will be minimal as the USFK will offer the concessions at Pyongtaek and Osan to offset any losses.

The following is from the Chosun Ilbo on 18 Jan 2004:

All US Military Facilities to Go South of the Han River

by Yu Yong-weon (kysu@chosun.com)

All U.S. military facilities located at the Yongsan Garrison, including the Combined Forces Command and the UN Command, are to be moved to locations south of the Han River by the end of 2007. The move would bring an end to the 122-year history of having a foreign military based in Seoul, a history that began with the occupation of Yongsan by troops from Qing Dynasty China during the Military Revolt of 1882. The government aims to turn Yongsan into a park.

During the sixth round of the "Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative" talks held in Honolulu, Hawaii, the Korean and U.S. negotiating teams, led by Assistant Defense Minister Cha Young-koo and Deputy Assistant U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Lawless, respectively, agreed Saturday afternoon to move all the men and facilities from the Yongsan Garrison to the Osan-Pyeongtaek area.

Taking into account feelings of insecurity within Korea and practical issues like securing base sites and building facilities, the two side agreed to start moving the Combined Forces Command and UN Command in the beginning of 2007, after a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue has been reached and essentially linked to the second stage of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division's redeployment to positions south of the Han River. The two sides also agreed to leave behind the Dragon Hill Lodge (which sits on roughly 25,000 pyeong of land), a liaison office of about 50 men, and communications offices for the Commander in Chief of Combined Forces Command (a four-star U.S. general) and the Deputy Commander in Chief (a four-star Korean general). (SITE NOTE: We question the wording in this article that states "after a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue has been reached" as it is something the USFK has repeatedly refused to link the future reductions/relocations to.)

Meanwhile, Seoul city officials said Sunday that they would recommend to the government plans to designate the Yongsan Garrison area a national park and woodlands. (SITE NOTE: The Ministry of Defense is planning to retain some of the acreage and sell off the remainder to pay for the move to Pyongtaek. The two sides -- the Seoul City administration and the Ministry of Defense -- are NOT on the same wavelength.)

According to Korea Herald on 20 Jan, Korea was already starting to waffle on repositioning costs. The controversy centered on how South Korea will finance the cost of relocating all American troops out of metropolitan Seoul over the next three years. To raise the money for the relocation, the Defense Ministry wants to sell the land used for the U.S. army to build commercial buildings. But the Seoul Metropolitan Government plans to acquire the army base site at no cost to turn it to a national park. Under the agreement, South Korea will have to shoulder all relocation costs, estimated at 3.6 trillion to 6 trillion won ($3 billion to $5 billion) by Korean estimates, but $9.5 billion by USFK estimates. Analysts, however, say it would be virtually impossible for Seoul to cover all the costs alone, considering that its national budget for this year increased by only 6.9 trillion won with the defense budget standing at almost 19 trillion won.

According to sources in the National Security Council, "About 90 percent has been agreed at working-level negotiations between South Korea and the U.S." The South Korean side will supply manpower to help with the move. Part of the costs will be paid for in services. However, negotiations were still underway to determine the details in January.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Goh Kun instructed government officials Monday to form a task force on the establishment of a national park in central Seoul where the headquarters of U.S. military forces in South Korea is currently located. Goh ordered his office to set up a pan-national panel including civilian experts to map out a "master plan" for the Yongsan relocation. Seoul City Mayor Lee Myung-bak said he would officially request the central government establish a public park in the Yongsan area. "The sites composing Yongsan garrison should be returned to the people to revive national identity," Lee said, touching upon a fact that foreign troops, including Chinese Ching Dynasty soldiers and Japan's Imperial army, have been stationed in the area for about 120 years.

The following is an editorial from the Chosun Ilbo on 18 Jan 2004:

Preparing for USFK to be South of the Han

Korea and the United States have agreed to move all United States Forces Korea (USFK) facilities from the installation in Yongsan to Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province. The U.S. 2nd Infantry is set to move south of the Han River in the near future. The end of all this winds up being a situation where the only USFK business north of the Han will be around 50 liaison officers on what will be the "former" base at Yongsan.

To begin with, you have to ask whether the government has plans supplement the difference in fighting power and equipment that will come with the era in which the USFK will be south of the Han. This is not something that needs repetitions of slogans about "independent diplomacy." The experts calculate that the cost of making up for the difference will be many times more than the US$3 billion it will cost to make the move.

The next question one worries about is whether the current government has formulated measures for dealing with the change in the character of the USFK and the subsequent increase in the fluidity and uncertainty of Korea's security. Even in the process of reorganizing its foreign deployed military after the end of the Cold War, the United States has maintained that the USFK would not be used for military purposes outside the Korean Peninsula, and stance has served to maintain control on the Cold War situation that remains on the peninsula and on North Korea's conventional capabilities.

The "era in which the USFK is south of the Han River" means U.S. forces will be free from this restricted role, and that its military strength could at any time be made to meet demands in Northeast Asia and the whole of Asia, not just those presented by North Korea. This means there has to be a complete re-thinking of our defense strategy, since we have automatically and habitually thought of our deterrent towards the North as the sum of the Korean military and the strength of the USFK.

Finally, one asks how the government will make up for the changed image, foreign and domestic, of Korea's security situation, which has until now been the result of a combination of having the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division at the DMZ and the Combined Forces Command and United Nations Command in Seoul. The resulting anxieties mean more than an increase in military uncertainties. The more fundamental anxiety is the question of whether this situation, which runs contrary to the people's judgment about security, isn't the result of an unreasonable conclusion to this agreement, one arrived at because of an obstinate attachment to the hollow concept of "independence" that exists within the current government.

Reaction in political circles to the Korea-U.S. agreement on the relocation of the entire U.S. forces in Korea to areas south of Seoul is divided along party lines. The majority opposition Grand National Party threatened not to ratify the bilateral accord, which it claims seriously jeopardizes the defense of the republic and wished the "tripwire" to remain in place. They viewed it as the precursor to the withdrawal of the USFK. The Millennium Democratic Party were concerned about the defense structure for the nation and the ultimate monetary costs to the ROK in order to fill the vacuum left by the USFK. The pro-government Uri Party of Roh Moo-hyun welcomed the move in order to put a happy face on their negotiations. The Seoul government, the political opposition and the U.S. authorities all have different thoughts on the matter of how the relocation will affect the defense of Korea. The USFK stated that there will be no impact and assured that ROK that it would not weaken the defense pact. The following is an editorial from the Korea Herald on 20 Jan 2004:

Politics of USFK relocation

Reaction in political circles to the Korea-U.S. agreement on the relocation of the entire U.S. forces in Korea to areas south of Seoul is divided along party lines. The majority opposition Grand National Party threatens not to ratify the bilateral accord, which it claims seriously jeopardizes the defense of the republic, while the pro-government Uri Party welcomes it. The Millennium Democratic Party called for supplementary steps not to weaken the security of the nation.

Many are concerned about the financial burden, which will be significant, but this is a secondary problem. The basic and the most important question is how the relocation will affect the defense of South Korea against a possible North Korean invasion. One disturbing fact is that the Seoul government, the political opposition and the U.S. authorities all have different thoughts on the matter.

First, U.S. officials insist that the USFK relocation, including the move of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command and the U.N. Command, will allow greater efficiency and economy of scale and thereby improve their combined defense posture. They believe it is also needed to shift the USFK mission from a posture of deterrence against aggression from the North to one of a strategic mobile force in the region.

The giant opposition party argues that the absence of the U.S. command in Seoul and pulling back the U.S. ground combat forces to the south of the capital mean the removal of the "tripwire" checks against a North Korean invasion and they also expose the populated areas to long-range artillery attack from the North. The GNP accused the Roh Moo-hyun administration of helping Kim Jong-il, claiming that the relocation is a precursor to the withdrawal of the USFK.

The position of the Roh government is more complicated. Seoul's representative to last week's talks in Hawaii said Korea accepted the U.S. proposal "in consideration of the Korean people's desire to end the stationing of foreign forces in the capital city," as well as the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and the overall U.S. forces realignment plan.

Korean authorities had initially opposed the departure of the dual command from Seoul but offered only 140 acres as compensation in Yongsan against the 230 acres demanded by the USFK. The Americans were somehow convinced that the Seoul government did not really want to keep the U.S. forces headquarters in the capital city, the target of anti-Americanism here, and stuck to their position.

At this point we wonder if the manner in which the Yongsan U.S. command relocation question was settled reflected in any way the newly re-emerged concept of an "independent diplomacy" stressed by the present administration, as against the traditional emphasis on a strong alliance with the United States. Whatever Seoul's basic philosophy, we see that non-military considerations have significantly interfered in the negotiations over the USFK relocation question.

The two allies should now closely cooperate so as not to create any vulnerability, both while the relocation is underway and thereafter. Seoul will have to monitor the progress of Washington's $11 billion program to reinforce the USFK over the next few years closely and adjust its own forces improvement programs accordingly.

Military officials assert that advanced technologies will ensure that the move of the 2nd Division to the south will create no defense vacuum. Yet, it requires that some well-equipped Korean ground forces replace the U.S. division in the Dongducheon area. It would mean an extensive realignment of the forward units of the Korean Army, as the addition of a new ROK Army division seems impractical.

The Grand National Party, meanwhile, is advised to be more prudent in dealing with the USFK realignment even if its concerns appear legitimate. The opposition party's threatened refusal to ratify the Korea-U.S. agreement will only complicate the matter as long as it cannot produce any viable alternative.

Future Closure of Camp Graves and Giant (Jan 2004) Camp Greaves and Giant will close by 1 Nov 2004 -- instead of 2011 under the original LPP -- and the USFK will scale down operations at Camp Bonifas and Camp Liberty Bell. On 12 Jan Brig. Gen. John A. Macdonald, the director of the Installation Management Agency-Korea Region, provided remarks to give as much early planning as possible to Korean civilian employees' future as it applies to the status of Camps Greaves and Giant. It appears that there is no contingency plan for civilian and Korean workers -- meaning they will be out of a job. As part of the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) there have been discussions concerning the possible acceleration of some facilities actions, but both the ROK and U.S. have confirmed no final decisions or timelines are in place.

Under the LPP, U.S. bases will be reduced from 41 to 23 by 2011. Base closures will come “on a timeline agreed to by both parties,” the release stated. Camps Greaves and Giant were originally scheduled for closure in 2011. “Finalized information will be released as decisions are agreed to by both the ROK and U.S. partners,” the USFK release read. Greaves and Giant are home to 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment. Soldiers at Camps Bonifas and Liberty Bell are part of the Joint Security Battalion, a U.N. Command unit headed by a U.S lieutenant colonel responsible for security at Panmunjom. U.S. and South Korean officials discussed reducing the U.S. presence at Camp Bonifas during the Future of the Alliance initiative meetings.

Camps Greaves, Giant to close by Nov. 1

By Joseph Giordono, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Saturday, January 17, 2004

YONGSAN GARRISON, South Korea — The Army will close Camp Greaves and Camp Giant by Nov. 1 and will drastically scale down operations at Camp Bonifas and Camp Liberty Bell, officials said Thursday. Brig. Gen. John A. Macdonald, director of the Installation Management Agency-Korea Region, made the surprise announcement at a town hall meeting with Camp Casey soldiers earlier this week. Official word, however, was not spread until a Thursday afternoon news release. "Camp Greaves will close. We plan to have the move completed by Nov. 1. Then we'll lock the gate and turn it over to the Republic of Korea," Macdonald said, according to the release. A spokesman for IMA-KORO said Thursday the closures were part of a revision to the Land Partnership Plan that South Korea and the United States signed in March 2002. Under the original plan, Greaves and Giant were to close in 2011, said the spokesman, Steve Oertwig. Officials could not immediately explain why the time line was moved up, or why the bases named were the ones to be closed or downsized. More details would be available Friday, Oertwig said. Greaves and Giant are home to the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, a major part of the 2nd Infantry Division. It was unclear Thursday where those soldiers would move, but military officials previously have said smaller bases in the 2nd ID area would be consolidated onto hubs at Camp Casey and Camp Red Cloud. "We own the bases but we don't own the soldiers," Oertwig said, when asked what would happen to troops stationed there. A 2nd Infantry Division spokeswoman said Thursday it was not "in her purview" to discuss the announcement at this time. Greaves, at 58 acres, and Giant, at 24 acres, offer fewer services than other area bases; soldiers stationed at the two bases routinely travel to the larger facilities in the area. Camp Giant also houses a Directorate of Public Works office, which likely will be shifted to Rodriguez Range and other bases in the Western Corridor area, officials said. Macdonald also announced that the number of U.S. soldiers at Camps Bonifas and Liberty Bell — which sit on the Demilitarized Zone's southern boundary and house soldiers who serve in the Joint Security Battalion — will be reduced from 200 to 43.

US PR active to put Smiley Faces on Relocation With the latest news of the pullout from Seoul, the "smiley face" articles are starting to appear to try to show that the US-ROK relationship is solid. The Stars and Stripes Pacific Edition on 20 Jan stated that the South Korean government has increased its spending to help support the stationing of American military bases here in recent years. For fiscal 2003, which ended Sept. 30, South Korea spent US$539.5 million in direct support of the 37,000 American troops stationed here, an increase from $49.5 million in 2002 and $114.5 million in 2001.

However, at the same time on 19 Jan, South Korean civic activists were rallying against the ROK-US agreement to relocate American troops from Seoul to Pyongtaek. These NGO activist groups vehemently oppose the relocation to Pyongtaek -- and instead would rather see ALL troops withdrawn from Korea.

Pyongtaek Farmers Rally Against Relocation The relocation of the military to Pyongtaek have ALWAYS been opposed by the residents, mayor and city councilmen. Despite all the "smiley faces" the ROK government and USFK want to paint on the issue, this is a fact. In the 1990s when the Yongsan relocation was surfaced, the then mayor and city councilmen flatly refused to have an increase in military within their city.

When the latest move to move the military south of the Han, the Pyongtaek hierarchy again protested the move but were steamrollered by the ROK government. At this point, the views of the residents were methodically suppressed in the foreign English speaking press, though periodically news clips would appear in the Yonhap news of the Pyongtaek residents unhappiness with the situation. News of the protest were always from Tongil News and OhMy News. In 2003, the demonstrations were mostly from student agitators from OUTSIDE the area who protested at the gates of Camp Humpherys. (SEE Relocation: 2003).

The following is a translation of the OhMy News article dealing with the relocation from the Pyongtaek Farmers perspective. The translation appeared in the Korea Herald on 30 Jan 2004.

Last November, when it was announced that 240,000 p'yeong of farming land was to be expropriated from part of P'aengseong-eup [in P'yeongt'aek City], the heads of 71 villages got together and formed the P'aengseong Response Committee. Since last Dec. 26, they have been on a sit-down strike in a tent on a farm road. The villagers take 24-hour shifts watching out for and impeding moves from the Ministry of Defense to expropriate their land.

We entered the sit-down strike tent, and there the married women's club members unburdened their hearts of their losses suffered from the U.S. military. Lee Ok-ja (59, P'yeongt'aek City, P'aengseong-uep, Daech'u-ri) said, "We've had land taken from us for the U.S. base, and rather than compensation, we've been forced from our homes naked or had to build and live in mud huts… we've had to cry tears of blood."

Lee Kyeong-bun (50, Daech'u-ri, president of the club) said, "Because of the ear-splitting sound from the American warplanes, our children go into convulsions, and because the American soldiers carelessly burn waste fuel, we couldn't hang up our laundry," and "I have nothing to ask the American military. The only thing I wish is that they would just go back to their own country quietly."

The married-women's club members shuddered as they recalled instances of rape and sexual harassment suffered at the hands of the American military. "Since we were frightened of the American military, we couldn't go out at night, and because we never knew what misfortune might befall us, we couldn't adorn ourselves as we would have liked," they said. Their voices rose, saying, "Since we have lived suffering as much as we could suffer, and enduring as much as we could endure, they mustn't do any more damage to us."

Lee Su-yong (36, P'aengseong-eup, secretary general of the Response Committee) protested that the government and the U.S. military were turning the villagers, who have lived their lives being sacrificed for national security, into believers in anti-Americanism. He said, "The land of Daech'u-ri is the villagers' land, not the nation's land, and the villagers will put everything on the line and defend their land to the end." Conveying the urgency of the situation, he said "The villagers oppose the turning over of land to the U.S. military with such a do-or-die spirit that they joke among themselves that they'd rather kick out the U.S. military and accept a nuclear waste dump." (SITE NOTE: This is in reference to the bloody riots when the government heavy-handily selected Puan and the future nuclear dump site without consultation with the residents. In December 2003, the government backed off and was seeking a new site.)

Construction Projects at Yongsan halted Because of the relocation notice for the units at Yongsan, the construction contracts for Yongsan and Camp Stanley have been put on a hold. The monies intended to improve Camp Stanley have been shifted to Camp Humphreys. The following article is from the Stars and Stripes on 27 Jan 2004.

S. Korea transformation complicates construction

By Jeremy Kirk, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Tuesday, January 27, 2004

YONGSAN GARRISON, South Korea — The U.S. Army has halted construction projects at Yongsan Garrison and in the 2nd Infantry Division area, focusing now on “enduring installations” the U.S. military plans to occupy long term in South Korea, said U.S. Forces Korea’s top engineer.

“We have been talking with the Koreans for some time now about reshaping the force here,” said Col. Dan Wilson.

Those talks have led to a USFK shift in construction plans, toward moving forces at Yongsan Garrison and consolidating the 2nd Infantry Division. Eventually, USFK officials have said, U.S. forces will relocate to two major hubs at Camp Humphreys in Pyongtaek and Osan Air Base.

But the continuing negotiations pose a logistics problem: Securing military construction funding requires congressional blessing and usually takes years. A year ago, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld ordered commanders to ensure their military construction requests made sense given the ongoing discussions, Wilson said.

USFK commander Gen. Leon J. LaPorte analyzed every planned construction project to see if it should be kept, the engineer said. LaPorte’s “commitment to the Congress has always been that he’s only going to invest in enduring installations … we were redefining what those enduring installations were.”

Because of potential changes in where the Korean government wanted U.S. troops to relocate, in spring 2003 the Defense Department recommended canceling and relocating some projects, Wilson said, and cutting the military construction budget accordingly. Affected were fiscal 2003 construction projects that hadn’t been awarded to builders and fiscal 2004 projects submitted to Congress, Wilson said.

For example, money planned to improve Camp Stanley — a 2nd Infantry Division camp in Uijongbu — was shifted to Camp Humphreys, he said. “That’s the future for Korea,” said USFK’s top engineer. “That’s the enduring installation. That’s where we are focusing all our resources.”

The result: The U.S. Army will spend $65 million on two Camp Humphreys construction projects during fiscal 2004 — the start of a hefty expansion planned for the base, which is in a relatively rural area surrounded by rice paddies 40 miles south of Seoul.

Plans call for spending $40 million to build a 464-person barracks, a 96-person unaccompanied officer quarters, one brigade headquarters and two company operations buildings, and spending $25 million to build a 232-person barracks, battalion headquarters and three company operations buildings.

But the two barracks projects can’t be awarded to a contractor, Wilson said, until USFK shows congressional military construction subcommittees a Camp Humphreys master plan accommodating the anticipated relocations.

The congressional committees also want to see relocation cost-sharing arrangements with Korea’s government, “which we are in the final stages of negotiating,” the engineer said.

An architectural engineering firm is drafting that master plan; the intent is to finish it before LaPorte gives his annual testimony to Congress, usually in March or April, Wilson said.

“We have a very good idea of everything we need to build at Camp Humphreys,” he said. “Everyone who is moving is going to get new facilities. So … it will be a big quality-of-life difference for everyone.”

LaPorte also made a project-by-project decision on construction funded by South Korea’s government and by U.S. military agencies whose budgets come from non-appropriated funds, outside the regular military budgets, Wilson said. “Our challenge is to work all of those different funding sources together and apply them against the appropriate projects.”

The Air Force got exactly what it wanted for fiscal 2004: $68.5 million in military construction and family housing construction dollars: $45 million for family housing projects, $16.5 for a barracks and $7 million for upgraded aircraft shelters at Kunsan Air Base, Wilson said.

The command is pursuing a build-to-lease project at Camp Humphreys similar to the U.S. Navy’s in Naples, Italy, he said: The military would rent housing, schools and other facilities from a Korean developer for a certain term, thereby avoiding construction and maintenance costs.

Developers will be asked to submit proposals this spring, Wilson said. While plans aren’t firm, the military tentatively seeks a community-style neighborhood including 1,500 family housing units, schools and shops. “The Koreans go out and build whole new cities all the time,” the engineer said. “Let’s leverage their expertise.” He attended the last round of relocation talks with South Korea’s government in Hawaii Jan. 15-16. After years of complaints about the amount of space U.S. troops occupy in downtown Seoul, officials agreed to vacate Yongsan Garrison by 2007. Under an existing agreement, South Korea must pay for such a move. No plans have been released yet on how South Korea will meet the estimated multibillion-dollar bill.

Those will come after South Korea’s National Assembly, its legislature, approves a final agreement, Wilson contended.

Despite press reports indicating tension during negotiations, Wilson described the atmosphere at all talks he’s attended as “very cooperative. It’s very open and honest. We don’t immediately agree on everything but that shouldn’t surprise anyone. We have agreed in principle on all the important points.”

FEBRUARY 2004

US Pacific Command Faces Sweeping Changes

By Richard Halloran
Times Staff Writer

HONOLULU, Hawaii -- Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld is planning a sweeping revision of the command apparatus through which U.S. military forces are controlled in Asia, in an effort to make them more responsive to contingencies from the Koreas to Australia.

Military officers said the revision would take place primarily in South Korea and Japan, but would affect deployments throughout the Pacific Command's area of responsibility, which runs from the West Coast across the Pacific and Indian Oceans to East Africa.

From its headquarters overlooking Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, it controls 300,000 military people and is the largest combatant command of the U.S. armed forces.

Among the command elements that will most likely be dismantled in South Korea are the U.N. Command (UNC), U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), the Combined Forces Command (CFC), and the Eighth U.S. Army. In Japan, United States Forces Japan (USFJ) will disappear, but a new operational corps headquarters led by a lieutenant general will be set up.

In addition, the position of the four-star general who commands the UNC, USFK and CFC will be abolished. At the same time, plans call for establishing a new billet for an Army four-star general at the headquarters of the U.S. Army Pacific at Fort Shafter in Hawaii. He will take control of Army forces in the Pacific region now under the command of a three-star general.

In response to a query, the spokesman for the Pacific Command, Navy Capt. John Singley said: "The Pacific Command is currently reviewing plans to strengthen our defense posture as part of a larger U.S. government global effort in that regard. We are currently consulting with our allies and partners in the region and will continue to do so before any decisions are made."

"Some of these plans are near-term," Capt. Singley said. "Others are further in the future. The aim of the global-posture review is to strengthen our defense relationships with key allies and partners, improve flexibility, enable action regionally and globally, exploit advantages in rapid power projection, and focus on overall capabilities instead of numbers."

Officers informed of the shakeup pointed to Mr. Rumsfeld's wider plan to "transform" the Pentagon and the armed forces.

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith told an audience in Washington in December: "A key facet of transformation is realigning our global defense posture. That is, updating the types, locations, numbers and capabilities of our military forces and the nature of our alliances."

In Asia, the officers said, the intent was to eliminate crisscrossing chains of command that are legacies of World War II, the occupation of Japan, the Korean War, the war in Vietnam, and the Cold War, which ended in 1989 when the Soviet Union collapsed.

These officers asked not to be identified because the review is still in process and no decisions have been made. "When we get through," said one officer, "it will be seamless."

By removing layers of the current cumbersome military bureaucracy, they suggested, troops and ships and aircraft would be able to respond more quickly to any crisis on orders from the president and secretary of defense.

In addition, the revisions are intended to appeal to South Korean nationalism and to tamp down rising anti-Americanism. The United States and South Korea have already announced that the U.S. headquarters will move from a congested area in Seoul to a new site about 75 miles to the south. The 2nd Infantry Division will move from the heavily populated area north of Seoul to new bases farther south.

Disbanding the CFC is intended to lessen South Korean complaints that it diminishes Korean sovereignty, said officers with experience there.

The CFC controls both South Korean and U.S. forces, but is led by a U.S. general with a Korean general as second in command. Many Koreans have argued that it is their country and they furnish the bulk of the forces, and therefore, a Korean should command.

"This would reduce the misperception that the U.S. controls the Korean military," said an officer. It might also take away a North Korean charge that South Korean forces are lackeys of the Americans.

Disbanding the UNC, Mr. Feith said, "will undoubtedly be part of the whole discussion that we have regarding the realignment of our posture in Korea."

President Roh Supports USFK Move out of Yongsan AND NGO Anti-War Group in Sync On 12 Feb 2004, President Roh Moo-hyun Thursday defended the agreement between South Korea and the United States to relocate the U.S. troops and facilities in Yongsan Garrison out of Seoul. Speaking at a luncheon meeting with representatives of the Korea Freedom League, a major conservative organization, Roh said, "It is the right decision to move the Yongsan Garrison, although there exist those who either support or oppose the relocation." Roh said the decision by the U.S. to move the Yongsan Garrison to Pyeongtaek, is part of the U.S. global strategy for troop redeployment.

The Chosun Ilbo stated, "From the armies of the Qing Dynasty and Japan in the past to the American troops of the present, foreign armies have been continually stationed to the Yongsan area, said President Roh Moo-hyun as he was commenting on the move of the U.S. garrison at Yongsan. "Now is the time for the area to release itself from its historic symbolism," he said. .. Korea has moved on from an era where foreign armies were garrisoned in the heart of Seoul to a new era of freedom, independence, harmony, cooperation, and peace." In other words, rejoice that the foreign invaders have been removed. Not pretty words.

The Anti-War Movement lead by the Rev. Mun Chon-Hyun, a Catholic priest whose operates out of Kunsan. (See photos below: The man with the short white beard using a cane is the Rev. Mun.) However, for the past year, his operations have been centered in Seoul where he has led the anti-American demonstrations near the embassy. On the latest move of the USFK forces out of Yongsan, Rev. Mun staged a protest in Seoul stating that the move from Yongsan was part of the U.S. Global Strategy and therefore the U.S. should pay for ALL of the move's costs.

Protest in Seoul (10 Feb 2004)

7th Meeting of the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative (20-21 Feb) On 20 Feb, the US and ROK will conduct the 7th round of meetings on the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA). There are areas that in conflict primarily the cost-sharing for the move to Pyongtaek. The ROK have balked at every turn on paying for the move -- which they signed off on starting in 1990 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), but later in 2003 "renegotiated." The ROK side makes it appear that the "Umbrella Agreement" is still being worked on, but the fact is that it was ratified under the 1990 MOA approved by the National Assembly. The U.S. is pressing Korea to pick up the tab for relocation costs per its agreement, but the ROK has taken the tact that the costs are inflated. The ROK position is that the MOA is invalid and must be renegotiated, while the US states that the MOA remains in effect with the ROK picking up ALL costs for relocation.

7th Round of ROK-US Future of Alliance Initiative (12 Feb 2004)

In 2003, Korea said that the U.S. had "padded" the figures. After a year of anti-Americanism pointed at the USFK in 2002, the U.S. was in no mood to banter over this point with a G-12 nation -- or in the U.S. words, "a prosperous democracy." When the topic was resurfaced again, the Korean government announced the relocation cost for Yongsan at $1.3 billion -- but this was NOT confirmed by the USFK. This was the starting volley of the Korean government wanting to negotiate the price down.

In 2004, the ROK wishfully thinks it can get the cost down to the $3.2 billion range, though the USFK has stated in the past -- and continues to state that it would be in the $9.5 billion range for the total relocation of forces south of the Han. The ROK has used every tact from poor-mouthing (not enough money in budget) to using pressure of declaring sales of military equipment to Korea may be in jeapordy. Even now there is a contentious move by the MND to attempt to pay for the move by selling the prime real estate Yongsan land -- while the Prime Minister calls for the creation of a national park.

The ROK is caught in a trap of its own making. For over 20 years Korea has slowly reduced its share of GDP for defense from 8% in 1980 under Chun Doo-hwan to 2.8 percent under Kim Dae-jung. Now it was being called upon to pay the piper. In 2004, the budget increased to 3.2 percent of GDP AFTER the US forced the ROK to do so. Up until that time the amount had slowly decreased until it was at 2.8% of GDP -- but far below the average 6 percent of GDP of other nations with a hostile frontier.

There was a great concern over what was at stake in the 7th round of talks. The Chosun Ilbo editorial stated, "United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said the other day that the U.S. did not want to station troops where they are not wanted or in places that are unfriendly. He said the current reorganization of overseas U.S. forces would be the largest since the end of World War II. Given the context of Rumsfeld's usual statements, these latest comments leave ample room to be interpreted as indicating there will be a reduction of the United States Forces Korea (USFK). When he visited Seoul in November of last year, he did not completely deny the possibility, saying that military strength is not measured in "numbers."

Troop Relocation from Yongsan (13 Feb 2004)

US, Korea to Discuss Yongsan Move during Talks

by Koo Sung-jae (sjkoo@chosun.com)

South Korea and the United Stat