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HOW IT WAS!KUNSAN AIRBASEOTHER UNITS (1951-1954)808th - 809th - 841st EAB |
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HOW IT WAS: KUNSAN AIRBASE (1951-1954) |
808th Engineering Aviation Battalions (Apr 1951-Mar 1953)809th Engineering Aviation Battalion (Oct 1951-Apr 1952)841st Engineering Aviation Battalion (Mar 1953-Oct 1954) SCARWAF Patch (Courtesy Ellie Price)

Background on Kunsan Air Base Land Area In Korea: A Geography Based on the Author's Travels and Literature by Hermann Lautensach (written in 1932) it stated, "On the foreside of the peninsula where Kunsan lies the rice polders (reclaimed tidal flats) of the Fuji Company have spread out since 1923. Basically they are set up the same as the Yong-ampo polders. Previously there were silty mud flats here as well, with a few pine-covered islands sticking out, some of them connected by (sand)bars (913, 914) By means of mighty dikes, completely covered with stones outside and therefore very steep, which run straight for miles and use the islands as supports, two large polders have been wrested from the tidal flats. They are separated from each other by the largest island and a reservoir. Three floodgates, one of which was blasted into the solid rock at the base of an old gneiss (stone) island, allow the mainland water to drain off. Each of the polders contains 1000 chongbo (992 ha) of paddy land and an additional total of 500 chongbo are occupied by buildings, roads and dry land. The fields of the south polder form one single block. The latter are leased to Korean farmers, those of the north polder to Japanese farmers. ... From autumn to spring its waters is pumped into the reservoir constructed between the polders, which has a very high dams and an accordingly large volume. The surface measures 319 ha. From June on its water is used for irrigating the fields. A system of main and side canals crossing at right angles with irrigation ditches again branching off at right angles brings the water to the fields. The drainage ditches flow from the fields underneath the irrigation canals and meet at the floodgates."Basically this means that the Japanese Fuji Company anchored a dike to one island and built it to the next sort of like connecting the dots. The largest island was where Kunsan Aerodrome was constructed. In the middle was created the Okku Reservoir. The center of the island was covered with a layer of sand and leveled to house the Aerodrome. The original strip was in a NNE/SSW direction. Its primary purpose was to aid the Japanese in its war in Manchuria -- but also as a defense force for Korea's fourth most important port. During World War II, the Aerodrome became an Army Advanced Pilot Training Base. There appeared to be between 240-500 personnel at the base based upon the fact that there were ten 24-bunk barracks at the southern "toe" of what is now called "Gunsmoke Hill" on Kunsan Air Base. In addition, there was one 500-man structure and three hangars close to the present Enlisted barracks. The runway was made of sod. For more details, go to How It Was (1938-1951). The original aerodrome was a 2,800 sod strip. To view a 1947 hand-drawn map by Fred Ottoboni of the runway location, go to Camp Hillenmeyer map. Core samples taken by the 63d Infantry Regiment, 3d Battalion in 1946 indicated that the field was leveled by hand with earth fill. Then the surface was covered with 3 feet of sand. Then the sod topsoil was added. The location of this area was in the center of the old island from which Kunsan Air Base was built. Along the west side were rice paddies along the sea wall. On the east side of the base (inland) were rice paddies. This left only the central area of the base as suitable for a strip. After the American Occupation forces left in 1948, there may have been a detachment of for the fledgling ROK Air Force at Kunsan. The ROKAF at that time was equipped with cast-off T-6 Texan trainers and L-4 Liaison aircraft. These aircraft were probably not stationed at Kunsan, but rather at Kimpo.
Background on SCARWAFThe following was excerpted from the Korean War Project: 811th EAB.
Engineer Infomation Bulletin March 1953, Vol. 1 No.2
Headquarters Aviation Engineer Force, Wolters AFB Texas
"When swift jet fighters or huge bombers take off into Korean skies, or
when they land after a mission that makes headlines in the next days
news, they do so on stout runways built by men who rarely achieve
mention in the public prints. Yet those men and thier work are vitally
necessary before the warbirds can ever take to the air. The story of
thier achievements is also a tribute to sevice cooperation between the
Army and the Airforce.
These men are the Aviation Engineers....the men who build and maintain
runways, taxiways, parking ramps, drainage systems, buildings,
waterlines, roads, and fuel storage tanks that make an airfield a going
concern. Most of them are engineers, but some are signal units.
All are known as SCARWAF....SPECIAL CATEGORY ARMY with AIRFORCE.
Their story actually begins in 1947 when the Department of the Airforce
was established as a seperate entity under the National Security Act.
The newly constituted Air Force had no engineering units; and the
logical result was SCARWAF, Army personnel assigned for special work
with the Air Force.
Although this sizeable group of Army personnel performed essential work
all over the globe, many newcomers in the service after 1947 apparently
never realized this large group existed. Advancement of SCARWAF
personnel was administered by the Air Force until July 1951 when
promotional control was returned to the Army and the training program
was expanded.
Today Aviation Engineer units are organized, manned and given their
initial training by the Army. They then go to the Air Force for
specialized training, becoming part of the Aviation engineer Force.
The Fifth Air Force's 417th Engineer Aviation Brigade is Headquarters
for all Aviation Engineer activities in Korea. Ten Battalions and
three Engineer Aviation Groups are serving there. The most outstanding
and typical of these is the 811th Engineer Aviation Battalion, first
elements of which landed at Inchon just nine days after the invasion
of Sept. 15, 1950. Men of that Battalion pitched in immediately and
have been hard at work building airstrips ever since.
Their most recent job is considered a CONSTRUCTION MIRACLE of the Korean
conflict....a 6,200-foot springboard to MIG Alley, wide enough for two
Sabre jets to take off wing to wing, and completed in just twentyfive
days!!!! Men of the Battalion claim the elapsed time would have been
even less had it not been for the tail end of two typhoons that struck
the area, pouring more than six inches of water onto the field. When
it wasn't raining the workers sweltered in temperatures over 100
degrees F. mark. The runway is designed to last at least seven years
without major repairs. When it is considered that jet fighters land
with twice the impact as a four motored piston type transport, that is
indeed a long life as runways go.
When Aviation Engineers start a job, they usually spend twenty four hours
a day at it, working under floodlights at night, even foregoing trips
to the Company kitchen or messhall. Trucks rush hot food to the men at
work.
Sometimes the paving moves ahead so rapidly that the Battalion must
borrow extra trucks, and the mechanics must repair their equipment in
odd moments snatched from their paving duties. Surveyors work until
there is no more light. While completing onehalf a runway jets would
take off on the other half, only a few yards from the staking or grading
or running heavy equipment.
When laying down new strips, the engineers concentrate on completing one
half the width in order to make that portion available to the fighters
and bombers. Sometimes as in the case of the huge 9,000 foot job, the
strips are laid alongside smaller existing strips so that there is no
interruption of air activities.
Sometimes the engineers start from scratch to turn a Korean swamp or a
jumble of rice paddies nto an airfield. At other locations, they
rebuild former Korean fields into first class fghter-bomber bases.
The work is never finished. Temporary installations must be replaced
with permanent ones. Runways need patching. No sooner had the 811th
finished thier record breaking runway job than they began work at two
airfields on a 4,500 foot asphalt runway job for trasport planes, an
1,800 foot taxiway, a huge hanger, and four 3000 barrel fuel tanks and
a few radar installations and parking area."
1950: Initial Problems with the Aviation Engineer CapabilitiesIn July of 1950 -- at the start of the Korean War -- the Aviation Engineering units available to the Far East Air Forces were badly understrength and deficient in technical training. This slowed the construction of six planned airfields in Korea and, together with the ground reverses, prevented a deployment of fighter planes to bases to Korea. A paper entitled, "The US Air Force in Korea: Problems that Hindered the Effectiveness of Air Power" (by Maj Roger F. Kropf, USAF) stated that the Air Force was moving into the jet age in 1950. Unfortunately, there were no long, reinforced runways in Korea, and only four in Japan, to support the Air Force's new jet aircraft. The only air power available for CAS (close air support) and AI (air interdiction) were F-51s, B-25s, and B-26s operating out of the primitive Korean airfields, thus greatly reducing FEAF capabilities. The paper goes on to talk about the Aviation Engineer capabilities in the early days of the war. It said, "FEAF was consistently short of aviation engineer units--the troops who build and repair runways. The need for reinforced runways to handle jet aircraft required significantly more time and effort than runways for older aircraft. Runways required 4.5 engineer battalion-months to build as compared to 1.5 in World War II. ... A transport field was built and operating three days after D-day, and in 16 days, five fighter bomber groups were operating out of Normandy airfields. Within 24 days, nine airfields were completed with seven more under construction. In comparison, it took from June to December 1952 to build the new 9,000-foot concrete jet runway at Osan-ni." In a nutshell, when the Korean War broke out, there were very few trained Engineers available. The Army had been thorough in swiftly disassembling its war machine. Gearing it back up again was another matter. It took time to get things rolling again. Prior to the war Kunsan had a sod runway that was about 2,800 ft long and classified only as an undeveloped "emergency landing strip." The HQ PACAF history states that the 808th Engineering Aviation Battalion (EAB) built the original 6300 foot concrete runway. (Note: Though Military Lore cites a 1950s document that gives the 931st EAB credit for the construction, but there was no such unit at Kunsan. The reason is that this was the 931st Engineering Aviation Group (EAG) of Taegu which joined the 930th EAG in Korea in May 1951. The 931st EAG was directed to repair Kimpo Airfield, to extend the runway and construct taxiways and parking aprons at Suwon, and to build a new airfield at Kunsan. It was administratively above the 808th EAB.) In Air Power, The Decisive Force in Korea (p229) it states, "Installations and Engineer Aviation units had very little equipment on hand at the outbreak of hostilities. This was particularly true of engineer heavy equipment. Bulldozers, cranes, shovels, motorized graders, and scrapers were not obtainable for several months. Most of the existing equipment had been in constant use for several years and required constant maintenance and replacement of parts to be kept operational. No equipment was available at the outset to fill shortages of organized units nor to equip organizations formed after hostilities began. Parts supply was a critical problem. In many cases it was necessary to cannibalize dead-lined equipment to keep other equipment operational. To make matters worse, much engineer heavy equipment was lost during United Nations withdrawals." "Many units were short equipment kits and sets that were vital to proper operations. When these items eventually began to arrive, it was found that essential parts were missing. In most cases these kits had been packed for use during the Second World War and were not inspected prior to shipment to the theater of operations. At the beginning of the Korean campaign, construction and repair materials were in low priority for procurement and transportation in comparison with the relatively high priority given other war materials. Consequently units were forced to resort almost entirely to purchase of most items of construction supplies and materials on the Korean market. As the supply channels broadened, many article gradually became available in limited quantities. But when units moved from one location to another, equipment had to be transported primarily by the wierd Korean rail system. Without guards for each piece of equipment, thieves would remove every part they possibly could before it arrived at its destination. At times equipment was in such condition upon arrival at its destination that it had to be salvaged." A bulldozer operator of the 1903d Engineering Aviation Battalion, a SCARWAF unit, helps prepare a new landing strip. The Korean soil was very hard when this picture was taken on January 19, 1953. (Click on photo to enlarge)"The shortage of trained engineering personnel was equally acute. Since none of the other United Nations participants was able to furnish its own airfield construction units, the Engineer Aviation and Installation units had to construct airfields for all the United Nations air forces in Korea. Enough Engineer Aviation units to cope with the workload was not available. Working on a twenty-four hour per day schedule, the few units in Korea concentrated their early efforts primarily on airfield traffic surfaces. Through their untiring effort and ingenuity, many new, converted, or rehabilitated Japanese airstrips were added to the list of cargo and tactical fields." "The shortage of Engineer Aviation units shifted responsibilities for construction of major airbase facilities and in some cases for airfield traffic surfaces on wing installation squadrons. But their mission was to repair and maintain buildings and grounds, to operate and maintain base utilities, to provide structueral and crash fire protection, to train auxiliary fire fighters, and to provide organizational maintenance on assigned power equipment. Their equipment and personnel authorizations were based on the normal requirements at prepared operating bases. Thus the construction responsibilities assumed by the installation squadron constituted an almost impossible work load." "The problem was partially overcome by both engineer units and installations squadrons through the use of locally hired labor and native contractors. The construction capability of Korean personnel generally was good when they could be give proper supervision. But because of their lack of knowledge of American construction methods and standards, the uses to which they could be put were limited. Highly skilled Korean labor was scarce -- only a few trained equipment operators, draftsmen, and engineers were available. Carpenters, electricians, plumbers, mechanics, painters, typists and others were available in various stages of skill, but the majority of the labor supply was in the "pick and shovel" class. Interpreters, of course were essential and proved invaluable. Labor battalions were organized and performed well in such jobs as ditching, filling, earthwork, and filling bomb craters. This help was of great importance on some jobs because of equipment shortages or inaccessibility of the site to heavy equipment. At one installation, the placing of a concrete runway fill was accomplished entirely by local contractors using native hand labor. Continuing experience in Korea led to better and more effective use of indigenous labor. But we were slow to realize the effectiveness of methods that appeared crude, slow and wasteful of manpower when compared to those employing modern construction equipment." Later it said (p235), "...it required about four and one-half battalion months to construct a 9000-foot runway for modern jet fighters, as against the World War II average of one and one-half months to construct a 4000-foot fighter runway. To build a complete airfield required about two and one-half times the construction effort expended for the runway alone. This factor remained constant for both World War II and Korea. Under the best conditions, eight to ten battalion months were required for the construction of a runway, taxiway, and parking aprons for a jet-fighter group." "Modern runways for fighter aircraft approximately doubled in length over World War II models, yet the time for construction tripled. What accounted for this extra one-third time factor? As previously discussed, several contributing factors were predominant: jet-blast erosion preventatives; procurement and previous preparation of a material for the upper base courses that had the natural strength to resist the shears imposed by small wheels with high tire pressures; and the additional time necessary to compact this material to high density required. Then too, sites readily adaptable to 4,000-to-6000-foot strips necessitated greatly increased earth work, drainage, and preparation for extension to 9000 feet. If the runway was to be used jointly by fighter, bomber and cargo aircraft, construction time was considerably increased over the four and one-half battalion months required for the fighter runway alone. With the type construction needed in Korea, at least one engineer aviation battalion per operational group was required to achieve maximum combat effectiveness and efficiency."
1951: Initial construction of the runway
After the Invasion of Inchon, Kunsan, the port city on the Kum River estuary, fell to the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, without opposition at 1300, 30 September 1950. Though we are not certain as to the exact date the Army took charge of Kunsan Harbor, we can be fairly sure that it was very shortly after the recapture of Kunsan. The first step was to de-mine the harbor. The North Koreans had mined the harbor in 1950 anticipating a possible American invasion in the area. The mines shipped to Changhang via train. After the mines had been removed and the shoreline cleared of mines, the operation of the port opened.
The first "Harbor Master" was probably an Army corporal or sergeant assigned a tugboat to tow allied supply ships into and out of the harbor. He was most likely dispatched from Pusan where the headquarters for the Army transportation units for Korea were located. The tug most certainly came from the "storage" facilities at Yokohama U.S. Army Storage Depot where all the floating wrecks from all over the Pacific were stored.
The development of a runway at Kunsan AB (K-8) became a major priority in 1950. Fifth Air Force had taken over Kunsan AB in October 1950 and immediately started plans for constructing a concrete runway there. However, the first priority was putting the base infrastructure in place. Though much was previously done by the Occupation forces (3rd Btn, 63rd Inf Reg), most of the buildings with any metal -- such as quonset hut structures or hangars -- were stolen. Only the masonry or wood structures remained. For the 5AF the first priority was setting up the base.
The need for air bases with developed runways in Korea was a prime concern. The F-80 and F-84 jet aircraft had insuffient fuel capacity to sustain combat operations for long from bases in Japan. (NOTE: It would be many months before they developed the "Misawa tanks" for the F-84 which extended the range of the aircraft.) In addition, jet aircraft required developed runways to operate from. For this reason, in the early days of the Korean War, the FEAF was forced to convert all the jet aircraft unit BACK to prop-driven F-51 Mustangs with F-51s shipped over from ANG units. This was the first "reverse conversion" in the USAF history. Taegu was used as a forward base for jet aircraft, but it had a tendency to rip up tires -- and at times landing gears -- on the PSP runway. Concrete runways in Korea were a major priority.
Initial ADVON of the 808th Arrives As the 27th AIS was greeted by an ADVON team when it arrived on 11 Feb 1951, we must assume that the initial teams arrived either in Feb 1951. (NOTE: January in Korea is normally too cold to accomplish anything as the ground and Kunsan Harbor are still frozen.) The groups at Kunsan were basically a hodge-podge of "advance parties" (ADVON) or small units split away from their main units to support this mission. We believe the 551st Transportation Truck Company also arrived with the ADVON at this time via LSTs and provided the base motorpool function -- trucks to haul the materials from Kunsan Harbor to the base.
LSTs filled with supplies were the first ships to land. Later cargo ships -- defueled to allow for the shallow draft of Kunsan harbor -- would be utilized. The first elements of the 14th Transport Co. would soon follow. The 14th Transport Co. -- of the 2nd Logistical Command from Pusan -- arrived to take over the port operations and ships bearing concrete and plywood from Japan. Most heavy equipment and personnel to construct the base were transported up from Pusan by rail. However, massive amounts of concrete and other construction materials had to be brought in by ships. (See 21st Transportation Port com B/14th Transportation Port com/Det 1 507th Signal Company.)
The operations, of course, were dictated by the tides and ships would have to wait off-shore until the tide rose. The harbor master duties would have risen immensely from the autonomous operations during the Occupation period and he would have reported directly to the Commander of the 14th Transport Co.. We are assuming that two tug boat operators were assigned because the immense amounts of cargo that was required in the building of Kunsan AB.
February 1951 The first elements of the 27th Airfield Installation Squadron (AIS) from Taegu arrived on 11 Feb 1951 to assist in the construction of the tent city to be used by the 808th EAB when they arrived. David A. Britts of the 27th AIS stated, "Shortly after, they loaded us up again and we headed across the Sea Of Japan. I was in this group. The aircraft began to descend and we kept waiting to see something. When the aircraft came to a complete stop all we could see was grass." The two key points is that (1) they were greeted by the 808th EAB ADVON team who were already setting up the operations; and (2) the building of the airstrip had not started as the main elements of the 808th EAB had not arrived yet.
When the 27th AIS arrived, the runway had not been built as yet. The 808th Engineering Aviation Battalion arrived in April 1951 and then work commenced on the initial excavation. David's seeing only "grass" confirms that he landed on the old sod landing strip used by the Japanese. It was 2800 feet long and listed as an "emergency landing strip."
He continued, "As we disembarked from the aircraft we saw three buildings standing alone in the grass. There were no windows, doors or roofs on any of the three buildings. Looking around we could see no building or people of any kind around the area. An officer in a Jeep with other vehicles said, "Welcome to Korea, let's get the aircraft downloaded. The duffel bags were all stacked in the three building shells and tarps were tied over as roofs. We had nothing, we ate canned food and I slept on some of the duffel bags that night." David later commented, "As for the three buildings I spoke of, as I remember they were side by side all shaped the same and were about 15' by 30' masonry."
 Map of Kunsan, Chollabuk-to (1945-46) (CLICK ON MAP TO ENLARGE)
 Closeup of Kunsan City, Map of Kunsan, Chollabuk-to (1945-46) (SITE NOTE: The harbor area had not changed since the Occupation. The LSTs would dock where the Kunsan-Changhang Ferry station is to the west of the three Pontoon Docks used for off-loading troops and shallow-draft ships carrying concrete or fuel. Later fuel would be pumped into holding tanks in the harbor area.)
Upon arrival at Kunsan, the 27th Installation Squadron immediately started off-loading materials from LSTs in Kunsan Harbor loaded with plywood and equipment for construction. Basically, the first priority was off-loading the LSTs of any materials needed for building Kunsan. The second priority was putting up the Tent City for the incoming troops of the 808th EAB from Okinawa. The third priority was putting the base infrastructure together to support the 3rd Bomb Wing scheduled to arrive after the 808th EAB finished the runway.
The 14th Transport Co. had already opened up the operations at Kunsan Harbor. (See 21st Transportation Port com B/14th Transportation Port com/Det 1 507th Signal Company.) Materials for construction on the base were being shipped in from Japan, as well as supplies for the growing refugee population at Kunsan. North Koreans with nowhere else to go were herded into refugee camps in Kunsan which were nothing more than warehouses. Rations of a small amount of charcoal and rice were distributed, but it was barely enough to survive. Starvation, pestilence and abject poverty were everywhere. This was not simply the ravages of war, this was the condition of Kunsan dating back to the Occupation days -- only now with the influx of refugees, the horrific conditions were multiplied in scope. In the Korean War, the area around Taebang Tunnel became known as the "North Korean Village." This tunnel is the one that had to be used to get materials from the harbor to the base -- and there was a great deal of pilferage there by the units unloading the LSTs.
We believe the 551st Transportation Truck Company, a colored truck unit, arrived in Kunsan in Feb 1951 and handled the transportation of materials from Kunsan Harbor to the base as well as the maintenance of the vehicles for the ADVON members. We assume that they arrived at Kunsan via an LST because the roads throughout Korea had not been completely secured. Their trucks would provide the backbone of the initial off-loading operations from Kunsan Harbor. However, after the 808th EAB arrived in April 1951, the unit departed. (Still in research.)
David continued, "The next day we began building a tent city which would become known as Kunsan AFB, Korea. I drove one of the six-bys and transport supplies to construct the tent city. We went to a nearby port (Kunsan Harbor), back and forth for days. You would back down into an LST boat where Korean men would load your truck. You would then head for the base. Just after leaving the port the road ran through a rather long and crooked tunnel. Many of our men lost their cargo in that tunnel." The Wolmyong tunnel (Taebong Tunnel) still exists today, but is blocked for pedestrian traffic only. This was the area where the North Korean refugees were clustered together.
David continued, "The Koreans would lay a child in the road just around the tunnel bend. The natural reaction was to stop, and many did. While you were catching your breath, your truck would rock twice and when you looked through your rear window you had an empty truck. There was nothing to do but turn around and go back to get another truck load. At first they placed shotgun guards on each truck, that took up to much manpower so they told us not to stop in the tunnel for anything. They said these children are well trained and you couldn't run over them if you tried. I was caught in two of these theft attempts. I didn't stop but ! ! my heart was beating faster than it ever had."
After the 808th EAB elements arrived in Apr 51, the 27th AIS was absorbed into the EAB operations. (See 27th Airfield Installation Squadron.)
According to the 8th Fighter Wing History, the 27th Air Base Group was assigned between 1 Apr 1951-24 Jun 1951. This is rather strange as the 27th Air Installation Squadron (AIS) arrived at Kunsan on 11 Feb 51 to set up operations -- two months before the 27th ABG arrived. At this time, we believe the 808th EAB who arrived in Mar 1951 actually provided the overall direction for the setup of the base -- with miscellaneous attached units under their supervision. Perhaps because the 808th EAB was a SCARWAF unit -- Special Category Army With Air Force -- it may have needed an USAF administrative unit to "take control of the base" before it could start work. All of this is supposition, because the presence of the 27th ABG does NOT make sense.
The key point is that the 27th Air Installation Squadron (AIS) were a SAC Reserve unit that was only on a one-year call-up. The 27th AIS remained at Kunsan until 05 Feb 52 and was credited with a 12-month tour. After the 3rd Bomb Wing (L-NI) arrived in August 1951 to take over the base, the 27th AIS personnel would have been attached to the 3rd Air Installation Operations (AIO). (See 3rd Air Installation Operations.) On 15 July 1951, the parent unit of the 27th AIS, the 27th FEW, was relieved by the 136th FBG at Itazuke AB, Japan and returned to Bergstrom AFB, TX -- leaving the 27th AIS behind. Those 27th AIS personnel at Kunsan remained in place until their 12-month tour had been completed. They departed Korea on 5 Feb 52.
However, the 27th AIS is currently credited by the USAF and 8th FW histories as the ones selected to oversee operations at Kunsan. This is NOT correct. When the small contingent of the unit, a reserve SAC unit from Bergstrom AFB, TX, appeared at Kunsan from Taegu, they were simply incorporated into the mainstream of the 808th effort to erect the base buildings for personnel -- an Airfield Installation Operations (AIO) function -- while the 808th EAB concentrated on the heavy construction. The AIO were the equivalent of today's Base Civil Engineers (CE) while the EAB were equivalent the USAF CESHR "Red Horse" units. The bottomline is that it is obvious the 27th AIS only assisted the 808th EAB -- but being USAF while the 808th was Army, they have received the credit for the initial construction of the USAF base over the years.
We can also surmise that the 808th EAB reinvented the Occupation forces "contract" labor system of hiring laborers and paying them at the end of the day. Later, there would refine the system to have "contractors" handle individual building contracts. The Jamesway buildings were also started as soon as indigenous labor support could be obtained. The prefab units were constructed for the incoming USAF units. The first flying elements of the 3rd Bomb Wing arrived in August 1951.
March 1951 Supposedly, the 808th EAB sent up a small ADVON in March -- two weeks before the main units arrived -- to mainly assist in setting up the Tent City for the incoming main elements. The ADVON units already at Kunsan were a hodge-podge of other units involved in off-loading the LSTs and transporting plywood and aviation fuel in barrels to the base.
April 1951 The first elements of the 808th arrived from Okinawa as a SCARWAF unit (Special Category Army With Air Force). From fragments we have pieced together that the 808th EAB had come up from the Pacific battles in WWII and then gone on to build Haneda AB in 1945-46 and then was split with one going to build up Kimpo AB in Korea and the other half sent to Okinawa. In 1950, the 808th was building an extended airstrip for the B-36 Peacemakers until the landing in Inchon. Then the unit was flagged to build a light-bomber strip at K-8. (In research.)
The main elements arrived in Apr1951 with their heavy equipment aboard LSTs. As the aviation engineer units available to the Far East Air Forces were badly understrength and deficient in technical training. This slowed the construction considerably. In addition, the EAB working in conditions they had not been trained in ... draining rice paddies and then filling them in with rock to make a runway.
In Oct 2006, Bruce B. Satra, a former SSgt with H&S Co., 808th EAB, wrote about being amongst the first elements to arrive at Kunsan. The unit arrived via troop ship at Kunsan Harbor. They off-loaded off-shore and were ferried to Kunsan via a landing craft.
He said, "I was on the troop transport---I believe we had only the one and since two battalions (808th and the 802nd) would be only about 1000 men between them (500 each, approx.) a troop transport could carry that number. ! questioned the "10 or 12 miles out" remark---I'd guess we were about 2 or 3 miles offshore when we off loaded into the landing craft, but it's anyones guess judging distances at sea. (SITE NOTE: This refers to Al Adams of Company C's statement on the arrival.) Some of the men apparently travelled with the equipment on the LST's. Yes, this was the initial group as we arrived there, the advance party I think was about two weeks ahead of us, they just set up tents primarily, as I understood the story. The transport was "AKA 19" as I remember that bit."
He continued, "I'd never been down a landing net and had heard all the horrer stories about possible dangers inherant in this so when they announced over the ships PA system, about a day before we arrived off Kunsan area coastline, that anyone who had never had experienced disembarking down a cargo net, report to the fore deck where they had slung a cargo net over a boom and would give us the" drill "-- I said to myself, I'm not going to be the only greenhorn out there , to hell with them, I'll take my chances. Good thing, there was no one reported for the training session."
"When we disembarked I was careful to do all I'd heard about, unfasten my pack so I could slip out of it quickly if I went in the drink, have my rifle on one shoulder, same reason, hold onto only the vertical ropes so no one would step on my hands, most important, try to time my jump off into the landing craft so it would be not too great a drop, the craft was rising and falling slowly with the sea swells, about 8 or 10 feet I'd estimate, jump as it fell away and you could have a long drop to a steel deck, jump too soon as it rose and you met it coming up as you came down and the impact with 60 pounds of pack on your back, not to mention 10 pounds of rifle, could be serious. I was very lucky, it was like stepping off onto a pillow, the craft rose up under me just as I was ready to step off, only a couple off feet to fall. After it was all over, several days later, I discovered none of us had ever had training concerning those landing nets."
"We went up the river at I'd suppose high tide. As we loaded into the landing craft (LCVP's) with just personnel, I'd guess 40 or so to a boat) the navy coxswain told us to keep our helmets on and our heads down, sit on the "floor" and don't try to raise up to see around. I figured it was just standard instructions for any such operation. Apparently the Navy had intelligence that there were guerillas along the river and we'd be under small arms fire. To my knowledge we never had any American infantry troops there for ground defense as we were always alone when it came to alerts later."
"I was told later, after it was all over, that we'd gone 26 miles up that river -- the map you show indicates pretty close to 26 miles in kilometers so someone got that right apparently (unusual for scuttle butt like that) and I always was surprised at how fast we got to our disembarcation point up river --- I didn't think at the time to check my watch but it seemed not very long, I'd estimate no more than an hour. We were never dressed warmly and it was very early spring, cold, sitting on a cold steel deck, I'd think if we were on that boat for two hours or so I'd remember it, but the time went fast. An ex navy friend here says they had special landing craft that could do about 20 knots, we may have been on them." (SITE NOTE: The 26-27 miles up river is questioned as Al Adams estimated 10-12 miles -- and Bruce Satra stated later it might have been 2-3 miles.)
At this time we believe all three LSTs off-loaded their heavy equipment in Kunsan Harbor. Because of the tidal conditions, the LSTs were grounded in the channel until the tides allowed them to off-load. There is only one available location in Naehang (inner port) where the LSTs could land. According to David Britts of the 27th AIS who arrived a month earlier, he drove to Kunsan Harbor in Feb 1951 and off-loaded plywood by backing "down into" an LST. There is only one location where the LST would be lower than the embankment. This would be the Kunsan-Changhang Ferry station. However, if this was a group of three LST's, only one could off-load at a time. The other two would have been stranded in mud in mid-channel if the low-tide hit -- and this appears to have happened as Bruce Satra described how they had "gone aground on sand bars" The LST unloading would also have been trapped until high-tide.
Bruce stated, "Our LST's all hung up on sand bars for a few days until an unusually high tide floated them off. Never have understood why we were sent up river under small arms fire all the way when there was a deep sea port right there?" Actually Kunsan Harbor at that time was not have a deep water port. Naehang (inner port) was a shallow draft port where one only entered at high tide. Later he wrote, "I will always wondered why we came 26 miles or whatever, up river under fire (no casualties but a couple of flat tires on equipment deckside on the LST's) in our landing craft, when we could as easily, or more easily, simply landed on the beach where ultimately the runway ended." To answer Bruce's question, the landing on the mudflats off Kunsan was impossible as the mud would have mired the LSTs far out in the channel and the troops would have had to slog about a two miles in the mud to reach shore. As for the equipment, there was no way it could get through the mud flats.
"...I think we had three (LSTs), with our heavy equipment--bulldozers, LeTornoue earth movers Tornocats (someone in the narrative called them "pony engines" I think---they were comparable maybe to a "tractor" as used describing a "tractor-trailer" or semi. Tornoscrapers were the ones he described as being pushed by Caterpillar tractors when the going got tough---they were a unit that had the tractor unit in front with a very large "box scraper" you might say, just behind, and could drop the front of the box to scrape up a load of earth, transport it as he said at fairly hi speed (up to 25 mph) and dump it out the rear like a dump truck. These were wheeled vehicles and didn't have the traction of a "cat" but did pretty well for hauling dirt around."
Bruce concurs that the landing took place most likely were he disembarked (Kunsan Harbor). "I didn't observe it (the off-loading) so am a poor witness, but I'm quite sure that if the LST's had gone back down the river, up the coast to Kunsan harbor to unload, we'd surely have had a lot of talk about it. I'm quite sure then that they simply proceeded upriver once they got off the sandbars and unloaded there on the river where we had disembarked from the landing craft earlier. It was a matter of only a day or two after we had arrived in our small landing craft. That's as I remember it anyway."
Being under fire coming up the channel was very possible as there were still many insurgents operating in the area. In fact, the Communist guerillas mortared Kunsan AB shortly after the first B-26s arrived in Oct 1951. The guerillas were part of the group that disappeared into the Chiri Mountains during the purge just prior to the Korean War -- and who returned after the North Korean forces captured Kunsan. After the Inchon landing, the Pusan Breakout pushed the North Koreans north until they simply abandoned their vehicles and took to hiding in the Chiri Mountains along with the guerillas.
Bruce believed the "Chinese had regular troops running the show in the area." He continued, "...we were never hit by serious "regular" units but harassed and kept on alert by the guerrillas who were reportedly led by the Chinese." However, this is not likely as the Chinese never got past Wonju in their invasion. On 4 Jan, Seoul fell to the CCF and the forces advanced to Wonju. On 12 Jan, Wonju fell, but the Chinese stopped their advance at this point and started falling back in some areas. The Chinese were saving themselves for the Spring campaign, but the allies did not know this. To them is was simply a break in the action. By 17 Jan, the situation was appearing desperate. Thus the scuttlebutt that the insurgents were led by Chinese would have been very reasonable given the circumstances, but has never been substantiated.
When they got to the landing site, trucks were awaiting them. "We were picked up by a colored trucking company "go go ichi", the 551st trucking co. (551st Transportation Truck Company), and trucked to our tent site which had been put up by a small advance party." The 551st appears to have been part of the ADVON elements to start the operations at Kunsan, but left after the EAB off-loaded their own vehicles -- most likely to shuttle the 802nd EAB to Suwon to start construction of the expanded air base there.
When they first arrived at Kunsan AB (K-8) it appears the Tent City was still not complete. They bedded down initially next to the original east-west runway that was being built. By June 1951, the 808th had relocated to Tent City in what is now the Kunsan Golf Course -- though they slept on the ground for the first six months until cots arrived. Bruce stated, " We burned down a couple of tents before realising the jet fuel we were given to heat our tents (ha ha) was designed to produce lots of expansion of air with the least possible heat. It did serve to ignite the tents satisfactorily when enough flame came out of the top of the stove pipe." At first kerosene was in short supply, but without any runway, the POL aircraft fuel in barrels where in great supply. Thus the reason for using jet fuel.
According to The U.S. Air Force in Korea by Robert Futrell (p395), "Construction troops at Kunsan Airfield encountered Korea's worst drainage problems. The site was only a little way inland from the mud flats bordering the Yellow Sea, and the local soil was a grayish-blue clay which had long been inundated for rice culture."
The choice of the runway location was a fairly simple decision. The first runway was to be 6,300 feet. There was only one place that the runway could be located due to the ricefields on the east and west and the hills on the north and south. The only location was where the old sod airstrip was. But the strip had to be realigned to a NE-SW direction to accommodate the increased length. The original Japanese runway was a short 2,800 foot sod runway that ran in a NNE-SSW orientation. Prior to the war, this runway was classified as an emergency runway. The original SE-NW runway was built on the site of the original Japanese sod runway (in the center of the old island land mass) and then extended out into the rice paddies (tidal flat reclamation area) at the east end to accommodate light bombers. The NE-SW orientation provided for a longer runway, but suddenly the runway extended off of the former main island mass into the tidal flat reclamation area. As a result, the folks had to do a lot of rock fills to stabilize the runway area. In Air Power, The Decisive Force in Korea (p232), it states, "The average California Bearing Ratio (an empirical formula use for rating soil shear-resistance) of these bottom-land soils was in the very lowest range. This meant that whereas a typical soil found in the U.S. midwest normally required a 6-inch base course layer, the layer in Korea had to be increased to two to three feet to provide the necessary support on these soils. ...All base-construction projects involved far more than building runways and their appurtenances. Since a jet air wing in combat could consume as much as 125,000 gallons of fuel each day, two detachments of the 931st Engineers supervised Korean laborers in the erection of tanks to hold a five days' supply of jet fuel at each of the major jet bases. ... In the early days at all Korean airfields, Air Force troops lived and worked in winterized tents, but more permanent buildings gradually replaced the tents. At Taegu air installations personnel contracted with Korean builders for stucco buildings. The initial cost was low, but these oriental structures rapidly deteriorated and required heavy maintenance costs. For this reason, steel quonset huts and "tropical shell" kits prefabricated in Japan were extensively used in Korea, both for housing and working quarters. Most structures were put up by Korean laborers or contractors under the supervision of base air installations personnel." It continued, "Before construction could begin, the entire area of the proposed airfield had to be drained -- a tremendous task. On this land which was water-logged to a depth of many feet, heavy construction equipment mired down or sunk completely from view, creating serious recovery problems and delays." However, the runway would have to be reoriented to meet the length requirements. This is the problem as the runway would have to be laid out in a NE-SW orientation and extend into the rice paddies at both ends. This in turn posed another problem as the rice paddies had to be filled in. This was easier said than done as massive amounts of rock fill was required.
As a result, a rock quarry had to be established. The rock quarry was a hill directly outside the north gate of the base. However, in 1951 graves on the hill had to be relocated first. Then blasting started. Korean workers were used in droves to fill the need for manual labor. The south side of the runway was the location of the old Japanese Ammo dump. This would be graded and a rail spur run to this area as the 3rd Supply Ammo Dump. When the 809th arrived, they would be billeted in tents in this area. On the south side of the Ammo dump was the fishing village of Haje.   Haje village on south end of base
July 1951: While the work on the runway progressed, the 27th Airfield Installation Squadron of Taegu had been at work constructing prefab Jamesway hootches for the 3rd Bomb Wing units coming in -- mainly through the use of indigenous Korean labor. (See 27th Airfield Installation Squadron.) The 808th personnel were also assigned to assist in wiring up the base and performing other tasks to get the base ready for the 3rd Bomb Wing.
The 808th tent city was constructed away from the runway -- above the USAF hootches -- in what is now the Kunsan AB Golf course. During the days of the Occupation forces (3rd Battalion, 63rd Infantry Regiment), the area was a low-lying area with only a few buildings situated on the edge of the rice fields that surrounded the base (Camp Hillenmeyer). During the monsoon season, a pond formed on the western edge from the runoff. After the area had been filled and graded, the unit relocated to this area.
The Army units were billeted in the "Tent City." The 808th EAB tent city was constructed away from the runway -- above the USAF hootches -- in what is now the Kunsan AB Golf course. During the days of the Occupation forces (3rd Battalion, 63rd Infantry Regiment), the area was a low-lying area with only a few buildings situated on the edge of the rice fields that surrounded the base (Camp Hillenmeyer). Photos of the tent city during the Korean War indicates the area had been built up prior to construction of the tent city. Because of the lack of heavy equipment such as graders in the initial days of the Korean War -- a shortage that existed throughout the Korean theater -- the area was almost certainly leveled through the use of coolie-laborers carrying sand in A-frame carriers (chige) on their backs. The use of coolie labor to level areas was not unusual as the original Japanese runway was built the same way. After the area had been filled and graded, the unit relocated to this area.
David Britts of the 27th AIS wrote, "The tent city grew out of that grass field from boxes of every shape and size were stacked." The supplies were hastily deposited into the field adjacent to Avenue C. Soon the field -- about two football fields long -- was stacked with piles of plywood about ten feet high.
He later wrote, "As for the tent city I spoke of, I may have used the word tent too loosely. As I remember the structures had plywood sides that came up four feet from the ground level and were framed in with two by fours for the rest of the structure. A canvas was placed over the structure to complete the buildings. In the sleeping quarters there was a potbelly stove that vented up through the top of the structure. I heated a lot of shaving water in my helmet through the hole in the top of that stoves. As far as the size of the quarters, I would think they were 12 man. All structures were connected together by two by four side walks, like they had in the old American West."
These "duck walks" that connected the tents were essential in Kunsan's rainy season and the clay mud made walking very difficult. They were everywhere in place of sidewalks.
Arthur Aseltine wrote, "I arrived at K-8 in the fall of 1951. Specifically, it was in September of 1951. During the entire time of my duty there the entire 808th EAB was not located anywhere near the runway. Indeed, I only saw the runway when I left Korea for more than one R & R. in Japan."
To the east of the "tent city" there were mounds of plywood to continue the construction of facilities on the base. He added, "Moreover, when I arrived, there were huge stacks of Philippine mahogany plywood which I understood was used to cover the walls of the BOQ. ... In any event, suffice it to say that we were far enough from the runways that the noise of bombers taking off did not bother us." The entire 808th EAB was housed in the area. However, when the 809th EAB arrived, they were located on the south side of the runway in their own area.
 Existing BOQ Quarters
August 1951: By August 1951, construction had progressed to the point that the Air Force assigned the 3rd Bombardment Wing to Kunsan. The 3rd BW moved to the base on August 22, 1951, as Kunsan's first assigned aircraft wing. According to The U.S. Air Force in Korea (p397), "In southwestern Korea, at the new Kunsan Airfield (K-8), the aviation engineers completed 5,000 feet of asphalt runway in mid-July, and this and other airfield facilities permitted the 3rd Bombardment Wing to establish itself there on 22 August." (NOTE: The original 5,000 asphalt runway was upgraded to a 6300ft concrete runway after the 809th EAB arrived.)
During this time the base had three types of enlisted billets. The quonset huts
were rounded corrugated buildings; the Jamesway huts were corrugated iron sides
with a pitched roof; and tents which were used for temporary quarters if there
was no room in the permanent structures. The Jamesway huts or "tropical shell"
kits were basically precut plywood prefabricated in Japan. Korean contractors
erected these "Jamesway" huts. The huts were basically an open frame with
plywood sides and top. The roof was covered with corrugated iron sheeting for
water protection. Sandbags were stacked on the corrugated iron roof to keep it
from flying off in high winds. Quonset huts were not as common as the
"tropical shells" on the base.
October 1951: The 808th had built the bulk of the runway when the 809th arrived. In fact, the 3rd Bomb Wing was already flying from the runway. When the 809th EAB arrived in October 1951, only the 808th was there and the 809th pitched in to help extend the east end of the runway into the rice fields. The 3rd Bomb Wing was already flying night missions from the concrete runway. The PSP was still being laid. Local indigenous labor was used for much of the heavy manual labor tasks. Kunsan AB: 1952 (Click on map to enlarge) |
Taxiways and parking pads were Pierced Steel Plating (PSP). A History of Air Force Civil Engineers states, "In the hectic early months of the war, engineers used pierced steel planking (PSP), a World War II innovation, as the primary expedient runway surfacing material. The urgent need for airfields and the limited construction capabilities of the SCARWAF units in Korea resulted in a tremendous requirement for PSP. Nearly 30 million square feet were used on airfields throughout the war." The turnoffs appeared to have been "marsden matting" (heavier steel version of the PSP).
PSP was used everywhere -- and even today PSP is being removed from areas under construction. Jim Heath remarked that in 1951 everything was mud before the installation of the PSP. However, even with the installation of the PSP, there were problems. If an aircraft made its turn to large and went off the PSP parking pad area, it would sink into the mud and have to be pulled out with tugs and cranes.
In Air Power, The Decisive Force in Korea (p235) it states, "Another engineering headache brought on by the use of jet aircraft was the considerable difficulty experienced with jet-blast erosion of the base under runway surfaces of pierced-steel plank landing mat. When the subsurface was affected, continued usage, which was sometimes unavoidable, resulted in uneven foundations, rutting and buckling of the planks, shearing of the plank bayonets, and a surface too rough for satisfactory operations. Many types of materials and methods were tried with varying success in an attempt to eliminate jet-blast erosion. The most successful remedy was a one-half inch asphalt pavement under the pierce steel planking." (NOTE: This was not a major problem at Kunsan until the 474th FBG F-84s and the Marine VMF(N)-513 F3D-2s came to town. The F3D-2 were the worst as their jets were cantilevered down and literally burned a trail in the tar. The taxiways became "tar pits". There are reports of angry Marines in the F3D-2s from Pyongtaek in 1953 intentionally increasing the engine rotation to do this because of their perceived unfair treatment from the USAF at K-8.)
(NOTE 1: Ron Stout, former VMF-513 RO, stated that "marsden matting" was heavier than PSP and used for the turnoffs at K-8. We have observed this same heavy gauge PSP in the 1950s as abandoned scrap around Pearl Harbor. However, we have not seen it at Kunsan. Though the concrete pads and taxiways for the VMF-513 were destroyed in 1965 by the 6175th CES, some PSP remained buried. In 2000 for the Foal Eagle Exercises, the 8th CES excavated the former VMF-513 area for use as a tent city. A lot of PSP was removed at that time. The PSP material removed resembled the PSP used during the Vietnam era -- not the heavier guage material that Ron Stout mentioned.)
(NOTE 2: We have been corrected by Tim Taylor that term "Marsden matting" is incorrect. He stated that "Marston matting" is named for the legendary B/Gen Marvin "Muktuk" Marston who first came up with it prior to WWII. In June 1942, Major Marston, empowered by the Governor of Alaska, built a native army of 3,500 men. Marston, an Arctic veteran who had earned his nickname by consuming enormous quantities of muktuk, or whale blubber. However, Kodiak Tour stated, "According to a note on page 90 of the book The Forgotten War Volume Four by Stan Cohen, Marston matting is named for the town in North Carolina in which the product was manufactured. According to Alaska Geographic Vol 22, No 4, p12, it was first tried out near Marston NC in November 1941. Each section weighed a bit more than 66 pounds and was 10 feet by 15 inches." These are just interesting sidenotes as this material spanned WWII through the Vietnam era as the universal building material. We make this note as a lot of folks from the Korean War era continue to mistakenly refer to this material as "Marsden matting" -- though it appears that the term was PSP (pierced steel planking) was popular by the Korean War.)
(NOTE 3: There were two types of PSP landing mats: M8 landing mat (PSP - 15"x11'10") and T11 landing mat (channel - 26"x12'). VSTOL AND POWER PROJECTION states, "During World War II, American combat aviation used temporary runways constructed of "Marston mat." One section of steel mat was 10 feet by 15 inches and weighed 66.2 pounds. Holes punched into each of the three channels reduced weight by 17.5 percent, controlled dust, and allowed drainage. In Southeast Asia, the mat was known as pierced steel planking. Richard K. Smith, "Marston Mat," Air Force Magazine, April 1989, 84-88. Recent advances in high strength composite materials could conceivably reduce weight even more. Reversible mat with a woodland camouflage paint scheme on one side an a desert scheme on the other could be interchangeably mixed and matched to provide excellent concealment for any location.")
In Taking Command by John Moench (p115), it states, "To drain away water, the construction personnel of the 808th Engineer Aviation Battalion built French drains across the planned runway area which consisted largely of virtual quicksand of the paddy area -- a base so fluid that a weight at one site would cause the surface to rise at some other location. During this work, laborers could easily sink waist deep in the paddy ooze. To overcome this situation, in addition to drainage and removal of the unstable materials, a massive quantity of fill was required. Fortunately, there were above sea-level hill resources nearby to include conglomerate and sand. But access to these sources of fill required the movement of large numbers of Korean graves." Borrow pit (Quarry) (1951) (Click on photo to enlarge) (Historical Research Agency) The book continued, "While it was true that the Kunsan Air Base site was that of an early Japanese airfield, that airfield was unimproved and very limited. Thus, to accommodate the current combat aircraft, a hard surface, extended runway was necessary. How it was determined that the first runway would be constructed on a NE/SW axis has been lost in history." (NOTE: If you look at the usable surface of the old island, you see they did the only logical thing by rotating the runway slightly to give them room for the original 5,000 foot asphalt -- that was upgraded into a 6,300 foot concrete runway and later extended to 9,000 feet.) The U.S. Air Force in Korea (pp396-397) states, "Throughout 1951 all engineer aviation units were constantly short of equipment and spare parts, shortages which forced improvisations, often to the detriment of sound construction. During peak operational periods in-commission rates as low as 15 percent were the rule rather than the exception on critical items of equipment. Some part of the low serviceability rates was caused by abuse of complicated machines by unskilled operators, but maintenance also suffered from a shortage of technicians and spare parts. In the spring of 1952 some new engineer equipment began to arrive in Korea, but much of this new equipment had been procured as an emergency action from domestic production in the United States, and there was a great variety in makes and models. The lack of standardization greatly complicated the stockage of innumerable spare parts. In some cases, by the time parts had arrived for one make of machine, it would have been replaced by an entirely different make, causing a never-ending cycle of difficulty."
27th Air Installation Squadron, 27th Fighter-Escort Wing (SAC) (February 1951-February 1952) The 27th AIS was the amongst the first elements of the ADVON tasked with getting the infrastructure for Kunsan AB (K-8) in operation -- including the setting up of the Tent City for the 808th EAB. They were incorporated into the 808th EAB operations as the EAB assisted in the re-building of the infrastructure. With the use of local indigenous laborers, the Jamesway barracks were erected for the incoming 3rd Bomb Wing people.
These were the folks that erected the mess halls and put the electrical systems back into operation. These were the folks that provided the drinking water and the water for showers. When the 3rd Bomb Wing took over the base in Oct 51, the 27th AIS was incorporated into the 3rd Airfield Installation Operations (AIO). Under the 3rd AIO, the remainder of the infrastructure was brought on line. Being a reserve unit, they completed their 12-month tour and returned to CONUS in Feb 1952. (See 27th Airfield Installation Squadron.)
Basically, the first priority was off-loading the LSTs of any materials needed for building Kunsan. The second priority was putting up the Tent City for the incoming troops of the 808th EAB from Okinawa. The third priority was putting the base infrastructure together to support the 3rd Bomb Wing scheduled to arrive after the 808th EAB finished the runway.
27th AIS diverted to Kunsan AB: The 27th FEW was located at Kearney AFB, Nebraska after World War II. It relocated to Bergstrom AFB, TX as part of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). After the outbreak of the Korean hostilities, the 27th FEW was mobilized and deployed to Japan to augment the allied Korean forces. According to the AFHRA, "To help meet the threat of the Soviet-built MiG-15 fighter in Korea, the U.S. Air Force diverted Strategic Air Command's 27th FEW with its F-84 ThunderJets to the Far East instead of sending it as planned to England. In early December 1950 the wing established a rear echelon at Itazuke, Japan, and took its F-84s to Taegu AB, South Korea. Less than two months later, fearful that Chinese ground forces would overrun UN jet bases in South Korea, Fifth Air Force withdrew the 27th to Japan. The wing continued combat from Japan until replaced in late June 1951 by the 136th FBW."
On Jan 4, Seoul fell to the CCF and the forces advanced to Wonju. On Jan 12, Wonju fell, but the Chinese stopped their advance at this point and started falling back in some areas. The Chinese were saving themselves for the Spring campaign, but the allies did not know this. To them is was simply a break in the action. By Jan 17, the situation was appearing desperate. Even the F-86s from the 4th FIG were switched to air-to-ground roles from Taegu like the F-84s of the 27th FEW. On Jan 19, FEAF started a 13-day intensive campaign to interdict the flow of supplies to the enemy frontline troops. By Jan 31, Suwon had been retaken, but the FEAF feared another major Chinese offensive. As a result, the 27th FEW was pulled back to Itazuke AB and rejoined the rear echelon on 1 Feb 51. It remained at Itazuke until relieved by the 136th TFW on 15 Jul 51.
According to the 8th Fighter Wing History, the 27th Air Base Group was assigned between 1 Apr 1951-24 Jun 1951. This is rather strange as the 27th Air Installation Squadron (AIS) arrived at Kunsan on 11 Feb 51 to set up operations -- two months before the 27th ABG arrived. At this time, we believe the 808th EAB who arrived in April 1951 actually provided the overall direction for the setup of the base -- with miscellaneous attached units under their supervision. Perhaps because the 808th EAB was a SCARWAF unit -- Special Category Army With Air Force -- it may have needed an USAF administrative unit to "take control of the base" before it could start work. All of this is supposition, because the presence of the 27th ABG does NOT make sense.
David A. Britt went on, "Our aircraft operated out of Itasuki for a while and then some personnel and aircraft were transferred to Taegu AFB, Korea. One attempt was made to fly remaining troops into Taegu; however, they were shelling the field and we were sent back to Itasuki." For about six months, David's unit was attached to the Itazuke Installation Squadon (Civil Engineering).
However, the need for air bases with developed runways in Korea was a prime concern. The F-80 and F-84 jet aircraft had insuffient fuel capacity to sustain combat operations for long from bases in Japan. (NOTE: It would be many months before they developed the "Misawa tanks" for the F-84 which extended the range of the aircraft.) In addition, jet aircraft required developed runways to operate from. For this reason, in the early days of the Korean War, the FEAF was forced to convert all the jet aircraft unit BACK to prop-driven F-51 Mustangs with F-51s shipped over from ANG units. This was the first "reverse conversion" in the USAF history. Taegu was used as a forward base for jet aircraft, but it had a tendency to rip up tires -- and at times landing gears -- on the PSP runway. Concrete runways in Korea were a major priority.
The development of a runway at Kunsan AB (K-8) became a major priority in 1950. Fifth Air Force had taken over Kunsan AB in October 1950 and immediately started plans for constructing a concrete runway there. However, the first priority was putting the base infrastructure in place. Though much was previously done by the Occupation forces (3rd Btn, 63rd Inf Reg), most of the buildings with any metal -- such as quonset hut structures or hangars -- were stolen. Only the masonry or wood structures remained. For the 5AF the first priority was setting up the base.
By the time the 27th Installation Squadron touched down at Kunsan AB (K-8), Kunsan Harbor had been cleared of North Korean mines and the Army Quartermaster in Pusan had moved a tugboat up to open up the operations of Kunsan Harbor. LST filled with supplies were the first ships to land. Later cargo ships -- defueled to allow for the shallow draft of Kunsan harbor -- would be utilized. The first elements of the 14th Transport Co. would soon follow. Upon arrival at Kunsan, the 27th Installation Squadron immediately started off-loading materials from LSTs loaded with plywood and equipment for construction.
The groups at Kunsan were basically a hodge-podge of "advance parties" or small units split away from their main units to support this mission. Basically, the first priority was off-loading the LSTs of any materials needed for building Kunsan. The second priority was putting up the Tent City for the incoming troops of the 808th EAB from Okinawa. The third priority was putting the base infrastructure together to support the 3rd Bomb Wing scheduled to arrive after the 808th EAB finished the runway.
The 27th Installation Squadron (AIS) arrived at Kunsan on 11 Feb 51 and started immediately to construct the tent city required to house the new personnel. The 808th EAB would arrive in April 1951 to start construction on the original east-west runway. When they first arrived it appears the Tent City was still not complete. They bedded down initially next to the original east-west runway that was being built. By June 1951, the 808th had relocated to Tent City. However, when the 809th EAB arrived to help the 808th EAB with the construction, they were sent to the south end of the base to live in tents. the 809th left after two months to build another airstrip up north.
The Jamesway buildings were also started as soon as indigenous labor support could be obtained. The prefab units were constructed for the incoming USAF units. The first flying elements of the 3rd Bomb Wing arrived in August 1951.
The 27th AIS would remain at Kunsan until 5 Feb 52 and was credited with a 12-month tour. After the 3rd Bomb Wing (L-NI) arrived in August 1951 to take over the base, the 27th AIS personnel would have been attached to the 3rd Air Installation Operations (AIO). (See 3rd Air Installation Operations.) On 15 July 1951, the 27th FEW was relieved by the 136th FBG at Itazuke AB, Japan and returned to Bergstrom AFB, TX -- leaving the 27th AIS behind. Those 27th AIS personnel at Kunsan remained in place until their 12-month tour had been completed. They departed Korea on 5 Feb 52.
Security Problems at Kunsan AB (K-8): In the local Kunsan area, Communist insurgents were running rampant up to late 1951. The ROK Army did NOT control the countryside. In fact, shortly after the 3rd Bomb Wing arrived in Aug 51, the Communists shelled K-8 from one of the off-shore islands. Not long after this incident, the 3rd Bomb Wing supported the ROK Army in attacking Communist positions near the base.
What had happened was that when the allies broke out of Pusan in Oct 50, the retreating North Koreans were caught in a pincer movement. The allies were pushing up from the south, as well as spreading inland from Inchon and the east coast to retake the northern part of South Korea. The elements of the North Korean 6th Division on the west coast were being chased down by task forces from the 24th Infantry and movement north was blocked. The North Korean 2nd Division on the east coast were in a desperate retreat being chased by task forces from the 35th Infantry. Finally the North Koreans abandoned their vehicles when the roads became clogged.
The decision was made to disperse into the all but impenetrable Chiri-san (Chiri Mountain) area northeast of Kunsan. The NKP 6th Division moved around the eastern side and the NKP 2nd Division moved around the western side of Chiri-san. This almost trackless waste of 750 square miles of 6,000 to 7,000-foot-high forested mountains forms a rough rectangle northwest of Chinju about thirty by twenty-five miles in dimension, with Chinju, Hadong, Namwon, and Hamyang at its four corners. This inaccessible area had long been a hideout for Communist agents and guerrillas in South Korea. Now, as the North Korean forces retreated from southwest Korea, many enemy stragglers and some organized units with as many as 200 to 400 men went into the Chiri Mountain fastness. There they planned to carry on guerrilla activities.
In Kunsan, the hastily assembled ROK Army units controlled the countryside by day, but the communists controlled it at night. The ROK Army units formed defensive barriers around Kunsan Harbor and Kunsan AB (K-8) as soon as construction of the base began. The standing order was for the ROK Army guards to summarily execute any individuals found in an "unauthorized area." Summary executions were commonplace -- though not normally witnessed by Americans. What made this unfortunate is that the large percentage of the Korean populace in Kunsan was starving and many would attempt to sneak onto the base simply to steal food to survive. When these starving people were caught, the ROK did not differentiated between them, the "slickey boy" thieves and Communist insurgents.
When the 27th Installation squadron first arrived at K-8, the situation appeared desperate for the allied forces. In Dec 50, the Chinese had launched a massive surprise attack on the allies. MacArthur's promise to have the troops home by Christmas exploded in his face. The US forces were fighting their way out of North Korea. By Dec 24, the X Corps had been evacuated from Hungnam Harbor on the east coast and the Eighth Army had pulled back below the 38th Parallel to form a defensive line.
David Britt remembered, "I thought back to the password we used at Kunsan. When someone approached you, you would ask, 'Who goes there?' They had better answer, 'Tea Kettle' and you would reply, 'Coffee Pot'."
On 1 Jan a million CCF and North Koreans launched a massive attack and Seoul fell on 4 Jan and Wonju fell on 12 Jan. With the loss of Kimpo AB, the need for another base on the Korean peninsula became a top priority. All priority was given to the Kunsan project to open up the base. The Reserve Engineering Aviation Battalions were activated and notified of shipment overseas. However, it would not be until April when the advance units of the 808th EAB arrived. Pending there arrival, the 27th Installation Squadron was tasked with restoring the infrastructure to Kunsan AB. Materials were shipped in from Japan via LSTs to support this effort. The railway systems were still not considered safe.
Suddenly in January the Chinese stopped their advance and started falling back in some areas to recuperate for the Spring campaign. The allies launched a massive counterattack. By Jan 31, Suwon had been retaken, but the FEAF feared another major Chinese offensive. As a result, the forward echelon of the 27th FEW was pulled back to Itazuke AB. However, the elements from the 27th Installation Squadron remained at Kunsan until the 27th FEW was relieved by the 136th TFW on 15 Jul 51. The 27th Installation Squadron then rejoined their unit and returned to Bergstrom.
NOTE: The photos below are of the base (Camp Hillenmeyer) as the 3rd Battalion, 63rd Infantry Regiment, 6th ID left it. Notice the lines of metal quonset huts. However, when David arrived at K-8, the base had been picked clean except for the dependent houses on the north end of base.  Aerial view of Camp Hillenmeyer Main Base (Courtesy Robert Grenig) Aerial view of Camp Hillenmeyer Main Base (Courtesy Robert Grenig) Aerial view of Dependent Area (Courtesy Robert Grenig)
27th Installation Squadron Arrival at Kunsan (K-8): David A. Britt went on, "Shortly after, they loaded us up again and we headed across the Sea Of Japan. I was in this group. The aircraft began to descend and we kept waiting to see something. When the aircraft came to a complete stop all we could see was grass."
When the unit arrived, the runway had not been built as yet. The 808th Engineering Aviation Battalion had arrived in April 1951 and were in work doing the initial excavation. His seeing only "grass" confirms that he landed on the old sod landing strip used by the Japanese. It was 2800 feet long and listed as an "emergency landing strip."
He went continued, "As we disembarked from the aircraft we saw three buildings standing along in the grass. There were no windows, doors or roofs on any of the three buildings. Looking around we could see no building or people of any kind around the area. An officer in a Jeep with other vehicles said, "Welcome to Korea, let's get the aircraft downloaded. The duffel bags were all stacked in the three building shells and tarps were tied over as roofs. We had nothing, we ate canned food and I slept on some of the duffel bags that night." David later commented, "As for the three buildings I spoke of, as I remember they were side by side all shaped the same and were about 15' by 30' masonry."
Materials from Kunsan Harbor: The 14th Transport Co. had already opened up the operations at Kunsan Harbor. (See 14th Transport Co..) Materials for construction on the base were being shipped in from Japan, as well as supplies for the growing refugee population at Kunsan. North Koreans with nowhere else to go were herded into refugee camps in Kunsan which were nothing more than warehouses. Rations of a small amount of charcoal and rice were distributed, but it was barely enough to survive. Starvation, pestilence and abject poverty were everywhere. This was not simply the ravages of war, this was the condition of Kunsan dating back to the Occupation days -- only now with the influx of refugees, the horrific conditions were multiplied in scope.
David continued, "The next day we began building a tent city which would become known as Kunsan AFB, Korea. I drove one of the six-bys and transport supplies to construct the tent city. We went to a nearby port, back and forth for days. You would back down into an LST boat where Korean men would load your truck. You would then head for the base. Just after leaving the port the road ran through a rather long and crooked tunnel. Many of our men lost their cargo in that tunnel." The Wolmyong tunnel (Taebong Tunnel) still exists today, but is blocked for pedestrian traffic only. This was the area where the North Korean refugees were clustered together.
 Taebong Tunnel (1947) (Poor Quality Reproduction). To the right is Taebong Tunnel. To the left is the Temple which faced a large open area The tunnel and temple were about two blocks from the loading point for the trucks at Kunsan Harbor. (Courtesy James Wilt)   | Taebong Tunnel (2000) -- Closed to vehicular traffic. The walkway leading up to Wolmyong Park are above the tunnel. In the Korean War, this was the prime road leading to Kunsan AB from the dock area. The picture to the left is of the Buddhist temple that now exists on the area that North Korean refugees started building their "village." (Click on photo to enlarge) |
Wolmyong tunnel (Taebong Tunnel) still exists today under the Wolmyong Park in Kunsan City. Until the early-70s, it was still used for vehicular traffic and the main street ran east-west through the city. Today the tunnel is used only for pedestrian traffic and the main street runs north-south. If connects the park to the fresh fish market along the waterfront.
David continued, "The Koreans would lay a child in the road just around the tunnel bend. The natural reaction was to stop, and many did. While you were catching your breath, your truck would rock twice and when you looked through your rear window you had an empty truck. There was nothing to do but turn around and go back to get another truck load. At first they placed shotgun guards on each truck, that took up to much manpower so they told us not to stop in the tunnel for anything. They said these children are well trained and you couldn't run over them if you tried. I was caught in two of these theft attempts. I didn't stop but ! ! my heart was beating faster than it ever had."
 Road to Kunsan (1952)
"I carried several truck loads of fuel to the base fuel dump. It was always interesting to me to see the ground go out in waves as one of the drums would hit the ground." The original POL dump was on the north end of base and an above ground tank was built by the 808th EAB for the aircraft fuel. The effect of "waves" was because the underlayer of much of Kunsan AB was simply mud and the land was unstable.
The base had been built up on reclaimed land from the Yellow Sea tidal flats. Kunsan AB was an island originally but much of the land on the base was reclaimed land from the mud flats. The original Japanese sod runway was built on the island part of Kunsan AB, but other portions of the base were in the "filled in" areas. According to The U.S. Air Force in Korea by Robert Futrell (p395), "Construction troops at Kunsan Airfield encountered Korea's worst drainage problems. The site was only a little way inland from the mud flats bordering the Yellow Sea, and the local soil was a grayish-blue clay which had long been inundated for rice culture." Because the land was unstable, massive amounts of rock and concrete were required to stabilize the runway and aircraft parking areas. As soon as the 808th EAB arrived, they opened up a stone quarry (borrow pit) north of the base.
Borrow pit (Quarry) (1951) (Click on photo to enlarge) (Historical Research Agency)
When the 3rd Bomb Wing took command of the base, the 27th AIS personnel fell under the 3rd Airfield Installation Operations (AIO) -- just as it had been absorbed by the 808th EAB. Basically there was no real change in the work as there was just too much to do and still not enough people to do it. (See 3rd Air Installation Operations.)
Building of the Base: In Air Power, The Decisive Force in Korea (p232), it states, "All base-construction projects involved far more than building runways and their appurtenances. Since a jet air wing in combat could consume as much as 125,000 gallons of fuel each day, two detachments of the 931st Engineers supervised Korean laborers in the erection of tanks to hold a five days' supply of jet fuel at each of the major jet bases. ... In the early days at all Korean airfields, Air Force troops lived and worked in winterized tents, but more permanent buildings gradually replaced the tents. At Taegu air installations personnel contracted with Korean builders for stucco buildings. The initial cost was low, but these oriental structures rapidly deteriorated and required heavy maintenance costs. For this reason, steel quonset huts and "tropical shell" kits prefabricated in Japan were extensively used in Korea, both for housing and working quarters. Most structures were put up by Korean laborers or contractors under the supervision of base air installations personnel."
 Kunsan AB (1952) Click on map to enlarge (Handdrawn map by Kalani O'Sullivan)
Roads: The base roads followed the same layout as laid down by the Occupation forces. Some roads were improved such as the road to the bomb dump on the south end of the base. Not much work was done in this area. The road configuration is basically the same as it is today -- except that Avenue B has been cut in places due to building of the Base Exchange and Dormitories.
Electrical: One of the first tasks would have been to restore electrical power to K-8. A coal-fueled steam-turbine generator had been installed in Kunsan City in 1945 -- in the same location as the present day KEPCO plant along the Kumgang River. The power lines to K-8 had been strung to all the facilities in the Occupation days, but the primary electrical energy was from the hydroelectric plants in North Korea. The Kunsan plant was simply a backup source.
After the Korean War outbreak, the generator in Kunsan was the only commercial electrical source. The electricity was unreliable and amperage weak. Some people complained of the lights being so dim one could not read at night -- and many times there was no electricity at all. Almost everyone reported using candles at one time or other.
After electrical power from the Kunsan electric plant had been restored, the task of wiring up the newly erected Jamesway huts and facilities started. Again the indigenous labor was used. Some commented on how the Korean linemen climbed the electrical poles using a blocks of wood with nails in it tied to their feet and a rope around the waist, while Americans were rigged out with climbers' spikes and leather belts. The 808th EAB electrical personnel were also assigned to assist in wiring up the base and performing other tasks to get the base ready for the 3rd Bomb Wing.
Auxiliary Power units were not brought in until after the 27th AIS had departed. In 1952-1953, the base added an auxiliary power substation equipped with four 100KW generators to provide electricity to the base (excluding airfield lighting) when the Kunsan City plant would go off line. This substation was located on the north end of base near the POL storage area. The location is still currently a power substation for off-base power.
Jamesway Prefab Buildings Construction: The 27th Installation Squadron started work constructing prefab Jamesway hootches for the 3rd Bomb Wing units coming in -- mainly through the use of indigenous Korean labor.
The Jamesway buildings were constructed over a concrete slab. These buildings were used mainly by the 3rd Bomb Wing personnel. The sides of the buildings were exterior plywood and then covered with corrugated iron sheets and slats. The roof was plywood topped with corrugated iron sheets. The sheets had to be weighted down with sandbags to keep them from flying away in high wind conditions. The entrance was one set of double doors. In winter, the building was heated by oil heaters at the ends fed by fuel drums on wooden stands outside. In the summer, the ventilation was very bad. Personnel would sleep on metal frame cots with air mattresses covered with mosquito netting.

James F. Farr of Farmington, Connecticut with his house boy in 1952
in front of Jamesway huts in the Airmen Billeting area. (Courtesy James Farr)
(Click on the image to enlarge)
Air Force personnel who could not be accommodated in the Jamesway huts were temporarily billeted in 12-man tents erected within the Airmen Billeting area. In the winter of 1951-1952 some of these tents burned down due to the oil heater malfunctions.
The old Occupation forces dependent housing became the Bachelor Officer Quarters (BOQ) for the 3rd BW. All officers (all services) were billeted in the BOQ area to the north end of the base. The holes in the floor of these old units and inoperative plumbing were low on the priorities list in early 1951. There was too much else to do. By mid-1952, most BOQ units had running water, but the flooring still hadn't been repaired. Additional plywood Jamesway huts were built later on in 1952 for the officers of the VMF(N)-513 and 474th FBW when these units arrived. BOQ billeting 1952 This was the 1947 Dependent housing that remained on the base. Click on photo to enlarge (Courtesy Hans Petermann)
After the 27th AIS left, housing became critical as the 474th FBG and the Marine VMF(N)-513 squadron were stationed at the base. Some USAF personnel had to be housed in quonset huts or in 12-man tents until space became available. The enlisted Marines were billeted separately from the USAF and Army.
 Korean Laborer at K-8 near the 808th EAB Tent City (1951) (Courtesy Al Gould)
808th EAB Tent City Construction: The Army units were billeted in the "Tent City." The 808th EAB tent city was constructed away from the runway -- above the USAF hootches -- in what is now the Kunsan AB Golf course. During the days of the Occupation forces (3rd Battalion, 63rd Infantry Regiment), the area was a low-lying area with only a few buildings situated on the edge of the rice fields that surrounded the base (Camp Hillenmeyer). During the monsoon season, a pond formed on the western edge from the runoff. Photos of the tent city during the Korean War indicates the area had been built up prior to construction of the tent city. Because of the lack of heavy equipment such as graders in the initial days of the Korean War -- a shortage that existed throughout the Korean theater -- the area was almost certainly leveled through the use of coolie-laborers carrying sand in A-frame carriers (chige) on their backs. The use of coolie labor to level areas was not unusual as the original Japanese runway was built the same way. After the area had been filled and graded, the unit relocated to this area.
David Britts wrote, "The tent city grew out of that grass field from boxes of every shape and size were stacked." The supplies were hastily deposited into the field adjacent to Avenue C. Soon the field -- about two football fields long -- was stacked with piles of plywood about ten feet high.
He later wrote, "As for the tent city I spoke of, I may have used the word tent too loosely. As I remember the structures had plywood sides that came up four feet from the ground level and were framed in with two by fours for the rest of the structure. A canvas was placed over the structure to complete the buildings. In the sleeping quarters there was a potbelly stove that vented up through the top of the structure. I heated a lot of shaving water in my helmet through the hole in the top of that stoves. As far as the size of the quarters, I would think they were 12 man. All structures were connected together by two by four side walks, like they had in the old American West."
These "duck walks" that connected the tents were essential in Kunsan's rainy season and the clay mud made walking very difficult. They were everywhere in place of sidewalks.
Arthur Aseltine (right) in front of Supply, 808th EAB (Courtesy Arthur Aseltine) Click on image to enlarge
He went on, "The mess hall had the stainless steel field stoves. We had large pots of hot water to wash our mess kits in. Once when we wanted to live high on the hog, we took riot shot guns and went out into the fields around the base and shot pheasants. That was a treat even though I did not shoot any. Not long after we got the city set up we had Korean girls working in the mess tent." (NOTE: The pheasants still abound in the area. However, because special licenses are required for shotguns and plus the pheasant hunting season in winter only, the pheasants are still plentiful.)
He went on, " There was an interesting gauge of our progress that developed just outside of the base. A momason and her girls began building a large house. They had their house completed and were in business well before we got the base operationally ready."
Indigenous Labor Contract Office: Most certainly, one of the first actions was to start an "Indigenous Labor Contract Office" to hire interpreters and other semi-skilled workers to assist on the base. As was mentioned before, the steel quonset huts and "tropical shell" kits (Jamesway huts) were prefabricated in Japan and put up by Korean laborers or contractors under the supervision of base air installations personnel. However, the lack of knowledge of American construction methods and standards did lead to problems. For example, the idea of interior drywall was foreign to Koreans carpenters.
Payment of contractors could be complex as the won had been inflated so much that payment for a small project would require duffle bags full of the money. The won was almost worthless.
Highly skilled Korean labor was virtually unknown in Kunsan. The problem dated back to the Japanese occupation when the Japanese reserved all managerial or technical jobs for ethnic Japanese. When these Japanese managers, engineers, draftsmen and technicians were repatriated after WWII, there was no one left in Korea to fill the void. It was stated before, "Carpenters, electricians, plumbers, mechanics, painters, typists and others were available in various stages of skill, but the majority of the labor supply was in the "pick and shovel" class."
The most important native hire were the interpreters. These were usually individuals trained in English by the Christian missionaries. Every headquarters unit had an interpreter/typist. An unfortunate side note was that the women employed as interpreters were considered "prostitutes" by the Korean populace for working closely with the Americans. Despite this hurtful gossip, these women remained in their positions simply because their salaries usually fed their entire families -- including extended families. Communication with laborers by Americans for the most part was done using simple Japanese phrases or sign language.
 Kunsan AB (1951-1952) Click on map to enlarge (Handdrawn map by Kalani O'Sullivan) Kunsan AB: Flightline and Tent City (1952) Looking south Click on photo to enlarge (13th Bomb Squadron (LNI) Website)
 Kunsan AB: Flightline (1952) Looking east Click on photo to enlarge (13th Bomb Squadron (LNI) Website)
 Kunsan AB: Officers Quarters (top) (1952) Tent City to lower left Looking north Click on photo to enlarge (13th Bomb Squadron (LNI) Website)
Water Supply: David remarked, "I was assigned water purification because I was a plumber. I had already built all the straddle trenches we needed. I fired up the water purification plant. After a short period of time Korean children came to get jobs on base. I hired a boy to help operate the plant. He took my clothing home at night and his grandmother washed and ironed them. I got back most of the clothes."
He later wrote, "There was an old cement water tank that was left on a hill on base property. We tried to restore it; however it was laced with some chemicals and with all the sandblasting we could not salvage it." He later wrote about an army unit that shot up a rubber water storage unit indicating that there was no water tower at the time. The water supply was stored in rubber bladders. (NOTE: The "cement water tank...on a hill" is an unknown as the 508th Utility Company during the Occupation years used a pond on the north side of the BOQ area as a water source and had their water purification plant set up there. Later on in the war, water was pumped from Okku Reservoir to the base to a de-sedimentation (Bldg 100) atop what was known as "Water Point" in 1953 -- on what is now "Gunsmoke Hill." The water purification plant was relocated to the hill.)
Aerial view (20 Sep 52) (Courtesy Wes Jacobson) -- (Click on photo to enlarge) The pond can be seen between the hill on the shoreline to the left and the BOQ housing area closest to foreground (1947 Dependent area).
Unfortunate Incidents: Dave continued, "After the aircraft arrived we had two unpleasant situations occur. There was always Korean men cutting the grass that grew just outside the base perimeter. One young man, probably in his late teens, walked over to look at one of the aircraft. The security police arrested the young man and turned him over to the ROK Army troops who had a small detachment on the corner of the base. The young man was beyond a doubt mental. He died that night during interrogation." It should be noted that the Korean Army guards were under orders to execute anyone caught in a restricted area. Summary executions on the flightline were common. However, one must remember that the Communists were still roaming free outside the perimeter of the base. In fact, shortly after the 3rd Bomb Wing arrived, the Communists actually shelled the base from an off-shore island.
He went on, "The other incident was when an American troop was killed by some of the Koreans for raping a Korean girl. His body was found in a barn some distance from the base. Many army organizations were visitors to Kunsan most of the time. They would stand down there before returning to the front. The young man who was killed was from one of these groups."
The units David speaks of were from the early 1951 time frame. At that time, the front lines were in flux with the MLR (Main Line of Resistance) shifting daily. After the lines stabilized in 1952, there were not many visits from front-line units to Kunsan.
He went on, "The USAF had a rather large hospital system built at Kunsan. This drew lots of different units to become our guests. One night an Army unit shoot up our rubber water tank. They were kicked out the next morning." The hospital area was the 3rd Hospital Group. The large size was because of the fear that Seoul would be overrun again by the Chinese and the base became a fall-back hospital facility for the peninsula. It was well-equipped with the best equipment and large wards. (See the 3rd Medical Group.)
Memorable Incidents: He added, "I had the pleasure of meeting the Korean President at Kunsan. He and the Area Commander came to the base one day in a jeep. Both gentleman walked around and shook hands with many of us." (NOTE: The President was Syngman Rhee (Yi Syng-Man) who would prove to be a thorn in America's side later on. Even today, the only reason South Korea is still technically at war with North Korea is because Syngman Rhee refused to sign the Armistice Agreement. It was signed by the Commander of the UN forces -- who happened to the U.S. forces commander -- and the Chinese "volunteer" army and North Korea.)
27th FEW Returns to U.S. -- 27th AIS Remains in Korea: The two elements -- the forward echelon at Taegu (K-2) and the rear echelon at Itazuke -- regrouped and remained at Itazuke AB from 1 Feb 51 - 31 Jul 51. Its relief was the 136th FBW which was activated in Jun 51. It departed Langley AFB, VA in Jul 51 and arrived in Itazuke AB, Japan. The 27th FEW was relieved by the 136th FBW at Itazuke (APO 929) and Taegu (APO 970) and then the 27th FEW rotated back to Bergstrom AFB, TX.
However, they left the 27th Air Installation Squadron in place at Kunsan until their normal 12-month rotation date. They departed Korea on 5 Feb 52 -- six months after the 3rd Bomb Wing (L-NI) had taken over the base. David stated, "I left Korea and Japan and flew back to Texas. I remained with the Wing until my discharge in 1953. I went back home to my home state and joined the railroad. In 1962 that railroad went bankrupt and I returned to the Air Force where I completed 30 years service and retired as a CMSgt. I would like to tell you that I have many memories of Korea, unfortunately in my 70th year the lights are growing faint." Humorously, he later wrote, "My wife reminded me that my mother's records had some of my records from the 27th FEW days. I went up into the attic and much to my surprise I found a Records Check printout. That printout states that we entered Korea 11 Feb. 1951 and departed 05 Feb 1952, Tour-length 012. That record also said the official name of our unit was the 27th Air Installation SQ." Our thanks to Mrs. Britt whose memory is still bright.
808th EAB Headquarters & Service Company:
In Oct 2006, Bruce B. Satra of Vernal, Utah was a former SSgt with H&S Co. He wrote about being amongst the first elements to arrive at Kunsan. His job was as a machinist. He added, "Oh yeah, another misfit. My MOS was communications, 740, intercept operator. Well, had a little machine shop training in high school so guess I was one of the lucky ones."
Headquarters and Service (H&S) Company was an orphan in the hierarchy of a battalion. It generally contained all the clerk typists, mechanics, technicians, though some of these specialties were also found in the line companies as well. Traditionally, the people of the H&S companies did not identify with the company, but rather with their specialty or job. He was there "from about March, 1951 to almost exactly one year later." He added in Sep 2007, "There are parts of the story that are right on, parts that I remember differently, but I was in the original group landing there (not by air, by sea) and most of the narrative is by men arriving 6 months later---a world of change in 6 months."
Machine Shop Bruce arrived in Okinawa in the early spring of 1950 and didn't really have time to settle in before getting order to Korea. At that time, the 808th was building runway expansion for the B-36 Peacemakers. Bruce wrote about his shop after his arrival at Kunsan (K-8), "I had the Heavy Machine Shop Truck ( the whole sum and substance of our machine shop services in the 808th Engineering Aviation Battalion.) ... We worked on the airbase on Okinawa together with the 802nd EAB but never mixed with them. Some rivalry, jealousy I think---totally unfounded. Then when we went into Korea we were to some extent intermixed -- the 802nd machine shop trucks (a Medium machine shop truck and a Light mach. shop truck) were parked next to mine and I was joined by Sgt. "Ma" Sims, an older Staff Sgt. from the 802nd, and another Staff Sgt. whose name slips my mind right now, both of them machinists from the 802nd. We got along very well, I liked them very much.
Then later they shipped out and I became NCOIC of that section having several newer machinists join us." Later he wrote, "In Korea we had no doctor in our outfit---learned later there was a great shortage of doctors in the army then. So for sick call we had to go over to the 802nd by ambulance, I'd guess two miles tops, across the runway area." (SITE NOTE: The 802nd EAB were sent to Suwon AB (K-13) to build the runway there from 1951-1953. By Jan 31, Suwon had been retaken, but the FEAF feared another major Chinese offensive. They would remain at Kunsan until after the Chinese Spring Offensive was thwarted.)
"I never heard of the 809th. They speak of NCO clubs, etc---we had nothing like that, slept on the ground in our tents the first 6 months or so, then were treated to those marvelous folding cots---now being up off the ground we froze on both sides." (SITE NOTE: The 809th EAB arrived later in Oct 1951 when most of the work had been done and in fact the 3rd BW started flying from the base. They stayed only a short time and then some of the unit moved on to Chunch'on (Camp Page) in Dec 52 to build the runway there for the FACs -- with the remainder of the unit leaving in Apr 1952.)
Bruce related a humorous incident dealing with loose accountability in a war zone. He stated, "We were always short of equipment and vehicles, everything was old and worn out. We got a new officer once when we were in Kunsan, didn't have a spare jeep or other vehicle for him and as an officer he was entitled to his own vehicle. He was very well liked and after he'd been with us a short time one of the mechanics came to me and asked if he could have my spare generator engine. My generator was an air force issue type, much more sophisticated than our usual simple army generators and used a jeep engine for power (ours used Ford four cyl . industrial engines)--I had a spare brand new Jeep engine in a crate, as reserve for my 10 kilowatt generator. I asked what he needed it for and he said a few of the guys were going to build a Jeep for this new officer--one of them knew the NCOIC of the wrecking yard down at Pusan and could get a Jeep chassis from him and the sheet metal body parts needed, in the end we had everything except for a steering wheel. One of the fellows on leave to Tokyo brought back a Nissan steering wheel, it fit perfectly.
Our painting shack painted the Jeep and stencilled the proper unit numbers etc. on the front bumpers, gave it a serial number--meaningless-but necessary, and presented it to the lucky officer. He had the best Jeep in the outfit."
"A little time went by and one day a C-47 landed with a party from the Inspector Generals' office in Tokyo, there for an un- announced inspection and inventory check. These types loved to find something missing or out of order, it makes their day. What they don't normally find is something extra that can't be accounted for, and here they found a Jeep which we weren't showing on inventory. Aha !! Must be a stolen one.
They drove themselves nutty trying to locate a unit that had lost a Jeep--no luck there. Then they tried to trace the serial number---absolutely no luck there either. This being before computers it must have called for a lot of paper work and scrambling around. Radio transmissions back and forth to Tokyo. Finally after what seemed ages they departed as they had come, but now totally dejected in defeat. Pure hell for bean counters.
It was well worth the sacrifice of my precious new Jeep engine, no regrets !! I don't think they can court martial me for this after all these years, wot?" (SITE NOTE: This situation brings to mind a similar situation at Kunsan during the Occupation period. A fully operational truck -- a rarity in those years -- was found that was not on the inventory. The resolution then was the officer in charge ordered the truck pushed off the cliff into the Yellow Sea.)
Another story he related was the improvising on the overhaul of an engine. He wrote, "We had no repair parts for anything---no that's not quite right, we had a little of this and that. I remember our 2 yard shovel, it was the biggest power shovel we had and could fill a 4 ton dump truck with one scoop and was the mainstay of our runway construction---it had an 8 cylinder Chrysler industrial engine for power and needed an overhaul. They found a kit for a 6 cylinder engine so fixed the 6 worst cylinders with that and attached a brass plate to the engine stateing that cylinders number such and such were bored oversize by so much, the other two were standard."
Bruce commented, "We had one rock crusher in our outfit and it was crucial of course to the operation, it never gave trouble on Okinawa, at least that I knew of, as I was never asked to repair or make new parts for it then. Several times in Korea I'd have someone bring me a broken part from the rock crusher, to fix the part or make a new one, finally they brought me something beyond my abilities, a fairly large cast iron gear with a broken tooth. It was as I remember about a foot in diameter, at least, big coarse teeth. I said I couldn't cut teeth that coarse and sent him to the welding shop to see if they could build up a tooth, maybe I could then dress it down to work ok.
Then the rock crusher head honcho came to visit me---a decent guy, a staff sergeant. I had two kinds of "customers", either they were very pleased with me or they brought their superior and tried to have my head--the latter if I couldn't do their job, beyond our capabilities."
"In this case I couldn't do the job, it called for a steel foundry to cast the gears if we couldn't get any from the states---and of course we couldn't. We might as well have been on Mars. I explained the situation to the sgt. and he said "too bad the gears are weak, that's a good machine otherwise, it's rated 50 tons per hour (for the size aggregate he was crushing to) and we're getting 100 tons out of it, no sweat." You have to kind of marvel at that remark.
"Next I was visited by a delagation of some of our officers and non- coms concerning the rock crusher problems and they brought with them a local Korean businessman who ran a foundry of sorts in town, he explained that the job was beyond his capabilities too but he could refer us to a larger establishment that might do the job. Apparently they did, because we kept on building airstrip and no one bothered me again.
"He made the remark that I had the largest lathe in Korea, upon seeing my shop. My lathe was a "Smith-Drum" made in the late '30s, a sliding bed gap lathe where the top bed would handle 16 inch diameter work, and when the upper bed was slid over to the right as far as the truck wall would permit, it could swing 30 inches diameter for about 3 feet of length. That says something about the state of manufacturing technology in Korea at the time.
Quality of EAB Worker Force A major setback for the EAB units were that the personnel assigned were usually very poorly trained -- or not at all -- in the specialties they were assigned to. It seemed to be a hodge-podge of individuals thrown together hastily in order to buy time. Morale was very low in all EAB units in the early days of the war. Bruce commented on this situation as he was a radio operator who was pressed into duty as a machinist -- for which the Army had NOT trained him. He stated, "Regarding the poor qualifications of most personell in the 808th----I enlisted in 1948 in what I understood to be Signal Corp communications---thought I'd be at a microphone behind a desk, sort of like a disc jockey---I thought "I can handle that". Turns out what my buddy and I enlisted in was the Army Security Agency---a branch of the National Security Agency. The ASA handles communications intelligence, copies radio traffic all over the world, friend or foe. As regards intelligence work, seems we have no friends. After basic training we went to Camp Gordon, Georgia for our training in Morse Code--18 month school, and the next longest schools in the army were cook and baker, and machinist, each 14 weeks."
I had flunked the aptitude test for Morse Code and the instructer said "I see you're ASA"--I said yes, he then showed me how to pass the test which I did pass. After nearly 18 months training I was up to 22 sending and 20 receiving (required to pass 25 words per minute to graduate) and the instructor told me I could probably pass 25 but it would take a few months (it was a matter of individual abilities, some of our group graduated early on and were retained as instructors, dummies like me could be given more time if needed) and he gave me a choice--I could be graduated as an intermediate speed operator there and then, or stay on---oh boy---I'd hated every minute of it but no way out, here was my chance.
I went by train to Vint Hill Farm Station, in Manasses, West Virginia and on reporting to the C.O. there was asked if I could do anything else, he had a surplus of radio operators.
Seems they had an un authorised small machine shop across the hall and the sergeant who worked in there was being discharged that week.
I told the Major that I had some machine shop experience in High School and he was overjoyed, asked if I'd like to work in that little shop.
I was in Heaven. I was there some months when the Korean War started, exactly one week after it started I was sent to Okinawa where I joined the 808th EAB.
Seems the whole outfit was made up of odds and ends of men like myself who'd been hastily yanked out of assignments where they were considered surplus or improperly assigned. I read years later that the Army thought we'd be into the 3rd World War shortly and were sending people like yours truly overseas as fast as possible before it started.
So, here I was , a radio operator working as an untrained machinist ( I was lucky to be assigned to something I had some knowledge of).
Other men were untrained in their assignment usually. Some like myself had a little experience in their work. So, as you've brought out, we were truly a bunch of cast offs and misfits. Our Esprit de Corps was totally missing---you couldn't get a fight out of any of us by denigrating the 808th---we'd tell you even worse stories!"
Runway Construction Scuttlebutt and War Stories Reflect Attitudes of the Soldiers (1951) Bruce related a good example of war stories and scuttlebutt for the runway construction. He stated, "The officer in charge on the runway operation was an ex-service station owner in civilian life I was told, like all our other officers he had no civil engineering experience. We did have one officer in the 808th with an Civil Engineering Degree--he of course was assigned as a bean counter in Battalion HQ. The officer in charge on the runway work had read somewhere of a technique of mixing asphalt with dirt 50/50 to make the mix go further--and faster--and that it was as strong or nearly so as regular asphalt mix. The idea was to disc or plow up the ground to a shallow depth and mix the asphalt directly into it and roll it with heavy rollers. I'm told they paved the 6000 feet this way, it was a disaster, and they had to tear it up and do it again the right way. I heard there was hell to pay."
This is a good example of scuttlebutt in the Korean War by those not immediately involved in the construction. The facts are not correct. No asphalt layer at a "shallow depth" alone was ever used for the runway. The runways were built using a massive underlayer of rocks and concrete. However, there might be a grain of truth in that the method of paving might have been tried for the taxiways -- not runway -- though we have not heard of this before. This method of mixing concrete and other materials has been used for decades by the forestry service for surfacing paths in National Parks. It might have sounded like a good idea at first for other flightline areas such as the taxiways. However, the taxiways were subject to the same forces as the runway -- a boggy underbelley. The taxiways and parking areas on the reclaimed tidal flat areas were ultimately built with concrete and rock. The only portions covered with PSP were the "solid land" parts of the original island. In 1951, PSP was being used for the parking ramps and taxiways -- with Masden matting (thicker PSP) for the turnoffs. The main parking area for the B-26s and later F-84s were on "solid land." However, areas such as the Marine VMF-513th areas required parking spots of rock and concrete. The ammo dump on the south end of base was on "solid land" of the other original island.
Though the facts of this scuttlebutt may not be all true, this scuttlebutt highlights a problem of soldier unrest during the early days of 1951 as failure after failure in constructing the runway was encountered. With all the things going wrong, the leadership most certainly looked like people who didn't know a thing about construction. Things were NOT going right with the runway construction in 1951 -- and the runway was constantly having to be "redone" because the runway was like jello. After many restarts, the leadership may have looked incompetent in the eyes of their soldiers. To compound the leadership's problems, they were faced with inadequately trained troops, lack of materials and supplies, and constantly broken down equipment without spare parts. But to their credit, the 808th EAB leadership were faced with problems that had never been encountered before by any US Army Combat Engineer unit. The water-logged soil conditions wouldn't drain properly because they were very near sea-level and there was the unknown problem that the original runway was sited on reclaimed tidal flat lands. The truth was that they were just winging it by ear -- improvising as they went along because in the end this was a "learn-as-you-go" project. Kunsan was the first Korean base to attempt to construct a runway under these conditions.
The sad thing in 1951 was that the EAB engineering staff didn't realize the runway was sited on land reclaimed from the mudflats. The underlayer was a muddy bog -- like a pie of jello with a solid crust over it. The Japanese constructed levees between the main land and the islands Then the mudflats behind the levee was then filled in by coolie labor to make rice fields. The main base portion of Kunsan AB was originally one island and the the south end of the base was another island. Where they were building the runway was the old reclaimed tidal flats between the islands. The EAB didn't know this. The runway site was chosen because it was the original Japanese grass airfield. But it was built on the reclaimed tidal mudflat and was originally sod over a 4 inch layer of sand. The area was suitable for light WWII Japanese aircraft, but NOT the heavier USAF bombers and jet aircraft.
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The base was sited on what was originally an island. Two areas were recovered from the tidal flats and connected to the island through the use of dikes. A reservoir separated the two areas. Hermann Lautensach in his 1932 book, Korea: A Geography Based on the Author's Travels and Literature states, "On the foreside of the peninsula where Kunsan lies the rice polders (reclaimed tidal flats) of the Fuji Company have spread out since 1923. Basically they are set up the same as the Yong-ampo polders. Previously there were silty mud flats here as well, with a few pine-covered islands sticking out, some of them connected by (sand)bars (913, 914) By means of mighty dikes, completely covered with stones outside and therefore very steep, which run straight for miles and use the islands as supports, two large polders have been wrested from the tidal flats. They are separated from each other by the largest island and a reservoir. ..."
Though we do not have any knowledge of the quality and qualifications of the 808th Officer EAB corps in 1951, we do have some background knowledge of the 839th, 840th and 841st EAB officers in the construction of the runway at Osan AB in 1952. Those officers in the construction units were from construction or engineering-related backgrounds -- and were extremely competent and resourceful in our opinion as they came up with innovative solutions to problems where there were inadequate materials, equipment or manpower. But in 1951, the bulk of the officers in Kunsan were most likely hastily drafted veterans of WWII from the Reserves -- and hopefully had some Combat Engineer experience. These 808th EAB officers in 1951 were handicapped by not having a central agency in Korea to turn to for decisions and oversee the Korean air base construction effort. Everything was out of kilter. The officers of the 808th EAB in 1951 were most certainly simply winging it -- and making decisions on the fly and just hoping they were right. Unbenownst to them, they were fighting a losing battle with the site location for the original runway -- and their failures coupled with the long hours of work could easily have translated into severe morale problems.
During the initial months of 1951, we believe that the frustration of the workers in having to repeatedly redo the construction of the original runway resulted in significant dissatisfaction on the part of the soldiers -- perhaps leading to violent acts against their superiors. Only after the war settled into a stalemate in 1952 did the conditions of leadership and centralized control take effect throughout all the EAB units in Korea. These units in 1952 also had the benefit of lessons learned the hard way from the 808th EAB in trying to build the first Korean runway from scratch. In 1952, the decision to give up on the original east-west Kunsan runway (now Taxiway Charlie) and build the north-south runway was made. This north-south runway was started in 1952 by the 808th EAB and completed by the 841st EAB in 1953 after the 808th EAB had departed Korea.
According to The U.S. Air Force in Korea (p499), "In May and June 1952, the 417th Engineer Aviation Brigade, the 934th Engineer Aviation Group, and the 366th, 840th, and 841st Engineer Aviation Battalions unloaded in Korea. From its command post at Taegu, the 417th Engineering Aviation Brigade filled a long-standing need for an agency which could supervise the construction of air facilities in the combat zone. The Fifth Air Force's director of installations now ordered construction and specified requirements; the 417th Brigade supervised the actual work and administered the aviation engineer troops." The 934th was tasked for construction of an entirely new jet fighter airfield on the flood plain of the Chinwi-chon River south of Suwon, at the village of Osan-ni."
Inter-service Conflicts and Cooperation To my knowledge no one was with our advance party sent as I remember about two weeks before us, to Kunsan, to set up tents, primarily. I never heard of any Air Force people helping them, but I wasn't there and no one ever told me specifically that A.F. personnel did or did not participate----but having said that, I know personally that later on when I was there, A.F. people were never helpful in any way as to helping us.
Now I'm not saying that in bitterness, I think they had their reasons, one being that they were no doubt under orders to hang onto, and take care of, everything they had in this desperate situation whether it was men or materiel. It was desperate in that we could get no supplies from stateside or Far East Command and apparently the flyboys suffered likewise.
He went on to speak of the rivalry between Air Force and Army -- which should not have existed, but it did. He stated, "...I had to scrounge for any material needed for my machine shop work, and our generators we used to keep batteries charged had little Briggs and Stratton engines--like on a small lawn mower---and they ran continuously. Orders were that when one shift took over from the previous shift they were to check the oil in those little engines since they didn't contain very much anyway, and burnt what was in there pretty fast. Well, orders are meant to be ignored, right? As a result, and since we couldn't get any kind of repair parts from Uncle Sam (somewhere in USA) I went over to the Air Force machine shop when they established one, at K-8, and chatted with the boys there for some time, then asked if they had any old bent prop blades I could scrounge to make my connecting rods for the little battery charger engines, they kindly gave me a blade and I hacked it up and made several new connecting rods for the little engines. I was a popular guy."
"Then I needed another blade after some time and went over to my friends at the air base shop and unfortunately in our conversation they got the idea I might be (ugh) ARMY---what had happened, some time previous to this the Air Force people had kindly offered to wash our fatigues for free---how kind of them. We had no way to wash them, we literally washed out of our helmets then. The Air Force had flown in a complete commercial laundry affair in a large trailer. The native women (if you could find one) had no soap and the few of us that had tried to have laundry done by them soon learned that beating a shirt on a rock in the river, with another rock, did get the dirt out, but the shirt could only stand about one such cleaning. Now, the Air Force personnel had one piece fatigues, which they hated. We had two piece fatigues, which we learned too late, they coveted. None of us wore any sign of rank or unit because the enemy snipers took out the highest ranks first. So after one cleaning the Air Force had two piece fatigue uniforms, much to their satisfaction, and we had (ugh) the one piece jobbies they had formerly endured. What could we say? But they had no desire to help us any more with our laundry and we had no desire to beg them to do so."
"So here I was, obviously an American serviceman, in Air Force fatigues, and it turned out they'd thought I was ONE OF THEM.
Now by a slip of the tongue (I wasn't trying to fool them, I thought they knew I was Army) they realised they'd been had by this damned doggie once, and now he was trying to con them out of another bent prop blade. Well, no luck, and I was made to know I was totally unwelcome there. Too bad, I'd have thought we served the same country?"
"Well, later, after the laundry incident (fascinating info, wot?) an Air Force officer approached one of our officers and asked if we could help with a few men to unload a transport plane that had just landed. Dunno why they couldn't handle the job but as it turned out the freight was heavy stuff. Several of our men who were grader operators had no jobs because their graders had no blades. We couldn't get grader blades (or anything else). We needed our graders obviously to work on the runway project, I think we had four Cat graders and only one was operable. Fairly typical for us. The Air Force had sent four Cat graders in--by air--for the maintenance of the air base. The Air Force refused to let us use them for construction because "they were meant to be used only for maintenance". So there they set. Turned out the plane that needed unloading was unloaded by our unemployed grader operators.
Unfortunately for the Air Force, these men were all literate, at least in english, and could read the stencilling on the heavy crates "Blades. Grader, Caterpillar, such and such." Would you believe those blades mysteriously disappeared? And fortunately someone found our replacement blades and put our graders back to work about that time. And we never had to help unload any planes again.
It seems there were "disagreements" between the Marines and EAB troops from time to time. The Marine unit was the Marine Air Control Squadron - 1 (MACS-1) who handled the Ground Control Intercepts (GCI). Bruce stated, "And then there was the Marine Communication outfit down the road a little ways---some of our men went to visit them and got in a fight---inter service rivalry y'know. What really hurt the Marines feelings was that a few misfits from a lousy army unit had beat them. After several such escapades the Marine Commanding Officer came to our Battalion Commander and asked that we keep our men away from "his boys"--their morale was suffering. Problem as I saw it was these boys were just that, fresh out of Paris Island boot camp, filled with the usual Marine propaganda thinking they were supermen---our men were mostly just a very few years older and at that age it makes a big difference, and the Marines found out they were just mortal men too. I do have all respect for the Corps---they're a good outfit, the only one better is the Pathfinders of our Army Ranger units. Maybe not better--but tougher."
There were also hard feelings over the USAF policy of evacuating the USAF personnel by air, but the Marines and Army were to fight there way out if the Chinese launched a full-scale attack down the peninsula. As the EAB was an FEAF asset, it had no choice in the matter. The Army AAA units and the EAB were expected to fight their way out of Kunsan and regroup at Taegu. The Marines had their hackles up over this policy, but having their own MAW-1 air assets, made provisions for evacuation. Bruce wrote, "Speaking of ground combat---and thinking of what I read in your site about bad feelings regarding the AF bugging out when things got tough--when we were threatened with an attack the airforce loaded up and left. They were our only means of supply, and we had no other army units around to back us up, that I knew of. We were spread out mighty thin along that ready line and I didn't really know how to pray but I surely tried! I said the 23rd Psalm as best I could, about all I knew." He added, "Yes, when those air force people left it was a sickening feeling that we were on our own and no help coming. This happened several times when typhoons threatened, but they never hit us hard."
Rememberances of B-26 Invaders of 3rd Bomb Wing (LNI) Bruce commented, "I knew of one B-26 that had a 2x4 (yes, that's a two by four, as in building houses) used for a spar replacement section in its wing. All their planes were shot up by ground fire---you couldn't go two feet anywhere on any B-26 and not see a patched area. The enemy hated their guts because they flew at night on interdiction and "target of opportunity" basis. They flew very low with their wheels and flaps down and landing lights on, looking for anything to bomb or shoot at. They'd get bored sometimes with lack of action and be happy to go after one lonely enemy with their forward firing eight (yes, count 'em) eight fifty caliber machine guns. I'd hate to have someone come at me at night with landing lights on tearing up the scenery with 8 .50's."
"Flying that low and slow they made a good target for every enemy down there with any kind of weapon from pistol to rifle---they didn't generally have anything better but still a lot of rounds found their mark and only the armor around the crew saved them. I never heard of any of our planes being lost over enemy lines but we lost a few on return, no hydraulics usually, shot out."
"That one that's mentioned as going down short of the runway out in the sea, I remember it. We wondered that they didn't lose a lot more that way. Our construction was halted at 6000 feet and we had heavy equipment out there on the runway at that point---couldn't remove them every time a plane came in because we never knew when one would arrive---they flew until they ran out of ordinance or fuel, then returned and loaded up and took off again, I've known of cases where one plane made three trips during the night."
"So the planes returned to a short runway, most had no brakes or flaps, a B-26 was a hot plane, without flaps I think their landing speed was on the order of 150 mph. They had 500 feet of blacktopped "over run" paved right down to the waters' edge. I've seen them with their wheels almost touching the whitecaps out there on approach, trying to use every inch of that over run because of the short runway.--And lack of brakes.
I've seen them piled up in the sand dunes on the side of the landing strip where they'd drifted off course and hit that soft sand at 150 mph---
found a thermos bottle once in a wreck scene, the coffee was still hot----that got to me---some blew up on landing with live ordnance--500 pounders usually---I wondered why they didn't just drop the damn bombs out over the sea if they were armed but later realised, there's no way crew can access the bomb bay in flight so if a bomb hangs up and won't release you're stuck with it, and if they armed them as they went over enemy territory, which of course they'd do, there was no way to disarm the thing."
"I hitched a ride on a B-26 before the Korean fracas and am a little familiar with them. These were actually A-26's y'know, the North American (manufacturer) re named the B-26 when the Air Force grounded all the original B-26 Martin Marauders after the 2nd WW.
So on occasion, I don't remember how often but I remember more than once hearing 500 pounders go off, and the enemy never had anything like that. It was one of ours landing."
The Food Situation Bruce was not overly enthusiastic in remarks of the cuisine in the mess halls. "We were attached for rations to the Fourth Field Hospital (MASH) for a while after we first arrived at the scene, food was good. had what the Army calls steak (G I's will know what I mean) at least a couple of times a week."
"Then after I don't know how long, maybe a couple of months, they cut us off and we had powdered eggs (always cold on those cold mess trays) for breakfast and either C Ration Stew or Salmon Patties for dinner. I used to wonder when on manuevers what they did with the C Ration Stew---again, G I's will know what I mean---one taste and you never again would ever bother to open a can of that swill--it was just chucked aside. Then the police detail cleaning up the area as we left would gather up those cans---well, apparently in their wisdom the Powers that Be saved all those cans of C Ration Stew for us in Korea."
"The Salmon Patties (who dreams up these names?) were hamburger helper patties cooked to a hard tack state and maybe one drop of salmon essence applied---there was a faint whiff of fishy smell. I was hungry but I couldn't eat that stuff---oh, the powdered eggs, I hear lots of complaints about their green color etc. but I thank God for them---they kept me alive. I weighed 165 lbs when we went into Korea, a year later I weighed 125 lbs. And that was after I'd been stateside about 6 weeks or more, eating good."
We never saw vegetables fresh or canned, any at all.
Life in Tent City He wrote, "If we had been 30 miles further north we would have been issued arctic gear, I heard. As it was, we had no warm clothes, our sleeping bags were those army thingeys made up of a shelter half and one blanket. I slept with half my clothes under me to keep off the ground chill and the other half on top of me, layed there most of the night shivering, too cold to fall asleep. And hungry."
"We were allowed to burn the tent stove one hour in the morning and one hour at night, and the only fuel was jet fuel---we weren't allowed to use the diesel fuel because it was in short supply and we had miles of jet fuel drums stacked along the road but couldn't take jets yet due to the short soft runway. Jet fuel is made to burn with the least heat possible to save the engine. Not too good for warming your butt at 20 below F."
"I got double pneumonia finally, about the end of December 1951."
"Found out years later reading a magazine that 50% of the outfit at any given time was down with it. No warm clothes, no decent food, winter was like Wyoming. I was given a shot in the butt three days and back to duty. Great to be young and resilient. Had pneumonia twice more the first year I was out, back stateside. They "lost" my medical records so the VA says I have no service connected disabilities---I've read that they "lost" 40,000 medical records in Korea."
"Our tents were 12 man tents, as has been said. They were pitched on the bare ground, no floors or wood sidewalls. Only our supply tent had such luxury. After about 5 or 6 months there we were issued the folding cots and now could freeze on both top and bottom. Several times a week, always at night, there would be an alert and we'd grab our rifles (always slept with it) ---no need to dress, we slept with our clothes on to keep warm--and run out to the ready line by the paddies, jump in your foxhole and find the damn thing had filled half full of sand since last visit, shovel it out and wait for the detail to bring up the ammo. We all had a private stash of ammo tho we'd officially been required to turn in all our ammo. This is a combat zone and they've taken away our ammo?"
"All the wrecks in the countryside had ammo scattered around or in them so we all had our private stash we carried--would have been court martialed if caught with it I suppose but in a combat zone you get kind of paranoid when shot at a few times."
Perimeter Defense He went on, "Our perimeter defense from the start was by ROK troops on rest duty having been returned from the front lines very recently and they were mostly scared spitless kids who fired at any sound at night, so between us being not allowed off base at night (of course some fools would sneak off) and the trigger happy ROK guards we lost several men the first few days we were there. After that the word was that if you heard someone grunt a word as you heard an M-1 bolt slam at the same time, you needed to be hitting the ground and rolling away. Apparently those ROK kids could see in the dark. They were supposed to be taught to say "halt" in english but you only got a gutteral grunt with that tell-tale bolt slam." (SITE NOTE: The M-1 Garrand has a distinctive sound as the bolt is pulled back and allowed to slide forward by spring action to chamber the round.)
"I don't think very many of us ventured out at night after that---tho I did once. You get so bored for any kind of change of pace you do crazy things. We worked two shifts I do remember but whether it was ten or twelve hours I'm not so sure--I think ten. Seven days a week of course."
Indigenous Labor Force Bruce also commented on the indigenous labor force as compared to the Japanese. His comparisons were the same as made by the Occupation Forces when comparing the two nationalities. Bruce stated, "We had a few natives ("gooks" to us) that were apparently paid out of some kind of program by the army, that worked for us as laborers." He later said, "I remember one of the carpenters telling me about the "papa-sans" with the "A-Frames"---you probably know of the A frame thingeys (Choge) they carried on their backs, when carrying materials, bricks, etc. He said they would whine and complain when given even light loads but if given some scrap lumber they might have for fuel or whatever, they would load an enormous amount onto their A Frames and trot off with it effortlessly."
"We all remarked about the difference between them and the Japanese. The Japanese worked for us on Okinawa (Japanese or Okinawan?) and would literally take the tools out of your hands to do the work---a real work ethic. I was told by Air Force people at K-8 that when they were at Iwakuni, anyway the airbase in Japan, the Japanese civilian workers would take the tools out of their hands and do the job---turned out these were ex Japanese air force people and the best, at that, and eventually the Air Force guys just let the Japanese take over the maintenence chores, and during the Korean War, all Air Force planes were maintained, and very well by Japanese hired to do menial labor."
"The Koreans (were) almost useless for work details, didn't want to get their hands dirty it seemed. One of the honchos --- overseers -- was "Bad Eye", who'd lost an eye and wore a patch. He spoke some English and was always in evidence, so everyone knew "Bad Eye." One day he was missing and I asked one of the Koreans where he was, he told me "Bad Eye" was a spy and he and a number of other suspects had been shot." (SITE NOTE: There were quite a few mentions of North Korean spies on K-8 during the war. Most Americans never fully trusted Koreans assigned to their work area. Part of this is a left-over from the initial days of the war when North Koreans blended in with the fleeing South Koreans in civilian attire and killed many unsuspecting Americans troops in ambushes. The general attitude at the beginning of the war was that the Koreans were lazy and could not be trusted.)
He stated he knew very little of the hiring practices of the indigenous labor force. "Apparently the Army had a fund of some kind to cover this hiring. On Okinawa I know the going wage was $25.00 per month, which to them, then, was a God send." He went on, "One thing that could bear on this --- the economy of Japan and even more so, Korea, was devastated by the past war and we were instructed by Washington to buy all we could locally, whether from Japan or Korea, to help them financially. We bought steel from Japan, it must have been made up of any kind of scrap steel they could find, and some I had to use (I was the only machinist in the 808th for some time) was so brittle that used to make replacement tail gate pins for dump trucks, it would break regularly. These were substantial pins that held the tail gate shut and were about an inch or more in diameter, one each side of the tail gate. After I'd had to make several I questioned a driver as to how on earth they could break as strong a pin as that and he showed me some broken pins he'd saved---very brittle steel."
"Then we bought dynamite from Japan---we used it in our quarries to blast the rock loose. Our American dynamite was standard 40% stuff and the drillers telling me the story said they used 2 sticks to a hole, went casually off a short distance and set it off--whump. Then we started to buy from Japan and the crates were lettered in Japanese--clearly enough dynamite but the strength was not shown and the powder monkies put 2 sticks in a hole (only the first shot) retreated a short distance as usual, set off the charge, and BOY!--TURNED OUT IT WAS 90% DYNAMITE. Interesting times these."
Goof-Offs Bruce wrote, "The first man in our outfit to break his glasses had to be sent to Tokyo for the eye test , prescription, and new glasses, then it was a space available situation to fly him back to us, so he was gone at least a week, I'm thinking it was as much as two weeks. It was a big deal to get a 3 day pass, had to be there at least 6 months I guess to get that, as I had two such passes. We didn't know what had happened to him but word circulated about his being gone so long and there was a good deal of interest. When he finally got back he had a big story to tell, nights on the town, girls, bars, oh boy!"
"You might not be surprised to learn that suddenly we had a number of men report broken glasses, the first bunch got by with it but then it all stopped when one came back ashen faced, with a new issue set of clothes, rifle, the works. Seems he got on the plane expecting to go to Tokyo, instead they landed at Taegu, I believe it was, where there was a MASH hospital unit. They took him in, apparently were able to test his eyes and get a prescription which was then sent on to Tokyo to have the spectacles made there. Meantime he was an ambulatory patient so they put him to mopping floors etc. No fun at all."
"Then the glasses came back from Tokyo, he was fitted and discharged. But not that easy. They were on a rail line which ran up to the front lines and seems about all the patients were from there, if your injuries weren't serious enough to send you to Japan or the States, you went back to the lines. They had taken all his clothing when he came in, standard procedure, now it was standard procedure to issue new clothes, a rifle, send him out to the train station to go back to the front. He tried to tell anyone who would listen---or not---that he was from K-8 airfield in Kunsan and they needed him there, after several days on the front lines they finally got it straight and sent him back to us. Now, would you believe , surprisingly, no more broken glasses?"
Early Additional Duty as AAA for Battalion (Apr-Jun 1951) Bruce wrote, "I tried to bring up the AA Battalion info and couldn't---do you have info re. the colored AA outfit that took over our AA duties?" (SITE NOTE: This was the 76th AAA, a negro unit, commanded by white officers. SEE http://kalaniosullivan.com/KunsanAB/OtherUnits/Howitwasa1b1x.html#30th%20Anti-Aircraft for the 76th AAA who arrived in Jun 51 to relieve the 808th EAB folks of the duty.)
"This was several months into our efforts there--we had four half tracks as I remember, one had a single barrel 40 mm AA gun, the others had quad mounts of .50 cal Brownings in what must have been a modified aircraft turret, it had no plexiglas dome but otherwise was as in an airplane with the 4 .50's air cooled--big problem. Our half tracks couldn't make 150-200 mph down hill and that's what the guns needed to cool the barrels. We were told to hold it to three round bursts, not easy unless you're really skilled. We burned out a few barrels early on.
"The truck had a Briggs and Stratton engine mounted behind the turret, driving a hydraulic pump that operated the turret's rotation and elevation mechanism to train the guns, worked really nicely. I could start the little engine usually within two pulls cold--very unusual in those days.
"We had men on rotation doing duty on the half tracks for air defense and it cut into our work schedules as these would be grader operators, truck drivers, heavy equipment operators etc., so finally they sent in a colored AA outfit, I never learned their strength whether company, battalion or what, nor their unit designation.
"We didn't mix with them at all, I think the feeling of distaste was mutual. They would show up at the Red Cross tent where we could buy coffee and doughnuts ( at stateside prices and made with donated flour etc--I saw the boxes) and freeze us out. I would have cheerfully shot one or more of them given the chance---seriously---we were kind of on edge by then. I was brought up to not be prejudiced in regard to race, etc. but in trying circumstances it's surprising what you'll do."
(SITE NOTE: There was a lot of tension within the 76th AAA and reports of open defiance of orders at times. Truman had signed the integration order for the military in 1949, but the Army was very slow to implement the order. The negro troops within the Army felt deep resentment -- and after a negro infantry unit deserted their positions on the frontlines in Korea, the Army did not trust the negro units -- nor the negro leadership of these units. Most of the 76th AAA NCOs were negro, though the officers were white. As a result of the distrust of negros in command, the Army "integrated" by promoting relatively young WHITE NCOs and replacing the black NCOs. After "integration", there appeared to no further racial problems. To this day, the Army's discriminatory practices of judging negros as only suitable for low-level jobs such as laundry and food services, AAA units or infantry foot-soldiers is used as an example of institutionalized discrimination. The USAF on the other hand did not have this problem and integrated their units starting in 1949 -- but the USAF also set higher standards for enlistment thus negros entering the USAF were college-graduate officers and individuals with high school diplomas.)
Bruce related another story about the AAA additional duty. He said, "We had an air force guy working in our motor pool as a mechanic, told me he had been an armorer in the AF. One day I happened to be in front of the supply tent, don't remember why, maybe to visit that Korean working there that I think was ROK Intelligence---a halftrack was sitting off maybe 50 yds away as it happened, unattended. Sunny clear day, and a plane came down along near ground level, realised later it was a P-47 but it had markings I'd never seen (turned out it was Nationalist Chinese from Formosa) and I could clearly see an oriental pilot looking at me, it was that close--no time to try to get help or warn anyone so I took off for the halftrack running and at the same time the flyboy armorer---only guy in the outfit who could really man that gun, came flying out of the supply tent and into the halftrack, had those .50's tracking that plane, all in seconds, the pilot saw those guns on him and took off, we never were visited again." (SITE NOTE: At the same time the Chinese were attacking from the north, they were attempting to overthrow the government of Chiang Kai-Shek in Formosa. At the time, the Communist Chinese were splitting the US forces to weaken the US resolve to defend Formosa. As to Kunsan, it became a convenient location to launch strikes on the Chinese mainland -- and use as an emergency landing strip after missions over China. Formosan U-2 flights were launched from Kunsan well into the 1970s.)
Bedcheck Charlie in Early Months at Kunsan The common name for the Popov Po-2 biplane was "Bedcheck Charlie." It would only appear at night and was virtually unstoppable because of its slow speed. In fact, the only aircraft that was credited with kills were F-4U Corsairs that were operating almost at stall speeds because the Popov Po-2 was so slow. The bombs that were dropped were mainly for harrassment as they rarely connected with any target of value. After the initial months of the 808th at Kunsan, "Bedcheck Charlie" stopped flying to the southern bases and concentrated on the bases at Kimpo, Suwon and Inchon.
Bruce stated, "We called those "night raiders" Piss Call Pete--I only remember two occasions while I was at K-8 of having those little frag. bombs dropped. They'd only fly on a night with no moon, or nearly so, pitch black, they couldn't see us any better than we could see them, we'd hear that funny sounding engine, kind of rough running, he'd scout around the general area and drop very few small bombs, maybe 25 pounders, they were way wide of any mark but one night one fragment clipped the valve off an oxygen tank in the supply tent and that bottle of oxygen took off like a torpedo, the supply clerk said. He had to sleep in the tent to keep us from robbing it blind--we'd steal hand grenades to go duck hunting on the paddies. Didn't like to use our rifles as the ammo was corrosive and it meant a lot of trouble cleaning the barrel with hot water for several days.
He was in the middle of the floor and the bottle would fly along a wall (our supply tent was the only one with a floor and wood walls) carrome around and finally crashed through the wall and got outside. These were big bottles about 4 feet tall or a little over, 150 lbs. I'd guess and 2000 lbs pressure in them. Scared the pee out of him, but that was the nearest we came to getting a purple heart out of these visits."
"Our alert signal as I remember it was that if we heard the 40mm firing we were attacked by air. If we heard the .50's firing it was a ground attack.
If we heard both it was by sea. Always at night, at least twice a week."
A Personal Perspective on the Army Integration Bruce wrote, "In regard to integration, let me add my bit. This is first hand and I remember it well as I was shocked. I was in basic training with the 4th Inf. Div. at Fort Ord, Calif. from late August 1948 to Nov. that year. At one point we were assembled in a post theatre for a lecture, at least a company of us, maybe more. The General Commanding---don't remember his name but he was not respected at all, jokes were made at his expense---he was at this assembly because he spoke to us there. I mention this because it shows how great was the breakdown of discipline and obedience to orders regarding integration.
"A staff sergeant gave the presentation, prefacing it with the word that this came direct from the Commander in Chief, Harry Truman and it was important. Then he gave his talk about integration---I had been taught to not be prejudiced and not having associated with large numbers of "blacks" it was easy for me to accept them---the ones I'd known were fine people, kids or adults. The sergeant gave a very good talk, then having finished he paused, snorted , and said, well, that's what I was supposed to say, but we all know how we're going to take this don't we?---as I say, the General was there I know, I suppose Staff Officers also, Generals don't flit around alone, and I was very, very disappointed with the whole charade.
"But then later in radio school in Camp Gordon, Georgia we had a negro down on the other end of the barracks from me and now and then I'd see he and one of the white guys sitting on his bunk, heads together and it seemed a little odd---especially in Augusta Georgia in those days, and the white guy was from an upper class white family. I happened to mention it one day to a bunk mate and he said "don't you know what's going on there?" I said, no, I didn't.
"He told me the black fellow was illiterate and the white guy was reading his mail to him and writing back for the black fellow. I'm from Seattle, way up north and had heard all the stories about the race problems so this really shook me---there were decent whites down there even then. It just about brought tears to my eyes, still does, I can still see them huddled together.
Post Exchange Bruce wrote, "When the air force brought in the first elements of the PX those of us free to get over there were anxious to see what they had, as I remember it was in a tent at first, rows of metal shelving (not a lot but several rows) and all they had that first while was kotex tampons and condoms. The joke was that I think we had about 5 Red Cross gals on the base, I dunno exactly because we only saw them in the tent where they served donuts and coffee, didn't fraternise with them a-tall, and the Korean women, what few there were around, stayed way away from us. ... So here we were with shelves full of condoms and kotex. Trust the Army to set things right. This went on for some time too." The Red Cross women lived in the BOQ area at the far end in the last row of houses on the hill. There was very little contact with enlisted men besides with the donut duties. This tale of the ample supply of kotex was related by others who were there in the early days of the war. This PX was the old Bldg 1004. It remained the main BX until 1971 when part of it was converted into a snack bar. After the new BX was built in the mid-1980s, it became a mini-mall and snack bar. Later it was converted into only a Food Court where it stood for many years before being torn down in 2006. The entry was towards east end and goods were displayed behind glass or on shelves behind the counter. Most of the items were first-come; first-served, but on certain high-demand items there was a lottery system.
808th EAB Company A:Arthur Aseltine wrote: "...I was at K-8 808th EAB Co. "A" This was a SCARWAF unit. I find that in civilian life, not many individuals know what that meant. I usually tell them that it was "an underwater mess kit repair battalion." SCARWAF meant "Special Category Army with Air Force". He was stationed at K-8 between September 1951 through October 1952 and served as the Company Clerk and also in the Supply Section for a time. There is a confusing facet that Arthur's insists the A Co. was located on the seaward side of base. However, we know that there were elements of the 808th on the east side of the runway as well. It appears that the line companies of the the 808th operated independently of each other. In fact, Arthur admits, "Truly, I am not exactly sure what the other line companies did." He only knew about 95-105 men which would be about a company size unit.Arthur later wrote, "As tough as it seemed to we who came in Sept. of "51," I know that the men
who came from Okinawa to empty fields of mud, grief and toil had it much worse than we. ... At the time, I didn't mind it so much but the thing I didn't like was the downright unfair conditions under which we lived compared to the Quonset huts of the Air Force. Living in tents in the middle of the winter is not my idea of "a good time was had by all." Oh well, we were much younger then and much more resilient insofar as adverse conditions were forced upon us. As the saying goes, "I wouldn't take a million for the experience; conversely, I wouldn't give a nickel to do it again." In front of Supply (Click on photo to enlarge)Arthur traveled by ship to Japan and then was flown to Kunsan. He wrote, "There were roughly 95-105 men in the 808th when I arrived. Perhaps more! I did arrive in early September of 1951 and we were the only EAB on the base at that time and none had been there. If you were to travel directly west of our campsite, you would go right into the Yellow Sea without any obstacle except the latrine and some trenches to which we went when a possible air raid was possible. I never did go there as I always felt that it may have been mined. Didn't explore it!" He continued, "We were the only Engineer Aviation Battalion on the base when I arrived in early September and the only other Engineer Aviation Battalion present on the base was the 809th when I left in the middle of July 1952." From these instructions the only place the 808th could be situation would be on the east side of the rice paddies next to the seawall. It would be near the location of the Marine MACS-1 (Ground Control Intercept unit). He wrote later, "It was as I said, with our backs and our string of tents perpendicular to the seawall of the Yellow Sea, with the BOQ to our left which would be north and a few degrees to the East. There was an antiaircraft outfit located along side and a bit rearward from our outfit. On one occasion when I had just gotten out to our trenches, they let go with a group of shots that had the required number of tracers fired along with them. Because of out location one would also see that they were firing over water. It scared the heck out of me as I didn't know for sure if there were enemy aircraft out there or not and I never did know for sure." (Note: Arthur also confirmed the information from other individuals that the Antiaircraft unit was an all-black unit. At this time, the unit designation is not known.) He wrote, "Anyway, as I stood in front of our supply tent or orderly room, the BOQ was to our left and therefore north of our unit. There was a huge empty area in front of our site which was later used for a PX and supply for the Air Force. When I arrived, it was a place where a huge amount of plywood had been stored. I suppose it was used to panel the walls of the BOQ. Piles high and about a half of a football field in size. Really startled me." Capone and Art in front of SupplyArthur stated that 808th Co. A was located in the area below the BOQ. He stated, "One thing that I remember also is that the chapel was away to the left and about 45 degrees more if you were to consider it to be rotated that way from our campsite." He continued, "It has been a while but I remember the labor office to have located to the right (on the map) of the chapel. There was an on the base Korean tailor shop during my stay there as well as a Red Cross day room where they served tons of doughnuts as well as coffee. I drank my share of coffee because there was no way to get a coke as there was no PX at that time. Later I found a way to get Coca Cola from the Air Force Supply because I also found out it was being supplied to the Commissioned Officers Club. They brought over to my supply tent six cases of those beautiful little Coca Colas. At first, I didn't share it with anyone but later after consuming about two cases or a little less, shared it with close friends. How do you conceal six cases of Coca Cola? Easy, if you have a whole 16 man tent to yourself and I did while I was working as Supply tech which I sometimes rotated with my secondary MOS of Clerk typist in the Orderly room. Incidentally, we lived in 12 or 16 man tents not in those 8 man tents some apparently lived in." He wrote, "When I arrived at the place, Captain Nicolai Tanski (a real taskmaster) was the Commanding Officer. Lt. Brinkerhof was one of the officers with whom I could relate and indeed saw him in Orlando, Fla. as I was getting my discharge." He later wrote, "Just before I left the area to go back to the States, I had a talk with our Company Commander and he asked me what I planned to do when I got out of the service. My reply was to go back to work with my father in his Construction Company. He seemed a bit perturbed in knowing that I had construction experience because as noted by others, most of the crew was poorly trained in construction procedures. I didn't want to do that sort of thing in that cold weather. Didn't make any sense to me at the time!" He mentioned about the types of equipment used. He said, "I know that we operated two rock crushers, had some large earth movers, including some 4 wheel Le Torneau units called Tornadozers but I am not sure of the spelling. They had tires that were about 6 feet in diameter. They seemed to be steered by a panel of switches and would really go fast for such a large machine. I think it was about 30 miles per hour or so. Also we had some units that had what I called donkey engines which were to pull so called "pans"or graders. The donkey engines could not operate alone but had to be connected to the
pan/grader. The Tornadozers had the advantage of speed but in tough going had to be assisted by a regular pusher Caterpillar tractor in order to load and then could go fast to their intended location, unload and scurry back to the point of loading again. Cats could never do the job alone so rapidly. The donkey engines were fast but not as fast as the Tornadozers. I don't know if
they survived very long in civilian work. I have not seen them around anymore." He said, "It was my duty as communications man for our company to go out there to the trenches even on a yellow alert before there was a red alert and establish communication with Battalion command. The rest of the outfit was only required to get up and get dressed in the event that there was a red alert. Sometimes there was never a red alert and I then packed up the stuff and returned with sometimes very little sleep on those night." He went on, "Also in that area they located a huge Motor/generator which was used to power our whole Battalion. I will remember the day that it was fired up as Korean and Army electrician/linemen were present. I have no idea why the Koreans were there. They, unlike our linemen, used only small wooden blocks with nails in them attached with short ropes to their feet as help to climb the necessary poles for transmission of electricity. They had a small rope around their waist which was wrapped around the pole when they climbed to the required spot. Picture that in contrast to the heavy spikes and belts our men used and still to this day use in our country."
He continued, "I was the company communications person for our outfit for quite a while because of my experience in radio before being in the service. We had a company street in front of our Supply tent and therefore in front of all of the supply tents and Company headquarters or orderly rooms. We were nowhere near the runway or taxi strip. I was there for about a year and never did see the taxi strip." He wrote, "Inasmuch as I was in a supply section for our Company "A" I had a chance to get around but never went that far. I did though go into Kunsan every day for about three months and that was an experience and a half. It was normally out of bounds or off limits to the general military personnel." He expanded on this later by saying, "You must understand that our trips were mostly in the darkness as this was in December, January and February. We did not go over any sort of large bridge and we were at the end of the reservoir when we passed and it extended out away from us." This means that he traveled to Kunsan using the main road past Okku village, over the dike, past Mimiyon village on a straight-away (that followed the irrigation ditch) till it met the Wolmyong mountain. It jogged right and snaked around the base until it entered the Wolmyong tunnel on the right and entered into Kunsan City proper. "The 808th was not disturbed by noise of the aircraft except for the first night when I arrived and I was sleeping in the last tent of our outfit and it was only a short distance to the latrines and not much farther
than that was the sea wall of the Yellow Sea. That night a bomber came in from a run on North Korea and he came in too low and hit the sea wall just short of the runway and crashed. I heard the explosion of the crash and the ensuing explosions of unspent ammunition of the aircraft as it burned. I later saw the aircraft because it was displayed not to far from Battalion headquarters which was just a short distance away from the Line Companies." (NOTE: In September 1951, there was only one nasty smash up with a fully-loaded and fueled 90th Bomb Squadron (BS) aircraft on takeoff. The 90th BS commander died in the accident. For details go to 90th BS (L-NI) in an account by Roderick Clarke.) "A NCO club was constructed by a Korean Contractor. A whole Korean family and I suspect others moved into the club near the end of the construction project and installed a terrazzo floor, grinding it all by hand. They lived, slept and ate in that building while there. (Danny Kaye and others entertained
there.) That was a gas! I will never forget the day he (the contractor) came to pickup his money for the job. Because of inflation of the Korean currency (then being 6000 Wan to a dollar) he had duffle bags full of money and hauled it off in a Jeep. I hired the same contractor to build a small chest of drawers for my stuff and sold it just before I left. I had the only one like that in our outfit. Others simply used duffle bags for their stuff." He also recalled the heartbreak of losing a dog. "It was several months after that when I acquired a dog which had been struck by a truck. I nursed it back to health and it lived only a short time after that when it was again struck buy another truck right in front of my tent which the little doggie and I occupied alone. Our CO wouldn't let me keep it after that because, said he, "It was too distracting from my regular duties." The CO ordered a Sergeant to take it out to the quarry and shoot it. He continued, "Anyway, it was our tech sergeant in charge of the motor pool who was ordered to shoot my dog. No hard feelings toward him because it was the Captain that ordered him to do so." He also remembers trips to the local orphanages. "Did go with the Chaplain of our area to at least two of the Korean orphanages also. That was a heart warming experience and distressing at the same time." He also remembers his departure."One of the most happy and yet sad experiences I had was just as I was leaving and saw some of the indigenous personnel who worked in our area crying. It really moved me and didn't expect it at all. I assure you that I shall never forget it." Supply Sgt. Sam BrabsonAfter all these years, Arthur remembers the names of many who worked with him. He said, "Names of a few of the men who worked with me are: (Phil Smith, co-company clerk) -- (Collins who was the company clerk when I arrived.) -- (Sam Brabson, Supply Sergeant after the original Sergeant was rotated.) (Supply techs Lang and Capone who were co-workers with me.) (Armorer Nordman and another whose name I have forgotten.) (Original CO who came with the 808th from Okinawa was as stated previously, Capt. Nickolai Tanski) (Next, CO 1st Lt. Larkin and his first name was perhaps John.) Another Captain came and replaced him in name only. His chief function was never discovered. Of course not to forget 1st Lt. Brinkerhof!" As to the Korean workers he remembered, "Koreans working directly with me: Oh Tai Ill (Oh Tae-il) and Kim Soong Chum (Kim Soong-kyum). The later spoke really rather good English. The other spoke only two words of English when he arrived -- "Okay and no." I had all my civilian clothes altered and gave them to Oh Tai Ill. He was so appreciative. There was quite a class separation there. The two while they worked to the common good were worlds
apart in terms of their respective places in the Korean society." Oh Tae-il and Kim Soong-kyumThe heart-warming part of this tale is that we located Mr. Oh Tae.-il in 2000. He was then 73 and he resided in Okku in a farm village near the base and remembered Arthur. He said he wore those clothes Arthur gave him for a long time. He like Arthur was very touched that an old friend had found him. After Arthur left, Oh Tae-il continued to work in A. Co. supply for two more years until the 808th left Kunsan in 1953. Arthur said, "His face (Oh Tae-il) was the last I remember seeing upon leaving Korea as he was standing in the doorway of the supply tent. I remember no one else (specifically) after that. Because I was told that I was to be rotated back to the "States" upon a short notice of about two hours, I did not have a chance to make proper "good-byes" to many different people. I was in the Barber shop having a haircut when someone arrived and said, "Get back and get your things together. You have to be at Base operations by 4:00 this afternoon as you are 'going home.'" That was nearly two o'clock and that left me little time to get washed and be on my way. Mr. Oh Tae-il wrote to Arthur a reply (that we translated). It was touching response to an old friend. "Dear Arthur, 50 years ago, you met me, Oh Tae-il. That you still remembered me has made me very happy, and I thank you very much. I saw your picture and it's the same face as 50 years ago. I am happy to hear that you have children, but I heard that you had a leg problem. For that I am sad.Anyway, when I left the base, I became a ROK army soldier. After I left the army, I returned to Okku to work on my farm. After that I met a Korean lady and got married. We had 6 children. Now everybody is married off and has gone away from us. I'm now over 70 years old. Aseltine, time is too fast. Now we are over 70. Now I'm too old and can't work on the big farm. I can only do little things on the farm to help my son who still runs the farm. However, I still have my health. Though we cannot travel to see each other, afterwards we will meet in the sky. Thank you for finding me on the internet. 5-15-00 Oh Tae-il"
808th EAB Company B:
Bobby E, Jenkins, SSgt (Ret) of Rushville, IN wrote on the Korea War Project in Jan 2007, "I was stationed in Okinawa in 1950 Co B 808 EAB and in April of 1951 we was shipped to Kunsan Korea to get an air strip laid for the 20th Air Force. I was radio operator of B company." He left Kunsan in Dec 1952.
808th EAB Company C:April 1951: Al Adams was a S/Sgt in CO. C 808th EAB. He was one of the initial troops who arrived at Kunsan in April 1951 to build the new runway. He wrote, "I happened to be in the original 808 EAB contingent which moved from Okinawa to Kunsan. I left Korea in March 1952." He mentioned that his unit built the original asphalt processing plant and also that the 808th also built the original petroleum storage tanks. The EAB was tasked with erecting these POL storage tanks to hold a five-day supply of jet fuel. He later wrote, ""The POL tanks we were involved in building were on a hillside, however, I couldn't swear to the direction. I was aware of only one quarry, however, I wasn't directly involved with the actual quarrying so there could very well have been two." The original POL tank was located on the east side of Gunsmoke hill in approximately the same location as the present above ground tank. The fuel was transported from the port to the base via tank cars. (NOTE: After the war, an above ground pipeline -- assembled only during fuel transfer operations -- ran from the port to Kunsan. In the 1960s, the line disappeared. It was not until 1968 that an underground pipeline was run from the port facility to transfer fuel to the base.) As to the inexperience of the troops, he said, "I can certainly relate to the lack of trained personnel. My MOS was communications (Radio Operator) and I wound up a Sgt. in the Heavy Equipment Platoon." He later wrote, "We were transported to Korea from Okinawa by troop transport and were disembarked in landing craft about 10-12 miles out. When we landed in Kunsan and the base at that time was primarily composed of advance parties." As to the ground conditions, he said, "The water table was the big problem. It was very shallow and we made several attempts to dig a series of drainage ditches to lower it although these were essentially unsuccessful. There were no pumps used to my knowledge. The drainage ditches were the only tasks I was involved with." There were some "french drains" which are trenches dug and filled with aggregate. They allowed water to drain away from the target area. He continued, "The descriptions of the runway were very close to reality. The asphalt runways would actually wave when aircraft would taxi or take off. The fix was to excavate large
sections of the runway and fill the excavation with rocks and cement. We did in fact stick some of our large bulldozers up to the tracks. ... However, they were very difficult to extract." The original asphalt runway was totally unsatisfactory. Basically, it was like taking-off and landing on a waterbed. Jim Heath of the 809th EAB which was aiding the 808th with the runway repairs, concurred wholeheartedly. He said, "Oh yes I remember the wave and our crews trying to fix it. They said the it was built over a rice paddy that had been there since time began. I saw trucks, graders and bulldozers get stuck. Never saw so much mud..." Jim later wrote, "When it (the runway) was finished it had to dug up and refilled as I remember a truck went over it and it did the wave way thing and the Capt Waters (commander C. CO. 809th) said dig it up and add more fill." He later wrote about some interesting information on the runway, "I was looking in my old kit bag and found a newspaper clipping which you might have an interest in. It is an article with a photo of Lt. Col. Lawrence W. Hall, Fairmont West Va., commanding officer of the 808th EAB congratulating Capt. Billy G. Wylie Kosousko, Miss. upon becoming the first pilot to land on the new airstrip. It mentions Lt. Col. Albert Hoffman operations officer; Major James Ivy, project engineer and Col. Robert J. Hughey, base commander. Unfortunately, the clipping is somewhat the worse for wear and may not be suitable for scanning."
Bruce B. Satra of H&S Company repeated some scuttlebutt about a fragging incident in C Company against its commander (unknown) in the 1951-1952 time frame. He stated that, "Someone wired a hand grenade to the starter on his jeep but fortunately the driver spotted it when he checked the oil. Then a group of men went down one night and shot up the orderly room tent thinking he (the commander) was in there, sadly he wasn't and the poor CQ on duty really scrabbled trying to dig a shelter trench with his bare fingernails, he managed to stay low enough to not get hit, but then they took away our ammo."
808th EAB Company D:Edward Svoboda of Sonora CA wrote on the Korea War Project in Oct 2004 about his memories of the time. We know from his relating the bomb incident that Mr. Svoboda was there in Dec 1952. To be truthful, we do not know what company Mr. Svoboda belonged to, but his words were so humorous -- and true -- that we had to include it. (SITE NOTE: Bruce Satra stated in Oct 2007, "To my knowledge there was no company D, but I guess you cover that in your closing remarks at the end of the story, that you didn't know his company?")
He wrote, "Things I remember:
- 1. Roll call announcement by Bn Commander. Our Bn had highest VD rate in entire Army, 16%. (SITE NOTE: Bruce Satra stated in Oct 2007, "Ed's remarks are right on, most cases I know of. He remarked about the VD rate being 16%. When I walked up to the door of the company HQ upon first reporting there for duty there was a sign above the door saying the VD rate for that month was something over 100%--what a shock! I thought, good God, what am I getting into? Turned out there were just a handful of men who kept getting infected over and over--sad sacks. Every company had the same problem it seemed, and there was a monthly contest where the lowest company on the list was rewarded with a beer party. Troop Information Period---a weekly thing started as far as I know in Korea--we hated it, compulsory attendance, all BS. One was slated to be a lecture on VD, the officer slated to give the lecture was known to be a very shy person, we doubted he knew anything about sex or women, this would be too good to miss !! He showed up all right, surprised me that he'd take the assignment. He got up in front of us and told us what the lecture was to cover, then he said " men, keep your pants zipped and you won't get in trouble" Dismissed!--short and to the point.)
- 2. A.F. armament boys loading B-26 with bombs, dropped one. 10 planes were destroyed before fireworks stopped. (SITE NOTE: The 13th Bomb Squadron Association Homepage has an short article by Vincent La Berge (then of the 13th BS) that relates this well-remembered incident. "About noon December 16, 1952, there was a terrible accident on the 8th Bomb Squadron flight line. An 8th armament crew somehow dropped a 500 LB M1A2 frag cluster bomb and one of the frags detonated. This cut the armorer's legs off, although he survived. The aircraft was being loaded with 500 LB GPs, which were on the ground under the wing when the aircraft caught fire. These 500 LB GPs blew up. This caused significant damage to several adjacent 8th aircraft, and some to the 13th aircraft. M1A2 (20#) were flying through the air, lodging under the landing gear on the aircraft and damaging engine nacelles, etc. Since the 13th aircraft were parked next to the 8th squadron, our line chief had our aircraft towed or taxied out of the area to a distant location. The crew chiefs showed real bravery in as much as the fire from the aircraft burning and exploding ammunition presented periods of great hazard. I know it was very hairy because I started taxiing one of the aircraft. We were all very lucky. The fire could have gotten into the flight line Bomb Dump, which was within 50 or 60 yards of the fire and explosions. There were several Soldiers' Medals given out from events this day.")
- 3. Troop info & edcu sessions, great visual aids!
- 4. Pete Swang, Bn photographer, & his photo books, WOW!
- 5. Base Commander who liked to take a B-26 up & blow up enemy locomotives. Called him locomotive Charley.
- 6. Blowing up mountain for new runway. A big fizzle, not enough explosive.
- 7. Sand fleas & getting sprayed with DDT every now & then.
- 8. The guy from Detroit who ran a crap game all night long in the tent across from mine. (SITE NOTE: Bruce Satra wrote, "All night crap games, yes. We had I think four Coleman gas lanterns, they were always used by the senior non-coms who had an on-going crap game about every night so far as I know. When four Bronze Stars were awarded late on in my tour there they were awarded to one deadhead who put out a little fire on his gas truck after we told him it wasn't worth risking his neck (worn out old truck, 2 1/2 w/750 gal. gas tank)"
the others went to the guys running the crap game who happened to be the senior nco's over the runway construction.
- 9. The typhoon that never came. (SITE NOTE: Bruce Satra wrote, "Typhoon that never came--yes---it was predicted that winds would be something like 120 mph or more, we were in tents, they parked all our trucks around the tent area but that looked like mighty little protection to me---I'd been in typhoons on Okinawa when we were in Quonset huts tied down on huge concrete slabs and it was no picnic then. Thank God it never came.")
- 10. The horrible water in the company lister bag.
- 11. Ronnie & Buckshot the Korean kids who lived with us.
- 12. The Korean trucks & crew who cleaned the latrines, a lesson in cleanliness. (SITE NOTE: Bruce Satra wrote, "The latrine was a row of 50 gallon drums with toilet seats on them, a Korean came and emptied them every so often, he had a donkey cart affair as I remember, looked like a mule train. The used food was used as fertiliser in the paddies. They warned us against eating fruit in Japan and Korea." He added, "We had a water line put in by the air force people, running from a hill near us over to their area, about a 2 inch pipe, very cold spring water. They let us tap into it for a shower, we put up some tarps around it to protect us a little from the wind and weather and hooked up a steam jenny powered by a Briggs and Stratton engine to pump water into the steam jenny to provide hot water. Worked great, unless the little engine ran out of gas, then you got live steam thru the shower head. You'd be taking a nice hot shower (man, what luxury) when you'd hear the engine start to sputter, need to get out from under that shower head pronto. Out into the cold to gas up the damn thing and start it again, bare ass-- Times never to be forgotten.")
- 13. We had a sign in our survey office that said "Welcome to Kunsan, the only place in the world where the germs are big enough to be seen".
Does anybody else remember any of this stuff?"
809th EAB: Giving a Helping Hand 809th Engineering Aviation Battalion Area (1952) (Courtesy Hans Petermann) Click on photo to enlarge October 1951 - December 1951: The 809 EAB arrived in October 1951 and immediately went to work assisting the 808th EAB completing the runway, as well as assisting the 27th Airfield Installation Squadron from Taegu in reading the base for habitation. The runway was completed in the winter of 1951. Though some elements of the 809th remained temporarily at Kunsan into 1952, the maintenance of the runway became the sole responsibility of the 808th EAB after that and the elements joined the main unit in Chunchon.
Jim Heath was with the 809 EAB which was sent as a battalion. It arrived at Kunsan in October of 1951. He was with the advance party of the 809th EAB out of Eglin AFB, Florida that shipped to Kunsan. He wrote,"The 809th was at Eglin AFB Fla. and the battalion commander was a major (forgot his name) wanted to go to Korea, but not alone he wanted his boys with him. Having some pull in Wash. we got orders for the Far East. Our advanced party at every stop (Guam, Oki, and 5th AF Hq in Japan) did not know anything about a 809th EAB coming. 5th AF said send them with their sister outfit the 808th. Even the ship we went over on did not really expect us as I was in the ship's advance party. When we arrived at Kunsan AFB we had just enough tents to house the personnel like every thing else we obtained in the first few weeks was begged, borrowed or stolen." He later wrote, "We shipped out of Fla to Calif 30 days on the USNS Aikrern Victory which sailed on or about the 6th Sept 1951. 30 days to Yokohama then 3 days to Pusan and on to Kunsan." Upon arrival in October 1951, they were immediately put to work. 809 EAB emblem on pillow (Courtesy Jim Heath)When the 809th first arrived it did not have its own mess facilities. According to Jim, they messed with the 3rd Bomb Wing in the Airmen's Billet area. The 808th and the 809th areas were at the east end of the runway where their work was being done. Jim said, "Spent about 2 months or so there and was sent to Chunchon. The 808 helped build a extension on one of the runways. There was a lot of PSP there as I helped put some of it down." He later said, "While I was wiring up the camp a lot of the people were laying the PSP we laid. A lot of it was put down; as I said, I did it for day or two until they decided they needed lights. There was a lot of mud before we put it down." Jim stated that the 809th was on the south side of the runway near the east end. He said, "The 809 was right across the runway from the 808th. I remember going across it (the runway) and going by the parked 26's some of them with flak holes from a raid the night before. Some of the PSP on the taxi area was done by the 809th. I was out there a couple of days doing it." (Note: When the 90th Bomb Squadron first arrived in Aug 51, they used the old Japanese airstrip as temporary parking area for B-26s while they laid the PSP for the parking areas. Ed Moyaghn of the 90th BS wrote, "about Aug 51 we left Iwakuni, flew a mission & landed at K-8 [my first time] our parking area [90th] was on the far side of the runway on the old Japanese runway [grass/mud] dark." However, by November 51 all the B-26s were on the north side of the runway in the permanent parking areas.) B-26s at End of Runway (Dec 1951) (Courtesy James Heath) (Click on map to enlarge)The position of the 809th was on the south end of the base in approximately the area of the present day Ammo Dump. Jim later wrote to clarify the exact position of his unit, "Facing towards the runway from where the 809th was the Yellow sea was on the left and the rice paddies on the right. I remember as when when we first arrived we needed a bath quite badly being on a Victory ship for 30 days with only salt water showers. We filled our helmets with water, stripped down to our birthday suits and started to wash when we heard all this giggling . Across the rice paddies were several mamasans pointing and laughing." The area described would be near the present fence to the east of the base which still is filled with rice paddies. After comparing descriptions of the locations of the 809th (including Jim's description of walking across to the 808th EAB and past the B-26s), we are convinced that the 809th was on the south side (at the southwest end of the runway) across from the main base -- and NOT on the northeast end of the runway. Lou Segaloff of the 90th Bomb Squadron said of the early years in 1951, "The only unit south of the active runway was the Aviation Engineers. Several members of the Engineers (presumably intoxicated and returning from the club) were killed taking a shortcut across the runway back to their barracks when planes taking off struck them." This incident indicates the dangers associated during those days on the flightline...especially during the nighttime hours when the primary flying was done. The 809th EAB worked round the clock on the runway project and used a 30kw generator for their lighting needs. The generator was located at the end of the runway where the work was being done. Jim clarified that the work done by the 808th and 809th involved an extension of the east end of the runway into the rice fields on that end. This was the extension from a 6,300 ft runway into a 9,000 ft one. He said, "Remember that there was a rice paddy there that gave a lot of trouble being filled in as when vehicle drove over it would dip...and would have to do a refill. If I remember right it was the end that the aircraft took off from most of the time." This would be inland as the aircraft most often took off over the sea. It appears that most of reworking (excavating and filling with aggregate and concrete) of the original asphalt runway had been done. He wrote later, "As far as I know we did extend the runway as I had a generator at the end to run tools. When the it was finished it had to dug up and refilled as I remember a truck went over it and it did the wave way thing and the Capt Waters ( commander C. CO. 809th) said did it up and add
more fill." Graders in work on taxiway (Dec 1951) Picture taken facing northeast. (Courtesy James Heath) (Click on map to enlarge)Jim also states that a lot of work was done at the quarry operation. Jim said, "We did put most of the personnel to work in the quarry as there was a great need for stone for the runway that was being built at the time. I have had demolition experience and was working around the clock blasting and did not have much time to notice any thing else." The quarry is on the seaward side of what the Occupation forces called "Black Top Mountain" -- not far from the North Gate of K-8. The 808th and 809th operated separate quarries. First used by the Japanese in building the polders (tidal flat reclamation in 1932), this quarry area is still in use today. This is where the unit obtained the raw materials for its rock crusher that Ted Tollin mentioned. The picture of the 809th quarry (below) is the south wall. Jim wrote, "If one faced north there was a high hill and the 808th EAB operated a quarry there. Both of these were right on the Yellow Sea." Later on, the 841st would use the quarry closest to base to obtain earth to fill in the rice paddies for the new north-south runway by cutting into the mountain side. This large scar is still seen today from miles away. This quarry is now a storage area for road construction materials. The other rock quarry is still in use providing stones for the tidal reclamation projects that are on-going. 809th Quarry Wall (Feb 1952) (Courtesy James Heath) (Click on map to enlarge)Jim also remembers a USO show to keep the troops morale up, "I remember the Danny Kay USO show raining hard and mud like I never seen before." Well, Jim...welcome to Kunsan a place with only two seasons -- freezing cold or steaming hot -- and torrential downpours in-between. (Note: Arthur Arseltine of the 808th remembered this show being performed in the NCO club.) Kunsan AB: 1951-1952 (Click on map to enlarge) | Aerial view (20 Sep 52) (Courtesy Wes Jacobson) (Click on map to enlarge) |
The original runway was asphalt over the mud underlayer that created a wave-effect on aircraft takeoffs and landings. It was excavated and filled with rock and concrete. Thus the next runway was concrete. This 6,300 ft concrete runway was further extended to 9,000 ft by the 808th and 809th EAB in the fall and winter of 1951. After the runway extension was complete, the 809th EAB moved on to Chunchon Airdrome (K-47) to build an new airstrip there in Apr 52. Though some elements of the 809th remained temporarily at Kunsan, the maintenance of the runway became the sole responsibility of the 808th EAB. The field at Chunchon later became Camp Page and according to Jim, the strip is still in the same location as it was when they built it. After Chunchon, the 809th was at Anyang, Pyongtaek and Kimpo between 1952-1953.
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