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This page is graphically intense with long load times due to photos. However, the photos and narratives by the men who served at Osan Air Base makes the wait well worthwhile. The opinions expressed are those of the author and in no way represents any official statement of Osan AB or the USAF. 
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 NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR TEST AND SANCTIONSUS Warns of Nuclear Test: ROK Says No Evidence (Aug-Oct 2006) According to ABC News on 18 Aug, North Korea seemed to be preparing to conduct a nuclear test in Gilju, North Hamgyeong Province. They said suspicious movements of vehicles and the unloading of large cables that may be used to connect equipment to observe the test had been spotted in the area. ABC quoted the anonymous US officials as saying there was a "real possibility" that the test will be carried out. In May 2005, cement and other materials were spotted being transported into a tunnel in the mountains, sparking fears of a nuclear test.Korean officials indirectly hinted at the truth of the existence of the cable that the ABC report spoke of. "As of this moment, there has been no confirmation of movements toward a nuclear test," an official here said, but added Seoul considers it "a logical possibility" that the North could carry out a test. "We are closely scrutinizing the situation," he said. "Since excavation is being conducted deep in the mountains, and cable is piling up at the location, these don't seem to be normal military training operations." (Source: Chosun Ilbo editorial.) (SITE NOTE: Experts overwhelmingly agreed that South Korea would lose its power to deter the North after any test and would have to change its policies. All agreed that a nuclear test would end all hopes of normalizing diplomatic relations between the U.S and North Korea. All also predicted a fatal impact on the South Korean economy. U.S investors would naturally leave the South in the face of a security crisis on the peninsula since military strategy and economic policy are inseparable in the U.S.)Officially, however, Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok said, "We think that the comments from the White House were intended to warn of a possibility." ROK position was that there was no concrete evidence that a nuclear test was being planned by the North. The government believes North Korea will not use its last card soon. The government is rather intentionally exposing suspicious actions of North Korea to pressure the U.S. to come to bilateral talks. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.) President Bush refused to comment on a hypothetical situation that might reveal intelligence information. He said, "If North Korea were to conduct a test, it's just a constant reminder, for people in the neighborhood in particular, that North Korea poses a threat; and we expect our friends and those sitting around the table with us to act in such a manner as to help rid the world of the threat." The United States, Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea have been part of stalled talks with North Korea aimed at making the entire Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons -- and the point was made that if the test were done, South Korea rapprochement polices must change and China must consider curtailment of aid to reign in the North. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)  Do as I say, Don't do as I do (Wolverton) (Sep 2003) Japan Confirms Activity at N. Korea Nuclear Site (Aug 2006) On 24 Aug Japan confirmed vehicle activity at a North Korean nuclear testing site, but it was unclear whether tests were imminent. Vehicles had been seen entering and leaving a nuclear testing site in the northeast of the country, the Associated Press quoted a Kyodo news agency as reporting. Minister of Unification Lee Jong-seok said Seoul has yet to secure any clear evidence, regarding the North's move to conduct what the United States calls a ``red line.'' ``We have yet to secure any clear evidence, but we believe it (a nuclear test) is possible, considering various circumstances,'' Lee told the National Assembly's Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee. Fears Mount of North Readying for Nuclear Test (Sep 2006) Earlier in Sep, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ban Ki-moon said in Seoul that the government has already begun reviewing its response to a nuclear weapon test. But he said Seoul has not yet detected any concrete signal indicating an imminent test. The US reported that cables had been laid at a nuclear site which may indicate preparations for a nuclear test. Preparatory activities, including movements of vehicles and the unloading of large reels of cable, have allegedly been taking place outside the facility. North Korea is determined to carry out an underground nuclear test, a British daily reported, quoting diplomats in Pyongyang. Kim Jong-il, the North Korean leader, is said to have made clear his intention to explode a nuclear device during recent talks with Russian and Chinese officials in Pyongyang, the Telegraph reported on its Web site on Saturday. ``Russian diplomats believe it is now highly probable that North Korea will officially join the nuclear club by carrying out its first underground test of an atomic device,'' the daily said. A Russian diplomat was quoted as saying that Kim has been ``irritated'' by financial sanctions imposed last year by the United States for North Korea's alleged money laundering and other alleged illegal actions such as trade in arms and drugs. (Source: Korea Times.) ROK "Closely" Monitoring North Activity (Sep-Oct 2006) A South Korean legislator reported that two tunnels were built with one parallel to the other. The Roh government stated that they were "closely monitoring" the situation in the North -- but still maintained that there was no evidence that a nuclear test was planned. (SITE NOTE: The ROK intelligence is based on debriefings of North Korean defectors but most of it cannot be verified. However, the ROK does NOT share the debriefing information with the US. All other intelligence is received from Japanese or US satellite data.)  Nuke-happy Kim Jong-Il North States it will Proceed with Test (Oct 2006) The Guardian Unlimited reported on 3 Oct that this is the first time the DPRK has explicitly, publicly announced its intent to conduct a nuclear test. The announcement was a blow to the already beleaguered diplomatic efforts and puts pressure on the US to hold direct talks with Pyongyang. The DPRK's statement gave no precise date as to when a test might occur but said it would be carried out "in a condition where safety is firmly guaranteed". The DPRK has said it has nuclear weapons in the past, but has not conducted any known test to prove its claim. On 3 Oct, Reuters reported that a statement by the DPRK Foreign Ministry said it would conduct its first nuclear test, and Washington warned it would respond to such an "unacceptable threat" to world peace. Pyongyang's announcement was condemned by neighboring Japan, and the ROK heightened its security alert. Britain said it would view a test as highly provocative, while Russia urged the DPRK to show restraint. "The US extreme threat of a nuclear war and sanctions and pressure compel the DPRK (North Korea) to conduct a nuclear test, an essential process for bolstering nuclear deterrent, as a corresponding measure for defense," said the statement carried by the country's official KCNA news agency. It added that it would never use nuclear weapons first and would "do its utmost to realize the denuclearization of the peninsula and give impetus to the world-wide nuclear disarmament and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons." In another article on 3 Oct, Reuters reported that US Ambassador John Bolton urged the UN Security Council to respond to DPRK's threat to conduct a nuclear test, saying it would be a grave threat to international peace and security. "Given the very strong action by the council in July condemning the North Korean ballistic missile tests, I think it's important we're prepared to follow up here," Bolton said. The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation on 3 Oct warned that the threat from the DPRK would only continue to escalate unless the United States pursues a more effective and viable plan to engage in negotiations that will lead to its abandoning its nuclear weapons and missile programs. Leonor Tomero, a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, noted "The Administration's strategy of focusing on form over substance by insisting on negotiations only in the context of the six-party talks has clearly failed to make us safer from the North Korean nuclear threat, instead allowing North Korea to produce enough material for perhaps as many as ten nuclear weapons." Lt. General Gard (USA, Ret.), Senior Military Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, warned "It is high time the United States negotiate in good faith and put forward a serious proposal, that would include a non-aggression pact, a promise not to threaten the North Korean regime, and economic and energy incentives, in exchange for North Korea dismantling its nuclear weapon program and accepting intrusive inspections." Market Watch reported on 3 Oct that the yen was broadly pressured after the North Korea announced that it would test its nuclear weapon. It reported that the yen dipped against the dollar and euro on 3 Oct after news from the DPRK that it will conduct a nuclear test sparking concerns over geo-political tensions in the region. New York Times on 3 Oct reported that DPRK experts inside and outside the Bush administration said DPRK's announcement that it plans to undertake a nuclear test was a negotiating ploy, intended to force the White House into lifting economic sanctions and holding one-on-one talks. American intelligence officials said they saw no signs that a test was imminent. But they cautioned that two weeks ago, American spy satellites picked up evidence of indeterminate activity around what is thought to be the main test site. It was unclear to them whether the activity was part of plans for a test, or perhaps a feint related to last month's visit to Washington by ROK President Roh Moo-hyun. At that meeting, Roh said the event would "change the nature" of the ROK's policy of economic engagement with the DPRK. But the two leaders did not appear to have a coordinated strategy, and a senior Asian diplomat in Washington said Tuesday that "no one is quite sure how to respond" if the test goes ahead.  Direct Talks (Sheneman) (Feb 2005) Washington Post on 4 Oct reported that the DPRK's announcement came just as the United States, along with the ROK, was launching a new effort to persuade the government in Pyongyang to return to talks. Top aides to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have been shaping the new approach, which began after a summit meeting last month between President Bush and ROK President Roh Moo Hyun. But US officials said on 3 Oct that the government in Pyongyang, which closely monitors US statements, appears to have concluded that there is no benefit in reaching a deal. Some analysts suggested that the DPRK is bluffing to force the United States to begin bilateral negotiations, something the Bush administration has rejected as being a reward for bad behavior. Instead, Pyongyang's gambit could embolden hawks in the administration who advocate confronting the DPRK with a stepped-up campaign of isolation and sanctions, perhaps even a naval blockade. Some officials have privately argued that a nuclear test by DPRK would be a clarifying event that would make the problem apparent to the rest of the world. On 5 Oct the Washington Post reported that the Bush administration delivered a secret message to the DPRK warning it to back down from a nuclear test, and said publicly that the United States would not live with a nuclear-armed Pyongyang government. The DPRK "can have a future or it can have these weapons. It cannot have both," Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill said on 4 Oct in remarks at Johns Hopkins University's US-Korea Institute. It was the toughest response yet from the Bush administration. Hill did not explain how the administration would respond to a test, but he said it is willing to sit with DPR Korean officials and diplomats from the region to discuss the crisis. Bush's top advisers held an emergency meeting to review a number of strategies under consideration but came away with little agreement. On 5 Oct the Donga Ilbo reported that reported that stopping the Mt. Kumgang Tourism project and the Kesong Industrial Complex project were under consideration, though the response was still undefined. On 5 Oct Japan stated that measures to be taken in such an event include the expansion of the current ban on port calls by the Man Gyong Bong-92, the passenger-cargo ferry, to include freighters from the DPRK and other countries. Tokyo also will work toward the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution to impose sanctions, based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, and call for the international community to take concerted action on sanctions against the DPRK. ROK-US Cooperate on Intel (Oct 2006) Korea Herald on 4 Oct 2006 reported that US and ROK intelligence authorities were on alert for any signs of "provocative activities" by the DPRK following its threat to conduct a nuclear test on 9 Oct. Experts and media reports have focused on Gilju in North Hamgyeong Province and Hagap, Mount Mumyeong and Gimdangol in Jagang Province as the renegade stated possible underground test sites. The most feasible candidate is Gilju, which the ROK and the US have kept under close observation since the 1990s, after recognizing the DPRK's construction of a pit in a mountainous valley. Some analysts said the DPRK may conduct nuclear tests in an unknown place other than those widely suspected sites. However, all acquired intelligence has been dependent on statements by DPR Korean defectors without satisfactory verification. What was significant was that in the past, the ROK had NOT shared intel with the US using the information received from North Korea debriefings. It was significant that the ROK would cooperate at this time. After the 9 Oct test, Grand National Party lawmaker Kim Hee-jeong said on 12 Oct it was highly likely that North Korea' nuclear test was NOT conducted at Sangpeyong-ri, Kimchaek City in North Hamgyeong Province as the government publicly announced. The U.S. Geological Survey and the Japan Meteorological Agency have estimated the site to be at 41.29-N, 129.13-E, but Seoul has plumbed for Sangpyeong-ri at 40.81-N, 129.10-E based on observations by the Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources. Experts indicate that Seoul's intelligence authorities have failed to locate the North's test site successfully, correcting the location four times. The National Intelligence Agency said initially the test took place at a mountain near the North's missile test site, Musudan-ri in North Hamgyeong Province, from where the militant regime test-fired seven ballistic missiles in early July. However, the NIS later corrected the location to Sangpyeong-ri near Kimchaek City, about 50 kilometers west of the initial location, and again to a remote mountain area in Poonggyeri in Gilju on the northeastern tip of the communist state. On Monday, the state-run Korea Seismic Institute, which had detected the North's blast, adjusted the site again to a mountainous valley in Gilju - a place U.S. intelligence authorities had located right after the nuke test. This was also identified by the NIS, with the help of U.S. intelligence, before the test as the most likely location. (Source: Korea Herald.) (SITE NOTE: On 16 Oct it was found that South Korea's Arirang-2 satellite launched in July 2006 failed to take any pictures of North Korea at the time the reclusive country said it conducted a nuclear test, it emerged. The satellite launched on July 28 cost W266.3 billion (US$1=W955) and equipped with a precision camera capable of identifying a car on a bridge on the Han River is designed to serve military purposes. Uri Party lawmaker Kang Sung-jong said Sunday in a press release the government would have been able to observe North Korea's nuclear test site with the help of the Arirang-2 satellite but did not take a single picture of North Korea between Oct. 3, when the North announced its test plan, and Oct. 9, when it went ahead.It is apparent the intelligence satellite was NOT scheduled to take pictures of the suspected North test area by instructions from the Korean government -- though the ROK government had previously released the suspected area of the test AND stated that they would closely monitor the site. There is an implication that the ROK government knew in advance of the pending nuclear blast and deliberately chose to not monitor the suspected area.  Area of Nuclear Test  Sites calculated as possible sites by Korea, US and Japan. North Conducts Nuclear Test (Oct 2006) North Korea on 9 Oct declared it had successfully conducted a nuclear bomb test, cementing its isolation at the risk of a security chaos in Northeast Asian region. The North's official Korean Central News Agency announced the test was carried out safely and successfully. There was no radiation leakage, the agency said, adding that it was a successful operation by its science and research center. The White House said there was a "remote possibility" that the world never will be able to fully determine whether the DPRK succeeded in conducting a nuclear test. (Source: Korea Herald.)  Little Announcement (Stantis) (Feb 2005) The New York Times on 10 Oct reported that the test appears to have been a nuclear detonation but was fairly small by traditional standards, and possibly a failure or a partial success. Scientists say that throughout history, the first detonations of aspiring nuclear powers have tended to pack the destructive power of 10 to 60 kilotons. But the strength of the DPRK test appears to have been a small fraction of that: around a kiloton or less. It will probably take several days to determine with confidence if the explosion was, in fact, nuclear.  Surprise (Parker) (Feb 2005) South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun called an emergency security meeting just before the North's announcement. South Korean intelligence had reported to the president that a 3.58 magnitude seismic tremor was detected from Hwadaeri near Gilju at 10:36 a.m. "We detected the explosive sound from Hwadaeri near Kilju in North Hamgyong Province at 10:36 a.m.(KST)," a senior Defense Ministry official said, asking to remain anonymous because of the sensitive nature of the information. Officials from the National Intelligence Service (NIS) said the test appears to have been conducted at a mountain close to a missile test site from where the communist state launched seven ballistic missiles in early July. (SITE NOTE: What was significant is that no one could pinpoint the exact location of the test. Immediately after the announcement, the Japanese dispatched three aircraft to take upper air samples, but no radioactivity was detected. Because of the small yield, there was speculation that it may have been a nuclear test of the trigger mechanisms. The bottom line was that there was very little information except for the North Korean admission. On 13 Oct the New York Times reported that traces of radioactivity had been detected from North Korea.)"We believe a nuclear test was conducted around 10:36 a.m. this morning and the (suspected) location of the test is about 30 kilometers away from Punggye-ri in Kilju" which intelligence officials had previously suspected to be a possible test site, an official from the state spy agency was quoted as telling the National Assembly Intelligence Committee. "We believe the test was conducted under a mountain with an altitude of 360 meters," the NIS official was quoted by Rep. Chung Hyung-keun of the opposition Grand National Party as saying. Considering the low altitude of the mountain, the intelligence office believes the nuclear test was conducted inside a horizontal tube instead of a vertically-dug tunnel, according to Chung. South Korea's military raised its readiness against possible aggression by increasing the number of troops near land and sea borders, but it has yet to raise its alert level beyond usual defense situations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said. The troops are still maintaining a Watchcon 3 surveillance status and Defcon 4 defense readiness status. "We have yet to detect unusual military movement in North Korea so far. South Korea and the U.S. are closely working together to share intelligence," said Col. Ha Doo-chul, spokesman for the JCS. When tensions rise and provocative acts take place, the alert status is upgraded. In war, it is raised to Watchcon 1 and Defcon 1. In June 1999, when a naval battle between South and North Korea took place, the first of its kind since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War, South Korean forces were put on a Watchcon 2 surveillance status and Defcon 3 defense posture. (Source: Korea Herald.) On 10 Oct US Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Japan spokespeople declined to comment on reports of the test, which had yet to be independently confirmed late Monday, and they directed queries to the Pentagon and State Department in Washington. The U.S. military in the Pacific showed no outward signs of increased force-protection status. According to the USFK Web site, all U.S. troops on the peninsula remained at Force Protection Bravo on Monday, with most of the U.S. community off to celebrate Columbus Day. In Japan, Yokota Air Base — headquarters of USFJ — remained at its lowest force-protection status.It was less than an hour after North Korean officials had called their counterparts in China and warned them that a test was just minutes away. The Chinese, who have been North Korea's main ally for 60 years but have grown increasingly frustrated by the its defiance of Beijing, sent an emergency alert to Washington through the United States Embassy in Beijing. Within minutes, President Bush was notified, shortly after 10 p.m., by his national security adviser, Stephen Hadley, that a test was imminent. China called the test a "flagrant and brazen" violation of international opinion and said it "firmly opposes" North Korea's conduct. Senior Bush administration officials said that they had little reason to doubt the announcement, and warned that the test would usher in a new era of confrontation with the isolated and unpredictable country run by President Kim Jong-il. Japan stated that they would support the US in taking the issue to the UN. (Source: NY Times.) The United States Geological Survey said it had detected a tremor of 4.2 magnitude on the Korean Peninsula. They identified the source of the explosion as North Hamgyong Province, roughly the area where American spy satellites have been focused for several years on a variety of suspected underground test sites. There were conflicting reports on the size of the blast. South Korea said it was relatively small, while Russia said it had been perhaps as powerful as the nuclear bombs the U.S. dropped on Japan during World War II. North Korea's state TV read the report about the test during its regular newscasts. The item wasn't the top story and there were no images shown of the test. SITE NOTE: The world asked the question: "Why would the North defy China and the world to conduct a test that ensured world wide condemnation?" Our opinion is that the North felt that if it possessed a nuclear weapon, it could force the US to deal seriously with the North. The North realized that its crumbling 1.2 million man army no longer provided the initimidation power it once had at the negotiations table. In addition, its economic situation continued to worsen with sanctions worldwide. This meant they could no longer upgrade their military equipment to compete with the modern weaponry of the US and South Korea. Whether realistic or not, the North viewed the possession of a nuclear weapon as a tool for removing its sanctions and forcing the US to hold one-on-one talks. In other words, it was a new weapon in its old game of political blackmail and brinksmanship. In our opinion, Kim Il-sung realized this cost-effective way to play the brinksmanship game the North is so good at. Regardless of the risks, the North had no other choice except to pursue this avenue. The North was being cornered -- and its supporters in China and the ROK were drawing away.World Condemns Test (Oct 2006) The world remained non-committal on the tests validity. The stakes were high as the North had pushed the limits past the brink -- if the reported test was true. (Remember that no photo of the test had been released nor the site definitively pinpointed. No trace radioactivity has been detected as of 11 Oct.)There is speculation that the Chinese are openly debating "regime change" in Pyongyang after the nuclear test. On 16 Oct an article appeared in The Australian: The Sunday Times. The Chinese Government has been ultra-cautious in its reaction. Some in Beijing argued against heavy sanctions on North Korea for fear that these would destroy what remains of a pro-Chinese "reformist" faction inside the DPRK. "In today's DPRK Government, there are two factions, sinophile and royalist," one Chinese analyst wrote online. "The objective of the sinophiles is reform, Chinese-style, and then to bring down Kim Jong-il's royal family. That's why Kim is against reform. He's not stupid."The DPRK military under the North's "military first" policy is still wasting away. Chronic food shortages and outdated equipment means that it will not be able to face the South on "equal" terms. It simply doesn't have the resources to maintain a fighting force -- and without military might, it is open to a coup. North Korea knows it would not last a day in a full-scale war with the US. It's 1.2 million fighting force effectiveness has been reduced significantly in recent years with the introduction of the Patriot system to dull its SCUD threats, the ATACMS missiles that are targeting the North's artillery, and now the native-grown ROK cruise missiIes that are capable of targeting Pyeongyang. The usefulness of a large standing army as a tool of intimidation was slipping away. However. just one nuclear weapon would be enough to deter any preemptive attack and be an effective tool for blackmail. It skillfully exploits an American weakness when it stirs fears about its potential to sow havoc among America's Northeast Asian allies and crucial trading partners — Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China. Initially, the world only had the North's word that it took place "successfully." But strangely, the communist party newspaper Rodong Sinmun did not report on the nuclear test on 10 Oct and instead promoted unity surrounding the leader Kim Jong Il. Although it criticized the U.S., it did not mention the nuclear weapons test. Another government-run newspaper Minju Chosun wrote, "We must embrace the party's military-first policies and military-first leadership" without mention of the test. South Korea's Yonhap news agency reported that the SUSPECTED test was conducted at 9:36 p.m. ET Sunday. The U.S. Geological Survey said it recorded a seismic event in northeastern North Korea coinciding with the test claim, but was unable to tell immediately if it was an atomic explosion or a natural earthquake. Later it reported that it was an "artificial earthquake" -- meaning it was man-made, but would not say if it was a nuclear explosion. Only Russia's Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov was definitive about its origin, saying there was "no doubt" that a nuclear explosion was involved. By 11 Oct, Russian President Vladimir Putin said "enormous damage has been done to the process of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the world." Japanese officials pushed for tough sanctions and raised the possibility of military action, which the PRC called unthinkable. Japan's chief cabinet secretary, Yasuhisa Shiozaki, declared that his government was considering "all possibilities," while officials in the PRC and ROK were saying that they would oppose any use of force. The official Chinese news agency, Xinhua, reported that President Hu Jintao joined in the international condemnation of the DPRK's atomic test, but said that the nuclear standoff should be defused through dialogue. China, the North's closest ally, said that Beijing "resolutely opposes" the North Korean nuclear test and hopes Pyongyang will return to disarmament talks. North Korea's move complicated efforts to get diplomacy back on track. A major setback was the reality that Beijing, despite its economic clout, has been unable to affect Pyongyang's actions. "China's diplomatic influence in the past few months has almost dropped to zero," said Shi Yinhong, Professor of International Relations at People's University in Beijing. It was reported that Chinese leaders were indignant about the fact that North Korea deceived China until one day before their nuclear test and that China was informed of their plan much later than Russia. China was notified 20 minutes before the test, while Russia had been notified 2 hours prior. Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, in Seoul for a summit meeting, said the region will be entering "a new, dangerous nuclear age" and North Korea "will be held responsible for the situation it has created." South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun said the test would make it difficult for Seoul to maintain its engagement policy with its communist neighbor. "This is a warning as well as my prediction," Roh told journalists after his summit with Abe on 10 Oct. Vice Foreign Minister Yu Myong-hwan told the Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee at the National Assembly that Seoul "plans to take part in some areas of the PSI or do so for specific matters." Earlier, the government chose not to participate in the initiative, but the nuclear test appears to have changed that. President Roh Moo-hyun told reporters on Monday, "Our policy of sticking to dialogue alone has lost considerable ground." But Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok told the committee the government has "not reviewed the option" of joining the PSI since there has been no official request from the U.S. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.) In the days that followed the nuclear test, speculation was everywhere as to why Kim Jong-Il would go ahead with a test that would turn the world against him. He pushed the issue over the edge of brinkmanship with nothing to gain. The following article from the Times Online in Britain on 11 Oct summed up the speculative nature of the situation.
See After Nuclear Test, ROK Changes Policy on DPRK -- then Waffles -- and then Goes Back to Business-as-Usual (Oct-Nov 2006) for South Korean Actions following the nuclear test. Korean Public Apathetic over North's Nuclear Test The bottom line is that the general populace seem unperturbed by the nuclear issue. North Korea's repetitious nuclear threats have caused South Koreans to not take them seriously, almost becoming insensitive to them. ``Especially among young people who are indifferent to politics, there seems to be a great level of insensitivity toward national security,'' said Yoon Hee-kyong, a student at Yonsei University. Michael Breen, president of public relations agency Insight Communications Consultants and author of ``The Koreans,'' said that it is an issue of blood. ``The post-war generation, reacting against the propaganda it grew up with, does not really feel that North Korea is nasty,'' he said. ``They feel that nuclear weapons are an issue for America to deal with. They feel North Korea is bluffing and making noise. Also, South Korea is a mercantilist state that has subordinated all other concerns to national economic self-interest.'' ``Until now, no one has really demonstrated how North Korean nuclear weapons affect what's important to South Koreans _ their economic well-being,'' he said. ``Add this all up, and the result is that Koreans don't feel substantial concern. This is a profound mistake, and it is one that, given the nature of this society, should be laid at the doorstep of political leaders who have failed to communicate the real, strategic meaning of the North acquiring WMDs.'' (Source: Korea Times.) Even the National Assembly was wishy-washy on their response. The National Assembly on 12 Oct finally managed to pass a resolution condemning North Korea's announced nuclear test, but not until after several delays and rounds of bickering between the two major parties in the legislature. The final resolution "strongly deplores" the "unpardonable" nuclear test, urges North Korea to "abandon nuclear weapons and all related programs" and calls on Pyongyang to return to the stalled six-party nuclear disarmament talks and to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. North Korea renounced the treaty in 2003 and expelled international monitors at its nuclear site in Yongbyon, north of Pyongyang. The resolution also calls on the Roh administration to cooperate closely with other nations in coping with the crisis that resulted from the nuclear test. The conservatives attempted to cancel the Kaesong project and have the Kumgang tourism project scrapped. The attempts were stymied. The Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula OFFICIALLY Rendered Worthless (Oct 2006) Not only experts but also both the ruling and opposition lawmakers all agreed in chorus that the joint denuclearization agreement was abrogated by North Korea's nuclear test on 9 Oct. Some argued that the denuclearization agreement had already been broken by Pyongyang's declaration of having a nuclear arsenal in February last year. However, as it was a mere declaration of possessing nuclear weapons, the situation was much different from now. (SITE NOTE: The Roh government now has been caught in a trap of its own making. The continued support of "humanitarian aid" and the Kaesong industrial area operations are in trouble. The parceling out of Gaesong Industrial Complex site seemed to be once again put off. The selling of lot was first planned in June, but later postponed to mid October. The Korea Land Corporation (KLC), which oversees the operation of Gaesong complex, had planned to encourage companies to invest in the plant lot for development this month. Of the total 79.2 hectares, KLC was to sell 9.9 hectares of an apartment-style plant site and 29.7 hectares of an ordinary plant site. Companies stated that on worst case scenarios they would move to China or Hong Kong. Even the most ardent supporters of reunification have been dumfounded by the North's actions -- which none wanted to believe would ever take place. The Kumgang Tourist Hotel operations in the short term will be shut down as there will be no Korean visitors wanting to sign up for tours -- and its long-term operations are seriously jeapordized. However, most of 1,100 tourists who reserved a three-day Mt. Kumgang tour on 9 Oct left for the North with only 10 cancellations. Future tours were uncertain.)South Korea and North Korea signed the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula on December 31, 1991. The joint agreement contained following details: a prohibition on the production, emplacement and use of nuclear weapons; use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; non-possession of nuclear reprocessing and enrichment facilities; and joint inspections on facilities both parties agreed to. North Korea's nuclear test certainly violates the clauses that stipulate prohibitions on making a nuclear arsenal and possessing nuclear reprocessing and enrichment facilities. After signing the denuclearization treaty, the US removed all nuclear weapons from the ROK and President Bush declared the ROK nuclear free in 1992. However, North Korea kept developing nuclear weapons and declared withdrawal of its membership from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993 and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1994. North Korea's nuclear crisis appeared to turn a corner in October 1994 when the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework. The communist regime declared to halt its nuclear activities in November 1994 and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was launched in March 1995 to fulfill the Geneva agreement and provide light-water reactors to the North. (SITE NOTE: KEDO was officially declared defunct in 2006 -- and the last of the ROK workers recalled in 2006. The ROK will have to absorb a massive financial loss as it was the one that demanded sole construction rights. See KEDO Project Finally Dead!! (Jan 2006) for details.)The nuclear problem resurfaced in October 2002 when the U.S. questioned about Pyongyang's development of nuclear weapons through a uranium enrichment program. Pyongyang acknowledged restarting its nuclear facilities in December 2002 and declared secession from the NPT once again in January 2003. Although six-party talks followed between the two Koreas and neighboring countries to resolve North Korea's nuclear issue, the North announced its possession of two nuclear weapons in February 2005 and eventually has pushed ahead with the nuclear test. With abrogation of the denuclearization agreement on the Korean Peninsula, some may raise their voices that South Korea should also acquire uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology for peaceful use, though it should not develop or possess nuclear weapons. However, quite a number of analysts believe such move will trigger a series of negative ripple effects in neighboring countries like the U.S., Japan, and China and its loss will be greater for South Korea than gain. (SITE NOTE: Such a move would start a Northeast Asia nuclear arms race. The Japanese already possess plutonium enrichment facilities and any move by the ROK to become a nuclear power will result in the Japanese becoming nuclear. Some feel the Japanese already have the capability to simply assemble the components to make a bomb. It is known that Japan does possess the critical trigger mechanisms and nuclear material stockpiles.)UN Sanctions (U.N.S.C.R. 1718) (Oct 2006) President Bush on 9 Oct condemned North Korea's purported test of a nuclear weapon as a "provocative act" that demanded "immediate action" by the United Nations Security Council. While stopping short of confirming that a nuclear test had taken place, Bush said North Korea's claim "constitutes a threat to international peace and security. In New York, John Bolton, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said the United States would move quickly to seek a Security Council resolution condemning and possibly sanctioning North Korea. The UN Security Council started drawing up a resolution to respond to North Korea's nuclear test based on drafts submitted by the U.S. and Japan on 9 Oct. The U.S. version would call on Pyongyang to return to six-party talks on its nuclear problems, provide for forcible inspections of vessels and airplanes, and a freeze of North Korean assets and other financial sanctions. It invokes Chapter 7 of the UN Charter that permits both economic and military sanctions. The U.S. made it clear it will gradually strengthen sanctions against the North, saying it will see how the communist country responds to the resolution 30 days after it is adopted. China's UN ambassador Wang Guangya also said Tuesday there should be "punitive" measures over the North's nuclear test. The final Security Council resolution was expected after a compromise with China and Russia, who have demanded diplomatic solutions instead of sanctions. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.) A United States-drafted U.N. resolution called for a total arms embargo, a freeze on any transfer or development of weapons of mass destruction and a ban on luxury goods, among other measures, as well as interdiction of Pyongyang's cargo. Japan's U.N. Ambassador Kenzo Oshima proposed even more stringent measures in amendments to the U.S. draft. These included banning all North Korean ships and planes from ports and imposing a travel ban on high-level Pyongyang officials. But diplomats doubted anything beyond a possible travel ban would be approved. China has stated that it will not accept any resoluton with a military action clause. (Source: Star Online.) Japan on 11 Oct decided to slap additional economic sanctions on North Korea, including a total ban on all products from the country, Japanese government officials said. The measures decided on at a meeting of the Security Council of Japan also call for banning North Korean ships from entering Japanese ports and barring North Korean nationals from entering Japan, the officials said. (Source: Yonhap News.) On 12 Oct the UN Security Council agreeded 15-0 to a resolution condemning the North Korean nuclear test that invoked Chapter 7 of the UN charter, which permits coercive measures. The UNSC will refer to Chapter 7 for the first time since the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993. However, the council has reportedly decided not to invoke Article 42 of Chapter 7, which allows military action. The resolution did NOT give authority to use military force to stop ships in international waters. To win over China, the US agreed to drop the reference to Article 42 of Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter that authorizes the possible use of military power to enforce sanctions. The resolution bars the sale or transfer of material that could be used to make nuclear, biological and chemical weapons or ballistic missiles, and it bans international travel and freezes the overseas assets of people associated with the North's weapons programs.  Nuclear Test Sanctions (Harville) (Oct 2006) In its most debated clause, the resolution authorizes all countries to inspect cargo going in and out of North Korea to detect illicit weapons. The Chinese ambassador, Wang Guangya, said China would not participate in the inspection regime because it would create "conflict that could have serious implications for the region." But China's refusal to take part in searches, and Russia's seeming annoyance at the end of the process, immediately raised questions about how effective the resolution's execution could be. After the vote, John R. Bolton, the American ambassador, insisted that China was bound by the resolution's terms and would have to find a way to comply with the inspection provision. (Source: New York Times.) The resolution includes economic and weapons sanctions against North Korea, including a travel ban and financial restrictions. It specifically rules out the use of force in what is seen as a concession to China and Russia. Meanwhile, Russian news agencies quoted Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov as saying that any UN sanctions should be withdrawn if North Korea agrees to return to six-party talks on its nuclear program. The clause imposing sanctions on export and import goods was amended from "all goods may be checked if deemed necessarily" to "collaborative measures will be taken such as checking goods if possible." However, clauses such as banning exports on luxuries, specific war supplies including tanks, components related to nuclear, mobile rocket launchers, freezing financial assets of individuals and groups related to weapon or missile programs in North Korea, and calling for the ban of its nuclear program remained the same. (Source: Donga Ilbo.) The final draft dropped a broad arms embargo in favor of one just on heavy equipment like battle tanks, artillery systems, missiles and warships. Immediately after the test, the US remarked that a "suspicious ship" had left North Korea, but that it would not be intercepted. Rather it would be searched at the first port it landed at. On 24 Oct it was reported that a North Korean cargo ship was inspected and detained by Hong Kong authorities for maritime safety violations, the government of the special administrative region of China on 23 Oct. The action, coming on the heels of a visit by U.S. officials to urge cooperation in enforcing United Nations sanctions against North Korea, seems to suggest that U.S. efforts to isolate North Korea and end its nuclear ambitions are bearing fruit. The Hong Kong government said that the Kang Nam I, a 2,035-ton cargo ship, arrived on 22 Oct from Shanghai. It was inspected on 22 Oct, and sufficient safety and procedural violations were found during the course of the inspection to justify detaining the ship. But no suspect cargo was discovered. Indeed, the ship, which was heading from North Korea to Taiwan via Shanghai and Hong Kong, was almost empty of cargo. Crew members said that the ship was on its way to Taiwan to pick up a cargo of scrap metal. It was also loading scrap metal in Hong Kong. (Source: Joongang Ilbo.)Dealing with the travel ban, the resolution says, "All member states shall take the necessary steps to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated by the committee or by the Security Council as being responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, [North Korea's] policies in relation to [its] nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related and other weapons of mass destruction-related programs, together with their family members." What this means is that IF the UNSC committee designates Kim Jong-il directly responsible for the nuclear test, WMD production or missile-related programs, he could be banned from travel to member nations -- including China as a "member nation." Again IF the committee targets Kim Jong-il, then the next step would be to see if China recognizes such a provision. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.) The South Korean government planned to announce its sanctions on the North before 14 Nov. In accordance with article 11 of Resolution 1718, member countries must submit a report on their intended measures within 30 days of the date the resolution was adopted. While the sanctions did not go as far as Washington wished, they probably gave it and Japan the legal means to squeeze the country. They provide the basis to inspect ships in ports around the world — though not necessarily on the high seas — and gives Washington a way to expand a program to force banks to halt dealings with the country. In Washington, President Bush signed a law allowing the United States to impose sanctions on any foreigner who provides weapons technology to North Korea. After imposing additional sanctions on North Korea, Japan has started reviewing laws to reflect the fact that it views North Korea's possible nuclear armament as "the gravest danger" to Japan's peace and security. That will enable Tokyo to search North Korean vessels in international waters or to support U.S. searches of North Korean ships. Japanese Defense Agency chief Fumio Kyuma said it was difficult to designate the current situation as "the gravest danger," but Prime Minister Shinzo Abe told his Cabinet to consider the designation. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.) It was reported on 17 Oct that China had erected a fence in Dandong along its border with NK where North Koreans waded across and stopped cash remittances to NK in Dandong. The fence was placed some 20km northeast of the Chinese border city of Dandong. It's the first fence ever constructed along the border of the two allies. The fence is built along an embankment of the Yalu River, blocking would-be refugees from coming ashore. The fence is concentrated along shallow and narrow spots in the river. So far, some 20km of fence has been installed, but authorities have informed local residents that more fencing is on the way. Trucks to NK were being stopped and "inspected" but observers stated none of the trucks were opened. Australia will ban NK ships from entering Australian ports, "except in dire emergencies." (Source: Associated Press.) Reports reveal that the DPRK has received 40,000 tons of crude oil as humanitarian aid in the past year -- with the latest 20,000 tons shipped in September. On 3 Nov Yonhap News reported that the UN sanctions committee finalized a list of items denied to the DPRK, the first action by the committee that oversees implementation of the resolution against the country. But the members could not agree on operational guidelines, especially how the sanctions should be adjusted according to improvements in the situation. North Preparing for Second Test (Oct 2006) American officials have reported recent activity at the test site, leading some to believe that another test might be carried out soon. The New York Times on 17 Oct reported that ROK and Japanese officials said today that they believe the DPRK may be preparing for a second test. American officials on 16 Oct confirmed for the first time that the DPRK did set off a nuclear explosion on Oct. 9, as it claimed, but that the blast was far smaller than would normally be expected, suggesting that the test may have misfired. That could give the DPRK two motives for a second test, nuclear scientists and security analysts said: To proclaim defiance of the sanctions and to show that it is capable of a successful nuclear detonation. (Source: New York Times.) Nuclear experts said that the analysis of atmospheric samples taken after the test shed new light on the factors that could lead to a second demonstration. American officials who reviewed the results of atmospheric sampling said on 16 Oct that the material used for the test appeared to have been plutonium harvested from the DPRK's small nuclear reactor. Because the material came from the reactor, which operated under international inspection between 1994 and 2003, and not from a uranium-enrichment program that the DPRK began in secret, nuclear experts said that it was easier to gauge how much weapons material it may now have on hand. Most intelligence analysts estimate that the country has enough plutonium for 6 to 10 bombs. North Korea said on 18 Oct that a second nuclear test was "natural" and should come as no surprise. The North Korean Foreign Ministry's U.S. chief Li Gun made the remarks in an interview with ABC anchor Diane Sawyer in Pyongyang. "We already announced that we have a nuclear -- nuke last year. But we just simply demonstrated peacefully that we have these nuclear weapons." The interview aired as part of Sawyer's live report from the North Korean capital on Wednesday afternoon. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)  Little Nuke (Patrick Corrigan) (Sep 2006) Supposedly Kim Jong-il told a ranking Chinese envoy that his country has no plan to conduct additional nuclear tests, the Yonhap News Agency reported on 20 Oct. Quoting an "unnamed diplomatic source" in Seoul, Yonhap said Kim made the promise in his meeting with Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan, who visited Pyongyang as Chinese President Hu Jintao's special envoy. "Kim was known to have clarified his stance that there will be no additional nuclear test," the South Korean news agency quoted the source as saying. (Source: Korea Times.) On 28 Oct Yonhap News reported that South Korean military officials had observed activities at the North's suspected nuclear test site that may be preparations for a second test. Yonhap news agency, citing several unidentified military officials, said Seoul is keeping a close watch on the movements of trucks and soldiers at the Punggye-ri site in the country's remote northeast. South Korean officials have said they have no intelligence suggesting another test is imminent. Meanwhile, more unidentified South Korean government officials said they are trying to confirm whether a new facility that has been built at the site could be part of preparations for a second nuclear test, the JoongAng Ilbo newspaper reported on 28 Oct. South Korea's Defense Ministry said it could not confirm the reports, and the U.S. State Department refused to comment. Kim Jong-Il Expresses "Regret" Over Test (Oct 2006) Kim apologized to Beijing for going ahead with its threatened nuclear test on Oct. 9, the source said. Tang returned to Beijing from Pyongyang on Thursday night after delivering Chinese President Hu Jintao’s message to the North Korean leader, the Chosun Ilb reported on 20 Oct. North Korean leader Kim Jong-il told a special Chinese envoy on Thursday the hermit nation will only return to six-party talks on its nuclear program if the U.S. lifts sanctions, according to a Chinese diplomatic source. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.) However, the Yahoo News article "reinterpreted" the meaning to indicate the DPRK regretted the nuclear incident, while the Chosun Ilbo story indicated that the DPRK only regretted that it offended its chief benefactor, China. It stated that Kim Jong Il expressed regret about his country's nuclear test to a Chinese delegation and said Pyongyang would return to international nuclear talks if Washington backs off a campaign to financially isolate the country -- quoting the Chosun Ilbo story. "If the U.S. makes a concession to some degree, we will also make a concession to some degree, whether it be bilateral talks or six-party talks," Kim was quoted as telling a Chinese envoy, the mass-circulation Chosun Ilbo reported, citing a diplomatic source in China. Kim told the Chinese delegation that "he is sorry about the nuclear test," the newspaper reported. The delegation led by State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan met Kim on Thursday and returned to Beijing later that day — ahead of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's arrival in the Chinese capital on 20 Oct. (Source: Yahoo News.) (SITE NOTE: Whether the "regret" of Kim Jong-Il was to be believed -- or simply perceived as bait for the wishful thinkers who want to get back to the non-negotiations of the six-way talks -- was still to be seen. The DPRK nuclear test was a tactical mistake as the Chinese will NEVER tolerate a nuclear threat on its border. The question is not whether the US will buy off on his "regret" but if the Chinese buy off on it. It is fairly certain the US will press forward with its strangle-hold approach to North Korea. It is unlikely that the US will make a "concession" on the financial sanctions claiming they are part of the counterfeiting claims. It will also not back off the PSI moves claiming they were UN-initiated. The Chinese want breathing room so they do NOT have to impose the sanctions on their borders -- if they can get the US to make a "token" concession and get the North back to the negotiating table.)Scientists Visit North (Nov 2006) On Oct. 31 to Nov. 4, 2006, a delegation led by Prof. John W. Lewis, Stanford University, accompanied by Siegfried S. Hecker and Robert L. Carlin of Stanford University, and Charles L. (Jack) Pritchard of the Korean Economic Institute visited Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). This report summarizes the findings regarding the DPRK nuclear program based on our discussions with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Korean People's Army, the Supreme People's Assembly, and the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. Three members of our delegation made similar visits to the DPRK in January 2004 and August 2005. Before and after the current trip to the DPRK, Lewis and Hecker also had extensive discussions about the DPRK nuclear program with Chinese officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the military, the Central Party School, the China Reform Forum, the China National Nuclear Corporation, and the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics.
ROK Refuses to Install Radiation Detection Equipment (Nov 2006) Regarding the measures to examine North Korean cargo as part of the resolution adopted by the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), the government revealed on November 7 that facilities for the detection of radioactive materials loaded aboard ships are already operating at a number of domestic ports. The Korea Maritime and Port Administration and the Korea Customs Service are known to possess equipment to determine whether the containers of ships contain any radioactive materials. “There are simplified meters which detect radioactive materials at the Korea Maritime and Port Administration and a number of other agencies, but there are no fixed facilities that can detect radioactive materials used for terrorism or that are being smuggled,” said a person related to Ministry of Science and Technology. “It is beyond our knowledge whether the government is separately running unrevealed facilities for the detection of radioactive materials against terrorism.” (Source: Donga Ilbo.) (SITE NOTE: Reading between the lines, the Port Authority has military hand-held radiation detection devices -- used since the 1950s by the ROK military -- that measure background radiation levels. These are not effective unless you are looking for the devices close up -- and even then may not be effective due to sensitivity. The US proposal was for special docking facilities which would measure the radioactivity of a suspect vessel with sensitive detection equipment -- which could be a very expensive proposition. The question amounts to (1) is this worth doing and (2) if so, who pays for it. The US probably will not...so objections by the ROK are valid.)In Jan 2007, after criticism of the ROK inability to detect nuclear detonations, sensitive monitoring equipment was procured from Europe. Seoul Still Opposed to Joining PSI (Nov 2006) Seoul is considering actively participating in the PSI program but the Uri party vigorously opposed the idea, arguing that doing so would only escalate tension on the Korean Peninsula and increase the likelihood of armed conflict between the two Koreas. The tough talk by the US has tapered off as interdictions on the high seas could be considered an act of war under International Maritime Law. Thus the US has switched to asking member nations to install measures to detect WMD that may transit their ports. However, the threat that the PSI may be upgraded to a blockade if the North undergoes a second nuclear test looms. The Blue House has remained silent on the PSI issue, but United Nations member-states are required to report by next week to the UN Security Council on measures they have taken in accordance with a UN resolution adopted in response to the North's nuclear test. Seoul is expected to make a decision on the issue in mid-November. A government official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said yesterday that remarks made earlier by Song Min-soon, the Blue House's chief security advisor, should serve as an indicator of Seoul's direction. Mr. Song told visiting U.S. officials recently that in regard to measures against the North, Seoul should be entrusted with devising them. (Source: Joongang Ilbo.) The ROK government and Uri party sought to come to a final position on the proposed expansion of South Korea's role in the U.S-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) targeting North Korea. Presided over by Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook, the closed-door meeting came ahead of the 13 Nov deadline for informing the U.N. Security Council of Seoul's measures to implement the U.N. sanctions against North Korea's nuclear test early last month. Seoul has been under strong U.S. pressure to formerly join the PSI, a U.S.-led measure aimed at interdicting vessels believed to be carrying weapons of mass destruction or related materials, since Pyongyang conducted the nuclear test on Oct. 9. South Korea has participated in the PSI exercises as an observer. The government has reportedly been reluctant to join the PSI out of fear that the action may lead to armed clashes with its communist neighbor. In the end on 13 Nov South Korea decided not to expand its role in a U.S.-led non-proliferation initiative to avoid possible clashes with North Korea. South Korea currently maintains observer status in the Proliferation Security Initiative, a multilateral drive aimed at preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction by "rogue" countries. However, since Korea turned down America’s countless efforts to persuade Korea to join the PSI as a way of sanctioning North Korea, some people are worried that the "psychological" distance between Korea and the U.S. will continue to be wide regarding North Korea’s nuclear problems. The U.S. revealed its disappointment in Korea’s position that was stated as, “We will not join the PSI regarding goods moved inside of the area, and will decide to support goods outside of the area with situational consideration.” (Source: Yonhap News.) (SITE NOTE: This heart-wrenching decision making process on12 Nov by the ROK was all for show. The decision was a forgone conclusion since Roh has decided to continue with his rapproachment policy towards the North. The Foreign Ministry and Unification Ministry were already in sync, and only the dissidents in the Uri Party needed to be silenced.)But Seoul refused to fully join a U.S.-led effort to intercept DPRK ships for cargo inspections. A PSI country can only conduct searches in the waters of another participating country. In a statement yesterday, the ROK government said it "supports the purpose and principles of PSI and will adjust the scope of our participation at our discretion." This would prevent the US to attempt interdiction in the territorial waters of South Korea -- as well as prevent the implementation of blockade of the North if the situation worsened. (NOTE: The US no longer pursues interdiction on the high seas as this may be interpreted as an act of war under International Maritime Law. Therefore, the US-led initiative seeks to strengthen the inspection of suspected ships when they enter the ports of member UN nations.) Chief Negotiators Meet to Synchronize Preparations Chief nuclear negotiators from South Korea, the United States and Japan will gather in Hanoi to prepare for six-party talks over North Korea slated to resume in December. The trilateral talks will be held 15 Nov, in advance of the annual Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit scheduled for the weekend of Nov. 18. The three negotiators Chun Yung-woo of South Korea, Christopher Hill of the United States and Kenichiro Sasae of Japan were to have sessions to coordinate their measures on North Korea's return to the nuclear talks and ways to implement the Joint Statement. Unfortunately, the ROK appears to be on a head-on collision with the other parties as it will continue its policy of rapproachment, while the other parties prefer to levy sanctions as a threat to ensure compliance with the Joint UN resolution. South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and U.S. President George W. Bush were scheduled to hold summit talks on the morning of Nov. 18. Though the turnovers of the Senate and House of Representatives to the Democrats, there will be no policy changes on the part of the US dealing with North Korea. Roh will also meet Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on 17 or 18 Nov, according to Japanese daily Tokyo Shimbun. It is also highly likely that the leaders of China and Russia will also join bilateral talks on the sidelines of the APEC forum. This would be the first time for the heads of state of the six-party members to discuss their stances on returning to the six-party talks. (Source: Korea Herald.) EU Enforces Sanctions (Nov 2006) Following the Japanese imposition of an embargo on luxury goods to the DPRK, All Headline News reported on 20 Nov that the European Union has decided to enforce a series of sanctions penalizing the DPRK for its nuclear testing. The sanctions include an embargo on arms, nuclear and missile technology and luxury products. All cargo from the DPRK sent to EU nations will be required to undergo inspections. (SITE NOTE: The luxury sanctions is all show and nothing of any consequence. If the North wants the goods, they simply will buy them on the black market in China.)Six-party Talks Fall Apart (Dec 2006) North Korea's chief nuclear negotiator on on 22 Dec 2006 warned the North will bolster its “deterrence” in response to U.S. pressure after five-day six-party talks on its nuclear program ended in Beijing without breakthrough. “The U.S. is taking a tactic of both dialogue and pressure, and carrots and sticks,” North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan said at a press conference “We are responding with dialogue and shield, and by a shield we are saying we will further improve our deterrent." North Korea uses the term "deterrent" to refer to its nuclear arms. The negotiations snagged on the DPRK's refusal to engage in substantive discussions until the US lifted financial sanctions imposed last year which have frozen millions of dollars of DPRK funds in a Macau bank. Pyongyang's chief delegate, Kim Kye-kwan, accused Washington of taking a tactic of both dialogue and pressure. Kim said that his country was responding with dialogue and a shield, which he said was adding further to their deterrent strength. Asked repeatedly if the six-nation dialogue had been discredited by the lack of progress, Hill said diplomacy takes more time than people would like, calling the multilateral framework the best way to solve the North Korean nuclear issue. Kim made it clear that Pyongyang has no plan to dismantle its nuclear arsenal for now, saying the North can discuss its nuclear program once the U.S. drops its “hostile” policy and the confidence built between them makes it feel safe from a nuclear threat. Kim added if the U.S. drops its sanctions, the North can further discuss “existing nuclear programs” except nuclear arms. Kim said North Korea developed the weapons because of the U.S. threat, not because it was looking for rewards or economic support. Whether the U.S. has the will to change its hostile policy will define the six-party talks, he added. The talks, reconvened after a 13-month hiatus, again ended without delegates setting a firm date for the next meeting. The Los Angeles Times said the United States and its allies are frustrated with North Korea after another round of six-party nuclear talks ended without an agreement. The daily quoted analysts as saying that there seems to be little hope in the foreseeable future that North Korea will agree to abandon its nuclear weapons program. The chief U.S. negotiator, Christopher Hill, was quoted as saying that the North Korean delegation had apparently no authorization from their leaders to compromise, which led to the breakup of the disarmament negotiations. But Hill nevertheless insisted that the talks had not been a waste and would probably resume sometime early next year. The report also said North Korea left the talks with what appeared to be a threat to continue developing its nuclear arsenal. The North gained recognition as an international nuclear power -- despite the refusal of the US and Japan to agree to this appelation. The ROK, US and Japan, however, gained nothing. In the beginning the US stated that it would require "substantial" proof that nuclear dismantling had taken place before there could be benefits, while the DPRK insisted that the benefits precede the dismantling. In addition, the DPRK stated that it wanted to be recognized as a nuclear power. Some argue that the six-party mechanism doesn't work. The question whether the North has any intention of giving up nuclear arms it has invested so much time and money in will become more urgent. The Secretary of State Rice has stated that the North has a two-year deadline to resolve the conflict. The pressure is now set for a showdown in 2008. Mixed Signals on Aid and Sanctions (Dec 2006) Kyodo News reported that Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party drafted a set of additional punitive steps against the DPRK on 22 Dec as the six-party talks recessed without progress the same day in Beijing. The proposal includes calls for tougher financial screening, broader financial sanctions, and further trade and port call bans. The requirement for financial institutions to report to the Japanese government remittances overseas of more than 300 million yen will be toughened for the DPRK to include amounts over 10 million yen. At the same time, Yonhap News reported that the ROK government may resume its humanitarian assistance to the DPRK in the near future as part of efforts to mend soured ties with the DPRK. "The government has a principle to resume the North-South dialogue at the earliest date possible," Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung told reporters. January 2007US Officials state North Readying 2nd Test (Jan 2007) On 6 Jan the Joongang Ilbo reported that U.S. defense officials told reporters for a U.S. network Thursday that North Korea appears to be preparing for another nuclear weapons test that, if it came soon, would be its second in less than three months. As they did before the first North Korean test on Oct. 9, government officials in Seoul said that although there had been some signs of activity at a suspected test site in the North, there was nothing to be seen that signaled an imminent test.Citing comments by several unnamed senior defense officials, ABC News reported that the activity was similar to that seen just before the first nuclear test. People and vehicles, those U.S. officials reportedly said, had been moving in and out of at least one area foreign intelligence officials believe could be a test site. Although the official line in Seoul was that the government was watching but saw no "special signs" that another test is being readied, a military source was not so sure. Noting the difficulties of seeing very much of the preparations for an underground test, he cautioned that the possibility of another blast had to be considered seriously. "For the North," he said, "it's just a matter of pushing the button. They can conduct a test whenever they want." The Oct. 9 test is generally considered to have been at most a partial success, with a yield that probably disappointed the North despite the triumphant propaganda issued by Pyongyang since then about its nuclear capabilities. A Foreign Ministry official commented on 5 Jan that the North might be determined to show that it has mastered the bomb-making technology in order to up the ante in the negotiations designed to persuade it to give up that technology. (Source: Joongang Ilbo.) Six-Party Talks and Financial Talks in Jeopardy (Jan 2007) (SEE NY Times Articles: North Korea 2006 for background in 2006.) The Agence France-Presse reported on 3 Jan that the two-day meeting between US Treasury and DPRK officials which were held on the sidelines of the Six Party Talks ended in deadlock. The officials had planned to have further talks on the financial sanctions in New York on January 22 but US Treasury spokeswoman Molly Millerwise told AFP on 3 Jan "there hasn't been a firm date and place nailed down yet." An ROK newspaper reported a week ago that the DPRK had rejected New York as a venue for the second round of talks after accusing US Treasury officials of not being serious. "The US didn't even offer evidence that North Korea committed illegal activities," North Korea's chief nuclear negotiator Kim Kye-Gwan was quoted saying. Millerwise said that any resolution to the issue would entail a lengthy process. "As we said at that time, for this effort to be productive, we believe it will be a long process through which we address our underlying concerns and concerns of the international financial community -- from North Korea's illicit conduct to recognized standards and norms for operating in the international financial system," she explained. The measures against BDA "remain in place and the institution remains designated as a primary money laundering concern," she added. Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice will meet her new ROK counterpart Song Min-soon following criticism by President Roh Moo-Hyun that Washington had wrecked hopes of a nuclear deal by imposing the financial sanctions. Financial Talks Halted (Jan 2007) The financial talks were supposed to have been resumed in New York on 22 Jan, but no firm date had been nailed down. The financial dispute was the main stumbling block that deadlocked Dec 2006's six-nation talks on North Korea's nuclear programs. In turn, the DPRK announced that Washington never showed them any evidence that the North was counterfeiting. (Source: Korea Herald.) Rumors were everywhere. Meetings between US and DPRK negotiators in Berlin were said to have resulted in US concessions, but the US at first denied the rumor. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.) New York Times on 19 Jan reported that the DPRK said it reached an agreement with the U.S. during talks this week, and the top U.S. nuclear envoy expressed optimism that progress could be made when wider arms negotiations reconvene. The DPRK's Foreign Ministry said three days of talks in Berlin had been held "in a positive and sincere atmosphere and a certain agreement was reached there." No further details were given. Hill said the talks laid the foundation for progress when six-nation nuclear negotiations resume and that he had agreed with his DPRK counterpart "on a number of issues." He also declined to elaborate. "I feel we do have a chance of making some progress at the next round, absolutely," he said. "We paid attention to the direct dialogue held by the (North) and the U.S. in a bid to settle knotty problems in resolving the nuclear issue," the North's ministry said in the statement, released by the country's official Korean Central News Agency. In the Berlin meetings, the U.S. promised North Korea to settle the issue of Pyongyang’s frozen accounts with the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia. The Washington Post says informal talks with Victor Cha, the Korean-American director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council, “including a chance encounter in the Beijing airport in December, helped lead to the unusual negotiations Hill and Cha held with North Korean counterparts in Berlin last month.” Cha in those informal talks hinted at the possibility of unfreezing some BDA accounts which North Korea calls legitimate, leading to the Berlin meeting and thus to the latest round of the six-way nuclear talks in Beijing. Bush seems to have been directly briefed about nuclear negotiations and given direct orders since then. (Source: Chosun.) |
