"The entire province of Cholla Pukto (North) was assigned to the 63rd as its zone of occupation. The 1st Battalion took over the Iri-Chonju-Chinan-Namwon sector; the 2nd Battalion, the Chonup-Kochang-Puan sector; and the 3rd Battalion, the Kunsan-Kumje sector."

"...First priority mission of the Regiment was to disarm and evacuate to Japan all Japanese army and navy forces in its zone. ... Another important mission...was the handling of all displaced persons in its zone. By 10 December 1945, 98% of the 30,000 Japanese civilians residing in the Regimental zone had been evacuated. ...Early in December, the port of Kunsan was designated as a main port of entry for Korean repatriates returning from Japan and China... over 35,000 Koreans having been processed through the port. ...Probably the most difficult mission assigned the Regiment in Korea was the establishment of Military Government."

Decisions leading to the Occupation of Korea: (NOTE: Our thanks to Joe Svinth for bringing this article to our attention.)

Excerpts from Portentous Sideshow: The Korean Occupation Decision by Donald W. Boose, Jr. from Parameters, Winter 1995, pp. 112-129. Colonel Donald W. Boose, Jr. (USA, Ret.) is the former Director of Asian Studies at the US Army War College. He spent six years with the United Nations Command Component of the Military Armistice Commission in Korea and was the Assistant Chief of Staff/J-5 (Director of Strategic Plans and Policy) of US Forces, Japan, from 1987 to 1990. He currently teaches at the Army War College.

The surrender declaration read:

"The senior Japanese Commanders and all ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces within . . . Korea north of 38 north latitude . . . shall surrender to the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East . . . . [A]ll ground, sea, air and auxiliary forces in . . . Korea south of 38 north latitude . . . shall surrender to the Commander in Chief, US Army Forces, Pacific." -- General Order Number 1, Military and Naval Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers 2 September 1945. -- "General Order No. 1, Military and Naval," quoted in US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1945 (Washington: GPO, 1969), VI, 659.

During the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II in the Pacific, attention has focused largely on those events that were obvious historical turning points: the detonation of the atomic bombs and the surrender ceremony that marked the end of the Japanese Empire. But even as General MacArthur was accepting the Japanese surrender on board the USS Missouri, an American occupation force was preparing to sail for Korea. This other operation, the result of a series of US wartime decisions, seemed very much a sideshow compared to the main event taking place in Tokyo Bay. But it was a sideshow with serious consequences, for the movement on short notice of an occupation force to Korea not only assured US access and influence and preserved half the peninsula from communism, it also established the conditions that led to the Korean Conflict and thus played a role in shaping the bipolar US-Soviet confrontation of the Cold War.

Korea had always been a sideshow from the US perspective. Before World War II, Americans took little notice of Korea, which had been a Japanese colony since 1910. Even after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Korea was incidental to US operations in East Asia. In the Pacific, American efforts were directed at holding a line against the Japanese assault and establishing a system of bases and lines of communications in preparation for a counteroffensive. The strategic policy toward China was to keep that country fighting without a major investment of US forces. Korea, whether viewed in terms of the Pacific or of China, was far from American forces and as inaccessible as the Japanese islands themselves.

Initially, American leaders tended to see Korea as largely a Chinese concern. But as the war continued, tensions with the Soviet Union increasingly influenced American policy. The problem was that until near the end of the war, the United States sought Soviet intervention in East Asia to place additional pressure on Japan and thereby reduce American costs and casualties. At the same time, American officials also realized that postwar access and influence in Northeast Asia was important to the United States and, if the USSR did intervene in the Pacific, it would very likely end the war in occupation of Manchuria, Korea, and perhaps even part of Japan.

Until his death in 1945, President Roosevelt was the ultimate arbiter of US policy. While his motivations remain subject to debate, he clearly saw cooperation with the Soviet Union as essential to the prosecution of the war and to establishing postwar peace and stability. He made great efforts to enhance that cooperation in the face of Stalin's growing suspicions. Yet his actions reflected a pragmatic view, and he took a number of steps to limit Russia's postwar influence in East Asia. At the same time, the President avoided making unequivocal statements or supporting actions that would reinforce Russian suspicions or disrupt US public support for the war effort.

US policy toward Korea was part of that pattern. Thus, Korean exiles seeking diplomatic recognition for a Korean Provisional Government in China met with polite rebuff, at least in part to avoid stimulating Soviet reaction. There were other reasons as well, including a desire not to "compromise the right of the Korean people to choose the ultimate form and personnel of the government which they may wish to establish." Roosevelt sought to sidestep this government-in-exile issue and avoid a confrontation over Korea while still assuring postwar US influence by proposing an international trusteeship in which the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union would participate.

When the Cairo Declaration was issued by Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on 1 December 1943, it read in part: "The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." While trusteeship was not specifically mentioned in the declaration, the concept was discussed by the Cairo participants, as well as by Roosevelt and Stalin at the Teheran Conference, and the term "in due course" clearly indicated that some temporary period of external supervision was to be imposed on Korea. Military planners assumed that the trusteeship mechanism would come into effect at the end of the war, but while the Allies discussed the concept from time to time, the Allied leaders never reached a formal agreement on the structure and operation of a trusteeship.

In late 1944, with invasion of the Japanese home islands under active consideration, the United States stepped up its efforts to obtain Russian intervention. Preliminary US-British-Soviet talks took place in the fall of 1944. At the February 1945 Yalta Conference, Stalin agreed that Russia would enter the Pacific War two or three months after the defeat of Germany. His conditions, accepted by Roosevelt and Churchill, included Soviet control of southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands and (subject to agreement by Chiang Kai-shek) preservation of the status quo in Outer Mongolia, Soviet access to the Manchurian port of Dairen (Lüda), control of the Port Arthur (Lüshun) naval base, and Soviet railroad rights in Manchuria.

As the war entered its final stages, Korean exile groups made new proposals to contribute to the war effort. Although the United States continued its policy of nonrecognition of any exile group, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) believed that individual Korean exiles might play some kind of role in psychological operations or in clandestine direct action missions. To that end the OSS recruited agents and established training camps in China, but the war ended before any missions were carried out.

By the spring of 1945, the US Pacific commanders were formulating a plan for the successive invasion of the southernmost Japanese home island of Kyushu (Operation Olympic) in November 1945 and of the main island of Honshu (Operation Coronet) in June 1946. US military planners briefly considered Korea as an alternative to Kyushu for an advanced base from which to tighten the blockade and prepare for the final assault against Honshu. But an assault on Korea, it was believed, would cost even more American lives than the Kyushu operation, and US forces would still be far from their ultimate objective. Soviet intervention was no longer considered essential to the success of the operation, although such intervention would, if properly timed, unquestionably shorten the war and reduce casualties. Moreover, the JCS was reluctant to commit US forces on the Asian continent. In June 1945 they told President Truman:

With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japs in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalize the Chinese to a point where, with assistance of American air power and some supplies, they can mop out their own country.

Although the JCS still saw Soviet intervention as useful, if no longer critical, US-Soviet relations had deteriorated markedly after the Yalta Conference. Among the factors contributing to this development were the death of President Roosevelt, the influence on President Truman by advisors who favored a strong line toward Russia, US frustrations over Soviet attitudes toward lend-lease and combined operations, and conflicting US and Soviet views on the postwar treatment of Germany and Eastern Europe (particularly Poland). Military planners were not insensitive to these political considerations. Mid-1945 saw a marked reduction in American efforts to achieve Russian cooperation in carrying out preparations for the forthcoming offensive. The JCS canceled plans to send US liaison teams into Russia and to establish air bases in Siberia, and postponed discussions on a Pacific supply route to Russia.

In May, Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew had sent memoranda to the Secretaries of War and Navy requesting their views on the political effects of Soviet entry in the Pacific War. He suggested that prior to any implementation of the Yalta Agreement, the United States should seek a firm commitment on the part of the USSR to the future freedom and independence of Korea and an agreement that Korea be placed under a four-power trusteeship immediately upon liberation. In reply, the two service Secretaries expressed a belief that the Soviets would enter the Pacific War at a time of their choosing "with little regard to any political action taken by the United States." The United States had little political leverage with regard to the Yalta Agreements, they pointed out, since those concessions were "within the military power of Russia to obtain regardless of US military action short of war," and since Russia was "capable of defeating the Japanese and occupying Karafuto [Sakhalin], Manchuria, Korea, and Northern China before it would be possible for the US military forces to occupy these areas." In spite of these reservations about the effectiveness of such a move, the Secretaries agreed that it would still be desirable to attempt to obtain the suggested commitments from the Soviet government.

In May 1945, US Special Representative Harry Hopkins traveled to Moscow as a preliminary to the upcoming Potsdam summit. Although he was provided with extensive briefing papers and a detailed draft agreement on Korean trusteeship for negotiation with Stalin, Hopkins' message to the President on the meeting stated only that "Stalin agreed that there should be a trusteeship for Korea under China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States." This verbal agreement and a subsequent one made by Stalin to Chinese Foreign Minister T. V. Soong appear to be the only accords on trusteeship in existence when the war ended.

Nor did any substantive talks on the Korean trusteeship issue take place at the July 1945 Potsdam Conference. The Combined Chiefs of Staff met with Soviet Chief of Staff, General Alexei E. Antonov, and his staff to discuss the coordination and division of operations between US and Soviet forces when Russia entered the war, including the coordination of air and naval boundaries near Korea. Nevertheless, except for a brief and inconsequential exchange on 22 July, the political leaders apparently did not discuss Korea.

While nothing of substance regarding Korea took place in the tripartite forum, behind the scenes at Potsdam, in Washington, and at the Pacific commanders' headquarters on Guam and in Manila, US leaders made decisions that would have important consequences for Korea. These decisions appear to have been influenced by a number of factors: concerns about Soviet actions and intentions, a new confidence that had emerged with the successful test of the atomic bomb immediately before the summit, and consequent realization that Japan might surrender without an invasion, allowing the United States to establish a presence in Korea without expending American lives in the process.

After he was informed that the atomic bomb test had been successful, President Truman asked Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson to query General Marshall as to whether or not Soviet intervention in the Pacific was still desirable. Stimson talked to Marshall on 23 July and interpreted the Chief of Staff's comments to indicate "that now with our new weapon we would not need the assistance of the Russians to conquer Japan." But, Marshall cautioned, the Soviets, with troops massed on the Manchuria border, were in a position to strike anyway, and thus get "virtually what they wanted in the surrender terms."

On the following day, General Antonov asked General Marshall if American forces could conduct operations "against the shores of Korea" in coordination with the Soviet units that would conduct an offensive in the Korean Peninsula. Marshall replied that no amphibious operations against Korea were planned, at least until after the Kyushu invasion, because they would expose American shipping to Japanese suicide attacks in the Sea of Japan and would divert assault ships from the landings on Kyushu. On 26 July, air and sea boundaries were established, but no provision was made for ground boundaries. President Truman later recorded that "no lines were set up for land operations since it was not anticipated by our military leaders that we would carry out operations to Korea."

The President would have been more accurate had he said there were no intentions of carrying out combat operations. In fact, the United States had begun planning for the noncombat occupation of Korea and stepped up the pace of those preparations at the very time Marshall was coordinating with Antonov. In August 1944, the JCS had directed the Joint War Planning Committee to "prepare plans for the occupation of Japanese-held strategic positions in the event of withdrawal of Japanese forces, collapse of the Japanese Government, or surrender." Little was done in this regard until after the outline plans for the invasions of Kyushu and Honshu had been completed. It was May 1945 before the Joint War Plans Committee turned its attention to the problem of contingency planning for Japan's surrender. The Joint Planning Staff recognized that there were areas "other than Japan proper" which the United States might find it necessary to seize. By June, the joint planners were including Korea (as well as places in Manchuria, Formosa [Taiwan], Indochina, and the China Coast) as being among those areas. On 14 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz to prepare plans "to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances, such as sudden collapse or surrender, to effect an entry into Japan proper for occupational purposes."

By 10 July, the Joint War Plans Committee had refined their outline plan. They anticipated that the United States would be responsible for the occupation of Japan proper, Korea, the Shanghai-Nanking area of China, the enemy-held Pacific islands, and Formosa, in that priority. The JCS followed this up prior to the Potsdam talks by directing the Pacific commanders to broaden their plans to include Korea. In response, MacArthur suggested that Tokyo and Seoul should have first priority for occupation, with Pusan and Kunsan having second and third priority. Thus, as the Potsdam Conference convened, the Joint War Plans Committee in Washington, General MacArthur's staff in Manila, and Admiral Nimitz's staff on Guam had all made considerable progress on occupation plans.

On 25 July, during the Potsdam conference, Marshall provided Truman a memorandum on the status of planning for a sudden Japanese surrender, informing the President:

Instructions were issued in June to General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz to prepare plans for occupation of Japan in event of a sudden collapse or surrender. Further instructions were issued to these commanders last week to include Korea in their plans and both commanders were informed that collapse or surrender might occur before Russia entered the war. General Wedemeyer [Commanding General, US Forces, China Theater] was also informed.

On the same day (the day after his initial talks with Antonov), Marshall directed Lieutenant General John E. Hull, Chief of the War Department Operations Division (OPD), to be prepared to move some troops into Korea. Hull did some preliminary planning with regard to possible ground boundaries between US and Soviet forces in the peninsula. Since it was considered necessary that at least two major seaports be included in the American zone (presumably for logistical support), a tentative line was drawn north of Seoul, "not on the 38th Parallel but near it and, generally, along it."

Marshall then wired MacArthur, advising him that "it appears likely that decisions may be reached in the near future on the occupation, control and treatment of Japan after the Japanese capitulation," and requesting MacArthur's views on the occupation of Japan and Korea. At the same time, Hull dispatched a message to OPD requesting them to "forward immediately gist of available information on MacArthur's plans for occupation of Japan and Japanese held areas in event of Japanese collapse or surrender in immediate future."

Both Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur had prepared occupation plans in the event of a sudden Japanese surrender in response to the JCS directive of 14 June. The Navy plan (Campus) called for the initial occupation of Tokyo by naval forces followed by landing of Army units in principal areas throughout Japan. MacArthur's plan (Blacklist) provided for the landing of strong forces from all three services in Tokyo, followed later by the occupation of secondary areas. A JCS plan, a combination of Campus and Blacklist, was also developed. But this plan was still under discussion when Japan surrendered, and in fact it was Blacklist ("with ad hoc modifications") which was used.

The Blacklist plan was still under development, however, when the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. Two days later, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov summoned Japanese Ambassador Sato and informed him that a state of war would exist between the Soviet Union and the Japanese Empire as of 9 August. On 9 August the US detonated the second atomic bomb, over Nagasaki, and Soviet troops crossed the Manchurian border in an attack against the Japanese Kwantung Army.

On 10 August, the Japanese government indicated its willingness to surrender and asked for an armistice. This initiated days and nights of frantic and confused activity as American officials, planners, and action officers in Washington and the Western Pacific redirected their efforts from combat operations to preparations for the occupation and administration of Japan and its conquered territories. The State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) and the Joint Staff Planners began a series of long conferences to develop the necessary instruments of surrender.[NOTE 33. The paramount issue to US planners was to assure that the US controlled the occupation of Japan and, to that end, to deploy US occupation forces into Japan as quickly as possible. The insertion of US forces into Korea was the second priority. But at the same time, General Wedemeyer was sending urgent messages calling attention to the civil war then beginning to heat up between the Chinese central government and the Chinese communists. Wedemeyer sought US forces to occupy key areas in China. Meanwhile, the Australians, British, Dutch, and French were all pressing to assure that their particular interests in the Japanese-occupied colonial areas would be protected.

A key document would be General Order 1, the first paragraph of which designated in detail the particular Allied authority to whom the Japanese forces in each area of the Far East were to surrender. This explicit information was intended to forestall jurisdictional quarrels between Allied commanders and to prevent attempts at opportunism on the part of Japanese commanders who might otherwise use promises of surrender to cause dissension among the Allies. Colonel C. H. Bonesteel III, Chief of the OPD Policy Section and member of the SWNCC Far Eastern Subcommittee, was directed to write a draft of General Order 1 for the consideration of the Joint Staff Planners and the SWNCC. Proposals for this document had been developed by the Joint Postwar Committee as early as December 1944, but the early versions did not provide explicit instructions as to who would accept the Japanese surrender in which areas.

Colonel Bonesteel and another member of his section, Colonel Dean Rusk, retired to an adjoining room to clarify these points. With regard to Korea, the problem was to reconcile State Department guidance that the boundary should be as far north as possible, with the inability of the United States to move troops to Korea quickly. Soviet troops were known to be advancing rapidly toward Korea, while the US forces designated for the occupation of the peninsula (and the forces closest to Korea) were on Okinawa with priority for troop movement going to those elements that would occupy Japan. A major consideration was the desirability of including three specific areas in the American zone: Seoul (the capital of Korea and the area designated for the initial Blacklist landings), Kaesong (an ancient capital city), and prisoner of war camps near Seoul. The previous discussions at Potsdam by General Marshall and General Hull concerning a US-Soviet boundary in Korea and the Blacklist Plan, although known to Colonel Bonesteel, influenced his deliberations only insofar as they reflected the time and space factors involved in the transportation of US troops to Korea.

An important consideration, as Bonesteel later described it, was the nature of the boundary line to be selected:

A first matter for choice was whether the line should serve Korean provincial boundaries or be a more non-political designator. The Allies, at the summit conferences, had agreed that Korea would be removed from Japanese hegemony and in due course become again an independent nation. However there was considerable vagueness in how this formula would be carried out and it was felt that every effort should be made to avoid the implication that the line for surrender had any political connotation in regard to the evolution of an independent Korea. Thus the choice of a parallel of latitude over the perhaps more recognizable provincial boundaries.

With these considerations in mind, Bonesteel and Rusk recommended the 38th Parallel as the boundary in Korea, dividing the country roughly in half and placing Seoul, Kaesong, and the prisoner of war camps in the American zone. The draft first paragraph of General Order 1 (which covered the surrender of Japanese forces throughout the Far East as well as Korea) was put in the hands of Brigadier General George A. Lincoln, Chief of the OPD Strategy & Policy Group, who, in the early hours of 11 August, presented it to the Joint Staff Planners.

One of the Joint Planners suggested that the boundary should be moved up to the 39th Parallel, a line which, if extended into the Liaotung Peninsula, would put the Manchurian ports of Dairen and Port Arthur in the American zone. General Lincoln suggested that the Soviets would be unlikely to accept a boundary that excluded them from Dairen and that it would be difficult to get American forces to the two seaports before the Russians arrived. A telephone call was put through to Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn, who expressed a view that Korea was considered politically more important to the United States than Dairen. Accordingly, the 38th Parallel recommendation was retained when the Joint Planners passed the draft of General Order 1 along to the SWNCC.

While these deliberations were taking place, there were ominous signs from Moscow that would directly affect the Korean question. Edwin W. Pauley, the Presidential Representative on Reparations, reported that the Soviets were becoming truculent in the reparations negotiations. Wiring from Moscow, Pauley urged the President to occupy as much of the industrial area of Korea as possible until a satisfactory agreement on reparations was concluded. Ambassador Harriman warned the President that Stalin was making increasing demands on the Chinese Foreign Minister and recommended that the United States send troops to Korea and the Kwantung Peninsula. At the same time, Russian troops continued to advance in Manchuria and Korea. Colonel General Ivan Chistyakov's Twenty-fifth Army crossed the Tumen River and attacked overland while Soviet naval task forces conducted amphibious operations along the northeastern Korean coast.

On 15 August, the SWNCC sent a clean draft of General Order 1 to the White House. President Truman approved the order and sent copies to Moscow and London. General Lincoln recommended that if the Russians refused to accept the proposed boundary in Korea and occupied Seoul ahead of MacArthur's troops, the American occupation forces should be sent to Pusan. As it turned out, however, Stalin made no objection to the 38th Parallel proposal.

On Okinawa and in the Philippines, the forces designated to occupy Korea began frantic preparations to move to Seoul. The Blacklist plan designated General Joseph W. Stilwell, former US commander in China, as the commander of the Korean occupation. Stilwell spoke Chinese and had years of experience in East Asia, but he had often clashed with Chiang Kai-shek and had left China in October 1944. Now he commanded the Tenth Army on Okinawa and had been preparing to play a major role in the assault on Japan when the war ended. His occupation force was to include Tenth Army Headquarters, two infantry divisions, plus combat and support elements from Lieutenant General John R. Hodge's XXIV Corps. Hodge and his headquarters would remain behind to garrison Okinawa.

Major General Frank D. Merrill, Stilwell's Chief of Staff, announced on 11 August that Tenth Army would occupy Korea 27 days after "B Day"--the day on which peace talks would begin and occupation operations would be initiated. During the next two days the Tenth Army staff reviewed the Blacklist plan. Almost immediately, however, a significant change in plans was announced. On 13 August, General Stilwell flew to Manila to confer with General MacArthur and to undergo minor surgery. While he was there, Tenth Army Headquarters received a message advising them that Blacklist was amended: XXIV Corps would assume responsibility for the Korean occupation, and the Tenth Army Headquarters would remain on Okinawa. It would not be Stilwell, the old Asia hand, who would command the Korean occupation, but Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, a solid combat commander, but a man with no particular qualifications to administer a liberated Asian nation. The reasons for this change are not completely clear. MacArthur shared with Stilwell the gist of an "eyes only" message from Washington. Apparently, Chiang Kai-shek had heard that Stilwell would command US troops landed on the "China coast" and Truman had assured him that this was not true. Since Korea might, in Washington, be considered a part of the "China coast," MacArthur decided to pull Stilwell from the Korean occupation. "So, they cut my throat again," Stilwell mused in his diary. "Why did they let me come out here if they were not going to back me up?" This change in the occupation commander had serious consequences. During the occupation Hodge proved to be insensitive to the complex and volatile Korean environment and made decisions that aggravated an already difficult situation.

On 15 August, President Truman announced that the Japanese government had accepted the terms of surrender. General Merrill advised the XXIV Corps staff that 15 August was B Day; serious preparations for the move to Korea now began. The Blacklist plan designated who would go where in the course of the occupation and gave a general idea of what they would do when they got there. When the war ended, however, almost none of the preliminary actions necessary to implement the plan had been carried out. Although the corps headquarters and the 7th Infantry Division were on Okinawa, the other units assigned to the Korea occupation force were located on Iwo Jima, Angaur (southernmost of the Palau Islands), and various islands throughout the Philippines. They would have to be embarked, transported to Okinawa, and then moved to Korea. Shipping was at a premium at the time, and movement of the massive occupation force to Japan had first priority. Responsibility for this difficult transportation task was assigned to Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey's Seventh Amphibious Force. Admiral Barbey and his staff were at Manila and his ships were scattered across the Western Pacific, some as far away as New Guinea.

While Admiral Barbey marshaled his transports and warships, the XXIV Corps Army Support Command (24th ASCOM) began developing loading plans and accumulating the supplies required to support the occupation troops. An enormous quantity of supplies had been stockpiled on Okinawa in preparation for the invasion of Japan. The reallocation of those supplies to the occupation force was a major task which had to be performed in a very short time. Confusion was inevitable. General MacArthur's headquarters warned the occupation commanders that because supply ships were being diverted from other duties to support the occupation force, supplies and materials arriving in occupied areas would not be those that would ordinarily be shipped to meet requirements for support of troops. XXIV Corps was moving from a tropical area to one where a severe winter could be expected. All the corps troops were in summer uniforms and had no winter equipment. Fortunately, a cargo ship full of woolen uniforms, stoves, and tents was discovered en route to Alaska. The ship was diverted and arrived at Inchon shortly after the occupation force.

While the 24th ASCOM labored to prepare men and supplies for loading on Admiral Barbey's ships when they arrived, General Hodge worked to find out what was going on in Korea. His immediate problem was a lack of information about what the Russians and Japanese were doing. By 22 August it was clear that the Russians had occupied Manchuria, but the situation in Korea was obscure. General MacArthur, still under the impression that the occupation was to be on a quadripartite basis, sent a message to the War Department requesting information on the agreements reached with the allied nations (especially Russia) regarding Korea. The SWNCC sent a reply to General MacArthur on 1 September, advising him:

In the absence of declared intentions by the United Kingdom, China, or other United Nation, initial occupation of Korea will be by US and Soviet forces only. . . . The matter of international arrangement with regard to Korea is under urgent consideration by the State Department.[49]

Before he received this message, MacArthur sent a letter to Hodge advising him that "Consideration must be given to the possibility that the Russians may occupy the Keijo [Seoul] area prior to the landing of the XXIV Corps." General MacArthur concluded that US forces were "clearly" authorized to enter Keijo to receive the surrender. Furthermore, he desired that they do so even if Russian forces were already present. General Hodge was therefore ordered to proceed to Inchon and, if Russians were there, to make prior contact with them. MacArthur should be notified and the landing delayed, if "events indicate that international complications will result."[50]

On 29 August, General MacArthur radioed the Japanese government that the landing in Korea would take place on 7 September. He ordered them to direct the Japanese commander in South Korea to establish contact with General Hodge by 31 August and gave instructions concerning the preparations to be made to receive the occupation force. Radio contact was finally established with the Japanese military commander in Seoul on 1 September. Hodge now knew for certain that Russian forces had not moved into South Korea.

An advance party from Hodge's headquarters flew to Korea on 4 September. Since the Russian consulate had continued to operate in Seoul throughout the short Russo-Japanese War, the advanced party had no difficulty in carrying out General MacArthur's order to make prior contact with the Russians.

Although the Japanese surrender occurred before the plan for the movement of occupation forces to Korea was complete, the plan as it existed had provided enough guidance so that troops, transportation, and equipment could be marshaled and the landings accomplished within the time schedule originally established. The occupation, in the tactical sense, was carried out with as fair a degree of success as could be expected of any hasty military operation. With regard to military government and civil affairs, however, the situation was far more serious.

To begin with, General Hodge's command suffered from a lack of trained civil affairs specialists. For reasons which remain unclear (perhaps because of the relatively low priority with which planners had viewed Korea), the US military did not begin serious efforts at Korea-oriented civil administration training until the end of the war.[51] Whatever the reason, military government personnel had not been assigned to XXIV Corps, nor had any civil affairs units been designated or trained for Korea.

In order to provide a nucleus of officers who could begin planning for the military government, the Tenth Army Anti-Aircraft Artillery Command was designated to act as the Military Government Headquarters. None of the officers of this command was trained in civil affairs, but an additional 20 civil affairs officers (none with any knowledge of Korea) were later transferred to Hodge's command from Tenth Army. A few additional civil affairs officers were subsequently diverted from Japan to Korea, but none of them arrived until after the landing at Inchon. Korea-oriented civil affairs training for units slated for Korea did not even begin until September 1945. As a result, in the crucial early days of the occupation the military government of Korea was carried out not by trained civil affairs specialists, but by combat troops. Moreover, there were no Korean linguists. After the long Japanese occupation, most Koreans could be expected to understand Japanese, but they would understandably prefer that the military government use their own language. No Americans on Okinawa could speak Korean. A search of the island finally turned up "six paroled Korean prisoners of war, who were accordingly attached to the XXIV Corps."

An even more serious difficulty was the lack of policy guidance. General Hodge had not received any instructions on such key questions as Korean independence, the severing of Korea from Japanese influence, and domestic Korean politics. Nor was General MacArthur at Manila any better informed. His 22 August message to the JCS urgently requested information for the guidance of the XXIV Corps. In the course of preparing a reply, the SWNCC advised the JCS that "there is no agreed United States view as to the character of administration of civil affairs in Korea." Four days later the US Consul General at Manila advised the State Department that General MacArthur had not yet received any directive regarding Korea. On 18 August General Hodge requested that the State Department send him a representative to provide political guidance. In response, Mr. H. Merrell Benninghoff was dispatched to Okinawa, arriving on 3 September just before the XXIV Corps embarked. His instructions had been scanty and he could add little to Hodge's knowledge of American policy toward Korea. A week after the occupation began, Benninghoff sent a letter to the State Department advising that one of the great difficulties facing the American headquarters was a total absence of any policy guidance. In fact, the initial directive on civil affairs administration in Korea was not sent from Washington until 17 October 1945, more than a month after the arrival of Hodge's advance party.

Finally, there was the problem for the occupation force of finding any information about the country they were to occupy. One of the few sources of intelligence was the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study of Korea (JANIS 75), which had been published in April 1945. This document contained some useful data but was superficial. Korean prisoners of war captured on Okinawa were interrogated and provided a small amount of additional information. Since the situation in Korea was obscure and General MacArthur wanted to avoid any incidents prior to the occupation, aerial reconnaissance of Korea was forbidden. However, some recent prints of aerial photographs were discovered, and the XXIV Corps staff persuaded an Army Air Force reconnaissance squadron on Okinawa to fly a few photographic sorties. The resulting photographs, although inadequate for combat operations, were useful for planning the deployment of the occupation troops. Thus, in the absence of any more authoritative information, the former anti-aircraft gunners of the newly formed Military Government Headquarters planned for the occupation of Korea using War Department field manuals, some illicit aerial photographs, the Cairo Declaration, and JANIS-75.

After Admiral Barbey marshaled his ships and set sail for Okinawa, his arrival was delayed by a series of typhoons, one of which devastated Okinawa and caused a week-long delay in the loading of the XXIV Corps. But by 5 September the lead elements of XXIV Corps were en route to Korea, landing at Inchon on the afternoon of 8 September.

The decisions having been made and the forces having been gathered and deployed across the vastness of the Western Pacific, the American occupation of Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude now began. But within Korea lay powerful, pent-up nationalist emotions and deep social and political schisms. While in American eyes Korea still lay in the shadow of Japan and events in Europe, it was, in fact, at the sensitive nexus where American and Soviet interests intersected. The Americans who occupied Korea entered an extraordinarily sensitive, complex, and strangely unfamiliar environment. They did well on a day-to-day basis, but they made many mistakes--some from arrogance, but most from ignorance, lack of forethought, and unpreparedness for their task. In succeeding years, Koreans and Americans would pay a heavy price for the failure to pin down an international agreement on Korean trusteeship, the lack of preparation for civil administration, and the hasty decision in selecting the American occupation commander. September 1945 saw not only the beginning of the occupation of Korea, but also the beginning of the march toward the Korean War.

We can never know how events might have unfolded had the United States not deployed occupation forces to Korea in 1945, but two consequences seem beyond dispute. Without the occupation, Korea would have become a communist state and the Korean War as we know it would never have occurred. The Cold War would certainly have taken a different course, in detail, if not in its fundamental outline. Americans can take pride in the proficiency and professionalism with which a large occupation force was marshaled and lifted across the Western Pacific on short notice. Many may argue that, for all the subsequent cost in blood and treasure, that deployment was a fortunate event. But they may also ponder how much better the outcome might have been had the Americans been as proficient in the politico-military aspects as they were in the operational aspects of the occupation.

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Occupation Forces: According to American Military Government in Korea by E. Grant Meade, 1951, (p76) "From a command point of view no separation had been made between the Japanese and Korean Occupations. Both were under the authority of General MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), and the first policy statements dealing with Military Government in Chosen (Korea) were issued by him from Japan before the XXIVth Corps landed in the peninsula. Error lay in not separating the two administrations and in not providing a more direct channel between Seoul and Washington. MacArthur could hardly be expected to give Korean problems more than secondary consideration, and there was a tendency to place both Japan and Korea in the same category. As one was an enemy, it would have been appropriate to place the two upon a different footing. The State Department was required to deal with Korea through SCAP, and the implementation of its Korean policies was conditioned by the attitudes of the military toward the Japanese occupation, whether these policies had any connection with that operation or not. In Chosen both the Americans and Koreans were adversely affected by this setup. The former found supplies scarce, replacements inferior, and promotion slow; the latter suffered from a stifled foreign trade program, an influx of destitute refugees, and the opprobrium of being classed with an enemy. No one benefited by the situation, but the most serious casualty was American foreign policy."

The magnitude of the problems that the Occupation forces faced was insurmountable. An example of these problems is related in This Kind of War, The Classic Korean War History by T.R. Fehrenbach, 1962. The experiences in 1945 of Lieutenant Colonel William P. Jones, Jr. of Morrisville, Illinois were not unique in Korea -- it was the same everywhere in Korea. Colonel Morrison's unit was brought in from Italy with the job of constructing housing for the U.S. Occupation forces in Pusan. However, his unit was demoralized. "The United States Army which had been the most powerful in the world, did not melt away in an orderly fashion. It disintegrated into a disorganized mob, clamoring to go home. ... No one gave much thought to the work to be done."

"Fortunately for Jones, the Jap soldiers in Korea waiting to be sent home were willing workers. Both Koreans, drunk with new liberation, and Americans, already mentally wearing civilian clothes, grew sullen at the idea of labor. The Japs, now that the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was gone, were affable, smiling, professional, and entirely helpful. Jones put them to work. Somebody had to get the job done."

"Eventually though, all the Japs had to be repatriated. They took with them every military officer, every professional man, every engineer, bank teller, and executive in the Pusan area. They left behind a hell of a mess."

"Like most Americans, Colonel Jones was not prepared to take Chosun. The appalling poverty, the dust, dirt, filth, and eternal clamor of Pusan repelled any man accustomed to the West. Orphan children, with running sores, lay in the streets. Society, with the iron Japanese hand gone, was in dissolution. Money was worthless, since the Japanese had printed billions of yen prior to the surrender and passed it out to all who wanted it. Almost all responsible Koreans, particularly the educated were -- rightly -- tarred with he collaborationist brush."

"Yangban, in conical hats, white robes, gray bearded and wise with years, got roaring drunk and staggered through the streets. Women and children fell beside the roads, and died, ignored by both authorities and passersby."

This is what the Occupation forces faced throughout Korea.

According to American Military Government in Korea (p81), the American Military Government took the final step in "extreme centralization" when General Hodge, on August 31, 1946, requested the military governor in Chollanam-do (South Cholla Province) to "turn over to Koreans the actual operation of all departments of government, with the temporary exception of agencies dealing with property and civilian supply." The provincial government was frozen into complete regimentation. It continued, "Military Government concluded its first year of occupation by foisting upon the Koreans a governmental structure in which one of the most certain safeguards of democracy, local self-determination, was completely lacking." While the people could elect their officials, the officials were NOT responsible to the electorate, but to the authority of USAMGIK (U.S. Army Military Government in Korea).

By 1947, most American Military Government officers realized that they might never be able to restore the Korean economy. South Korea had not been able to develop the necessary capable executives to run the countries businesses. In addition, two-thirds of Korea's people lived and farmed south of the 38th parallel, but almost the entire industry and mineral wealth of the country lay in the north. Without the two halves joined, the task of building a viable economy was impossible. The country was split and it made absolutely no sense -- except to two mutually hostile occupying powers, each with its own irons in the fire...and the Russians and the Americans would not cooperate.

To make matters worse for the Occupation forces, Korea was logistically at the end of the line. Most Army equipment had been diverted to surplus sales, to ease the screaming civilian demand for goods, and very little likelihood of new appropriations. Troop morale was lousy. They didn't have proper food and clothing. Fred Ottoboni's stories of life at Camp Hillenmeyer attest to this fact.

The book summarizes the feeling of all who worked with the Military Government, "...the country was just too damn poor, too primitive, too temperamental, too stinking, for Americans to like or understand. ...few Americans forced to live for an extended period in a land without safe drinking water or plumbing, can keep both equilibrium and an open mind."

"By 1947 the Government of the United States, as well as the men still stationed in Chosun, was sick of the Korean problem. A great deal of effort had been made; a great deal of money had been thrown at it; but the problem wouldn't go away."

"As long as the Military Government remained, South Korea would remain in chaos; no lasting solution to the country's ills could be made. And the forty-five thousand men tied down there were desperately needed elsewhere by the shrunken American ground forces."

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63rd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Battalion:A Soldier's Story (1947-1948):

Acknowledgment: Thanks to Dr. Fred Ottoboni of Reno, Nevada for providing the following information of Camp Hillenmeyer in his book Korea Between the Wars -- A Soldier's Story. Thanks to Russell E. McLogan's book Boy Soldier -- Coming of Age During World War II for providing insights into the operation of the 63d Infantry Regiment in 1945.

63rd Infantry Division History (Dec 1945): An interesting note about the 63rd's history is in Boy Soldier -- Coming of Age During World War II (p. 313). "The Unit History also says that by December 31, 1945, the 63rd Infantry had accomplished the following (abridged) missions in Korea:"

• a. Completed the occupation of Cholla-Pukto Province.
• b. Completed the disarmament and evacuation of 3,751 Japanese Army troops to Japan.
• c. Military Government in Cholla-Pukto Provice down to all 14 Guns (Counties) totaling 1,700,000 in population.
• d. Completed the evacuation of 22,095 Jap civilains to Japan.
• e. Established a processing station at the port of Kunsan. At total of 33,845 Koreans from Japan were unloaded and dispatched by rail to relocations centers in Korea. A total of 251 Chinese were dispatched by LST to China.
• f. Approximately 600 tons of Japanese ammunition and explosives were destroyed.

Repatriation: Prior to the 63d Infantry Regiment, the Japanese were told to report to a central collection33,845 Koreans were processed through Kunsan on the way to relocation centers in Korea. According to reports there were 2 million Koreans in Japan at the end of the war. 1.4 million were voluntarily repatriated, but 600,000 remained in Japan. In the opposite direction, 22,095 Japanese were returned to Japan. (NOTE: Though South Koreans still claim that the Koreans in Japan today are descendants of those conscripted as forced labor before and during WWII, this in NOT true. The fact is that the Japan was forced to use Japanese ships to repatriate the Koreans -- at their expense -- by direction of Gen. McArthur's GHQ. Those that remained in Japan voluntarily became the "Zainichi Koreans" who received special residency permits from the Japanese Government. The facts are that the bulk of these Koreans came to Japan for economic reasons AFTER World War II.)

Sanitation at the time must have been very primative. McLogan commented, "I heard some medics talking once about how they had to meet the incoming ships, mostly LCIs and LSTs, and spray delousing powder on the Koreans before they were allowed to board trains for their home towns."

Hand-drawn map of Camp Hillenmeyer (1947) by Fred Ottoboni

Camp Hillenmeyer:

The Japanese "Kunsan Aerodrome" was originally named "Camp Iri" by the United States Army. It was redesignated as "Camp Kunsan" in 1947. The site was also known as "Camp Hillenmeyer" starting in 1947.

Camp Hillenmeyer is named for an American Army Captain killed in an explosion at the Kunsan ammo dump. On November 30, 1945 two American officers, 3 enlisted men and 12 civilians were killed in an explosion while attempting to defuse abandoned Japanese munitions. After the explosion, one officer and the three enlisted men were missing. Two villages were destroyed and 3,000 people left homeless. (Ref: G-2 Periodic Report of the XXIV Corps USAFIK, Report # 82 dated 1 DEC 1945.) The current Ammo Dump is in the same general location of this explosion.

In Boy Soldier -- Coming of Age During World War II (p.308) Col. Arndt Mueller wrote that Capt. (Henry R.) Hillenmeyer, the S3 Operations Staff Officer along with another officer was killed in this explosion. (McLogan's book has a copy of the condolence letter to Capt. Hillenmeyer's widow signed by Gen. McArthur. Later the 3d Battalion's camp would be unofficially be renamed, Camp Hillenmeyer, though the records indicate that it was officially called first Camp Iri and then Camp Kunsan.)

Col Mueller wrote, "There were numerious Korean casualties. Some were the brave firemen...the rest were in the neighboring village. Most of the houses were flattened. A fierce fire broke out. The figure of 300 Korean caualties is not out of line and may even be a low figure. ... This was a tragedy waiting to happen. Every time I went into that dump, my skin would crawl ... Ammo, black powder, picric acid explosives, fuses and blasting caps were all mixed up. Black powder had been spilled on the ground. The Japs did not obeserve the strict ammo storage procedures that we did..." went on to describe the explosion in the Japanese ammo dump on the South side of the base on Nov 30, 1945. He stated that "Division sent us an explosives expert who was to supervise the job of reducing the dump ... An engineer Lt. in charge of repair of a nearby bridge said that the last he saw of the expert, (just before the explosion), he was standing on top of a pile of explosives directingthe Korean firemen in their attempt to put out a fire in the rice stubble inside the dump." This site remained the ammo storage area for Kunsan AB (K-8) during the Korean War and is the current location of the 8th FW munitions storage area.

McLogan described how they disposed of the Japanese munitions by dumping them into the sea from flat-bottomed barges. Requests to use the Japanese regiment to do this labor was denied because of the fear that Japanese treachery would create a disaster. After the explosion, Col. Mueller stated, "Division said it was OK to use the Japs to dispose the ammo at sea. They did it without incident ... gave me no trouble -- followed all the rules I laid down to the letter. I even took my guards off their compound."

From Paul Hillenmeyer of Dry Ridge, KY, we have learned a little more of Captain Hillenmeyer. Paul wrote, "Captain Hillenmeyer certainly must be Henry Reiling Hillenmeyer, also know as "Henny", who was born in Lexington, KY, 12/24/20, and died November 30, 1945. He was the third of four sons of Walter W. Hillenmeyer, Sr., and Marie Reiling Hillenmeyer. He married Lucy Carolyn Taylor, and a son, Henry, Jr. was born in November 1943, two years before his death. He was a graduate of Campion High School, a jesuit school in Prarie Du Chien, WI, as well as the University of Kentucky."

The following is an excerpt from Fred's email:

"Camp Hillenmeyer was established on the site of the old Japanese Kunsan Airdrome. When the 6th Infantry Division first arrived they called it Camp Iri and later Camp Kunsan. Then, in honor of an Infantry Captain who was killed while in a Japanese Ammo dump at the site while being cleaned up in 1945/46, the camp was named Hillenmeyer and was called that while I was there, 1947/48. Today, the site is the Kunsan United States Air Force Base. At the time I was there, Camp Hillenmeyer was about ten miles by bumpy dirt road down along the Yellow Sea coast from the (Wolmyong Park) tunnel in Kunsan. We lived in Quonset Huts which were not far from the beach of the Yellow Sea."

KP in early 1947
(Left to Right) Walker, Prinzo, and Fred Ottoboni.
Note Pinzo holding chinaware for exclusive use of officers.

"I included in the book as much of the early history of American troops in the Kunsan area as I could find. Not much is available even in military archives. Lots of records seem to have been lost. But there is evidence that the first Americans arrived in September/October of 1945 and established themselves at the Japanese airbase where Japanese airplanes were still sitting out on the field. Troops from the 6th also located units in buildings in Kunsan, Iri and Chonju. These troops were from the 63rd Infantry Regiment that had just finished a very long period of active combat in the Philippine Islands. They came by LST from the Philippines, landed at Inchon, and I think, got to Iri, Chonju, and Kunsan by truck convoys. They were not equipped for the cold weather and used surplus Japanese army clothing and blankets according to one guy (McLogan) that I have talked to who was there at that time."

In Russell E. McLogan's book Boy Soldier -- Coming of Age During World War II (p.303) it mentions long buildings 250-300 ft long with rooms on either side holding 6-8 persons were there upon their arrival in October 1945. From these buildings, one could estimate that there were between 120-180 persons to 240 persons in this area of the base. On p. 300, he states, "It took all day to make the trip from Seoul to Kunsan, some 130 miles. It was dark when we arrived at the Japanese Air Base near Kunsan where the third battalion was billeted in wooden barracks." He described the barracks (p. 303) as "very long and constructed of wood. The interior walls were made of paper-tin plywood. A long, narrow, central hallway ran the length of the barracks some 250 or 300 feet. There were small rooms on both sides of the hallway housing offices and sleeping quarters of the men, six or eight to a room. They were unheated and veritable fire traps." He went on, "Apparently the Japanese military were hardy souls who could live in that climate without heating the barracks. We Americans, who had just arrived from a tropical island, were always cold. We had available for our use small portable kerosene stoves. They were about six inches in diameter and eighteen inches high, about the size of a kerosene lantern, with a single burner on top. We used these little stoves mostly to keep warm, but also to make tea or coffee or to boil fresh eggs which we obtained from the local Koreans. Later one of these stoves was accidentally tipped over and the whole barracks was destroyed.

On pp. 305-306, he went on, "One building, which must have been officers' quarters, had a mini-swimming pool in it which turned out to be a communal bath tub. The story was that the Japanese all bathed together and sat around on the ledge. The cranked the heat way up and the last one to get out was considered to be the toughest. We used it as a reservoir of hot water and dipped buckets out of the pool to bathe." This was the traditional Japanese "furo" used for baths. From Fred Ottoboni's descriptions, there was a building was on the EAST side of what is now Gunsmoke Hill -- near the present POL above ground tank. It was away from the enlisted barracks area on the WEST side of the hill. My assumption is that this was the flight crew or officer billets because of its segregated location.

Yellow Sea and Perimeter Defense: In Russell E. McLogan's book Boy Soldier -- Coming of Age During World War II (p.308) he mentions that "The Yellow Sea was within walking distance and we often walked down to the shore. The tides in this part of the world are enormous, sometimes running as high as 30 heet. When it was at low tide we could stand on the beach and look out over miles and miles of mud flats with the ocean barely discernible on the horizon." There were rice fields between the base and "beach," but the shore line was open.

The Japanese defended their bases with pillboxes overlooking the shoreline. One was near the present Civil Engineering compound on Avenue C and appeared to be a command post. It was used by the 3rd Comm Squadron in the Korean War, but was a nightmare to demolish in the mid-1960s. This resulted in the decision to leave the other pillboxes intact. These pillboxes are along the edge of the golf course. One is across from the gas station and is still used in exercises. One is near the BOQ area and is locked and unused. These pillboxes on the Golf Course were on what was then the perimeter of the base as the north-south runway was not built at the time.

Fred guarding ammo dump
January 1947

Later on Fred described his work on base as part of the 508th Utility Engineering Company. He remembered that the water was supplied from a pond with polluted water from the rice paddies. This pond may be the pond (near the 1947 dependent area) that still exists behind the K-9 kennels today. In the 1952 photo below, the pond can be seen between the shoreline hill on the left and the 1952 BOQ area (1947 Dependent housing) in the foreground. Another possibility is small pond next to the rice paddies (near the Company areas) in 1947 that became an emergency fire-fighting water pond in 1954 ... and is now a water hazard on the golf course.

Aerial view of Camp Hillenmeyer Main Base (Courtesy Robert Grenig)

Aerial view of Camp Hillenmeyer Main Base (Courtesy Robert Grenig)

Aerial view of Dependent Area (Courtesy Robert Grenig)

Aerial view (20 Sep 52) (Courtesy Wes Jacobson) -- (Click on photo to enlarge)
The pond can be seen between the hill on the shoreline to the left
and the BOQ housing area closest to foreground (1947 Dependent area).

He also noted the primitive latrines that were constructed for the troops. "The latrines we built did not have flush toilets or sewer connections. The toilets used at the time were open-topped, 50 gallon steel drums with a flat piece of plywood laid on top of each drum. These pieces of plywood had a hole in it of about the right size."

"The drums were emptied every week by Korean contractors. They came with a horse-drawn honey wagon. To empty the drums, the contractor lifted off the plywood top, set it to one side, brought the barrel outside and dumped it into the honey wagon. All of the latrines in the camp worked this way. I do not think the new latrines were intended to house these steel drum toilets. They, I think, remained in their own separate tin shacks. The new latrines were really washrooms, if I remember correctly. I do remember them being called latrines insofar as their identity for construction purposes." Go to 1947 Photos for a picture of a "honey wagon".

Fred in early 1947
with borrowed parka returning from guard duty.

Robert and Betty Grenig of Scottsdale, Arizona were at the base in 1946-47 and remembered the "honey pots" that lined the road from Camp Hillenmeyer leading into Kunsan. They also remembered the horrific smells of fields fertilized with the "night soil." That's the most likely final repository of that "night soil" collected from Camp Hillenmeyer.

Dependent housing built in 1946 for families at then Camp Hillenmeyer.
Compare the entryway roof and chimney area of this photo and the photo
of the BOQ in the brochure. (Click on the image to enlarge.)
Courtesy Robert and Betty Grenig of Scottsdale, Arizona.

Fred's unit also worked on the construction of dependent housing at Kunsan. The buildings at the north end of the base were for officers' families constructed with Japanese War Reparations materials by Japanese-trained Korean carpenters. In his book, Fred relates some funny anecdotes about differences in American and Japanese-style construction techniques such as putting up wallboard. (Go to Officer's family tour to view examples of their construction.) Jay Grenig of Milwaukee, Wisconsin remembers, "The houses were built by Korean labor using Japanese materials. The plan for the officers' housing (of which I understand some is still in use) was a standardized plan for housing in Japan and Korea. We lived in a similar (albeit two-story) house with the same floor plan in Japan four years later. Conditions were terrible. The plumbing didn't work well. (Took a bath in a washtub in the kitchen.) Cold. " Betty Grenig of Scottsdale, Arizona remembers that the electricity supplied by North Korea was very intermittent at night and her kids took a bath in the kitchen in a washtub. These buildings were later recycled as BOQ billets in the Korean War with the three+ men in the common area (living room) and others in the bedrooms. There was a kitchen, but cooking there was discouraged in the Korean War. See Officers Quarters (1954) for examples of billets.

BOQ billeting 1952
This was the 1947 Dependent housing
Click on photo to enlarge
(Courtesy Hans Petermann)

It is a shame that the hard work of the Occupation forces was soon forgotten. Bruce Verhaaren of the Argonne National Laboratory, University of Chicago, writes, "There are no formal real estate documents predating 4 April 1955, and the first building inventory was completed in 1957. At that time all structures that were recorded as found on base in 1951 were assigned the date of 1950, which they still have in the official database. The report states "it would be safe to assume that these buildings are of Japanese construction" Japanese style and construction materials were also cited as evidence of Japanese construction. Not a bad guess really, but we now know that the housing was built with Japanese reparation materials, and was indeed Japanese. According to your site a standard style was used in Japan and Korea for housing construction by US troops. A Japanese style is likely to have been chosen, since Korea seems to have been pretty much an afterthought at the time. From the photos in Moench's book, Taking Command, they seem similar to the Japanese kirizuma-yane style, a gabled roof with a tile coping along the ridge. It seems Camp Hillenmeyer was pretty much forgotten by 1957."

Off-base Roads: The old roads to Kunsan City followed the route as the irrigation canals (marked in Fig 76 of Lautensach's book). The road proceeded out of the main gate (at the top left corner of the southern polder). The first road proceeds to the reservoir and makes the bend through the hill in the reservoir (21); heads straight through what is now Mimiyon/American town to the base of Wolmyong mountain. Currently there is a new intersection here with an east-west road (Industrial-Complex Road) to connect to the new Industrial road of Waehang. The old road then continued straight to follow the waterfront, much as it does today down to the Wolmyong mountain tunnel. Col. Grenig remembers that there were two roads to the base. The second road connected at the reservoir. The narrow one-truck lane runs along the top of the reservoir dike -- that still exists today -- and connected to the old farm road that headed to Iri (Iksan).

Another Soldier's View Point of Life at Camp Hillenmeyer In Jun 2007, Jim Shofner of Lakeland, FL wrote of his experiences at Camp Hillenmeyer in 1947, He stated that his experiences paralleled those of Fred Ottoboni's except that his company seemed to take care of their troops better. "In my letters and in my memory, I know that our platoon sargeant took care of 'his men.' That could go so far as to steal from others. While I do not approve of it at the time, he brought us provisions from charcoal to heat the hut to clothing. We did not ask where he got it. In one letter I mention that one of our good sargeants was back from the hospital and perhaps our food would be better. Again, I don't know how he made things better for us or even how much was true except what I saw. That includes the charcoal and wood from the backstop at the ball field. The sargeant kept us in a little world of our own as he was very critical of the Army and its ways as he was a 20 year veteran having fought in Burma against the Japanese."

"Some things stand out while other things are long forgotten. For instance: I cannot remember the food or even where we ate. I mention not getting enough to eat...no seconds..in one or two of the letters, but I can't bring up the slightest memory of where we ate it." He also noted that Fred stated in his book that the first sergeant transferred out the "troublemakers" because they made him look bad. He disagreed as he was one of those that was shipped out to Pusan and was not a disciplinary problem. However, at Pusan he admitted that life was much better than at Kunsan. He was discharged in 1948 and attended the University of Florida School of Pharmacy on the GI Bill.

In a message to Fred Ottoboni, he said: "I stayed at an old factory which apparently was the silk factory you mention. We left there for Kunsan on the same day as you, but it must not have been the same train as it had no civilians on board that I recall. The factory must have been a little better than where you stayed, but not any warmer. All the men in one building was a positive and we had a mess hall."

"I left Kunsan in June and was sent to Pusan with the 6th Signal Company which was attached to the headquarters of the 6th Division. Therefore, I think my memories of Pusan are clearer than those of Kunsan We had it good in Pusan comparatively...indoor work as a teletype operator, big PX, theater, and rec hall in the city. Our outfit was about ten miles north of the city, and we also had our own theater, 'beer hall,' and other conveniences in our company area. We also had a radio operators school. All orders for the division came through our office. I stayed there until leaving Korea in Jan '48.

And, we did receive parkas at Hillenmeyer on 1/13 and had our showers working in mid February. However, it was so cold the water lines were frozen most of the time. As I look back and read my letters, I think a big difference was that we seemed to have officers and NCO's that were determined to take care of their men..Company D, that is."

He stated in June 2007:

The one day trip from Okinawa to Korea lengthened to three when our ship developed engine trouble shortly after leaving Naha. We finally arrived at Inchon, Korea, on January 2, 1947.

Due to extreme tidal changes in this area of the world, the ships anchored in the harbor, and the men were taken from the ship to the dock in small landing craft. We then boarded an old train which traveled about thirty miles inland to the replacement depot. It snowed a few days prior to our arrival, and the remaining snow was dirty and the ground was muddy.

The air was smoky from coal-burning heaters, and the buildings seemed dirty and old. We were housed in an abandoned factory building which had no heat. The temperature outside was about 25 degrees, and about four inches of snow fell the first night in Korea. After five long, cold days we boarded trains again to go to our regular outfits. Bob and I parted ways at this time when he was assigned to a unit in Pusan on the southern coast of Korea, and I went to the city of Kunsan on the Yellow Sea.

Korea, known by the people as "The Land of the Morning Calm," was an interesting, but destitute country. Much of the land in the country is cultivated for growing rice. The fields growing it are called "rice paddys." We were warned not to eat fresh vegetables, drink untreated water, and to protect any injuries to the skin, as the farmers used human excrement to fertilize their fields. Men called "honey dippers" collected the material from the pits of the outdoor toilets with small buckets attached to the end of a long pole. The putrid material was placed in barrel like containers on a cart pulled by oxen, and taken to the fields where it was distributed. The air in Korea always had a pungent odor of one kind or another, and foreigners had great difficulty adjusting to their surroundings.

Upon arriving at the new base, I was assigned to the mortar squad of a heavy weapons company of the 63rd Infantry Regiment at Camp Hillenmeyer which was located about seven miles west of Kunsan, Korea. The camp was newly constructed, and the buildings were primarily quonset huts.

Our squad leader was Sergeant Ekhardt, who was a veteran of the war against the Japanese in Burma. He was a strict disciplinarian, and very serious about training us in the use of our weapons. The training was difficult, but we were willing learners because the Russians had six divisions not far away in North Korea.

Most of our time was spent training, but we also were required to take part in "guard duty" periodically. I became accustomed to the task, but my first night was terrifying.

My "post" was a "fuel dump" where fifty gallon drums of diesel fuel and gasoline were stored. When the temperature dipped below freezing during the night, it caused the large drums to contract suddenly with a loud noise. As an inexperienced eighteen year old, in a foreign country, facing fears of an unknown people, the sounds alternating with the quietness of a cold dark night produced an uncontrollable trembling that was relieved only when my shift was completed.

The 63rd Infantry Regiment had a distinguished record in the war. Quoting from a commemorative booklet written on "Regimental Day," July 12, 1947; "On 12 July, 1945, troops of the 63rd Infantry Regiment captured KIANGAN, high in the wild and mountainous Ifugao Province in northern Luzon, Phillipine Islands. The capture of the towns climaxed a sustained 30 days drive against bitter Japanese resistance. KIANGAN was the last great enemy stronghold to fall on Luzon, and for months previously had been the headquarters of General Tomayuki Yamashita, Supreme Japanese Commander in the Phillipines. To the men of the 63rd Infantry the fall of KIANGAN marked the end of a bloody but victorious campaign; to Yamashita it spelled final and utter defeat."

The United States Army was in Korea after World War II as the "Army of Occupation." This meant that the army had control over the country, was to keep peace and order, and perform the duties of a military government until the nationals could resume their rightful place in the society. Thousands of Japanese soldiers were disarmed and returned to Japan. Many Koreans returned to Korea from Japan where they had been sent by the Japanese. By the time I arrived, most of this work had been accomplished. Our job was primarily as a military presence to discourage the Russians from moving into South Korea, and to prevent any local civil disturbance.

During this cold winter in Korea, I began to think about my future for the first time. The men around me were my age or slightly older, and most were planning to return to college. Many of them knew where they were going to school, and what they were going to study. It became clear to me that it would be necessary to have a college education in order to compete in the post-war world. I began to understand that education was the door to the opportunities our great country offered to anyone who would accept the challenge. Around me were people who lived in a country that had been conquered by the Japanese, and oppressed for many years. The Koreans would have given up their own country, and gone to America to benefit from the many advantages that we take for granted.

In mid 1947, I was transferred to the Sixth Signal Company in Pusan. The trip was an overnight trip on a civilian train. It was interesting to be on a train traveling with Korean people. Many of the men brought their lunch in their brief case, but it was difficult to tell what kind of food they were eating. Many had small flasks of "saki," which is a very potent rice wine. Many of the civilian trains are extremely crowded with people standing in doorways, hanging from the steps, and some even riding on the top of the train. Late in the afternoon, we changed trains in Taegu, which is in central Korea. We ate supper there at a small Army post not far from the train station. After being allowed to sleep in a bunk in the sleeping car, we arrived in Pusan early the next morning.

In Pusan, our outfit was housed in a two-story, stucco-type building which had probably been a hotel located about three miles north of the city. The two main buildings contained living quarters, offices, showers, and mess hall. We also had a theater, recreation building, and outdoor privies.

Another large two-story building contained the division radio school. Men from all over our division came here to be trained in the operation of short wave radios. It was very interesting to go into the "radio shack" to hear long and short wave radio communications from all over the world.

I was given an office job of operating a teletype machine because I could type. I worked in the division headquarters building in the central area of the city.

Pusan, the second largest city in Korea, is located on the southern coast, and is a deep-water port. There were many interesting areas to explore, such as the dock area, where there were always many fishing boats tied up with their catch laid out in the sun to dry. The people in Korea ate dried fish as well as fresh fish. There were usually several large freighters in port, and on several occasions naval vessels from Great Britain, or the United States, would stop there. A large island located just off of the coast was rumored to be a lepers colony.

On the sea coast north of the city was a resort area with a nice beach where we went on several occasions. The water, which was the Sea of Japan, was extremely cold.

While walking the streets of Pusan, our sense of smell was assaulted by a different assortment of odors. Drying fish, strange vegetables and spices being cooked by street vendors, burning charcoal, garbage, horse manure in the streets, and occasionally a person left dead on the street, produced various reactions from our senses. A foreign language; strange music with bells, chimes and drums; a different style of clothing; Oriental architecture; and a different monetary system reminded us constantly of our presence in the Orient.

During my stay in Korea, my parents were faithful to send packages of food and various other items I requested. Only very basic supplies were available at the time. All of us looked forward to receiving cookies, jams or anything edible. ...

In January 1948 we began the trip back home.

Occupation Forces in Kunsan City:

Kunsan City: McLogan states, "We could also catch a ride to town, which was a congested, smelly place of mud houses with thatched roofs. The shops were full of junk that we weren't interested in buying. Hair pomades, for instance. There seemed to be hundreds of jars of the stuff in every other shop. They were also overstocked with incense and equipment to burn it. Some soldiers bought some but got a lot of complaints when they tried burning it in the barracks. ... We were forbidden to eat or drink any of the native foods because they didn't have much and needed what little they did have to keep from starving, and their standards of public health were much lower and the prevalence of communicable intestinal diseases, principally typhoid fever and cholera, was very high. This was because they used human excrement as fertilizer on their farms."


Map of Kunsan, Chollabuk-to (1945-46) (CLICK ON MAP TO ENLARGE)


Closeup of Kunsan City, Map of Kunsan, Chollabuk-to (1945-46)

One humorous statement was the combination of human excrement and KIMCHI was the reason for the rank smell of Kunsan. He went on, "Actually, Kunsan was a fairly large city of some 40,000 people at that time. It was Korea's sixth largest port and could accommodate ships of 4000 tons. However, a ship drawing more than eight feet of water could reach the harbor only at high tide. Kunsan was being used to ship out the Japanese and bring in the repatriated Koreans." The pontoon docks were built in about 1932 and later expanded by the Japanese. These conditions in the harbor lasted up until the present times -- even with dredging. It was not until the mid-1990s that they developed the deep water "outer port" (wei hang) area for ships.

Scenes of Poverty around Camp Hillenmeyer scenes (1947)
(From Korea Between the Wars: A Soldier's Story)

In a later email, Fred Ottoboni said: "I made many trips through the Kunsan tunnel as a shotgun guard in the right front seat of G.I. 6x6 trucks. I describe these trips in my book." Facing the tunnel, the temple grounds were on the right. In 1947 there was a large front on these temple grounds. The bell in the park was relocated to a small Japanese temple about three blocks west when the field was converted into a primary school.

Wolmyong Tunnel (1947) (Poor Quality Reproduction).
To the right is Wolmyong Tunnel. To the left is the Temple faced a large open area
The tunnel and temple were one block southwest of the KCC building.
(Courtesy James Wilt)

Wolmyong tunnel (Taebong Tunnel) still exists today under the Wolmyong Park in Kunsan City. (Click on 1947 Kunsan tunnel to view.) Until the early-70s, it was still used for vehicular traffic and the main street ran east-west through the city. Today the tunnel is used only for pedestrian traffic and the main street runs north-south. If connects the park to the fresh fish market along the waterfront.

As to his drive up a steep walkway, the steep walkway is still there, but now it is paved. (Click on Wolmyong Park for photo. The towering Peace Torch monument in the park is a Kunsan landmark.) This drive used to go up past a Japanese-erected pagoda that existed until the 1990s when it was torn down. There was a winding path that connected to the reservoir (city water supply). Nowadays this is a concrete road lit with street lamps and lined with benches that connects Wolmyong park to the reservoir and then exits near Eunjeok-sa temple on the other side of the mountain. It is a favorite exercise path for many people.

Wolmyong Tunnel (2000) -- Closed to vehicular traffic. The walkway leading up to Wolmyong Park are above the tunnel. The Buddhist temple on the left of the tunnel is new. The old Japanese Buddhist Temple (that used to be on the right of the tunnel) has been relocated to about five blocks to the south-east. The temple was constructed using traditional Japanese methods and could be broken down and relocated. It is now located in a quiet cul-de-sac against a hill with the old bell sitting outside under a small shelter. (Click on photo to enlarge)

Fred went on to say, "Also, when I first got there in January, 1947, I was in Kunsan as member of a telephone wire maintenance platoon. There were some telephone poles in Kunsan at that time, but many wires were strung up on the trees. Three of us were in town with a jeep fixing our regimental phone lines. Anyway, the driver decided to show us the park on top of the tunnel and drove the jeep up a long, very steep walkway. Seemed to me at the time that a jeep should not be driving in that particular area, but I was brand new in the area and had no clue about what was right or wrong and, of course, being a buck private, had no authority anyway." In his book, Fred relates how they simply strung the telephone wire on the ground between Camp Hillenmeyer and Kunsan City, but within the city, they strung the wire on available electric poles.

Fred continued, "Interesting to hear the mudflats near Kunsan airbase have been filled in and are now dry land. At low tide, those mudflats extended out into the Yellow sea perhaps a mile or more." The mudflats he mentions being filled in are part of a massive 14-year tideland reclamation project called the "Saemangum Project". Part of this project is the construction of a 33km dike connecting the Pyonsan Peninsula, Kokunsan Islands and the seaside of Kunsan. It is currently projected for completion in 2004.

Fred wrote, "One other thought I did not mention in my last email was the old monastery where a whole company of infantry lived. It was Company L, 63rd Infantry Regiment. For many months, they did all the guard duty in around Kunsan, particularly the port area. ... To get from Kunsan to the monastery, we drove along the shore of the harbor, upstream from Kunsan until the harbor had narrowed to the size of a creek. There was a concrete bridge about 50 feet long across this water gap. Then we drove on up a hill, perhaps a mile or so to the monastery." If you follow the harbor you come to a stream that extends inland and still exists today -- though not as a channel to the sea for boat. The stream enters the harbor at the present location of the KEPCO (Korea Electric Power Co.) power generation site. There is an old "concrete bridge" here with flood gates to one side. Much later, Fred commented, "If I had to try the find the place where L Company was located, I would start at the old tunnel on the side near the harbor. Then I would try to snake eastward along the edge of the harbor and go far enough so that the harbor had narrowed down to maybe a couple of hundred feet. In short, it would look like a creek or a river rather than the old harbor." He went on, "We then came to and crossed a concrete bridge over this creek or river. The bridge seemed to run generally toward the north. We followed this road and began going uphill along a west or southwest facing hillside. After a while, but not far, we came to wooded, kind of flat area where the monastery was located. It seemed to me it overlooked the harbor which was toward the west or southwest." There are two small hills in that area. However, Koreans don't know of any monastery on the hills in that area. But it's been over fifty years.

Fred continued, "When on duty, they lived in a 3 story concrete building in Kunsan we knew as the KCC Building. This building, even though it had no water or heat and most of the windows and doors were broken out, served for two or three years as the guardhouse for the Kunsan area." Built by the Japanese in a 1930s art-deco style, it still used as an auxiliary building to the City Hall government. Some Koreans in Kunsan have stated that "KCC" means "Korean Commerce Committee." Much later Fred commented on the buildings description and it matches the KCC building pictured below. He said, "The KCC Building I remember was in town. The route I remember from Camp Hillenmeyer was in through the tunnel. Go down the main street that extended from the tunnel at that time about 2 to 4 blocks. Turn left, go a block or two or maybe 3 and there it was." He continued, "The construction was not art-deco with the round corner. It was definitely square cornered. Probably three, maybe 4 stories high. Built out of poured in place concrete. Outside and inside color and finish was that of concrete, light gray. The building looked like it was not completely finished. Maybe construction was stopped by WW-2. Or maybe WW-2 ended before it was finished. The inside was bare concrete, including the stairways. Same for the outside." He went on, "There were essentially no plumbing fixtures in the building. Perhaps they had been stolen or maybe they were never installed. I only saw a few bidets on the upper floors. They were made out of white porcelan. I saw no sinks or faucts. There was no water inside the building." The "bidets" that he refers to would be the "bombsight" toilets that are common in Korea even today -- though they are slowly vanishing.

He continued, "The main entry was set back from the sidewalk by a wide set of stairs that was maybe 6 or 7 steps high. These stairs led onto a short porch that was inset into the building. This porch was perhaps 4 or 5 feet deep and led to two swinging metal doors. Each door were designed to enclose a single large glass panel that reached from about a foot from the floor to 8 inches from the ceiling. At the time I was there, both glass panels had been completely broken out and entry was to simply walk through the hole in the doors." The two swinging glass doors are still the same (though they have probably been replaced over the years).

As to the interior, he added, "The place was bare concrete inside. The upper floors had windows on two sides, the front and the right side, when looking at the building from the street in front. The windows extended the length of the walls, were about 4 feet high, and the concrete sills were about 3 feet above the floor. It seemed to me that the windows may never been installed, because I do not recall seeing metal frames that would remain behind if the windows were broken out. There was also an alley on the right side of the building that was used as an open latrine for the patoon of guards who used it." The alleyway on the right side still exists today, but it leads to a small parking area and a small "room" church behind it. The interior appears to have been "stuccoed" at a later date possibly in the 1950s as the material is now flaking off the walls in the stairwell and disintegrates to the touch.

Old KCC Building (2000) -- Built in the 1930s art-deco style by Japanese.
Used to house the Korean Commerce Committee (KCC).

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HEALTH ADVISORY TO VETERANS OF KUNSAN Fred Ottoboni wrote that he wanted to get the word out to others who served at Kunsan. The condition referred to as "jungle rot" on the feet can develop into cancer -- FORTY YEARS LATER. He has received treatment for this condition and was concerned that others may have been misdiagnosed or refused treatment by VA hospitals for this form of cancer. He wrote in June 2007:

You will be interested that Korea was the cause (of not replying sooner). The cancer, a T-cell lymphoma of the skin, according to my doctors, was caused by a long-term infection of the skin by a combination of fungus and bacteria. This infection was called "Korean Crud." Similar cancer is also caused by the tropical skin diseases called "Jungle Rot." The doctors said it takes about 40 years to turn from the skin infection stage to cancer. I got it while in Korea. The Army did nothing. The VA tried in 1951, but could not help me So I had to live with a constant peeling and itching of the skin on my feet whether I liked it or not. Many years and many doctors could not help me. But when it turned from flaking and peeling into cancer, my doctors told me they might have to amputate my feet. But another doctor took a biopsy sample and sent to three major university dermatology laboratories. They all reported T-cell lymphoma of the skin. And this led to the treatment I am now undergoing, electron beam radiation. Started treatment in February and now finishing it. One foot looks almost like brand new and the other is healing fast.

When I went to the local VA hospital for help about a year before my cancer was diagnosed. They refused to help in any way. They said I could not prove I got it while in the Army. When I mentioned my treatment in 1951/52 at the VA hospital in Menlo Park, CA, they insisted, with some gloating, that all of those old records were lost. They denied any knowledge of skin diseases associated with Korea and refused even to refer me to experts in the VA system that my doctors could talk to by phone. Very disappointing.

There are probably some other guys who were in Korea that have the same disease and problems with the VA, so I have written a letter to the Association of the 6th Infantry Division and asked them to publish it in the Sightseer, their newsletter. I would like to let veterans know about the Crud and its cancer connection and the difficulty of diagnosis. If caught early, this cancer is effectively killed by the electron beam treatment.

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NOTE: Korea Between the Wars -- A Soldier's Story (ISBN 0-915241-02-1) is available by mail order from the publisher Vincente Books, Inc., PO Box 50704, Sparks, NV 89435 or through Amazon.com on-line. Dr. Fred Ottoboni's book provides a wealth of information on understanding this pivotal era. The abject poverty, distrust of Americans, and other problems facing the occupation forces are related from the viewpoint of a young soldier -- though with humanity and understanding. Click here for the review of Korea Between the Wars -- A Soldier's Story.

In June 2000, Fred Ottoboni was good enough to donate a copy of his book to the Kunsan Base Library, after repeated attempts to place his books on the BX shelves failed. We are extremely grateful for Fred's generosity in trying to pass on the history to the people who are at Kunsan.

Another book covering this period is Russell E. McLogan's Boy Soldier -- Coming of Age During World War II", published by Terrus Press, Box 525, Reading MI 49274. The final chapters of the book describes the movement of the 63rd Infantry Regiment to Kunsan from the Philippines and the original hardships encountered by the soldiers, such as having no warm clothing and using salvaged Japanese items to keep warm. Click here for the review of Boy Soldier -- Coming of Age During World War II.

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• Go to Japanese Aviation Training Base (1938-1945)
  
• Go to Occupation Forces: 6th Infantry Division, 63d Infantry Regiment, 3d Battalion; A Soldier's Story (1945-1947)
  
• Go to Occupation Forces: 63d Service Company, Kunsan Harbor
  
• Go to Occupation Forces: Officer's Tour (1946-1947); Korean Constabulary (1949-1951)
  
• Go to Cholla Province Korean War History (1950-1951): North Korean Invasion and Military Actions in Cholla area
  
• Go to Cholla Province Korean War History (1951-1952): Invasion of Inchon and Retaking of Kunsan AB
  

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