A New U.S. Embassy Building is not Allowed at the Deoksu Palace Site

JANUARY 21, 2005 22:40 by Chae-Hyun Kwon (confetti@donga.com)

A decision was made to preserve a total of 7,800 pyeong, which includes 1-8, Jung-dong, Jung-gu, Seoul, where Gyeonggi Girls` High School was once located (some 4,500 pyeong) and adjacent areas around 1-39, Agwan Pacheon street (some 3,300 pyeong) as part of an effort to protect important cultural assets. The U.S. Embassy to Korea had planned to build a new embassy building and a residential apartment for its staff on the site.

The decision officially concluded the three-year controversy which began when the U.S. Embassy to Korea decided to build a 15-story new embassy building and an 8-story residential apartment for its staff on the former Gyeonggi Girls’ High School site in May 2002, and requested the National Cultural Properties Research Institute to check whether the site housed cultural assets underground.

The Cultural Properties Committee decided in a joint meeting among four divisions— Cultural Properties Policy Division, Historic Sites Division, Architectural Cultural Properties Division, Buried Cultural Properties Division- in the afternoon of January 21 in the meeting room of the former National Museum of Korea in Gyeongbok Palace.

Jung Yang-mo, head of Cultural Properties Committee, announced, “After researching cultural assets, it was concluded that the site of the area is a historic and cultural place with evidence of Korea’s history during the Daehan Empire era, including Agwan Pacheon street and important buildings of Gyeongwoon (Deoksu palace) such as Seonwonjeon, Heungbokjeon, Heungdeokjeon and Saseongdang, and that the area should be preserved and avoid damage.”

Jung added, “The participants of the meeting reached an agreement to designate the site as a historic relic through discussions with the U.S. right after the site is returned to Korea, and then recommend the government to restore the dismantled buildings there after a through investigation and research.”

In May of last year, Korea and the U.S. agreed that the U.S. will return some 7,800 pyeong of the former Gyeonggi Girls’ High School site which it owns, and in return, Korea will offer a 24,000-pyeong plot in Camp Coiner inside Yongsan Garrison for the construction of a new U.S. embassy building.

Yongsan to House US Embassy

By Ryu Jin
Staff Reporter

The U.S. Embassy in Seoul plans to offer an additional plot of land it owns in downtown Seoul for the envisioned land-swapping deal, under which the mission will be relocated to Yongsan, Seoul, officials here said Monday.

The U.S. Embassy, currently located just in front of Kwanghwamun at the center of the capital, originally wanted to move to a new grandiose diplomatic complex at the nearby site of former Kyonggi Girls High School.

But the 4,500-pyong (14,880-square-meter) site has recently been found to have cultural importance, along with the 3,300 pyong (10,910 square meters) of land adjacent to the former school, where a U.S. legation used to be.

``As the recent findings make it virtually impossible to take advantage of the former legation site, now talks are going in the direction of the U.S. offering the two sites in return for the alternative land at Camp Coiner in the U.S.' main Yongsan Garrison, which will be relocated to south of the capital,'' a government official said. The official hinted that the total area of land given for the new U.S. Embassy will exceed a combined area of 7,800 pyong (25,785 square meters) as the U.S. wants more land, citing the different land prices in the locations.

The U.S. project for building a new embassy complex began in 2001, but hit a snag as civic groups and activists claimed the proposed site, near Toksu Palace of the Choson Kingdom (1392-1910), should not be spoiled by construction.

The results of a cultural survey which came out last week suggested that both sites are of cultural importance and therefore worthy of preservation.

As this outcome for the survey had long been anticipated, the U.S. Embassy and the South Korean government have engaged in lengthy negotiations to find an alternative site for the new mission and housing facilities for embassy staff.

The two sides have all but formally agreed on Camp Coiner, a U.S. military base in the Yongsan Garrison, which will be vacated by American soldiers when they move the Osan-Pyongtaek area just south of Seoul under last year's agreement.

A swap of the high school site for Camp Coiner had long been expected, but the recent ruling also offered an additional 3,300-pyong plot, which has been in the U.S.' possession since the 1940s.

According to last week's findings, the previous proposed sites include a pathway via which Emperor Kojong, the last monarch of the Choson Kingdom, fled from the palace to the Russian legation in 1896 when his throne and life were threatened by the Japanese military not long after Empress Myongsong, his wife, was murdered.

ROK ACTIONS

The Tracks Get Tangled in South Korea's "Defense White Paper"

While Seoul was launching its peace initiative through its Unification Minister, who represents the Sunshine Policy of incentives diplomacy, presenting its national budget inaugurating its plan for independent self-defense, and negotiating a Security Policy Initiative with Washington, its Defense Ministry was preparing to issue its first white paper on defense in four years on February 4. The white paper, which is usually published annually, had been delayed because of internal conflict over whether North Korea should continue to be named the South's "main enemy," as it had been in the 2000 document.

The "main enemy" designation had been adopted in 1995 after Pyongyang had threatened to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire" during the ongoing conflict over Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. Conservative forces inside and outside South Korea's military establishment wanted to keep the designation in place, whereas liberal backers of the Sunshine Policy wanted it to be eliminated. In a compromise, the Defense Ministry substituted "direct and substantial military threat" for "main enemy," but made it clear that the enemy designation would be retained in internal Ministry documents and discussions. An anonymous Ministry official told the Associated Press: "The fact remains that North Korea is our main enemy."

Beyond the weak symbolic concession to the Sunshine Policy, the white paper had little new to offer. Much was made in press reports of the paper's statement that Washington had committed to send 690,000 troops, including 40 percent of the U.S. Navy and 70 percent of the Marine Corps, to South Korea, in case it was attacked by the North, but all reports failed to mention that exactly the same statement had appeared in the 2000 white paper. Adopting all tracks at once, a Defense Ministry press statement explained: "We considered the extraordinary dual nature of inter-Korean ties that we have to push for inter-Korean rapprochement and military preparedness simultaneously." (SITE NOTE: In April 2005, the ROK refused to negotiate its cost sharing stance that it was cutting its contribution by 8.9 percent. The US countered that some pre-positioned equipment may be removed -- and the result is that without pre-positioned equipment there will be cutbacks in some follow-on troops.)

Rather than a coherent policy statement, the white paper is a symptom of conflicts within South Korea's political class and wider society, as the country struggles for strategic focus. It is also an admission that, in a time of strategic uncertainty, it is best to keep all options open and to defer decisive choices.

Despite its tilt toward confrontation, the white paper evoked anger in the G.N.P., which accused Roh of "pampering" Pyongyang. G.N.P. legislator Hwan Jin-ha told Agence France Presse that "the 'main enemy' concept is important to maintain discipline and morale in the army. It must be kept intact as long as North Korea holds to its dream of communizing the Korean peninsula." Pyongyang was equally dissatisfied and threatened first to turn U.S. bases into a "sea of fire" should Washington launch an attack on the North, and then to "thoroughly incinerate the aggressor elements that collude with the U.S. imperialists."

The liberal administration in Seoul is committed to its three-track policy, and that policy reflects a realistic appraisal of Seoul's long term interests in a peaceful and prosperous East Asia in which South Korea is a strong and respected player. Pressures from conservative forces within the country and from Washington and Pyongyang make the success of the strategy dependent on the highest levels of diplomatic and political skill. Faced with the most complex geostrategic predicament in East Asia, South Korea has much to gain and much to lose, depending on how well it performs in the rebalancing act. (SITE NOTE: In Apr 2005, with President Roh in command, the ROK was not doing a very good job as it started into a "diplomacy war" over Tokdo and history. Seoul's three-track geostrategy was becoming a shambles. The first track takes it toward detente with Pyongyang (which continued unabated), the second toward military self-sufficiency (which was given lip service, but none of the funding to make it a reality) and the third toward maintaining and deepening its alliance with Washington (which by Apr 2005 was going swiftly down the toilet). Then it made its announcement of military cooperation with China -- a direct slap to the US and Japan. The ROK was locking itself into a road that was really not a good option for the present -- though one considered for the future.)

PINR: Geostrategic Multiplicity The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. It states, "Seoul's three-track geostrategy is an intelligible response to its predicament. The first track takes it toward detente with Pyongyang, the second toward military self-sufficiency and the third toward maintaining and deepening its alliance with Washington." The only problem is that the ROK has made moves towards an alliance with China -- while Washington is considering China as an adversary as it plans to build up a high-tech army to become the regional power. The full article is at PINR: South Korea Seeks Strategic Focus Among the Behemoths. The following are excerpts from the rather long and detailed analysis of Korea's struggle to position itself strategically.

Geostrategic Multiplicity

As South Korea grapples with its political divisions, which have stalled the reform efforts of Roh's administration and have caused a sharp decline in his popularity in the face of a slowing economy, Seoul has moved in January and February 2005 to begin its repositioning in the changing East Asian balance of power. Seoul's recent readjustment has placed the country on three separate tracks that take it in different directions, but that do not yet force decisive choices, reflecting uncertainty about the future and the need to compromise among conflicting domestic forces. Depending on how the rebalancing of power in East Asia proceeds, the tracks might eventually converge or they might diverge so much that Seoul will have to decide to take one or two of them. For now, it is keeping its options open.

At the top of Seoul's geostrategic interests is settling its conflict with Pyongyang and moving closer to reunification of the North and South, which would eliminate the major military threat to South Korea and, as a consequence, ease its dependence on Washington, free the country to maneuver more flexibly in the region, and eventually join the two Koreas -- either through a close alliance or a single state -- to create a formidable and independent power center. As it attempts to pursue its overriding interest, Seoul is confronted by the Pyongyang regime's determination to maintain its hold on power and, consequently, its reluctance to surrender its nuclear option and to liberalize its closed society, despite food shortages and the immiseration of its population. As long as Pyongyang does not commit itself clearly to detente, South Korea faces a serious threat from its northern neighbor's massive military presence on its border, including artillery that could -- as Pyongyang puts it -- turn Seoul into a "sea of fire."

Seoul's pursuit of detente with Pyongyang is complicated by its relations with Washington, which desires regime change in the North, and has still not taken military action against Pyongyang off the table insisting, at a minimum, that Pyongyang roll back its nuclear program irretrievably before offering it any incentives to cooperate or agreeing to negotiate with it bilaterally. At the same time that it takes a hard line toward Pyongyang, Washington is proceeding with its plans to redeploy most of its military presence in South Korea to the south of Seoul, diminish the number of its troops in the country, and redirect their mission from protecting the country against the North to responding to terrorism in the region and deterring Beijing. Since South Korea is not yet militarily capable of deterring military action from the North, Seoul must take Washington's interests into account as it executes its geostrategy, impeding its pursuit of detente.

Seoul's basic geostrategic predicament of finessing Pyongyang's conflict with Washington is further compounded by the rise of Beijing as a major military power and trading partner, and the possibility that Tokyo will choose to remilitarize if Washington's influence in East Asia diminishes, forcing Seoul to choose sides or to develop its own high-tech military capabilities, and perhaps even a nuclear option, to achieve a measure of strategic independence. Maneuvering among behemoths that have underlying conflicting interests, Seoul faces the most complex geostrategic situation in East Asia.

Seoul's three-track geostrategy is an intelligible response to its predicament. The first track takes it toward detente with Pyongyang, the second toward military self-sufficiency and the third toward maintaining and deepening its alliance with Washington.

INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS

T H E C H I N A F A C T O R

China remains an important factor in South Korea’s strategic calculations. Some suggest the Roh administration was clearly leaning toward China, while others stress it remains committed to the U.S.-ROK alliance but also wants friendly relations with China. However, most South Koreans seem to agree that China’s recent claims to the history of Koguryo — an ancient Korean Kingdom that extended from the northern part of the peninsula into northeast China — convinced many in South Korea to rethink the future role of China in the Korean peninsula. It was evident that most South Koreans interpreted China’s claim to Koguryo negatively, and it has rekindled South Korean perceptions of China as a threat. They took great umbrage (some even suspected Chinese territorial ambitions) at competing Chinese claims to “ownership” of the ancient kingdom’s historical heritage. The China debate appears to have persuaded many in South Korea that the U.S. is the only major power in Northeast Asia that does not have any territorial designs on Korea, while the others in the region have historical tendencies to dominate the Korean peninsula. The pendulum appears to have swung back in favor of the U.S. for the time being, but one is reminded that China still looms large in Korea. According to a recent opinion poll, nearly 50 percent of all respondents indicated that China should be the country that Korea maintains the closest diplomatic ties with if the U.S.-ROK alliance deteriorates.

U . S . - J A P A N R E L A T I O N S

South Korea is very concerned about U.S. efforts to expand the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Many believe the pace of change in Japan’s security posture is too fast and they fear its lofty status as America’s most important ally in the Asia-Pacific will result in an inevitable downgrade in Korea’s own status. Some wonder whether this is happening to counter China. As a shrimp among whales, South Korea is concerned about the rising tensions between Japan and China. South Koreans are also aware of the speculation that a Northeast Asia command will be formed at Camp Zama, Japan. South Korea is unlikely to accept any U.S. command structure that subordinates U.S. forces in Korea to a headquarters located in Japan. They seem to view this as an indication that Korean interests are being subordinated to Japanese interests. Although cultural exchanges between the two countries have advanced significantly over the last five years, South Korea appears to be wary of Japanese attempts to strengthen bilateral security relations. Some of the discussions also indicate that South Korea will continue to resist U.S. initiatives to expand U.S.-Japan- ROK security cooperation. This is in part because of its historical legacy with Japan, but also because it does not want to unnecessarily antagonize China.

US Policy on Asia Sound The following article by James Kelly expounds on the changes -- or lack thereof -- in US policy in Asia, as well as subtle changes in the opening of communication channels between China and the US. When looking at the changes in Korea, one must also consider the occurrences happening around it. James Kelly has hands-on credibility as the foremost negotiator in the frustrating DPRK nuclear negotiations up to 2005. James A. Kelly was the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs from 2001-2005. He is counselor to the Ho-nolulu-based Pacific Forum and senior adviser to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. These comments were made in remarks to the Pacific Forum CSIS' Honolulu International Forum on Feb. 23. and posted on March 20, 2005.

No need to shift gears in U.S. policy on Asia

By James A. Kelly

As President Bush begins his second term, many have asked how announced and anticipated changes in his foreign policy team will affect U.S. policy in Asia. Although I can't predict the prospects for U.S. policy over the next four years, it is safe to say there will be no profound differences.

First, many policy aspects worked reasonably well in the first administration; there is little reason to change them. Second, President Bush and Secretary of State Condeleezza Rice have been intimately involved in every important component of East Asia-Pacific policy over the past several years, so there is no reason to expect major shifts.

Finally, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick has both affinity for and firsthand experience in Asian political issues, as well as the economic issues on which he put so much attention as U.S. trade representative.

As I look back over the past four years, engaging China and handling its "peaceful rise" was inevitably the top priority. Since the "bad days" of the EP-3 crisis, we have developed a cooperative, constructive, and candid relationship with China.

By candid, I mean there are a number of issues over which we have strong disagreements: human rights and protection of intellectual property rights, to name but two. But it is important to note that there have been an increasing number of issues on which we cooperate very well.

China has changed a lot over the past decade. Its diplomats — and many of China's leaders — are very intelligent, and well educated. They are capable, and far more confident.

Before and during the Clinton administration, phone calls between top officials or senior diplomats were unusual, and sometimes they took 24-36 hours to arrange. During much of the EP-3 incident, no one on the Chinese side was taking calls. Now, we have as many as four to five senior-level calls a month, some with only 30 minutes notice on either side. Overhanging this is a complex and important economic relationship. The United States has an enormous trade deficit with China, and U.S. companies have invested significant amounts of money in China.

For its part, China (as has Japan and others) has huge foreign exchange reserves that are invested in U.S. Treasury instruments, and that has a powerful impact on the U.S. economy.

Two important domestic factors shape Beijing's thinking: the first is economic growth and improvements in the lives of many Chinese; the other is rising nationalism. There are many causes of that nationalism, but it's fair to say most Chinese people are sensitive to what they believe to be 200 years of mistreatment by foreigners and they "are mad as hell and not going to take it anymore."

This cultivated but real sense of victimization does put some limit on Chinese government action. But does that tell us where a most untransparent China is going to go?

Some, not many, believe that China is headed for a bad end and we had better be prepared for a new Cold War. Others are optimistic, given China's movement into status as a global power.

There are conflicting possibilities, and the United States must be mindful of both sets.

Another point of emphasis for the Bush administration has been its alliances in Asia. That is something we feel pretty good about. The U.S.-Japan relationship has never been stronger. That is the product of hard work on both sides and important changes in Japan.

North Korea's admission that it abducted Japanese citizens and its development of ballistic missiles have helped make Japan a supporter of ballistic missile defense. The joint declaration produced by the Feb. 19 Security Consultative Committee should not be seen as new or shocking, but it is a robust statement that goes beyond what earlier Japanese governments would have said.

The press is full of stories about how the U.S.-South Korea alliance is beset with difficulties. It is true that there are some problems but not as much as media suggest. There are tangible accomplishments, too.

South Korea has the third largest number of military forces in Iraq (behind only the U.S. and Britain). After years of effort, we have reached agreement on moving U.S. forces out of Yongsan Base in Seoul. We have agreed on the realignment of U.S. forces in Korea. And, President Roh Moo-hyun has excellent communication with President Bush. He speaks directly and sincerely.

On North Korea, when it counts, we are on the same page. The determination to have a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons is clear.

At the same time, South Korea has an understandable preference for keeping things calm. If tensions go up, the risk premium on South Korea's extensive public and private borrowing goes up. As a result, there is a powerful economic disincentive to raising tensions on the DMZ.

South Koreans, with 52 years of hard work to build prosperity south of a mostly peaceful DMZ, have complex views about the North that complicate issues, but the alliance endures for good reasons.

When I got back to Washington four years ago, I was surprised at the deterioration of U.S.-Philippine relations.

Concern for the war on terror and good leadership chemistry has improved relations, but there are still problems with the basic approach of the Republic of the Philippines to life in East Asia. Forty years ago, the Philippines was Asia's most prosperous country (less Japan) and that is not true today. Why?

When the Philippines finds the solution to that question and unlocks the unquestioned talent of its 80 million people, that will be very good news.

Our relationship with Thailand has been strengthened. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has proven to be a strong and occasionally mercurial leader.

While Indonesia is not a treaty ally, our relationship with that country also is very important. Last year was a remarkable experience in democracy with three national elections that ended with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as president.

The tsunami has been a setback for the new administration, and there are a host of other problems, but at the same time these have provided a catalyst for the United States to improve relations with that country.

The Indonesian experience is a reminder that the spread of democracy in the Asia-Pacific region has been a very strong story in many respects. Last year witnessed a long list of elections in more than 10 countries. Much is now routine, but no less remarkable given where Asia and the Pacific have been.

Our relationship with Vietnam has significantly improved. But Vietnam is still — with delays in its World Trade Organization membership — behind the economic power curve.

Four years ago, we signed a bilateral trade agreement, but for internal political reasons, Hanoi had delayed that for two years. It has since discovered that that action in turn delayed its accession to the WTO, putting it behind competitors and, in particular, adversely affecting the textile sector.

Although there is still lots of distrust, there has been a significant improvement in relations. Vietnam's prime minister is expected to visit Washington later this year.

The Vietnamese have a love of education and a determination to move ahead that is as strong as that in China and perhaps stronger than much of the rest of Southeast Asia. It will take them a few more years to sort though internal political impediments, however.

Now, I'll turn to regional organizations and opportunities.

Just a few years ago, China seemed to hate the idea of multilateral organizations. Beijing felt such gatherings were occasions to criticize China and its activities. Still, China decided to grit its teeth and join.

As a result, there is now a significant group of educated and experienced people who attend the events, and China is eager to participate in multilateral organizations. And if the United States isn't in them, that is just fine with Beijing. This applies to the various ASEAN plus 3 (or more) groupings and, now, the East Asia Summit.

Some worry that the United States is giving the initiative to China in the region. In particular, the China-ASEAN free trade agreements have won a lot of attention.

But the United States is not being dealt out. The Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative — a series of Trade and Investment Agreements with strong support from former Trade Representative Zoellick, are moving forward.

Leading emphasis continues to be on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the region's sole all-inclusive gathering, both for following through on its agreed trade liberalization and in relating it to political/security concerns that directly impact trade. We are still unclear about the proposed and poorly defined East Asia summit.

Is it different from the ASEAN Plus Three? No one knows. Possibly India is going to go to the meeting, but probably not Australia and New Zealand. The United States has not been invited.

Challenges remain. The threat raised by North Korea and the nuclear weapons it undoubtedly has remains a most serious problem. North Korea has had at least 14 years to work with plutonium and to make a weapon. It has hard workers who are smart and well educated. Logic alone says the North could have weapons — you don't need particular intelligence.

It was reported that Pakistani A.Q. Khan has said that he was taken to a cave and shown three nuclear weapons ready to fit on a missile. Eight or 10 times the North has said that it has such weapons, and it has certainly worked hard to that end in various kinds of technology.

The six-party talks are an appropriate venue — involving each national player with essential interests — but North Korea has been working on nuclear weapons for very many years and it is not about to easily give them up.

Pyongyang will certainly make a deal, but it wants an arrangement that guarantees what it sees as its security, avoids any issues like human rights, pays generously and only requires it to give up some of its nuclear-weapons capabilities. Solving this problem is going to be a long and difficult process. Delay involves risks.

The possibility that the DPRK might sell weapons or other fissile material to any buyer, although it says that it would not, is a potential nightmare. Yet, various id