• Other Units at Kunsan Airbase (1951-1954)
  • 3rd Air Base Group, Headquarters/Photo Lab
  • 3rd AIO Ground Support
  • 3rd Communications Squadron
  • 3rd Maintenance Squadron
  • 3rd Medical Group
  • 3rd Motor Vehicle Squadron
  • 3rd Supply Squadron
  • 5th Motor Transport Squadron
  • 1973rd AACS (Aircraft and Airways Communications Service)
  • 2157th Air Rescue Squadron
  • 76th Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) Battalion/30th AAA Battalion
  • 77th Squadron of the Royal Australian Air Force
  • ROK Air Force Detachment
  • 21st Transportation Port com B/14th Transportation Port com/Det 1 507th Signal Company --Small Army group in Kunsan City that handled the railhead and port facility
  • 808th, 809th, and 841st Engineering Aviation Battalions
    • Background on Kunsan Air Base Land Area
      
    • 1950: Initial Problems with the Aviation Engineer
      
    • 1951: Initial construction of the runway
      
      • 808th EAB Company C
        
      • 809th EAB: Giving a Helping Hand
        
    • 1952: Repairing the runway
      
      • 808th EAB Extending the Runway
        
      • Company A of the 808th EAB
        
    • 1953: Building the New North-South Runway
      
    • 841st EAB Replaces the 808th EAB
      
    • 1954: Ellie Price's Story
      
    • Epilogue
      
  • Marine Air Control Squadron No. 1/Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron No. 1

1950: Initial Problems with the Aviation Engineer Capabilities

The paper goes on to talk about the Aviation Engineer capabilities in the early days of the war. It said, "FEAF was consistently short of aviation engineer units--the troops who build and repair runways. The need for reinforced runways to handle jet aircraft required significantly more time and effort than runways for older aircraft. Runways required 4.5 engineer battalion-months to build as compared to 1.5 in World War II. ... A transport field was built and operating three days after D-day, and in 16 days, five fighter bomber groups were operating out of Normandy airfields. Within 24 days, nine airfields were completed with seven more under construction. In comparison, it took from June to December 1952 to build the new 9,000-foot concrete jet runway at Osan-ni."

In a nutshell, when the Korean War broke out, there were very few trained Engineers available. The Army had been thorough in swiftly disassembling its war machine. Gearing it back up again was another matter. It took time to get things rolling again.

Prior to the war Kunsan had a sod runway that was about 2,800 ft long and classified only as an undeveloped "emergency landing strip." The HQ PACAF history states that the 808th Engineering Aviation Battalion (EAB) built the original 6300 foot concrete runway. (Note: Though Military Lore cites a 1950s document that gives the 931st EAB credit for the construction, but there was no such unit at Kunsan. The reason is that this was the 931st Engineering Aviation Group (EAG) of Taegu which joined the 930th EAG in Korea in May 1951. The 931st EAG was directed to repair Kimpo Airfield, to extend the runway and construct taxiways and parking aprons at Suwon, and to build a new airfield at Kunsan. It was administratively above the 808th EAB.)

In Air Power, The Decisive Force in Korea (p229) it states, "Installations and Engineer Aviation units had very little equipment on hand at the outbreak of hostilities. This was particularly true of engineer heavy equipment. Bulldozers, cranes, shovels, motorized graders, and scrapers were not obtainable for several months. Most of the existing equipment had been in constant use for several years and required constant maintenance and replacement of parts to be kept operational. No equipment was available at the outset to fill shortages of organized units nor to equip organizations formed after hostilities began. Parts supply was a critical problem. In many cases it was necessary to cannibalize dead-lined equipment to keep other equipment operational. To make matters worse, much engineer heavy equipment was lost during United Nations withdrawals."

"Many units were short equipment kits and sets that were vital to proper operations. When these items eventually began to arrive, it was found that essential parts were missing. In most cases these kits had been packed for use during the Second World War and were not inspected prior to shipment to the theater of operations. At the beginning of the Korean campaign, construction and repair materials were in low priority for procurement and transportation in comparison with the relatively high priority given other war materials. Consequently units were forced to resort almost entirely to purchase of most items of construction supplies and materials on the Korean market. As the supply channels broadened, many article gradually became available in limited quantities. But when units moved from one location to another, equipment had to be transported primarily by the wierd Korean rail system. Without guards for each piece of equipment, thieves would remove every part they possibly could before it arrived at its destination. At times equipment was in such condition upon arrival at its destination that it had to be salvaged."

"The shortage of trained engineering personnel was equally acute. Since none of the other United Nations participants was able to furnish its own airfield construction units, the Engineer Aviation and Installation units had to construct airfields for all the United Nations air forces in Korea. Enough Engineer Aviation units to cope with the workload was not available. Working on a twenty-four hour per day schedule, the few units in Korea concentrated their early efforts primarily on airfield traffic surfaces. Through their untiring effort and ingenuity, many new, converted, or rehabilitated Japanese airstrips were added to the list of cargo and tactical fields."

"The shortage of Engineer Aviation units shifted responsibilities for construction of major airbase facilities and in some cases for airfield traffic surfaces on wing installation squadrons. But their mission was to repair and maintain buildings and grounds, to operate and maintain base utilities, to provide structueral and crash fire protection, to train auxiliary fire fighters, and to provide organizational maintenance on assigned power equipment. Their equipment and personnel authorizations were based on the normal requirements at prepared operating bases. Thus the construction responsibilities assumed by the installation squadron constituted an almost impossible work load."

"The problem was partially overcome by both engineer units and installations squadrons through the use of locally hired labor and native contractors. The construction capability of Korean personnel generally was good when they could be give proper supervision. But because of their lack of knowledge of American construction methods and standards, the uses to which they could be put were limited. Highly skilled Korean labor was scarce -- only a few trained equipment operators, draftsmen, and engineers were available. Carpenters, electricians, plumbers, mechanics, painters, typists and others were available in various stages of skill, but the majority of the labor supply was in the "pick and shovel" class. Interpreters, of course were essential and proved invaluable. Labor battalions were organized and performed well in such jobs as ditching, filling, earthwork, and filling bomb craters. This help was of great importance on some jobs because of equipment shortages or inaccessibility of the site to heavy equipment. At one installation, the placing of a concrete runway fill was accomplished entirely by local contractors using native hand labor. Continuing experience in Korea led to better and more effective use of indigenous labor. But we were slow to realize the effectiveness of methods that appeared crude, slow and wasteful of manpower when compared to those employing modern construction equipment."

Later it said (p235), "...it required about four and one-half battalion months to construct a 9000-foot runway for modern jet fighters, as against the World War II average of one and one-half months to construct a 4000-foot fighter runway. To build a complete airfield required about two and one-half times the construction effort expended for the runway alone. This factor remained constant for both World War II and Korea. Under the best conditions, eight to ten battalion months were required for the construction of a runway, taxiway, and parking aprons for a jet-fighter group."

"Modern runways for fighter aircraft approximately doubled in length over World War II models, yet the time for construction tripled. What accounted for this extra one-third time factor? As previously discussed, several contributing factors were predominant: jet-blast erosion preventatives; procurement and previous preparation of a material for the upper base courses that had the natural strength to resist the shears imposed by small wheels with high tire pressures; and the additional time necessary to compact this material to high density required. Then too, sites readily adaptable to 4,000-to-6000-foot strips necessitated greatly increased earth work, drainage, and preparation for extension to 9000 feet. If the runway was to be used jointly by fighter, bomber and cargo aircraft, construction time was considerably increased over the four and one-half battalion months required for the fighter runway alone. With the type construction needed in Korea, at least one engineer aviation battalion per operational group was required to achieve maximum combat effectiveness and efficiency."

1951: Initial construction of the runway

After the Invasion of Inchon, Kunsan, the port city on the Kum River estuary, fell to the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, without opposition at 1300, 30 September 1950. Though we are not certain as to the exact date the Army took charge of Kunsan Harbor, we can be fairly sure that it was very shortly after the recapture of Kunsan. The first step was to de-mine the harbor. The North Koreans had mined the harbor in 1950 anticipating a possible American invasion in the area. The mines shipped to Changhang via train. After the mines had been removed and the shoreline cleared of mines, the operation of the port opened.

The first "Harbor Master" was probably an Army corporal or sergeant assigned a tugboat to tow allied supply ships into and out of the harbor. He was most likely dispatched from Pusan where the headquarters for the Army transportation units for Korea were located. The tug most certainly came from the "storage" facilities at Yokohama U.S. Army Storage Depot where all the floating wrecks from all over the Pacific were stored.

The development of a runway at Kunsan AB (K-8) became a major priority in 1950. Fifth Air Force had taken over Kunsan AB in October 1950 and immediately started plans for constructing a concrete runway there. However, the first priority was putting the base infrastructure in place. Though much was previously done by the Occupation forces (3rd Btn, 63rd Inf Reg), most of the buildings with any metal -- such as quonset hut structures or hangars -- were stolen. Only the masonry or wood structures remained. For the 5AF the first priority was setting up the base.

The need for air bases with developed runways in Korea was a prime concern. The F-80 and F-84 jet aircraft had insuffient fuel capacity to sustain combat operations for long from bases in Japan. (NOTE: It would be many months before they developed the "Misawa tanks" for the F-84 which extended the range of the aircraft.) In addition, jet aircraft required developed runways to operate from. For this reason, in the early days of the Korean War, the FEAF was forced to convert all the jet aircraft unit BACK to prop-driven F-51 Mustangs with F-51s shipped over from ANG units. This was the first "reverse conversion" in the USAF history. Taegu was used as a forward base for jet aircraft, but it had a tendency to rip up tires -- and at times landing gears -- on the PSP runway. Concrete runways in Korea were a major priority.

Initial ADVON of the 808th Arrives As the 27th AIS was greeted by an ADVON team when it arrived on 11 Feb 1951, we must assume that the initial teams arrived either in Feb 1951. (NOTE: January in Korea is normally too cold to accomplish anything as the ground and Kunsan Harbor are still frozen.) The groups at Kunsan were basically a hodge-podge of "advance parties" (ADVON) or small units split away from their main units to support this mission. We believe the 551st Transportation Truck Company also arrived with the ADVON at this time via LSTs and provided the base motorpool function -- trucks to haul the materials from Kunsan Harbor to the base.

LSTs filled with supplies were the first ships to land. Later cargo ships -- defueled to allow for the shallow draft of Kunsan harbor -- would be utilized. The first elements of the 14th Transport Co. would soon follow. The 14th Transport Co. -- of the 2nd Logistical Command from Pusan -- arrived to take over the port operations and ships bearing concrete and plywood from Japan. Most heavy equipment and personnel to construct the base were transported up from Pusan by rail. However, massive amounts of concrete and other construction materials had to be brought in by ships. (See 21st Transportation Port com B/14th Transportation Port com/Det 1 507th Signal Company.)

The operations, of course, were dictated by the tides and ships would have to wait off-shore until the tide rose. The harbor master duties would have risen immensely from the autonomous operations during the Occupation period and he would have reported directly to the Commander of the 14th Transport Co.. We are assuming that two tug boat operators were assigned because the immense amounts of cargo that was required in the building of Kunsan AB.

February 1951 The first elements of the 27th Airfield Installation Squadron (AIS) from Taegu arrived on 11 Feb 1951 to assist in the construction of the tent city to be used by the 808th EAB when they arrived. David A. Britts of the 27th AIS stated, "Shortly after, they loaded us up again and we headed across the Sea Of Japan. I was in this group. The aircraft began to descend and we kept waiting to see something. When the aircraft came to a complete stop all we could see was grass." The two key points is that (1) they were greeted by the 808th EAB ADVON team who were already setting up the operations; and (2) the building of the airstrip had not started as the main elements of the 808th EAB had not arrived yet.

When the 27th AIS arrived, the runway had not been built as yet. The 808th Engineering Aviation Battalion arrived in April 1951 and then work commenced on the initial excavation. David's seeing only "grass" confirms that he landed on the old sod landing strip used by the Japanese. It was 2800 feet long and listed as an "emergency landing strip."

He continued, "As we disembarked from the aircraft we saw three buildings standing alone in the grass. There were no windows, doors or roofs on any of the three buildings. Looking around we could see no building or people of any kind around the area. An officer in a Jeep with other vehicles said, "Welcome to Korea, let's get the aircraft downloaded. The duffel bags were all stacked in the three building shells and tarps were tied over as roofs. We had nothing, we ate canned food and I slept on some of the duffel bags that night." David later commented, "As for the three buildings I spoke of, as I remember they were side by side all shaped the same and were about 15' by 30' masonry."


Map of Kunsan, Chollabuk-to (1945-46) (CLICK ON MAP TO ENLARGE)


Closeup of Kunsan City, Map of Kunsan, Chollabuk-to (1945-46) (SITE NOTE: The harbor area had not changed since the Occupation. The LSTs would dock where the Kunsan-Changhang Ferry station is to the west of the three Pontoon Docks used for off-loading troops and shallow-draft ships carrying concrete or fuel. Later fuel would be pumped into holding tanks in the harbor area.)

Upon arrival at Kunsan, the 27th Installation Squadron immediately started off-loading materials from LSTs in Kunsan Harbor loaded with plywood and equipment for construction. Basically, the first priority was off-loading the LSTs of any materials needed for building Kunsan. The second priority was putting up the Tent City for the incoming troops of the 808th EAB from Okinawa. The third priority was putting the base infrastructure together to support the 3rd Bomb Wing scheduled to arrive after the 808th EAB finished the runway.

The 14th Transport Co. had already opened up the operations at Kunsan Harbor. (See 21st Transportation Port com B/14th Transportation Port com/Det 1 507th Signal Company.) Materials for construction on the base were being shipped in from Japan, as well as supplies for the growing refugee population at Kunsan. North Koreans with nowhere else to go were herded into refugee camps in Kunsan which were nothing more than warehouses. Rations of a small amount of charcoal and rice were distributed, but it was barely enough to survive. Starvation, pestilence and abject poverty were everywhere. This was not simply the ravages of war, this was the condition of Kunsan dating back to the Occupation days -- only now with the influx of refugees, the horrific conditions were multiplied in scope. In the Korean War, the area around Taebang Tunnel became known as the "North Korean Village." This tunnel is the one that had to be used to get materials from the harbor to the base -- and there was a great deal of pilferage there by the units unloading the LSTs.

We believe the 551st Transportation Truck Company, a colored truck unit, arrived in Kunsan in Feb 1951 and handled the transportation of materials from Kunsan Harbor to the base as well as the maintenance of the vehicles for the ADVON members. We assume that they arrived at Kunsan via an LST because the roads throughout Korea had not been completely secured. Their trucks would provide the backbone of the initial off-loading operations from Kunsan Harbor. However, after the 808th EAB arrived in April 1951, the unit departed. (Still in research.)

David continued, "The next day we began building a tent city which would become known as Kunsan AFB, Korea. I drove one of the six-bys and transport supplies to construct the tent city. We went to a nearby port (Kunsan Harbor), back and forth for days. You would back down into an LST boat where Korean men would load your truck. You would then head for the base. Just after leaving the port the road ran through a rather long and crooked tunnel. Many of our men lost their cargo in that tunnel." The Wolmyong tunnel (Taebong Tunnel) still exists today, but is blocked for pedestrian traffic only. This was the area where the North Korean refugees were clustered together.

David continued, "The Koreans would lay a child in the road just around the tunnel bend. The natural reaction was to stop, and many did. While you were catching your breath, your truck would rock twice and when you looked through your rear window you had an empty truck. There was nothing to do but turn around and go back to get another truck load. At first they placed shotgun guards on each truck, that took up to much manpower so they told us not to stop in the tunnel for anything. They said these children are well trained and you couldn't run over them if you tried. I was caught in two of these theft attempts. I didn't stop but ! ! my heart was beating faster than it ever had."

After the 808th EAB elements arrived in Apr 51, the 27th AIS was absorbed into the EAB operations. (See 27th Airfield Installation Squadron.)

According to the 8th Fighter Wing History, the 27th Air Base Group was assigned between 1 Apr 1951-24 Jun 1951. This is rather strange as the 27th Air Installation Squadron (AIS) arrived at Kunsan on 11 Feb 51 to set up operations -- two months before the 27th ABG arrived. At this time, we believe the 808th EAB who arrived in Mar 1951 actually provided the overall direction for the setup of the base -- with miscellaneous attached units under their supervision. Perhaps because the 808th EAB was a SCARWAF unit -- Special Category Army With Air Force -- it may have needed an USAF administrative unit to "take control of the base" before it could start work. All of this is supposition, because the presence of the 27th ABG does NOT make sense.

The key point is that the 27th Air Installation Squadron (AIS) were a SAC Reserve unit that was only on a one-year call-up. The 27th AIS remained at Kunsan until 05 Feb 52 and was credited with a 12-month tour. After the 3rd Bomb Wing (L-NI) arrived in August 1951 to take over the base, the 27th AIS personnel would have been attached to the 3rd Air Installation Operations (AIO). (See 3rd Air Installation Operations.) On 15 July 1951, the parent unit of the 27th AIS, the 27th FEW, was relieved by the 136th FBG at Itazuke AB, Japan and returned to Bergstrom AFB, TX -- leaving the 27th AIS behind. Those 27th AIS personnel at Kunsan remained in place until their 12-month tour had been completed. They departed Korea on 5 Feb 52.

However, the 27th AIS is currently credited by the USAF and 8th FW histories as the ones selected to oversee operations at Kunsan. This is NOT correct. When the small contingent of the unit, a reserve SAC unit from Bergstrom AFB, TX, appeared at Kunsan from Taegu, they were simply incorporated into the mainstream of the 808th effort to erect the base buildings for personnel -- an Airfield Installation Operations (AIO) function -- while the 808th EAB concentrated on the heavy construction. The AIO were the equivalent of today's Base Civil Engineers (CE) while the EAB were equivalent the USAF CESHR "Red Horse" units. The bottomline is that it is obvious the 27th AIS only assisted the 808th EAB -- but being USAF while the 808th was Army, they have received the credit for the initial construction of the USAF base over the years.

He said, "I was on the troop transport---I believe we had only the one and since two battalions (808th and the 802nd) would be only about 1000 men between them (500 each, approx.) a troop transport could carry that number. ! questioned the "10 or 12 miles out" remark---I'd guess we were about 2 or 3 miles offshore when we off loaded into the landing craft, but it's anyones guess judging distances at sea. (SITE NOTE: This refers to Al Adams of Company C's statement on the arrival.) Some of the men apparently travelled with the equipment on the LST's. Yes, this was the initial group as we arrived there, the advance party I think was about two weeks ahead of us, they just set up tents primarily, as I understood the story. The transport was "AKA 19" as I remember that bit."

He continued, "I'd never been down a landing net and had heard all the horrer stories about possible dangers inherant in this so when they announced over the ships PA system, about a day before we arrived off Kunsan area coastline, that anyone who had never had experienced disembarking down a cargo net, report to the fore deck where they had slung a cargo net over a boom and would give us the" drill "-- I said to myself, I'm not going to be the only greenhorn out there , to hell with them, I'll take my chances. Good thing, there was no one reported for the training session."

"When we disembarked I was careful to do all I'd heard about, unfasten my pack so I could slip out of it quickly if I went in the drink, have my rifle on one shoulder, same reason, hold onto only the vertical ropes so no one would step on my hands, most important, try to time my jump off into the landing craft so it would be not too great a drop, the craft was rising and falling slowly with the sea swells, about 8 or 10 feet I'd estimate, jump as it fell away and you could have a long drop to a steel deck, jump too soon as it rose and you met it coming up as you came down and the impact with 60 pounds of pack on your back, not to mention 10 pounds of rifle, could be serious. I was very lucky, it was like stepping off onto a pillow, the craft rose up under me just as I was ready to step off, only a couple off feet to fall. After it was all over, several days later, I discovered none of us had ever had training concerning those landing nets."

"We went up the river at I'd suppose high tide. As we loaded into the landing craft (LCVP's) with just personnel, I'd guess 40 or so to a boat) the navy coxswain told us to keep our helmets on and our heads down, sit on the "floor" and don't try to raise up to see around. I figured it was just standard instructions for any such operation. Apparently the Navy had intelligence that there were guerillas along the river and we'd be under small arms fire. To my knowledge we never had any American infantry troops there for ground defense as we were always alone when it came to alerts later."

"I was told later, after it was all over, that we'd gone 26 miles up that river -- the map you show indicates pretty close to 26 miles in kilometers so someone got that right apparently (unusual for scuttle butt like that) and I always was surprised at how fast we got to our disembarcation point up river --- I didn't think at the time to check my watch but it seemed not very long, I'd estimate no more than an hour. We were never dressed warmly and it was very early spring, cold, sitting on a cold steel deck, I'd think if we were on that boat for two hours or so I'd remember it, but the time went fast. An ex navy friend here says they had special landing craft that could do about 20 knots, we may have been on them." (SITE NOTE: The 26-27 miles up river is questioned as Al Adams estimated 10-12 miles -- and Bruce Satra stated later it might have been 2-3 miles.)

At this time we believe all three LSTs off-loaded their heavy equipment in Kunsan Harbor. Because of the tidal conditions, the LSTs were grounded in the channel until the tides allowed them to off-load. There is only one available location in Naehang (inner port) where the LSTs could land. According to David Britts of the 27th AIS who arrived a month earlier, he drove to Kunsan Harbor in Feb 1951 and off-loaded plywood by backing "down into" an LST. There is only one location where the LST would be lower than the embankment. This would be the Kunsan-Changhang Ferry station. However, if this was a group of three LST's, only one could off-load at a time. The other two would have been stranded in mud in mid-channel if the low-tide hit -- and this appears to have happened as Bruce Satra described how they had "gone aground on sand bars" The LST unloading would also have been trapped until high-tide.

Bruce stated, "Our LST's all hung up on sand bars for a few days until an unusually high tide floated them off. Never have understood why we were sent up river under small arms fire all the way when there was a deep sea port right there?" Actually Kunsan Harbor at that time was not have a deep water port. Naehang (inner port) was a shallow draft port where one only entered at high tide. Later he wrote, "I will always wondered why we came 26 miles or whatever, up river under fire (no casualties but a couple of flat tires on equipment deckside on the LST's) in our landing craft, when we could as easily, or more easily, simply landed on the beach where ultimately the runway ended." To answer Bruce's question, the landing on the mudflats off Kunsan was impossible as the mud would have mired the LSTs far out in the channel and the troops would have had to slog about a two miles in the mud to reach shore. As for the equipment, there was no way it could get through the mud flats.

"...I think we had three (LSTs), with our heavy equipment--bulldozers, LeTornoue earth movers Tornocats (someone in the narrative called them "pony engines" I think---they were comparable maybe to a "tractor" as used describing a "tractor-trailer" or semi. Tornoscrapers were the ones he described as being pushed by Caterpillar tractors when the going got tough---they were a unit that had the tractor unit in front with a very large "box scraper" you might say, just behind, and could drop the front of the box to scrape up a load of earth, transport it as he said at fairly hi speed (up to 25 mph) and dump it out the rear like a dump truck. These were wheeled vehicles and didn't have the traction of a "cat" but did pretty well for hauling dirt around."

Bruce concurs that the landing took place most likely were he disembarked (Kunsan Harbor). "I didn't observe it (the off-loading) so am a poor witness, but I'm quite sure that if the LST's had gone back down the river, up the coast to Kunsan harbor to unload, we'd surely have had a lot of talk about it. I'm quite sure then that they simply proceeded upriver once they got off the sandbars and unloaded there on the river where we had disembarked from the landing craft earlier. It was a matter of only a day or two after we had arrived in our small landing craft. That's as I remember it anyway."

Being under fire coming up the channel was very possible as there were still many insurgents operating in the area. In fact, the Communist guerillas mortared Kunsan AB shortly after the first B-26s arrived in Oct 1951. The guerillas were part of the group that disappeared into the Chiri Mountains during the purge just prior to the Korean War -- and who returned after the North Korean forces captured Kunsan. After the Inchon landing, the Pusan Breakout pushed the North Koreans north until they simply abandoned their vehicles and took to hiding in the Chiri Mountains along with the guerillas.

Bruce believed the "Chinese had regular troops running the show in the area." He continued, "...we were never hit by serious "regular" units but harassed and kept on alert by the guerrillas who were reportedly led by the Chinese." However, this is not likely as the Chinese never got past Wonju in their invasion. On 4 Jan, Seoul fell to the CCF and the forces advanced to Wonju. On 12 Jan, Wonju fell, but the Chinese stopped their advance at this point and started falling back in some areas. The Chinese were saving themselves for the Spring campaign, but the allies did not know this. To them is was simply a break in the action. By 17 Jan, the situation was appearing desperate. Thus the scuttlebutt that the insurgents were led by Chinese would have been very reasonable given the circumstances, but has never been substantiated.

When they got to the landing site, trucks were awaiting them. "We were picked up by a colored trucking company "go go ichi", the 551st trucking co. (551st Transportation Truck Company), and trucked to our tent site which had been put up by a small advance party." The 551st appears to have been part of the ADVON elements to start the operations at Kunsan, but left after the EAB off-loaded their own vehicles -- most likely to shuttle the 802nd EAB to Suwon to start construction of the expanded air base there.

When they first arrived at Kunsan AB (K-8) it appears the Tent City was still not complete. They bedded down initially next to the original east-west runway that was being built. By June 1951, the 808th had relocated to Tent City in what is now the Kunsan Golf Course -- though they slept on the ground for the first six months until cots arrived. Bruce stated, " We burned down a couple of tents before realising the jet fuel we were given to heat our tents (ha ha) was designed to produce lots of expansion of air with the least possible heat. It did serve to ignite the tents satisfactorily when enough flame came out of the top of the stove pipe." At first kerosene was in short supply, but without any runway, the POL aircraft fuel in barrels where in great supply. Thus the reason for using jet fuel.

The choice of the runway location was a fairly simple decision. The first runway was to be 6,300 feet. There was only one place that the runway could be located due to the ricefields on the east and west and the hills on the north and south. The only location was where the old sod airstrip was. But the strip had to be realigned to a NE-SW direction to accommodate the increased length.

The original Japanese runway was a short 2,800 foot sod runway that ran in a NNE-SSW orientation. Prior to the war, this runway was classified as an emergency runway. The original SE-NW runway was built on the site of the original Japanese sod runway (in the center of the old island land mass) and then extended out into the rice paddies (tidal flat reclamation area) at the east end to accommodate light bombers. The NE-SW orientation provided for a longer runway, but suddenly the runway extended off of the former main island mass into the tidal flat reclamation area. As a result, the folks had to do a lot of rock fills to stabilize the runway area.

In Air Power, The Decisive Force in Korea (p232), it states, "The average California Bearing Ratio (an empirical formula use for rating soil shear-resistance) of these bottom-land soils was in the very lowest range. This meant that whereas a typical soil found in the U.S. midwest normally required a 6-inch base course layer, the layer in Korea had to be increased to two to three feet to provide the necessary support on these soils. ...All base-construction projects involved far more than building runways and their appurtenances. Since a jet air wing in combat could consume as much as 125,000 gallons of fuel each day, two detachments of the 931st Engineers supervised Korean laborers in the erection of tanks to hold a five days' supply of jet fuel at each of the major jet bases. ... In the early days at all Korean airfields, Air Force troops lived and worked in winterized tents, but more permanent buildings gradually replaced the tents. At Taegu air installations personnel contracted with Korean builders for stucco buildings. The initial cost was low, but these oriental structures rapidly deteriorated and required heavy maintenance costs. For this reason, steel quonset huts and "tropical shell" kits prefabricated in Japan were extensively used in Korea, both for housing and working quarters. Most structures were put up by Korean laborers or contractors under the supervision of base air installations personnel."

It continued, "Before construction could begin, the entire area of the proposed airfield had to be drained -- a tremendous task. On this land which was water-logged to a depth of many feet, heavy construction equipment mired down or sunk completely from view, creating serious recovery problems and delays."

However, the runway would have to be reoriented to meet the length requirements. This is the problem as the runway would have to be laid out in a NE-SW orientation and extend into the rice paddies at both ends. This in turn posed another problem as the rice paddies had to be filled in. This was easier said than done as massive amounts of rock fill was required.

As a result, a rock quarry had to be established. The rock quarry was a hill directly outside the north gate of the base. However, in 1951 graves on the hill had to be relocated first. Then blasting started. Korean workers were used in droves to fill the need for manual labor.

The south side of the runway was the location of the old Japanese Ammo dump. This would be graded and a rail spur run to this area as the 3rd Supply Ammo Dump. When the 809th arrived, they would be billeted in tents in this area. On the south side of the Ammo dump was the fishing village of Haje.

Haje village on south end of base

July 1951: While the work on the runway progressed, the 27th Airfield Installation Squadron of Taegu had been at work constructing prefab Jamesway hootches for the 3rd Bomb Wing units coming in -- mainly through the use of indigenous Korean labor. (See 27th Airfield Installation Squadron.) The 808th personnel were also assigned to assist in wiring up the base and performing other tasks to get the base ready for the 3rd Bomb Wing.

The 808th tent city was constructed away from the runway -- above the USAF hootches -- in what is now the Kunsan AB Golf course. During the days of the Occupation forces (3rd Battalion, 63rd Infantry Regiment), the area was a low-lying area with only a few buildings situated on the edge of the rice fields that surrounded the base (Camp Hillenmeyer). During the monsoon season, a pond formed on the western edge from the runoff. After the area had been filled and graded, the unit relocated to this area.

The Army units were billeted in the "Tent City." The 808th EAB tent city was constructed away from the runway -- above the USAF hootches -- in what is now the Kunsan AB Golf course. During the days of the Occupation forces (3rd Battalion, 63rd Infantry Regiment), the area was a low-lying area with only a few buildings situated on the edge of the rice fields that surrounded the base (Camp Hillenmeyer). Photos of the tent city during the Korean War indicates the area had been built up prior to construction of the tent city. Because of the lack of heavy equipment such as graders in the initial days of the Korean War -- a shortage that existed throughout the Korean theater -- the area was almost certainly leveled through the use of coolie-laborers carrying sand in A-frame carriers (chige) on their backs. The use of coolie labor to level areas was not unusual as the original Japanese runway was built the same way. After the area had been filled and graded, the unit relocated to this area.

David Britts of the 27th AIS wrote, "The tent city grew out of that grass field from boxes of every shape and size were stacked." The supplies were hastily deposited into the field adjacent to Avenue C. Soon the field -- about two football fields long -- was stacked with piles of plywood about ten feet high.

He later wrote, "As for the tent city I spoke of, I may have used the word tent too loosely. As I remember the structures had plywood sides that came up four feet from the ground level and were framed in with two by fours for the rest of the structure. A canvas was placed over the structure to complete the buildings. In the sleeping quarters there was a potbelly stove that vented up through the top of the structure. I heated a lot of shaving water in my helmet through the hole in the top of that stoves. As far as the size of the quarters, I would think they were 12 man. All structures were connected together by two by four side walks, like they had in the old American West."

These "duck walks" that connected the tents were essential in Kunsan's rainy season and the clay mud made walking very difficult. They were everywhere in place of sidewalks.

Arthur Aseltine wrote, "I arrived at K-8 in the fall of 1951. Specifically, it was in September of 1951. During the entire time of my duty there the entire 808th EAB was not located anywhere near the runway. Indeed, I only saw the runway when I left Korea for more than one R & R. in Japan."

To the east of the "tent city" there were mounds of plywood to continue the construction of facilities on the base. He added, "Moreover, when I arrived, there were huge stacks of Philippine mahogany plywood which I understood was used to cover the walls of the BOQ. ... In any event, suffice it to say that we were far enough from the runways that the noise of bombers taking off did not bother us." The entire 808th EAB was housed in the area. However, when the 809th EAB arrived, they were located on the south side of the runway in their own area.

Existing BOQ Quarters

August 1951: By August 1951, construction had progressed to the point that the Air Force assigned the 3rd Bombardment Wing to Kunsan. The 3rd BW moved to the base on August 22, 1951, as Kunsan's first assigned aircraft wing. According to The U.S. Air Force in Korea (p397), "In southwestern Korea, at the new Kunsan Airfield (K-8), the aviation engineers completed 5,000 feet of asphalt runway in mid-July, and this and other airfield facilities permitted the 3rd Bombardment Wing to establish itself there on 22 August." (NOTE: The original 5,000 asphalt runway was upgraded to a 6300ft concrete runway after the 809th EAB arrived.)

During this time the base had three types of enlisted billets. The quonset huts were rounded corrugated buildings; the Jamesway huts were corrugated iron sides with a pitched roof; and tents which were used for temporary quarters if there was no room in the permanent structures. The Jamesway huts or "tropical shell" kits were basically precut plywood prefabricated in Japan. Korean contractors erected these "Jamesway" huts. The huts were basically an open frame with plywood sides and top. The roof was covered with corrugated iron sheeting for water protection. Sandbags were stacked on the corrugated iron roof to keep it from flying off in high winds. Quonset huts were not as common as the "tropical shells" on the base.

October 1951: The 808th had built the bulk of the runway when the 809th arrived. In fact, the 3rd Bomb Wing was already flying from the runway. When the 809th EAB arrived in October 1951, only the 808th was there and the 809th pitched in to help extend the east end of the runway into the rice fields. The 3rd Bomb Wing was already flying night missions from the concrete runway. The PSP was still being laid. Local indigenous labor was used for much of the heavy manual labor tasks.

Kunsan AB: 1952 (Click on map to enlarge)

Taxiways and parking pads were Pierced Steel Plating (PSP). A History of Air Force Civil Engineers states, "In the hectic early months of the war, engineers used pierced steel planking (PSP), a World War II innovation, as the primary expedient runway surfacing material. The urgent need for airfields and the limited construction capabilities of the SCARWAF units in Korea resulted in a tremendous requirement for PSP. Nearly 30 million square feet were used on airfields throughout the war." The turnoffs appeared to have been "marsden matting" (heavier steel version of the PSP).

PSP was used everywhere -- and even today PSP is being removed from areas under construction. Jim Heath remarked that in 1951 everything was mud before the installation of the PSP. However, even with the installation of the PSP, there were problems. If an aircraft made its turn to large and went off the PSP parking pad area, it would sink into the mud and have to be pulled out with tugs and cranes.

In Air Power, The Decisive Force in Korea (p235) it states, "Another engineering headache brought on by the use of jet aircraft was the considerable difficulty experienced with jet-blast erosion of the base under runway surfaces of pierced-steel plank landing mat. When the subsurface was affected, continued usage, which was sometimes unavoidable, resulted in uneven foundations, rutting and buckling of the planks, shearing of the plank bayonets, and a surface too rough for satisfactory operations. Many types of materials and methods were tried with varying success in an attempt to eliminate jet-blast erosion. The most successful remedy was a one-half inch asphalt pavement under the pierce steel planking." (NOTE: This was not a major problem at Kunsan until the 474th FBG F-84s and the Marine VMF(N)-513 F3D-2s came to town. The F3D-2 were the worst as their jets were cantilevered down and literally burned a trail in the tar. The taxiways became "tar pits". There are reports of angry Marines in the F3D-2s from Pyongtaek in 1953 intentionally increasing the engine rotation to do this because of their perceived unfair treatment from the USAF at K-8.)

(NOTE 1: Ron Stout, former VMF-513 RO, stated that "marsden matting" was heavier than PSP and used for the turnoffs at K-8. We have observed this same heavy gauge PSP in the 1950s as abandoned scrap around Pearl Harbor. However, we have not seen it at Kunsan. Though the concrete pads and taxiways for the VMF-513 were destroyed in 1965 by the 6175th CES, some PSP remained buried. In 2000 for the Foal Eagle Exercises, the 8th CES excavated the former VMF-513 area for use as a tent city. A lot of PSP was removed at that time. The PSP material removed resembled the PSP used during the Vietnam era -- not the heavier guage material that Ron Stout mentioned.)

(NOTE 2: We have been corrected by Tim Taylor that term "Marsden matting" is incorrect. He stated that "Marston matting" is named for the legendary B/Gen Marvin "Muktuk" Marston who first came up with it prior to WWII. In June 1942, Major Marston, empowered by the Governor of Alaska, built a native army of 3,500 men. Marston, an Arctic veteran who had earned his nickname by consuming enormous quantities of muktuk, or whale blubber. However, Kodiak Tour stated, "According to a note on page 90 of the book The Forgotten War Volume Four by Stan Cohen, Marston matting is named for the town in North Carolina in which the product was manufactured. According to Alaska Geographic Vol 22, No 4, p12, it was first tried out near Marston NC in November 1941. Each section weighed a bit more than 66 pounds and was 10 feet by 15 inches." These are just interesting sidenotes as this material spanned WWII through the Vietnam era as the universal building material. We make this note as a lot of folks from the Korean War era continue to mistakenly refer to this material as "Marsden matting" -- though it appears that the term was PSP (pierced steel planking) was popular by the Korean War.)

(NOTE 3: There were two types of PSP landing mats: M8 landing mat (PSP - 15"x11'10") and T11 landing mat (channel - 26"x12'). VSTOL AND POWER PROJECTION states, "During World War II, American combat aviation used temporary runways constructed of "Marston mat." One section of steel mat was 10 feet by 15 inches and weighed 66.2 pounds. Holes punched into each of the three channels reduced weight by 17.5 percent, controlled dust, and allowed drainage. In Southeast Asia, the mat was known as pierced steel planking. Richard K. Smith, "Marston Mat," Air Force Magazine, April 1989, 84-88. Recent advances in high strength composite materials could conceivably reduce weight even more. Reversible mat with a woodland camouflage paint scheme on one side an a desert scheme on the other could be interchangeably mixed and matched to provide excellent concealment for any location.")

In Taking Command by John Moench (p115), it states, "To drain away water, the construction personnel of the 808th Engineer Aviation Battalion built French drains across the planned runway area which consisted largely of virtual quicksand of the paddy area -- a base so fluid that a weight at one site would cause the surface to rise at some other location. During this work, laborers could easily sink waist deep in the paddy ooze. To overcome this situation, in addition to drainage and removal of the unstable materials, a massive quantity of fill was required. Fortunately, there were above sea-level hill resources nearby to include conglomerate and sand. But access to these sources of fill required the movement of large numbers of Korean graves."

The book continued, "While it was true that the Kunsan Air Base site was that of an early Japanese airfield, that airfield was unimproved and very limited. Thus, to accommodate the current combat aircraft, a hard surface, extended runway was necessary. How it was determined that the first runway would be constructed on a NE/SW axis has been lost in history." (NOTE: If you look at the usable surface of the old island, you see they did the only logical thing by rotating the runway slightly to give them room for the original 5,000 foot asphalt -- that was upgraded into a 6,300 foot concrete runway and later extended to 9,000 feet.)

The U.S. Air Force in Korea (pp396-397) states, "Throughout 1951 all engineer aviation units were constantly short of equipment and spare parts, shortages which forced improvisations, often to the detriment of sound construction. During peak operational periods in-commission rates as low as 15 percent were the rule rather than the exception on critical items of equipment. Some part of the low serviceability rates was caused by abuse of complicated machines by unskilled operators, but maintenance also suffered from a shortage of technicians and spare parts. In the spring of 1952 some new engineer equipment began to arrive in Korea, but much of this new equipment had been procured as an emergency action from domestic production in the United States, and there was a great variety in makes and models. The lack of standardization greatly complicated the stockage of innumerable spare parts. In some cases, by the time parts had arrived for one make of machine, it would have been replaced by an entirely different make, causing a never-ending cycle of difficulty."

27th Air Installation Squadron, 27th Fighter-Escort Wing (SAC) (February 1951-February 1952)

On Jan 4, Seoul fell to the CCF and the forces advanced to Wonju. On Jan 12, Wonju fell, but the Chinese stopped their advance at this point and started falling back in some areas. The Chinese were saving themselves for the Spring campaign, but the allies did not know this. To them is was simply a break in the action. By Jan 17, the situation was appearing desperate. Even the F-86s from the 4th FIG were switched to air-to-ground roles from Taegu like the F-84s of the 27th FEW. On Jan 19, FEAF started a 13-day intensive campaign to interdict the flow of supplies to the enemy frontline troops. By Jan 31, Suwon had been retaken, but the FEAF feared another major Chinese offensive. As a result, the 27th FEW was pulled back to Itazuke AB and rejoined the rear echelon on 1 Feb 51. It remained at Itazuke until relieved by the 136th TFW on 15 Jul 51.

According to the 8th Fighter Wing History, the 27th Air Base Group was assigned between 1 Apr 1951-24 Jun 1951. This is rather strange as the 27th Air Installation Squadron (AIS) arrived at Kunsan on 11 Feb 51 to set up operations -- two months before the 27th ABG arrived. At this time, we believe the 808th EAB who arrived in April 1951 actually provided the overall direction for the setup of the base -- with miscellaneous attached units under their supervision. Perhaps because the 808th EAB was a SCARWAF unit -- Special Category Army With Air Force -- it may have needed an USAF administrative unit to "take control of the base" before it could start work. All of this is supposition, because the presence of the 27th ABG does NOT make sense.

David A. Britt went on, "Our aircraft operated out of Itasuki for a while and then some personnel and aircraft were transferred to Taegu AFB, Korea. One attempt was made to fly remaining troops into Taegu; however, they were shelling the field and we were sent back to Itasuki." For about six months, David's unit was attached to the Itazuke Installation Squadon (Civil Engineering).

However, the need for air bases with developed runways in Korea was a prime concern. The F-80 and F-84 jet aircraft had insuffient fuel capacity to sustain combat operations for long from bases in Japan. (NOTE: It would be many months before they developed the "Misawa tanks" for the F-84 which extended the range of the aircraft.) In addition, jet aircraft required developed runways to operate from. For this reason, in the early days of the Korean War, the FEAF was forced to convert all the jet aircraft unit BACK to prop-driven F-51 Mustangs with F-51s shipped over from ANG units. This was the first "reverse conversion" in the USAF history. Taegu was used as a forward base for jet aircraft, but it had a tendency to rip up tires -- and at times landing gears -- on the PSP runway. Concrete runways in Korea were a major priority.

The development of a runway at Kunsan AB (K-8) became a major priority in 1950. Fifth Air Force had taken over Kunsan AB in October 1950 and immediately started plans for constructing a concrete runway there. However, the first priority was putting the base infrastructure in place. Though much was previously done by the Occupation forces (3rd Btn, 63rd Inf Reg), most of the buildings with any metal -- such as quonset hut structures or hangars -- were stolen. Only the masonry or wood structures remained. For the 5AF the first priority was setting up the base.

By the time the 27th Installation Squadron touched down at Kunsan AB (K-8), Kunsan Harbor had been cleared of North Korean mines and the Army Quartermaster in Pusan had moved a tugboat up to open up the operations of Kunsan Harbor. LST filled with supplies were the first ships to land. Later cargo ships -- defueled to allow for the shallow draft of Kunsan harbor -- would be utilized. The first elements of the 14th Transport Co. would soon follow. Upon arrival at Kunsan, the 27th Installation Squadron immediately started off-loading materials from LSTs loaded with plywood and equipment for construction.

The groups at Kunsan were basically a hodge-podge of "advance parties" or small units split away from their main units to support this mission. Basically, the first priority was off-loading the LSTs of any materials needed for building Kunsan. The second priority was putting up the Tent City for the incoming troops of the 808th EAB from Okinawa. The third priority was putting the base infrastructure together to support the 3rd Bomb Wing scheduled to arrive after the 808th EAB finished the runway.

The 27th Installation Squadron (AIS) arrived at Kunsan on 11 Feb 51 and started immediately to construct the tent city required to house the new personnel. The 808th EAB would arrive in April 1951 to start construction on the original east-west runway. When they first arrived it appears the Tent City was still not complete. They bedded down initially next to the original east-west runway that was being built. By June 1951, the 808th had relocated to Tent City. However, when the 809th EAB arrived to help the 808th EAB with the construction, they were sent to the south end of the base to live in tents. the 809th left after two months to build another airstrip up north.

The Jamesway buildings were also started as soon as indigenous labor support could be obtained. The prefab units were constructed for the incoming USAF units. The first flying elements of the 3rd Bomb Wing arrived in August 1951.

The 27th AIS would remain at Kunsan until 5 Feb 52 and was credited with a 12-month tour. After the 3rd Bomb Wing (L-NI) arrived in August 1951 to take over the base, the 27th AIS personnel would have been attached to the 3rd Air Installation Operations (AIO). (See 3rd Air Installation Operations.) On 15 July 1951, the 27th FEW was relieved by the 136th FBG at Itazuke AB, Japan and returned to Bergstrom AFB, TX -- leaving the 27th AIS behind. Those 27th AIS personnel at Kunsan remained in place until their 12-month tour had been completed. They departed Korea on 5 Feb 52.

Security Problems at Kunsan AB (K-8): In the local Kunsan area, Communist insurgents were running rampant up to late 1951. The ROK Army did NOT control the countryside. In fact, shortly after the 3rd Bomb Wing arrived in Aug 51, the Communists shelled K-8 from one of the off-shore islands. Not long after this incident, the 3rd Bomb Wing supported the ROK Army in attacking Communist positions near the base.

What had happened was that when the allies broke out of Pusan in Oct 50, the retreating North Koreans were caught in a pincer movement. The allies were pushing up from the south, as well as spreading inland from Inchon and the east coast to retake the northern part of South Korea. The elements of the North Korean 6th Division on the west coast were being chased down by task forces from the 24th Infantry and movement north was blocked. The North Korean 2nd Division on the east coast were in a desperate retreat being chased by task forces from the 35th Infantry. Finally the North Koreans abandoned their vehicles when the roads became clogged.

The decision was made to disperse into the all but impenetrable Chiri-san (Chiri Mountain) area northeast of Kunsan. The NKP 6th Division moved around the eastern side and the NKP 2nd Division moved around the western side of Chiri-san. This almost trackless waste of 750 square miles of 6,000 to 7,000-foot-high forested mountains forms a rough rectangle northwest of Chinju about thirty by twenty-five miles in dimension, with Chinju, Hadong, Namwon, and Hamyang at its four corners. This inaccessible area had long been a hideout for Communist agents and guerrillas in South Korea. Now, as the North Korean forces retreated from southwest Korea, many enemy stragglers and some organized units with as many as 200 to 400 men went into the Chiri Mountain fastness. There they planned to carry on guerrilla activities.

In Kunsan, the hastily assembled ROK Army units controlled the countryside by day, but the communists controlled it at night. The ROK Army units formed defensive barriers around Kunsan Harbor and Kunsan AB (K-8) as soon as construction of the base began. The standing order was for the ROK Army guards to summarily execute any individuals found in an "unauthorized area." Summary executions were commonplace -- though not normally witnessed by Americans. What made this unfortunate is that the large percentage of the Korean populace in Kunsan was starving and many would attempt to sneak onto the base simply to steal food to survive. When these starving people were caught, the ROK did not differentiated between them, the "slickey boy" thieves and Communist insurgents.

When the 27th Installation squadron first arrived at K-8, the situation appeared desperate for the allied forces. In Dec 50, the Chinese had launched a massive surprise attack on the allies. MacArthur's promise to have the troops home by Christmas exploded in his face. The US forces were fighting their way out of North Korea. By Dec 24, the X Corps had been evacuated from Hungnam Harbor on the east coast and the Eighth Army had pulled back below the 38th Parallel to form a defensive line.

David Britt remembered, "I thought back to the password we used at Kunsan. When someone approached you, you would ask, 'Who goes there?' They had better answer, 'Tea Kettle' and you would reply, 'Coffee Pot'."

On 1 Jan a million CCF and North Koreans launched a massive attack and Seoul fell on 4 Jan and Wonju fell on 12 Jan. With the loss of Kimpo AB, the need for another base on the Korean peninsula became a top priority. All priority was given to the Kunsan project to open up the base. The Reserve Engineering Aviation Battalions were activated and notified of shipment overseas. However, it would not be until April when the advance units of the 808th EAB arrived. Pending there arrival, the 27th Installation Squadron was tasked with restoring the infrastructure to Kunsan AB. Materials were shipped in from Japan via LSTs to support this effort. The railway systems were still not considered safe.

Suddenly in January the Chinese stopped their advance and started falling back in some areas to recuperate for the Spring campaign. The allies launched a massive counterattack. By Jan 31, Suwon had been retaken, but the FEAF feared another major Chinese offensive. As a result, the forward echelon of the 27th FEW was pulled back to Itazuke AB. However, the elements from the 27th Installation Squadron remained at Kunsan until the 27th FEW was relieved by the 136th TFW on 15 Jul 51. The 27th Installation Squadron then rejoined their unit and returned to Bergstrom.

NOTE: The photos below are of the base (Camp Hillenmeyer) as the 3rd Battalion, 63rd Infantry Regiment, 6th ID left it. Notice the lines of metal quonset huts. However, when David arrived at K-8, the base had been picked clean except for the dependent houses on the north end of base.

Aerial view of Camp Hillenmeyer Main Base (Courtesy Robert Grenig)

Aerial view of Camp Hillenmeyer Main Base (Courtesy Robert Grenig)

Aerial view of Dependent Area (Courtesy Robert Grenig)

27th Installation Squadron Arrival at Kunsan (K-8): David A. Britt went on, "Shortly after, they loaded us up again and we headed across the Sea Of Japan. I was in this group. The aircraft began to descend and we kept waiting to see something. When the aircraft came to a complete stop all we could see was grass."

When the unit arrived, the runway had not been built as yet. The 808th Engineering Aviation Battalion had arrived in April 1951 and were in work doing the initial excavation. His seeing only "grass" confirms that he landed on the old sod landing strip used by the Japanese. It was 2800 feet long and listed as an "emergency landing strip."

He went continued, "As we disembarked from the aircraft we saw three buildings standing along in the grass. There were no windows, doors or roofs on any of the three buildings. Looking around we could see no building or people of any kind around the area. An officer in a Jeep with other vehicles said, "Welcome to Korea, let's get the aircraft downloaded. The duffel bags were all stacked in the three building shells and tarps were tied over as roofs. We had nothing, we ate canned food and I slept on some of the duffel bags that night." David later commented, "As for the three buildings I spoke of, as I remember they were side by side all shaped the same and were about 15' by 30' masonry."

Materials from Kunsan Harbor: The 14th Transport Co. had already opened up the operations at Kunsan Harbor. (See 14th Transport Co..) Materials for construction on the base were being shipped in from Japan, as well as supplies for the growing refugee population at Kunsan. North Koreans with nowhere else to go were herded into refugee camps in Kunsan which were nothing more than warehouses. Rations of a small amount of charcoal and rice were distributed, but it was barely enough to survive. Starvation, pestilence and abject poverty were everywhere. This was not simply the ravages of war, this was the condition of Kunsan dating back to the Occupation days -- only now with the influx of refugees, the horrific conditions were multiplied in scope.

David continued, "The next day we began building a tent city which would become known as Kunsan AFB, Korea. I drove one of the six-bys and transport supplies to construct the tent city. We went to a nearby port, back and forth for days. You would back down into an LST boat where Korean men would load your truck. You would then head for the base. Just after leaving the port the road ran through a rather long and crooked tunnel. Many of our men lost their cargo in that tunnel." The Wolmyong tunnel (Taebong Tunnel) still exists today, but is blocked for pedestrian traffic only. This was the area where the North Korean refugees were clustered together.

Taebong Tunnel (1947) (Poor Quality Reproduction).
To the right is Taebong Tunnel. To the left is the Temple which faced a large open area
The tunnel and temple were about two blocks from the loading point for the trucks at Kunsan Harbor.
(Courtesy James Wilt)

Wolmyong tunnel (Taebong Tunnel) still exists today under the Wolmyong Park in Kunsan City. Until the early-70s, it was still used for vehicular traffic and the main street ran east-west through the city. Today the tunnel is used only for pedestrian traffic and the main street runs north-south. If connects the park to the fresh fish market along the waterfront.

David continued, "The Koreans would lay a child in the road just around the tunnel bend. The natural reaction was to stop, and many did. While you were catching your breath, your truck would rock twice and when you looked through your rear window you had an empty truck. There was nothing to do but turn around and go back to get another truck load. At first they placed shotgun guards on each truck, that took up to much manpower so they told us not to stop in the tunnel for anything. They said these children are well trained and you couldn't run over them if you tried. I was caught in two of these theft attempts. I didn't stop but ! ! my heart was beating faster than it ever had."

Road to Kunsan (1952)

"I carried several truck loads of fuel to the base fuel dump. It was always interesting to me to see the ground go out in waves as one of the drums would hit the ground." The original POL dump was on the north end of base and an above ground tank was built by the 808th EAB for the aircraft fuel. The effect of "waves" was because the underlayer of much of Kunsan AB was simply mud and the land was unstable.

The base had been built up on reclaimed land from the Yellow Sea tidal flats. Kunsan AB was an island originally but much of the land on the base was reclaimed land from the mud flats. The original Japanese sod runway was built on the island part of Kunsan AB, but other portions of the base were in the "filled in" areas. According to The U.S. Air Force in Korea by Robert Futrell (p395), "Construction troops at Kunsan Airfield encountered Korea's worst drainage problems. The site was only a little way inland from the mud flats bordering the Yellow Sea, and the local soil was a grayish-blue clay which had long been inundated for rice culture." Because the land was unstable, massive amounts of rock and concrete were required to stabilize the runway and aircraft parking areas. As soon as the 808th EAB arrived, they opened up a stone quarry (borrow pit) north of the base.

When the 3rd Bomb Wing took command of the base, the 27th AIS personnel fell under the 3rd Airfield Installation Operations (AIO) -- just as it had been absorbed by the 808th EAB. Basically there was no real change in the work as there was just too much to do and still not enough people to do it. (See 3rd Air Installation Operations.)

Building of the Base: In Air Power, The Decisive Force in Korea (p232), it states, "All base-construction projects involved far more than building runways and their appurtenances. Since a jet air wing in combat could consume as much as 125,000 gallons of fuel each day, two detachments of the 931st Engineers supervised Korean laborers in the erection of tanks to hold a five days' supply of jet fuel at each of the major jet bases. ... In the early days at all Korean airfields, Air Force troops lived and worked in winterized tents, but more permanent buildings gradually replaced the tents. At Taegu air installations personnel contracted with Korean builders for stucco buildings. The initial cost was low, but these oriental structures rapidly deteriorated and required heavy maintenance costs. For this reason, steel quonset huts and "tropical shell" kits prefabricated in Japan were extensively used in Korea, both for housing and working quarters. Most structures were put up by Korean laborers or contractors under the supervision of base air installations personnel."

Kunsan AB (1952)
Click on map to enlarge
(Handdrawn map by Kalani O'Sullivan)

Roads: The base roads followed the same layout as laid down by the Occupation forces. Some roads were improved such as the road to the bomb dump on the south end of the base. Not much work was done in this area. The road configuration is basically the same as it is today -- except that Avenue B has been cut in places due to building of the Base Exchange and Dormitories.

Electrical: One of the first tasks would have been to restore electrical power to K-8. A coal-fueled steam-turbine generator had been installed in Kunsan City in 1945 -- in the same location as the present day KEPCO plant along the Kumgang River. The power lines to K-8 had been strung to all the facilities in the Occupation days, but the primary electrical energy was from the hydroelectric plants in North Korea. The Kunsan plant was simply a backup source.

After the Korean War outbreak, the generator in Kunsan was the only commercial electrical source. The electricity was unreliable and amperage weak. Some people complained of the lights being so dim one could not read at night -- and many times there was no electricity at all. Almost everyone reported using candles at one time or other.

After electrical power from the Kunsan electric plant had been restored, the task of wiring up the newly erected Jamesway huts and facilities started. Again the indigenous labor was used. Some commented on how the Korean linemen climbed the electrical poles using a blocks of wood with nails in it tied to their feet and a rope around the waist, while Americans were rigged out with climbers' spikes and leather belts. The 808th EAB electrical personnel were also assigned to assist in wiring up the base and performing other tasks to get the base ready for the 3rd Bomb Wing.

Auxiliary Power units were not brought in until after the 27th AIS had departed. In 1952-1953, the base added an auxiliary power substation equipped with four 100KW generators to provide electricity to the base (excluding airfield lighting) when the Kunsan City plant would go off line. This substation was located on the north end of base near the POL storage area. The location is still currently a power substation for off-base power.

Jamesway Prefab Buildings Construction: The 27th Installation Squadron started work constructing prefab Jamesway hootches for the 3rd Bomb Wing units coming in -- mainly through the use of indigenous Korean labor.

The Jamesway buildings were constructed over a concrete slab. These buildings were used mainly by the 3rd Bomb Wing personnel. The sides of the buildings were exterior plywood and then covered with corrugated iron sheets and slats. The roof was plywood topped with corrugated iron sheets. The sheets had to be weighted down with sandbags to keep them from flying away in high wind conditions. The entrance was one set of double doors. In winter, the building was heated by oil heaters at the ends fed by fuel drums on wooden stands outside. In the summer, the ventilation was very bad. Personnel would sleep on metal frame cots with air mattresses covered with mosquito netting.

James F. Farr of Farmington, Connecticut with his house boy
in 1952 in front of Jamesway huts in the Airmen Billeting area.
(Courtesy James Farr)
(Click on the image to enlarge)

Air Force personnel who could not be accommodated in the Jamesway huts were temporarily billeted in 12-man tents erected within the Airmen Billeting area. In the winter of 1951-1952 some of these tents burned down due to the oil heater malfunctions.

The old Occupation forces dependent housing became the Bachelor Officer Quarters (BOQ) for the 3rd BW. All officers (all services) were billeted in the BOQ area to the north end of the base. The holes in the floor of these old units and inoperative plumbing were low on the priorities list in early 1951. There was too much else to do. By mid-1952, most BOQ units had running water, but the flooring still hadn't been repaired. Additional plywood Jamesway huts were built later on in 1952 for the officers of the VMF(N)-513 and 474th FBW when these units arrived.

After the 27th AIS left, housing became critical as the 474th FBG and the Marine VMF(N)-513 squadron were stationed at the base. Some USAF personnel had to be housed in quonset huts or in 12-man tents until space became available. The enlisted Marines were billeted separately from the USAF and Army.

Korean Laborer at K-8 near the 808th EAB Tent City (1951)
(Courtesy Al Gould)

808th EAB Tent City Construction: The Army units were billeted in the "Tent City." The 808th EAB tent city was constructed away from the runway -- above the USAF hootches -- in what is now the Kunsan AB Golf course. During the days of the Occupation forces (3rd Battalion, 63rd Infantry Regiment), the area was a low-lying area with only a few buildings situated on the edge of the rice fields that surrounded the base (Camp Hillenmeyer). During the monsoon season, a pond formed on the western edge from the runoff. Photos of the tent city during the Korean War indicates the area had been built up prior to construction of the tent city. Because of the lack of heavy equipment such as graders in the initial days of the Korean War -- a shortage that existed throughout the Korean theater -- the area was almost certainly leveled through the use of coolie-laborers carrying sand in A-frame carriers (chige) on their backs. The use of coolie labor to level areas was not unusual as the original Japanese runway was built the same way. After the area had been filled and graded, the unit relocated to this area.

David Britts wrote, "The tent city grew out of that grass field from boxes of every shape and size were stacked." The supplies were hastily deposited into the field adjacent to Avenue C. Soon the field -- about two football fields long -- was stacked with piles of plywood about ten feet high.

He later wrote, "As for the tent city I spoke of, I may have used the word tent too loosely. As I remember the structures had plywood sides that came up four feet from the ground level and were framed in with two by fours for the rest of the structure. A canvas was placed over the structure to complete the buildings. In the sleeping quarters there was a potbelly stove that vented up through the top of the structure. I heated a lot of shaving water in my helmet through the hole in the top of that stoves. As far as the size of the quarters, I would think they were 12 man. All structures were connected together by two by four side walks, like they had in the old American West."

These "duck walks" that connected the tents were essential in Kunsan's rainy season and the clay mud made walking very difficult. They were everywhere in place of sidewalks.

He went on, "The mess hall had the stainless steel field stoves. We had large pots of hot water to wash our mess kits in. Once when we wanted to live high on the hog, we took riot shot guns and went out into the fields around the base and shot pheasants. That was a treat even though I did not shoot any. Not long after we got the city set up we had Korean girls working in the mess tent." (NOTE: The pheasants still abound in the area. However, because special licenses are required for shotguns and plus the pheasant hunting season in winter only, the pheasants are still plentiful.)

He went on, " There was an interesting gauge of our progress that developed just outside of the base. A momason and her girls began building a large house. They had their house completed and were in business well before we got the base operationally ready."

Indigenous Labor Contract Office: Most certainly, one of the first actions was to start an "Indigenous Labor Contract Office" to hire interpreters and other semi-skilled workers to assist on the base. As was mentioned before, the steel quonset huts and "tropical shell" kits (Jamesway huts) were prefabricated in Japan and put up by Korean laborers or contractors under the supervision of base air installations personnel. However, the lack of knowledge of American construction methods and standards did lead to problems. For example, the idea of interior drywall was foreign to Koreans carpenters.

Payment of contractors could be complex as the won had been inflated so much that payment for a small project would require duffle bags full of the money. The won was almost worthless.

Highly skilled Korean labor was virtually unknown in Kunsan. The problem dated back to the Japanese occupation when the Japanese reserved all managerial or technical jobs for ethnic Japanese. When these Japanese managers, engineers, draftsmen and technicians were repatriated after WWII, there was no one left in Korea to fill the void. It was stated before, "Carpenters, electricians, plumbers, mechanics, painters, typists and others were available in various stages of skill, but the majority of the labor supply was in the "pick and shovel" class."

The most important native hire were the interpreters. These were usually individuals trained in English by the Christian missionaries. Every headquarters unit had an interpreter/typist. An unfortunate side note was that the women employed as interpreters were considered "prostitutes" by the Korean populace for working closely with the Americans. Despite this hurtful gossip, these women remained in their positions simply because their salaries usually fed their entire families -- including extended families. Communication with laborers by Americans for the most part was done using simple Japanese phrases or sign language.

Kunsan AB (1951-1952)
Click on map to enlarge
(Handdrawn map by Kalani O'Sullivan)

Kunsan AB: Flightline and Tent City (1952)
Looking south
Click on photo to enlarge
(13th Bomb Squadron (LNI) Website)

Kunsan AB: Flightline (1952)
Looking east
Click on photo to enlarge
(13th Bomb Squadron (LNI) Website)

Kunsan AB: Officers Quarters (top) (1952)
Tent City to lower left
Looking north
Click on photo to enlarge
(13th Bomb Squadron (LNI) Website)

Water Supply: David remarked, "I was assigned water purification because I was a plumber. I had already built all the straddle trenches we needed. I fired up the water purification plant. After a short period of time Korean children came to get jobs on base. I hired a boy to help operate the plant. He took my clothing home at night and his grandmother washed and ironed them. I got back most of the clothes."

He later wrote, "There was an old cement water tank that was left on a hill on base property. We tried to restore it; however it was laced with some chemicals and with all the sandblasting we could not salvage it." He later wrote about an army unit that shot up a rubber water storage unit indicating that there was no water tower at the time. The water supply was stored in rubber bladders. (NOTE: The "cement water tank...on a hill" is an unknown as the 508th Utility Company during the Occupation years used a pond on the north side of the BOQ area as a water source and had their water purification plant set up there. Later on in the war, water was pumped from Okku Reservoir to the base to a de-sedimentation (Bldg 100) atop what was known as "Water Point" in 1953 -- on what is now "Gunsmoke Hill." The water purification plant was relocated to the hill.)

Unfortunate Incidents: Dave continued, "After the aircraft arrived we had two unpleasant situations occur. There was always Korean men cutting the grass that grew just outside the base perimeter. One young man, probably in his late teens, walked over to look at one of the aircraft. The security police arrested the young man and turned him over to the ROK Army troops who had a small detachment on the corner of the base. The young man was beyond a doubt mental. He died that night during interrogation." It should be noted that the Korean Army guards were under orders to execute anyone caught in a restricted area. Summary executions on the flightline were common. However, one must remember that the Communists were still roaming free outside the perimeter of the base. In fact, shortly after the 3rd Bomb Wing arrived, the Communists actually shelled the base from an off-shore island.

He went on, "The other incident was when an American troop was killed by some of the Koreans for raping a Korean girl. His body was found in a barn some distance from the base. Many army organizations were visitors to Kunsan most of the time. They would stand down there before returning to the front. The young man who was killed was from one of these groups."

The units David speaks of were from the early 1951 time frame. At that time, the front lines were in flux with the MLR (Main Line of Resistance) shifting daily. After the lines stabilized in 1952, there were not many visits from front-line units to Kunsan.

He went on, "The USAF had a rather large hospital system built at Kunsan. This drew lots of different units to become our guests. One night an Army unit shoot up our rubber water tank. They were kicked out the next morning." The hospital area was the 3rd Hospital Group. The large size was because of the fear that Seoul would be overrun again by the Chinese and the base became a fall-back hospital facility for the peninsula. It was well-equipped with the best equipment and large wards. (See the 3rd Medical Group.)

Memorable Incidents: He added, "I had the pleasure of meeting the Korean President at Kunsan. He and the Area Commander came to the base one day in a jeep. Both gentleman walked around and shook hands with many of us." (NOTE: The President was Syngman Rhee (Yi Syng-Man) who would prove to be a thorn in America's side later on. Even today, the only reason South Korea is still technically at war with North Korea is because Syngman Rhee refused to sign the Armistice Agreement. It was signed by the Commander of the UN forces -- who happened to the U.S. forces commander -- and the Chinese "volunteer" army and North Korea.)

27th FEW Returns to U.S. -- 27th AIS Remains in Korea: The two elements -- the forward echelon at Taegu (K-2) and the rear echelon at Itazuke -- regrouped and remained at Itazuke AB from 1 Feb 51 - 31 Jul 51. Its relief was the 136th FBW which was activated in Jun 51. It departed Langley AFB, VA in Jul 51 and arrived in Itazuke AB, Japan. The 27th FEW was relieved by the 136th FBW at Itazuke (APO 929) and Taegu (APO 970) and then the 27th FEW rotated back to Bergstrom AFB, TX.

However, they left the 27th Air Installation Squadron in place at Kunsan until their normal 12-month rotation date. They departed Korea on 5 Feb 52 -- six months after the 3rd Bomb Wing (L-NI) had taken over the base. David stated, "I left Korea and Japan and flew back to Texas. I remained with the Wing until my discharge in 1953. I went back home to my home state and joined the railroad. In 1962 that railroad went bankrupt and I returned to the Air Force where I completed 30 years service and retired as a CMSgt. I would like to tell you that I have many memories of Korea, unfortunately in my 70th year the lights are growing faint." Humorously, he later wrote, "My wife reminded me that my mother's records had some of my records from the 27th FEW days. I went up into the attic and much to my surprise I found a Records Check printout. That printout states that we entered Korea 11 Feb. 1951 and departed 05 Feb 1952, Tour-length 012. That record also said the official name of our unit was the 27th Air Installation SQ." Our thanks to Mrs. Britt whose mem