HOW IT WAS! KUNSAN AIRBASE ROKAF (1970-Present) Page 5 of 5

The Enemy: North Korea If one listens to AFKN (Armed Forces Korea Network), one is bombarded by the U.S. propaganda that its military forces are the best -- and prepared to fight and win. However, as an outside observer, one sees that there are two sides to any story. The North is not a paper tiger. A few years back the DOD released a report that stated the life expectancy of the front line troops on the DMZ was 1.25 minutes. Paper tigers don't cause that kind of destruction. Though it is agreed that the North does possess a large quantity of obsolete armaments, it also possesses some of the most modern as well. In addition, though the North's armaments are obsolete, one should not snicker. The ROK is still using the 1960s Honest John missiles as well as the 1960s Nike-Hercules missiles (that were illegally modified as air-to-ground weapons).

The 1996 article 'On Guard for Peace and Labour' (Short History of North Korean Air Force 1948-1996) presents a pretty balanced case on North Korea's military situation. However, in the intervening years the situation has become critical in North Korea as China now demands hard currency for oil. The North is flat broke and having a hard time finding rice to feed its massive army. Oil reserves are estimated at 90 days. There is a lesson to be learned from the Pusan Perimeter where the North Koreans manpower alone did not win the battles. There is the old Napoleanic adage, "An army travels on its stomach." Without food, an army will falter. However, there is another saying that a hungry tiger is to be feared.

The article states, "Despite the loss of almost all allies and mounting pressure from the "free world", the ruling clique of North Korea is still full of faith in the final victory of communism in their own country. Their faith is strengthened by the KPA. It is considered to be among the most powerful armies of the world. North Korea is completely closed, so military analysts can make only approximate estimates of general situation in the country, and estimates of the status of the armed forces are even more difficult. In the KPDR information on the KPA is scarce and very one-sided. It appears that North Korea is even more enamoured of bluster and secrecy than its Soviet and Chinese friends. Naturally state propaganda constantly declares the KPA to be invincible, that its officers and men are ready to fight "one against a hundred". American experts partly agree with that; they believe that North Koreans have obsolete weapons and equipment but their morale is extremely high."They are well trained soldiers who are used to iron discipline". But even this did not prevent "great general" Kim Il Sung from regular criticizing his marshals for "loss of vigilance, lack of morale and passive mood of troops" at all party congresses.

"The mainstays of the KPA are some ten thousand cannons and up to seven thousand AFVs from obsolete Soviet-made T-55's and T-62's and Chinese T-59's. Also acquired in the late 80's were the modern T-72M, BMP-2, BTR-70 . Some western experts are too optimistic with their estimates that anti-tank weapons in the possession of South Koreans and US troops stationed in Korea" can make North Korean tank armadas the largest metal junk heap in the World".

"Similarly the Americans seem too optimistic in their assessment of North Korean military aviation, they assert that the NKAF "is in a worse technical state than the Iraqi Air Force. The planes are so old that their first pilots are grandfathers now. Today pilots are poorly trained and they spend only seven hours per year in the air. Even if they manage to take off in their pieces of junk, most likely they'll fly to the South and like kamikazes crash their aircraft into the first ground target of opportunity".

"One can't bet on this assumption completely, but it's absolutely clear that Soviet and Chinese-made equipment the NKAF is armed with comprises mostly of obsolete types that are not suitable for the modern combat environment. Furthermore air crew are being trained in accordance with outdated procedures and, with lack of fuel, have very little experience. However North Korean aircraft are sheltered in underground hangars and plenty of runways are available. In the KPDR there is absolutely no private vehicle ownership but many highways with concrete surfaces and arched reinforced concrete tunnels (for example the superhighway linking Pyongyang with Wonsan), that in case of hostilities are sure to be used as military airfields. It thus seems highly improbable that the NKAF would be knocked out in one strike, particularly considering the very formidable Air Defence system that US intelligence believes to be "the most tightly-knitted system of anti-missile and antiaircraft defence in the world".

Western analysts estimate that the KPDR's Air Defence Forces have in field positions more than nine thousand AAA systems, including light machine guns, the World's most powerful 100-mm Flak and self-propelled ZSU-57 and ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" systems. Besides that there are ten thousand SAMs including stationary S-25, S-75, S-125, mobile "Cub", "Strela-10" and portable launchers with crews "that don't know the word fear".

"As far as quality is concerned NKAF is not just a collection of rusty junk, either. It is true that even into the 1990's they have over 150 MiG-15's and 100 MiG-19's (including the Chinese types Shenyang F-4 and F-6 respectively), 50 Harbin H-5 bombers (Chinese-made Soviet Il-28) and 10 Su-7BMK fighter-bombers. However by the beginning of the 1980's the NKAF began a new round of modernization: in addition to 150 MiG-21's, the NKAF received from the USSR a batch of 60 MiG-23P fighter-bombers and MiG-23ML close-support fighters and from China - 150 Q-5 Fantan ground attack planes. Army aviation, that then possessed only twenty Mi-4 helicopters, received ten Mi-2 and fifty Mi-24. In May-June 1988 North Korea received its first six MiG-29's. By the end of the year the transfer of the whole batch of 30 planes was complete, as well as the transfer of 20 Su-25K ground attack aircraft. A surprise reinforcement for the NKAF at the end of 80's came in the shape of twenty American-built Hughes-500 helicopters acquired in a roundabout way from third countries: these helicopters have no armament and are used for liaison and observation.

"In the same period obsolete aircraft (MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19) were being transferred to "fraternal countries, fighting against world imperialism" - first of all to Albania, then Guinea, Zaire, Somalia, Uganda and Ethiopia. In 1983 thirty MiG-19 fighters were transferred to Iraq and used in the war with Iran. The same aircraft positioned at Iraqi airfields as false targets took the brunt of allied aerial strikes during the "Desert Storm" operation.

"It should be mentioned that KPDR still has no civilian aviation at all. Any flight, should it be long-range delivery of food and medicine or internal passenger flights or chemical treatment of fields, is made with planes or helicopters in NKAF markings. The mainstay of this military-civilian force is about 200 An-2's and its Chinese replica, the Y-5.Up to the beginning of the 1970's flights to "fraternal countries" were made by five Il-14 and four Il-18. Subsequently the KPDR's air inventory was reinforced by twelve An-24 (according to other sources some of them are An-32 version), three Tu-154B and one "presidential" Il-62, on which Kim Il Sung made a number of official visits abroad. After the collapse of the USSR North Korea acquired some civilian aircraft, bought at bargain prices from "independent airlines"of the CIS, the biggest among them being some Il-76's. At the beginning of 1995 the KPDR signed an international treaty opening its airspace to foreign passenger airlines. In this connection North Korean planes that fly abroad received civilian markings of the newly founded airline "Chosonminhan", but their crews continued to be military.

"For crew training by the beginning of the 1990's there were over 100 piston-engined CJ-5 and CJ-6 aircraft (Chinese modification of Yak-18), twelve L-39 Czech-made jets and some dozens of MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-29, Su-25 trainers. It is logical to assert that training of pilots on the NKAF's most modern aircraft is much more significant than "seven flying hours per year". These pilots are first of all from the elite 56th Guards and 57th Fighter Regiments that equipped with MiG-29 and MiG-23 and are based near Pyongyang to defend the capital of KPDR.

Nuclear Weapons: In the 1960s, US troops in South Korea received tactical nuclear weapons and their carriers - "Sergeant", "Honest John" and "Lance" missiles, later "Pershing". The South Korean army, along with the locally based US 7th Infantry Division, began preparations for nuclear war.

What is not talked about much is the 1970s SOUTH Korean nuclear program. Korea's Place in the Sun, A Modern History (p359) states, "It was at this time that South Korea embarked on an expensive, highly secret nuclear program to reprocess plutonium into weapons-grade fuel and build atomic weapons; a blistering cable from Kissinger shut down the direct weapons program, but the Park government still fooled with "heavy water and other hanky-panky," in the words of one American official, which included buying specifications and assembly equipment from an American firm for the Atlas Centaur missile." This is just another example of why many American officials distrust South Korean military intentions. The Honest John missile -- which was used as a nuclear-warhead platform by the Americans -- was transferred to the ROK in the 1970s as an air-to-air defense system. The weapon was refitted illegally as an air-to-ground missile against treaty restrictions. It incidentally remains in use today as such a weapon. But the Americans were just as bad at breaking the rules. Nuclear weapons were moved to Korea in violation of Section 13b of the Armistice. The American solution? It unilaterally discarded Section 13b and moved the weapons to Kunsan.

At Kunsan, the first nuclear weapons arrived in 1958. From 1958-1964 with the B-57Bs of the 3rd Bomb Wing from Yokota AB, Japan sat nuclear alerts at Kunsan from C-pad near the current Base Operations. (Go to 3rd Bomb Wing: 1958 for more information.) The nuclear alert left Kunsan for Osan in 1964, but returned in 1968 with the Pueblo Incident. From 1968-1974 with Det 1 475th TFW and 3rd TFW stood nuclear alerts with their F-4C/Ds. They were situated in the "Tree" area that are now ROKAF bunkers. After the 8th TFW arrived in 1974, the tasking was reduced to a war-time tasking only under the PACAF Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) role. The nuclear weapons remained at Kunsan.

In 1991, President Bush announced a nuclear arms reduction proposal providing for the withdrawal of all U.S. ground-based missiles stations overseas. However, according to Peter Hayes in Pacific Powder keg: American Nuclear Dilemma in Korea, 1991, (pp94-95) the U.S. government would not comment on the sixty or so nuclear gravity bombs for F-4 and F-16 aircraft that were reported in 1985. In about 1992, all nuclear weapons were removed from Kunsan AB and reportedly prepositioned in Guam. However, it had always been an open secret that nuclear weapons were stored at Kunsan. The ROKAF followed the US Government policy of "NCND" (No Comment -- No Denial). Nuclear weapons were just never talked about. However, this "NCND" policy was broken when former President Roh Tae-woo gave an interview in April 2000 relating that Kunsan was the only base with nuclear weapons in Korea at the time of their withdrawal.

In 1995, Kim Il-sung died suddenly leaving his son, Kim Jong-il in power. Tensions remained high as there was an uncertainty about the next actions by the north.

The New York Times reported the possibility that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons in 1988. These concerns would overshadow the relations with North Korea throughout the 1990s and push the world again to the brink of war. In 1998, the ROKAF and USAF units were placed on full alert. Surprisingly, in a May 2000 interview with the independent Hankyoreh Daily, former President Kim Yong-Sam insisted that President Clinton was ready to strike the North and had moved a carrier into position for a first strike action. Kim warned the US ambassador another war on the Korean peninsula would turn all of Korea into a bloodbath, killing between 10 and 20 million people and destroying South Korea's prosperous economy. "I told him that I would not move even a single soldier of our 650,000 troops (in case a war broke out because of the bombing of Yongbyon)," he said to the paper. He called Clinton and argued with him for "32 minutes." "I told him there would be no inter-Korean war while I was the president." He went on, Clinton tried to persuade me to change my mind, but I criticised the United States for planning to stage a war with the North on our land," he said. Most people credit former President Jimmy Carter with defusing the situation. However, the solution has proven to be a nightmare for the parties involved. The US claims it only was committed to providing the oil to North Korea and South Korea was to provide for the cost of the light-water nuclear reactors based on their design. The South Koreans dragged Japan into the fray claiming they should pay for a bigger share. The finger-pointing and childish antics continues till today.

Changes in the "Little Brother" Ideas: The key point that must be made is that the ROKAF is now the "host" at Kunsan AB and the USAF, the "tenant"...a big change from the post-Korean War days. Up until the 1980s, there was a persistent idea amongst the Koreans of a big brother-little brother relationship. As Americans under President Carter planned to reduce their forces and go home, there was disbelief that the Americans would desert their "little brother."

However, the view changed as Koreans expanded their world view (popularly called "globalization"). They changed their perspectives of themselves and their relationships within the world community. The idea of being a "little brother" was cast aside as obsolete. It was at this point that Korea started making plans to become independent of the US. The start of its building its own "blue water navy" with construction of new submarines and destroyers. It started its Korean Fighter Plane program to gain the technology to stand alone.

The SOFA is another illustration of the changes in attitude of the Korea of today versus that of yesteryear. In August 1965, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was signed. However, the basic premise of the SOFA deals with percentage share. If you pay more for the support of the American troops, you get a lot more. The Koreans paid little to nothing in 1965 and the SOFA was heavily weighted towards the Americans' advantage. It was not until the 1992 that the SOFA was successfully renegotiated when Korea was willing to increase its percentage share to $220 million. Substantive changes dealing with the thorny custody issue of Americans accused of crimes were clarified. (NOTE: $220 million is a drop in the bucket compared to the estimated $1.5 billion that it costs the U.S. to maintain its troops and equipment in Korea. Though Korea wishes to renegotiate certain issues, it is still unwilling to increase its share.)

Recently, the Korean government has expressed an interest in clarifying further the custody issue. The U.S. has also expressed an interest in renegotiating portions of the SOFA but not the custody issue. An future negotiations are tenuous.

These changes deal with how the ROKAF views itself today. It is not a "little brother" to the USAF, but rather an equal. The ROKAF now considers itself an equal partner with its USAF comrades. It no longer will tolerate an inferior position as in the past. Small signs of this at Kunsan include the reserved parking space at the base golf course for the 38th TFG Commander along with the 8th FW Commander. These little items point out the changing roles from the past. Though the USAF is by far the largest unit on base, there is no friction between the units. Relations between the units have remained cordial. The USAF no longer views the ROKAF as inferiors as they had in the 1960s-1970s. They are considered as respected equals.

FUTURE ROKAF PROGRAMS

The Block 52 F-16s are slated to be fitted with the Martin Marietta LANTIRN night- navigation/targeting pod system, Texas Instruments AGM-88B HARM anti-radiation missile, AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missile for maritime strike missions, and the Hughes AIM-120 medium-range air- to-air missile in addition to its normal payload. Preliminary talks with Israel's Rafale over purchase of a lightweight version of the AGM-142 Popeye medium-range stand-off missile for the RoKAF's F-16s were held in late October 1994. The new F-16s will join 30 F-16C and 10 F-16Ds already operational. (NOTE: For more information of the RoKAF F-16 Program go to South Korea Han-guk Kong Goon F-16.) (NOTE: The F-16s and KF-16s are flown by the 11th FW of Taegu AB. The following is from the Chosun Ilbo (Yoo Young-won, "TWENTY MORE KF-16S TO BE PRODUCED," Seoul, 05/12/99) reported that the government decided to produce twenty more KF-16 fighter aircraft. This decision is designed to maintain fighter aircraft production facilities at Samsung Aviation and others facilities and to preserve jobs from April next year when the KF-16 Project is terminated, until 2005 when the KTX-2 program begins. The Korean Fighter Project (KFP) is a program that started in 1994 and was to manufacture and assemble 120 KF-16 fighters. This is to be followed by the FX program that is to introduce the next generation warplanes to the ROK Air Force (ROKAF). The ROKAF said that the KF-16 cannot cover all of the DPRK and can only loiter over Tokdo islets for five to ten minutes, and lacks all weather capability.")

The ROKAF at Fifty Article by Eric Hehs

This article appeared in the April 2000 issue of Code One Magazine.

Fifty years ago this June, North Korean troops stormed south of the 38th parallel, the dividing line between North and South Korea established at the end of World War II.

The invasion marks the beginning of the Korean War and the earliest days of the Republic of Korea Air Force. Today, the Republic of Korea defends that same parallel with a modern military that includes Korean-built KF-16s.

The Peoples Army of North Korea captured Seoul, the capital of the Republic of Korea, three days after the invasion in 1950. By early August, ROK forces held only a small portion of southeastern Korea from the Korean Strait in the west to just north of Pusan on the east coast. North Korea’s overwhelming strength at the beginning of the war fueled the quick advance. Its 135,000 troops outnumbered South Korean forces by more than 40,000. Its army was seasoned from fighting alongside Soviet and Chinese forces against the Japanese during World War II. North Korea had 120 tanks; South Korea had none. The north also had 180 aircraft (mostly Soviet-built YAK fighters and attack bombers). South Korea had only twenty liaison aircraft (L-4s and L-5s) and ten newly purchased T-6 trainers.

As a result of a United Nations resolution on 27 June 1950, twenty-one countries came to the aid of South Korea. By late summer, the UN troop strength exceeded that of North Korea. UN and ROK forces began counterattacks from Pusan in September. In mid-September, Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s bold landing of UN forces at Inchon, a port city halfway up the west coast on the Yellow Sea, turned the tide of the war. The North Koreans were forced out of Seoul by the end of September and soon after were pushed all the way back to the Yalu River, Korea’s northern border with China.

The momentum shifted back to the north in late 1950 when China entered the conflict. By early January 1951, Chinese and reconstituted North Korean forces captured Seoul. UN forces retook Seoul in March and pushed farther north. The battle line shifted north and south until late summer when it consolidated near the original starting point at the 38th parallel. A relative stalemate — marked by a series of peace talks, major offensives, and hill battles — continued for almost two years. A cease-fire signed on 27 July 1953 effectively ended the war.

The precise number of casualties during the Korean War is not known. Estimates of the total losses range between 1.5 and 2 million. Total casualties for the UN forces (killed, wounded, or missing) were almost 500,000, including 300,000 South Koreans. Civilian casualties incurred in South Korea totaled one million. Over forty percent of the industry and more than thirty percent of the homes in South Korea were destroyed.

The Korean War is often termed “the forgotten war” in the United States, where most Americans derive their knowledge of the conflict from warmed-over episodes of M*A*S*H. Koreans, however, have clearer memories and a more distinct understanding. Their country remains divided by a four-kilometer buffer zone that stretches the width of the peninsula. The armistice that ended the fighting, still in place today, amounts to a cease-fire — not a formal peace treaty. North Korea maintains a sizable force near the buffer zone, which is a thirty-minute drive from Seoul. North Korean forces have a variety of chemical and biological weapons at their disposal as well as missiles and heavy artillery that can deliver these and other weapons at long ranges. The North test-launched a multi-stage rocket in August 1998, sending it over Japan and into the Pacific.

Today’s North Korean army consists of twenty corps with 4,000 tanks, 2,300 armored vehicles, and 12,000 artillery pieces. Their navy operates ten battle groups and some 570 vessels, including ninety submarines and 260 amphibious landing craft. Their air force includes almost 800 fighters, 80 bombers, over 500 support aircraft, and 320 helicopters. Four long tunnels built by North Korea under the demilitarized zone have been uncovered since 1974. The tunnels are large enough to allow the passage of 30,000 armed troops in one hour. North Korean patrol boats and ROK navy vessels have exchanged gunfire as recently as June 1999.

Unsurprisingly, South Korea places a priority on national defense. The country’s military counters the numerical superiority of the North Korean threat with more modern equipment and a well-trained fighting force. The army consists of eleven corps that operate about 2,000 tanks, 2,300 armored vehicles, 5,000 pieces of field artillery, and 600 helicopters. The ROK Navy operates three fleets and some 200 vessels including ten submarines and sixty aircraft. The ROK Air Force consists of about 800 aircraft organized into eleven wings, which includes one composite wing, one tactical airlift wing, and nine tactical fighter wings. About 130 F-16s constitute the core of the ROK fighter force.

A good portion of ROKAF’s F-16 fleet is located at Sosan Air Base, southeast of Taejon in the central part of the country. Sosan, the newest base in Korea, is home to four F-16 squadrons that comprise the 20th Fighter Wing, which was formed in December 1996. The F-16s at Sosan are referred to as KF-16s to indicate their Korean origin at the F-16 production facilities at Sachon in the southern part of the country [see October 1996 issue of Code One for details of F-16 production in Korea].

“This wing is the most modern F-16 unit in Korea and probably the most modern F-16 unit in the world,” notes Gen. Chang, the wing commander. “All of our aircraft here are Block 52 KF-16s. The differences between our air force’s Block 32 and Block 52 F-16s in terms of capability are almost revolutionary. The KF-16 performs flawlessly in both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. Its friend-or-foe interrogator system combined with AMRAAM allows us to intercept enemy aircraft in beyond-visual-range conditions. Improved avionics make it possible to target several aircraft at a time. Also provisions for close-in fighting have been expanded. The KF-16’s LANTIRN has remarkably boosted its capability for night fighting. The precision guidance system works well with laser-guided munitions and Maverick air-to-ground missiles. Additionally, the Block 52’s HARM capability allows us to dominate the air space. The KF-16 successfully performs a variety of missions and it improves on the excellent repair and maintenance reputation set by our Block 32 aircraft. Our mission capable rate hovers around ninety percent.”

As the first Korean pilot to fly an F-16, Gen. Chang speaks from experience that includes almost 4,500 total hours in the F-4, F-5, and F-16. He was the first Korean pilot to ferry an F-16 from the United States to Korea as well.


ROKAF F-16 painting by Thompson (From Code One Magazine)
Click on image to enlarge

“The KF-16 is the cutting-edge, the latest aircraft in the Korean Air Force,” says Gen. Chang. “It’s also one of the main pillars in the Korean armed forces. We have the best aircraft, pilots, and excellent maintenance crew. The KF-16 serves as a powerful deterrent against North Korea in times of peace and a formidable weapon in times of war.”

The four squadrons at Sosan fly with precision-guided bombs and LANTIRN navigation and targeting pods. Unlike current USAF F-16s, the KF-16 can handle both HARM and LANTIRN missions. (An avionics program in work for USAF Block 50 and Block 40 F-16 fleets will provide a common capability in the near future.)

The advanced capabilities of the KF-16 are complemented by the modern facilities of Sosan Air Base, which sets a high standard for other ROKAF bases. Maintenance hangars are well lit, spotless, and extremely organized. Squadron buildings match some of the best in the United States. Well fortified NATO-style aircraft hangars flank long twin runways. The base has new living quarters, churches, athletic fields, and many other facilities to improve the living conditions for ROKAF personnel. “Quality of life issues are as important in our air force as they are in yours,” notes Gen. Chang. “Even though military service is required in our country, conscripts are allowed to choose which branch they want to serve for periods up to thirty months. So, the ROKAF must try to attract conscripts. The service must also improve living conditions to retain its best and brightest officers. Korea’s thriving economy adds to the challenge.”

Future KF-16 pilots may also be attracted to ROKAF by its proud history, which has been popularized in Korean-produced movies and television shows. These entertainment venues can draw on more than fifty years of aerial accomplishments that officially began in December 1949 when the ROKAF was established. But Korea can trace its aviation heritage back to 1922 when An Chang-nam became the first Korean pilot to fly in his country’s air space. Military aviation started about the same time. Korean expatriates desiring to support the independence movement in their homeland went through flight training at aviation schools in other countries. Korea’s first six military pilots received their training in Curtiss JN-4s in 1920 at the Redwood flight school in northern California.

Choi Yong-duk, who later played a leading role in establishing ROKAF, set up an organization called the Air Force Foundation Committee in 1943 to train Korean pilots in China to fight in the independence war against Japan. When World War II ended, thousands of other Koreans involved in the independence war returned home. Yong-duk and several others set up several private organizations that promoted aviation. Yong-duk, Lee Young-Moo, and Chung Jin-Il integrated these organizations in August 1946 to form the Korean Aviation Establishment Committee. As relations between the north and south became more confrontational in the late 1940s, the committee began negotiations with US forces in Korea to establish an aviation unit under the control of the ministry of national defense. The unit, equipped with L-4 and L-5 liaison aircraft, was acti-vated in May 1948. An air force academy was established at Kimpo Air Base eight months later.

As the communist forces of North Korea strengthened their airpower with Soviet equipment and as US forces withdrew from the peninsula in June 1949, South Korea asked for more military aid, including fighter aircraft. The United States denied the request to avoid increasing tensions in the region. Republic of Korea President Lee Seung-Man went about finding other avenues for procuring military hardware to respond to the North Korean military build up. A nationwide donation campaign called “National Flag” collected money for aircraft. The funds raised were used to buy ten T-6 trainers. The aircraft were rolled out in ceremonies at Yoido Air Base in May 1950 and named “National Foundation Aircraft” to commemorate the public’s part in providing them for the country’s defense. The timing could not have been more portentous — the war began less than six weeks later.

In the first days of the war, ROKAF pilots made heroic but vain attempts to turn back North Korean forces by dropping hand grenades on enemy tanks from their liaison aircraft. The day after the initial invasion, ten ROKAF pilots were rushed to Idasuke Air Base in Japan to receive conversion training for the F-51 Mustang. They returned to Taegu Air Base in South Korea less than two weeks later to take part in the war. ROKAF operations were soon moved to Jinhae Air Base near Pusan as ROKAF pilots sup-ported the Naktong River defense line around that city after the initial retreat.

ROKAF forces became more proficient as the war progressed. In October 1951, ROKAF F-51 pilots conducted their first independent air operations against enemy supply lines. South Korean pilots later distinguished themselves by destroying the Sung-Ho-Ri iron bridge after many unsuccessful attempts by US bombers in January 1952. Other memorable operations include the Pyung-Yang bombing operation in August 1952 and a series of highly effective close air support missions in March 1953.

From its first mission in July 1950 to the armistice in July 1953, ROKAF F-51 pilots completed about 8,500 combat missions. Thirty-nine out of a total of 115 ROKAF combat pilots flew 100 combat missions or more. Seventeen ROKAF pilots lost their lives during the war. The service grew from a meager force of twenty-two liaison aircraft and 1,100 troops at the beginning of the war to 118 aircraft and about 11,500 troops at war’s end.

From the end of the war to today, ROKAF has sought prudent and effective ways to increase its capabilities and to maintain technological superior-ity. The air force entered the jet age in 1955 with F-86F fighters and T-33 trainers. ROKAF soon took over air traffic control and warning tasks and established its own communications and aircraft control and warning units. The service entered the supersonic jet age in 1965 with the F-5A. F-4D fighters were introduced in 1968. ROKAF entered the modern age of fighter aircraft with Block 32 F-16s in April 1986. The first Korea-produced KF-16 was delivered in formal ceremonies in December 1994, followed two years later by the first all-KF-16 wing at Sosan Air Base.

The close ties established between South Korea and the United States during the Korean War con-tinue in the form of economic trade and national defense. The longtime US security commitment to the ROK has both legal and moral sanctions. US legal obligations fall under UN Security Council resolutions of 1950, by which the United States leads the United Nations Command in Korea. The ROK/US Mutual Security Agreement of 1954 commits both nations to assist each other in case of outside attack. The United States is also a partner in the operations of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command, an integrated headquarters established by the two governments in 1978, and is responsible for planning the defense of South Korea and, if necessary, directing the ROK/US combat forces to defeat enemy aggression.

Major elements of US forces in Korea include the Eighth US Army, the Seventh Air Force, and US Naval Forces Korea. Together with ROK forces, these US forces share the rigors of maintaining a deterrent to another North Korean attack.

Cooperation with United States forces comes in two primary forms for ROKAF— large-scale exercises and pilot exchanges. Large-scale exercises, such as Ulchi Focus Lens, Foal Eagle, Cope Jade, and Hokuk Training, improve the mutual understanding of unit operations, unit structures, weapon systems, and strategies and tactics of each service from both countries. Pilot exchanges include a buddy wing program in which several PACAF pilots fly with ROKAF units for a few days, and maintenance crews get to service PACAF aircraft. These exchanges improve communication and understanding between ROKAF and PACAF personnel. ROKAF also sends exchange pilots to PACAF units for longer terms. “Both of these forms of cooperation are critical to our national defense,” notes Col. Lee, who commands the 123rd Fighter Squadron at Sosan. “These exercises and exchanges improve the ability of our joint operations in wartime. They also increase understanding between Korean and American forces and help us detect and solve problems. We are always looking for better ways to work with our American counterparts to ensure our nation’s defense.”

“Joint exercises with the USAF are something of an absolute necessity to accomplish what we are supposed to in case of war,” adds Gen. Chang. “A systematic and detailed plan has been made at the levels of Air Force Component Commander and Air Force Operation Commander with respect to the concept and procedure of operation. Despite its short history, the 20th Fighter Wing at Sosan performs a key role in these joint operations.”

US Air Force operations in Korea fall under the command of the 7th Air Force, which is headquartered at Osan Air Base, just south of Seoul. The 7th Air Force plans and directs air component operations in the Republic of Korea and in the Northwest Pacific in support of US Pacific Command, United Nations Command, US/ROK Combined Forces Command, and US Forces Korea. The 7th develops the total air campaign and reinforcement plans for ROK defense and sustains mission readiness of 117 operational units and 8,300 US Air Force personnel.

“We have a great ally with ROKAF, which I would match with any air force in the world,” says Lt. Gen. Charles Heflebower, who commands the 7th Air Force. “They are very capable. ROKAF officers and leadership are professional, and they take their job very seriously. ROKAF pilots fly a lot and train a lot. They are scrambling almost every day, reacting to potential threats. Many of these units are located a minute or two from the front, so they have no margin for error.”

Korea is an intense assignment for US military personnel. Over ninety percent deploy to Korea without their families. “Few airmen volunteer to come to Korea,” notes Heflebower. “Who wants to tell their spouse and children that they want to be away from them for a year? We try to make the assignment more attractive by giving people more weight in choosing their next assignments. Still, most soldiers come to Korea with heavy feet.

“Once they get here, though, that attitude changes,” Heflebower continues. “Serving in Korea is unlike any other assignment in the Air Force. Everyone here is focused on the mission. We have very few distractions. We constantly remind our people that we are not at peace. The situation is a formal cease-fire, a pause in a war. Less than fifty miles from here, the North Koreans have arrayed a huge capability in artillery, infantry divisions, and a good size air force. People have to be ready to fight as soon as they arrive in Korea.”

As a required part of their orientation, newcomers to Osan are sent for a guided tour to the demilitarized zone at Panmunjom. “That tour provides a good reminder of why we serve here,” says Heflebower. “The north and south were the same country for almost 5,000 years. They have been separated for about fifty years, and the difference between the two countries today is huge. The south is bright, colorful, and self-sufficient with a well-educated and industrious population. The north is a wasteland. Every American should come here and take a tour of the DMZ. They will feel grateful for the freedoms they enjoy in the United States.

“We are here to help a nation that shares our values against a nation that has no values,” Heflebower sums up. “We value the human spirit and rights of the individual. I won’t even say that the north values the state—it values a regime. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that serve here understand the situation. When people return home, they are better from the experience. They get a lot of real-world training in that one year. They also gain a better appreciation for what we are protecting in this region and for what they have in America.”

Many Americans and most Koreans will certainly reflect this June on the war that began fifty years ago. With reflection comes hope. And the next fifty years will certainly see renewed efforts — if not true success — at reuniting the two Koreas through peaceful interchanges and cooperative programs that have begun recently by South Korea under its “Sunshine Policy.” A strong defense is a key to this policy of engagement and critical to South Korea’s larger geopolitical role in Southeast Asia. So, the coming years will also bring improvements in South Korea’s military as it becomes more technologically advanced and self-sufficient. The country’s aviation industry is taking part in these efforts. With experience gained from licensed production programs like the KF-16, South Koreans are developing their own military aircraft in the form of the KTX-2, recently named the T-50.

“With a sense of pride and mission as a major fighting force,” reflects Gen. Chang, “the ROKAF is here to deter any possible provocation of the enemy and to defend our country’s air space. Our air force will grow stronger strategically to ensure the security of the country in the twenty-first century and to prepare for the time when Korea will be reunited into one country.”

Eric Hehs is the editor of Code One.

Plans to buy 20 Swiss-built Pilatus PC-9 trainer aircraft to replace the RoKAF's obsolete fleet of T-37 and T-41D aircraft have been scrapped in favor of an indigenously developed design, the KTX- 1. Production of up to 100 KTX-1 primary trainers is scheduled to begin in 1997. Several prototypes have been developed and flight tested, the latest incorporating the more powerful Pratt and Whitney 710kW (950shp) PT6A-62 turboprop in place of the 410kW PT6A-25 engine. Flight control surfaces have also been redesigned to impart better handling and more maneuverability. The KTX-2 advanced supersonic trainer/light attack aircraft is expected to enter production some time in 1998.

The RoKAF will reportedly lease an undisclosed number of surplus T-38 Talons over the next five years to replace its aging T-37B and T-33As until the first KTX-2 squadron becomes operational in 2003 at the earliest. The first batch of 15 T-38s will arrive in 1996. RoKAF's plans to purchase new-build BAe Hawks to serve as an interim trainer were cancelled following selection of the T-38. (NOTE: The first T-38s (no-cost lease) arrived at Kunsan Harbor via ship and trucked to Kunsan on March 25, 1999. They were flown out to Yechon Air Base. Go to Kunsan hosts T-38 shipment bound for ROK Air Force for the full story.)

Prime contractor Samsung has approached U.S.-based Lockheed Martin as a potential partner in this $2 billion, 100 aircraft program. The supersonic KTX-2 is powered by a single 71kN (16,000 lb)-class engine and has seven external hard points and an internally mounted 20-mm cannon. Samsung and U.S.-based Lockheed Martin completed Phase 1 (conceptual design) of the KTX-2's development program in late 1995. Phase 2 (full-scale development) is likely to begin in early 1997 and is expected to last until 2003. Efforts to procure 24 Tornado Electronic Combat and Reconnaissance (ECR) variants to fill a RoKAF requirement for a dedicated SEAD aircraft have been abandoned in favor of using HARM - equipped F-16s.

A planned F-4 Phantom upgrade program has also been abandoned. Rockwell's North American Division was initially tapped to upgrade 40 F-4 Phantoms as part of the $3.6 billion Korean F-4E Phantom Upgrade (KPU) program. Funds originally earmarked for the KPU program will be redirected into the RoKAF's ongoing F-16 procurement program. Plans to develop a new tactical strike fighter remain under discussion. Likely contenders for the "F-XX" fighter program include Saab JAS39 Gripen , Dassault Rafale , McDonnell Douglas F/A-18E/F , Eurofighter EF-2000, or an additional F-16C/D buy.

Plans to acquire between six to eight airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft are under discussion with U.S. and Israeli manufacturers. Funding totalling $416 million for two airborne early warning aircraft was authorized in late 1996. A contract award are expected to be issued some time in 1998. Platforms under consideration include a Boeing 767-based AWACS variant, an Airborne Early Warning & Control version of the Lockheed Martin C-130J Hercules II (equipped with the APS-145 surveillance radar), Northrop Grumman's E-2C Hawkeye (also fitted with the APS-145 ), and an IAI Boeing 747SP-mounted Phalcon radar system. In the interim, eight Westinghouse aerostats fitted with Hughes APG-65 radars and FLIR pods provide surveillance and early warning along the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Longer-term plans include buying a number of more sophisticated airborne surveillance systems. In 1994, U.S. officials briefed South Korea officials regarding the possible sale of up to four E-8 Joint-STARS ground surveillance and targeting aircraft to allow monitoring of North Korean troop movements.

In September 1995, the ROK announced plans to purchase eight tactical reconnaissance aircraft as part of a $550 million deal known in South Korea as the Bedku program and Peace Pioneer to the U.S. Four of the eight are thought to be Raytheon Hawker 800s configured as ELINT/SIGINT platforms. The four remaining aircraft reportedly will be fitted with synthetic-aperture radars (SAR). The Hawker 800 and the four yet to be determined aircraft (some reports suggest the Dassault Falcon 50 is the preferred aircraft) will replace the U.S. Army's RC-12/RU-12 Guardrail COMINT/ELINT and SAR- equipped RV-1 Mohawk aircraft beginning in 1998 and 1999 respectively.

For more information on the ROKAF site at Korea Air Force Homepage. Though it is in Hangul (Korean), but has some nice historical pictures. The "Black Eagles" aerobatic team page in English.

Another interesting page is the Korean Air Force Veterans Association (hangul). Another site of interest is the Korean Veterans Association(hangul).

• ROK Air Force Detachment/111th Fighter Squadron, 38th Fighter Group
  • Original ROKAF Aircraft:
  • Early Days of Korean War:
  • First ROKAF Units at Kunsan (1953):
  • Problems Dealing with Training a Technical Workforce After the Korean War:
  • ROKAF at Kunsan in the 1960s:
  • F-86F Sabres
  • The ROKAF at Kunsan in the 1970s:
  • Transition to F-4D/E:
  • F-5A/B Freedom Fighter:
  • The ROKAF at Kunsan in the 1980s:
  • F-5E Tiger II:
    • Specifications of Northrop F-5E Tiger II:
  • The ROKAF in the 1990S and into the New Millennium:
    • 38th Fighter Group:
    • Off Base Conflicts:
    • Offensive Strategy
    • Kunsan ROKAF's Role in Event of War:
    • Kunsan AB Strategic Defense:
    • Differences between USAF and ROKAF Perspectives on War Preparations:
    • The Enemy: North Korea
    • Nuclear Weapons:
    • Changes in the "Little Brother" Ideas:
  • Future ROKAF Programs

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