Incheon Landings from Air (8 Sep 1945) (US Navy)

Incheon Landings from Air (8 Sep 1945) (US Navy)

Deoksu Palace and City Hall (9 Sep 1945) (US Navy)

Dongdaemun and Cheonggye Stream and Namsan Mountain (9 Sep 1945) (US Navy)

Japanese Being Marched to Inchon Port (1945) (US Army)

Korean Policeman Guarding Japanese (1945) (US Army)

Almost all electric power had been generated by the hydroelectric plants on the Yalu and other rivers (with only 0.5 percent in the south) and the entire supply of chemical fertilizer came from the Japanese-established plant at Hungnam on the northeast coast. When the northern supply of chemical fertilizer stopped, farm production in south declined sharply, creating a serious food shortage. Because of the lack of power, many industrial plants were shut down.)

Basically, the country's money was worthless as the Japanese issued bank notes in enormous amounts before the end of their colonial rule...and the trend continued after they were gone. The "yen" was the monetary unit in 1946 as Korea transitioned to the "won".

Many factories in the south were closed due to the shortage of skilled workers, technicians, electric power, and raw materials, making the economic situation worse. Moreover, the influx of some 1.5 million refugees from China, Manchuria, Japan, and North Korea in 1945-1946 caused additional problems. The rapid population growth increased the housing shortage as well as shortages of essential commodities, resulting in many social problems. As a sense of frustration overwhelmed the people, moral and ethical standards declined.

In 1946, an eyewitness reported: the "situation is getting worse. There is rampant inflation. Consumer goods and coal are virtually nonexistent. Food distribution is inequitable. ... Transportation equipment is breaking down. Unemployment is rising to dangerous proportions. ... Hunger is rapidly spreading and will probably result in starvation in many areas by midsummer."

According to the Pyeongtaek History (Pyeongtaek Si Sa), in 1945 there were many problems dealing with the removal of the Japanese police force. These police units were led by Japanese officers and NCOs with Koreans in the lower ranks. Only those Koreans who assumed Japanese nationality were allowed to be promoted up the ranks. This form of management structure cause great upheaval when Korea received its independence in 1945 and the Japanese were slated to be repatriated. According to the Pyeongtaek History (Pyeongtaek Si Sa), the Suwon police were assigned the duty of taking care of Pyeongtaek. The US Military government (Occupation Forces) asked the Japanese police leadership to remain in place until Koreans could be trained to take over the positions. Though this riled many Koreans, it was the only solution until Koreans could be trained take over.

In A History of the Korean People by Andrew C. Hahn, South Korea is described as being "in economic chaos after the collapse of Japanese rule and partition of the country. Before the division of Korea, the south had been primarily an agricultural region, producing 63 percent of the nation's food grains, and containing most of the country's light industry and about 24 percent of heavy industry."

Almost all electric power had been generated by the hydroelectric plants on the Yalu and other rivers (with only 0.5 percent in the south) and the entire supply of chemical fertilizer came from the Japanese-established plant at Hungnam on the northeast coast. When the northern supply of chemical fertilizer stopped, farm production in south declined sharply, creating a serious food shortage. Because of the lack of power, many industrial plants were shut down.)

Basically, the country's money was worthless as the Japanese issued bank notes in enormous amounts before the end of their colonial rule...and the trend continued after they were gone. The "yen" was the monetary unit in 1946 as Korea transitioned to the "won".

Many factories in the south were closed due to the shortage of skilled workers, technicians, electric power, and raw materials, making the economic situation worse. Moreover, the influx of some 1.5 million refugees from China, Manchuria, Japan, and North Korea in 1945-1946 caused additional problems. The rapid population growth increased the housing shortage as well as shortages of essential commodities, resulting in many social problems. As a sense of frustration overwhelmed the people, moral and ethical standards declined.

In 1946, an eyewitness reported: the "situation is getting worse. There is rampant inflation. Consumer goods and coal are virtually nonexistent. Food distribution is inequitable. ... Transportation equipment is breaking down. Unemployment is rising to dangerous proportions. ... Hunger is rapidly spreading and will probably result in starvation in many areas by midsummer."

A History of the Korean People by Andrew C. Hahn: In 1946, one such group that resented the Americans was the Communists and Socialists. They flourished with the new freedoms after the liberation -- especially in the Cholla provinces. They established their political organizations and publications -- with the goal of unifying under the leadership of North Korea.

However. by October 1946, General Hodge had lost patience with the Communists who caused serious problems in South Korea and ordered the arrests of key Communist leaders of the South Korean Workers' Party. Widespread Communist-inspired strikes and riots in souther cities ensued. Riots in Taegu and Chonju and other cities in South Cholla Province were particularly serious as more than 2,000 Communists were arrested. Some 1,500 were prosecuted, 500 were convicted, and 16 sentenced to death. Key Communists fled to North Korea.

The surviving rebels, however, established guerrilla bases in the Chiri, Odae and Taebaek mountains, aided by two smaller mutinies in the Taegubased 6th Regiment in November and December, 1948. Further assistance came in the form of refugee southern Koreans who infiltrated back to the south as partisans. By mid-1949 Rhee faced a significant rural partisan force in five of his eight provinces. Although both the Communists and the government forces widely misreported losses, incidents with casualties ran around an average of 1,000 a month between October, 1948 and October 1949, then jumped during the Winter Suppression Campaign, 1949-1950. The partisan war took on additional dimension when in May, 1949 regular units of the North Korean border constabulary clashed with infantry regiments of the South Korean army, as the Constabulary had been redesignated in December, 1948. For a year units up to regimental size staged operations on both sides of the border, focused principally on the Ongjin peninsula, the hills north of Kaesong, and the mountains that surrounded Chunch'on, the provincial capital of Kangwon-do, the gateway to the guerrilla bases in the Taebaek mountains. (Source: "Understanding Is Better Than Remembering: The Korean War, 1945-1954", Allan Millett, 1995.)

Two separate states -- the Republic of Korea in the south and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the north -- were formally proclaimed in 1948. With the U.N.-held elections of May 1948 (and the inauguration of the Republic of Korea on 15 August 1948), the Communist troubles flared anew. The strong-arm methods of razing villages on a vast scale after an uprising in Cheju Do in April 1948, gave the regime a fascist stamp. (Source: The Republic of Korea, W.E. Reeve, 1963, p32) The Communists who opposed the UN sponsored elections in South Korea instigated a rebellion on Cheju Island. The Cheju Rebellion from April 1948 to the spring of 1949, resulted in the deaths of at least 30,000 people.

SITE NOTE: To this day, some Koreans still fault Major General Hodge, the first US Military Governor, for the brutality and manner in which the rebellion was put down. Though General Hodge was not directly involved in the actions, evidence does point to his offices selecting key Korean officers to carry out the brutal campaigns. The main focus appears to be that Military Government wanted the rebellion put down -- by any means -- to prevent a drawn out conflict that would have prevented the Americans from withdrawing from Korea. "Kimsoft" on the net builds an eloquent case of the US Military Government's fingers in the stew. In recent years, the April 3rd Cheju Uprising has been resurfaced by activists. The focus is that international laws prohibit "scorched earth" tactics as a war crime. According to Kim Ik-Ruhl, the Cheju police commander Kim Jung-Ho and the US Military Government police commissioner Cho Byong-Ok were guilty of conducting inhuman and barbaric scorched earth campaigns against their own people. The unstated allegation is that this was done with the knowledge and encouragement of Washington and the US Military Government.

After an anti-election protest on March 1, 1948, the police arrested 2500 young people. One of those arrested was later fished out of a river, tortured to death. According to an account by Gen Kim Ik-Ruhl, on 3 April 1948, the rebels simultaneously attacked all Cheju police stations. They occupied all stations - except the Cheju City station - and the police suffered major damages and lost much weapons and ammo. The rebel strength was estimated to range from a few hundreds to a few thousands. No one knew who the rebels were or what they wanted. The violence was aimed at the Police and the Northwest Youth Group which had been terrorizing the civilians. The Northwest Youth group was formed was formed as a para-military forrce which would provide a reserve in case of need. However, after the initial take over of the police stations, the violence turned extreme with public executions. The Americans and the police had no plan for counter-attacks. During this time, the US trusted the police with US carbines and ammunition, but the constabulary were issued Japanese Model 99 rifles WITHOUT ammunition.

There was a meeting over the April 3rd Cheju Uprising on 5 May 1948. The participants were: the US Military Governor Maj. Gen. Dean, US Military Government Civil Affairs Minister Ahn Jae Hong, Army (Constabulary) Commander Brig. Gen. Song Ho Chang, US Military Government Police Commissioner Cho Byong Ok, Cheju commandant Lt. Col. Mansfield, Cheju Governor Yu Hae Jin, the 9th Regiment commander Lt. Col. Kim Ik Ruhl, Cheju Police Inspector Choe Chun, and Gen. Dean's interpreter Mr. Kim (a Christian minister).

The Cheju Police Inspector Choe Chun spoke on behalf of the police and stated that the Cheju Uprising was planned and organized by the Communist International and that the only way to put it down was a massive joint military-police campaign.

Lt. Col. Kim Ik-Ruhl (36), 9th Regiment commander, presented the army plan -- stating that less than 300 rebels were armed and other rebels were "mere hanger-ons."

• He stated that Communists, anarchists, smugglers and other criminal elements had taken advantage of the islanders' xenophobia and instigated the Cheju uprising. (SITE NOTE: At the time, the Cheju people were unfriendly to outsiders and treated the Constabulary officers and soldiers in the same way they treated the Japanese or the Americans as more than 80 percent of the troops were from Chollabuk-do or Kyongsang-do. After the liberation, the government sent members of the Northwest Youth Group to resettle in Cheju -- they at first were welcomed, but later when they started to commit heinous crimes against the people under the protection of the police, the Cheju people came to hate them as well.)
• The direct cause of the rebellion was the conflict between the police and the smugglers. (SITE NOTE: Under both the Japanese occupation and US military government, Cheju ports were in effect free trade ports that crawled with would-be smugglers of Japanese products and merchants looking for deals. The police and the Northwest Youth members hijacked contraband shipments from the locals and secretly sold them to the mainland merchants.)
• He claimed the weak link in the operation was the police's lawlessness, which is mainly responsible for driving the people to the rebel side. For this reason, the entire police on Cheju should be placed under his command for unified operations. The scorched earth tactics of the police and the failed police policies caused rebel strength to increase by several folds from a few hundred to several thousands.

At that point, Dr. Cho Byong-Ok (54) -- speaking in English for the sake of General Dean as most of the Koreans at the meeting could not understand English -- falsely accused Lt. Col. Kim of being a Communist and saying his dead father was actually a high-ranking cadre in North Korea. He further stated the photographic evidence of the atrocities assembled by AMERICAN Cheju commandant Lt. Col. Mansfield was fabricated. Lt. Col. Kim was condemned by Dr. Cho's words and the impression was that General Dean had believed him. At this point, Lt. Col. Kim attacked Dr. Cho and attempted to strangle him unless he retracted his words. Brig. Gen. Song, Commander of the ROK Constabulary (Army) under the US Military Government, simply called for the two to stop fighting -- but did not break up the chaos. Finally General Dean had US MPs separate the two.

Ahn Jae-hong, Minister of Civil Affairs, attempted to mediate, but ended up sobbing and pounding his chair. "Oh, This is so terrible! Regimental commander, please get hold of yourself. All this is because our nation was liberated not on our own strength but on others. For this, we have to suffer through these insults. Commander, please restrain yourself!"

(SITE NOTE: The impression made by Ahn Jae-hong is that if the Americans had not liberated Korea, there would not be the chaos pitting Korean against Korean in the name of ideologies -- Democracy versus Communism. The experience of Korea stands in sharp contrast with other Asian nations, not because the Koreans did not seek liberation, but because they received it at such low cost. Nationalism throughout Asia had been forged and tempered by the fires of fighting the European imperialists, then the Japanese, and even themselves between 1937 and 1945, but in Korea the sheer weight of Japanese oppression and economic co-option had eliminated all but symbolic resistance. There is no Mahatma Gandhi, Aung Sen, Chin Peng, Ho Chi Minh, Mao Zedong, or Ramon Magsaysay in Korean history, so Korean claimants for power had to invent themselves as great national heroes - or allow foreign patrons to perform this service. Perhaps if more Koreans had fought and died between 1937 and 1945, fewer Koreans would have died in 1948-1953. Of course, thousands of Koreans died in World War II, but they did so as part of the Japanese armed forces or as victims of American bombing of the Japanese home islands. Dying as a participant in the Japanese war effort, however unwilling, is not the same as sacrificing one's life and liberty in the cause of national independence. Only a handful of Korean politicians could stake a real claim to being resistance leaders. If there is any lesson in post-colonial politics, it is that power grows out of a gun grasped by a partisan leader who remains in his homeland and fights, as the shades of Jorno Kenyatta, Josip Broz, Menachim Begin, George Grivas, and Houari Boumedienne can testify. (Source: "Understanding Is Better Than Remembering: The Korean War, 1945-1954", Allan Millett, 1995.) See Ahn Jae-hong of Songtan writeup as a "patriot" in the 1930s.)

Lt. Col. Kim was replaced as regimental commander by Lt. Col. Park Gin-Gyon. According to Kim, there was a sinister motive in the Park appointment as he was secretly directed by Gen. Dean to start the scorched earth policy advocated by Mr. Cho -- while Lt. Col. Kim and Col. Mansfield were against such a policy. Washington told Gen. Dean to settle up the Cheju issue promptly and he urgently needed a Korean yes-man to command the 9th Regiment. Dean found his man in the person of Lt. Col. Park Jin Gyon.

Park told his troops that the Cheju rebellion was stopping Korea from becoming independent and therefore, it must be put down even if it meant killing all 300,000 residents of Cheju -- independence was more important than Cheju. As the new commander of the 9th Regiment, he started scorched earth campaigns and his tactics were repeats of the Japanese tactics in China and Manchuria, whereby innocent civilians were killed. Park's scorched earth tactics yielded no significant gains against the rebels. The army suffered heavy casualties and villagers joined the rebel ranks.

One month after Park started his tactics, Gen. Dean came to Cheju, promoted Park to a full colonel and invited local dignitaries to a celebration party. Col. Park got drunk and retired to his room. The colonel's orderly shot and killed him with an M1 rifle and then committed suicide. The group of three who plotted his assassination were from the Kyonggi-do area and most interestingly were Christians. They claimed they were nationalists and killed Park who was a traitor in killing the people he was sworn to protect. They were executed by firing squad and Capt. Hauseman, the officer claimed to be the "father of the ROK Army" fired rounds into the lifeless bodies after execution which created a furor in the Korean press. (Source: Gen. Kim Ik Ruhl: The Truth about Cheju 4.3: Chapter 20..)

In response, the ROK military, paramilitary police and youth gangs -- under US command -- unleashed one of the most vicious episodes in the Korean counter-revolution. By April 1949, 20,000 homes in Cheju had been destroyed, while about 100,000 people (one-third of the population) had been forcibly removed to coastal areas under ROK control. By the end, about 12% of the Cheju people had been massacred. The US embassy happily reported: ``The all-out guerilla extermination campaign came to a virtual end in April with order restored and most rebels and sympathisers killed, captured, or converted''. (Source: Green Left.)

The beginnings of the present-day Korean army started as an American-trained gendarmerie. In 1948 the American aid program was stepped up and arms and equipment for an army of 50,000 was provided. In December 1948, the Constabulary was redesignated as the ROK Army. The South Korean police then numbered 30,000 and were almost as well armed as the army, and it was believed that various para-military forces such as the Youth Corps would provide a reserve in case of need. These para-military forces aligned themselves with the police forces as they were the ones in power. Publicly the US wanting to be rid of the Korean problem was making statements boasting of the ROK Constabulary competence. Senator H.A. Smith in 1949 when he reported privately to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he believed the South Korean army "thoroughly capable of taking care of Southern Korea in any possible conflict with the North." In truth, the Constabulary was as a whole more of a rag-tag bunch ill-trained to meet the needs for defense of the nation. Though each unit supposedly had U.S. advisors, the complaint was that many units never saw them except for brief visits. Most of the lower rank members were from the poverty-ridden northern regions of South Korea and simply were members interested in having a square meal. On the other hand, the officers were made up of the young elite who were educated and aggressive officers -- many with Japanese military experience. Though the records state that the US provided the constabulary with arms, in truth many regiments were equipped only with Japanese Model 99 rifles and armament confiscated at the end of the war -- and most importantly, NOT provided any ammunition for the weapons. On the other hand, the police was provided with not only Japanese weapons and ammunition, but also American carbines and ammunition. In other words, the US Military Government did NOT trust the Constabulary fearing an armed rebellion -- as had happened in Yosu in 1948 and Taegu in 1949 -- and therefore, did not properly arm the troops -- except in the Seoul garrison area. Another reason was that the KMAG felt that ammunition rationing and the advisors' influence would keep the Korean army on the defensive -- instead of attacking North Korea. Under the US Military Government a standard policy was developed of moving the highest-ranking commanders around at regular intervals to remove any potential threats to the Government. (NOTE: This policy was followed after the Korean War by Syngman Rhee's government for the same reasons.) The head of the Constabulary was a Brigadier General with headquarters in Seoul.

Rhee's warlike rhetoric, echoed by some of his favored generals, disturbed the State Department enough that it blocked KMAG's request in 1949-1950 for light tanks and improved medium artillery for the Korean army. Part of the Truman administration's reluctance to arm the Korean army for more than counter-guerrilla operations came from the suspicion that Rhee would siphon off Mutual Defense Assistance Act (1949) aid for personal and political aims and turn the army into a bulwark of political repression. The fear had some foundation, but was also naive since the Korean National Police and its para-military youth auxiliaries already had enough resources for this "mission." To insure the quest for traitors in the army, Rhee created the Army Investigative Command (which evolved into the Korean Counterintelligence Corps) and placed it under the command of Brigadier General Kim Chang-yong, a former sergeant-investigator in the Manchurian army and notorious among his colleagues for his unrelenting search for Communist subversives, broadly defined.

As Brigadier General William L. Roberts, USA, chief of KMAG, argued, the arms he requested had little to do with policing the civilian population and a great deal to do with stopping an invasion. Roberts and his advisors felt confident that ammunition rationing and their own influence would keep the Korean army on the defensive. Even when the Truman administration approved increased aid to the Korean army (no tanks, though), it could not obtain Congressional approval until it tied Korean aid (which it wanted) to military assistance to the Chinese Nationalist army on Taiwan (which it did not want). The result was that the Korean army received $10 million in badly-needed assistance in March 1950, but too late to help. (Source: "Understanding Is Better Than Remembering: The Korean War, 1945-1954", Allan Millett, 1995.)

First Republic

The US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) operated all of the machinery of government until Koreans could be trained for bureaucraftic duty, political parties organized, and a dulty elected Korean government was able to assume control. While this was taking place in the South, a Soviet-trained cadre of Korean Communists formed a separate government , spurning all calls by the United Nations for free, UN-supervised elections throughout the peninsula.

As long as it survived, the Rhee regime could and did exploit the guerrilla war to its political advantage. In November, 1948, the National Assembly passed a draconian National Security Law that outlawed the Communist party and gave the security forces detention and judicial powers that made Western lawyers quake, but would have surprised no Asian. Although the National Security Law gave a veneer of legalism to the anti-left vendetta - for such it was, reciprocity for the horrors visited upon the Korean National Police and its families - the Rhee government did not ignore the rightist challengers. Earlier in the year (August, 1948), the Assembly had passed the National Traitor Law, which gave the government power to arrest, to deny public office, and to confiscate property from any Korean who had served the Japanese colonial government in a leadership position (broadly defined) and whose loyalty now seemed suspect. The Korean National Police, for example, tried to use this law to purge the Korean army of its senior officers, the majority of whom had been junior officers in the Japanese and Manchukuo armies. Both laws and the general internal regulations of the KNP and Korean army allowed both organizations to purge their own ranks of suspected rebels. The Korean army rid itself of more than 4,000 officers and men, jailing about a thousand and executing around 200. The U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), about 500 officers and men, formed a strong bond with the army's surviving senior officers to protect the army from Rhee and the police while it recruited itself up to 100,000 and worked on its training and equipment problems. (Source: "Understanding Is Better Than Remembering: The Korean War, 1945-1954", Allan Millett, 1995.)

Syngman Rhee inaugurated as First Republic President on 24 Jul 1948. (Pyeongtaek City) (Source: Pyeongtaek History (CD), Pyeongtaek Si Sa)

First Republic celebration at National Assembly (1 Aug 1948) (Pyeongtaek City) (Source: Pyeongtaek History (CD), Pyeongtaek Si Sa)

Barred entry to the North, the UN Commission on Korea had no choice but to oversee elections only in the South. These were held on 10 May 1948, and sent 200 representatives to the National Assembly. The Assembly adopted the constitution of the Republic of Korea on 12 July without debate -- simply because of the deadline involved -- and, three days later, elected Syngman Rhee as its first president. On 14 August 1948, three years after liberation from Japanese rule, the government of the Republic of Korea was formally inaugurated and the USAMGIK terminated.

Syngman Rhee (Yi Syng-Man) was born in Kaesong, Korea, on 26th April, 1875. He took an interest in politics and in 1897 he was imprisoned by the Yi Dynasty for taking part in a protest against the monarchy. Though historians agree that he was a despot, Syngman Rhee's positive image is still portrayed in America -- especially amongst his supporters in Hawaii where he went into exile. The consensus of most historians is that he was a despot who ruled with a harsh iron-fist in the name of anti-Communism, but in actuality his rule was based simply on his remaining in power.

"Rhee is a sinister and dangerous man, an anachronism who had strayed into this age to use the cliché‚s and machinery of democracy for unscrupulous and undemocratic ends." - Mark Gayn, the Chicago Sun

"The Korean leadership is provided by that numerically small class which virtually monopolizes the native wealth and education of the country... Since this class could not have acquired and maintained its favored position under Japanese rule without a certain minimum of collaboration, it has experienced difficulty in finding acceptable candidates for political office and has been forced to support imported expatiate politicians such as Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku. These, while they have no pro-Japanese taint, are essentially demagogue bent on autocratic rule." -- March 10, 1948, US CIA

"Rhee will be killed in a few weeks, when the Korean people find out the truth." -- Gen. MacArthur.

Supported by the US when Kim Ku opted not to run for the Presidency, the US sought a person they could control. Unfortunately, it turned out that Syngman Rhee turned out to be the "loose cannon" during the Korean War -- and created problems that still plague Korea even today. Many of the darkest tragedies occurred in the name of "anti-Communism" but it was a loose term that encompassed anyone who was a threat to Rhee's position or who opposed his authority. Over the years his regime was seen as authoritarian, corrupt and inefficient. He was re-elected in 1956 and 1960 by large majorities. However, few believed the elections had been fair and gave rise to widespread anti-government demonstrations that were put down with such brutality that it toppled his regime.

Who Was Rhee Syngman?

Lee Wha Rang, February 22, 2000

Dr. Rhee Syngman ruled South Korea from 1948 until his downfall in 1960. His fanatic anti-communism made him a darling of the United States. In spite of his professed faith in Christianity, he had more Koreans killed than any other tyrants in the Korean history.

He is accused of being the man behind the Cheju April 3rd Massacre, the Daejun Massacre, the Suwon Massacre, the blowing up the Hangang Bridge, assassination of Kim Ku and Yo Woon Young and countless other killings of Koreans. However, much of the Korean accusations of responsibility for incidents over fifty years ago cannot be substantiated as most of the first hand witnesses are dead and there are confusing historical reports after the Korean War that placed the blame for many of the killings on the Communists.

Although Dr. Rhee dominated Korea for over ten years, little information is available on him on the Internet and what little cyber-information available is mostly false or inaccurate. For example, one source claims that Rhee presided over a 'government in exile in Hawaii'. Another source claims Rhee was from the royal family line. Most history books praise him as the 'tiger of Korea', democratically elected founder of Korea, most revered by all Koreans even today, and so on.

Nothing can be further from truth.

All the legends aside, Rhee was born on March 26, 1875 (many of the 'official' documents list 1876, but Rhee listed 1875 as the year of his birth on his application to Princeton), a son of an impoverished yangban, Rhee Kyong Sun. Rhee organized fellow students to oppose the corrupt Yi government and spent six years in jail for his "treason". While in prison, he became a Christian.

In 1904, the Yi government sent Rhee (because of his English and American connection) to the US in order to implement the US-Korea Friendship Treaty signed in 1885. The Yi officials were unaware of the secret agreement the US had made with Japan, whereby Japan would take over Korea and Manchuria, and the US would take the Philippines.

In November 1905, Rhee Syngman met Teddy Roosevelt in Washington and pleaded in vain for American support for Korean independence. Foreign nations (including the US) withdrew diplomatic missions from Seoul.

Rhee obtained a Bachelor of Art at George Washington University in 1907 and a Master's Degree at Harvard in 1909. In September 1908, he enrolled at Princeton University and obtained a Ph.D. on June 14, 1910 at the age of 33.

Rhee was penniless and the Princeton University waived the fees and the Princeton Theological Seminary gave him free room and board (Rhee's mailing address was: 111 Hodge Hall, Princeton, NJ) on Rhee's promise that he would return to Korea to spread the Gospel.

In a neat handwritten letter to the Princeton officials dated September 23, 1908, Rhee pleads for special considerations for his 'extreme poverty' and his promised return to Korea by 1910. He wants a Ph.D. in two years and the Princeton granted his wish in a letter dated October 2, 1908. Rhee lived at 202 N 36th St., New York, NY at the time.

Curiously, Princeton had contacted Harvard to verify Rhee's alleged Master's degree. It turned out that even though Rhee had completed his master degree requirements, he had not been awarded the degree yet. Princeton decided to ignore Rhee's 'misunderstanding' and the whole matter was dropped. (Rhee's 'official' biography states that Rhee was awarded a Master's degree from Harvard in 1908, but the degree was awarded in 1909, one year after Rhee was admitted to Princeton).

Rhee was not a good student. His grade cards show: Economics (D), Government (B) and 3 History courses (B, B, C). He took 7 classes at Princeton barely passing them. In fact, the first reading of his thesis - "Neutrality As Influenced by the United States" - was unfavorable. In an April 14, 1910 letter, Prof. Edward Elliott, Dean of College, informed Rhee that "The majority of those who have examined it are unwilling to recommend its acceptance..".

On May 24, 1910, Rhee's thesis was accepted finally "on condition that the last part be put into as good condition as the first.." Rhee was finally granted his Ph.D. - the first Korean to be so honored - on June 3, 1910. However, Rhee could not raise enough money to bind and publish his thesis as required by Princeton and Rhee was given one year to comply with this rule. In mid-1910, Rhee Syngman returned to Korea as a teacher at Seoul YMCA and as a Christian missionary (Methodist). He lived at YMCA, Seoul, Korea. In a letter dated January 31, 1911, Rhee tells Princeton that he does not have the $80 needed for his thesis. He wrote "I have to ask for some more help either from the University or from the unknown friend who helped me so much already." The 'unknown friend' probably refers to the Methodist Church of America.

In 1912, Rhee Syngman gave up his evangelic work in Korea and emigrated to Hawaii as headmaster of a Methodist school, The Korean Christian Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii. There, Rhee founded and edited the Korean Pacific Magazine in 1913.

On April 8, 1919, the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) was established in the French Concession of Shanghai. Rhee Syngman (in absentia) was elected president, Yi Tong Whi defense minister (later, premier) and Kim Kyu Sik foreign minister. The KPG had its own parliament, press, and a military school in Shanghai. The original founders of KPG represented a broad spectrum of the Korean political ideologies united in the common cause of Korean independence.

On Sept. 23, 1919, Gen. Yi Tong Whi took over the premiership of the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai. Gen. Yi filled high positions in the KGP with his fellow members of the Korean People's Socialist Party. Yi's effort to regroup KPG into a united front failed, however. The exiles split into two primary groups: Yi's group who favored military actions with Soviet backing and Rhee Syngman's group which favored diplomatic channels working closely with America.

On Dec. 8, 1920, Rhee Syngman arrived in Shanghai. Rhee was elected president of the KPG in 1919, in absentia, but this was the first time Rhee set foot in the KPG office.

On Jan. 26, 1921, Shanghai, the Korean Provisional Government split openly. When Rhee's faction learned about Lenin's gold rubles, an open hostility toward Gen. Yi erupted. Rhee Syngman accused Kim Rip of embezzling funds to finance his sex habits. Kim Rip was assassinated and Gen. Yi parted company with the KPG.

Unfortunately for the KGP, Rhee was more interested in fermenting dissension in the ranks than in forming a united front against Japan. Rhee was finally expelled by Kim Ku from the KPG in 1925 for embezzelements (in 1960, he was expelled again, being accused of taking $20 million from his Seoul government among other misdeed). Kim Ku became the president.

Rhee returned to Hawaii in disgrace. From 1925 to 1945, Rhee attempted to pass himself off as the sole representative of Korea even though the Korean Provisional Government disowned him in 1925. The US State Dept. officials wrote him off as an old man out of touch and representing no one but himself in Korea.

In America, Rhee's financial problems worsened and he turned to the Soviets for help. On his train tip to Moscow, Rhee met a young Austrian woman, Francisca Donner. Rhee was refused entry to the Soviet Union. Bitterly disappointed, he returned to Hawaii but kept in touch with Miss. Donner.

He married Francisca Donner on October 8, 1934 in New York City. He supported his family on contributions from other Koreans in US. In 1943, the Korean National Association in the US accused Rhee of taking money earmarked for independence activities for his personal use. According to a Princeton document, Rhee and his wife lived at 1766 Hobart Street, NW, Washington, DC. in 1940.

Rhee listed his profession as: "Washington Representative" of the Provisional Government of Korea in Exile, Chungking, China. In a 1948 document, Rhee lists his position as: "Chairman, Korean Commission", located at 4700 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC.

On October 12, 1945, Gen. MacArthur ordered Col. Preston Goodfellow, former Deputy Director of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services), to fetch Syngman Rhee from America. Rhee owed this fortune to Chiang Kai Sek. MacArthur was looking for a Korean leader he could count on and asked Chiang Kai Sek for a recommendation. Chiang came out with two names: Kim Ku and Rhee Syngman.

MacArthur ordered Gen. Hodge (in charge of Korea) to treat Rhee with respect and do whatever in Hodge's power to anoint Rhee as the chosen puppet to control the 'Korean mobs'.

Rhee had been trying to return home since Aug. 15, 1945, but the US State Dept. would not issue him a passport for his travel. Sometime in the 1940's, Rhee was enrolled into the OSS by Col. Preston Goodfellow. The OSS wanted 'Col. Rhee' to organize an espionage network inside Korea.

However, "Col. Rhee" had no contact in Korea and could not find a single Korean in Korea for this job. Nevertheless, Rhee gave out generous "concessions" in post-war Korea to a number of his supporters including Goodfellow in return for their support for his authority Korea.

In 1948, Rhee was 'democratically elected President of the First Republic of Korea.". Rhee was removed from power by the Korean people in 1960.

On April 28, 1960, a DC-4 belonging to the Civil Air Transport (CAT was operated by the US CIA) spirited Rhee out of Korea barely one step ahead of a lynch mob. Kim Yong Kap, Rhee's Deputy Minister of Finance, revealed that Rhee took $20 million of the government fund. Rhee, his wife and an adopted son lived at 2033 Makiki St., Honolulu, Hawaii. Rhee died on July 19, 1965 at the age of 90 of a stroke. His 65-year old wife Francisca and adopted son Rhee In Soo were at his bedside. A US Air Force plane carried his body to Seoul for a family funeral. Park Jung Hee, who had plotted to topple Rhee, planned a state funeral but decided against it in face of mounting opposition. Rhee's body was interned at Dougjak-dong National Cemetery near Seoul.

Francisca Rhee returned to her native country and lived out her tragic life with a relative, Miss B Donner, at Laurenzgasse 4/6, 1050 Vienna, Austria. (Source: Kimsoft: Who Was Syngman Rhee?, Lee Wha Rang, 20 Feb 2000.)

Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge and President Rhee signed an agreement on 24 August 1948, whereby the ROK government would gradually assume command of the nations's security forces and the US Army Forces in Korea began their withdrawal. (Source: The US Military Experience in Korea 1871-1982, pp 6-8, Command Historian's Office, USFK/EUSA)

An event occurred in October 1948 that got much more attention, indeed international coverage: a rebellion at the southeastern port city of Yosu that soon spread to other counties in S. Cholla and S. Kyongsang, and that for a time seemed to threaten the foundations of the fledgling Republic. The proximate cause of the uprising was the refusal on October 19 of elements of the 14th and 6th Regiments of the ROK Constabulary (Army) to embark for a counterinsurgency mission on Cheju. Led by Communists, the mutineers killed the local police, and seized the city of Suchon, twenty miles to the north. About 2000 insurgent soldiers won control of the city and sent a detachment to take neighbouring Sunchon. By October 20, the rebel elements controlled a number of nearby towns. In Yosu, the people paraded with red flags and shouted slogans. At a mass meeting on October 20, the Communist people's committee was made the governing body. People's courts were established to try police officers, landlords, regime officials and other active supporters of the Rhee dictatorship. The rebels established people's committees and tribunals which tried some 500 officials, soldiers and others, some of whom were executed.

The Communist-led mutiny became a full-scale revolt that spread into other areas leading to the deaths of 1,200 civilians and South Korean troops, 1,500 rebels and their supporters and much property damage. The rebellion was crushed with terrible severity by loyal troops under the direct orders of Syngman Rhee -- and would be a forewarning of his actions to suppress Communists in the Korean War. Several young Korean colonels: Chung Il-gwon, Chae Pyong-duk, and Kim Paek-il -- along with their American advisors quelled the uprising. Gen. William Roberts, the KMAG commander, ordered Americans to stay out of direct combat, but even that injunction was ignored from time to time. American advisors were with all ROK Army units, but the most important ones were a Colonel Harley E. Fuller, named chief advisor for the suppression, Captain James Hausman from KMAG G-3, and Captain John P. Reed from G-2 (Army intelligence).

Gen Roberts met with Gen Song Ho-sang and urged him "to strike hard everywhere ... and allow no obstacles to stop him." Roberts' "Letter of instruction" to Song read, Your mission is to meet the rebel attack with an overwhelmingly superior force and to crush it.... Because of their political and strategic importance, it is essential that Sunchon and Yosu be recaptured at an early date. The liberation of these cities from the rebel forces will be moral and political victories of great propaganda value.

American C-47 transports ferried Korean troops, weapons, and other materiel; KMAG spotter planes surveilled the area throughout the period of the rebellion; American intelligence organizations worked intimately with Army and KNP counterparts. The loyal Constabulary first contained the main elements in Yeosu and then policed up the Sunchon area. Seeing the futility of their situation, the trapped rebels in Yosu surrendered.

The UN Commission on Korea for 1949 stated that 23,000 persons were arrested and over 80 percent of them were found guilty. R.C. Allen stated that ten months after the rebellion Koreans were still being executed for alleged complicity in it.

In April 1949, the remnants of the rebels fled into the Chiri mountains and were joined by North Korean guerillas. They established three bases (in the Chiri mountains, Odae mountains, and Andong area). In October 1949, some 3,000 guerillas and several hundred local supporters launched a winter offensive against such large towns as Andong, Chinju, and Pohang. Though they failed to occupy the towns, the stage was set for the Korean War.

The ROK Marines was organized in 1949 after the ROK Army communist rebellion in Yosu in October 1948.

In 1949, Inchon, Suwon and Kaesong were upgraded to "shi" (city).

Prelude to the Korean War Rhee had discouraged the elections scheduled for May, 1950, pleading the guerrilla threat to the voters. With maximum pressure from the State Department and the United Nations Commission on Korea and minimal partisan interference, the National Assembly elections (monitored by UNOK observers, however superficially) produced a stunning setback for Rhee and every other organized faction. Independents captured 126 of the 208 seats while "ruling party" candidates won only fifty-five, rightist oppositionists twenty-four, and the left (now virtually outlawed) three seats. With his domestic powerbase still in danger, Rhee courted foreign friends and was in turn cultivated in the name of a new anti-Communist alliance that would include South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and, Japan. Rhee cultivated his friendship with General Douglas MacArthur and welcomed John Foster Dulles on a visit to Seoul. He corresponded feverishly with any American he thought could muster support in Congress or set-up "off line" military assistance and counter- subversive aid. As the monsoon season of 1950 approached, Rhee saw nothing ahead but a season of discontent, but he did not expect war. (Source: "Understanding Is Better Than Remembering: The Korean War, 1945-1954", Allan Millett, 1995.)

A History of the Korean People by Andrew C. Hahn: The outcome of the American occupation of South Korea was quite dissimilar from that of the American occupation of Japan. Having no clear-cut policy or plans for Korea, the American occupation left behind no particular imprints, or notable accomplishments. When the Americans ended their occupation, South Korea was unstable, socially chaotic, and an economically bankrupt country. The truth was that the majority of the Americans in Korea lost interest in helping the Koreans and simply wished to go home. To most American GI's, Korea was simply "a piece of worthless real estate," and they totally lacked concern for the Korean people's future.

The Soviets, on the other hand, achieved much more in North Korea, although they too had no policy or plans for Korea in the early stage of their occupation. In contrast to the Americans in the south, the Soviets promoted cordiality with North Korean leaders. established coherent political structure, and fostered a well-equipped military force capable of launching an aggressive war to unify the divided country.

The inherent weakness of South Korea, particularly its military weakness, coupled with certain steps taken by the U.S. government, contributed to North Korea's launching of the war. In the first place, the U.S., because of President Truman's demilitarization program, withdrew U.S. troops from South Korea in 1949 without adequatelhy preparing South Korean troops to defend their national territory. The U.S. regarded South Korea strategically less important than Greece, Italy, and Iran in dealing with Soviet expansionism.

Secondly, President Truman did not believe that the Soviet Union would permit a North Korean invasion for military conquest of the entire peninsula. He believed that the Soviets would continue their efforts through infiltration and underground activities.

Above all, the U.S. government -- specifically Secretary of State, Dean Acheson -- wanted to make Korea a testing ground for the policy of containment of the United States, and therefore misled the North Koreans to believe that the U.S. had abandoned South Korea. Some dispute this idea of Dean Acheson's intent. However, the fact remains that Dean Acheson, knowingly or unwittingly, stated that the American defense perimeter stretched from the Aleutians to the Ryukus (Japan) -- leaving South Korea unprotected -- and followed this by the announcement that Congress had cut off aid to South Korea. This sent a clear message to Kim Il-Sung in North Korea that it was an opportune time to attack and he began his preparations for war.

At least six warnings of a possible invasion was sent to Washington between October 1949 and June 1950 from General MacArthur or General Hodge, but were either ignored or they were only given cursory attention. Then on a Sunday morning on 25 June 1950, North Korea attacked.

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The Area around what would become Osan AB (1950) Osan-ni was considered the largest town in the local area. The next major village was Seojong-ni. The entire area was mostly rice fields. Between Osan and Seojong the Kyongbu-son Railroad and the road that would become MSR-1 (Main Supply Route-1). The villages between Osan-ni and Seojong-ni along the MSR-1 was Kaltong-ni, Habung-ni (Habuk), Ojwa (now gone in Deogok-dong), Chwa-dong (Jwa-dong) and Chijang-ni (Jijang-dong). A side road running west from Habung-ni (Habuk) connected Chinwi (Jinwi), Masan-ni (Masan), Sang-ni, and Sanha-ni. A side road running east connected to Cholmal, Anmal. Hoehwa-ri and Hwangguji-ri -- all north of the Chinwi-cheon (stream) and east of the Hwangguji-cheon (stream) in Seotan-myeon. Hoehwa-ri's road connected to Kuman-ni which led to the MSR-1. A bridge crossed the Chinwi-cheon (stream) to the west of where Osan AB would be built. It connected Hoehwa-ri to the north of the Chinwi-cheon to the village of Chokpong-ni to the south of the Chinwi.


Osan-ni to Seojong-ni (1950)

Chokpong-ni was at the base of what would become "Hill 180" to the north -- in the main base area. This Chokpong-ni (Jokpong-ni) remained within the boundaries of the base during its construction in 1952, and then relocated to the south of "Hill 180" when the 5th AF arrived in 1953. This road from Hoehwa-ri ran from Chokpong-ni on the west side of Hill 180 to the MSR-1. There were five roads from Chokpong-ni. (SITE NOTE: There is still a conflict whether or not Hill 180 was actually the site of the bloody battle that won Capt Millet the Medal of Honor. Capt Millet's notes indicate a Ginko tree on the hill and there was only one in the area according to local authorities on Hill 180. However, the US Army does not recognize it as the site of the battle.)

• (1)
• (2) A road swung to the southwest to Kuong-ni, Nongso-ri to Hwangjogok. At Hwangjogok, it turned in two directions.
  • (a) A road turned to the northwest through Kumgang-ni (Kumgak-ri). It continued on in a wide arc around the rice fields to Yari and crossed the Chinwi Stream (cheon) to Hoewari.
  • (b) A road turned southeast to Turung-ni and on to Seojong-ni -- and reconnected to an offshoot west from Seojong near Kyeru-ri. This road the proceeded over the Chinwi River to Oyon-ni and Honsan-ni. This would later become Country Road 302 from Seojeong.
• (3) A road crossed the ricefields -- where the runway is now -- to Yari.
• (4) A road ran west through the area of what is now the Beta Gate to Sinjang-ni. Sinjang-ni is at what is now the end of the runway and near the Doolittle Gate. From Sinjang-ni the road led across the Chinwi Stream up to Taejong-ni and then to MSR-1. Also from Sinjang-ni a dirt road led up to the Kyongbu-son Railroad -- as shown on early 1951 photos of the area -- across the tracks to MSR-1. This is the basis of the road to the Doolittle Gate though it remained an undeveloped dirt road until the 1990s.
• (5) A road led over the hill through the valley between Hill 170 and Hill 180 -- the present Songtan Blvd -- to where the Main Gate is now. It continued straight ahead along the rice fields to the right to the railroad tracks and MSR-1 in the area of what is now Ichung-dong. At the same time there was a path from what is now the Main Gate to the Chwa-dong (Jwa-dong) area. Near this path a new road was built to the Main Gate from MSR-1 starting at the point near "Chwa-dong" on the map. This road was from MSR-1 through Chicol Village into the Main Gate.

Area to become Osan-ni AB (1950)

The area where Osan AB would be built was all rice fields in 1950. To the south of the Chinwi stream (cheon) was Yari and Sinya-ri (New Yari). These would be the first villages to be demolished when the airfield was constructed in 1952 and turned into sand pits.

At the east end of what would become the east-west runway was Sinjang-ni. There were two hills -- the ammo storage area of the base and the hill where the Catholic church is located. The low area between these two hills was all rice fields. People lived on the slopes of what is now the Beta ammo storage area (unused) and in the Namsan-teo area below Hill 170. It is assumed that the farmers who were relocated from the Beta area formed what became known as Chicol-ni (Shinjang 1-dong) as the area where the road to the main gate was sparsely populated.

To the south of Hill 180 was Makum-ni that is still located south of the Hill 180 Gate at the base of the slope. There was a footpath up what became Milwal-dong to Makum-ni (Hill 180 Gate area) and then over the hill down to Chokpong-ni. There appeared to be a reservoir between Makkum-ni and Kuong-ni in what became the base Golf course. Supposedly there was a village called "Enheng Jengui" after the Ginko tree planted in 1269 that is now on the Osan AB Golf Course. However, the 1950 map shows Kuong-ni approximately where "Enheng Jengui" was supposed to be located. A road from Chokpong-ni connected Kuong-ni to Nongso-ri and then Hwangjogok. To the west end of the base was a village of Changdung-ni where the base expanded to in the 1960s as an ammo storage area.

A small road to the east of MSR-1 connected to Chisan-ni (Jisan-ni) and Udong-ni (now gone). The road proceeded down until Chijang-ni (Jijang-dong) and then onto Seojeong-ni. To the southwest of Chijang-ni (Jijang-dong) was Ich'ung-ni (Ichung-dong). A path was at the base of Burak mountain that went from Ichung-ni (Ichung-dong) past Chijang-ni (Jijang-dong) and Chwa-dong (Jwadong) to the Songbuk-dong area bypassing the swamp area in Chisan-ni (Jisan-dong).

From Seojong-ni a road leading east connected to Kajae-ri (Kajae), Toil-li (Doil), Oegach'on-ni. To the north of Kajae-ri was Nae-ri which connected to Sanha-ni and on to Chinwi. To the south of Oegach'on-ni was Ch'irwon-ni; to the east was Chilgong-ni; and to the north was Chimun-ni, Sanjich'on and Songun-ni.

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1950:

Invasion The origin of the conflict between the two Koreas is to be found in the artificial division of Korea after World War II and in the failure to reach an agreement on the method to be used for returning independence to Korea by the occupying powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The main aim in temporarily dividing Korea militarily along the 38th parallel was to coordinate the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and Korea. However, because of the emerging Cold War between the two major powers, two contrasting political systems were established in the occupation zones, with each side refusing to recognize the other and claiming sole jurisdiction and legitimacy for the whole of Korea.

The desire to unify the country was equally strong in both parts of the country. After the complete withdrawal of the US and Soviet troops from Korea in 1949, the South wanted to "restore the lost land" and the North wanted to "liberate the southern half of the Republic". The North, economically and militarily much stronger than the South, decided to solve the problem of non-recognition and of the division by military means. Kim Il-sung went to Moscow in April to convince Stalin, and in May 1950 to China to obtain the approval of Mao. In Moscow he could secure Stalin's support in return for political as well as some material gains for Korea.(Note: 216 secret Soviet documents which Russian president Boris Yeltsin presented to South Korean president Kim Young-sam on June 1994 reveal that Kim Il-sung could not start a war without Soviet approval. Stalin was interested in getting 25,000 tons of lead per year. See Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No 5, Spring 1995, pp. 1-9.) At the beginning, Stalin was cautious and against the adventure, but was convinced by Kim Il-sung that the war could be won quickly without US intervention.

The desire to unify the country was equally strong in both parts of the country. After the complete withdrawal of the US and Soviet troops from Korea in 1949, the South wanted to "restore the lost land" and the North wanted to "liberate the southern half of the Republic". The North, economically and militarily much stronger than the South, decided to solve the problem of non-recognition and of the division by military means. Kim Il-sung went to Moscow in April to convince Stalin, and in May 1950 to China to obtain the approval of Mao. In Moscow he could secure Stalin's support in return for political as well as some material gains for Korea.(1) At the beginning, Stalin was cautious and against the adventure, but was convinced by Kim Il-sung that the war could be won quickly without US intervention. (Source: Asia Times)

Scattered but heavy rains fell along the 38th Parallel in the pre-dawn darkness of Sunday, 25 June 1950. Farther south, at Seoul, the day dawned overcast but with only light occasional showers. The summer monsoon season had just begun. Rain-heavy rain-might be expected to sweep over the variously tinted green of the rice paddies and the barren gray-brown mountain slopes of South Korea during the coming weeks.

Along the dark, rain-soaked Parallel, North Korean artillery and mortars broke the early morning stillness. It was about 0400. The precise moment of opening enemy fire varied perhaps as much as an hour at different points across the width of the peninsula, but everywhere it signaled a co-ordinated attack from coast to coast. The sequence of attack seemed to progress from west to east, with the earliest attack striking the Ongjin Peninsula at approximately 0400.

The tactical situation for the ROK Army above Seoul was poor as evening fell on the second day, 26 June. Its 1st Division at Korangp'o-ri was flanked by the enemy 1st Division immediately to the east and the 4th and 3d Divisions at Uijongbu. Its 7th Division and elements of the 2d, 5th, and Capital Divisions were fighting un-co-ordinated delaying actions in the vicinity of Uijongbu.

During the evening the Korean Government decided to move from Seoul to Taejon. Members of the South Korean National Assembly, however, after debate decided to remain in Seoul. ... The generally calm atmosphere that had pervaded the Seoul area during the first two days of the invasion disappeared on the third. The failure of the much discussed counterattack of the ROK 7th and 2d Divisions and the continued advance of the North Korean columns upon Seoul became known to the populace of the city during 27 June, and refugees began crowding the roads. During this and the preceding day North Korean planes dropped leaflets on the city calling for surrender. Also, Marshal Choe Yong Gun, field commander of the North Korean invaders, broadcast by radio an appeal for surrender. The populace generally expected the city to fall during the night. By evening confusion took hold in Seoul. ... Before midnight, 27 June, the defenses of Seoul had all but fallen.


North Korean Tank heading south (1950). (Pyeongtaek City) (Source: Pyeongtaek History (CD), Pyeongtaek Si Sa)

Seoul fell on the fourth day of the invasion. At the end of June, after six days, everything north of the Han River had been lost. On the morning of 29 June, General Yu Jai Hyung with about 1,200 men of the ROK 7th Division and four machine guns, all that was left of his division, defended the bridge sites from the south bank of the river. In the next day or two remnants of four South Korean divisions assembled on the south bank or were still infiltrating across the river. Colonel Paik brought the ROK 1st Division, now down to about 5,000 men, across the Han on 29 June in the vicinity of Kimpo Airfield, twelve air miles northwest of Seoul. He had to leave his artillery behind but his men brought out their small arms and most of their crew-served weapons.

Of 98,000 men in the ROK Army on 25 June the Army headquarters could account for only 22,000 south of the Han at the end of the month. When information came in a few days later about the 6th and 8th Divisions and more stragglers assembled south of the river, this figure increased to 54,000. But even this left 44,000 completely gone in the first week of war-killed, captured, or missing. Of all the divisions engaged in the initial fighting, only the 6th and 8th escaped with their organization, weapons, equipment, and transport relatively intact. Except for them, the ROK Army came out of the initial disaster with little more than about 30 percent of its individual weapons.

(Source: South of the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapter III)

Truman Enters Korean War On 29 June President Truman approved a new directive greatly broadening the authority of the Far East commander in meeting the Korean crisis. It is to be noted that this directive of 29 June did not authorize General MacArthur to use U.S. ground combat troops in the Han River area-only at the southern tip of the peninsula to assure the retention of a port. At midmorning on 30 June President Truman held a meeting with State and Defense Department officials and approved two orders: (1) to send two divisions to Korea from Japan; and (2) to establish a naval blockade of North Korea. The legislative leaders and UN were notified of the action and the US was in the Korean War.

In the two or three days following the North Korean crossing of the Parallel, air units moved hurriedly from bases in Japan distant from Korea to those nearest the peninsula. Most of the fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons moved to Itazuke and Ashiya Air Bases, which had the most favorable positions with respect to the Korean battle area. Bombers also moved closer to the combat zone; twenty B-29's of the 19th Bombardment Group, Twentieth Air Force, had moved from Guam to Kadena Airfield on Okinawa by 29 June.

The air action which began on 26 June continued during the following days. One flight of U.S. planes bombed targets in Seoul on the 28th. Enemy planes destroyed two more American planes at Suwon Airfield during the day. Land-based planes of the Far East Air Forces began to strike hard at the North Koreans by the end of June. On the 28th, the Fifth Air Force flew 172 combat sorties in support of the ROK Army and comparable support continued in ensuing days. General Stratemeyer acted quickly to augment the number of his combat planes by taking approximately 50 F-51's out of storage. On 30 June he informed Washington that he needed 164 F-80C's, 21 F-82's, 23 B-29's, 21 C-54's, and 64 F-51's. The Air Force informed him that it could not send the F-80's, but would substitute 150 F-51's in excellent condition. The F-51 had a greater range than the F-80, used less fuel, and could operate more easily from the rough Korean airfields.

President Henry S Truman responded quickly by sending troops from Japan to Korea and mobilized the UN to undertake its first-ever international military action. Unfortunately for the North, the Soviet Union was not present at the UN Security Council at that time in protest against the non-recognition of communist China by the UN, so it was unable to veto the action against the North. On the same day, the UN Security Council condemned the invasion as a breach of peace and an act of aggression and called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal to the 38th parallel. With the refusal of North Korea to withdraw from the South, Truman decided to intervene in Korea, and on June 27, 1950 the Security Council called for members to help South Korea.

On 30 Jun Gen Church fell back to Suwon and was ordered to hold on to the Suwon strip for two days until reinforcements could be flown in, but while away at Osan-ni (which had a telephone relay switch to contact Japan), panic set in a Suwon communications were destroyed. Upon his return, Gen Church was furious, but the situation dictated withdrawal to Taejon -- reaching there on 1 July. (NOTE: The USAF Security Service records shows 1st RSM of Johnson AB, JPN with a "Det C Osan AB" in 1950 -- which had not been built yet. This might have been the unit that was in Osan-ni. USAFSS Units states under 32 CSS Pacific division (Comsec/Transec) 1953 to 1955: "Note #10 The origins of the unit were TDY groups from the Japanese Unit. There were two deployments both were handled as TDY missions from Nagoya. The first mission was in late 1950. It was located at Seoul and it was quickly withdrawn during the Chinese offensive in the latter part of that year. They got out with the clothes on their backs. The unit lost its equipment and all members of the team lost their personal belongings. The second mission began in the later part of 1951 and it was located in the Ewha College area of Seoul. The unit moved to K-55 (Osan-ri) in 1955.")

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Massacres at Chonju, Suwon, and Taejon (Jun-Jul 1950) In the late 1940s, President Syngman Rhee's U.S.-installed rightist regime crushed leftist political activity in South Korea, including a guerrilla uprising inspired by the communists ruling the north. By 1950, southern jails were packed with up to 30,000 political prisoners. The southern government, meanwhile, also created the National Guidance League, a "re-education" organization for recanting leftists and others suspected of communist leanings. Historians say officials met membership quotas by pressuring peasants into signing up with promises of rice rations or other benefits. By 1950, more than 300,000 people were on the league's rolls, organizers said.

At the outbreak of war in 1950, one of the first acts of the Rhee regime was to order the execution of political prisoners, whose deaths were in due course attributed to atrocities by the incoming northern forces. In Seoul, there was only time to execute 'about a hundred communists' (according to an Australian diplomatic source), but in Pusan an estimated 50,000 were killed, and Gregory Henderson, then a United States Embassy official in Seoul, estimated that throughout the country, 'probably over 100 000' people were killed without any trial or legal warrant at this time. (Source: Korea Since 1850, Stewart Lone and Gavan McCormack, 1993)

North Korean invaders seized Seoul, the southern capital, in late June 1950 and freed thousands of prisoners, who rallied to the northern cause. Southern authorities, in full retreat with their U.S. military advisers, ordered National Guidance League members in areas they controlled to report to the police, who detained them. Soon after, commission researchers say, the organized mass executions of people regarded as potential collaborators began — "bad security risks," as a police official described the detainees at the time. The declassified record of U.S. documents shows an ambivalent American attitude toward the killings. American diplomats that summer urged restraint on southern officials — to no obvious effect — but a State Department cable that fall said overall commander Gen. Douglas MacArthur viewed the executions as a Korean "internal matter," even though he controlled South Korea's military.

In 2002, a typhoon's fury uncovered one mass grave. Another was found by a television news team that broke into a sealed mine. Further corroboration comes from a trickle of declassified U.S. military documents, including U.S. Army photographs of a mass killing outside this central South Korean city. "Even now, I feel guilty that I pulled the trigger," said Lee Joon-young, 83, one of the executioners in a secluded valley near Daejeon in early July 1950. The retired prison guard told the AP he knew that many of those shot and buried en masse were ordinary convicts or illiterate peasants wrongly ensnared in roundups of supposed communist sympathizers. They didn't deserve to die, he said. They "knew nothing about communism." (Source: Associated Press.)

In 2003 Korean TV news reported on the massacres that occurred throughout the country were committed by the Korean National Police. The pieces featured relatives who were searching for the remains of their relatives. In 2003, one news expose depicted graphically on Korean TV the excavation of bones of piles of skulls and bones in a mass grave not far from the Chonju prison.

According to Massacres: Asia, "When the Korean War broke out, Col. Nichols (an American spy master) was the last American to leave Seoul. On his flight south, he participated in the massacres of 1,800 civilians at Suwon: "I stood by helplessly, witnessing the entire affair. Two big bull-dozers worked constantly. One made the ditch-type grave. Trucks loaded with the condemned ("Communists") arrived. Their hands were already tied behind them. They were hastily pushed into a line along the edge of the newly opened grave. They were quickly shot in the head and pushed into the grave.... The worst part about this whole affair was that I learned later that not all the people killed were communists.." There is photographic evidence of the presence of US military personnel (as observers) at the site.

The official United States Army report issued at the end of the war gave a total figure of civilian victims of atrocities of 7,334 (which it will be noted is a small fraction of those executed by Rhee in the first moments of the war alone). Of that 7,334, the deaths of unnumbered civilians, variously estimated from 5,000 to 7,500 (sic), were attributed to a single incident, known as the 'Taejon Massacre'. As for Taejon, a massacre undoubtedly occurred, but what precisely happened, when and who was responsible remain to be settled. When first revealed, it was blamed on the Communists, but there is doubt.

Two Australian officers - Major Peach and Wing Commander Rankin - were in the Taejon area at the precise time when the massacre occurred. Major Peach reported on July 9 that he saw trucks loaded with prisoners on the way the killing field. Father Cadars, a French priest, witnessed the Daejon massacre: '..just before the Americans retreated from the town, South Korean police had brought into a forest clearing near his church 1700 men, loaded layer upon layer into trucks. These prisoners were ordered out and ordered to dig long trenches." (Source: Korea Since 1850, Stewart Lone and Gavan McCormack, 1993)

The first published references to the massacre appeared in an article in the English communist) paper, the Daily Worker, dated 9 August 1950. Its correspondent, Alan Winnington, accompanying the (Northern) Korean People's Army on their march southwards, reported having inspected mass graves at a village called 'Rangwul' near Taejon, which is about 160 kilometres south of Seoul. He concluded from inspection of the graves, photographic evidence and discussions with villagers in the vicinity, that approximately 7000 prisoners from the gaols of Taejon and nearby had been summarily executed at that spot between 6 and 21 July (when the area was captured by the KPA), and buried in mass graves dug by locally press-ganged peasants. Because of the political ramifications in the midst of a war, the allegations made by Winnington were never followed up nor even mentioned in the US Army report at the end of the war. He also asserted that from June 29 to July 3, 1950 more than 1,800 people were killed in Inchon, where a branch of Sodaemun Prison, Seoul, was situated, and at least 1,200 in Suwon. This suggested the possibility of mass killings of inmates of prisons situated in areas north of Taejon.

When British communist journalist Alan Winnington entered Daejeon that summer with North Korean troops and visited the site, writing of "waxy dead hands and feet (that) stick through the soil," his reports in the Daily Worker were denounced as "fabrication" by the U.S. Embassy in London. American military accounts focused instead on North Korean reprisal killings that followed in Daejeon. But CIA and U.S. military intelligence documents circulating even before the Winnington report, classified "secret" and since declassified, told of the executions by the South Koreans. Lt. Col. Bob Edwards, U.S. Embassy military attache in South Korea, wrote in conveying the Daejeon photos to Army intelligence in Washington that he believed nationwide "thousands of political prisoners were executed within (a) few weeks" by the South Koreans.

The American photos, taken by an Army major and kept classified for a half-century, show the macabre sequence of events. White-clad detainees — bent, submissive, with hands bound — were thrown down prone, jammed side by side, on the edge of a long trench. South Korean military and national policemen then stepped up behind, pointed their rifles at the backs of their heads and fired. The bodies were tipped into the trench. Trembling policemen — "they hadn't shot anyone before" — were sometimes off-target, leaving men wounded but alive, Lee said. He and others were ordered to check for wounded and finish them off. Evidence indicates South Korean executioners killed between 3,000 and 7,000 here, said commissioner Kim. A half-dozen trenches, each up to 150 yards long and full of bodies, extended over an area almost a mile long, said

Another glimpse of the carnage appeared in an unofficial U.S. source, an obscure memoir self-published in 1981 by the late Donald Nichols, a U.S. Air Force intelligence officer, who told of witnessing "the unforgettable massacre of approximately 1,800 at Suwon," 20 miles south of Seoul. Such reports lend credibility to a captured North Korean document from Aug. 2, 1950, eventually declassified by Washington, which spoke of mass executions in 12 South Korean cities, including 1,000 killed in Suwon and 4,000 in Daejeon. (Source: Associated Press.)

The Daejon Massacre was covered by No Ka-Won in an article (Taejon hyong-mu-so sa-chon san-baek myong hak-sal sa-kon (The massacre of 4300 men from the Taejon prison), Mal Magazine, February 1992, pp. 122-31). Mr. No interviewed some of the South Korean police who did the killing at Daejon as well as scores of other eyewitnesses. (Source: The Coverup Goes On: 'Dead Koreans Talk No Tale?', Lee Wha-Rang)

Massacres at Cheongwon, Ulsan and Busan (Jul 1950) In 2008, hundreds of sets of remains had been uncovered so far, but researchers say they were only a tiny fraction of the deaths. The commission estimated at least 100,000 people were executed, in a South Korean population of 20 million. That estimate was based on projections from local surveys and is "very conservative," said Kim Dong-choon, a member of the Truth and Reconcilliation commission set up by Roh Moo-hyun in 2006 investigating the killings. The true toll may be twice that or more, he told The Associated Press. The commission in 2007 excavated sites at four of an estimated 150 mass graves around the country, recovering remains of more than 400 people. Working deliberately, matching documents to eyewitness and survivor testimony, it had officially confirmed two large-scale executions — at a warehouse in the central South Korean county of Cheongwon, and at Ulsan on the southeast coast. As of 2008, it had verified 16 incidents of 1950-51 — not just large-scale detainee killings, but also such events as a South Korean battalion's cold-blooded killing of 187 men, women and children at Kochang village, supposed sympathizers with leftist guerrillas.

Up to 10,000 were killed in the city of Busan alone, a South Korean lawmaker, Park Chan-hyun, estimated in 1960. His investigation came during a 12-month democratic interlude between the overthrow of Rhee and a government takeover by Maj. Gen. Park Chung-hee's authoritarian military, which quickly arrested many then probing for the hidden story of 1950. This still has not been fully investigated. (Source: Associated Press.)

North Koreans Cross the Han (28 Jun-4 Jul 1950)
South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu

North Koreans Cross the Han After securing Yongdungp'o on 3 July, the N.K. 4th Division prepared to continue the attack south. The next morning, at 0600, it departed on the Suwon road with the 5th Regiment in the lead. Just before noon on 4 July, eleven enemy tanks with accompanying infantry were in Anyang-ni, halfway between Yongdungp'o and Suwon. The road from Suwon through Osan toward P'yongt'aek was almost solid with ROK Army vehicles and men moving south the afternoon and evening of 4 July. The 5th Regiment of the ROK 2d Division attempted to delay the enemy column between Anyang-ni and Suwon, but fourteen T34 tanks penetrated its positions, completely disorganized the regiment, and inflicted on it heavy casualties. The Australian and U.S. Air Forces, striving to slow the North Korean advance, did not always hit enemy targets. On that day, 4 July, friendly planes strafed ROK troops several times in the vicinity of Osan. The ROK Army headquarters left Suwon during the day. At midnight the N.K. 4th Division occupied the town.

(Source: South of the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapter V)

US-ROK Front 13 Jul 50
South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu

Task Force SmithAs requested by General Dean, the 3d Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. David H. Smith, went to Ansong, twelve miles east of P'yongt'aek to cover the highway there. Colonel Lovless set up his regimental headquarters that day, 5 July, at Songhwan-ni, six miles south of P'yongt'aek, on the main highway and rail line. General Dean placed great importance on holding the P'yongt'aek-Ansong line. On the west, an estuary of the Yellow Sea came up almost to P'yongt'aek and offered the best barrier south of Seoul to an enemy that might try to pass around the west (or left) flank of a force defending the main highway and rail line. See South of the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapter VI (pp60-75) for accounts of the Task Force Smith's entry into the fray and battles at Osan.

Task Force Smith arriving from Japan at Taejon

According to the VFW Post 10216: Osan AB:

Osan is situated near the site of two significant battles that occurred early in the Korean War. The first ground combat action between American and north Korean forces was fought just a few miles north of Osan Air Base. To halt the advancing North Korean army, which had seized Seoul and was pushing south, Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, commander of the 24th Infantry Division, sent two under-strength infantry companies and a headquarters element from Japan to Pyongtaek July 2, 1950. There they were joined by elements of an artillery battalion. Under the command of Lt. Col. Charles Bradford Smith, this force of 540 men, now called "Task Force Smith" moved into position at Juk Mi Pass, just south of Suwon Air Base, where they faced more than 5,000 north Korean soldiers and 34 Soviet built T-34 tanks. Smith's mission was to halt the enemy drive south and allow Gen. Dean time to regroup United Nations forces and establish a defensive perimeter.

On July 5, 1950, "Task Force Smith" engaged the enemy near Chukini-Ryong. The battle raged for seven hours as the task force held firm against an entire communist division. Outnumbered, outgunned, and out of ammunition, the survivors managed to fight their way clear and reach Pyongtaek where they joined elements of the 34th Infantry Regiment. Delaying actions continued just north of Chonan, until the weary soldiers pulled back to Taejon where General Dean had established his headquarters. The delaying actions fought by Task Force Smith and the 34th Infantry enabled the 24th Infantry Division to land in Korea and establish and hold the "Pusan Perimeter" along the Naktong River.

Topping a hill a few miles north of Osan on the road to Suwon stand two monuments. On the West Side of the highway a stone pillar constructed by Companies B and C of the 3rd Engineering Battalion, 24th Infantry Division pays tribute to the first American soldier who gave his life in the valley. The larger memorial on the East Side of the road was erected by the Republic of Korea to honor the gallant men of Task Force Smith who had fought so bravely. The Kyongi-Do Governor and VFW annually pay tribute to the members of Task Force Smith in a solemn ceremony at the monument.

On July 5, 1950, "Task Force Smith" was hit by enemy fire between the Towns of Osan and Suwon. For seven hours, the task force held firm against an entire communist division. With ammunition depleted, the survivors managed to fight their way clear and reach Pyongtaek. There, joining an element of the 34th Infantry Regiment, they soon had to give up this position, almost without a fight. Just north of Chonan, the task force fought another delaying action, but soon was pulled back to Taejon where General Dean had established his headquarters. "Task Force Smith" fought for 16 days, culminating its delaying action by holding the north Korean army outside of Taejon. That enabled the 24th Infantry Division to land at Pusan and hold the Pusan perimeter until the famous Inchon landing September 15, 1950. (Source: GlobalSecurity.org: Osan AB)

The following are the actions on 5 July. There were tales of dud ammunition, bazooka rounds fired point blank bouncing off the T-34 tanks, and the rice paddy muck causing the soldiers to shed their helmets and anything that slowed them down as they retreated from the North Korean onslaught. On 5 July, enemy attacks continued along the Suwon-Singal-Kumyangjang line. Enemy 1st, 2d and 5th Divisions pressed toward Osan and Pyongt'aek while US troops retreated.

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1st Lt. Philip Day, Jr. Task Force Smith
In the early gray dawn of July 5, Sgt. Loren Chambers yelled, "Hey, look over there, Lieutenant. Can you believe?!" Looking down the road toward Suwon, I made out a column of tanks. Seems like there were eight o f them. I couldn't believe my eyes. "What are those?" I asked. Chambers answered. "Those are T34 tanks, sir, and I don't think they're going to be friendly toward us." The company commander was called. Everybody got real excited about them. The day was beginning in earnest.

Really in earnest, Dashner said, "Let's get some artillery on them." Behund us the 105-mm howitzers (of the 58th Field Artillery Battalion) fired several rounds but without effect. The tanks kept coming. Behind the first goup came anouther, then another. They passed through B Company, which was spread out on either side of the road. Lt. Ollie Connor had a bazooka in a ditch beside the road. He hit several tanks, but they continued to roll through our position. At any one time seems like ther'd be four tanks behind us curling up the hill, five going through B Comapany and two comining down the road toward me. Several of them swiveled their turrets and began shooting. I was with a 75-mm recoilless-rifle team. "Let's see," I shouted, "if we can get one of those tanks." We picked up the gun and moved it to where we could get a clean shot. I don't know if we were poorly trained, weren't thinking, or if it slipped our minds, but we set up the gun on the forward slope of the hill. when we fired, the recoilless blast blew a hole in the hill which instantly covered us in mud and dirt. The effect wasn't nearly as bad on us as it was on the gun. It jammed and wouldn't fire until we'd cleaned the whole damn thing.

When we were ready again, we moved the gun to a better position and began banging away. I swearr we had some hits, but the tanks never slowed down. One we hit in the tracks and ti slewed sidways off the road. More of the tanks began shooting at tus. I saw their exlosions walking up the hill. I don't know what happend to the other tow guys with me, but one blast knocked me and the gun over backward. I began bleeding from my ears. I wasn't unconscious, just stunned by the concussion.

In a little less than two hours, thirty North Korean tanks rolled through the position we were supposd to block as if we hadn't been there. That was our first two hours in combat. (Source: The Korean War, Pusan to Chosin, An Oral History, Donald Knox, pp19-22)

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1st Lt. William Wyrick, Task Force Smith

My assistant platoon sergeant, Loren Chambers, called back on the soud-powered telephone for some 50-mm motar fire on the enemy tanks. The answer was, "They won't reach that far."
"Well, how about the 81-mm mortars?"
"They didn't come over with us."
"Howabout the 4.3s (mortars?"
"The 4.2s can't fire."
"How about the artilery?';
"No comunications."
"What about the Air Force?"
"They don't know where we are."
"Call the Navy."
"They can't reach this far."
'Well, then, send me a camera. I want to take a picture of this."

About an hour after the tanks went through our position, a long convoy of trucks, bumper to bumper and as far as I could see, rolled down the road from the direction the tanks had come. They were paced with North Koran troops. (Source: The Korean War, Pusan to Chosin, An Oral History, Donald Knox, pp19-22)

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1st Lt. Charles Payne, 1st Battalion/34th Infantry
Hitting the T34 head-on mearly produed a bounce-off. We soon ran out of ammo and had one man killedin action (Pvt. Kenneth Shaddrick). I pulled everyone back while our 4.2 mortar engaged their tanks. I saw one tread on fire and we bade their infantry cramble. There were many more North Korean trucks on the road immediately ot out north. Having run out of ammo, the bazooka teams and the 4.2s dropped back. (NOTE: Pvt Shaddrick was killed in action when he was raked across the chest by machine gun fire south of the village of Osan near the railroad tracks -- near present day Osan AB.) (Source: The Korean War, Pusan to Chosin, An Oral History, Donald Knox, pp19-22)

Topping a hill a few miles north of Osan on the road to Suwon stands a m/onument, constructed by Companies B and C of the 3rd Engineering Battalion, 24th Infantry Division, in honor of the men who gave their lives in the valley. The inscription on the plaque, in both English and Hongul, reads: "In commemoration of this site, 5 July 1950, 408 men of Task Force Smith, 21st Infantry Regiment and Battery, 57th Field Artillery Battalion, 24th Infantry Division, fought the initial action between United States and Communist Troops."

(Source: GlobalSecurity.org: Osan AB)

Task Force Smith at Osan-ni (5 Jul 1950)
South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu

Once south of P'yongt'aek, the Korean peninsula broadens out westward forty-five miles and a road net spreads south and west there permitting the outflanking of the Seoul-Taegu highway positions. East of Ansong, mountains come down close to that town, affording some protection there to a right (east) flank anchored on it. P'yongt'aek and Ansong were key points on the two principal highways running south between the Yellow Sea and the west central mountains. If enemy troops succeeded in penetrating south of P'yongt'aek, delaying and blocking action against them would become infinitely more difficult in the western part of Korea. [2] General Dean was expecting too much, however, to anticipate that one battalion in the poor state of training that characterized the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, and without artillery, tank, or antitank weapon support, could hold the P'yongt'aek position more than momentarily against the vastly superior enemy force that was known to be advancing on it. See South of the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapter VII (pp79-100) for accounts of the Delaying Actions from Pyongtaek to Chonan.

Task Force Smith at Osan-ni (5 Jul 1950)
South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu

One incident from South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapter 7 tells on one incident very close to the present day Osan AB. Assuming the incident was "one mile from the edge of Seojong-ni," it would place the encounter with the enemy tank somewhere near the railroad tracks near the present-day Shinjang Shopping Mall.

Lt. Charles E. Payne with some infantrymen started north. Approaching the village of Seojong they discovered tank tracks in the muddy road where an enemy tank had turned around. Payne stopped the trucks and dismounted his men. A South Korean soldier on horseback, wearing foliage camouflage on his helmet, rode up to them and yelled, "Tanks, tanks, go back!" Payne eventually located the enemy tank on the railroad track about a mile ahead at the edge of Seojong-ni, five miles south of Osan. In an exchange of fire about 1600 between his bazooka teams and the tank at long range, enemy machine gun fire killed Pvt. Kenneth Shadrick. The bazooka teams withdrew, bringing Shadrick's body with them. The group returned to P'yongt'aek and reported the futile effort to Barth and Ayres. [3] (34th Inf WD, 5 Jul 50; Barth MS, pp. 2-3; Higgins, War in Korea, pp. 58-65; New York Times, July 6, 1950, p. 3; Time Magazine, July 17, 1950, p. 12. Miss Higgins erroneously publicized Shadrick as being the first American infantryman killed in the Korean War.) See South of the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapter VII (pp79-100) for accounts of the Delaying Actions from Pyongtaek to Chonan.

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Osan-ni
Task Force Smith Monument (1954) (Dan Klopsten)


Task Force Smith Monument (1954) (Robert Furrer) (NOTE: The hill was barren in 1954. Bob remarked that when he revisited the monument in 1999 he was astounded that he could even see it because of the changes in landscaping.)


Task Force Smith Monument (1954) (Walter Faulkner)

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SNIP OF HISTORY DETAILS:

There are a lot of historical details we are going to snip out here as we are only dealing with Songtan and the immediate vicinity. For the details of the Pusan Perimeter, Invasion of Inchon and subsequent move North, go to South of the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Table of Contents.

As the war swept over the area, the state of the infrastructure fell into disrepair. After the Inchon Invasion and Pusan Breakout, the railway system was found to be in a state of disrepair. Water pumps and electrical systems were destroyed. Communications was crippled. Prior to the invasion, Osan-ni had a telephone relay switch for international calls that was also destroyed.

Infrastructure and Train System at Start of Korean War Because of the long distances and the very poor roads, everyone moving in Korea wanted to go by rail. Pusan Base Section ruled that rail movement was possible only for vehicles over two and one half tons that were going farther than Taegu. Everything lighter, or going shorter distances, had to be driven. The following is from PART II Transportation Corps, 5. Problems in Railroad Operations (pp63-67) -- from Combat Support in Korea, John G. Westover (P/O Center of Military History Online Collection. It stated,

Railroad activities in the Korean conflict have been vital to the movement of troops, equipment, and supplies. The military railway personnel have been faced constantly with problems of reconstruction, operation, maintenance, destruction, and then, again, reconstruction of the rail lines, bridges, stations, and communications facilities. All these have had to be handled along with the forward and rearward movement of supply trains as the tactical situation changed.

During the first several months, as the United Nations troops were withdrawing to the Naktong perimeter, there were few technical problems. This was a period in which traffic control and the train movements were the major considerations. When the September drive began, however, the railroads had to contend with destroyed water pumps, bridges, stations and tracks, and communications.

The locomotives of the Korean National Railroads were all steam operated and required large amounts of water. Pumps were in poor condition originally, but in the recaptured territory they were broken or had no power. The first pumps obtained from the Corps of Engineers had a capacity of only 1C6 gallons per minute. Later, 480-gallon pumps were installed and found satisfactory. To provide electricity for shops, roundhouses and pumping stations, 100-kilowatt generators were installed.

Communications were also a problem. From Sindong to Seoul, communications lines were 75 per cent destroyed; from Seoul to Kaesong, 100 per cent; from Kaesong to Pyongyang, 25 per cent. U.S. signal troops and supplies were not available for repair of the lines. Until December 1950 only Korean communications men could be used, and their work was unsatisfactory.

There was no copper wire for railroad communications lines, and field wire was used in emergency circuits. These circuits would function only for a day or two. Then a second expedient was attempted— SCR-399 radios placed at each main station between Taegu and Seoul. This, too, was unsatisfactory.

By late November the telephone line between Sindong and Seoul had been pieced together and was working after a fashion. Early in December a good line was established from Kaesong to Pyongyang, but it was mid-December before the line between Seoul and Kaesong was functioning properly. The circuits between Pyongyang and Sinanju never operated.

The greatest help to the railway communications system was the Mukden cable circuits, provided by Eighth Army in late November and early December. Circuits to Pusan, Taegu, Taejon, Chonan, and Pyongyang were assigned directly to the 3d TMRS switchboard.

During the withdrawal of November-January there was no difliculty with communications. In addition to the Mukden cable circuits, the 3d TMRS now had good wayside communications from Pyongyang to Seoul.

As the troops moved north after the breakout from the Pusan perimeter, the 3d TMRS and KNR personnel repaired tracks and bridges. Such repairs made heavy demands on the engineers for timbers and tools. If the engineers had these, the 3d TMRS got them.

U.S. engineers repaired the Naktong River bridge at Waegwan, the Han River shoo-fly bridge (expedient railroad structure) at Seoul, the Imjin River shoo-fly bridge, and the high-level bridge at Hanpo-ri. Except for these, Korean bridge and track gangs repaired the rail lines during the advance. They opened the lines rapidly by using sandbags, timber trestling, and rail stringers as expedients. The Korean gangs could repair as much in three or four days as the U.S. engineers in ten. However, it was somewhat diflicult to get the lightly clad Korean gangs to work during cold weather.

During the fall of 1950 the KNR had money to make repairs. However, the scale of reconstruction was so vast that in December the money ran out. It was then necessary for the United States to pay all labor, new construction, and repair charges.

By late November continuous operation as far North as the Taedong station was made possible by the completion of the bridge at Hanpo-ri over the Yesong River. On 1 December 1950 the railroad was in operation as far north as Sinanju, but there was no railroad bridge crossing the Taedong River at Pyongyang. Both bridges across the Taedong had been blown and it was necessary to unload the cars at the Taedong station, load the supplies on trucks which crossed a ponton bridge, and then reload trains going north. At the time of the Chinese Communist offensive, thc Korean railroads were carrying four thousand tons daily into Taedong.

When the general withdrawal started, the technical services hurriedly evacuated large quantities of critical materiel. However, certain supplies remained in the north and others were moved northward to meet requirements. Empty cars were sent into Taedong for south-bound loading.

Successive railheads were set up at points where the division could draw POL, rations, and ammunition. As one railhead was closed, another was opened farther south. This went on for several weeks, all the way south through Chonan.

The locomotives and rolling stock north of the unbridged Taedong River were destroyed because they could not be evacuated. South of Pyongyang, every effort was made to save as much as possible. Rail yards were stripped. Inoperative locomotives were destroyed. Bridges, switches, control towers, and other equipment were dynamited.

A typical closing of the rail line was the operation at Yongdungpo. On 4 January, 23 trains (462 cars) moved south-bound between 0001 and 2030 hours. One of the last trains contained machinery and equipment from the KNR shops and yards. The movement control personnel rode the last train, while the engineer and transportation representatives who demolished the yards withdrew by jeep. By 0200, 5 January, Yongdungpo was cleared, and trains were moving south on both tracks of the main line.

Similar operations took place at Ascom City and Inchon. Heavy traffic moved out by rail over the main line, but much was moved by rail to Inchon and placed on ships. Rail yards at these two cities were blown on the night of 4 January; the railroaders, including the KNR employees, were moved to Pusan by water. Only the last two switch engines working at the docks were destroyed.

During the withdrawal, thousands of Korean refugees streamed south. Railroad yards became so crowded that the refugees had to be driven away before the trains could be made up. This was particularly true at Seoul and Yongdungpo. All south-bound trains carried refugees —as long as one more could hang on.

Screening points for the north-bound cars were set up along the main line. Items not needed, or intended for units that had moved, were cut out. But even with this system, the consignee unit was often gone when a car arrived at its destination. If possible, a re-routing or reconsignment was made.

The urgency of the tactical situation brought much disorganized loading. Some cars were not marked, others were marked inadequately, and on some the marks were obliterated. The railroads moved all cars. Screening was carried out along the line, but it allowed many unmarked cars to be brought all the way to the Pusan area.

Early in January, 20 to 30 trains were coming into Pusan area daily. The rail lines could not handle this volume. About 50 per cent of the cars arriving were unmarked. Screening teams, which opened the cars, often found items for three or four different services loaded into one car. It took months to clear the Pusan yards of the retrograde tonnage.

The men of the Korean National Railroads showed great loyalty and courage during the withdrawal. In several instances train and engine crews moved their trains from a city as the infantry withdrew. At Seojong-ni the infantry had taken up positions south of the town while the KNR crews were still making up the last train.

The Security Council decided on July 7,1950 to establish a Unified Command for the UN Forces in Korea and mandated a joint military action to repel the troops from the North and to restore the status quo in Korea. General Douglas MacArthur was designated by the US government as the supreme commander of the UN forces in Korea, and South Korean president Rhee Syng-man put the South Korean military under his command. The forces committed were: The US forces, those of South Korea and combat contingents from Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Great Britain, Greece, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey, with medical units from Denmark, India, and Sweden. These forces were placed under a unified UN command headed by the US commander in chief in the Far East, General Douglas MacArthur.

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Invasion of Inchon and Push North

But for all the subterfuge, it is now known that China's Mao Tse-Tung had warned North Korea's Kim Il-Sung that MacArthur would probably land at Inchon on September 15...but Kim Il-Sung disregarded this warning.

On September 15, 1950 the US 1st Marine Division, ROK marines and army troops led the "surprise" attack at Inchon. Despite this lack of secrecy, the landing met with little resistance and was resounding success with few casualties. As word of this spread to the North Korean forces, their forces completely shattered. On September 18, the U.N. broke out of the Pusan Perimeter. By September 23 the NKPA (Inmun Gun) was everywhere in full retreat. US, ROK, and UN forces launched counterattacks against the North Korean forces from the Pusan Perimeter in order to link with the UN forces at Seoul and Inchon.


Landing at Inchon


Soldiers Climbing Sea Wall at Inchon

Following a street-by-street fight in Seoul, the US X Corps captured the ruined ROK capital of Seoul on 26 September. Late that same night a fast-racing 1st Cavalry Division battalion linked up with elements of the 7th Infantry Division near Osan-ni, the same village at which American troops had first met the North Koreans in combat. (Source: USAF in Korea, Robert F. Futrell, p167) According to the New York Times on 25 Sep 1950, Osan was recaputed by the 10th Corps, while the retreating communists who were moving only by night.

Victory in South Korea came quickly once the North Korean People's Army, already reduced to a dearth of logistics by aerial blockade, was outmaneuvered on the ground. On 29 September General MacArthur and President Rhee flew to Seoul for a victory parade which marked the Republic of Korea government's return to its capital city. South of the United Nations lines remnants of six Red divisions coninued to resist the US IX Corps, a new organization comprising the US 2d and 25th Infantry Divisions and attached units which had become operational for the mopping-up campaign on 23 September. Althohough somme bypassed North Koreans, continued to fight, General MacArthur informed the United Nations that "the backbone of the North Korean Army has been broken." (Source: USAF in Korea, Robert F. Futrell, p167)

The UN military action in Korea, taken by the US Eighth Army under General MacArthur, was able to accomplish its mission by October 7, 1950 by restoring the status quo in Korea. The war could have ended here.


American advance after Pusan Breakout and Inchon Invasion. American troops crossing the Pyongtaek Bridge Sep 1950. (Pyeongtaek City) (Source: Pyeongtaek History (CD), Pyeongtaek Si Sa)

However, sensing an opportunity not only to stop but also to roll back communist expansion and to unify the country by force, General MacArthur and president Rhee Syng-man decided to march forward to the North. Truman approved orders for UN forces to cross the 38th parallel and to push the enemy above the Yalu River, although communist China had warned repeatedly against such an action. By October 25, some advance units had reached the Yalu river and victory was close, but they were confronted with an unexpected enemy, the Chinese "volunteers". The Chinese began to move into North Korea in massive numbers and together with North Korean troops started an offensive. They pushed back UN forces to below the 38th parallel, and recaptured Seoul in January 1951. The conflict had developed into a limited international war involving the United States and 19 other nations on one side and China and North Korea on the other.

Inchon Invasion and Pusan Breakout and Push North

The UN forces including three ROK divisions pursued the fleeing North Korean forces. But unknown to the UN forces, the Chinese 40th, 39th and 42d armies under Commander-in-Chief Peng had marched under the cover of darkness into North Korea on 19 October. They were getting into position for their initial assault. In all there were four armies, three artillery divisions and one antiaircraft regiment. This was the first contingent of thirty-nine divisions that Chairman Mao promised to send to North Korea. The goal of the Chinese in Korea was to assist North Korea in the "reasonable settlement of its problem by wiping out the U.S. troops and then seek a peaceful settlement." They went undetected by American fliers and MacArthur was convinced there was no threat of Chinese intervention. This is what he told President Truman in his meeting with him on October 15 at Wake Island.

Three Chinese Armies -- the equivalent of nine U.S. divisions -- moved into position slowly by night. On October 21 Pyongyang fell to UN forces. On the October 21 the orders were given for the Chinese troops to destroy the ROK 6th, 7th and 8th Divisions that were advancing north. By October 25, two of the armies were in position to attack. The plan was to lure the enemy UN and ROK troops into mountain areas, then encircle them and wipe them out.

MacArthur still in ignorant of the Chinese presence in North Korea, issued a statement in Tokyo that "the war is definitely coming to an end shortly." But contact had been made by ROK 1st Division near Unsan and captured a Chinese prisoner who revealed that vast numbers of Chinese had crossed the Yalu and were heading south. This was radioed to headquarters. In addition, a spy group headed by Navy Lieutenant Eugene Clark ranged far to the north and had picked up conclusive evidence of thousands of Chinese heading south. However, MacArthur still refused to take the Chinese seriously despite the intelligence.

The race to the Yalu continued despite the warnings. On October 24 The Eight Army crossed the strategic Chungchon River and one division, the ROK 6th Division had reached the Yalu River on the Manchurian border. MacArthur rejoiced and authorized the use of "any and all ground forces to secure all of North Korea."

The Chinese Spring the Trap On October 26, the X Corps landed at Wonsan on the east coast.

On November 2 Peng sprang the trap to wipe out the U.S. 2nd Division. By November 5 MacArthur, without consulting Washington (but later approved by Truman), gave the orders to bomb the Korean end of the Yalu River bridges. He now realized that the Chinese intervention was serious, for the Chinese had driven Eighth Army back across the Chungchon River. Suddenly the Chinese disengaged as Walker had succeeded in withdrawing the bulk of his troops safely across the Chungchon River. But Mao was satisfied with the First Chinese Campaign. The Chinese had annihilated 15,000 of the ROK & UN forces and foiled MacArthur's plan to occupy all of Korea by Thanksgiving. But then suddenly the Chinese withdrew back across the Yalu on November 7. By suddenly withdrawing, Mao guessed that MacArthur, assuming he had beaten the Chinese, would push his troops farther north.

MacArthur fell for the trap. Between November 10-24, X Corps advanced toward the Yalu River in the east, while the Eight Army closed in on the west. On November 24, MacArthur issued orders for a "final offensive" to launch an all-out attack to secure all of North Korea. Following MacArthur's orders, UN forces continued forward being drawn into the area. MacArthur felt the mountainous backbone of North Korea made it impossible for the Chinese to use the area for military operations. He knew little of his new enemy. The Chinese simply waited to spring the trap, then on November 25 the slaughter began. Three Volunteer armies suddenly attacked the western front of Eighth Army along the Ch'ongch'on River. The ROK II Corps was in disarray after both its divisions collapsed. The road to retreat was jammed.

At the Chosin Reservoir, the Marines and the 7th Division were unaware of the debacle going on in the western flank and prepared for their attack. Little did the Marines know that eight Chinese Volunteer divisions had been lying in wait for them on the west side of the Chosin Reservoir. On the east side of the Chosin Reservoir, the Chinese 80th Division approached the 7th ID without being observed. On November 27 the Chinese struck the 1st Marine and 7th ID at Changjin Reservoir in the east. The rest is history. The debacle, the misery, the heroism, the fighting and the frozen retreat.

Mysteriously, General Almond of X Corps remained oblivious to the true situation and wanted to continue the attack. General Walton Walker of the Eighth Army did not share this view and ordered a general withdrawal of the Eighth Army -- in order to save his men. By November 28 MacArthur woke up to reality and authorized Walker to fall back to Pyongyang and there to go on the defensive, while X Corps was to withdraw to the Hungnam-Wonsan area. He cabled the Pentagon: "We face an entirely new war." Mao's troops on both the eastern and western fronts had caused a sensational turn of events smashing MacArthur's dreams of taking all of Korea -- with his forces in full retreat.

The Communist Chinese intervention with 260,000 "volunteers" on November 27, 1950 failed to push far enough south to put Kunsan in jeopardy. The construction continued on the base. On December 22, General Walker was killed in a jeep accident and replaced by General Matt Ridgeway. On December 24, X Corps sails from Hungnam. North Korea is evacuated.

As the military situation developed unfavorably for the Allied forces, General MacArthur asked Truman to authorize the use of nuclear weapons against China and North Korea. Fortunately, although some US military leaders favored the nuclear option, Truman decided not to use the weapons for a number of reasons.(NOTE: General MacArthur was strongly in favor of using nuclear weapons on Korea and on China. For the political and military considerations of employment of nuclear weapons during the Korean War, see D Calingaert, "Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War", Journal of Strategic Studies, June 1988, pp. 177-207.) Later in 1951, he discharged General MacArthur over this issue and redefined American policy by abandoning his objective of military reunification of Korea. His aim was now a return to the status quo, even as the Chinese and North Koreans were advancing southward. Truman was unwilling to engage in an all-out war which could have led to a world war involving the Soviet Union.

As the war reached a new phase with massive intervention of Chinese "volunteers", the UN General Assembly formally proposed a ceasefire in December 1950. Following some preparatory talks, representatives of the UN and communist commands began formal truce negotiations in July 1951 at Kaesong, North Korea. (Source: Asia Times, The Korean peninsula's imperfect past, Mark B M Suh.)

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1951:

Third Chinese Campaign (January 1951) On December 31, 230,000 Chinese volunteers and 70,000 North Koreans launched the Third Chinese Campaign as a surprise attack. This flow of battle centered around the 38th Parallel and Seoul. Though the Chinese and North Koreans recaptured Seoul on January 4, 1951, the UN forces retook Seoul on March 18, 1951.

As the third phase of the Korean War—the CCF (Communist Chinese Forces) Intervention— drew to a close on 24 January 1951, the United Nations Command (UNC) had come to the end of a series of tactical withdrawals. Starting in mid-December 1950, Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway's Eighth Army had fallen back from the 38th Parallel, first to the South Korean capital of Seoul, then to a line below Osan and Wonju. Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond's X Corps had evacuated by sea on the east coast to Pusan, where it became part of the Eighth Army. All the territorial gains in North Korea of the earlier phases of the war had been lost. But General Ridgway was convinced the enemy lacked the logistical system to maintain offensive operations for any extended period, and he was preparing to begin a counteroffensive. This fourth phase of the war would largely shape the outcome of the conflict.

After two task forces had encountered little or no Chinese opposition in probes to the north, on 25 January General Ridgway launched Operation THUNDERBOLT, a larger but still cautious reconnaissance in force supported by air power. Resistance stiffened at the end of the month, but it gave way in the west by 9 February. The next day UN forces secured Inch'on and Kimpo airfield, and the U.S. I Corps neared the Han River. Meanwhile, on the central front, as the operation expanded, the X Corps met increasing opposition, and the Chinese struck back on the night of 11–12 February, driving back Republic of Korea (ROK) forces north of Hoengsong. But when four Chinese regiments attacked the crossroads town of Chip'yong-ni on the 13th, the U.S. 23d Infantry and the French Battalion conducted a successful defense for three days until the enemy withdrew. Ridgway regarded this valiant effort as symbolic of the renewed fighting spirit of his command.

Osan is remembered as the location for the first U.S. Army company-strength bayonet charge since World War I, which occurred on February 7, 1951. That charge was part of a larger plan to clear the Republic of Korea of all communist troops south of Seoul. Army Capt. Lewis L. Millet led his soldiers against communist Chinese forces on Hill 180, which dominates present day Osan Air Base. For his heroic actions, Captain Millet received the Medal of Honor. According to the VFW Post 10216: Osan AB site:

After the Chinese counter-attacked they swept down pushing the bloodied allied troops back across the border and taking Seoul. On December 31, 230,000 Chinese volunteers and 70,000 North Koreans launched the Third Chinese Campaign as a surprise attack. This flow of battle centered around the 38th Parallel and Seoul during the Third Chinese Campaign (January 1951) and Fourth Chinese Campaign (April 1951). On February 1, the U.N. voted to end the Korean conflict by "peaceful means." Though the Chinese and North Koreans recaptured Seoul on January 4, 1951, the UN forces retook Seoul on March 18, 1951. In the midst of this action was the "The Battle of Bayonet Hill"

The Battle of "Bayonet Hill", 7 February 1951

Hill 180, as it was called during the Korean War, lay between the exhausted Chinese Communist and North Korean forces and General Matthew Ridgeway’s revitalized 8th U.S. Army in late January, 1951. After being driven back steadily during the last months of 1950 by Chinese hordes, U.S. troops regrouped and were ready to probe the overextended, under-supplied Chinese and North Koreans. Ridgeway sent the 27th Infantry "Wolfhounds" north toward Osan as the vanguard for an all-out U.N. assault called Operation Thunderbolt. Easy Company, part of the Wolfhounds contingent, was commanded by a tough, World War II-hardened officer--Captain Lewis Millett. Company E boarded tanks and started forward.


Capt Lewis Millet (7 Feb 1951)

On February 5, 1951, it was moving through a frozen rice paddy west of the road running south out of Osan. Suddenly, the crackle of enemy machine-gun fire broke the morning air. The first platoon found itself pinned down. Chinese were emplaced on two hills straddling the road. Their fire picked up. The bullets whistled through the air, slapping into the ice.

"Second platoon!" Millett hollered. "Fix bayonets--move to the left of the first." Then Millett was off, shouting, "C’mon with me!" He bounded to the base of the hill. There he waited for his platoons to form up. "We’ll get ‘em with the bayonet! Let’s go!" he yelled when they were ready. Up the hill the two platoons went, all the GIs yelling at the top of their voices. Above them, Millett appeared on the skyline, rifle in one hand, waving his men upward with the other. Even as he did so, Chinese soldiers scurried from their foxholes, skittering down the reverse slope helter-skelter.

By the time the two platoons joined Millett on the crest only a few enemy stragglers remained. They were quickly dispatched. To the rear, the rest of Millett’s battalion observed the audacious charge. The colonel quickly came forward to shake Millett’s hand and congratulate him for his courage. That night the colonel began the paperwork that would bring Millett the Distinguished Service Cross. Little did he know that Millett’s charge was but a rehearsal for what would come just forty-eight hours later.

At midday on February 7, Company E had the point for the battalion. Near the smoke-blackened village of Soam-ni, just west and north of Osan, they approached a ridge line. On military maps, it was designated Hill 180. To the men of Company E and the annals of U.S. military history it would forever be "Bayonet Hill."

Accompanied by two of his platoons astride tanks, Millett approached Hill 180, fully expecting to bypass it completely. Then one of his men noticed movement among the thick foliage near the top of the hill. It was crawling with Chinese. And Company E sat almost directly under their guns. Once apprised of the situation, Millett quickly ordered the tanks off the road. He got his two platoons deployed along a paddy dike.

By now the Chinese had opened fire. A number of Millett’s men fell, cut down by vicious machine-gun fire. Leaping aboard the nearest tank, Millett grabbed its .50-caliber machine gun. He sent a stream of tracers flying toward the enemy position. "Keep it going there," he told the gunner. Then he jumped off the tank and moved on. He knew from here on it was all a matter of timing. He had to get an attack under way quickly. He didn’t want these Chinese to get away like the others had two days earlier.

Millett called to one of his platoon leaders to get ready to move out. Seconds later, enfilading fire from a previously quiet Chinese machine gun tore into the first platoon. Casualties mounted. Then the .50-caliber machine gun supporting first platoon went silent--jammed with a ruptured cartridge. Millett swore under his breath. His attack was crumbling even before it started. He scrambled from his position and raced across the bullet-swept ground to the first platoon. Spotting the platoon sergeant as he barreled into position, Millett just hollered at the men, "Get ready to move out! We’re going up the hill. Fix bayonets! Charge! Everyone goes with me!" He raised his rifle and took out across the open fields.

Bounding from the small rises and hurdling the ditches, Millett kept his feet across the ice-covered ground. Behind him the platoon sergeant and a dozen men ran after Millett. Those who hadn’t followed were cut down minutes later as enemy machine-gun fire from Hill 180 zeroed in on them. When he reached the base of the hill, Millett flung himself down under a rocky outcropping while he waited for the others to catch up. After they did Millet motioned upward. "Let’s go!" he said. Dashing from rock to rock. Millett made the first of three small knobs that comprised Hill 180. The center and far knob rose some twenty meters higher. Millett spotted a Chinese machine gun to his left. He ordered a BAR to fire on it. Another soldier spotted eight Chinese squatting in a hole just ten yards from Millett. The captain ran to it, firing his carbine and throwing grenades. The enemy died.

Millett now radioed for his third platoon to come forward. After he had them in position Millett told them, "Attack straight up the hill!" With their bayonet-tipped rifles carried at high port, screaming Chinese phrases as they ran, Millett and his assembled men raced toward the two higher knobs. Lunging into the first line of enemy foxholes, the GIs ripped into the Chinese, bayonets first. The terror-filled shrieks of the bayoneted enemy rose above the din of battle. Millett was so far in front of his men he had to dodge grenades thrown by both sides. Ignoring the thundering explosions, he charged headlong at an anti-tank gun firing point-blank at him. A few well-tossed grenades took care of that weapon.

A cluster of grenades flew down from a Chinese position farther uphill. Millett danced and dodged around, avoiding the detonations of eight grenades. A ninth got him, sending hot steel shards into his back and legs. He could feel the blood coursing down his skin, drenching his fatigues beneath his parka. Unmindful of the intense pain, Millett continued his charge. He urged his men forward. "Let’s go!," he screamed. "Use grenades and cold steel! Kill ‘em with the bayonet!" At the crest of the highest knob he jumped into one arm of a V-shaped slit trench. With a savage thrust of his bayonet he impaled one enemy soldier. He had to fire a round to dislodge his weapon. A second enemy soldier rushed at Millett. The emboldened captain met him like a frenzied tiger, jamming his sharp steel blade into the man’s throat, ripping it wide open. A third Chinese, in the far arm of the V, raised his rifle. Before he could fire Millett was on him, slamming his blood-stained bayonet into the enemy soldier’s chest. While Millett dispatched the soldier, the rest of his men rushed past. Millett leaped after them.

Together they went on, screaming and yelling, firing from the hip, ripping and stabbing enemy flesh with their bayonets, throwing grenades into bunkers and foxholes until they had completely eliminated the enemy from the hill.

When it was all over Millett stopped atop the saw-toothed ridge and pumped his bloody rifle up and down, signaling to those below he had conquered Bayonet Hill. After the battle forty-seven enemy dead were counted on the forward slope of the hill; thirty had died as a result of bayonet wounds. On the reverse slope lay another fifty enemy, dead of either bayonet or gunshot wounds. Witnesses estimated another hundred Chinese escaped.

Evacuated due to the seriousness of his wounds, Millett spent several months in the hospital recuperating. His Medal of Honor was presented to him at the White House on July 5, 1951.

(L) Col. Millet at Bayonet Hill 50th Anniversary (R) Col. Millet honored at VFW Post 10216 (Hill 180 Post) (2000) (VFW Post 10216: Osan AB)
Bayonet Hill 50th Anniversary (2000) (51st FW History Office)

Plaque on Hill 180 (1998) (VFW Post 10216: Osan AB)

EPILOGUE: John C. Sullivan, USAFE Director of History, wrote in Apr 2005:

That said, the entire debate over Hill 180 raged for years. When MOH Recipient and Bayonet Charge hero Millett visited (four times during my tenures in Korea), the discussions were long and painful. Local, and amateur, historians were adamant that the Chinese never reach Osan AB (that far south) and based their discussions on Army Morning Reports. They had me convinced until I saw Millett's drawings in his Korean War notebook that showed a large ginko tree in the center of the town where he took enemy gunfire. The historian in me took several of us to the Kyonggi-Do Mayor's Office and then to several "authorities" who all stated that only one ginko tree survived the Korea War and it was in the center of the town of - whatever that village with the long name was - and that led credence to Millett's claim of the Hill 180 location. That, and his drawings, which matched the Osan AB Hill to a "T" - so I ended the debate. The Army folks finally admitted (in person, but not in writing) that the unit's AM reports showed Millett's unit was north of where Osan was, but they agreed that enemy forces could have been on patrol down MSR 1 as far as Pyongtaek. Who knows. Millett said when he filed his report he listed the encounter "somewhere west of MSR 1 near Suwon." Sounds OK by me. He didn't encounter the entire Chinese army.

So, if you check the dates of Millett's bayonet charge, you will reach the conclusion that there was no base at present day Osan until later - not even any digging or preparation.


Ginko Tree on Golf Course (2003)


Landmark Marker of Ginko Tree (2003) (NOTE: Marker tells of a rich man without children planting the tree and then having children. He celebrated event at this tree annually and the tree was known as "Enheng Jengui" (Mana from the Ginko Tree). The village was called "Enheng Jengui" after the tree and became part of the base in 1950.) (SOURCE: Osan AB History Web Page)

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Chinese Advance Stalls (Jan 51) As almost half a million Chinese Communist and North Korean troops launched a new ground offensive, Fifth Air Force embarked on a campaign of air raids on enemy troop columns on 1 Jan. On 3 Jan, massive numbers of Chinese troops crossed the frozen Han River east and west of Seoul. Eighth Army began evacuating the South Korean capital. The ROK government began moving to Pusan. In one of the largest FEAF Bomber Command air raids, more than sixty B-29s dropped 650 tons of incendiary bombs on Pyongyang. UN forces burned nearly 500,000 gallons of fuel and 23,000 gallons of napalm at Kimpo in preparation for abandoning the base to the advancing enemy. Far East Air Forces flew 958 combat sorties, a one-day record. On 4 January, for the third time in six months, Seoul changed hands as CCF troops moved in. The last USAF aircraft left Kimpo Airfield. On 14 January, Chinese Communist forces reached their furthest extent of advance into South Korea with the capture of Wonju. The following is from AFHRA: Jan 1951.

Early in January, the powerful new offensive by Chinese Communist and North Korean forces drove UN forces out of Seoul and nearby Kimpo and Suwon Airfields. The UN and communist ground forces fought a see-saw battle for the crossroads city of Wonju in north central South Korea. By mid-January, the enemy offensive had stalled on a line between Pyontaek on the west coast and Samchok on the east coast, partly because the UN Command retained air superiority over the front. By the end of the month, UN forces had launched a counter-offensive, forcing the enemy northward toward Seoul.

With the loss of Kimpo and Suwon Airfields, the U.S. Air Force moved most jet fighters to bases in Japan. From there, USAF F-86s did not have the range to reach the front easily, much less the MiG-infested skies of northwestern Korea. After almost two weeks out of combat, the Fifth Air Force returned some Sabres to Korea to test their capabilities in new missions of armed reconnaissance and close air support. These flew air to ground missions from Taegu, where F-80s and F-84s also continued to operate. communist jet fighters remained at their Yalu River bases and for the first nineteen days of January only occasionally challenged U.S. aircraft over North Korea. Lacking the range and air-to-ground weapons, enemy jets did not provide any air support for communist ground troops. Despite severe winter weather that sometimes curtailed sorties during January, Fifth Air Force conducted extremely destructive close air support missions for UN forces, killing or wounding an estimated 18,750 enemy troops. C-47s embarked on new roles-dropping flares in support of B-26 and F-82 night raids and serving as communications platforms to connect the Tactical Air Control Center, TACPs, and T-6 Mosquito airplanes.

FEAF Bomber Command raided enemy marshalling yards, airfields, and supply centers, dropping more than 6700 tons of bombs on over 720 sorties. Superfortress crews occasionally struck bridges with radio-guided bombs but largely avoided northwestern Korea, where they might have encountered scores of MiG-15s. In an air campaign intended to burn and destroy key North Korean cities, Bomber Command B-29s raided Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, with huge formations dropping incendiary bombs on the city. Targets of other major incendiary raids in North Korea included Hamhung, Kaesong, and Komusan. By the end of the month, FEAF Bomber Command, with a total force of about one hundred B-29s, was launching about twenty-four Superfortresses daily, rotating missions among the 19th, 98th, and 307th Bombardment Groups. The command also initiated B-29 night harassment attacks against North Korean cities during January.

Deprived of bases in the Seoul area, FEAF Combat Cargo Command could not easily respond to increased UN demands for airlift caused by rapid unit withdrawals and blocking of surface supply lines by heavy snow. Near the front lines, Eighth Army engineers bulldozed airstrips at Wonju and Chungju for the cargo landings, but Wonju fell into enemy hands, and frozen mud caused C-46 accidents at Chungju. The C-119s, which were too large to land at these airstrips, dropped supplies to UN forces in north central South Korea. Depending primarily on C-47 and C-119 airplanes, Combat Cargo Command delivered more than 14,000 tons of equipment and supplies; it also evacuated 10,000 combat casualties in South Korea during the first three weeks of January. Search and rescue units flew 452 missions, evacuating 112 critically wounded patients and rescuing sixteen soldiers from behind enemy lines. The Fifth Air Force's Boat Section conducted forty-two missions.

On 15 January when no enemy troops appeared on the "Dog" line, General Ridgway sent a regimental combat tem northward to feel out the enemy's strength. This task force "Wolfhound" probed to Osan before it exchanged shots with a fleeting detachment of hostile troops, and on the following day "Wolfhound" got almost to Suwon before it was finally halted by enemy emplacements. The tactical aircrewmen who supported "Wolfhound" returned from missions with strange reports: they claimed to have inflicted heavy casualties upon bodies of enemy troops moving northward out of Suwon. Evidently the Reds had overreached their grasp and were withdrawing rrom extended positions to regroup, respupply and rearm. (Source: USAF in Korea, Robert F. Futrell, pp281-282)

17 Jan 51 Eighth Army reentered Suwon. This was the most favorable entry in Eighth Army's journal since the Chinese intervention in the war in late November 1950. (Source: Chronology data)

UN Forces Retake Seoul (February-March 1951) 10 Feb 51-- Eighth Army units retook Inchon and Kimpo airfield. UN patrols entered Seoul. (Source: Chronology data)

In the west the U.S. I and IX Corps gradually seized the area up to the Han River, except for one enemy foothold between Seoul and Yangp'yong. By February 18th combat patrols confirmed that Chinese and North Korean troops along the entire central front were withdrawing. General Ridgway then began a general advance (Operation KILLER) by the IX and X Corps to pursue the enemy. By the end of the month the Chinese foothold below the Han River had collapsed. With the approval of General Douglas MacArthur, the UNC commander, Ridgway continued his attack north by launching Operation RIPPER on 7 March. The objective was a line designated Idaho just south of the 38th Parallel. On the night of 14–15 March, UN patrols moved into a deserted Seoul. By the end of the month Ridgway's troops had reached the Idaho line.

One group that made the advance was the 65th Engineer Combat Battalion. When the unit fell back in January 1951, they had blown the bridge at Osan-ni where the Chinwi River crossed the Main Supply Route 1 (MSR-1) just north of the present Osan AB (K-55). When they were "bugging out" from Seoul with the Chinese on their heels in Jan 1951, they thought they were leaving Korea so they did a thorough job in their demolition. Now upon returning in Feb 1951, they had to figure out how to reconstruct the bridge.

3. Causeway at Osan

Lt. Sam D. Starobin, S2, 65th Engineer Combat Battalion

During the withdrawal of November 1950-January 1951, the 25th Infantry Division withdrew across the Han River at Seoul and continued south on the main road as far as Chonan. At Osan we crossed the Chinwi River and there the 65th Engineer Combat Battalion blew the bridge. We believed we were withdrawing from Korea and we did thorough work on our demolitions.

The bridge at Osan was a 28-foot, two-lane, four-span, concrete structure. The abutments were fifteen feet high. The bridge was demolished by blowing alternate piers and the south abutment. This left a saw-toothed appearance.

Four weeks after we had destroyed this bridge we were back to it and were faced with the problem of crossing the Chinwi River. Osan was built up to the bank of the river, which prevented us from building a bypass alongside the bridge. We had to go east of the town with a detour, then ford the river upstream.

Our new bypass was not satisfactory. It lengthened the route by more than a mile and the river bed gave us a great deal of trouble. The spongy clay was frozen several inches deep, but the constant movement of our heavy vehicles over it soon broke this crust and the vehicles bogged down. We had to move the bypass several times.

Sketch of Bridge (Before/After) We did not feel justified in expending materials or labor to make this bypass permanent and we feared high water would make it useless. We didn't have 280 feet of bridging, and a shorter bridge would have to cross the spongy river bed. The battalion S3 (Major Joseph Pessa), the CO of Company A (Capt. Richard F. McAdoo) and I held a conference at the bridge site. We concluded it would be more practical to build a new bridge than to repair the damaged one. But we also found that the deck of the old concrete bridge was adequate for a causeway.

Company A placed four hundred pounds of TNT kicker charge to blow piers 1 and 3, and the north abutment. The explosions were simultaneous.

After the site cleared we could see that our calculations were accurate and that the bridge had dropped as planned. The concrete deck of the old bridge now formed a causeway over the banks and stream some four feet above the ground. There was plenty of room underneath for the river to flow at low stage.

Within six hours of our conference traffic was rolling across the newcauseway. There was no limit on tonnage on this structure, but it was limited to one-lane traffic.

During the heavy spring rains several other bridges along the route were washed out. I know that this one was functioning perfectly as late as April. The river might have gone over it later, but it could never be washed away.

We used this system of stream crossing several times later. It always worked. (SITE NOTE: They were correct that at low stage, it was passable, but at high water, the bridge was covered with water and impassable. This bridge remained in use until the 1980s when it was replaced when the expanded highway was built.) (Source: PART I Corps of Engineers, 3. Causeway at Osan (pp14-16) -- from Combat Support in Korea, John G. Westover (P/O Center of Military History Online Collection

Fourth Chinese Campaign (April 1951) The question now was whether to cross the 38th Parallel again. On 20 March the Joint Chiefs of Staff had notified General MacArthur that President Harry S. Truman was preparing to announce a willingness to negotiate an end to the conflict with the North Koreans and the Chinese, an announcement that would be issued before any advance above the 38th Parallel. MacArthur preempted that announcement by issuing his own offer to end hostilities, but one that included a threat to cross the parallel. President Truman never released his statement, concluding, however unhappily, that perhaps MacArthur's ultimatum would pressure the enemy to the negotiating table. He also left the decision on crossing the 38th Parallel to tactical considerations. Consequently, when Ridgway received intelligence about enemy preparations for an expected spring offensive, he began a new attack, with MacArthur's approval, in early April. The objective was a line designated Kansas about ten miles above the 38th Parallel. By the 9th the U.S. I and IX Corps, and the ROK I Corps on the east coast, had reached that line, and the U.S. X Corps and the ROK III Corps were nearing it. The I and IX Corps then continued their attack beyond Kansas. At the same time, on 11 April, President Truman relieved MacArthur after the UNC commander said he would welcome the use of Nationalist Chinese forces since there could be "no substitute for victory" in Korea. Ridgway replaced MacArthur, and on 14 April Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet assumed command of the Eighth Army.

Eight days later four Chinese army groups and two North Korean corps began the enemy's spring offensive, attacking most heavily in the west, with a major focus on recapturing Seoul. Withdrawing in stages to previously prepared defenses several miles north of Seoul, General Van Fleet finally stopped the advance. On 15 May the enemy attacked again. Van Fleet had expected another advance on Seoul, but the brunt of the assault was in the east-central area. By repositioning units and using unrelenting artillery fire, he stopped the attack on 20 May after the enemy had penetrated thirty miles. To prevent the Chinese and North Koreans from regrouping, Van Fleet immediately sent the Eighth Army forward. Meeting light resistance, the Eighth Army was just short of the Kansas line by 31 May. The next day Van Fleet sent part of his force farther north, to a line designated Wyoming in the west-central area known as the Iron Triangle. By mid-June the Eighth Army was in control of both the Kansas line and the Wyoming bulge.

Given this strong defensive position, Van Fleet was ordered to hold and fortify it while Washington waited for the Chinese and North Koreans to offer to negotiate an armistice. The enemy in turn used this lull to regroup and to build defenses opposite the Eighth Army. The days settled down to patrols and small clashes. On 23 June, Jacob Malik, the Soviet Union's delegate to the United Nations, called for talks on a cease-fire and armistice. When the People's Republic of China endorsed Malik's statement, President Truman authorized General Ridgway to arrange the talks. After a series of radio messages, the first armistice conference was scheduled for 10 July in the town of Kaesong. The time of large-scale fighting was over.

Armistice Talks (July 1951) Armistice talks began at Kaesong on 10 July 1951. North and South Korea were willing to fight on, but after twelve months of large-scale but indecisive conflict, their Cold War supporters—the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union on one side, the United States and its UN allies on the other—had concluded it was not in their respective interests to continue. The chief negotiator for the UN was American Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy; his counterpart was Lt. Gen. Nam Il, the chief of staff of the North Korean People’s Army. At the first session it was agreed that military operations could continue until an armistice agreement was actually signed. The front lines remained relatively quiet, though, as the opposing sides adopted a cautious watch-and-wait stance. (Source: Center of Military History: Korean War)

Refugee Problems Refugee problems were a primary concern. Not only were millions of North Koreans fleeing south, but the populace in general was fleeing the North Korean onslaught. In Pusan, there was a huge refugee problem as makeshift camps were set up.

After the outbreak of hostilities, the war effort and relief work submerged all other considerations. The military forces were concerned with the prevention of conditions among the civilian population which might lead to disease, starvation, and unrest. In addition to military assistance from many member states of the United Nations, aid for civilian relief purposes was also made available. The United Nations Civil Assistance Command (UNCACK), later redesignated as the Korean Civil Assistance Comand (KCAK). Thus from the start the United States, which was acting as the Unified Command under the resolutions of the United nations, played the leading role in adminstering economic as well as military assictance.

UNCACK and KCAK, with headquarters in Pusan, had teams in all the important provincial centers, extended one by one as the Communists were pushed northwards, until they covered the whole of the Republic's territory. In cooperation with the local Korean officials, they were remarkably successful in preventing widespread starvation or the serious epidemic diseases normally typical of refugee conditions. Thousands of tons of foodstuffs and huge quantities of clothing were distributed to the evacuees; millions of persons were vacinated and injected with anti-cholera and anti-typhus vaccine; refugee camps were set up and housing provided. (Source: The Republic of Korea, W.E. Reeve, 1963, pp108-109)

War Time Economy It is impossible to escape the conclusion that certain policies and actions of the authorities, both Korean and those of the United Nations Command, went to aggravate the problems faced by the Korean War economy. One of the major contributory causes of the hyper-inflation, for instance, was the method of financing the local expenditure incurred by the United Nations forces.

In July 1950 an agreement was signed requiring the South Korean Government should provide Korean currency to the Commanding General of the U.N. forces. Nothing was said in this agreement about repayment, and a quarrel over the won conversion rate had the result that until August 1952, foreign exchange was NOT made available to the Korean Government in repayment except fo one installment in 1951, coverng some 63 billion won. By that time, the vast sum of 739 billion won had been advanced -- a sum over eleven times the total note issue at the beginning of the war. In other words, the UN was borrowing money, but not repaying it back -- and this was compounded by Rhee wanting the money to be repaid to be more than the going-rate.

It was not until just before the end of hostilities that the disagreement arising from Rhee's insistence on over-valuing the won was, for the time being, resolved with the repayment of $86 million then made in full and final settlement of the outstanding advances, and arrangements made that all future drawings of local currency by the UN forces should be promptly repaid. These payments for local expenditures of UN forces together with US offshore purchases contined to represent Korea's largest source of foreign currency earnings, far exceeding the value of visible exports well into the 1970s.

On the Korean side, attempts were made to curb the inflationary tide under extremely difficult conditions, for instance, by slashing many intems of non-defense budget expenditure. But some other actions contributed to inflation, such as the bank loands granted to cover deficits of vested government enterprises. In the three years of the Korean War, the money supply increased about 17 times, retail prices 22 times, and wholesale prices 18 times. Barter transactions were increasingly resorted to and in the general disarray of economic life and organizational machinery there grew a degree of corruption much greater than was traditional in Korea. (Source: The Republic of Korea, W.E. Reeve, 1963, pp109-110)

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