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HOW IT WAS!

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KUNSAN AIRBASE

VMF(N)-513 "FLYING NIGHTMARES"
(1951-1954)

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HOW IT WAS:
KUNSAN AIRBASE
(1951-1954)

Marine Squadron VMF(N)-513 (1952-1953):
"The Flying Nightmares"

Click on to enlarge

Acknowledgment: Special thanks to Ron Stout of Burien, Washington for his narratives and invaluable technical information. Special thanks to Paul Noel of Oak Harbor, Washington for his invaluable assistance in providing information, proofing the text, providing guidance in assembling the materials and contributing his narratives. Special thanks to Jack Kio of Oswego, New York for his narratives, photos, and invaluable technical information. Thanks to Jim Curzon for his narratives and photos of Kunsan. Thanks to Eugene "Mule" Holmberg for the patches of the VMF(N)-513. Thanks also to Ken Gates for his research materials and photos. Thanks to Ron Harribson for his narratives. Thanks to Bill Brennen for his narratives and photos. Special thanks to Robert Frankovich for his narrative of a 22d CRBS rescue attempt. Also thanks to Ray Bourgholtzer; Gil Garcia; and Ray Harvey for their contributions. Thanks to Joseph S. Rychetnik of Point Richmond, California for his narratives and technical information. Primary Source Material: The Flying Nightmares: A History and Assessment of VMF(N)-513 at War in Korea 1950 - 1953 by Benjamin Huston Kristy, History Thesis, Kansas State University, 1995; U.S.Marine Corps Aviation: 1912 to Present by Peter B. Mersky); Air Power, January 1986; Naval Fighters Number Four Douglas F3D Skyknight, by Steve Ginter.


Move to Yonpo Airfield, North Korea: On December 1, 1950 the VMF(N)-513 moved to Yonpo Airfield (K-27), North Korea near Hamhung. (Go to Airfield Location and Designator Map.) They flew close air support missions at the Chosin reservoir during the Marines withdrawal. The trapped Fifth and Seventh Marines moved out on 2 December from Yudam-ni headed to Hagaru-ri. Ahead of them lay fifteen miles of tortuous, icy roads in mountains swarming with Chinese Red troops. Overhead as many as 40 to 60 tactical aircraft constantly circled the Fifth and Seventh Marines. Paul Noel noted, "Wonsan/Hamhung: I was there until 2 Dec 1950 when I crashed a R4D (C-47) up at the reservoir. I remember shuttling between Wonsan and Yonp'o (the field at Hamhung) including moving 513." (Note: Before this time, the VMF(N)-513 was at Wonsan Airfield (K-25).)



"Official USMC photos of the R4D that Col. Paul Noel crash landed at the Chosin Reservoir on 1 Dec. 50. All crew members escaped serious injury. The plane was destroyed when the infantry evacuated Hagaru-ri on 6 Dec. 50. I salvaged the communications gear before it was torched. -- Bill Brennen" Top: Aircraft 50767; Middle: Crew of 50767 - Capt Noel, TSgt Schwitzer & Sgt MacLeod; Bottom: Artillery with aircraft in background. (Click on photos to enlarge)


In Night Wings: USMC Night Fighters, 1942-1953 by Thomas E. Doll, it said, "The VMF(N)-513 and VMF(N)-542, now flying from Yonpo, kept approximately 24 hours of air cover over the embattled Marines and soldiers trying breakout at Chosin. The F7F-3Ns of -542 made a rocket and 20mm cannon strafing run against a large group of Chinese just west of the 3rd Battalion/1st Marines perimeter at Hagaru. This attack at 0045 was followed by a second mission five hours later. Two F4U-5Ns of the VMF(N)-513 made a pre-dawn attack in support of B Company, 1st Battalion/5th Marines at Yudam-ni. Since the last part of October, the -513 had been hitting the enemy hard. The squadron had greatly devastated the North Koreans in the rice paddies in the Kojo area. On one particular mission in November -- Major Reinberg's last flight as CO -- VMF(N)-513 hit the North Koreans in the area around Sudong. Rockets, 20mm cannon fire and general purpose bombs proved too much for the Communists and the strike was listed as successful. Pilots taking part in this attack were: Major Robert L. Cochran, Captain Edwin Pendry, and 1st Lts Warren J. Beyes and William E. Jennings. Jennings while serving with the VMF(N)-542 on Okinawa, had made the last "kill" of WWII."

It continued, "Close air support missions were flown under terrible conditions, operating at tree-top levels over mountainous terrain where the tops of the hills were often hidden by low clouds. The four-engined Douglas R5Ds of the Marine Transport Squadron (VMR)-152 flew in tons of supplies and on the way out took out 4000 casualties of the fighting. The squadron also provided an R5D outfitted as an aerial command center that controlled all aircraft covering the breakout." However, Paul Noel disputes the use of the R5Ds (USAF C-54) in evacuating "4000 casualties." He said, "I am positive this is incorrect (and I do not say that often, particularily today). This may be the Marine R4Ds and some researcher assumed all transports were assigned to the transport squadron. Research by Bill Brennen for an article on the R4D operations at Hagaru-ri, coordination with Col. Paul Fritz, USAF, Ret, the ops officer and on site (Hangnum) OIC of the USAF C-47 participation, and my research reports only one R5D, from NAS, Atsugi, landing at Hagaru-ri early on. As you recall the R5D had a nose wheel and the cabin entrance was way off the ground (10 feet?). There was no ground equipment for R5Ds. The R4Ds and C-47s flew their loads to Hungnam where the R5Ds of 152 and USAF hospital planes flew the wounded to Tokyo." Bill Brennan stated a rumor that a Navy Chief NAP landed an R5D at Hagu-ri but took off empty and even then barely made it. Bill also clarified the subject of "4000 casualties" evacuated by 5 Marine R4Ds. He stated, "According to the USAF DUC awarded to the 21st TCS for the Hagaru-ri/Koto-ri operation, 4,689 wounded were evacuated from the 2 emergency air strips in over 150 evac flights. 5 Marine R4Ds made 56 of those evacuation lights. The Marine air crews were attached to the 21st TCS, and as such, were also awarded the USAF DUC."

Close air support missions flown by the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy provided a continual umbrella of bombs and bullets around the advancing column. And, artillery fire from the perimeter at Hagaru provided an additional steel curtain to cut down attacking Chinese. With their single tank to blast roadblocks, the two regiments fought forward toward Lt CoL Raymond Davis and his battalion at the pass. The units cleared the pass and moved inside the Hagaru perimeter on the morning of December 3.

Wounded, frostbitten, and ailing Marines, nearly 1,000 men of the 5th and 7th Regiments, were flown out of Hagaru before nightfall to hospitals in Japan. During the prior three days, some 1,750 casualties, most of them Army troops who straggled in from the battles east of the Reservoir, had been evacuated. Before December 9, 4,675 casualties would be evacuated.

The fight from Hagaru to Koto-ri began on December 6, with elements of the 7th again on the road. Units would stage out, and General Smith made the decision to come out in a fighting withdrawal with every piece of salvageable equipment. The provisional Army battalion took the left flank, 2nd Battalion of the 7th was on point, 1st on the right, and 3rd as rear guard. Tanks were up front to blast roadblocks. Overhead were tactical aircraft ready to deliver bombs and bullets in close support. There were an estimated 1,000 vehicles in the column. Only drivers, the wounded and a very few selected by unit commanders rode. Harassed by automatic weapons and mortar fire throughout the day, the column made slow progress while infantry skirmishes erupted. Chinese troops infiltrated and cut the column at night, and two blown bridges had to be repaired before they reached the Koto-ri perimeter during the morning of December 7.

Supported by 76 aircraft, the 5th regiment fought a rear guard action out of Hagaru against stiff resistance. On the night of December 7, they entered Koto-ri. Air Force C-47 and C-119 aircraft continued the daisy-chain of resupply and evacuation of the wounded from the airfield at Koto-ri until the morning of December 8, when the regiments of the division and 1,400 vehicles moved out. Two battalions of the 1st Regiment would fight rear guard action. (NOTE: There is some confusion over histories that erroneously credit the C-119 "Flying boxcars" with the evacuation of wounded. Paul Noel wrote, "In my exchanges with Col Fritz and Bill Brennen, including reviewing many photos of transport operations, nothing indicated C-119s ever landed and took out wounded. Their operations was air resupply. In fact a portion of the field at Hagaru-ri was designated a permanent drop zone." Bill Brennen added, "As an air crewman on a R4D (C-47), I made 17 evacuation and supply flights to Hagaru-ri between 1 & 5 Dec 1950. I never observed any C119 on the strip, but I did observe them make regular para supply drops in a large open area near the strip. The strip at Koto-ri was shorter than the Hagaru-ri strip, according to our other R4D crew, that made 2 trips to Koto-ri. I never heard of a C119 landing at either strip, although supposedly a Navy Chief NAP landed a R5D (C-54) at Hagaru-ri. The story I heard was that he flew out empty, and barely made it. I can't guarantee the accuracy of this, but my memory tells me the strip was about 1900 ft. long on 1 Dec, and about 2400 ft. long on 5 Dec.")


R4D used for evacuations. According to Bill Brennen, "The R4D...is the plane I served aboard as a crew member. Col. Noel had flown this plane many times, but it was assigned to Hq. MAG 33 when I was serving on it. He was assigned to 1st, Wing Hq."


The 1st Battalion of the regiment deployed forward from Chinhung-ni toward Koto-ri to seize the high ground on the convoy's route of march. During a blinding snowstorm they ran into strong Chinese opposition and took heavy losses before they reached their objective. It took twenty-two hours for the Marine column to cover the nine-and-one-half-mile road from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri. the trip had cost the Marines 600 wounded who were air evacuated out. At the improvised fields at Haguri and Koto-ri, the aircraft landed under the most hazardous of flying conditions.

Ground elements of the VMF(N)-513 and VMF(N)-342 had been airlifted from Wonsan to Yonpo for air operations from there on December 1. On December 7, 1950 as the southward advance of Communist forces required the evacuation of airfields in northern Korea. At Wonsan, the naval gunfire had held the North Korean forces at such a respectable distance from the UN perimeter that UN troops were never seriously threatened. Not a single life was lost during the December 7th evacuation of 7,009 civilians, 3,834 military personnel, 1,146 vehicles and 10,013 bulk tons of cargo.

Marine Fighter Squadron 214 took off from Yonpo on December 7 and landed on boardSicilyoff Hungnam without a break in its close air support operations. On the morning of 8 December the withdrawing Marine column departed Koto-ri, moving down the slippery, ice-covered mountain road toward Chinhung-ni. Chinese troops were still resisting every foot of the way. On 9 December, the lead elements of the Seventh Regiment joined with the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. On the dawn of December 9, clouds lifted, the snow stopped, sun shone through, and the firepower of Marine Corsairs allowed the 1st Battalion to take their objective. With thirty-six miles to go, the Marines encountered a blown bridge that would entail them abandoning their heavy equipment. Instead C-119 "Flying Boxcars" air-dropped a two-ton bridge span that the Marine Corps engineers installed in three hours, and the column moved forward. The first elements of the 7th Marines arrived at Hamhung on the morning of December 10, to hot food and warm tents. The last elements of the division did not arrive until the afternoon of the next day.

Marine Corps losses were heavy. At the four perimeters, more than 700 had died, and there were more than 3,500 wounded and more than 7,000 non-combat casualties. But the Chinese had paid a heavier price--an estimated 25,000 killed, and more than 10,000 wounded.

According to The Sea War in Korea (p181). "The selection of Hangnam as the port of embarkation and evacuation was logical for several reasons. It was only four miles away from General Almond's Tenth Corps headquarters in Hamhung; it was approximately the same distance from Yonpo airfield which could serve as the air control center until operations were transferred to the Fleet after the airfield was abandoned. Hangnam was tactically feasible as an assembly and loading point for the Tenth Corps units which had fanned northward out of Wonsan and Iwon. And lastly, Hungnam was ideal because of its port facilities. Although small, the port was excellent and well protected. The tidal range was less than a foot and berthing space was available alongside the docks for seven ships. By double-banking ships, four additional ships could be simultaneously loaded. Other beach areas of the port were suitable for LST operations."

Thus the VMF(N)-513 remained at Yonpo until December 15 where it acted as the air control center for the evacuation of Hamnung. By this time the enemy forces had moved forward. Ron Stout added, "...off duty crews manned the perimeter with rifles to fend off Chinese attackers while the Corsairs and F7F's were able to take-off, deliver ordinance, and return to base without ever having to raise their landing gear. The presence of Marine air and its effectiveness definitely made the Chinese change their tactics when opposing Marines. They usually confined their "human wave" attacks to night time or early morning." On December 15, its ground elements were evacuated and the air control center was transferred to Fleet control.

VMF(N)-513 Returns to Itami AB, Japan: On December 15, 1950 the VMF(N)-513 moved to Itami AB, Japan after evacuating Yonpo.



MacArthur in center of group at Yonpo (left),
with his Constellation (right) (Courtesy Gil Garcia)


On December 17, 1950 the light carrierBataanwith Marine Fighter Squadron 212 embarked, joined forces in the Sea of Japan protecting the evacuation of troops from Hungnam and other ports. On December 24, 1950, X Corps sailed from Hungnam. North Korea was evacuated.

On January 4, 1951 Seoul was captured by the CCF.The VMF(N)-513 continued to fly close air support missions in Korea from Itami. On January 18, 1951, the VMF(N)-513 moved from Itami AB, Japan to K-9 East-Airfield in Pusan, Korea. On February 8, 1951, other Marine fighter squadrons returned to Korea after a period in Japan, and began support operations from the airfield at Pusan. On February 26, 1951, the VMF(N)-513 moved to K-1 West-Airfield in Pusan.

VMF(N)-513 F4U-5N at Pusan in 1950
(Courtesy Ken Gates)
Click on photo to enlarge

VMF(N)-513 Nightfighter Corsair at Pusan (K-1) in 1951
Note the White Markings
(Courtesy Ken Gates)
Click on photo to enlarge



VMF(AW)-513 sign taken at K-1 between Pusan and Masan according to Gil Garcia. (Gil Garcia)


Seoul was retaken by U.N. forces on March 18, 1951. On June 1, 1951 the First Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW) inaugurated the policy of basing one squadron immediately in the rear of the First Marine Division to provide ground alert aircraft which were on call through the Joint Operations Center for close air support missions.

Top: Cpl Bill Brennen aboard ship prior to Korea
Bottom: Bill Brennen at Pohang in March 1951
(Courtesy Bill Brennen)
Click on photo to enlarge

VMF(N)-513 Receives F7F-3N Tigercats: In March 1951, the VMF(N)-513 gained the F7F-3N "Tigercats" (and personnel) from the VMF(N)-542 when it departed Korea. VMF(N)-542 had operated F7F Tigercats from Sept. 15. 1950, until Feb. 15. 1951. On that date the squadron turned all its aircraft and equipment over to VMF(N)-513 and all unneeded personnel returned to MCAS El Toro on March 24, 1951. The VMF(N)-542 arrived at MCAS El Toro in May 1951.

According to U.S. Air Force in Korea by Robert F. Futrell (p329), "As the B-26 intruders sought their targets far to the northward, Maring Squadron VMF(N)-513 commenced a maximum interdiction campaign against the main supply routes closer to the front lines on 1 March. Almost invariably these Marine missions teamed together Firefly C-47's and attacking F4U's and F7F's. Flying in relays from Pusan Airfield, the Marine night fighters met C-47 flare-droppers over an assigned road, and both planes looked for enemy vehicles. When targets were located, the Marine crew request the Firefly to light them with flares dropped upwind, well of to the side of the road. After orienting himself in the flare light, the Marine fighter went down and attacked the targets with rockets, napalm, fragmentation bombs, or proximity-fuzed 500-pund bombs, the latter ordnanace being used chiefly to suppress hostile antiaircraft fire. The ordnance load varied with target conditions, but the Marine airmen thought that their 20-millimeter cannons were their most effective weapons. After a Marine fighter stayed in the target area for about an hour and a half it was getting low on fuel and was coustomarily relieved on station by a fresh fighter. The cooperation between the Marine fighters and the Firefly was not simple, for the flare crew often had difficulty postitioning itself over an invisible road and dropping its flares precisely in terms of wind and terrain." (NOTE: A Marine source says that the "Fireflies" used by the Marines were R4D (Marine equivalent to the C-47) that belonged to the Marine group.)

The book continued (p330), "The "Flying Nightmares" of VMF(N)-513 regularly utilized Firefly support to attack moving targets on four selected road routes south of Pyongyang, and on several nights used PB4Y flare support to attack enemy vehicles on the road south of Wonsan." (NOTE: The call sign of the PB4Y was "Fat Face".)

VMF(N)-513 Marine pilots in April 1951 at Pusan (K-1)
(Courtesy Ken Gates)
Click on photo to enlarge

On July 10, 1951, the United Nations military representatives, headed by Vice Admiral C. T. Joy, arrived at Kaesong, Korea, for armistice discussions with Communist leaders. Thus began many trying months in which negotiations were alternately suspended and reopened while hostilities continued unabated.

VMF(N)-513 Moves to Kangnung Airdrome (K-18): Between November 1951 - April 1952, there was a stalemate along the Korean battlefront during discussions at Panmunjom.On December 9, 1951 the VMF(N)-513 moved to Kangnung Airdrome (K-18) on the west coast of Korea. Ray Bourgholtzer a Radar Operator on F7F-3Ns wrote, " October, November, and December saw us flying out of K-1. Then in the latter part of December 1951, we took out sleeping bags and a small handbag each and had them tied up inside the fuselage. After flying a mission, we landed at out new base, K-18 (Kangnung). We soon were cold and miserable at Kangnung. MSgt Preston Kammeirer almost got warmed up when he came in for a landing with a hung napalm. It dropped loose when he touched down and then he had to firewall it to get out of the road of the napalm. In January 1952, the RO's (AIO's) were assigned two pilots to fly with since we had a surplus of pilots and a shortage of AIO's. This meant that on some nights you might have two flights -- each with a different pilot. My second pilot was a Marine Reserve Captain who had been my link trainer operator at Pensacola. He had a different concept of our mission and it was difficult to talk him into the air. He always wanted to know when we crossed the front lines and if you were honest, he would then call the flare plane and tell them that we had engine trouble and were returning to base. That meant salvoing the ordinance. I thought maybe I could talk him into going a little farther as I knew where there was supposed to be a barracks area. This I thought would be more useful disposition of our ordinance. However, Fatface, our flare plane, came up on the radio and the Captain asked for their position and that told me I was in trouble. As my pilot asked them to kick out a flare, it went off just a short distance in front of us. He told me that he thought I could do a better job of navigating than that."

"Lt Col Burnett became our Commanding Officer around the middle of March and I flew an intruder mission with the skipper into the Singosan area. On April 9, 1952, Bud Dillberg and I made a belly landing at Kimpo with one engine out. We had flown single engine for more than 40 minutes."

Later Ray wrote, "Kangnung was a miserable place. We were snowed in for two weeks. One day a C-47 (R4D) was able to get in and as he was coming down the runway a wheel hit a piece of ice frozen to the PSP and he spun around and then was able to use a little power to slow the taxi speed."

"Bill Wamel, who at that time was a MSgt and now a retired Major, could probably tell you a lot about intercepts. Bill was one of our top pilots. One of our major duties was the NCAP's of the Panmunjon area. They had big orange balloons with search lights trained on them around Panmunjon at the time and maybe they are still there. Our primary duty was to intercept the B-26's that violated the truce zone and force them to land at Suwon for debriefing. How you could fail to see the balloons was beyond me."

"MSgt C.E. Brown and MSgt Jim Kirbo (now deceased) had quite a story about an intercept they made one night. Since they did not have any common freq. with us, Snowflake (JOC) would have to relay the messages that they had been intercepted. Brown gave them the Bureau number on the B-26 he had intercepted and Snowflake ask how he got their number and he told them he had read it off of the tail section of the airplane. Yes, we could get tucked in without them knowing it."

The U.S. Air Force in Korea (p459) states that in the latter part of December 1951, "the Fifth Air Force also lost a part of its night-intruder capability for Marine Squadron VMF(N)-513 ran short of aircraft and crews and was forced to suspend its intruder operations."


VMF(N)-513 Moves to Kunsan AB, Korea: On April 11, 1952, the unit moved to Kunsan AB (K-8), Korea with both the F4U-5N/F4U-5NL "Corsair" and F7F-3N "Tigercat." (NOTE: Though "April 11, 1952" and "April 1952" are dates given in source materials (Kristy's text and HQ PACAF's History of Kunsan AB (for an unspecified Marine unit)), the runway was closed at Kunsan for repairs from March-June 1952 with the 3d Bomb Wing deployed to Pusan. It is therefore assumed that the VMF(N)-513 used the PSP taxiways as their takeoff-landing strip. The F4U-5NL was capable of this as proven by 1st Lt. Andre's later actions when he caused quite a stir by taking off from the taxiway past the control tower.)

Ray Bourgholtzer recalls, "On April 11, 1952 my log book shows me flying in an R5D from K-18 to K-8 and that was the start of my very brief tour of Kunsan. And it marked the end of our tour at K-18. In May, 1952 , I flew with Art Schmagel on his first mission and it was one of the few times we got hit. Got a burp gun slug in the nose of our belly tank."

In May 1952, the VMF(N)-542 remained at El Toro MCAS training F7F crews for combat. A cadre led by Lt Col Lambrecht worked to prove the F3D's combat VMF(N)-542 hand over its F3D Skyknights over to VMF (N)-513. In Air Power (January 1986) it states, "On May 27, 1952. Lt.Col. P.D. Lambrecht took VMF(N)-542's Skyknights to Korea via Moffett Field and Atsugi, Japan." (Note: In Kristy's History Thesis, it states, ""In late May, the cadre's CO, Col. Peter Lambrecht, and a small detachment of men, including a Douglas aircraft representative, Flew to Japan with nearly seven thousand pounds of electronic test gear.") Ron Stout remembered, "I joined the squadron out of boot camp in September of 51. They trained F7F crews for combat while the cadre tried to prove the F3D combat ready. When Hq MC decided the F3D was good to go they loaded onto the Badoeng Strait at San Diego and shipped out."

VMF(N)-513 Flightline area with Marine F7F-3N Tigercats and F4U-5N Corsairs. (1952) (Note: The F7F is sitting high because it hasn't been refueled yet after returning from a mission.) (Courtesy Hans Petermann) Click on photo to enlarge

VMF(N)-513 Receives F3D-2 Skyknights: The second element of from the VMF(N)-542 departed El Toro for Korea in May 52. The Air Power article says, "Under the command at Lt.Col. J.C. Scott, the squadron's Skyknights left for Korea via NAS North Island. VMF(N)-542 arrived in Japan on June 18, 1952, and by the 22nd, fourteen of the fifteen Skyknights had been repainted in the flat black with red code letters scheme that was used during the Korean campaign. At the same time the tail code WH was changed to WF as, once again, VMF(N)-542 was absorbed by VMF(N)-513 with Col. Lambrecht becoming commanding officer of VMF(N)-513. (Note: Kristy's History Thesis states, "The rest of the cadre and fifteen F3D-2s arrived at San Diego on the first of June and were loaded on the transport carrier U.S.S. Windham Bay (TCVE-92) for the trip to Korea. Arriving in Japan on June 18, three F3D-2s were placed in the aircraft replacement pool at Itami Air Base, and the remaining twelve aircraft, as well as the rest of the cadre's men all arrived in Korea by June 27, when Col. Lambrecht became the squadron's CO.") In June 1952, VMF(N)-513 received twelve new F3Ds.

However, they were unable to operate the Douglas F3D Skyknights for awhile because the gun barrel extensions were left behind and firing the cannon without them would blow the radome apart. In addition, there was a supply problem with radio tubes for the radar system.

Because the F-94's could not be flown over North Korea because of its top-secret fire control system, the F7F's took their place. In July 1952, the VMV(N)-513 made four F7F's available for B-29 bomber support each night. In support of the B-19's, the F7F's customarily preceded the bomber stream by about five minutes between the initial point and the target. The conventional F7F's were said to be "completely ineffective" for battling Red jet aircraft at night".

The F-3Ds flew these missions along with the F-94s Starfires of the 319th Fighter Interceptor Squadron (FIS) from Suwon -- after their restriction was lifted. The Skyknight proved to be a better answer to countering the nocturnal MiGs during escort missions with the night-flying B-29 Superfortress. Throughout the remainder of the war the Air Force never lost a B-29 on a F3D escorted mission, even though the MiGs attempted to draw off and eliminate the F3D threat. A single Mig would fly across the bomber formation hoping to draw a Skynight away. Once the F3D was drawn from the bombers it would be jumped by two other Migs. This ploy, however, was not successful: as the Migs would show up on the Skynight's tail warning radar and the F3D could disengage before the Migs reached firing range.

Jack Kio remembers coming in with the F3Ds. He wrote, "We came with 12 F3Ds to K-8 and three were in reserve in Japan. We were supposed to have 16 but but we lost one at El Toro just before we shipped out. This I know for sure because I was in an F3D and the pilot couldn't land because the run way was blocked. He showed me how the stall warning worked and I could understand why they disconnected them. Because the 20mm gun extension was missing we couldn't fly missions until later. The rounds would go through the radar dome without the extension."

Later on Jack added, "I thought cadre left El Toro around June 1952. ... We had 15 F3Ds with us when we left San Diego on the USS Windham Bay , a small aircraft carrier ( I think in WWII they were called "jeep carriers") There was plate that said built by Kaiser in 90 days. ... The second day out the Captain came on loud speaker and said that we could smoke anyplace on the deck that we weren't carrying any fuel. I turned to a buddy and said "What's he talking about? Our planes are loaded." About the fourth day it got warm out and gas started coming out the over flow. You talk about a mad Captain, he made us take about 30 or 40 gallons out of each plane and dump it over the side, I heard later that he had wondered why the ship wasn't handing the way it should or did before we came aboard. Ours were not the only planes on board, I learned later that this ship took new planes over and brought back the ones that were shot up."

Jack remembered that there were two groups that came over separately. One with the planes and one with the test benches. "Our test benches and other equipment must have went on Badoeng Strait I remember we sent some men some place to ride the train back to k-8 as guards on our equipment."

According to the Air Power article, "Meanwhile, the parent VMF(N)-542 remained in the States training F3D crews and becoming the first Marine missile fighter squadron with the F3D-2M."

Attack on North Korean Hydroelectric Plants: On June 23-24, 1952, the Combined elements of Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps virtually destroyed the electric power potential of North Korea with attacks on prime military targets which had been by-passed through almost 2 years of war. On the 23rd, the main effort was directed against the hydroelectric plant at Suiho, 40 miles up the Yalu River from Antung, Manchuria. The attacks continued next day with more attention being given to the plants at Chosen, Fusen and Kyosen. This 2-day attack, which involved over 1,200 sorties, was the largest single air effort since the close of World War II and the first to employ planes from all the U.S. services fighting in Korea.

On July 11-12 1952, in one of the major coordinated air efforts of the war, Navy, Marine, Air Force, Australian, and British air elements launched a round-the-clock attack on the railroad yards and industrial facilities at Pyongyang.

Support of B-29s by F7Fs: Beginning in July 1952, the F7Fs began flying support for the night-flying B-29s. They usually patrolled ahead of the Superforts as they swept the sky, from the initial point to the target area, to ensure that no MiGs lurked in their path. Unfortunately, the F7Fs proved ineffective in this role.

On August 29, 1952 the new UN philosophy of mass air attack was again demonstrated in the record breaking around-the-clock raid on Pyongyang. In this the entire carrier air force of TF-77 teamed up with the Fifth Air Force, First Marine Aircraft Wing, ROK Air Force, and the British to spread destruction on the supply concentrations in and about the city.

On April 11, 1953, both sides agreed on terms for the exchange of sick and wounded captives. The U.N. would return 5,800; the Communists only 684 (471 ROK's, 149 Americans, and 64 from other nations). (Go toPOW/MIA pagefor continuing POW/MIA issues.) Suddenly there was a dreary realization that 58 percent of the POWs had perished in the camps along the banks of the Yalu. On May 3, 1953 the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, listed 30 major North Korean airfields to be maintained unserviceable in order to limit Communist air action and to prevent augmentation of their air arm preceding the date of a possible armistice.

By late May, 1953 VMF(N)-513s strength was brought up to 24 Skyknights, and the last of the Tigercats were phased out of service. Additionally, four Skyknights and crews from VC-4 arrived aboard the U.S.S. Lake Champlain for temporary duty with VMF(N)-513.

Move to Pyongtaek AB (K-6):On June 6, 1953 the VMF(N)-513 moved to Pyongtaek (K-6). However, In the Jan 1996 Marine Night Fighter Association (MNFA) Newsletter, then Lt.Col. Dave Severance recounts that the move took place physically on June 1, 1953. He said, "Col. Hutchinson had promised the Wing Commander (1st MAW) that the squadron would make the move without any loss of missions. ... With the amount of radar gear to keep functioning and with two engines to maintain on the F3Ds, turn-around times were sometimes delayed for a day or more. To meet our commitment most of the aircraft flying missions the night of 31 May would have to land at K-6 and require little or no maintenance. The plan was for all the test benches to be unplugged at K-8 early on the morning of 1 June, move them by C-117s (I think that was the "flying boxcar" designation) and plug them into preconstructed electronic bays at K-6. Other transports were to move the remaining materiel and personnel."

Loading C-119 for Move to K-6. (June 1, 1953)
(Courtesy Jack Kio)
(Click on photo to enlarge)

On June 7-19, 1953 the major effort of carrier air was directed on a round-the-clock basis against Communist frontline and supporting positions to counter an apparent effort by the enemy to gain ground prior to a possible armistice.

On June 25, 1953 Task Force 77 deployed four F4U-5N Corsairs to Kimpo to operate under the Fifth Air Force for an indefinite period. The purpose was to intercept night attacks being made on the field by aircraft flying too slowly to be intercepted by jets.

End of the Korean Conflict: During the last month of the war VMF(N)-513 lost two crews to unknown causes. On 2 July, one of the VC-4 aircraft disappeared and on 4 July, Capt. Thistlethwaite and Staff Sergeant W.H. Westbrook were also lost. On July 27, 1953 the cease-fire was signed at Panmunjom. Fighting ended.(NOTE: South Korea refused to sign the agreement -- nor did it ever ratify the eventual agreement. It simply supported the cease-fire. 50 years later this action continues to cause technical problems. Only the U.S. General Mark Clark (as U.N. Commander); Peng Tei-huai for China and Kim Il-Sung for North Korea signed the ceasefire. Go to Armistice Agreement for text.)

The VMF(N)-513 remained at Pyongtaek (K-6) until late 1954 when the unit moved to Atsugi NAS, Japan.

F3D-2, Korea in Sept. 1954, crewed by 2nd. Lt. Donald Harvey and SSgt. Donald Lambert.
Blue with red codes and light grey nose wheel. (Marine photo via Harry Gann)
(Courtesy Ken Gates)
Click on photo to enlarge


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NOTICE/DISCLAIMER: The content of this page is unofficial and the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of anyone associated with this page or any of those linked from this site. All opinions are those of the writer and are intended for entertainment purposes only. Links to other web pages are provided for convenience and do not, in any way, constitute an endorsement of the linked pages or any commercial or private issues or products presented there. None of this site has been endorsed by the DOD, the Air Force, the 8th Fighter Wing or Mickey Mouse. All Air Force links are publicly accessible through the world-wide web. When eye-witness accounts conflict with OFFICIAL DOD materials, this website opts to lend credence to the people who were there.



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19 June 2001


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