HOW IT WAS! KUNSAN AIRBASE VMF(N)-513 "FLYING NIGHTMARES" (1951-1954) Page 5 of 9

Acknowledgment: Special thanks to Ron Stout of Burien, Washington for his narratives and invaluable technical information. Special thanks to Paul Noel of Oak Harbor, Washington for his invaluable assistance in providing information, proofing the text, providing guidance in assembling the materials and contributing his narratives. Special thanks to Jack Kio of Oswego, New York for his narratives, photos, and invaluable technical information. Thanks to Jim Curzon for his narratives and photos of Kunsan. Thanks to Eugene "Mule" Holmberg for the patches of the VMF(N)-513. Thanks also to Ken Gates for his research materials and photos. Thanks to Ron Harribson for his narratives. Thanks to Bill Brennen for his narratives and photos. Special thanks to Robert Frankovich for his narrative of a 22d CRBS rescue attempt. Also thanks to Ray Bourgholtzer; Gil Garcia; and Ray Harvey for their contributions. Thanks to Joseph S. Rychetnik of Point Richmond, California for his narratives and technical information. Primary Source Material: The Flying Nightmares: A History and Assessment of VMF(N)-513 at War in Korea 1950 - 1953 by Benjamin Huston Kristy, History Thesis, Kansas State University, 1995; U.S.Marine Corps Aviation: 1912 to Present by Peter B. Mersky); Air Power, January 1986; Naval Fighters Number Four Douglas F3D Skyknight, by Steve Ginter.

Close Air Support:

1. A difference in philosophy over the use of air power
2. A difference in techniques
3. A difference in semantics

Paul Noelexplained that CAS support is the Marine specialty -- and had been since they invented it! He went on to say, "WWII night fighters maintained air superiority. We taught very little in night air-to-ground in F7F training, Idea was to be exposed to the flash, noise, and smoke. Emphasis was on maintaining night vision. It was not until 1947 that my squadron exercised night delivery of cannon fire, rockets, and practice bombs. Most of us interceptor types did not like it and I am sure the R/Os liked it less as I fired at altitude of 300 feet on the radio altimeter and pushed over to check the hit! But these pilots are the guys that did the night road recces when the F7Fs first got to Korea. Of course they had success. Until Korea we never dreamed of running up and down a road shooting up trucks. CAS was the name of the game. But in Korea JOC needed road recces and the F7Fs were assigned to do so. They did. And that was the way the system worked."

Paul continued, "Marine Corps squadron's primary mission had nothing to do with day-to-day operations, within reason. Transports were not kicking bombs out the door, but they would have if it came down to that. The 'dictator' was the guy who controlled all aviation assets in Korea. CG 5th AF comes to mind. His agent was JOC who issued the frag orders. Control was through a command center. When we pulled up the landing gear lever the R/O switched from tower to command center. After a vector and identification we were handed off to a GCI station for the intercept or patrol. Upon establishing firm radar contact the R/O would TAKE control from the ground controller and complete the intercept. About all a pilot does is take off, follow directions, pull the trigger, and land the airplane. Surplus baggage most of the time. At least that is the way I recall events. It was standard and can be traced back to the Battle of Britain."

At the local level, there were more basic problems because of the way Marines did business. Air Force units are used to the idea of operating from a "home" base, while Marines are mobile and no place is home. Ron Stout adds, "Marine air is subordinate to, and an extension of, the infantry and as such is expected to be flexible so that they can carry minimum fuel and maximum ordinance in support of the grunts. That being the case, it behooves Marine air to be highly flexible so that they can stay near the bomb line. Marines in Korea, as in WW II operated off carriers, PSP strips, dirt roads, or wherever we could hang our hats."

Basically, the 1st MAW CAS mission had all the advantages over the Fifth Air Force CAS system, but the bottomline was that the Fifth Air Force was in control. The 1st MAW CAS mission was designed for tactical aircraft -- rather than fighter aircraft. Tactical air support was the 1st MAW's primary mission versus the Fifth Air Force where tactical air support would get no higher than a priority three on a mission. The Navy-Marine aircrews were thoroughly trained and familiar with the supported units tactics, problems and techniques versus the Fifth Air Force aircrews who had no real training in CAS. 1st MAW communication was simplified and local, while Fifth Air Force methods were complicated and insufficient and required Field Army-Tactical Air Force detailed control. Despite all these 1st MAW advantages, the Fifth Air Force CAS system prevailed.

This Navy-Marine Corps view of the CAS mission is explained in The Close Air Support Controversy in Korea by Capt. Keith Kopets. Under the section "The Navy and Marine Corps Method" it states, "Amphibious warfare shaped Navy and Marine Corps tactical aviation. Support of ground forces during ship-to-shore movement was the raison d'etre for naval aviation. The Navy-Marine Corps Team practiced the same CAS doctrine in Korea they had perfected in the South Pacific. Although the FEAF theoretically enjoyed "coordination control" over all aircraft in Korea, the Air Force exercised only nominal control over naval aviation during the early stages of the war due to communications difficulties. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW) and carrier groups of the Seventh Fleet initially provided CAS in support of EUSAK's defense of Pusan. After Pusan, the naval air forces assumed the duties (in practice) as the tactical air force of X Corps. Subsequently, they supported the Inchon and Wonsan landings and covered the X Corps withdrawal from North Korea. After Chosin, the operational control of the 1st MAW passed to Fifth Air Force for the remainder of the war."

"The naval air forces relied upon World War II-vintage to provide CAS. The F4U-4 Corsair and AD-1 Skyraider -- both propeller driven fighter bombers were the primary aircraft used to support the ground troops. The naval capabilities of these aircraft afforded the Navy and the Marine Corps numerous advantages over the Air Force. For instance, the Navy and Marine Corps were able to fly their sorties from just off the cost of Korea during the early stages of the war. They resulted in a quicker response time and allowed the aircraft to loiter "on station" to provide oncall CAS. In contrast, the Air Force could only place their landbased aircraft on "strip alert" in Japan because of fuel requirements."

But the Marine Corps CAS system was not without support from high level Army commanders. In The Close Air Support Controversy in Korea under the heading "The Controversy" it stated, "GEN Douglas MacArthur maintained X Corps as a separate tactical unit from the Eighth Army through the end of 1950. This division of command also held true for the air order of battle; the 1st MAW served as X Corps' Tactical Air Command, while Fifth Air Force fulfilled the same function for Eighth Army. After the U.N. withdrawal from North Korea, however, the Eighth Army absorbed X Corps, and the 1st MAW had to follow the Fifth Air Force system of CAS. This did not sit well with many Army commanders, particularly MG Edward M. Almond, X Corps commander. Almond had become a devout believer in Marine air and heaped criticism on the Air Force's shortcomings. X Corps undertook a study comparing the two systems of CAS at Almond's behest. The report compared the two systems ... and came out in strong favor of the Marines."

"The report made it all the way back to Washington. Army Chief of Staff GEN J. Lawton Collins filed a formal complaint against the Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, criticizing the Air Force's CAS operations in Korea. This report led to an investigation that concluded that the Air Force system of close air support was doctrinally sound and simply required better execution."

The bottomline was that the Fifth Air Force system was maintained for the remainder of the war. The Air Force doctrine of air interdiction shifted the focus of missions away from CAS. Large scale air interdiction missions were fragged. However, the complaint from many pilots was that they were hitting the same bridges from the same flight path at the same time everyday making them easy targets. The Marine view of having the ground units with a commited air component was lost in the shuffle. More and more the Air Force attention was drawn to the flashier air roles like air superiority.

The traditional relationship between the Marine Air, the Navy and the "Other" folks was changed in Korea. A lot depends on definitions and a lot on the historical relationship with the Navy. The Marine Corps evolved into a hard hitting, heavily armed force with its own air power to come in hard and fast, secure and hold a port area, so the navy could bring in Army forces with extra heavy equipment for the long haul. Later this concept expanded to capturing a nearby air field; a la the Inchon landing and capture of Kimpo. The WWII Pacific island campaigns sort of follow that scenario, too. The attack squadrons are for close air support of the grunt and fighters are to maintain air superiority so the attack guys can do their job. All through peace time the Marines train for and budget hardware buys so that they can accomplish that objective.

InThis Kind of War, The Classic Korean War Historyby T.R. Fehrenbach, it details this type of concept as the Marines Air covered the opening the port of Hamhung and then covered the Marine withdrawal after the Chinese entered the fray. It states (p 247), "Marine air from the 1st Air Wing near Hamhung, carrier pilots fromPhilippine SeaandLeyte, and Air Force supply planes flew constantly over the column. Marine aircraft strafed, bombed, and napalmed as close as fifty yards from the leading elements. Marine air flying so low as to touch the mountains, knocked out roadblock after roadblock, as fast as the Chinese assembled them. Marine pilots volunteered to fly night missions in the dangerous mountains. Hour after hour, the sky above the American troops was black with friendly aircraft, and without them, in spite of their courage, in spite of all else, the ground troops would never have come out."

The "fly in the ointment" comes when there is a Korea or Vietnam where the Marines come in fully loaded to do the job, but stay and are absorbed long term into the battle. The overall air commander wants control and allocation of ALL aviation assets and the Marine grunts are assigned a sector on the MLR. The Marines have budgeted for and expect to have 'their' air support (especially helicopters) and if the other services are short---the Marines feel no pity as they should have spent their money on more whatevers in the years past. To the Marines, it is like the ant and the grasshopper -- the them as the industrious and frugal ants, while the other services are the foolish grasshoppers.

Marine aviation comes under the area commander, whether they like it or not. The assets are assigned by the area commander, every 24 hours, as the frag order is put out. The senior Marine grunt and the senior Marine aviator did not dream up the idea of F3Ds escorting B-29s. It was something that was needed, the area commander had the assets. That traditional AF mission was done by who was capable and available -- the VMF(N)-513 F3Ds.

When one speaks to Marines about their mission in the early days of the Korean War, you see their underlying feeling. "WE did our job, WE prepared, WE came to get the job done, but YOU folks..." One can clearly see their pride in the Corps...but we also see the underpinnings of interservice rivalry. Regardless, there is truth in these statements from the Marines. InThis Kind of War, The Classic Korean War History(p128) it states, "When the Korean War broke, somewhat less than 10 percent of the small United States Marine Corps had seen combat. But fortunately for the Corps, the percentage was highly concentrated within officer and key NCO grades, most of the Marine troop leaders knew what war was like. And the Marines, who had always been largely a volunteer organization, had escaped the damaging reforms instituted within the United States Army at the end of World War II. The public clamor rose against the Army, during the war twenty times the small, parochial Corps' size, and ignored the Marines. In 1950 a Marine Corps officer was still an officer, and a sergeant behaved the way good sergeants had behaved since the time of Caesar, expecting no nonsense, allowing none. And Marine leaders had never lost sight of their primary -- their only -- mission, which was to fight. ... In 1950 the Marines, both active and reserve, were better prepared to die on the field of battle than the Army."

As to the role of close air support (CAS) often Army ground would request Marine CAS. Once absorbed, Marine grunts did not get a better break than their Army cousins reallocation. It came from the AF, actually Joint Operations Command (JOC). Paul Noel noted, "It was located at Osan when I got there and I suspect it had been there quite a while. Of course there was a Marine liaison officer assigned to JOC, a major in Korea; not sure in Vietnam, but like every thing else I am certain it escalated. Senior bird at a minimum." He continues on that the Marines were always good soldiers who followed orders...regardless of what service. Though they would have preferred to be in their element supporting their own, they were a Fifth Air Force asset and knew it.

Flare Drop Mission:

It continued (p382), "The flare planes and the Marine intruders did not depart in company from K-1 since the VP plane cruised at a slower speed than the fighters (though not much slower when the bomb and rocket load was as big as the Marines liked to carry). Rendezvous was accomplished in the target area either by the night fighter picking up the flare plane on radar and homing in, or by the flare plane dropping a flare and having the fighter home in on it. A flare mission normally lasted for approximately six hours, one plane having the sunset to midnight session, and a replacement having the midnight to sunrise stint."

"Each plane was scheduled to work with a total of four fighters, which came on the scene individually, spaced approximately one-half hour apart. If a fighter had to abort for some reason, the flare plane frequently was able to work with other planes for illumination purposes for bombing runs or anything else that might be required. The arrangement was obviously quite flexible and quite interesting for the VP boys, who were accustomed to long, monotonous hours of overwater flying. This seemed almost like legalized flat hatting."

"The flare-dropping task called for the patrol aircraft to depart after sunset with a two-ton load of flares and to fly over Korea accompanied by several Marine night-intruder aircraft. (Sometimes as many as seven attack aircraft would utilize the P4Y2's flares for a single flight, although the average was three to four. Such missions required the most careful and complex teamwork on the part of these planes. First of all, the flare-carrying P4Ys (called "Lamp Lighters") had to make a rendezvous with the night-attack aircraft. When this had been done, a search for enemy truck lights was commenced by the intruder and the flare plane. Upon finding a suitable target, a string of four to seven flares would be dropped to illuminate the target area. The attacking pilot might also ask for the flares to be dropped on a certain heading, and for repeated runs."

"Once the area had been illuminated, the attack pilot searched the ground and attempted to locate targets while the VP plane kept the area illuminated. The Marine intruder pilot had to make his search quickly before the enemy trucks had time to conceal themselves beneath trees or other cover."

Jack Kio wrote, "There was a time that we (enlisted men ) were offered rides in the PBY (PB4Y-2) to help drop the flares out. I didn't but I think some of the men did." Joe Rychetnik added, "The Gooks would often frustrate the low level flare dropping and attacks by fixing a steel cable across valleys to snag aircraft. The P4Y2 pilots had more than a handful of work to make it through the night."

Ground-level Friction between the Services:

The life of a Marine outfit on an Air Force base isn't always smooth. Ron Stout remembers an accident where the Base Commander got all excited after some 20mm HEI rounds passed through his house. "We landed from the sea toward land and the house sat just inside the tide line on the inland end of the runway. Where we turned off to unload our guns was on marsden matting pointed toward the sea with the house sometimes in the line of fire as it were." One day while unloading the guns, a few rounds of 20mm HEI were pumped into a house and the Base Commander became excited over this event. Ron went on to explain, "We took the position he was a wedge ass for getting all excited just because we dumped a few rounds of 20mm H.E.I. ammo through the civilian house he had commandeered for his use at the turn off end of the runway where we cleared our cannon after landing in the F3D-2's."

(NOTE 1: Ron Stout, former VMF-513 RO, stated that "marsden matting" was heavier than PSP and used for the turnoffs at K-8. We have observed this same heavy gauge PSP in the 1950s as abandoned scrap around Pearl Harbor. However, we have not seen it at Kunsan. Though the concrete pads and taxiways for the VMF-513 were destroyed in 1965 by the 6175th CES, some PSP remained buried. In 2000 for the Foal Eagle Exercises, the 8th CES excavated the former VMF-513 area for use as a tent city. A lot of PSP was removed at that time. The PSP material removed resembled the PSP used during the Vietnam era -- not the heavier guage material that Ron Stout mentioned.)

(NOTE 2: We have been corrected by Tim Taylor that term "Marsden matting" is incorrect. He stated that "Marston matting" is named for the legendary B/Gen Marvin "Muktuk" Marston who first came up with it prior to WWII. In June 1942, Major Marston, empowered by the Governor of Alaska, built a native army of 3,500 men. Marston, an Arctic veteran who had earned his nickname by consuming enormous quantities of muktuk, or whale blubber. However, Kodiak Tour stated, "According to a note on page 90 of the book The Forgotten War Volume Four by Stan Cohen, Marston matting is named for the town in North Carolina in which the product was manufactured. According to Alaska Geographic Vol 22, No 4, p12, it was first tried out near Marston NC in November 1941. Each section weighed a bit more than 66 pounds and was 10 feet by 15 inches." These are just interesting sidenotes as this material spanned WWII through the Vietnam era as the universal building material. We make this note as a lot of folks from the Korean War era continue to mistakenly refer to this material as "Marsden matting" -- though it appears that the term was PSP (pierced steel planking) was popular by the Korean War.)

(NOTE 3: There were two types of PSP landing mats: M8 landing mat (PSP - 15"x11'10") and T11 landing mat (channel - 26"x12'). VSTOL AND POWER PROJECTION states, "During World War II, American combat aviation used temporary runways constructed of "Marston mat." One section of steel mat was 10 feet by 15 inches and weighed 66.2 pounds. Holes punched into each of the three channels reduced weight by 17.5 percent, controlled dust, and allowed drainage. In Southeast Asia, the mat was known as pierced steel planking. Richard K. Smith, "Marston Mat," Air Force Magazine, April 1989, 84-88. Recent advances in high strength composite materials could conceivably reduce weight even more. Reversible mat with a woodland camouflage paint scheme on one side an a desert scheme on the other could be interchangeably mixed and matched to provide excellent concealment for any location.")

Ron Stout later said, "...the tension with the base C.O. was a well known and oft mentioned reason for our leaving before the base at K-6 was fully finished and equipped for our use." There is a grain of truth in Ron's statements -- though there are compelling real-world reasons for their swift movement to K6. The Marines stayed by themselves and in fact, seemed to be intentionally segregated from the rest of the USAF units on the base. Whether by chance or planning, it is hard to say. The area the Marines located at Kunsan was near the boggy end of the airstrip. This location is at the end of the runway, away from the USAF units (F-84 and B-26s).) (NOTE: Though the concrete pads were broken up by the 6175th CES in 1965 with the PSP hauled off happily by the locals as scrap, there appears to have been a lot of PSP left behind. The area the Marines formerly located was cleared by the Kunsan Air Base Civil Engineers in 2000 and they dug up PSP sheeting scattered throughout the area.)

The Marines tended to think of the Air Force fighter units as "fair weather" flyers -- though they did acknowledge the B-26s and F-84 fighter-bombers as flying in most weather conditions. Ron Stout stated, "...we were called upon to launch our strip alerts to replace AF planes grounded by weather. Normally those replacements were for F-86 and F-94 CAP's." However, the primary reason the Marine night fighters like the VMF(N)-513 and B-26s were called upon to fly in fog-enshrouded daylight interdiction was their aircraft was equipped with radar and SHORAN. These aircraft could "see" in the dark -- or fog. (NOTE: In August 1952, the 3rd Bomb Wing was commended for never standing down except for three days -- and that was because there were no targets. The 3rd Bomb Wing flew in rain, sleet or fog when other aircraft on the peninsula were grounded. The 474th Fighter Bomber Wing also flew more than other fighter-bomber wings because K-8's location in the South (with a protective mountain barrier) gave it milder weather conditions than bases such as Kimpo or Suwon...and even Pusan.)

Ron Harbison wrote, "From the time that I got there until I went to K-6 on June 1, 1953, there was only one night that the Flying Nightmares did not fly and that was because of icing. We kept sending a plane up all night long to see if conditions had improved. The Air Force seemed to only fly if they had good weather. The sad part about the lack of rescue equipment is that they flew out over the same water as we did."

Jack Kio only remembers an F-86 outfit that came in TDY in April 1953 as the only ones near them. He also remembers the friction between the Marines and the base. He said, "Other than them I don't remember any outfit being close to us. We and the Air Force didn't get along very good. A short time after we got there with the F3Ds our officers were asked to stay out of the officers club, the staff nco were told to stay out of the staff club and the enlisted club didn't want us. Looking back on it I think it was more our fault then the Air Force, we were not good guests. Also your mess hall didn't stay open all the time and our C.O. wanted a place were the crews coming back from mission could get something eat and the ones working on the planes. So we opened our own mess hall and we all ate together the officers and staff nco on one side the enlisted men on the other. The one thing the Marine Corps always tries to do is feed us the best they can, there thoughts are if they feed us good and pay us on time they can get us to do almost anything. They may be right."

Life was a little strained for the Marines at Kunsan as they were ostracized by the Air Force community there as some sort of pariahs. However, it really wasn't a good idea to mix these two elements whose philosophies of battlefield operations were so different. Jim Curzon wrote about the times and trials at Kunsan and the USAF not really liking them on the base. He wrote, "I wasn't too fond of the Air Force either. They considered us their poor relatives. And the way we lived, I was beginning to believe it. But we had the best of it because we had us. They kicked us out of their Officer`s Club so we built our own. We would have parties and they wouldn't be invited. One morning after one of our parties, I was walking to the Mess Hall when an AF Lt. Col. stopped me and said he almost came over last night and took those drum sticks away from the drummer and rammed them down his throat. I chuckled and told him I would have liked to have seen that because, he was a Lt. Col. too. I would have given anything to have seen him even have tried to take the sticks away from Jack Winters."

He later wrote to complete the story, "I should have told you the rest of the story about the drummer. When I got down to the flight line that morning, they told me, the Skipper wanted to see me. When I got in the office, Col. Hutchinson looked kind of peeved and I wondered what I had done now. He said an AF Lt. Col. called and said that one of the officers of 513 had been very insubordinate to him and he had his name. He took it from the name on his jacket. It was me. I chuckled a little when Col. Hutchinson raised his voice and said that this was not a laughing matter. He said it was hard enough to keep peace with them without stirring up something. Well I told him just what happened and what was said. He laughed and told me to get out of his office. As I started out the door, he was still laughing and said he too would have liked to have been there when he tried to take the drumsticks away from Jack. ...I thought you ought to know the whole story and know that it is not just the troops that didn`t have a great deal of love for the AF on that base at that time."

He wrote, "I guess we did feel like poor relatives the way we lived, and they rubbed it in. Letting us know they were taking a nice shower in a bathroom with heat as we walked on the old boardwalk to the old tin building we called our showers. They let us know that the old tin huts we called home was all we deserved. But I said we had each other and our loyalty to one another. We enjoyed life even as rough as it got to be. We even got together and wrote our own squadron song. Our Intelligence Officer, I think his name was Griffin, we called him Griff, came up with a catchy folk tune from Norway or Sweden. We all gathered around and started putting words together until we were soon U Pie Deeing all over the place. So when we would get together and sing like we used to all the time we would sing our song. The Flying Nightmares chant this tone U Pie Dee, U Pie DO when up at night and all alone U Pie Dee I O etc. It was great fellowship."

Jim later continued about the friction between the services. "I guess we brought a lot of it on ourselves. When we built our own Officer`s Club, it was our own. Not the Marine Corps, not the Squadron`s but ours. We each kicked in 20 dollars apiece to get started. I made the first bootleg run. I flew over to Itami, Japan and stocked the bar. I used the AF's PX for the beer and cokes. I was the first Club Officer and to make things simple, we did not use money. Just signed chits. One drink , and sign your name. It didn`t make any difference whether it was a coke, a beer or a rum and coke, it was still the same price. I don't recall how much it was but I`m thinking it was 25 cents. Then at the end of the month I'd just count the number of drinks. Pretty simple huh. We made money and we couldn't do that so we would throw a party and invite all our friends. We would invite our MAGIS boys over. We owed them for all the times they brought us in GCA. I think this is what started all the friction between us and the AF.They would hear a party going on and come over and we would turn them away. After that it was remarks like, "How is life in the Boonies anyway." "Hey, don`t track your muddy feet on our sidewalks." And just small and snide remarks like that. I suppose we should have invited them over, since all the material that we used to build the club came from them.They didn`t know it, at the time. When we built the Club, we found out the Padre was a pretty good stone mason. He built the fireplace."

As a note to this club, this was pretty standard faire for the war. Most flying units -- regardless of service -- operated a separate bar for its pilots to improve morale. In Officers in Flight Suits, The Story of American Air Force Fighter Pilots in the Korean War (pp125-126) to relate how "booze became the primary recreational activity. Whereas beer was bought locally, liquor was imported to bases from the rear-echelon base at Tsuiki to Kimpo. Pilots ferrying planes back to Tsuiki for maintenance would also bring back as many fifths of liquor as their flight suits would carry. The 80th Squadron went so far as to cut doors in a spare set of wingtip fuel tanks to carry booze from its rear base at Itazuke to its forward base at Suwon." These o-clubs would pay for liquor and other supplies by collecting dues from users and also by charging small dues for drinks. At most bases, all drinks were twenty-five cents. These were the "wild ass days" when pilots were given a long leash as long as the impressive numbers continued. The officers could do as they pleased during off-hours. In an environment where pilots were shot down every day, drinking provided an important escape from the danger and boredom of war.

Jim added another note about the Korean help at their Marine O-Club. He said, "We had a young Korean by the name of Ha, who was our bartender at the club. He was about 20 or 21 years old and likeable. He spoke pretty good English and had a good sense of humor. When I first opened the club we needed another house boy and they sent Ha over. He took care of the club and acted as bartender. He learned quickly and turned out to be a good bartender. He always mingled and made sure everyone was happy. I came in one day and there was a different Korean behind the bar. I asked him who he was? I don't remember his name, but he said they sent him over to take Ha's place. He didn't know why Ha didn`t show up or anything. All he knew was that he was to come to the club and someone would show him what to do. He asked me it I was the one who was to tell him what to do. I told him, Yes. As we were going over things, like drinks, tickets, stock etc , One of the officers came in. I don't recall who it was but he said that it didn't take them long to get a replacement for Ha. I asked him, if he knew anything about Ha. He said that he was a North Korean Agent and that ROK Intelligence had come and picked him up. It was later verified as true. That was something to talk about for awhile, wondering whether you had said anything that he could have used against us. Everyone after that watched what they said and who was around when they said it." This continued to be a problem even years later. In John Moench's book Taking Command he relates a tale of a North Korean spy being employed by the Kunsan O-club in 1959.

Joseph S. Rychetniksaid it best, "You must understand that the Air Farce and the Marines never got along in Korea . It's the nature of things since 1917." He later wrote, "Once the Air Force had jets, they referred to Marine Air as "Stone Age." There has been a running war between the Air Force, spelled and pronounced Farce, and Marine Air. The battle still goes on."

It is always a bad idea to put cats and dogs in the same cage, but this was Kunsan in 1952.

• Marine Squadron VMF(N)-513 (1952-1953): "The Flying Nightmares"
  • Flying Nightmares:
  • On the Move: From WWII to Arrival in Japan to Itami to Wonsan, North Korea
  • On the Move: To Yonpo, North Korea to Itami to Kangnung to Kunsan to Pyongtaek
  • Arrival at Kunsan:
  • The Way We Did Business:
    • Close Air Support:
    • Flare-drop Mission:
    • Ground-level Friction between the Services:
  • F4U-5NL Corsair:
  • F7F-3N Tigercat:
  • F3D-2 Skyknight:
  • Squadron "kills":
  • Air-to-Ground Results:- A review of the "Final Air-to-Ground Results: Aug 1950 - May 1953"
  • Germ Warfare: -- The VMF(N)-513 is accused of using germ warfare from Kunsan
  • Departed Kunsan for K-6:
  • After Korea:
  • Footnotes:
  • 319th Fighter Interceptor Squadron: -- F-94 Squadron from Suwon providing B-29 air cover with VMF(N)-513 and Specifications of the Lockheed F-94 Starfire
  • B-29 Superfortress:-- Night bombing strikes on the North Korea (June 1952 - July 1953)

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