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HOW IT WAS!
MILITARY AFFAIRS NORTH KOREAN CRISIS
(2005)
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 Korean Bases/Camps
MILITARY AFFAIRS: NORTH KOREAN CRISIS
FEBRUARY 2005
PINR: Seoul's "Peace Initiative" Toward Pyongyang The full article is at PINR: South Korea Seeks Strategic Focus Among the Behemoths. The following are excerpts from the rather long and detailed analysis of Korea's struggle to position itself strategically.
Seoul's "Peace Initiative" Toward Pyongyang
Seoul's most desired future -- its best case scenario -- is a peaceful, prosperous and democratic East Asia, in which South Korea is unified or closely allied with a liberalized North and is a respected and powerful player in a regional strategic and economic community in which the bigger players are reconciled and committed to cooperation -- a configuration bearing resemblance to the European Union, though perhaps not as closely knit as the E.U. is. Although that scenario is only one of the possible outcomes of the present rebalancing process -- and not the most probable one -- as long as South Korea retains a liberal administration, it will be the standard against which Seoul formulates its geostrategy and measures its successes and failures.
Seoul's comprehensive strategic aims became clear in late January when South Korea's Unification Minister Chung Dong-young delivered speeches at the German History Museum in Berlin and the World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland. Expanding on the "Sunshine Policy" initiated by Roh's liberal predecessor Kim Dae-jung in 2000, which opened up diplomatic and economic relations between Seoul and Pyongyang, Chung presented a "peace initiative" that broke with South Korea's previous policies in significant ways.
Most importantly, the peace initiative marked a split with Washington by offering Pyongyang generous economic aid for its energy and transportation sectors if it renews its participation in the six-party negotiations on its denuclearization with Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, Moscow and Seoul, and aid to its agricultural sector if it merely renews its bilateral "dialogue" with Seoul. Pyongyang had abandoned both sets of talks on the basis of its declared suspicions of Washington's hostile intentions, demanding bilateral negotiations with Washington and Seoul's abandonment of the six-party formula. Having broken with Washington's position that there can be no aid for Pyongyang until its denuclearization is irreversible, Chung took the further step of declaring that Seoul has no interest in regime change in the North: "For North Korea, securing the regime may be its utmost priority. But it must realize that the nuclear development program would threaten the regime and not secure it." Reinforcing his message, Chung called on Washington to be "forward looking" and "pragmatic": "The U.S. needs to take on the negotiation with the North in a comprehensive approach."
In place of creating a nuclear fortress, Chung offered Pyongyang a "grand vision" of expanding the Gaesung Industrial Zone -- a cooperative venture in the North between Pyongyang and South Korean chaebols -- into "a competitive economic zone in Northeast Asia by combining the production capacity of Gaesung along with the distribution capacity of Inchon port and airport, and the financial capacity in Seoul." Seoul's high card is its economic power and it now seems serious about playing it. Whether Pyongyang responds favorably to the peace initiative in the short run is less important than the fact that Seoul has so decisively opened up the track and has made it plain that it will not support neoconservative policies from Washington.
At the end of the Berlin address, Chung outlined Seoul's broader strategic vision for East Asia, proposing that the six-party talks "advance into a multilateral security cooperation system of the region," citing Europe's ability "to institutionalize military cooperation among its members through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe." In light of the geostrategic doctrines of Washington and Beijing, such a scenario is unlikely to occur, but it is the design that would best serve Seoul's long term interests. As the toughest tiger among behemoths, Seoul would like nothing better than to draw the major powers into a durable cooperative network of mutual security, when the alternative down the road might be a choice among dependencies.
U.S. Position on North Korea Hardening The U.S. is hardening its stance on North Korea now that George Bush has received his second term and will press for sanctions. Pyongyang has recently announced that it has nuclear weapons (though it has been denying it while alluding to it in talks). The impacts could be dire as there are rumors that the US may be seeking a military solution coupled with sanctions in 2005. This strategy impacts the location of the troops on the DMZ as a primary deterent. A leaked dossier from the Korean National Security Council confirms that the chief of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's North America bureau warned North Korea in January that unless there was progress in the six-party talks within the next two or three months, the U.S. might push for a military solution. The Washington Post said, "There is little sentiment within the administration for making concessions to North Korea. If the talks do not resume, the administration could face a tough struggle to get the issue before the U.N. Security Council."
However, the Bush administration strategy is to set in motion plans to use methods used against Al Quaida to freeze assets and cut off sources of revenue in behind the scenes actions. As these secretive efforts expand, the Bush administration could afford to abate its public crusade against North Korea. Plausible deniability
established, it could then play the responsible, if uncompromising, negotiator and leave the destabilizing to those in the background. The US can play this role as there is confusion in the mediation process. The South Korean, Russian, and Chinese governments are clamoring for a more flexible U.S. position, whereas the Japanese government wants to invoke sanctions against Pyongyang for its failure to provide full disclosure on an abductee issue. With a quiescent public at home, regional allies pushing in different directions, and war off the
agenda, the Bush administration is likely to choose the middle way of diplomatic stasis coupled with covert and nongovernmental destabilization.
The Japanese press predicted that due to the North's declaration of its nuclear capability, Japanese public opinion will tilt more toward sanctions and the Defense Agency, which is seeking a missile defense (MD) system, will get a boost in its efforts to expand its arsenal. Japanese politicians stated that the time was right for economic sanctions against the North. Russia was very disappointed by the announcement as it came without warning. Russian newspapers warned that it will fuel the move for South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan to go nuclear.
The New York Times ("U.S. IS SHAPING PLAN TO PRESSURE NORTH KOREANS", 2005-02-14) reported that in the months before the DPRK announced that it possessed nuclear weapons, the Bush administration began developing new strategies to choke off its few remaining sources of income, based on techniques in use against Al Qaeda, intelligence officials and policy makers involved in the planning say. The new strategies would intensify and coordinate efforts to track and freeze financial transactions that officials say enable the government of Kim Jong Il to profit from counterfeiting, drug trafficking and the sale of missile and other weapons technology. All of this is aimed at a regime change by covert and non-governmental means.
But critics argue that the idea of regime change is not realistic and based on wishful thinking. According to South Korean intelligence, no hard evidence has surfaced concerning the defection of a large block of high-ranking North Korean military officers. The train disaster has not led to the purge that
might be expected if the government had uncovered or suspected an assassination plot. Anti-government slogans have been reported for more than 10 years they probably exist but don't necessarily translate into
imminent revolution. And the fact that portraits of Kim Jong II have been removed from public places may support earlier contentions that the North Korean leader is trying to reduce his official personality cult. In his recent memoir recalling seven years as a translator in Pyongyang, Michael Harrold writes of his temporarily successful campaign to remove Great Leader from the translations of Kim II Sung works, because he considered the honorific too awkward for English readers. After Western journalists interpreted this change as a sign of the leader's weakening power, the title was quickly restored. Such is the great potential for error in reading too much into small details in North Korea.
To harden the US stand, the hardliners have dragged out "proof" that the gaseous uranium found in Libya in 2002 came from North Korea according to Ridge atomic laboratory -- but NOT confirmed by the AEC who feel it might still be Pakistan. (NOTE: The hardliners think the gaseous uranium was probably extracted from U235 mined in the North and extracted in a centrifuge process. However, the US feels the North does not have enough centrifuges to produce sufficient quantities of the gaseous uranium for nuclear weapons.) This story debuted back in May 2004 after Libya turned over a cask of uranium hexafluoride to U.S. investigators as part of its own denuclearization deal. Scientists have since failed to identify the source. Having ruled out Pakistan and other candidates, some administration officials have concluded that the supplier must have been North Korea. But since the United States lacks any sample of North Korean uranium, the link cannot definitively be made. The International Atomic Energy Agency, meanwhile, still believes Pakistan might have been the culprit. And the uranium hexafluoride must be processed further to become nuclear material; it is not itself the stuff of bombs.
There is a great deal of pressure coming from somewhere, a North Korea-based diplomat told The Guardian at the end of December. "We don't know whether it is internal or external, but something is going on." External pressure is certainly coming from U.S., South Korean, and Japanese civic groups in northeast China that are taking advantage of a porous border to encourage anti-government sentiment within North Korea. The political opposition in South Korea, hostile to the engagement policy of the Roh Moo Hyun administration, has also shifted to a more aggressive stance. It conducted a provocative fact-finding tour of China looking at the refugee issue, intending to embarrass both Beijing and Seoul. Opposition lawmakers also leaked to the press two secret North Korean government plans to prepare for mass defections, a possible civil war, and the need to establish an emergency administrative headquarters.
Japan is also taking measures to put pressure on the North. The New York Times reported on 14 Feb that Japan, too, was stepping up pressure on North Korea through revisions to its maritime controls law that will go into effect in March. Because no North Korean ships are likely comply with regulations calling on all vessels that pass through Japanese waters to be insured against such things as leakage of hazardous materials, the revision would effectively spell an end to shipping between North Korea and Japan. If Japan enforces trade sanctions that cut off all trade, the DPRK's GDP will fall by between 1.25 percent and 7 percent causing a decline of about $1 billion. Japan imported the equivalent of some $223 million from the DPRK each year between 2000 and 2003. Japan's exports to the DPRK reached an annual average of $144 million during the same period.
In turn Kyodo News on 15 Feb reported that the International Atomic Energy Agency projected that the DPRK's nuclear-processing facility has been in almost full operation since 2004 and is capable of producing some 10 kilograms of plutonium per year, which can be converted into one or two nuclear weapons. IAEA officials stated the UN nuclear watchdog has concluded that the DPRK has extracted plutonium from spent nuclear fuel rods in early 2003 and 2004.
The South Korean government must make a choice now that Pyongyang has officially declared it has nuclear weapons. For now, Seoul and the US appear to regard that admission as a negotiation strategy. In essence, the two countries are opting to "disregard" the comments rather than react to them. If one thinks about it, reaction for the US means military action which was never removed from the table and for South Korea action means severing its economic and cultural ties established under its reapproachment processes. At this time, these are NOT good options. Thus both countries have opted for no action.
 Menees (Feb 2005)
However, the 2004 ROK Defense White Paper already admits that it is "possible" that Pyongyang has nuclear arms. (See White Paper Published.) The 2004 White Paper published Feb. 4 stated that North Korea could have manufactured one or two nuclear devices with about 10-14kg of plutonium the country extracted before IAEA inspections in 1992. The ROK is being boxed into a position to finally choose which side it is on -- if it solidly lands on the side of North Korea, the US may take a reasonable approach to simply cut its losses and pull out of Korea -- relying on Japan to be its ally in isolating the North. This is a worst case scenario as it will also entail playing hardball to kill South Korea's economic recovery as it will feed the North. In inter-Korean dialogue and exchanges, the North concentrated only on the economic issues necessary for it and dodged the military and security sectors, including the nuclear problem.
The ROK has chosen the path of playing down the North's nuclear threat. It continues with its MAY HAVE stance -- meaning "it may have the bomb, but without a test it is unverifiable." (NOTE: Nuclear testing is normally done underground, but it would fatally damage the DPRK's ecosystem.) Joongang Ilbo on 14 Feb 2005 reported that top Roh Moo-hyun administration officials downplayed the significance of the DPRK's declaration that it has nuclear weapons, with the unification minister saying it would be premature to label the DPRK a nuclear power. The ROK's top policymaker on the DPRK, Chung Dong-Young, indicated that the ROK government was inclined to view the statement as more bluster in the DPRK's game of nuclear brinkmanship. He told parliament that the ROK still had confidence in its policy of reconciliation with Pyongyang and that the nuclear standoff could be resolved through dialogue.
Now it is "it may have a bomb, but it doesn't have the warheads for missiles nor the missiles technology to deliver it." Evaluations of Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities differ even within the government. Both the Defense Ministry and NIS are emphasizing the possibility that North Korea has manufactured atomic weapons, while the Unification and Foreign ministries are noncommittal citing lack of evidence. An official with the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security said the different responses were attributable to the fact that the Foreign and Unification ministries must consider the country’s relationship with the North, while the Defense Ministry and NIS have to keep in mind battle capabilities.
Basically the ROK will continue on with its current program of reapproachment. As to the nuclear weapon issue, it says that the North cannot use the weapon against them without destroying itself -- and it was too heavy for a missile. This attitude recognizes that the North's nuclear threat is to Japan and not them. Therefore, they choose to disregard it.
According to Chosun Ilbo on 16 Feb, the ROK's NIS intelligence agency said that the DPRK may possess nuclear weapons but probably lacks the technical know-how to mount them on missiles. The NIS said even if North Korea produced nuclear weapons they would be A-bombs to be dropped from aircraft similar to the one that devastated Hiroshima, Japan at the end of World War II, a committee member reported. "North Korea might have developed one or two nuclear bombs, but if it did, it may not have the technology to launch them on a missile," the NIS report said. A report to the National Assembly's Intelligence Committee, the National Intelligence Service said that even if the DPRK has managed to produce nuclear weapons, they would be of primitive design and could only be transported to their targets by bombers, not by missiles. But the officers said Pyeongyang is not in possession of crucial technology for reducing the weight of the nuclear payload enough that it could be mounted in a missile warhead.
All of this is occuring as the North publicly executed in February those defectors who attempted to enter missions to get to South Korea but were captured and returned to North Korea. Supposedly about 60 were executed in the North in mid-January to discourage North Koreans from seeking political asylum in South Korea. In a statement, the Headquarters for Protection of North Korean Defectors said, "North Korea executed in public eight to nine North Korean defectors sent back to Chongjin City, North Hamgyeong Province, from China in mid-January in an effort to prevent North Koreans from fleeing." A total of about 60 North Korean defectors were executed in various detention centers throughout North Korea at a similar time, the organization said. The North is a human rights nightmare.
The framers of the North Korean Human Rights Act (NKHRA) were careful to note that their bill was not connected to regime change. But Kansas Republican Sam Brownback and neoconservative Michael Horowitz of the Hudson Institute have crafted follow-on legislation titled "End Dictatorship, Assist Democracy" that will dispense with rhetorical niceties. Horowitz's vision is to transform 45 autocracies by 2025, North Korea (DPRK) among them, through nonmilitary means -- without mentioning any names specifically. As for the NKHRA it has turned into a basket case as the Bush Administration has NOT asked for funding of the program. The initial amounts allocated were quickly sucked away by Korean groups in America claiming that they would to set up agencies in America to assist the North Korean defectors.
 Sheneman (Feb 2005)
In addition the DPRK is increasingly denying monitoring visits to the country by the World Food Program (WFP) causing the agency to suspend its food distribution in more districts. In the WFP report on the DPRK published Friday 11 February , the WFP said Pyongyang added Kowon County, South Hamkyong Province, early this month to its areas designated as off limits, making the agency suspend its aid operation there. It was the 10th denial of access by Pyongyang since late last year.
However, within the same context the free market operations in North Korea appear to be blossoming. Reports have it that in some areas all types of meat and produce, Japanese TVs, ROK cosmetics and PRC goods abound. However, the point is that only the rich can afford these goods while the poor masses must rely on the government distribution system. Experts recommend a two-path system for the immediate future until the free market trade concept takes hold. The question is who is going to subsidize the government system if the ROK pulls the plug on fertilizer shipments and the WFP continues to suspend food deliveries to more areas?
 Stantis (Feb 2005)
On 12 Feb 2005 Vice President Dick Cheney met with South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon in Washington. According to the New York Times Cheney asked Ban Ki-moon to suspend fertilizer aid to North Korea -- though Ban denied this. Cheney was said to have told Ban that if Korea wanted to help Kim Jong-il choose between nuclear weapons and deepening isolation, it needed to respond in concert with other nations trying to disarm North Korea. The deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz also told the same thing to Ban in his meeting with him. In the past the South has been a pain in the tush for the US. Though there is a tri-party agreement (Korea, Japan and US) that they all take a unified stance on dealing with North Korea, the South has been marching to its own drummer and continuing to aid North Korea with fertilizer, food, and business transactions -- including the Kaesong Economic Zone.
Yonhap news ("S. KOREAN LABOR GROUPS TO DELIVER FERTILIZER TO N. KOREA", 2005-03-22) reported that the ROK's two umbrella labor groups will deliver 200 tons of free fertilizer to the DPRK on Wednesday, officials said Tuesday. The aid will be shipped in eight 25-ton trucks to the DPRK's Mount Geumgang resort. A 16-member delegation from the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) will accompany them, officials said.
To make the above report seem surreal, the Joongang Ilbo reported that with direct contact between the two Koreas was almost nonexistent according to Chung Dong-young, the ROK's minister of unification. Chung stated the DPRK should have no expectation of receiving fertilizer aid from Seoul unless Pyongyang resumes bilateral talks. In an interview with the Chungang Ilbo, Mr Chung, who also heads the National Security Council, said the two Koreas' governments have always held talks over procedures of the routine fertilizer aid to the DPRK before shipments were made. This contradicts the actions of the ROK by allowing the "humanitarian" aid of 200 tons by the unions to be shipped across the border.
Ambassador Christopher Hill stated that the joint North-South Kaesong Industrial Project and a request for fertilizer aid from Pyongyang to Seoul are issues that have appeared to divide the U.S. and South Korea. Hill said he understood the unique intra-Korean relationship, but added that all parties to the talks needed to ensure that Pyongyang did not play them off against each other. "We don’t have to act identically, but we do have to act in coordination," Hill said. In diplomatic parlance, this was a warning to Seoul not to pursue economic cooperation with the North without consulting the U.S.
Ban said Seoul has yet to decide on Pyongyang's request for an unprecedented 500,000 tons of fertilizer. However, in a separate statement, the Blue House stated that it will continue with aid to the North -- but review it if the situation deteriorates. There are fears that intra-Korean economic cooperation like the Kaesong Industrial Zone project could become a bone of contention between the U.S. and South Korea. For example, on 18 Feb Yonhap News Agency reported that the ROK government allowed its state-run power supplier, KEPCO, to provide electricity to the Kaesong Industrial Complex, a joint-venture between the two countries located north of the border -- a move to bypass the North's claims of power shortages.
 Wright (Feb 2005)
On 10 Feb North Korea said six-party talks aimed at resolving its nuclear issue had been "suspended indefinitely" over U.S. hostility. Though Seoul and the US stated that this is negotiation strategy rhetoric, the American press continued to report plans for sanctions against North Korea -- including proceeding with a 5-way talks that did NOT include the North. In addition the Bush administration is looking into ways to block money flowing into the North -- at the time when Japanese monies remitted to the North has dropped 35 percent to about 62 billion yen.
The rift between Pyongyang and Washington showed no signs of healing. White House spokesman Scott McClellan flatly rejected bilateral talks between North Korea and the U.S., while the Chosun Shinbo, the mouthpiece of the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, said in a dispatch from Pyongyang on Saturday that 2005 would be the year when North Korea's strength and U.S. military and diplomatic pressure collide head on. Again the North called for all US troops to be withdrawn from Korea before it would start negotiations on nuclear weapons.
 Plante (Feb 2005)
North Korean Crisis Shows Movement Off HardlineThe JoongAng Ilbo on 18 February stated that the DPRK's top diplomat said in a phone interview that Pyongyang
is willing to attend talks "in any form" over its nuclear arms program if
the United States promises coexistence with the DPRK and noninterference in
its internal affairs, and if Pyongyang can expect the talks to have
"substantial outcomes in denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and renouncing
hostile U.S. policy." He stressed that he was speaking officially for the DPRK.
The Korea Times on 18 Feb reported that the PRC and Russia share a goal of realizing a ``nuke-free Korean Peninsula'' through peaceful methods such as multilateral talks involving relevant parties, Seoul's chief envoys to the
two countries said. PRC's role in the six-party talks, aimed at defusing the DPRK nuclear crisis, is very significant as many experts and officials recognize the extent of Beijing's influence over the impoverished DPRK, the diplomats stressed in unison. The PRC and ROK urged patience with the DPRK on Thursday, stressing their commitment to six-party talks on its nuclear program, as diplomats consulted in Beijing to try to get the process back on track.
The feeling in Japan is heating up. Yomiuri Shimbun reported on 18 Feb that the DPRK has proved it deserves the ire of Japan and the world after announcing last week that it has "manufactured nukes" and is suspending participation in the six-party talks. Adding fuel to the fire, Pyongyang audaciously accused Tokyo of inaccurately analyzing the false remains of abductee Megumi Yokota. Who can blame the Japanese public for demanding that all ties with the DPRK be summarily cut off? Starting next month, only a handful of DPRK ships will be permitted to dock at Japanese ports, as a revised marine indemnity insurance law takes effect. And public outrage is pushing the Cabinet of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi ever closer toward
imposing unilateral economic sanctions against the DPRK. At the same time, a pro-DPRK newspaper, the Choson Sinbo, run by a Pyongyang-aligned organization of ethnic Korean residents in Japan, blamed Washington's failure to alter its "hostile"
policy toward the DPRK for Pyongyang's recent nuclear declaration.
At the same time, the Korea Times reported on 18 Feb that a DPRK expert stated that the DPRK's legislature, the Supreme Assembly, will meet early next month tol endorse the Foreign Ministry's announcement last week that the nation has nuclear weapons and will boycott the six-nation nuclear talks. The expert's analysis came hours after the DPRK's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) will hold the third session of the 11th SPA, the first of the year, in Pyongyang on March 9.
Japan Expands Mutual Security Definition The Washington Post ("JAPAN TO JOIN U.S. POLICY ON TAIWAN ", 2005-02-18) reported that the United States and Japan will declare for the first time in a joint agreement that Taiwan is a mutual security concern, according to a draft of the document. Analysts called the move a demonstration of Japan's willingness to confront the rapidly growing might of the PRC. The United States has long focused attention on the PRC government's threat to use military force against Taiwan if the island, which the PRC views as a renegade province, moves toward independence. Until now, Japan has been content to let the United States bear the brunt
of Beijing's displeasure.
At the same time, Japan is becoming more active in its territorial disputes with its neighbors. The issue of Takeshima (Tokdo) by the Japanese causes great ire on the part of the Koreans who seized the island in 1954. (See Tokdo Dispute History for historical data and information on Tokdo.) This has caused some to call for the abrogation of the 1999 fisheries agreement with Japan that concluded after the Japanese government unilaterally canceled a 1965 pact, announcing an EEZ after the United States and the Soviet Union in 1977 declared their seas as EEZs. The Korean government had been blamed previously for making too many concessions to Japanese government demands during the negotiations, a situation which fueled fierce national antagonism at the time toward Japan. (NOTE: The row escalated in March 2005 to a level of great friction between the two countries. See March 2005)
Japan is also now openly confronting Russia and China over disputed islands taken from it at the end of WWII. Activists invaded a lighthouse maintained by the Chinese on a disputed island and set up a Japanese flag on it. To the north, the Japanese refused the offer of the Russians to split four islands between the two and negotiate on the two in its possession at a later date.
NEW WORRY: IMPROVED SCUD The Chosun Ilbo on 15 Feb reported that the North had developed a new SCUD missile. According to the report, the DPRK developed an upgraded Scud missile, dubbed the Scud-ER, with an estimated range of 600 - 1,000 kilometers. The missiles have a longer range and are more accurate than existing Scud missiles. A government source that US spy satellites discovered the new Scuds one or two years ago, and were currently trying to determine whether they have been deployed. The source said the missiles are capable of striking targets in nearly all of the ROK even from bases in rear areas of the DPRK. The missiles have longer ranges than North Korea's existing arsenal of 600 Scud B (300km) and Scud C (500km) missiles.
Accuracy has always been the weak point of existing Scud missiles. Rumors of the upgraded Scuds E-R (for "extended range") spread among some specialists in the latter half of the 1990s, but their existence was never confirmed.
But the range of the new Scuds is considerably shorter than that of Pyongyang’s arsenal of Rodong missiles (1,300km) and newly designed intermediate-range ballistic missiles (3,000 - 4,000km), which have already been deployed; its Taepodong-1 missile (2,500km), which was test-fired in 1998 but never deployed; and the Taepodong-2 missile (6,700km), which is currently under development. However, they are reportedly all aimed at Japan and the U.S. rather than South Korea.
 Taepodong 2
The Scud upgrades, by contrast, were designed with South Korea in mind, and intelligence authorities believe they represent a greater threat than the long-range missiles.
Joint Close Air Support Exercise Korea Times ("CFC PROPOSES ROK-US JOINT MILITARY DRILL", 2005-02-16) reported that the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) recently proposed to the ROK military a joint special forces training drill with troops from the US, the US Forces Korea (USFK) said Wednesday. The CFC made the proposal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army, asking if the military drill could be held next month and open to the news media, said Kim Young-kyu, spokesman of the USFK. The military drill will be focused on "close air support" in which aircraft are mobilized to support nearby ground combat operations by launching air strikes against the ground enemy.
The A-10 Warthogs of Osan AB have trained in Korea primarily as "tank-killers" though it is a primary weapon for Close Air Support (CAS) as seen in Desert Storm and in the Iraq War. However, there has not been much interface in the past with the USAF and its ROK counterparts who would be the primary recipients of any CAS in case of a North Korean breakout. For as long as there has been an Army and an Air Force, there have been differing definitions of what is CAS. Even now in the US military, there are differing definitions of CAS for the Marines versus Navy and Air Force. It will be interesting for the ROKAF and USAF to compare notes on their respective definitions.
In March 2005, there was to be a "small scale" joint exercise with only dozens of soldiers. Most likely computer interface for Command Post functions such as in Ulchi Focus Lens.
USS Pueblo Return Demanded??? In a propaganda move, Congressional Record (Senate) ("SENATE RESOLUTION 53--DEMANDING THE RETURN OF THE USS "PUEBLO" TO THE UNITED STATES NAVY", 2005-02-14) Whereas the USS Pueblo, which was attacked and captured by the North Korean Navy on January 23, 1968; Whereas the capture of the USS Pueblo resulted in no reprisals against the Government or people of North Korea and no military action at any time; Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the Senate--(1) demands the return of the USS Pueblo to the United States Navy; and (2) directs the Secretary of the Senate to transmit copies of this resolution to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State.
The USS Pueblo is now a floating museum in Wonson to recall the DPRK "victory."
Two Aegis Destroyers to Yokosuka The Japan Times on 17 Feb 2005 reported that the US Navy in Japan has said it will replace a cruiser and a destroyer forward-deployed here with two Aegis-equipped destroyers later this year. With its ability to acquire and track ballistic missiles by radar, the vessel is expected to operate as part of the US-led missile defense shield, which Japan joined in December 2003, against possible missile attacks by the DPRK.
The Stars and Stripes on 18 Feb stated the guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes is expected to depart in April after nearly eight years in Yokosuka. The Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS Lassen will arrive to replace it around June, Navy officials announced. In June, the Spruance-class destroyer USS Cushing is expected to depart, to be replaced in September by the guided missile destroyer USS Stethem, commissioned in 1995.
“The big difference is they have a greater combat capability,” said Cmdr. John Wallach, spokesman for Commander, Naval Forces Japan. “Newer, advanced Aegis combat systems and better capabilities.”
"Both USS Cushing and USS Vincennes are nearing the end of their service lives," stated a Navy release. "These ship rotations are part of the Navy's long-range plan to routinely replace older ships assigned to the Navy's Forward Deployed Naval Forces with newer or more capable surface combatants."
The Vincennes, the Navy’s first Ticonderoga-class Aegis cruiser to operate in the Pacific Fleet, was commissioned in 1985 and holds a crew of about 362. The Lassen, commissioned in 2001, will bring a crew of 317. The Cushing, commissioned in 1979, carries a crew of 345 and has been based at Yokosuka for eight years. The Stethem carries a crew of 317. The new ships have fewer personnel aboard, and therefore fewer families will be moving to Yokosuka.
This action also places Korea on the outside of this Missile Defense Shield. Korea recently backed off on the purchase of used PAC-2 Patriots from Germany to fill the void in its missile defense, instead opting to use the U.S. Patriot missile defense umbrella that was expanded with upgraded PAC-3 Patriots in 2004 and positioned in Kwangju and increased at Osan AB.
US, Japan to Develop Missile Shield in FY 2006 According to Seoul Times. citing a Kyodo News report, Japanese Defense Agency Director General Yoshinori Ono and U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld agreed in Feb 2005 to advance ongoing bilateral research on a missile defense system to the development stage in fiscal 2006. In a Washington date lined story, Japan news agency reported that the two nations are expected to move swiftly to the production and deployment stage as Japan has already paved the way for exporting related components to the United States by relaxing in December its ban on arms exports.
The agreement came days after U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Director Porter Goss said North Korea could be ready to test-fire a new long-range Taepodong 2 ballistic missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to the United States 'at any time.' Goss was referring to an upgraded version of the Taepodong 1 missile fired by North Korea in August 1998, part of which flew over Japan into the Pacific. The incident led Japan and the United States to begin their joint missile defense system research in 1999. The following is from the Seoul Times article:
Pyongyang maintains the launch was of a rocket for sending a satellite into orbit. But it has agreed to halt the launching of ballistic missiles, and has kept to the moratorium to date. Uncertainties have grown over North Korea since Pyongyang declared Feb.10 its possession of nuclear weapons and an indefinite boycott of six-party talks on its nuclear ambitions.
... Rumsfeld proposed upgrading the missile shield research to the development stage in fiscal 2006, and Ono welcomed the plan, the official said, adding that they also agreed to step up cooperation on information and other aspects to make the missile defense system effective.
The proposal came after the U.S. Defense Department decided recently to develop a bigger enhanced version of its independently developed sea-based Standard Missile 3 interceptor to defend against ballistic missiles.
The Japan-U.S. joint research involves key components of the enhanced SM3 interceptor. The U.S. Navy has strongly pressed for its development despite skepticism expressed by some experts about its effectiveness.
The Japanese officials said Ono and Rumsfeld also agreed to accelerate bilateral consultations on the realignment of the U.S. military presence in Japan with the aim of maintaining the deterrence provided by U.S. forces and reducing the burden on local hosts, including Okinawa.
BACKGROUND: Prior to 1998, Japan backed a "vital" defense system in the east Asian region but has stopped short of expressing support for U.S. plans to set up a new missile defense shield. Then the North fired a Taepodong-1 missile across Japanese airspace claiming it was a satellite launch. N. Korea flight-tested its Taepodong 1 missile, which could presumably haul a 1,000-kilogram nuclear bomb about 2,500 kilometers. The same missile might carry a lighter biological or chemical warhead 4,100 kilometers — just shy of the two closest parts of the US: the tip of Alaska's Aleutian Islands and the western end of the Hawaiian Islands. This caused the Japanese to view the North in a completely different light -- coupled with the nuclear threats the North had made against Japan.(NOTE: In Mar 2005, the ROK government's "left-leaning" NIS director stated to the National Assembly it was a satellite launch -- though how he came to that conclusion without any external intelligence sources is unknown.)
In December 2003, Japan decided to introduce a missile defense shield to deal chiefly with the possibility of ballistic missile attacks from North Korea. The government asked for 100 billion yen in the budget for fiscal 2004 to cover the costs of implementing the system up until 2007, with 15 billion slated for use in fiscal 2004. The envisaged shield combined the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) to be launched from Aegis-equipped destroyers to intercept ballistic missiles at midcourse in space and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missiles to shoot down any remaining missiles from the ground. (The two new destroyers in 2005 fulfill this portion of the Missile Defense Shield.) According to the Mainichi Shimbun, Japan, Dec. 19, 2003, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda added that existing defensive steps were not fast enough to adequately cope with the threat of ballistic missile attacks, which can be completed within minutes. However, others pointed out that becoming involved in the missile defense shield would violated the government's interpretation of the Constitution, which it claimed forbids Japan from being involved in a collective defense agreement. But Fukuda stressed that Japan's role in the system was entirely for its own self-defense. China's successful launching of a manned space capsule in 2003 and the increasingly frequent movement of Chinese naval vessels near Japan's territorial waters have also unnerved the Japanese. Japan has stressed the North Korean threat, trying to persuade a skeptical China that the shield would be purely defensive.
China has warned that Japan's adoption of an antimissile system would disrupt the global strategic balance and set off an arms race. An effective shield would challenge China's military power by curbing the effectiveness of its missiles, which can now strike Taiwan or American forces stationed in Okinawa and elsewhere. Russia said in February 2004 that it was developing a so-called hypersonic missile technology capable of piercing the United States' system.
Japan would spend $10 billion in this decade to develop a two-layer shield. In the 10 minutes or so that it would take a ballistic missile fired from North Korea to reach Japan, one of Japan's advanced destroyers with the Aegis weapons system would try to intercept it by firing ship-to-air missiles. If that failed, Patriot missiles based around key cities would have a second chance to knock down the enemy missile.
To build the shield, Japan plans to modify its four Aegis destroyers by adding the interceptor, the Standard Missile-3, and by purchasing 16 new versions of the Patriot missiles. To track incoming missiles, Japan would rely on intelligence from United States satellites, but it also plans to construct a land-based radar network and a command and control system.
In the last two years, the United States has conducted five tests of its Aegis-based Standard Missile-3, completing four successfully. The United States and Japan are expected shortly to conduct joint tests of an upgraded version of the missile that would incorporate four components developed together: an infrared seeker, kinetic warhead, rocket motor and nose cone.
The first joint test is to take place in late 2005, followed by another in early 2006, said Lt. Cmdr. Alvin Plexico of the Navy, a spokesman for the Defense Department.
Now that Japan is an ally of the US, Washington regrets that its US sponsored constitution contains a pacifist clause and is using pressure to have it modified. It has urged Japan to forge closer ties on missile defense and said US-made missile defense systems would be useful for Japan to shield against possible attacks. Visiting US missile defense chief Lieutenant-General Ronald Kadish told Japanese Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba that Washington wanted to secure closer cooperation from Japan on its planned missile defense shield. Kadish told Ishiba that the US combination of an Aegis ship-based interception system and Patriot ground-to-air system would be useful for Japan. Ishiba told Kadish that Japan would need more discussions on the missile defense system before making any concrete decision. Japan has been considering introducing the two US-developed missile defense systems to cope with possible attacks by a third country, notably North Korea. Ship-based missile defense (SMD) using Aegis-equipped destroyers is designed to intercept short- and mid-range ballistic missiles at mid-course. The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) ground-to-air system is designed to shoot down missiles that the ship-based system fails to intercept. In August 1998, North Korea alarmed the world by launching a Taepodong-1 missile that passed over Japan, demonstrating that areas with large populations including Tokyo were within the weapon's estimated 1'000-km range. The surprise test-firing of the North Korean missile prompted Japan to start studying with Washington a theater missile defense system, a variant of the US national missile defense system, aimed at shielding US troops and allies in Asia. (Reuters, 6/16/03).
According to Voice of America on 17 Dec 2004, Japan and the US signed an agreement to encourage cooperation on developing a missile defense system. Japanese Defense Minister Yoshinori Ono signed a memorandum of understanding Friday in Tokyo with U.S. Ambassador to Japan Howard Baker. Under the agreement, Japan and the United States will exchange information on research, deployment and operations of a missile shield. The agreement comes one week after Japan adopted new defense policy guidelines that would allow the joint development of a missile defense system with the United States.
In December 2004, the Asahi Shimbun, a Japanese daily, said the US and Japan signed a contingency plan in 2002 to respond to a possible crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The Asahi Shimbun said that the plan, code-named "Operation 5055," calls for Japan's self defense forces to assist American troops in combat if war breaks out on the peninsula. The scenario also envisages Japan guarding against possible invasion by hundreds of North Korean agents.
Under the plan, Japan's military would join search and rescue operations for U.S. troops missing in action and also guard 135 possible military targets such as U.S. bases and nuclear power plants along its northwestern coast. The paper also said Japanese maritime forces with minesweepers would keep open shipping lanes between the Korean Peninsula and the northern coast of Japan's main island of Kyushu. The report comes comes days after Japan unveiled a new defence policy that calls for a shift from the purely defensive posture in place since its defeat in World War Two
The five-year defense outline allows the sale of missile defense components to the United States for production of a missile shield. Japan says other arms export cases will be considered on a case-by-case basis. The change in the production of these MDS components — and the likelihood that they will eventually be sold to other nations joining the network — forced Japan to abandon one of the cherished tenets of its postwar pacifism: a ban on arms exports. Although Japan has long had one of the world's largest military budgets, its arms industry has been barred from exporting since 1967. Currently the Patriot Missile components are manufactured and assembled in Japan under license for domestic use only.
Another necessary change might be a redefinition of Japan's concept of collective self-defense. Japan has maintained that it has that right, but chooses not to exercise it because it is not allowed under its Constitution, which was imposed by the United States during the postwar occupation. The government has argued that intercepting a missile aimed at Japan amounts to a pure act of self-defense and emphasizes that the shield will be a Japanese one. But others point out that Japan will be part of a system linking the continental United States and other friendly nations. This leads up to the current situation where the Japanese are being lobbied to change Article 9 of the Peace Constitution to allow the expanded role for Japan's self-defense -- including the right to preemptive strikes if necessary to protect itself.
In Feb 2005. Japan's cabinet voted on a bill to revise its Self-Defense Force Law. The revision is designed to permit a field commander to launch anti-ballistic missiles at his own discretion. Currently, Japan much first receive approval from the U.N. Security Council, the Cabinet and the Prime Minister before it could launch such a missile. The problem is that there is NOT enough time to obtain this permission before missile impact with a missile launched from North Korea.
The four-step process had been designed to prevent such an important decision from being made independently by the military, experts said. The bill, was expected to be delivered to parliament for review, stipulates that the ballistic missile interception procedure is an administrative order rather than a legislation, therefore dispensing with recognition from parliament. Japan enacted a series of laws over the past two years, considerably enhancing the administrative bodies' power in national defense. The legislation has raised severe concerns that the war-renouncing constitution is increasingly ignored and Japan's self-defense-oriented force is gravitating towards that of an offensive capacity.
The question the ROK really needs to start asking itself is IF the US pulls back its Patriots if Roh escalates the tensions again between the US-ROK military question, what protection does it have against its "friends" in the North? It has delayed its procurement of even used PAC-2 Patriots to defend against SCUD attacks, it has no ATCMS missile launchers (though on order but unfunded). It has recently developed a home-grown cruise missile, but it is primarily for sea-launch and has not been fielded as of this date. In essence, the ROK has NO missile defense or counter-attack capability of its own. However, its NGO groups -- led by the anti-War faction -- have staged violent protests against the adoption of the MDS system in Korea.
The concern is that the MDS will create a network that will eventually require the sharing of critical information and coordination among its members, which could split Asian nations into two camps: those inside and those outside the system. Those inside the system say the shield will be a defense against the missile buildup by nations like China and North Korea; those outside say it will destabilize the region and start an arms race. Australia has signed on to the MDS and negotiations were on-going with India. Taiwan will receive missile tracking equipment to identify inbound missiles from China. China, already displeased with Japan's decision, said that the radar sale to Taiwan sent the "wrong message," and it reiterated its opposition to America's selling "advanced weapons" there. The United States has vowed to protect Taiwan against an attack by China, which has 500 missiles pointed at the island.
But the ROK is not the only nation opting out of the MDS. Canada in Feb 2005 publicly stated it would not support the "weaponization of space." Though the Prime Minister Paul Martin initially supported joining the program when he was a candidate for the Liberal leadership, Martin has retreated, since polls indicate that a majority of Canadians oppose it. Many believe that the umbrella, when fully implemented, could lead to an international arms race. The Bush administration has tried to make a public show of understanding that Martin heads up a minority government that could fall over such a contentious debate, but it is a great blow to the US when its neighbor would not stand with it on this pivotal issue. In Europe, Britain has signed on, but interest there has been generally tepid compared with the reception in Asia, where the missile buildup in China and North Korea, and the proliferation of nuclear technology from Pakistan, are driving the rise in the region's military spending.
Seoul to Finish S-N Railroad by Dec. South Korea plans to finish connecting an inter-Korean railroad on the east coast by the end of the year to support a Mt. Kumgang tourism project in North Korea, Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young said on 24 Feb. The government would negotiate with the North to guarantee travelers' safety on their way to the scenic resort area through the heavily fortified Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The east coast road, linking the South's Kangwon Province to Mt. Kumgang, has been open to the public since September 2003. Currently, travelers are only allowed to use shuttle buses.
Up until January this year, 872,332 tourists have visited the special tourism zone in the North. The tourism program, designed by Hyundai Asan, began in November 1998. An excursion ship has been used to transport tourists.
ROK "Admits" to North Korean Satellite Launch Yonhap News reported on 25 Feb 2005 that the National Intelligence Service admitted that
the DPRK launched a satellite in 1998, overturning a previous assessment that the communist country fired a long-range missile. In a parliamentary report, Ko Young-koo, head of the NIS, said that a "Daepodong-1" missile was used in launching the satellite in August 1998.
The significance of this is that this supports the North Korean claim -- which in turn slaps the U.S. and Japan in the face as they claim the missile was a test of the long-range Taepodong-1 ICBM which overshot the Japanese territory and landed in the sea in 1998. The Japanese public reacted in an uproar to this missile incident and public sentiment shifted dramatically. The long-range missiles would be capable of carrying warheads to Japan. As a result the Japanese have joined the controversial Missile Defense Sheild Initiative (MDS) promoted by the US. PAC-3 Patriot missiles and new Aegis destroyers of the SDF -- along with added US Aegis destroyers add to this shield to protect Japan.
 Taepodong 1 missile (From DPRK TV)
The latest worry is that the North with its admitting to having nuclear weapons can install the weapons on a long range missile aimed at Japan. Commonsense dictates that the North cannot use the nuclear weapon on the peninsula without destroying itself -- so the only country that the North would target would be Japan (or China its ally).
As a sidenote, Ko Young-koo, head of the NIS, was appointed to the NIS by President Roh over the objections of the National Assembly who called him "left-leaning" individual. Roh appointed him anyway to "reform" the NIS in 2003. The National Assembly voiced strong opposition as his nominee was considered as having no experience for the top intelligence job. Roh did not need the National Assembly approval and Roh angrily appointed him despite the opposition. What made matters worse was that the National Assembly stated that the proposed appointee to the NIS policy and planning seat was a "North Korean supporter." Roh appointed him anyway as well. The aim was to gut the National Security Law which Roh continues to push for.
This revelation from the NIS seems to verify that the ROK intelligence has now been "reformed" and now openly supports the North Korean views. The point is that the ROK has NO external intelligence capability in the form of spy satellites or other means. Therefore, its intelligence is based on US-provided intelligence. How it came about this conclusion that the North launched a satellite is therefore based solely on ROK-inspired interpretation.
Japanese Start to Work on Constitutional Reform The Yomiuri Shimbun on 25 Feb 2005 reported that the Liberal Democratic Party's committee on constitutional reform is
involved in heated debates over whether the party should maintain its conservative stance or work with other parties to devise constitutional amendments that are feasible. Arguments have erupted in the committee,
chaired by former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, in debates aiming to complete a draft of amendments by April. The points of dispute include Article 9 and the status of the emperor.
The emperor portion is to allow a women to inherit the title of Empress. However, the important issue for the ROK is the Article 9 of the Peace Constitution. The US is lobbying heavily for a change to Article 9 which would allow it to remove its troops from Okinawa/Korea/US and relocate them to the Japanese mainland. It would allow Japan to become a true nation with its own defense and give it the right to protect itself against aggression -- including first-strike capabilities. To be truthful, the Japanese have most of the armament in place and the SDF is currently realigning itself to ensure that it has this war-fighting capability. The focus of course is North Korea as the tensions between the two countries continue to escalate.
The following is an editorial by Park Cheol-hee in the Joongang Ilbo on 25 Feb 2005:
Spurning the U.S. alliance foolish
The United States and Japan have been building a bilateral alliance for the 21st century. If the U.S.-Japan alliance during the Cold War focused on the defense of Japan, it has attempted to form a regional one after the Cold War.
Since the Sept 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Japan has pursued the globalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi suggested making the bilateral alliance "the U.S.-Japan alliance in the world" as soon as U.S. President George W. Bush was re-elected.
The revised strategy of the U.S.-Japan alliance was laid out concretely in a joint statement issued after the two-plus-two talks between foreign and defense ministers of the United States and Japan on Feb. 19. The two countries set, in the joint statement, the "common strategic goals" for stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the international community.
What is remarkable first of all is "the globalization of the alliance." The two countries emphasized partnership to improve the international security environment, including the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the prevention and eradication of international terrorism. The countries confirmed their view that stability in the international community is directly connected to Japan's peace and prosperity. They agreed to jointly contribute to peace-keeping activities in Afghanistan and Iraq and international disasters, including the recent tsunami disaster. They also confirmed their support for a democratic community through a joint pursuit of basic values, including democracy and human rights.
This means that the joint statement stressed strategic cooperation between the two countries that goes far beyond the framework of the existing U.S.-Japan alliance.
"Sharing a common regional strategy" is also particularly noteworthy. The United States and Japan urged China to resolve the Taiwan problem peacefully, and on the other hand asked the country to enhance transparency in its military and play a responsible and constructive role in the stability of the region and the world.
As common strategic goals, the two countries clearly stated latent threats from China and suggested the possibility of joint intervention in the Taiwan problem. They pressed North Korea for the peaceful resolution of specific current issues, including nuclear weapons, missiles and Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea. This is an extension of Japan's new "Outline of Defense Plan" announced last year in which Japan named North Korea and China as possible threats.
The United States and Japan also agreed to review the joint use of military bases as part of defense cooperation following the relocation of U.S. military forces. This means that they began to introduce integrated operating roles, duties and capabilities while strengthening the ability of mutual cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. military forces in Japan.
They have sought stable stationing of U.S. military forces in Japan through a proposal of cooperative realignment of military forces, including reducing burdens on military base areas, improvement of relations with the regional community and consideration of environment.
As such, Japan aims to transform its alliance with the United States facing up to the trends of the new international order that has developed since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and reinforcing and deepening the bilateral alliance.
As far as the maintenance of alliance is concerned, Japan is a level ahead of us. Japan is worried over if it might be abandoned by the United States. But Japan is not a mere tool of the United States. Japan acts knowing that it can have more space for international activities and raise its voice within the framework of the bilateral alliance. Japan praises the United States in front of others and delivers its requests quietly if it has any. For this reason, trust is accumulated between the two countries. When Japan, whose national strength is 10 times larger than our country, acts this way, South Korea has no reason to abandon its alliance with the United States. If it discards the alliance with the United States, South Korea will hardly be able to avoid being treated coldly by China, North Korea and Japan. The argument for abolishing the alliance is not realistic.
While being cautious of China, Japan chose the United States. Will South Korea opt for China as an alternative? No, it won't. When China does not contend that the country is an alternative to the United States, South Korea does not need to choose China first. Even if South Korea relies on China, there is no guarantee that its security will become solid.
Therefore, we should pursue cooperation with China from many aspects, but China is not an alternative for our security strategy. Standing alone in the international community is even more difficult. Neutrality or self-reliance is a term that sounds good, but its creation and maintenance alike are not easy. Taking a lesson from the example of Japan, South Korea should find a shortcut to maintaining a mature and balanced relationship with the United States. Raising our voice unconditionally and arguing for the difference in opinions will not strengthen South Korea's stance. South Korea, still divided with North Korea, has no reason to distance China either.
South Korea had better deepen social, economic and diplomatic cooperation with China while remaining with the United States for military cooperation.
It will be beneficial to national interests to strengthen the U.S.-South Korea alliance until a framework of stable peace is formed by multilateral security in Northeast Asia.
* The writer is a professor of political science at the Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University. Translation by the JoongAng Daily staff.
by Park Cheol-hee
The main point is that in 2005, the US aims to lobby for the change of Article 9 of the Japanese Peace Constitution. If this is done, the headquarters for the USFK's UN function, the CFC could be moved out of Korea and into Camp Zama in Japan with I Corps returning to fulfill the overhead "administrative" role. Right-leaning Japanese politicians and military planners in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), led by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, want Japan to assume a more assertive (they would say rightful, while critics would say aggressive) role on the world stage and change its low profile in international politics by shedding its strong pacifism enshrined in the post-World War II US-imposed constitution in the future. Washington has urged Tokyo to amend Article 9 and to authorize the right to collective self-defense. (Japan's current official stance is that it has this right, but cannot invoke it under the current constitution.) US military planners clearly want Tokyo to expand the SDF's activities to support US-led operations in Asia and elsewhere in the future.
Japan still cannot fully be involved in US military operations. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution prohibits the use of force as a means of settling international disputes, and the SDF is authorized to fight only if Japan itself is invaded, and then only on Japanese territory or in the surrounding sea and air. For this reason, Japanese troops were deployed to Samawah, a southern Iraqi city, which the Japanese government claims as non-combat zone, strictly on a "humanitarian" mission. The 2003 Special Measures Law stipulates that the SDF can only be sent to areas where hostilities are not under way. To send troops into a combat zone would violate this law.
Article 9 of the constitution, the "war-renouncing" provision, states: -
1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
- 2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of aggression of the state will not be recognized. (NOTE: For years the Japanese have played the "rename game" of redesignating their destroyers and cruisers with names that indicate coastal defense. In truth, Japan has a full-blown blue water navy that is only missing a carrier to make a carrier battle group.)
(Ref: The Asia Times, Japan to become 'Britain of the Far East'
on 24 Feb 2005)
Forces could be relocated to Camp Fuji and the Japanese SDF and USFJ would become the "defense line" against North Korea. The MDS for Japan (Aegis destroyer with Patriot 3) is anticipated to be in place by 2006. The 5th AF that moved to Guam with the 13th AF could return to Yokota to assume the new air component headquarters for the region. According to The Asia Times, Japan to become 'Britain of the Far East'
on 24 Feb 2005, "For ordinary Japanese, the issue of the consolidation and reduction of US military bases in Japan, especially in Okinawa, is more important than anything else. The two nations agreed to accelerate consultations based on the objectives of realigning US military forces in Japan, committing themselves to reduce the burden on local communities hosting US forces while maintaining effective deterrence. Still, the relocation of US military units such as those in Okinawa to other local cities and towns could trigger strong opposition from concerned local governments and communities in the coming months." The two countries agreed to look into handing over to Japan US-held base management and air-traffic-control rights in order to expand the joint use of the facilities, including Yokota Air Base in Tokyo. If this new arrangement is realized, the SDF would manage the bases and use them in conjunction with the US military. By reducing the current footprints of US bases, Washington appears to seek those bases being made permanent but less offensive, despite strong anti-base movements such those as in Okinawa. (Ref: The Asia Times, China seethes at US-Japan 'meddling' (24 Feb 2005))
At the same time, the threat of the Chinese invasion could be increased. In Feb 2005, China pushed through anti-cessation law pointed at the Taiwan independence movement. Japan has openly come out to state that the Taiwan Straits are in its strategic interests in backing the US position. Currently the 7th Fleet operating out of Yokosuka are a major deterent to Chinese aggression against Taiwan dating back over 50 years. China looks to the new US-Japan alliance as a threat. First, Beijing considers the revitalized US-Japan military alliance as part of Washington's containment strategy against China. Second, the new defense guidelines extend the alliance's defense perimeter to include the Taiwan Strait. Third, the revitalized alliance allows the Japanese Self-Defense Force to take on additional responsibilities. Beijing is increasingly worried that a more assertive Japan actively involved in the region's security affairs and seeking to be a "normal" power will emerge as a result of the US-Japan accord. (Ref: The Asia Times, China seethes at US-Japan 'meddling' (24 Feb 2005))
The new Japanese defense guidelines and the recent defense white paper in effect give Japan the green light to go beyond the original mandate exclusively of self-defense to a broader collective defense function, therefore providing justification for Japan to intervene in regional security affairs. Japan already has one of the largest defense budgets in the world and has a reasonably sized (given its Peace Constitution) but best-equipped military in the region. In addition, Japan's industrial and technological wherewithal will provide it with ready resources should it decide to become a great military power at short notice, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons. (Ref: The Asia Times,China seethes at US-Japan 'meddling' (24 Feb 2005))
Given Korea's phobia that Japan will again once again become a military power in the region, the US move closer to Japan starts to create problems. The US secretaries of state and defense met with their Japanese counterparts in Washington, DC, at the Security Consultative Committee (more commonly known as the "2+2 meeting") in Feb 2005. The joint statement released after the session on February 19 applauds the cooperation between the two countries, reaffirms the significance of the US-Japan security relationship to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, and articulates a set of common strategic goals for the alliance. The joint declaration also notes Japan's efforts to take a more active role in international security affairs. That was it in a nutshell, but it also meant that the US-Japan were "locking-in" the progress made in the US-Japan solidarity as Prime Minister Koizumi's tenure is drawing to a close. The joint statement laid the foundation upon which Koizumi's successor will have to operate - preventing a potential regression of Japanese security policy following Koizumi's departure. The 2 plus 2 meeting joint statement was to first and foremost, show that the US-Japan alliance continues to evolve towards a global strategic alliance. Second, the joint statement was an effort by both governments to "lock in" the progress that has been made within the alliance to date. Third, the joint statement signaled that Tokyo is consolidating its national-security policy priorities around the US-Japan alliance. (Ref: The Asia Times, Devil in the details of US-Japan pact on 12 Mar 2005)
Meanwhile, Japan's media has saturated the public with the "getting tough" rhetoric, fashioned by its right-wingers and endorsed even by socialists and communists: rhetoric to impose economic sanctions against North Korea (not so easy); to end Japan's official development assistance (ODA) to China; to launch preemptive strikes against North Korea; to identify "enemies" and "threats" (China and North Korea) in its most recent "Defense Outline"; to rearm Japan even with nuclear weapons (see Ayako Doi, "Unforeseen Consequences: Japan's Emerging Nuclear Debate," PacNet Newsletter, #12, March 13, 2003, www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0312.htm); and to blame Asian nations for their displeasure with Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's repeated visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, where the class-A war criminals are enshrined. (Ref: The Asia Times, The fault lines that could shake Asia on 13 Mar 2005)
North Signals "CONDITIONAL" return to Nuclear Talks Kim Jong-il signaled to Chinese envoy Wang Jiarui that Pyongyang was ready to return conditionally to the six-party talks on 23 Feb, appearing to back away slightly from the North's stunning Feb. 10 declaration that it possessed nuclear weapons and would indefinitely boycott the discussions. Kim Jong Il has effectively presented four conditions for returning to the six-way talks on its nuclear programs, including a demand for a security guarantee from the US. Kim also told a senior PRC official on Feb. 21 that he wants the US to give its reasons for describing the DPRK as one of the world's "outposts of tyranny," provide an assurance that it will negotiate with the DPRK on an equal basis and show by actions that it can be trusted.
On 26 Feb, South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Song Min-soon and his new six-party talks counterpart, U.S. Ambassador Christopher Hill, will be joined by Kenichiro Sasae, chief of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Asia-Oceania bureau who arrived in Seoul on 25 Feb for the strategy session. The three men are expected to discuss the results of Wang's meeting with the North's leader, following individual briefings from China.
Though the meeting signals the onset of a tri-party agreement on the North's nuclear stance, there are serious issues pending on how to handle the North. The ROK continues with signals for reapproachment, aid and increased "carrots" for the North. The Japanese are ready to levy sanctions over the abductee issue -- that Kim Jong-il called the DNA tests that proved the returned remains of one of the abductees as not the persons fabrications by the Japanese. The first of the sanctions takes place in March as all ships entering Japanese ports must show proof of insurance to cover oil spills, etc. Only 2.5 percent of the North Korean ships that visited Japanese ports in 2004 possessed such insurance. The US has announced its position to control tyrannies worldwide -- an oblique reference to North Korea -- thus supporting regime change. These are all disparate positions and need to be resolved. In our opinion, the US and Japan are in-sync as the sanctions support the US idea of regime change if the fragile economy of the DPRK collapses. Perhaps wishful thinking, but nevertheless it has been the course the US has chosen for the past four years.
PRC asked Japan to help convince the US to soften its stance over the DPRK in order to bring Pyongyang back to the six-way talks, a move that could put Tokyo in an awkward position. Beijing made the request to Japan following a visit to Pyongyang by Wang Jiarui, head of the PRC Communist Party's International Department, in late Feb. The US ambassador and negotiator Christopher Hill stated "We have a full intention to meet North Korean representatives separately and discuss if it is within the framework of the six-party talks." (NOTE: This a different stance as the US up to this point has been "moderate" -- even in making contact between the DPRK and the US within the framework of six-party talks. "What we mean by a wide-ranging forum of discussions is that it would include the format that North Korea wants," ROK negotiator Song said on KBS radio.)
In the first meeting, the US and Japan stated that North Korea should return to the negotiating table WITHOUT CONDITIONS. The ROK didn't comment. Instead, the ROK announcement was that the three countries agreed that the delivery of fertilizer as humanitarian aid to the North was a ROK perogative, though the ROK stated that it would not do so without a new inter-Korea agreement on the subject. If you read between the lines, there is a big difference between "the ROK said" and "the three countries said." In other words, the ROK simply stated its view and the others did not comment. The ROK has continued with its intent to open the Kaesong industrial area with KEPCO (Korean Electric Power Company) supplying the electricity for the South Korean companies starting operations there in March 2005. The railroad connections between the North and South are to be completed by Dec 2005.
On 15 March, KEPCO will start transferring power after it succeeded in testing the supply of electricity to the complex. The corporation set up 220 power poles in the 25 kilometers between South Korea's Munsan substation and the complex for the electricity supply. Currently, three small and medium sized South Korean companies which have established operations in the complex use electricity from their own generators. KEPCO is to supply 15,000 kilowatts of electricity but plans to increase the power to 100,000 kilowatts by 2007 when 300 more companies are expected to be operating production facilities in the complex. The supply will pave the way for running production lines in the industrial park on a stable basis.
The Kaesong complex, which aims to combine the South's capital and entrepreneurial expertise with the North's cheap labor, is considered the crowning achievement of the June 2000 summit between then South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. Companies in the 28,000-pyeong (92,400-square-meter) pilot complex that began operations late last year are currently running at about 30-percent capacity, largely because of electricity shortages. The state-run Korea Land Corp., which is in charge of the distribution of the complex, is set to distribute 50,000 pyeong and bring more small- and mid-sized firms into the complex within this year. The size of the complex in the first stage of development amounts to 1 million pyeong, with the total size expected to reach 20 million pyeong. South Korean officials hope the Kaesong project will help prod North Korea into opening up to the outside world and lead to
an easing of tension over the North's nuclear arms program.
In actuality, the ROK is about to blow its foot off with its continued support of the North. IF the Article 9 constitutional amendment passes in Japan, there will be a immediate move to relocate the CFC functions to Camp Zama with a relocation of the I Corps from Washington state to oversee the combined forces. The UNC functions will remain in Korea as a contingency unit -- and much smaller. Mobility forces can be relocated to Camp Fuji -- and the Marines can relocate out of Okinawa. The combined 5th/13th AF can be reestablished in Japan again. Things would change in a hurry and Korea will see its comfortable economic climate disappear. Investment in Korea will no longer be "safe." Everything will be rearranged...including the power structures.
Currently the ROK must rely almost solely on the US for intelligence. However, Japan has successfully launched a weather satellite that put its spy satellite program back on track. The New York Times ("AFTER FAILURES, SPACE EFFORT IN JAPAN GETS A LIFT", 2005-03-01) reported that a 16-story-high rocket blasted into the tropical night on Saturday, firmly placing Japan back in Asia's space race. The successful launch and deployment of a weather satellite over the Pacific from this remote island 650 miles southwest of Tokyo restored morale to a rocketry program battered by its rival in the PRC. Japan's rocket program is seen increasingly to have military applications. Japan launched its first military spy satellite from here in March 2003. The November 2003 launch that failed was an effort to orbit two more. These spy satellites are intended to give Japan "shutter control," the independent ability to photograph its neighbors, notably the PRC and DPRK, at will and in secret. At one time the ROK had lofty dreams of a space program as well with a launch base in the Cholla provinces in 2003, but that was shelved simply because the realities of budget concerns came to the forefront. In 2005, it was talking of placing a satellite in space with the aid of Russia.
On 28 Feb the conservative Sankei Shimbun reported that the DPRK had told officials in the ROK it was willing to take part in six-party talks on its nuclear arms program in June and offer to suspend the program in hopes of aid and a US pledge not to invade. Pyongyang also said in its message, which was conveyed to the ROK by unofficial routes and then to Japan by Seoul, that it was willing to sign a treaty with the US by October. A Japanese Foreign Ministry official denied the report.
IS THERE REALLY A NUKE??? US Military Action against North Limited This is a rehash of what we have said all along and the world knows -- but deserves being retold again. Wall Street Journal ("OPTIONS WITH IRAN, NORTH KOREA ARE LIMITED; U.S. MILITARY'S AVAILABLE CHOICES TO CURB SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CARRY HAZARDS", 2005-02-28) reported that an American strike on the DPRK or Iranian nuclear facilities seems far from likely. In both countries, Mr. Bush lacks good military options to eliminate or significantly degrade nuclear ambitions. If the DPRK isn't bluffing, the nuclear weapons and the weapons-grade plutonium could be hidden almost anywhere in the country, making it harder for the US to destroy them. The US also believes that the DPRK has developed a separate, uranium-based effort, but officials say they have no idea where those facilities may be hidden. The US does seem better equipped today than before to respond to a DPRK conventional military attack thanks to precision-guided munitions and better intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, said Thomas Mahnken, a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington. Still, he said, the damage to Seoul with conventional artillery cannons would likely be vast if the DPRK attacked, so initiating hostilities "is not an attractive option in the least."
 Map of North Korea Missile and Nuclear facilities
Jane’s Digest ("IS NORTH KOREA BLUFFING AGAIN?", 2005-02-28) reported that given the almost complete absence of reliable intelligence and the virtual impossibility of access to the DPRK, any assessment of the 'Hermit Kingdom's' nuclear program is necessarily based on incomplete and unverifiable information. However, there are some points of agreement among Western and ROPK intelligence analysts. The most important fact is that, to date, no nuclear test has been carried out by Pyongyang. As a result, ROK and other international officials stressed that it is still too early to declare that the DPRK is now a nuclear power. They add that the alleged weapons have neither been tested, nor have their existence been confirmed beyond doubt.
However, it was reported in Asahi Shimbun on 27 Feb 2005 that the PRC had dropped its initial doubts and now agrees with the US that the DPRK has a uranium-based nuclear program. The PRC had long questioned the US accusation, saying Washington had not shown conclusive evidence that a uranium program existed. But Beijing in recent months has edged toward the US position. However, soon after the announcement, there were indications that the PRC was vacillating as an official stated that he did NOT believe the DPRK had nuclear weapons.
The ROK continues its skepticism. Agence France-Presse ("‘N. KOREA HAS NO WORKING FACILITY FOR ENRICHED URANIUM?, 2005-02-28) reported that the ROK National Intelligence Service (NIS) told the National Assembly that the DPRK has some components of an atomic program but is unlikely to be able to produce nuclear weapons. The NIS said Pyongyang probably purchased materials in 2000 to produce the prototypes for centrifuges needed for an enriched uranium program that would be the first step towards building a nuclear arsenal. But tight international surveillance had prevented the DPRK from obtaining other key equipment. This stance places it on the opposite side of the table from the US with the PRC skeptics.
Gary Milhollin, the director of the U.S.-based Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, said the statement may simply be a way for North Korea to attract attention. "This statement by North Korea that it has nuclear weapons, and it doesn't want to talk to us anymore, what I think you could say about this is that they are trying to get our attention," he says. "They would like to get money from us, and if they don't, then we have to worry about what they might do next -- and that could include selling nuclear weapons to people we don't like, such as terrorists. That's the concern that we should have at this time."
MARCH 2005
AWSJ Accuses Seoul of Propping Up Kim Jong-il and Others Join In The Asian Wall Street Journal (AWSJ) said on 11 Mar 2005 that the gap between the U.S. and South Korea over how to deal with the North Korean nuclear threat was growing wider. The AWSJ article, "North Korea Finds Unlikely Ally: Seoul," the conservative paper said that while the U.S. was trying to increase economic pressure on Pyongyang, block nuclear proliferation and reduce the North Korean military threat, South Korea was busy keeping its former enemy afloat with aid and economic cooperation. Currently civic groups have started sending food and other donations to the DPRK. But this is the small time aid, the items needed are tons of fertilizer and food/rice which the South pays for out of a special fund claiming it is for "humanitarian" needs. However, at the same time, the ROK does NOT monitor the distribution of these goods so they may end up for military purposes for all that is known.
While the UN Food Program is scaling back its food distribution because the North will not allow it to monitor the distribution in certain areas, the South continues its humanitarian aid WITHOUT monitors. In fact, the North asked the UN to close its Humanitarian Aid office in Pyongyang -- with no reason given. On 29 Mar 2005, Itar-Tass reported that the DPRK had tightened restrictions on the traveling inside the country for staffers of international humanitarian organizations, a spokesman for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said in Beijing. The government has cut the number of visits that Red Cross officials are allowed to make to North Korean hospitals by 30 percent-50 percent in recent months without any explanation to authorities, said John Sparrow, a Beijing-based spokesman for the agency. Since late 2004, a third to half of the federation's requests for random visits to 2,300 Red Cross-equipped hospitals, routine trips to 120 communities with Red Cross-backed water sanitation projects and checks of disaster preparedness sites have been turned down. Representatives of international organizations have no opportunity now to control how humanitarian aid arriving in the DPRK from abroad is used, which may make donor countries reduce the financing of humanitarian aid or refuse aid altogether. The comments echo reports by other aid groups that they face new restrictions. Donors have warned the Red Cross that if agencies are not given access to monitor how aid is used, "it could have serious consequences to the effect that certain programs will no longer be funded."
The video tape of the summary executions in the North was taken by hidden camera on 1 and 2 March and smuggled out of the DPRK by underground human rights groups. (See Christian Science Monitor on 29 March 2005 for article.) The Christian Science Monitor reported that at the time its release, refugee groups in Seoul were ecstatic. It looked like a human rights slam-dunk: yet in a twist not anticipated by underground groups that carried off the filming, ROK TV authorities have not let the video be broadcast. The only public airing of the tape in Korea came March 25 in a basement room of the Seoul National Assembly Library. However, the video tapes have NOT been released for broadcast by ROK TV authorities though still shots have been seen. Korean execution tapes, purportedly of "middlemen" who help refugees escape to China, are not yet available for viewing by Koreans in the South. The indirect censure adds to frustration among those documenting the gulags and torture in the North.
It also raises anew questions about a five-year policy in Seoul of studiously avoiding acts that might upset Pyongyang, for fear of harming fragile North-South relations. South Korea's ambivalence about a get-tough policy with North Korea may also factor into the mechanics of the six-party talks over the North's recently declared nuclear program. "We have told of many public executions [in the North]. But officials in Seoul always ask us for material evidence," says Pak Sang Huk, an escapee from the North. "Now that we have evidence, they don't want to see it.... The people who brought this tape through China were speechless when they visited KBS [Korean Broadcast Service] studios, and were shunned." Mr. Pak claims those who filmed the executions risked their lives to do so.
Of late, the South has stopped raising the North's abuses in international bodies. In 2003, South Korea withdrew from a UN Geneva process when it required a vote on North Korea's human rights record. In 2004, Seoul abstained from voting. On 7 Apr 2005, the Chosun Ilbo reported that the Seoul government had decided again to abstain from voting on a UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) resolution condemning violations of human rights in the DPRK. The resolution expresses concern about human rights abuses in the DPRK such as concentration camps for political prisoners. It calls on Pyongyang to ratify the Convention Against Torture and guarantee that the UN special rapporteur on human rights in the DPRK is allowed to operate freely.
Humanitarian and Unification groups in the ROK take the position that the fastest way to resolve the worsening tension between South and North Korea amid the North Korean nuclear crisis is through increased exchanges and humanitarian aid.
The Tongil News on 10 Mar showed photos of the trucks loaded with vinyl for "farmers" receiving a sendoff by well-wishers. The ROK NGO activists provided DPRK farmers with vinyl used for rice seedbeds to coincide with the spring planting season. Twelve NGOs, including "the South-North Sharing Campaign," donated about 48.4 million square meters of vinyl for seedbeds to grow rice seedlings in the impoverished DPRK. Another photo showed ministers at the port blessing the humanitarian goods headed north.
Yonhap news on 22 Mar 2005 reported that the ROK's two umbrella labor groups will deliver 200 tons of free fertilizer to the DPRK on Wednesday, officials said Tuesday. The aid will be shipped in eight 25-ton trucks to the DPRK's Mount Geumgang resort. A 16-member delegation from the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) will accompany them, officials said.
Later on 25 Mar it was reported that a Christian student group sent 120 sheep and hay via ship to North Korea as aid. On 29 Mar 2005, Yonhap news reported that four opposition legislators left for the DPRK to support an aid project by a ROK civic group. Representatives Lee Jae-oh, Kim Moon-soo, Bae Il-do and Kim Ae-sil of main opposition Grand National Party are on a three-day visit to the DPRK to support the project that will provide DPRK homes with some 50,000 heaters before the end of next year.
The ROK stated on 14 Mar that they were going to import 40 tons of North Korean chicken after the sites passed South Korean health standards. The chicken was to be tested and released, but the shipments were halted on 16 Mar after a North Korean defector stated that there had been outbreaks of Avian Flu in the North. South Korea was first hit by bird flu in December 2003, suffering serious damage to its poultry industry. Late last year, it saw another, less deadly bout at a duck farm in Gwangju before taking swift emergency measures. On 28 Mar 2005, the Wall Street Journal reported that the DPRK acknowledged for the first time an outbreak of bird flu at poultry farms near its capital, in a sign that the deadly avian virus endemic in Southeast Asia could be greatly expanding its geographic reach. Pyongyang's official news agency reported Sunday that hundreds of thousands of chickens had been destroyed in an effort to curb the spread of the disease, which had killed birds at "a few chicken farms." The Korea Central News Agency report also said that no people were known to have been infected with the virus. On 28 Mar 2005, the BBC News reported that the ROK has said it is ready to help the DPRK combat bird flu, after the DPRK publicly admitted on Sunday that it was fighting the virus. Pyongyang has not asked Seoul for assistance, but a ROK official said the official announcement appeared to indicate the DPRK would accept aid. "North Korea, plagued by food shortages, has struggled to modernise and build facilities for the breeding and processing of chicken, a main source of animal protein," Kwon Tae-jin, an expert on DPRK agriculture based in Seoul, told the ROK Munhwa Ilbo newspaper. On 29 Mar the Donga Ilbo reported that the DPRK had slaughtered around 10 million chickens nurtured in the Pyongyang region after the outbreak of bird flu in the area's chicken farms. About 18.73 million chickens are raised all across the country. The Joongang Ilbo on 29 Mar reported that ROK intelligence sources said yesterday that the DPRK was apparently afraid of the spread of bird flu to top officials when it canceled an annual meeting of its highest legislative body scheduled to take place on March 9. Japan and Hong Kong have stopped the import of live birds from the DPRK until the outbreak is contained.
The AWSJ said Seoul was providing aid to the North because it believed that if the economically destitute and heavily armed North Korean regime were to collapse, the economic and political costs for South Korea would be enormous. It said most South Korean officials were opposed to measures that could destabilize Kim Jong-il's regime. This is true as in the 1990s, the Koreans were accusing the Americans of stalling the process, but when they found out that it could become a reality, they started to propose a ten-year "phase-in" period for unification. The South fears the collapse of the North will release a flood of North Koreans over the border into the South. Much like the American border with Mexico, only a thousand times worse.
The paper said in a situation where military action was unrealistic, South Korea's policy of reconciliation tied Washington's hands. It said Pyongyang's two patrons, Seoul and Beijing, were hesitant to even consider economic sanctions out of fear of a North Korean collapse. In fairness, it should be said that Bejing has used its oil as a leverage to coerce the North into attending the talks -- and has moved troops to the border to attempt to stem the massive flow of North Koreans across the border.
The ASWJ said friction between Seoul and Washington was particularly intense over the joint North-South Kaesong Industrial Project. In the first stage of the project alone, 300 Korean companies were scheduled to employ 75,000 North Korean laborers and invest US$9.6 billion over nine years. The first of the companies has started operations in 2005. Along with international aid and trade, this would greatly ease North Korea's economic difficulties. The paper quoted Institute for International Economics senior fellow Marcus Noland as saying US$1-2 billion in funds a year was sufficient to keep the North Korean regime afloat.
What is frightening is that the ROK has opened its "copyright" of "Made in Korea" to be applicable to North Korean goods manufactured in Kaesong -- or the use of "Made in Korea (Gaesong)." This will allow the North to gain a foothold in receiving much needed foreign capital infusions. The US is also very concerned of the transfer of "dual-use" technology to the North and held heated talks with the South over this issue. Though there was an agreement, the impression was that it was not one that was in full agreement -- and rather one the US is taking a wait-and-see attitude for the first sign that the South violates its treaty responsibilities. The South is footing the bill for providing electricity to the Kaesong area through KEPCO -- and the railroad to the Kaesong area is expected to be in full operation by December 2005. (NOTE: Yonhap ("SOUTH KOREA TO EASE RESTRICTIONS ON CROSS-BORDER TRAFFIC", 2005-03-23) reported that the ROK will ease regulations on inter-Korean trade and cross-border traffic as the two Koreas move towards greater economic cooperation, the Unification Ministry said Wednesday (23 March). Under the new regulations, which are expected to go into effect next week, the ROK will abolish military inspections for its vehicles crossing over to the DPRK border town of Kaesong. In addition, ROK citizens will be allowed to visit the Kaesong industrial park simply by undergoing inspections at immigration and the quarantine offices. The ROK also plans to simplify the procedures for bringing goods produced in the DPRK's industrial park across the border, the officials said.)
On 13 March, the ROK stated that it would ease regulations on organizations that provide humanitarian assistance in North Korea. The Unification Ministry said would remove a guideline mandating at least one year of consistent dealings or contact with North Korea before an aid body can apply for a government-issued license. The license that designates an organization as a "North Korea support group" entitles the holder to receive assistance from a government fund set aside to facilitate South-North cooperation. Another rule demanding verification of the source of the funding to conduct humanitarian programs in North Korea will also be abolished. (NOTE: In other words, if you wanted to aid North Korea as the US and Japan tighten the noose on transactions with the North, the ROK won't check as is mandated by the National Security Law -- but that just got bypassed.) "The scrapping of the 'one-year' clause should allow more groups to take part in helping North Korea," said a government policy maker. He added that the Unification Ministry will move to ease further restrictions hindering humanitarian assistance from moving across the border. Seoul will work to ensure the aid reaches those most in need, and that humanitarian efforts provide a steady and consistent flow of relief, according to government authorities. (NOTE: We wonder how since there is no mechanism and the ROK government refuses to push the matter.)
Then on 29 Mar 2005, Asia Pulse/Yonhap News reported that the ROK and DPRK are working to set up another joint industrial complex, this time in Pyongyang and for small- and medium-sized companies, a business association in Seoul said. "We have forged an agreement with representatives from the North to push for the construction of an industrial complex in Pyongyang," said Kim Young-il, who heads an inter-Korean business investment association. "The North will provide the site, labor, and raw materials, while the South will supply capital, technology and other facilities." This is the same proposal that the ROK had made when it first started the idea of industrial free economic zones. At that time the DPRK offered an area to the north that was totally unsuitable because of inaccessibility, lack of infrastructure, and other problems. The ROK business conglomerates proposed a site near Pyongyang instead. The DPRK refused and instead launched its own version of a free autonomous economic zone on the border with China and appointed a flamboyant Chinese (of Dutch nationality) entrepenuer as the head. However, the zone idea soon turned into a fiasco where the entrepenuer was imprisoned by China for embezzlement and fraud. Nothing has mentioned of this zone since. This may be simply a pipe dream as the DPRK still remains fearful of the "contamination" of foreign elements -- especially so near to its center of power.
Congressman slap at Korea; Korea slap at Congressman Chosun Ilbo ran a story on the "U.S. Congress Catches South Korea Chill." In it the story stated that "The chairman of the U.S. House International Relations Committee said Thursday South Korea must make up its mind who the enemy is before it can expect U.S. help in an emergency. Rep. Henry Hyde, during a House hearing on the North Korean nuclear issue, was referring to the omission of the term "main enemy" for North Korea in the 2004 Korean Ministry of Defense white paper despite the fact that continued hostility from the North was a major basis of the Korea-U.S. alliance. Hyde said the white paper nonetheless counted on some 690,000 U.S. soldiers being deployed to Korea in the event of a conflict.
But the remark has been read in a much broader context as indicating "Washington's discontent over Seoul's handling of the North Korea issue has made its way into the U.S. Congress." Hyde said it was only appropriate to ask for a clear definition of who South Koreas enemy is if it wants U.S. help. The new chillier atmosphere was palpable when both houses of the U.S. Congress unanimously passed the North Korea Human Rights Act late last year despite opposition in South Korea. It has been admitted that Korea and the U.S. were experiencing difficulty over the disappearance of the "main enemy" concept.
The article stated, "Hyde's statement reflects what many within the U.S. Congress have been silently thinking. Both Washington and Seoul have been stressing the solid nature of the alliance through summits and discussions between foreign ministers, but congressional conservatives - and especially Korea experts with civilian think tanks - say fundamental disagreements lie just below the surface."
The article stated, "Even though the U.S. Congress, like the National Assembly, is divided into hawks and doves, conservatives and progressives, it is no exaggeration that the entire U.S. legislature has fallen in with the hard line when it comes to North Korea's nuclear program. Hydes comments are emblematic of the dissatisfaction with Seoul spreading in Washington as a sense of crisis
over North Korea deepens."
In other words, the US Congress conservatives are not happy that the ROK wants to pursue reapproachment with the North while at the same time retaining the US troops in the ROK. However, at the same time the ROK wants these troops to NOT be used as part of a regional force. He said Seoul was sending mixed signals in security matters and thereby making the
North Korea issue more difficult.
Visiting politicians have stated that the mood of the U.S. Congress had gotten very hardline after Pyongyang's Feb. 10 declaration that it has nuclear arms. Despite the political correct statements of praise for the Iraq support and kudos on the US-ROK alliance, in a roundabout way, U.S. lawmakers and government officials have been complaining about Seoul's policy of engagement with Pyongyang. There is concern about South Korean fertilizer aid to the North and intra-Korean economic cooperation continuing regardless of the nuclear crisis.
In response to Rep. Hyde's statements of the ROK needing to designate its "main enemy," Unification Minister Chung Dong-young on on 14 Mar 2005 dismissed as "inappropriate" a taunt from a U.S. lawmaker that Korea should make up its mind who the enemy is before it can rely on U.S. help. According to the Chosun Ilbo Chung said Northeast Asia was trying to move from hostile confrontation to coexistence, reconciliation and cooperation and Hyde's confrontational thinking was not helpful in resolving problems. The statements was made in Chung's capacity as chairman of the National Security Council and was likely to cause tremors in the Korea-U.S. relationship. In effect, Chung slapped Hyde across the mouth in his contemptuous remark.
As Unification Minister, Chung said Seoul would "consider several situations and independently decide how to proceed with aid" to the North. In other words, the Seoul government would proceed with reapproachment -- a signal that there may be discord ahead in the "unified stance" of the US/Korea/Japan in dealing with North Korea. In effect, Chung said that Korea will do whatever Korea thinks best -- and the US opinion is not needed.
Unfortunately the game is not over and President Roh has increased the ante. The relationship between the US and Korea is at the crossroads -- and Roh and his Unification Minister (who views himself as a potential Presidential candidate and thus must make the appropriate Presidential-like posturing). Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Ban is running around like crazy trying to mend fences.
According to the article, "Chung retorted that to call for Korea to first designate an enemy before it receives U.S. help is a misunderstanding of the object and spirit of the alliance. He said no nation in the world, the U.S. included, designates enemies in its defense ministry white papers. He added there was no change in Seoul's position that the U.S. is an ally and North Korea an ethnic brother." This should cause some Americans in power to start to reevaluate their support of the ROK -- because Chung was simply playing two sides against the middle. (NOTE: We beg to differ with the concept that no nation has designated a specific nation as its main enemy as Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union, "The Evil Empire." "Glasnost" and Gorbechov changed that image of Russia as the MAIN enemy. The Cold War was based on two designated enemies, the Russians facing Europe and NATO -- while China had been flagged as a target ever since it became a nuclear power with the aid of the Russians. Only after Nixon did tensions ease.)
US-Korea relations at Crossroads Richard Halloran is a writer we respect highly. He was one of the few who flagged the anti-American campaign in Korea in 2002 while the respect of the world's journalists chose to look the other way. Richard Halloran also was the first to "pop the cork" on the potential reorganization of the USFK and PACAF. At the time, the USFK denied his article |