HOW IT WAS! KUNSAN AIRBASE VMF(N)-513 "FLYING NIGHTMARES" (1951-1954) Page 4 of 9

Acknowledgment: Special thanks to Ron Stout of Burien, Washington for his narratives and invaluable technical information. Special thanks to Paul Noel of Oak Harbor, Washington for his invaluable assistance in providing information, proofing the text, providing guidance in assembling the materials and contributing his narratives. Special thanks to Jack Kio of Oswego, New York for his narratives, photos, and invaluable technical information. Thanks to Jim Curzon for his narratives and photos of Kunsan. Thanks to Eugene "Mule" Holmberg for the patches of the VMF(N)-513. Thanks also to Ken Gates for his research materials and photos. Thanks to Ron Harribson for his narratives. Thanks to Bill Brennen for his narratives and photos. Special thanks to Robert Frankovich for his narrative of a 22d CRBS rescue attempt. Also thanks to Ray Bourgholtzer; Gil Garcia; and Ray Harvey for their contributions. Thanks to Joseph S. Rychetnik of Point Richmond, California for his narratives and technical information. Primary Source Material: The Flying Nightmares: A History and Assessment of VMF(N)-513 at War in Korea 1950 - 1953 by Benjamin Huston Kristy, History Thesis, Kansas State University, 1995; U.S.Marine Corps Aviation: 1912 to Present by Peter B. Mersky); Air Power, January 1986; Naval Fighters Number Four Douglas F3D Skyknight, by Steve Ginter.

Arrival at Kunsan:

The Marine enlisted were housed in quonset huts in the Airmen billet area on Main Base. Marine officers were billeted in the USAF Officer BOQ area on the north end of base. The area was above the older USAF BOQ buildings originally built by the Occupation forces for dependents in 1946. The Marine structures were the prefab plywood shelters shipped in from Japan. The roofs had to have sandbags on the corrugated roofing to keep them from blowing off. These plywood structures housed the Marines and the 474th FBW pilots. The Marine billets were on a road that was in direct line with the last row Commander's quarters on the Signal Hill (later called Gunsmoke Hill). The nurses quarters on the hill at the end of the Signal Hill quarters.

Though reclusive, some Marines made a lasting impression.Ken Mendell(F-84 crewchief with the 428th FBS) remembers, "Marines were at the far end away from the sea , they used to taxi by our planes. In fact they thought that their planes were so secret that one of their planes that was taxiing by stopped & took the film out of a crewchief's camera. Guess who that crewchief was??? Marine major was the pilot." Talk about a lasting impression...50 years later and Ken still wants his film replaced.

Ron Stout wrote, "My memory of K-8 is so hazy that I barely remember the location of 513 except that we had an open air hangar and the Air Force people were (F-84's and B-26's were to our left. The hangar was really minimalist with the front open to the elements and panels missing from the sides. Alongside the hangar were our administrative offices in some wooden huts."

Ron Stout said, "We lived straight down the road from the operations area (an open front hangar with several quonset huts) in a mixture of quonsets and Dallas huts. Our mess hall was over by the Air Force enlisted club which was a Dallas hut. Our E club was half a quonset hut."

Pilots were regularly rotated after 60 missions. Jack Kio wrote that there was an error in Kristy's Thesis where he wrote that if "we came in July and we would all leave simultaneously when our tour of duty was up in October. Our tour of duty was about one year and there was no way the Marine Corps would let us leave at the same time. One reason I stayed an extra three months was so the married men could go home."

Jack Kio remembers the planes being parked in a semi-circle that was off the main taxiway. He also remembers the planes that got stuck in the mud. "Our planes were parked two to a pad in a half circle and sometimes the pilots would get off the steel mating and I am sure you know how the mud is at k-8." He continued, "When our planes came back they had to take a right turn off the main taxi way then another right to get into our area. And you are right about mud I bet that at least six F3Ds got off psp and sunk . One of the pictures show us getting one out, we would put up white crosses with the pilots name on it not all of them thought this was funny, the CO told them to lighten up."

Sometimes the men played practical jokes to relieve tension of the grueling workloads. Jack Kio, a Radar Technician with the VMF(N)-513, remembers, "Shortly after we got to K-8 and were set up, some work was being done outside our shop by Korean laborers. I think it was M/Sgt. Leet put small neon bulbs in each ear and a larger one in his mouth (we used them to check the swipe of the radar) he went out and acted funny all the Korean were laughing and pointing at him. Inside we had the radar on the bench (on) standby. After a time we turned it on. The bulbs in his ears and month lit up and the Koreans took off running. I not sure if we ever got them to come back or (whether) we had to do the work ourselves."

Jack went on to say, "The Marines do some strange things, like when we first got to K-8 the standing orders was to carry our weapon and 80 rounds of ammo wherever we went. That lasted until some of the interments were broken in the cockpit with the M-1 that some of us had to carry. After that they gave us 45s and kept the M-1 in the shop."

Jack remembered another tale about their F3D aircraft sitting on alert. He said, "When Eisenhower came to Korea after 1952 election, 513 had night strip alert. We had two F3Ds parked out at the end of the runway with support, two power units -- one plugged-in and running. There was a crew in one F3D (pilot & R.O.) ready to start engines. The other crew was back in Operations, after two hours the crew from Operations would come out and get in the other F3D and check it out. The first crew wouldn't get out until the second crew signaled they were ready for take off. It went that way every night that Eisenhower was in Korea. We scrambled a couple of times and when we did the other crew from Operations would come out and take off in the other F3D. It was supposed to be a big secret when Eisenhower came, but as soon or very shortly after we were put on this duty we guessed what was going on. We didn't know for sure until after he left."

He also remembers a Christmas dinner in 1952 in the Marine mess hall. "Also for Christmas 1952 the C.O. had the officers wait on table for the enlisted men at dinner. It's strange to have officers call you sir and asking you what you want." Later on Jim Curzon wrote to Jack later that he was one of those officers that was serving him the meal. Strange what memories still linger on after 50 years.

Diego del Valle of Miami, Florida was a Sgt.with the VMF(N)-513 from Apr 52 - Apr 53. He wrote, "I was a member of the Night Ordnance crew with VMF(n)513 from April 1952 to April 1953. I remember the Air Force flightline aircraft exploding, when one of them caught fire. Their CO was returned to the mainland. They found that the aircraft were parked too close to each other. Later on, an F84 flamed out at the end of the runway, while waiting to take off, and blew up just as the fire truck had pulled next to it." (NOTE: For more details on the December 1952 incident of the B-26 Invader aircraft exploding go to the 8th Bomb Squadron and the F-84 incident go to 474th Fighter Bomber Wing.)

He continued, "That winter was my first taste of cold weather. The mud in Korea sticks to your Mickey Mouse boots until they weigh about three times as much. I remember Capt. Freeman; MSgt. Farmer,my NCOIC; TSgt. "Pappy" Price; TSgt. Beatty; Sgt. Dewey; Sgt. "Shortman". Loved loading up the Corsairs and the F7Fs. Hated the F3Ds!"

"The chow was the best I had in the Marines! We picked the huge T-bone steak we wanted from a big pile at the entrance and took it to one of three cooks to have it grilled as we wanted, Rare, Medium, or Well done. And I never ever tasted better SOS!"

However, not all memories of Kunsan are of the war. Some sad memories are of the survivors of the Korean War. After the Chinese took Seoul, Kunsan City's population swelled to about 100,000 with refugees -- many from North Korea. This compounded the problems of an already poverty-striken area. A page from Between the Wars: A Soldier's Storyby Fred Ottoboni shows pictures of people living in caves and kids culling through the garbage while the Occupation forces were in Kunsan in 1945-1949. (Go toKunsan (1947)) In 1951, the same conditions existed -- only worse. Below is a 1951 picture of kids at the Base Garbage dump who would cull through the garbage looking for anything edible or salable. Life was not pretty for the Korean people during the Korean War period.

Ron Stout remembers, "My most vivid memory of Kunsan was a scene in the train yard there. We were waiting to take off with a trainload of 513's stuff for Osan via Iri when some people living in caves dug into the face of a dropoff next to the tracks came out begging for food. One was a very young girl with a baby in her arms. The baby's lips were covered with terrible open sores. The baby was very caucasian in appearance causing us to feel terribly sorry for it and its mother because the Korean people treated those mixed race babies and their mothers very badly while the U.S. government had no policy toward them at all. Marine Air Group 12 supported several Catholic orphanages near Pyong-Taek for such refugee children."

This was Kunsan during the Korean Conflict. The 3d Bomb Wing supported the orphanage in Kunsan City, as had the 3d Bn 63d Infantry Regiment during the Occupation Forces years from 1945-1949. Unfortunately, the Korean attitude that Ron speaks of towards mixed-blooded children continues till today. This an unfortunate fact of life in a country that prides itself as a "homogeneous" race. If you are a "homogeneous" nation, you must by definition exclude all who are not in order to ensure the purity of your blood-lines. Xenophobic, perhaps...but it comes with being homogeneous. Though there are exceptions, the general public still shuns mixed-blooded children -- and they are locked out of many opportunities for better life.

The Way We Did Business at Kunsan:

Ron Stout replied, "That may have been the F7F-3N that I thought had gone down in a lake nearby (where the IFF and electronics were swiped by a local). The story, as I got it second hand, said that the pilot didn't get out and one of the people searching for him saw a hardhat (crash helmet or brain bucket), kicked it and when it rolled over saw that it contained the top of the pilots head. The F7's were so old and overworked that we ignored the rule that you rejected a plane if either engine showed more than a 150 RPM "mag drop". Hell, most of them had at least a 300 RPM drop, whether in the states or in Korea and we'd never have got any flying done by the 150 standard. Paul Noel and the pilots would know a lot more about this than me. All I did was try not to aggravate the pilot too much and when he asked whether or not we should accept the damn plane I said hell yes. What eighteen year old sergeant wants his pilot to think he's a wimp for Gods sake?"

Ray Bourgholtzer completed the story, "I was at Kunsan by the Sea when that accident occurred. Pilot was Chief Flynn and ROI was McAvpy. In fact Bud Dillberg and I took them out to their plane in a jeep. As they left us, Bud made the standard remark of the day, "Don't crash and burn." As we watched their takeoff, the nose suddenly went sharply up and Flynn pulled the power back and as it dropped thru put it back on and once again went into steep climb and stalled and flipped over. As it went up the second time we saw something come from the rear cockpit and as the plane flipped, we saw the pilot leave and his chute opened and he swung one time and then hit the ground. As we took off, the fire was still burning. We were staging out of K-6 and each plane left K-8 with a bunch of flares tied into the fuselage. Plane also had the standard load of one 110 gallon napalm and 300 gallon tank of gas. Chief Flynn went down a little later on while flying a Corsair. Was a POW and got returned."

Ron Stout remembers another incident dealing with a crashed F7F. He said, "The reservoir on the map you sent jogged my memory about a piece of folklore about 513 that was extant when I was at K-8. (Go to K-8 Air Base for hand-drawn map of the base.) So the story goes, a 513 F7F lost both engines on take-off and went down in a lake (rice paddies) off the end of the runway. Concern was expressed about recovering the WW II I.F.F. with which the plane was equipped. F3D's had the top secret newer I.F.F.'s that would have had to be recovered immediately at all cost. The C.O. decided that the I.F.F. recovery could wait until spring since, it was presumed, no one could access the belly hatch to access the electronic bay of the plane as it was buried in mud. In spring a navy diver was brought in to get the I.F.F. and reported it missing and the electronics access door open. A panic search ensued and the I.F.F. was found in a nearby farmers hut. No one felt moved to inquire as to how the farmer dived into that frigid water, swam underneath the plane, opened the electronics hatch (dzus fastened, requiring a slotted tool) and took the I.F.F. The farmer had also, so the story goes, stripped the plane of its other electronics components."

Kunsan Attempted Crash Rescue Incident: Ron Stout related another incident. "Another of my instructors beat me to Korea and died off the end of the runway at K-8 when his F7 went down in the Yellow Sea and he died of hypothermia after he was rescued. His name was M/Sgt Weldon Hardin." (This is sadly true after being in the frigid waters (25 degrees F) for TWO HOURS were rescued alive and talked to the boat crew. Unfortunately, they perished on the way into Kunsan Harbor and were pronounced DOA at the docks.) George Cullins remembered MSgt Hardin fondly as well. He wrote, "Wendle Harding (sic) was my RO in 1950 and part of 51 when he went home with the bug-out crew when 542 and 513 merged in Feb of 51. In 52 Harding tried to talk me into going back out with him. I was up to my ass in girls in Laguna Beach to fall for that. He went out and the next thing I heard that on an approach to K-18, I think, he and his pilot went into the bay in mid winter. Harding died from Hypothermia, I was told. The water was just too cold to survive in. I thought the Aircraft was a F7F." The F7F could be seen about a mile off the base at low tide. George continued, "Harding was a good RO and a great Marine. I joined 542 at El Toro the 16th of August 1950 and left San Diego the 26th of August 1950. I being single was sent to North Island, with a detail, to get the ship ready to transport 542 and 212 to Japan. Ray Wright and Harding were with me in the detail to get the ship ready with about 20 others. It was a filthy mess. It had just come out of moth balls. They were a great help in getting the job accomplished. We, being the only Marines aboard, got called up to the ships EX office and were informed that we were in charge of the brig. A sailor was giving the guys on guard duty a ration and Ray said he would take care of it. Everytime the Sailor opened his mouth Ray turned the fire hose on him. I got my ass chewed out by the EX but the sailor reversed his attitude and was a pleasant individual after that. He also learned how to do push-ups Marine style."

However, there was some lingering bitterness expressed about this incident -- mainly because the official facts were not released to the lower echelons at the time. Ron Harbison wrote, "At K-8 we lost one plane into the ocean off of the runway. It could be seen at low tide during the day. We lost that crew, containing RO Hardin, because the [air farce] had two helicopters without night instruments and two weasels which were inoperative. That was strange because they flew B-26s off of the same field at night." (NOTE: "Weasels" are small amphibious vehicles based on a jeep.) He later wrote, "I had inherited a one-piece fleece lined flight suit from a homeward bound radar operator. Hardin borrowed it that night and still had it on when they brought them back. That was before we got our rubber suits and thermal boots. That is why I mention the weasels and helicopters the last time I wrote. They had to call an Army rescue unit stationed near Kunsan, which had to go out in the river then down to the airplane. That probably would have taken two or more hours. ... So you can see where some of the hard feelings come from in regard to the air farce." (NOTE: The crash rescue boat belonged the USAF 22nd Crash Rescue Boat Squadron deployed to Kunsan Harbor.)

The boat was running with only one engine -- due to the lack of spare parts. Any boat rescue attempt in high surf conditions with the underpowered boat was virtually impossible until the tide started going out. The helicopter problems most likely were attributed to parts problems. Time was a major factor as life expectancy in the mid-winter water conditions (25 degrees F) was only 15-20 minutes -- though the crew lasted for two hours. An inquiry was held after the incident with a board of two Marine colonels, the 3rd Bomb Wing Commander, Air Force flight surgeon and other Air Force officers. The rescue boat was exonerated of all blame -- as well as the helicopter crews.

The first claim of the "weasels" not being used can be answered by the fact that the breakers were coming in to the Korean coast line from the Yellow Sea were running between 10 to 15 feet. (NOTE: This info provided by Les Adams, former 22nd CRBS commander.) With these conditions these small amphibious vehicles would have been useless and swamped. Their use would NOT have been an option. Ron's claim that the weasels were "inoperative" is also a distinct possibility. There was a severe vehicle parts shortage of mind-boggling proportions for all types of vehicles and machinery throughout Korea. Quartermaster records indicate the horrendous problem procuring even the most common of parts. Throughout Korea, vehicles of all transportation units were kept in commission by "cannibalizing" (taking parts from "dead-lined" vehicles). By the time the rescue boat running on one engine -- reached the site, the tide was running out.

The second claim about the helicopters is a little disturbing. At the time of this incident, the Detachment 1 3rd Rescue Squadron had a Sikorsky H-5 at Kunsan. Ron Harbison's comment of "two" H-5s is strange as we show the 3rd Rescue Squadron Det 1 only had ONE H-5 authorized for Kunsan. The allegation about not flying because of night instruments seems very strange as the aircraft was less than a mile off of Kunsan -- visual range of Kunsan's lights. As these rescue helicopter pilots' heroism in rescue work is unquestioned, we must assume that it was mechanical problems. If it had a mechanical problem, parts would have had to have been flown in from Kimpo. Another possibility is the lack of a hydraulic hoist on the aircraft. Not all H-5s were modified with the hoist and third seat. Bottomline: the helicopter squadron was exonerated by the Board of Inquiry.

The third claim against the crash rescue boat's skipper was unfounded. The skipper was exonerated in an inquiry after the incident. The 22d Crash Rescue Boat Squadron (CRBS) of the FEAF had a detachment at Kunsan harbor at the time. Even with boats standing by at the wharf at Kunsan harbor, it took considerable running time for the boats of whatever speed to reach the open sea and get under the traffic pattern approaches to Kunsan AB runways. (Normal response time was 20 minutes.) Operating with only one engine significantly impaired the boat's rescue attempt.

The skipper of the crash rescue boat,Robert Frankovich, wrote the following account to explain what happened. It sheds some light on the conditions the rescue crews had to endure as well as the sea rescue for Marine operations throughout Korea. "I arrived in Japan in May 1952 as a S/Sgt Boat Skipper. I was made skipper of the R-2-1196, a 63' boat and went to K-9 in Korea for 3 months for rescue duty for the Air Force. We were so short of personnel that I had 3 Japanese crewmembers on my boat at K-9. From there, I went to K-3, for about 3 months for rescue duty with the first Marine Air Wing. I went back to Japan to get the bottom of the boat painted and change engines for 2 new rebuilt engines just received from the states. The engines in the 1196 had over 1200 hours on them. I also tried to get two spotlights, but none were available."

He continued, "After changing engines and having great difficulty getting them running correctly, I departed for K-8 Korea about the latter part of November. I first went to K-10 where we refueled and spent the night. I departed the next day and was only gone for a few hours when one engine was smoking and running so badly that I had to shut it down. I requested by radio to return to Japan for a new engine or even to get the old ones back, but was ordered to proceed to K-8 with the engines installed as is, because no others were available. Through further radio communications with Japan and our observations, we determined we had lost the tops of some pistons in the one engine."

He went on, "It took me two days to make K-8 from K-10 on one engine instead of the normal one day with two engines. I tied up at an Army caisson and reported to Kunsan AB by Army telephone that I had arrived. Kunsan AFB was several miles from the Army base. I then spent the next few days familiarizing myself with the area and getting some times and courses running on one engine. I also talked to either the operation officer or Col. LeBailly's Adjutant about how effective I could be in a rescue in the event of a plane crash considering the condition of my boat and the temperature of the water. Mine was the only boat between K-10 and K-55 or sometimes even further north. I believe there are six islands not far off the end of the runway at Kunsan. We talked about getting a barge permanently anchored between the two nearest islands where I could tie up. I could not anchor there without the barge because with only one engine, I would lose my boat if a storm blew up." (Note that the "Army" that Robert is referring to was the 14th Trans Port Co. (later the 21st Trans Port Co.) of the U.S. Army that handled the Kunsan port operations, as well as the railroad links and all freight/cargo coming in and going out of Kunsan.)

He added, "Before anything could be implemented, a Marine plane went down off the end of the runway. I was notified by telephone by the Army. I proceeded down the river with both engines running, but had only run a little while when the gas leaking into the crankcase through the bad cylinders blew up and blew oil all over the engine room. I had the engine shut down, filled with more oil and started again. The same thing happened again so I shut down the engine and didn't try that again. If the engine blew down instead of up, it could blow the bottom out of the boat causing us to sink. As the tide was running out, I went about 5 miles into the sea and turned south toward the end of the runway." It should be noted here that his boat was not equipped with any surface search radar. His search for the crew was strictly visual. The Air Force did not start equipping the 63' boats with that device until mid 1953. Neither was the boat equipped with a fathometer (depth gauge) though operating in shallow waters.

Robert continued, "I then turned toward shore and ran about 10 minutes when we saw lights from the life jackets of the two crewmen. We dropped the rescue nets and I also had a metal litter with four lines attached, which we dropped over the side to scoop up an injured man. It had taken me almost 2 hours to reach the men, who were still alive and talked to us. We used the litter and tried to pick up one man but discovered that they were tied together. The litter could not pick up both men together so I went into the water and cut the men apart. The first man got into the litter and the crew got him into the boat. I helped by holding onto the rescue net with one hand and lifting the litter with the other hand. When we got the litter on board, my crew took the man, wrapped him in blankets and got him to the dispensary."

Robert's account graphically illustrates the effects that the freezing water has on the body. "I tried to climb on board by grabbing the lifeline, but my hand would not close because it was so frozen. I fell back into the water and I don't believe the crew even noticed because they were so busy. I swam to the stern of the boat where there was a wooden ladder and I climbed on board by hooking by arms through the rungs since I could not use my hands to hold on. I went through the dispensary to the engine room and lay on top of the running engine with my soaked clothes on to get warm. The heat and the wet clothes steamed me and probably saved my life. The crew was busy getting the second man on board and didn't miss me. That was the only heat in the boat. The 1196 had no heating system of any kind installed on it for either crew protection or medical aid to survivor."

He added, "I threw on some dry clothes and we returned to Kunsan Army docks. I notified the Air Force that I had the two men on board and they met us at the docks with an ambulance and a doctor. I believe the doctor pronounced the two men dead on arrival. Neither aircrew member was wearing a survival suit. At the flight surgeon's request, we went out the next day and measured the temperature of the water at the rescue site. It was 25° F."

As in many tragic cases, preventive measures are implemented AFTER the disaster. Robert continued, "After the accident, I received one survival suit and two rubberized electric blankets from the air base at K-8. Men came from Japan to replace the blown pistons in the bad engine. This was almost an impossible job while the engine was in the boat because the men couldn't get to the bottom of the engine. When reinstalling the blocks, the men couldn't put back the bottom rings on some of the pistons. This wasn't perfect, but at least I could run the engine at cruising speed. One of the men from Japan was W.O. Donald Slessler and I think a T/Sgt Johnson. I don't recall the names of the other men."

He continued, "There were nine men on my crash rescue boat. After the engine was reparied, we would anchor between the two islands. We only carried 150 gallons of water and had a 3-burner alcohol stove to cook on and heat the galley. We would stay out for 3 days and then come in for showers and supplies at the Army docks. I would only let the men brush their teeth with fresh water once a day and nothing else as we needed the rest for cooking and drinking. The only heat we had on the boat was the alcohol stove in the galley so the crew took turns getting warm in the galley because it was not big enough to hold all the men at one time. I could not get extra blankets, but did get extra mattresses so we slept with our clothes on with one mattress under us and one mattress on top of us. When we woke up from the cold, we would go into the galley and a warm person would have to go to his cold bunk."

As a result of the tragedy, there was a Board of Inquiry convened that included the 3rd Bomb Wing Commander, Col. LeBailley; his adjutant (a Lt. Col.); the USAF Flight Surgeon; and two Marine Colonels from the 1st Marine Air Wing at K-3 (Pohang). Robert wrote, "One morning while at anchor between the islands, I was called on the radio and told a board of inquiry about the accident would convene at 1200 hrs. that day at Kunsan AFB. I told them I would be at the dock at 1000 hrs. and be ready to be picked up by 1100 hrs. I was available for pick up at 1100 hrs. but no transportation was there to pick me up. None came until 1630 hrs. The board consisted of two Marine Colonels from K-3 and several Air Force Officers. The Marine Colonels did most of the questioning and were rather sharp with their questions. One Marine Colonel made the remark that the Marines should get the Navy to pull their rescues at K-8 like they did at K-3 and not the Air Force. I told the Colonel that the Air Force runs the crash rescue boats at K-3 and that I had just pulled 3 months duty there from mid-August to mid-November. The Colonel was confused because we wear Navy uniforms and I had one on then. His attitude markedly changed toward me when he learned that we were Air Force and ran all the crash rescue boats in Korea. The flight surgeon testified that because of the time the crewmen spent in the water, there was nothing I could have done to save them. The board absolved me of all blame."

The barge was located between the 2 closest islands off Kunsan Air Base sometime after February 1953. After the Armistice (for fear of upsetting the delicate negotiated peace), the flying mission dropped off to about nil. The barge was relocated to Kunsan Harbor again where it remained until the 22nd CRBS was deactivated in 1956.

Upon learning of the real circumstances surrounding this incident, Ron Harbison, along with the veterans of the VMF(N)-513, extended his heartfelt appreciation to Robert Frankovich and his crew for their valiant rescue attempt so many years before. Some noted that it was a shame that the thanks had to be 50 years late simply because they were not privy to the facts at the time.

Later Ron Harbison wrote about another F3D lost out over the water. "On 30 May 1953 we lost one other crew on final approach over the ocean - Capt. Brown and Sgt. Harrel. We never did figure out what happened to them." This appears to be the same aircraft observed by Jack Barclay (flight engineer on 8th Bomb Squadron B-26s). He wrote, "A Marine F7F landed short of the southwest end of the runway in the water in the area where you have marked rice paddies. The aircraft could only be seen during low tide. The base guns along the shore line blew it up before the local Koreans could strip it." Looks like they learned their lesson from the first incident at the reservoir.

There may have been another accident at the inland end of the runway. Ron Harbison wrote, "We lost another crew off of the other end of the runway which had a large resevior at the end of it. The lost RO was M/Sgt Cecil Greir." He later wrote, "They probably lost power or electric because they should have been able to see the lights of Kunsan, which would rule out vertigo." (NOTE: We don't have any other information on this crash at this time.)

Another crash was related by Ron Harbison. "The fourth crash that I know of occurred on the night before I arrived at K-8 in mid September. In this crash the plane ran out of gas between the main line of resistance and K-8. The radar operator (Haveland) bailed out but the pilot (Major Berry) was a large man and he had trouble getting out. ... Major Berry was found beside the plane with his parachute open. Haveland was brought back to the base about the time I arrived." Jim Curzon remember it too. He said, "The crash I remember was Ed Berry was the pilot. He had fuel system trouble and was on the way back to the base. ... The RO got out OK but can`t remember whether he was picked up or not. Ed wrapped around the tail when he baled out. This was an F7F. They had been having trouble with that particular plane and its fuel system. I remember Joe Burns telling Ed to watch it because he had trouble with that plane."

Still another crash was related by Ron Stout. "There was an F3D crash at K-8 (1953) involving Colonel Ross Mickey and his R.O. M/Sgt John Wilcox.The plane crashed on landing and caught fire. Both went out through the top hatch but Colonel Mickey's foot was caught and he suffered severe enough burns to require evacuation to the hospital ship off Inchon. I later heard that Wilcox was killed in a crash in to a mountain in Japan. Colonel Mickey is retired and living in Hawaii." Paul Noel added a bit of "scuttlebutt" about this incident. Though unverified, it sounded so good that we are adding it here. Paul said, "I have no documentation, and have not thought about it for years, but here is some scuttle butt: Col. Mickey was trapped and hanging head down outside the cockpit. The fire cooked off some ammo and the crash crew backed off. R/O drew his side arm and threatened crash crew with death if they did not go back and rescue Col. Mickey---which they did successfully. If true, certainly did not help base relationships. His feet must have been badly burned. He was my Group CO 1962-63. Never saw him without stockings. I attributed that to burn disfigurements, although he walked/marched normally. He lives in Hawaii."

Jack Kio added more about Col Mickey's crash, "The crash you are talking about I remember because I and others were in the shop waiting for the planes to come back so we could find out how the radar worked. We heard on the radio they took a wave off and went out side to see them come in, they forgot to put there wheels back down. You could just hear engines start to whine up then they hit the deck. Up to that time I didn't know a metal plane could burn that fast. That happened before crash crew lost some of there men." (NOTE: The crash crew deaths mentioned by Jack was caused by an exploding F-84 of the 474th FBG on 23 Oct. 1952 due to a engine fire on takeoff that cooked off the bombs.)

Flight Operations: Jim Curzon wrote about the way they flew their missions. "You know all the different things we did. Where most squadrons would get briefed as to what their targets were and take off time. They knew what they were going to be doing. We knew nothing, until we got down to operations. We could be escorting B-29s, making radar controlled bomb drops, road recces, CAPs or even escorting B-26s. Then Col. Hutchinson came back from and flew a mission that night. We were waiting for him when he came down. He came into Operations and said "Men, It`s an Ass Buster but we can do it."

"That is when we started taking off and checking in up at Bomb Line for radar controlled bomb drops. They got hairy sometimes. Ground control would have you come at certain altitude, airspeed and heading. When you were all lined up and set you would turn the control of the aircraft over to them. It was an eerie feeling. You would just sit there with your hands on the throttle and the stick and finger on the button. Then they would say , stand-by five, four, three, two, one now. You would hit the button then the switch, cutting off their control, then the trottle and get the devil out of there. The Koreans called them Human Finding Bombs because we would drop them during storms and bad weather and they would always find their mark."

"After that we would head for road recces. We would either be on our own or hook up with FatFace Our Flare plane. I might have the name wrong , that is the name I remember. After the road recces we would be assigned to CAP someplace. Finally we would get to go home after anywhere from 4 1/2 to 5 hours after Take-Off. This is what Col. Hutch was so mad about. We would only get credit for 1 mission. If we didn't pull an Ass Buster we would get escort service. The escorting of the B-29s was a good 4 hour stint. After escorting them up to drop their load, we would have to CAP just south of the Yalu. Escorting the B-26s was as long as they stayed. Sometimes not too long." (NOTE: "Fat Face" was the correct call sign for the PB4Y-2 flare-drop aircraft.)

Jim added a note about the "Human Finding Bombs" that the uneducated superstitious Communist soldiers feared. He said, "the North Koreans just called them Human Finding Bombs because of where they were dropped. The only thing special we had on our planes for these drops was the little gadget that hooked on to the autopilot that gave the ground control, control of our plane. They had it figured out at a certain speed, altitude and heading a bomb could be dropped at a certain spot and it would hit its target. They would control the plane to that spot and we would push the button. It was a combination of radar, auto-pilot, calculations and human reflexes that made it work. And it just killed the Air Force see something work that good and not be theirs. I wanted you to know it wasn't some secret weapon. If it were, we wouldn't of had it. It was something our people put together to get a job done."

Jim remembers that the equipment was something that was rigged up by the Marines, though it was most likely a coordinated test program. Paul Noel added a historical clarification. He said, "At this time frame no change of any kind could be made to a Marine/Navy aircraft without the approval of Navy Bureau of Aeronautics as the Navy literally owned the aircraft; they had to be maintained for transfer to Navy units, compatible for carrier operations, etc. So a requirement, like ground control bomb drop, would be established by Marine Corps, had to get Navy to budget, concept was developed and tested at a Naval Aviation test organization (probably with a Marine Naval Aviator Project Officer---in this case at NAS, Pt. Mugu), and sent to the field for testing by a specialized unit or squadron (in this case--513-- working together)." Paul also added that with the passing of 50 years, memories on a "gadget" like this could get a little fuzzy.

Jim said, "I remember the Air Force going to take that equipment away from us. It wasn't "Standard Issue", it was something that our electronics people put together. When the Air Force said "turn it over', our people dismantled it completely and turned over a heap of parts. The Air Force said they didn't want it that way, they wanted it assembled and working. Our people told them that that was how we received it and with no instructions for assembly so that is how they were returning it. The Air Force turned it down so we put it back together and was in business again. This is the story we got back at the base. It came from one of the men from that outfit who was visiting us at K-8. It was things like this that always popped up that kept us upset with the Air Force. They couldn't just get along. They had to always be the big cheese or they would throw a wrench in the works for any other Service that was trying to get a job done."

(NOTE: An email in the KWP by James L. Johnson (343 Main St, S.Dennis Ma 02660) may be a part of the unit that controlled the "Human Finding Bomb". It said, "Between the summer of 1951 and the summer of 1952 I was in Korea with a relatively unknown USMC close air support group that provided radar and computer controlled guidance of appropriately equipped USMC fighter bombers in conducting bombing missions." He continued, "We called ourselves Dev Charlie which was taken from our radio call sign. Major Marion Dalby (Dirty) whom I understand eventually was promoted to General was our Commanding Officer. The group consisted of about 8 Officers and 30 Enlisted. ... I'm not sure of the organizations official name, we referred to ourselves sometimes as MASRT as I recall meaning Marine Air Support Radar Team. In any event the system we took to Korea was a prototype developed at Point Mugu, Ca. We went to Korea for combat evaluation of the system and after about 6 months were declared operationally essential. I believe we belonged organizationally to the 1st Air Wing and that Major Dalby reported, at least in parrallel to someone in Washington.")

How the unit did business was what "normal" folks would call "flying by the seat of his pants." Ron Harbison gave an example of one of his missions. "This is my story about the night of November 18-19, 1952. We left for a night combat air patrol (NCAP) above Cho-Do early in the morning of November 19. Unusually, we had two external wing tanks and one belly tank. Someone might have known that we may have been short on planes that night. We found out early in the mission that we could not get gas out of the belly tank. On the way up to Cho-Do we crossed the Haeju Peninusla, usually at the same altitude, speed, and heading. That night Major Carr suddenly wheeled the plane in a hard port turn. When he banked the plane back again I could see what happened. There was nothing but red anti-aircraft fire coming up. If they had not used tracers it would have lifted us out of the sky. I do not know if it was radar or sound control, but it was right on target."

He continued, "On station we usually orbited north of Cho-Do and when our station was about over we would start working our way south to wait for our relief. Our relief aborted so we worked our way back north of Cho-Do. In the meantime we could see the plane dropping flares over the water between Cho-Do and the mainland. We found out about the B29 going down and the flares were to help boats searching for survivors. I could pick up the flare plane on my radar as we made our orbits. As we started working our way south again to be relieved, we again got the message that our relief had aborted. We still could not get any gas out of our belly tank. As we turned back north again I had the flare plane on my scope and suddenly picked up another plane rapidly closing on it. We called Cho-Do and they instructed the flare plane to take violent evasive action. The flare plane broke 90 degrees to my port and the other plane headed for Korea. I set up a cut-off vector and we were after him. I brought us in 200 ft. behind him and at an altitude of 500 feet; we had started at 10 or 15 thousand feet. We were closing fast when he crossed the coastline which blanked out my scope with ground return. We called Cho-Do but they could not help us. I think whoever was flying that plane needed a change when he got back."

He went on, "By that time dawn was starting to break and time for the F-86's to take over. We were getting low on gas so after we crossed the Haeju peninsula Major Carr requested a heading for Kimpo, which was about due east. As we flew east it became daylight and we had a solid cloud cover below us. Major Carr kept asking about our heading because the aerial direction finder needle set for Kimpo's frequency was pulling to the north. Major Carr soon called and said he had a 10 degree deflection and soon it was 15 degrees. I was also mapping and confident of our heading, but if I was wrong we would end up between Kimpo and Kunsan out of gas. After I told Major Carr we were over Kimpo he went down through an opening in the clouds about 5 miles ahead and did a 180 into Kimpo. North Korea, having monitored everything all night may have been waiting for this chance with a more powerful ADF transmitter for such an opportunity. I am thankful that Major Carr trusted my navigation. Otherwise it may have been a long winter."

Ray Harvey sent an article about another interesting incident of how a combined Marine-Navy operation destroyed some Communist trains. In the article which was released by the 1st MAW on 17 Oct 52, the headline read "Marine Flier Teams Up With Two Destroyers To Wreck Four Red Trains." Marine Capt. Thomas S. Moore of Amarillo, TX and TSgt. Raymond K. Harvey of Watertown, NY in an F7F spotted four Communist supply train about 35 miles northeast of Haungam in northeast Korea. "There were about 70 freight cars," Moore said. "We attacked the longest string, about 30 cars, and bombed and strafed until our ordnance was gone." The article continued, "Going in low, the Marines found they had blown several cars off the tracks and started two fires in the second train. There were several explosions as ammunition blew up. Moore flew the F7F Tigercat out to sea looking for a ship that could finish the job. He found two Navy destroyers and directed them by radio to a point offshore. For an hour and a half while the destroyers poured shells into the trains, Moore and Harvey circled the target, radioing results and correcting aim." Ray wrote later about this incident long ago, "Hard to imagine that it has been so long ago. Sometimes seems like yesterday. I don't feel a day older but know that I am."

• Marine Squadron VMF(N)-513 (1952-1953): "The Flying Nightmares"
  • Flying Nightmares:
  • On the Move: From WWII to Arrival in Japan to Itami to Wonsan, North Korea
  • On the Move: To Yonpo, North Korea to Itami to Kangnung to Kunsan to Pyongtaek
  • Arrival at Kunsan:
  • The Way We Did Business:
    • Close Air Support:
    • Flare-drop Mission:
    • Ground-level Friction between the Services:
  • F4U-5NL Corsair:
  • F7F-3N Tigercat:
  • F3D-2 Skyknight:
  • Squadron "kills":
  • Air-to-Ground Results:- A review of the "Final Air-to-Ground Results: Aug 1950 - May 1953"
  • Germ Warfare: -- The VMF(N)-513 is accused of using germ warfare from Kunsan
  • Departed Kunsan for K-6:
  • After Korea:
  • Footnotes:
  • 319th Fighter Interceptor Squadron: -- F-94 Squadron from Suwon providing B-29 air cover with VMF(N)-513 and Specifications of the Lockheed F-94 Starfire
  • B-29 Superfortress:-- Night bombing strikes on the North Korea (June 1952 - July 1953)

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