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This page is graphically intense with long load times due to photos. However, the photos and narratives by the men who served at Osan Air Base makes the wait well worthwhile. The opinions expressed are those of the author and in no way represents any official statement of Osan AB or the USAF. 
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Acknowledgement: Thanks to Lt Kim Nu-ri, Executive Officer, 37th Tactical Intelligence Group for the unclassified information on his unit. Thanks to Lt Choi Jae-hong, Chief of Operations, AFOC Support Wing and Lt Han Ju-yop (Justin), Translator AFOC Support Wing for their help in providing information on the AFOC Support and Services Wing and ADA Platoon. 
1970s View of Osan AB (USAF Photo) ROKAF AT OSAN ABHISTORY OF ROKAF AT OSAN AB:IN WORK...ROKAF (Republic of Korea Air Force) THIS IS A WORK IN-PROGRESS AND FACTS ARE BEING ADDED/DELETED DURING THIS PROCESS. THIS IS NOT A COMPLETED HISTORY.ORIGINAL ROKAF AIRCRAFT: Original Aircraft: Though Osan AB never had an assigned aircraft wing, the ROKAF was always attached to the 5AF and 7AF headquarters as operational planners for the ROKAF at F-51s at Gangnung and later the F-86s at Sachon and Kunsan. The original aircraft of the South Korean Air Force were discarded aircraft that were left behind by the Japanese after the war. Charles Euripides of Charlotte, North Carolina wrote, "I have collected photographs of the following Japanese aircraft in service in Korea, 1945-1950: 1. Ki-55 "Ida" (NKAF, overall gray); 2. Ki-54 "Hickory" (NKAF, overall green); 3. Ki-86 "Cypress" (SKAF, overall silver); 4. Rufe (float only); 5. Ki-9 Spruce (overall green, South Korean markings." Charles' observations of the Japanese aircraft in use by the SKAF is corroborated by the website Japanese Aircraft in Foreign Markings. It says, "South Korea: By force of circumstance, this "new" nation had to develop an air force from scratch at the end of the war. Initially, they operated Tachikawa Ki-9 "Spruce" machines, that appear to be in red - lime trainer colours. Markings consisted of a large Korean red / blue roundel, outlined in white, carried at least on the fuselage and upper wings. A broad white fuselage band was carried in front of the tail section." At Kunsan Air Base, when the 63rd Infantry Division, 3rd Battalion came to Kunsan, the Captain Robert Grenig reported seeing a "Zero" abandoned on the base. This aircraft was slowly stripped of any usable parts by the Koreans (with the knowledge of the Americans) until it was nothing but a skeleton. The Japanese had simply laid down their arms at the end of the war and walked away. (NOTE: The "Zero" was most likely a Ki-55 "Ida" as the "Zero" was a naval aircraft and Kunsan Aerodrome was an Army Advanced Training Base.) The Ki-55 "Ida" was a single-engined dual seat Army Type 99 Advanced Trainer and Ki-54 "Hickory" was a dual-engine Army Type 1 Advanced Trainer/Transport. Both of these aircraft may have been used at Kunsan by the 12th or 23rd Advanced Air Training Units who operated in the area. The 19th Air Training Unit was also in the area and may have used the Ki-86A "Cypress"; Ki-9 "Spruce"; and Ki-17 "Cedar" aircraft. These were Army single-engined two-seat biplane primary trainers.       Later Charles wrote of a photo of Kimpo c.1945. He said, "The photo shows a number of Ki-84's, Ki-55's, Ki-54's, Ki-79b's and a few P-38's and one C-47. Another photo shows a number of Ki-46's, a Fokker Super Universal, and the same aircraft listed above." Thus Kimpo appears to have been the "collection point" of the Japanese aircraft after the war. Charles also mentioned that the Japanese aircraft left in North Korea were taken to Russia by the Russians after they drove down to the 38th Parallel. He said, "I sent a number of vivid, color photos of Japanese aircraft in North Korean markings to No Kum-Sok, the North Korean pilot who defected in September, 1953 to Kimpo. Even after reviewing the photos, he wrote me and said that the Russians took all Japanese aircraft back to Russia following WWII and that the Koreans had no Japanese aircraft." According to an article in Code One Magazine celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean Air Force, the history of the ROKAF predates the official 1949 formation date. It states, "...Korea can trace its aviation heritage back to 1922 when An Chang-nam became the first Korean pilot to fly in his country's air space. Military aviation started about the same time. Korean expatriates desiring to support the independence movement in their homeland went through flight training at aviation schools in other countries. Korea's first six military pilots received their training in Curtiss JN-4s in 1920 at the Redwood flight school in northern California."  J-1 Jenny (From Code One Magazine)  Old ROKAF (From Kimsoft) It continued, "Choi Yong-duk, who later played a leading role in establishing ROKAF, set up an organization called the Air Force Foundation Committee in 1943 to train Korean pilots in China to fight in the independence war against Japan. When World War II ended, thousands of other Koreans involved in the independence war returned home. Yong-duk and several others set up several private organizations that promoted aviation. Yong-duk, Lee Young-Moo, and Chung Jin-Il integrated these organizations in August 1946 to form the Korean Aviation Establishment Committee. As relations between the north and south became more confrontational in the late 1940s, the committee began negotiations with US forces in Korea to establish an aviation unit under the control of the ministry of national defense. The unit, equipped with L-4 and L-5 liaison aircraft, was activated in May 1948. An air force academy was established at Kimpo Air Base eight months later." "As the communist forces of North Korea strengthened their airpower with Soviet equipment and as US forces withdrew from the peninsula in June 1949, South Korea asked for more military aid, including fighter aircraft. The United States denied the request to avoid increasing tensions in the region. Republic of Korea President Lee Seung-Man went about finding other avenues for procuring military hardware to respond to the North Korean military build up. A nationwide donation campaign called "National Flag" collected money for aircraft. The funds raised were used to buy ten T-6 trainers. The aircraft were rolled out in ceremonies at Yoido Air Base in May 1950 and named "National Foundation Aircraft" to commemorate the public's part in providing them for the country's defense. The timing could not have been more portentous — the war began less than six weeks later." By mid-1950 the ROKAF had some T-6 Texan trainers and L-4 Piper liaison aircraft -- though the reports of the numbers of these aircraft vary from 20 to 60. These were all World War II surplus aircraft -- and all trainers. According to The United States Air Force in Korea by Robert Futrell (p17), "The ROKAF's 16 planes (8 L-4's, 5 L-5's, and 3 T-6's) were located at Kimpo and Seoul airfields, and it had detachments at Suwon, Taegu, Kwang-ju, Kunsan and Cheju-do." The ROKAF was not up to the task for the war ahead. EARLY DAYS OF KOREAN WAR: The original 1,900 man ROKAF was decimated in the first days of the war. A few of the survivors became the fighter pilots who would later form the nucleus of the ROKAF 51st Provisional Squadron under Major Hess. According to Air War Over Korea by Robert Jackson (p13) states, "...one critical deficiency in the South Korean defences became apparent when two North Korean Yak-9 fighters appeared over Kimpo and Seoul Airfields and circled leisurely for several minutes at low altitude before flying away northwards. The South Korean had nothing capable of intercepting the the enemy aircraft; in June 1950, the Republic of Korea Air Force consisted of 60 aircraft, all trainers; 8 L-4s; 5 L-5s and 3 T-6 Texans. These were based on Kimpo and Seoul Airfields."  (NOTE: All Japanese aircraft (i.e., Tachikawa Ki-9 "Spruce") have been "officially" erased from ROKAF history.) (From ROKAF 50th Year History) The following is excerpted from 'On Guard for Peace and Labour' (Short History of North Korean Air Force 1948-1996). It stated, "The NKAF was "opposed" by the ROKAF, by the middle of 1950 it had in its inventory eight Piper L-4 liaison aircraft and three T-6 Texan trainers. A southern pilot defected to the North in another Piper in May 1949. All remaining aircraft were destroyed on the ground during the first days of the war. The ROKAF was caught at the early stage of its formation; in fact Kimpo was the only air base it had available and none of the five airfields that were under speedy construction was ready by the start of the hostilities. One flight school was founded in Jan.1949 and it had insufficient time to train enough cadres." "The overall strength of the ROKAF on 2 June 1950 was 1,899 officers and men, including at least 100 pilots, and all this force during the opening days of the war was killed, scattered or taken prisoner. Thus when it became necessary to commit to combat some South Korean aircraft, at least for outward show, "Project Bout One", planned before the outbreak of war, was put into effect: ten re-activated F-51D Mustang fighters of USAF with ROKAF markings. The pilots were Americans under Maj. D. Hess, ground crews were also American. In operations during the summer and autumn of 1950 these planes saw much combat, demonstrating that the "...South Korean Air Force, wing by wing with UN aviation, defends the sky of the Motherland". The Americans had no choice in this matter because there were not enough native South Korean pilots." According to Coalition Warfare: Considerations for the Air Component Commander by Peter C. Hunt, "The ROKAF was virtually nonexistent when the war erupted--it had less than twenty trainer and liaison aircraft, none of which were suitable for combat. Shortly thereafter, the USAF transferred ten F-51Ds to the ROKAF, accompanied by flight and ground crew instructors. As the RAAF transitioned from the F-51D to the Meteor, they gradually turned over their extra Mustangs to the ROKAF as well." "Any real disagreements about airpower between the US and the ROKAF occurred before the war. In its effort to establish an air force, the Korean government was supported by General Claire Chennault, who recommended a 100-plane force (including 25 F-51s) for the Republic. The US initially eschewed any commitments of this nature for two main reasons. First, the US Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) was not prepared for such an undertaking because they had limited resources. Second, the weak ROK economy could not support the cost of an air arm. When the Korean government in October 1949 established the ROKAF despite US resistance, the KMAG gradually formed an air advisory group." When the tensions with North Korea increased before the Korean War, President Syngman Rhee requested F-51 Mustangs that the U.S. were scrapping in favor of the F-80 Shooting Stars. In Air War over Korea (p13) it states that, "The pitifully inadequate state of the ROK Air Force was a direct result of United States policy; following repeated pleas by President Syngman Rhee, Major-General Claire L. Chennault had drawn up a plan for a South Korean Air Arm consisting of 99 aircraft, including 25 F-51 Mustang fighter-bombers, but this had been rejected by General MacArthur, who believed that the build-up of such a force would serve to increase the tension that already existed between North and South Korea and would lend weight to the Communists' claim that the United States was deliberately seeking to promote an arms race in the area." The transfers were reluctantly approved and started to the ROKAF in 1949. However, after the invasion of Korea a new problem popped up. The jet fighters in Japan could not operate from the undeveloped airstrips in Korea. The F-51s were hastily pressed into service by the Americans during the initial days of the war...leaving the Koreans with nothing. After the initial shock in June 1950, the F-51s were handed over to Major Hess' "Bout One". According to South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (p17), "The South Korean Air Force in June 1950 consisted of a single flight group of 12 liaison-type aircraft and 10 advance trainers (AT6). Maj. Dean E. Hess, KMAG adviser to the South Korean Air Force, had a a few (approximately 10) old F-51 (Mustang) planes under his control but no South Korean pilots had yet qualified to fly combat missions. These planes were given to the ROK Air Force on 26 June 1950." It states in Air War Over Korea (p25), that there was a plan to deploy a proportion of the F-51s recalled from the Air National Guard on the South Korean airfields as soon as possible after their arrival in the Far East. However, it continued, "Before the deployment could take place, however, steps would have to be taken to remedy the deplorable condition of the South Korean airfield still held by the Allies. In July 1950 the only airfield suitable for operations even by piston-engined combat aircraft was Taegu, and even that had little to offer; the runway was a bumpy pilot's nightmare of packed earth and gravel, and amenities consisted of a few ramshackle buildings. Since June 30th Taegu -- known also under the military designation of K-2 -- had been the home of the ten worn-out Mustangs supplied to the Republic of Korea on the request of President Rhee. This unit, manned by a mixed bunch of South Korean and American pilots under the command of Major Dean Hess, was in action almost continually during the early days of July, although in effectiveness was hampered by the fact that many of the South Korean pilots lacked sufficient experience to handle the F-51 and also by the lack of a suitable tactical air control system. Nevertheless, because of its location the Mustang squadron was the only Allied unit capable of ranging along the whole length of the front and of patrolling the battle area for between two and three hours at a stretch. It was comforting for the commanders of the hard-pressed 24th Division and ROK forces to know that a flight of Mustangs could be overhead within minutes of a request for help being sent out." This first battle-weary unit of the ROKAF was absorbed by the Mustang-equipped ROKAF 51st Provisional Fighter Squadron at Taegu. It flew its first ground attack mission on July 15th.  (Courtesy Ken Creasy) According to Major Hess in his autobiography Battle Hymn (pp75-76), "At Itazuke my excitement increased. The instructions called for command of a new project, a classified organization with the nebulous title "Bout I." I was to take ten American pilots, four ground officers, and a hundred enlisted men to Korea, where we would train a number of South Korean pilots in the F-51 (Mustang). Some of these Korean were veteran flyers who, ironically had flown for Japan in World War II -- an indication of how during their forty-five-year occupation of Korea the Japanese had attempted to absorb these people. But now their country was independent once more after forty years of subjection, and these Koreans were waiting to be taught how to fight for their freedom with our modern weapons." He continued (p76), "I was told it was to be a training mission only. We would be located on a field near the town of Taegu and thus be the only friendly air power in Korea. But we Americans were to stay out of combat. The men we were to instruct would become the nucleus of what might prove to be a valuable addition to the United Nations forces. They in turn would teach more of their compatriots to fly the F-51s." Later Major Hess would get a "reinterpretation" that would allow he and his pilots to lead the combat missions. Major Hess stated that many of the original Korean pilots had previous flying experience with Japanese aircraft during World War II. Because of this one pilot with a few confirmed American kills under his belt felt that the Americans had nothing that they could teach him. Unfortunately, he was used to a much more maneuverable Japanese aircraft and was not accustomed to the F-51s flight characteristics. On an attack on a tank, his angle of attack was too steep and he plowed into the ground. These and other problems frustrated Hess' originally. Language barriers were probably the greatest obstacle to his training program. However, after the arrival of the 6002nd Fighter Bomber Squadron from the Philippines flying F-51s, the ROKAF 51st Provisional Squadron was absorbed into the unit. The ROKAF aircraft ceased to exist. However, Maj. Hess made an impassioned plea to General Timberlake to maintain the unit and was given permission. Most of the American pilots voluntarily chose to remain with the 6002 FBS and only Maj. Hess, Lt. Mike Bellowin and about thirty enlisted volunteered to remain with the ROKAF. The fledgling ROKAF unit under Maj. Hess moved to K-4 (Sachon) near Pusan to continue flying and then on to K-10 (Chinhae) in July. By this time, there were only six F-51s. The unit remained small with three American pilots and only eight of the original ten ROKAF pilots. After the recapture of Seoul, the unit moved to K-24 (Youngdungpo) on Sep 27, 1950. It followed the drive north and was at K-24 (Pyongyang) between Oct 28 - Dec 6, 1950. It arrived at K-5 (Taejon) on Dec 6. The training cadre was sent on to Cheju Island (K-40). It departed Taejon and moved back to K-16 (Youngdongpo). 
 ROKAF Training (From Code One Magazine) The following was excerpted from Coalition Warfare: Considerations for the Air Component Commander. "After the war began, the US initiated a special project called "Bout One" to assist the development of the ROKAF. Bout One provided the ROKAF with ten F-51s, spare parts, and US instructors for aircrew and maintenance personnel. Even after General MacArthur announced that the decision to establish Bout One was final, Lieutenant General Earle Partridge, the 5th Air Force (5AF) commander, harbored doubts about the project because of inadequate ROKAF logistics and "entirely incompetent [Korean] F-51 pilots." "Led by USAF Major Dean E. Hess, Bout One's airpower objectives largely reflected the desires of US commanders, on whom the unit depended for guidance and leadership. Hess had unique insight into ROK political objectives as well as ROKAF airpower goals, since he had close personal relationships with President Rhee and General Kim Chung Yul, the ROKAF Chief of Staff. The South Korean pilots wanted to serve their country in any way possible--when the US considered dissolving Bout One, the South Korean crews volunteered to join the army so they could continue to fight. In fact, a major airpower objective throughout the Korean War was to support the outnumbered UN ground troops through close air support (CAS). In this mission, Korean cultural beliefs occasionally undermined the capability of airpower to achieve its objectives effectively. The ROK Army was sometimes reluctant to call for CAS, fearing the perception of weakness and a corresponding loss of face." "With about two dozen aircraft, mainly Canadian-built, North American T-6 trainers and L-4 and L-5 liaison aircraft, the ROKAF organization had virtually no combat capability. In the early days of the war, Korean pilots used the liaison aircraft to drop small homemade bombs that they kept on their laps. The allocation of ten F-51s for Major Hess's Bout One project eventually grew to twenty fighters by the end of 1951. This expansion was closely monitored by USAF leaders who wanted to control the post-war ROKAF capability without signaling a US commitment for long-term support." "Operationally, Bout One diverted much-needed USAF aircraft and pilots to the ROKAF during a critical phase of the war. USAF plans to dissolve the project were shelved when President Truman specifically authorized the initial F-51 transfer. Additionally, because most of the Korean pilots could not speak English, CAS was not feasible due to communications problems. At 5AF, the political significance of Bout One forced commanders to attend to the smallest matters personally. General Partridge was distracted by the need to oversee specific details about pilots and missions when the ROKAF and USAF flew together."  (From Mig Alley Skin Central) "Practically speaking, the ROKAF had to integrate into the US command structure because they depended on Major Hess's instructions from the USAF. American instructor pilots normally led mixed flights of US-ROKAF crews, and ROKAF pilots simply followed the leader. The language barrier essentially precluded the ROKAF from leading flights, because the JOC and the American instructors spoke only English." "Commanders should question the assumption that language differences do not affect airmen, since English is the common language of aviation. American, British and Australian crews spoke English as their primary language, and the Afrikaaners in the SAAF spoke fluent English as well. Although the ROKAF contribution to the war was small, the inability of their pilots to speak English created significant operational hurdles that were never fully solved over the three years of war."  ROKAF Training (From Code One Magazine) But this problem of language was not only South Korean. The following is excerpted from 'On Guard for Peace and Labour' (Short History of North Korean Air Force 1948-1996). It states, "By the middle of 1953 the NKAF had not been rebuilt as a true fighting force. The brunt of air combat over Korea was borne by Russian and Chinese pilots. As can be concluded from recollections of Soviet participants of the war, North Korean pilots were few and far between and, because they couldn't speak Russian or Chinese, they were hard to teach. According to some recollections (not without expletives) the Koreans were simply avoiding combat under the pretext of 'preservation of national cadres'." As the Korean War stabilized, the ROKAF increased its aircraft numbers with transfers from the USAF which now was transitioning back to F-80, F-84 and F-86s. The ROKAF units moved to Kangnung to be closer to the front lines which now had stabilized along the 38th Parallel. As other RAAF-associated units transitioned to the Glouster Meteor their F-51 aircraft was transferred to the ROKAF. For example, 2Squadron (SAAF) records indicate that many of the South African Air Force (SAAF) F-51Ds were transferred to the ROKAF in 1953-1954 as well. Starting in 1955, F-86F being discarded by the USAF were transferred to the ROKAF to replace the F-51s.  ROKAF F-51 (From Code One Magazine) According to an article in Code One Magazine celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean Air Force, "In the first days of the war, ROKAF pilots made heroic but vain attempts to turn back North Korean forces by dropping hand grenades on enemy tanks from their liaison aircraft. The day after the initial invasion, ten ROKAF pilots were rushed to Itasuke Air Base in Japan to receive conversion training for the F-51 Mustang. They returned to Taegu Air Base in South Korea less than two weeks later to take part in the war. ROKAF operations were soon moved to Jinhae Air Base near Pusan as ROKAF pilots supported the Naktong River defense line around that city after the initial retreat." It continued, "ROKAF forces became more proficient as the war progressed. In October 1951, ROKAF F-51 pilots conducted their first independent air operations against enemy supply lines. South Korean pilots later distinguished themselves by destroying the Sung-Ho-Ri iron bridge after many unsuccessful attempts by US bombers in January 1952. Other memorable operations include the Pyung-Yang bombing operation in August 1952 and a series of highly effective close air support missions in March 1953."  ROKAF F-51 (From Code One Magazine) It added, "From its first mission in July 1950 to the armistice in July 1953, ROKAF F-51 pilots completed about 8,500 combat missions. Thirty-nine out of a total of 115 ROKAF combat pilots flew 100 combat missions or more. Seventeen ROKAF pilots lost their lives during the war. The service grew from a meager force of twenty-two liaison aircraft and 1,100 troops at the beginning of the war to 118 aircraft and about 11,500 troops at war's end." PROBLEMS DEALING WITH TRAINING A TECHNICAL WORKFORCE AFTER THE KOREAN WAR: 1950s: The 6146th Air Force Advisory Group (ROKAF) was formed to train the ROKAF. Originally organized as the 6146th Air Base Unit in July 1950, the organization elevated to group-level in August 1952; redesignated to 6146th Air Advisory Group (ROKAF) at that time, and finally redesignated to 6146th Air Force Advisory Group (ROKAF) in July 1953. The organization's primary mission was to train pilots and ground crews for the Republic of Korea's Air Force (ROKAF), but it also flew armed reconnaissance close air support missions. The group maintained its own aircraft and kept operational the airstrip at which it was based, which was often nearer the front lines than any other USAF unit. For part of 1951, a unit detachment trained Korean personnel on the island of Cheju (Cheju Do). At Sachon it trained ROKAF personnel in the operation and maintenance of L-4, L-5, L-16, T-6, and F-51 aircraft. When the group moved to Taegu in early 1953, it left a detachment at Sachon to continue that training. Once trained at Sachon, the Korean pilots deployed to Kangnung near the 38th parallel, where another of the group's detachments had been based since the end of 1951. That detachment earned a Distinguished Unit Citation for the period December 1952 through April 1953 for flying hundreds of close support and interdiction strikes with a wing of the Republic of Korea Air Force. Under the guidance of 6146th Air Force Advisory Group pilots, Koreans flew F-51s from Kangnung to bomb, rocket, and strafe enemy troop concentrations, vehicles, supply dumps, and fuel storage sites. (Source: Korean War Project.) The problems associated with training a technical workforce were immense. Up to the Post-World War II period, the Japanese had reserved all technical positions for the Japanese -- with Koreans filling the lower menial positions. When the Japanese went home, they took with all the managerial level or highly-skilled workers. If a Korean was trained by the Japanese, he was painted with a broad brush of "collaborator" and persecuted. In a nut shell, the common Korean was basically only suited for menial labor. Though there were semi-skilled labor to varying degrees, the highly-skilled technicians were nil and professionals such as engineers were at a premium. After the war, the ROKAF started from scratch building their workforce under the guidance of the US military. Prior to the F-86, the ROKAF conducted their F-51 flight training out of Kangnung with the 10th FBW (ROKAF). However, in 1955 the USAF started the first transfers of the F-86 to the ROKAF. This entailed training the ROKAF on a completely different technology to bring them into the jet age. "An Open Letter to my Buddy" by a retired USAF MSgt states, "I went back for a second tour in 1956. I was stationed at K-13 Suwon as an advisor to the Republic of Korea Air Force. (ROKAF) We were teaching the Koreans how to fly and maintain the F-86." Prior to the F-86, the Koreans were noted as "band-aid mechanics." Basically, they were miracle workers who could temporarily fix things with bubble gum and bailing wire. However, jet engines were not tolerant of these old-fashioned techniques. Suwon became the training base for the F-86 to train the ROKAF personnel.  (From ROKAF 50th Year History) 1960s: By the 1960s, the ROKAF was expanding as more and more trained technicians filled their ranks. Training was still primarily through US assistance -- but only a little training was done at Osan with the primary ROKAF-USAF training being done at Suwon. Pilots and senior technicians attended military schools within the United States. Under the military aid programs, military hardware was transferred to Korea at no cost using the slight-of-hand tricks of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and US military "aid" dollars to purchase the FMS materials. As US units transitioned to the F-100 Supersabres, the F-86 Sabre jets were sent to the ROKAF. The ROKAF organizational structure in the 1960s was understandably a carbon copy US organizations. The ROKAF was heavily reliant on US aid. However, there has been a dramatic change in the form of training provided to the ROKAF over the years. Years ago the USAF would train the ROKAF on the system and then transfer the system to the ROKAF. However, now systems are purchased "off-the-shelf" and contractors provide support/training. For example, let's consider the development of Air Traffic Control within the ROKAF. In 1952, the Taegu Air Control Center (ACC) was established in Taegu by USAF/MATCOM. However, by 1958, the ROKAF was sufficiently trained to take over the enroute control of aircraft. In 1968, the High-Control Service was established at Mt Palgong by USAF to provide radar service for flights at or above FL240. In 1973, the ROKAF took over High-Control Service. In 1986 a new computer-based enroute radar control system was installed at Taegu airbase by ROKAF. Thus one can see that the pattern in the past was that the USAF first established a system; the ROKAF was trained via OJT to maintain the system; and then the system was transferred to the ROKAF. This system of "training and transfer" was used in all areas. However, after the "Miracle of the Han River" came about, Korea has gone about developing her own electronic systems in cooperation with foreign companies. Throughout the history of the ROKAF, American personnel would serve as transition trainers and advisors for new aircraft received. Most often these "trainer-advisors" would be USAF personnel from bases in Korea who would be sent to various ROKAF bases requesting assistance. A History of the Korean People, Tradition and Transformation by Andrew C. Nahm (p505) states, "Following the signing of the armistice agreement in July 1953, south Korea strengthened its military, aiming at the construction of a self-reliant defense posture. Various new academies of the military branches and a war college were established, and after the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States on October 1, 1953 more U.S. military aid was received and troops became better trained and equipped. While training better qualified officers at military schools in Korea, the government sent a large number of officers to receive advanced training at U.S. military institutions." It continued, "Although South Korea's military strength increased during and after the Korean War, it was not until after the emergence of the Third Republic in 1963 that the national defense posture was noticeably improved. The government adopted several important measures to strengthen national defense, increased the number of divisions and units in the armed forces, and improved the training programs." 1970s: Military expenditures grew steadily after 1963, particularly after 1972, due to the shift in U.S. Asian policy and international situation. To be more specific -- Vietnam blossomed after 1963. Lyndon Johnson escalated the Vietnam war in 1965 and 1966. The U.S. needed its troops...and international support as well. In order to get Korean involvement, the U.S. threatened to pullout portions of its troops from Korea if Korea did not contribute its troops. However, if Korea did acquiesce, the U.S. agreed to provide additional military assistance in the form of U.S. military aid dollars. Korea's involvement was blackmail, but the Korea really didn't have much choice, but to join the Vietnam effort. Korea sent its troops off to war. Part of this "deal" was that the US was going to remove the 7th ID and promised to upgrade the ROK military with new equipment and armaments. The 7th ID was removed in 1977. Though Park Chung-hee had volunteered troops before and sent a Korean MASH unit in 1964, 50,000 Korean soldiers were fighting in Vietnam after 1965 under the new agreement. By the time the ROK forces withdrew in 1973, as many as 300,000 Koreans had served there. Korea transferred most of its F-5A to Vietnam and in return had them replaced with F-4E aircraft. However, after Vietnam fell, the U.S. needed Korea to maintain its image as the protector of democracy. With all the excess stockpiles of Vietnam materials, much of it ended up in equipping the South Korea forces. The first "Team Spirit" was born in the late 1970s and continued till the 1990s. But another trend was happening in the U.S. There was a strong push in America to reduce the size of the military after Vietnam. (This was shown by President Carter's plan in 1979 to reduce the American forces by 6,000 troops -- though it was discarded later.) With this new reality, it was essential to beef up the South Korean forces.  (From ROKAF 50th Year History) By these actions, the Korean military hardware was being upgraded by the U.S. Korea secured an increasing amount of military loans from the U.S. "Military assistance from the United States was a key factory in Korean military development. Between 1953 and 1961, the United States provided $1.6 billion; between 1962 and 1969, $2.5 billion; and between 1970 and 1976, $2.8 billion in grants and loans." South Korea spent an enormous amount of money for the military in its military modernization program. It purchased $2.1 billion worth of arms from the United States between 1975 and 1979. South Korea was the 4th largest buyer of U.S. military hardware. Most of this spending was simply "slight-of-hand" tricks of Foreign Military Sales (FMS)...U.S. giving loans that were later "forgiven" after Korea had bought U.S. arms. By 1990, Korea's military expenditures had reached $9.18 billion and was increasing rapidly as Korea set out on its path to be militarily independent from the U.S. military. However, a key point of this modernization that should not be overlooked is that technology was being transferred along with this upgrade in military hardware. In 1969, the manufacturing of small arms, tanks, and guided missiles and rockets began, and Korean-made guided missiles, tanks and high-powered rockets were tested successfully in September 1978. The people trained in the military took this training in military technology and converted it to the civilian markets. The miracle of the Han was underway.   (From AFTHS) 1980s - 1990s: By the mid-1980s, Korea had transitioned from low-tech industries (shoes, clothing) into mid-tech industries (petrochemicals, steel, automobiles), but it wanted to enter into high-tech areas (electronics, aircraft manufacturing). However, it did not have the technology. The only way to obtain this technology quickly with minimal risk was through partnerships. Thus was born the KFX (Korean Fighter Program) which gave birth to the KF-16. This was an aircraft "co-produced" in Korea in hopes of gaining the technology to "co-develop" at a later date its own aircraft (similar to the JSF Japanese Fighter Program). (NOTE: In "co-produce" Korea uses another company's designs and manufactures it in Korea, but in "co-develop" Korea participates in the design phases of the aircraft as well as production.) The Korean KTX-2 Advanced Trainer/Fighter is a step along this path. It is plain to see that Korea has already mapped out a long-range plan to be self-sufficient in design, development and production in its own aircraft systems. The key item for the Koreans is "technology transfer." In the development of the KTX-2, David Ash, Lockheed Martin's program director for the KTX-2, said in July 99, "The supersonic KTX-2 will have the maneuverability, endurance and systems to prepare future pilots to fly advanced, front-line fighters like the F-16, F-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter. In addition, the team of engineers from Lockheed Martin and Samsung Aerospace are working together to make sure the design experience that comes from producing the world's most advanced fighter programs is transferred to the Korean industry." Korea aims to develop its own high-tech aircraft manufacturing capability.  (From ROKAF 50th Year History Background History of Nation in 1960s: The country of Korea was in turmoil in the 1960s. The corruption within the Syngman Rhee government was rampant. In 1958 legislation was passed that abolished election for local officials. Politically important local posts were filled with Rhee's Liberal Party members; Chiefs of police were replaced with Rhee supporters; and a National Security Law was passed that virtually killed any chance for democratization of politics. The end result was riots and student demonstrations that erupted throughout the country. It culminated in the April 19th Student Uprising. This toppled the Rhee government. Rhee resigned from office in April 1961 and left for exile in Hawaii. This was the end of the corrupt and oppressive First Republic. However, the Second Republic was short-lived. On May 16, 1961, a group of military officers carried out a coup and established a military junta. A small group of young officers commanding 3600 men toppled a government that had authority over an army of 600,000. The reason was that President Yun had sided with the junta and persuaded the U.S. Eighth Army and the commanders of various South Korean army units not to interfere with the new rulers. President Yun stayed on for ten months after the military junta took over power thereby legitimizing it. The revolutionary junta suspended the constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, forbade all political activities, imposed press censorship, and banned student demonstrations. Major General Park Chung-Hee consolidated his power and retired from the military to become President of the Third Republic (1963-1972). In May 1965, President Park visited the US at President Johnson's invitation, and soon after an agreement between South Korea and the US was reached regarding the dispatch of Korean troops to Vietnam. There was a great outcry and vehement opposition from a large number of National Assemblymen, students, and intellectual and political leaders in Korea. However, the die was cast and several thousand Korean troops left for Vietnam. Korea had been blackmailed into agreeing to this. If it had refused, some American troops with their modern weaponry would have been withdrawn for duty in Vietnam. But if Korea agreed, the U.S. promised to increase the monetary grants and loans to Korea. Park Chung-Hee's regime has been colored as an "iron-fisted dictatorship", but his supporters claim the country needed a strong-willed leader with a vision at the time. Perhaps they were right as the "Miracle of the Han River" can be directly attributed to him. However, by the 1970s there were others who felt quite the opposite about his continued iron-fisted rule. Popular politicians such as Kim Jung-pil, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung openly criticized the regime. Later they would be arrested for their views. In August 1965, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), an administrative agreement concerning the status of US troops in Korea, was signed thus resolving many thorny problems which had existed ever since the arrival of the American troops. Parties agreed to permit other privileges and rights, including relief from taxes, customs, immigration requirements, and sharing of payment for claims. However, the basic premise of the SOFA deals with percentage share. If you pay more for the support of the American troops, you get a lot more in concessions. The Koreans paid little to nothing in 1965 and the SOFA was heavily weighted towards the Americans' advantage. It was not until 1992 that the SOFA was renegotiated and Korea increased its share to $220 million. But in the early 1960s, the U.S. still spent $500 million a year to support the ROK and as such, the ROK had no negotiating power. Then on January 21, 1968, the North Koreans dispatched Commandoes to the South to assassinate Park Chung-Hee, but failed. Two days later the North Koreans captured the USS Pueblo on the high seas east of the North Korean port of Wonson. The situation became worse when the North Koreans shot down a U.S. EC121 reconnaissance plane, which due to a navigational error flew over North Korea on April 15, 1969. Korea was on the brink of war. The USAF deployed successive units to Kunsan with some elements at Osan AB. After the Pueblo Incident, the nuclear tasking was moved back to Osan.  (Click on image to enlarge) F-86F SABRES According to the Baugher site, "The Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) received its first Sabres when five F-86Fs were turned over to ROK pilots on June 20, 1955. Korea received 85 ex-USAF F-86F-25 and -30 fighters between June 1955 and June 1956. These replaced the F-51D Mustang fighters used previously, equipping units of the RoKAFs 10th Wing. In 1958, 27 more F-86Fs and ten RF-86F reconnaissance aircraft were delivered. Many of the ROKAF ex-USAF Sabres were retrofitted with the "F-40" wing with extended tips and slats. Many were modified to carry the AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missile. These ROKAF Sabres were replaced by Northrop F-5s beginning in 1965. At least three F-86Fs survived until 1987." Beginning in November of 1960, the Republic of Korea got sufficient numbers of F-86Ds to equip two interceptor wings.
F-86F 51-13180 preserved at Seoul War Museum (MAP); F-86F (ex-RoKAF?) displayed at Osan AB.; Unidentified F-86F being assembled for display at Inchon war museum Aug99 (R. Royce Raven) From: Duncan's Sabre Site 1970s: After peace overtures from the North, President Park announced his willingness to open gradual contacts with North Korea. However, he did not know that the North had secretly started building infiltration tunnels under the DMZ in 1970. In 1971, Korean ground troops assumed responsibility for the defense of the 156-mile DMZ with a partial withdrawal of American forces with the removal of the 7th Infantry Division. Park Chung-hee, angered over the removal of the 7th ID, and only appeased by the promise to upgrade his military with direct aid. In 1971 President Park declared a national emergency after narrowly defeating Kim Dae-Jung for the presidency (51%). Because of Kim Dae-jung's attacks on the Park regime, he became a marked man of the KCIA. Korea's Place in the Sun, A Modern History (p358) refers to the "Yushin" constitution this way. The 1972 constitution was written "removing all limits on his tenure in office and giving him powers to appoint and dismiss the cabinet and even the prime minister, to designate one-third of the National Assembly..., to suspend or destroy civil liberties, and to issue decrees for whatever powers the Yushin framers forgot to include." In 1972, President Park imposed martial law and was elected to a six-year term under a new constitution. Basically, with the "Yushin" system, Park could remain President as long as he wished with being bothered by elections. Military expenditures grew steadily after 1972 due to the shift in U.S. Asian policy and the international situation. Most of this increase was due to the grants and loans promised by the President Johnson if the ROK Army would join the alliance in Vietnam in 1965. In 1973, U.S.-Korea relations became strained in connection with the kidnapping from Japan of Kim Dae-jung, who would later become Presidents of Korea. He claimed that the government of Park was "highly militaristic" and it had been turned into a "police state" during his Presidential campaign in 1971. In 1973, he was kidnapped from Japan; underwent torture; and faced imminent death at the hands of the Korean CIA. It was the US intercession that saved his life. Park became indignant with U.S. interference in the internal affairs of South Korea -- Washington reduced its military aid to Seoul in the early 1970s as a warning against the authoritarian rule and human right abuses of the Park regime. He sought self-sufficiency through defense budgeting -- U.S. grant aid was terminated in 1976 -- and US-supported indigenous arms production. Despite a covert nuclear weapons program and the illegal conversion of the Honest John missile, the US never abandoned the alliance with the ROK. Because of the growing discontent against his policies in 1974, Park imposed an emergency decree forbidding criticism of the "Yushin" constitution. With the power of the National Security Act, the KCIA enforced this decree through intimidation and torture. World-wide attention was being focused on Korea with outraged cries against the human rights violations. In 1974, a North Korean sympathizer from Japan, in an attempt on the life of President Park Chung-hee at a public gathering, shot and killed Mrs. Park. There was growing criticism of the Americans against human rights violations by the Korean government. In 1975, Jimmy Carter in running for President told the Washington Post that he saw no reason for American troops to be stationed in South Korea and that, if elected, he would pull them out along with the nuclear weapons stationed there. In the 1992 publication, Kim Young-Sam and the The New Korea (p99) it states, "Carter apparently wanted to removed the "trip-wire" U.S. force to avoid any possibility of an American entanglement in a future land war in Asia. But Carter also appeared to be motivated by his and his advisers' deep antagonism to the authoritarian government in South Korea and its violations of human rights. It appears that they were also heavily influenced by the so-called Koreagate scandal of 1971 involving a lobbyist for South Korea, Tong-sun Park, with ties to the Korean Central Intelligence Agency." Koreagate involved the dispersal of between $500,000 to $1 million annually in cash gifts and campaign contributions. President Jimmy Carter's plan to withdraw the ground troops of the US from South Korea caused grave concerns for the national security. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff warned of the superiority of the North Korean forces, but did recommend a scaling down of the American forces. The impact of these decisions at the local level was that USAF base officials took a "wait-and-see" attitude before approving monies for improvements to the base. In 1976, two American army officers were brutally hacked to death in an unprovoked attack by 30 axe-wielding North Korean Communist security guards in the joint security area of the truce conference installation at Panmunjon. The ROKAF along with the U.S. forces went on full alert. A massive buildup was immediately undertaken with carrier fleets and AWACS aircraft deployed to Korea. Though the tensions died down, whenever you have so many armed forces confronting each other there is always the chance that someone may pull the trigger and World War III will start. Any face-off is dangerous. However, the event did strengthen the case of the opponents to Jimmy Carter's withdrawal plans. In 1976, the U.S. Senate in a 77-to-15 vote refused to endorse Carter's withdrawal scheme. Politically, the scheme was dead, but Carter needed a face-saving exit. In early 1977, the third in a series of tunnels secretly dug under the DMZ was discovered. In February 1979, Carter on the basis of a reappraisal of North Korea's military strength, said no further withdrawals would take place until the end of his administration. The reappraisal was a face-saving device which permitted the reversal of policy. Following President Carter's Korea visit in June 1979, the thorny issue of troop withdrawals was solved and the plan was withdrawn. However, a 1979 Gallup poll showed the American people's support for South Korea was at its lowest point ever. The assassination of Park Chung-Hee by the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency on October 26, 1979 shook the nation. Martial Law was enacted and the Fourth Republic came to an end. Again the ROKAF was on full alert. On the night of December 12, 1979, Major General Chun Doo-hwan ousted General Chong Sung-hwa as Army Chief of Staff. A History of the Korean People, Tradition and Transformation (p465) states, "This incident raised a serious issue between the commander of the U.S. forces in Korea and General Chun because of his mobilization of troops without the authorization of the commander of the U.S.-Korean Combined Forces Command (CFC) which was established on November 1978, with the commander of the U.S. Eight Army as commander of the combined forces. Therefore any troop movement of Korean troops without the approval of the commander of the combined forces was regarded as illegal. However, the United States, recognizing the particular situation in Korea, raised no serious objection." (NOTE: The effects of this U.S. decision to say -- and do -- nothing is still being felt today as the Korean student activists use it as "proof" that the U.S. "supported" Chun Doo-hwan in his actions. It is not known what actions were taken by the Kunsan ROKAF to support this action by Chun Doo-hwan, but it is assumed that the unit was confined to barracks and on full alert. However, the Commanding General of the First Army guarding Seoul ordered his troops to remain "neutral." Most likely similar orders were issued to the ROKAF. Kunsan would have been too far away from any of the coup activities going on to be considered a player.) On May 9, 1979 Kim Yong-sam and Kim Dae-jung urged the government to cancel martial law and suspend its plans to revise the constitution. Government response was vague and student protests erupted and spread nationwide. Facing a possible collapse of law and order, the government extended its limited martial law to nationwide one on May 18. Kim Yong-sam, Kim Jong-pil and Kim Dae-jung were arrested. In Kwangju the news of the arrest of Kim Dae-jung infuriated the residents. They occupied buildings and broke into armories to get arms. On May 22, paratroopers stormed Kwangju and subjugated the rebellion, but the insurrection resulted in the death of several hundreds (though Kwangju residents claim it is in the thousands). Westerners call it the "Kwangju Riots" or "Kwangju Uprising", but Koreans call it the "Kwangju Massacre". Kim Dae-jung was indicted by the Chun regime for inciting the riots and given the death sentence...but it was later commuted to life in prison. (NOTE: Again anti-American protestors assign some degree of blame and guilt upon U.S. military and government authorities for the bloody crackdown in Kwangju. South Korean army units were technically under the Combined Forces Command (CFC) were pulled from their positions near the DMZ to participate in quelling the Kwangju uprising. Radicals accuse the U.S. of approving or at least acquiescing to their deployment to Kwangju. However, on the opposite side of the coin, some vocal American politicians have used this same case as demonstrating the untrustworthiness of Koreans in living up to treaty agreements.) Though Kwangju is 120km from Kunsan, it is unlikely that there was any involvement from the Kunsan ROKAF to support the suppression effort. It was strictly a ROK Army operation. Again, the ROKAF would have probably been confined to barracks and on full alert. (NOTE: This uprising would be the centerpiece of investigations by the National Assembly in 1987 under Roh Tae-woo and then reopened under the Kim Young-sam presidency. In the latter, Chun Doo-hwan and Ro Tae-woo were arrested in 1995 and tried in 1996 on bribery and sedition charges. Though the charges for "treason" were dropped, the two former Presidents were sent to prison for corruption. In 1995 President Kim Young-sam said this was a major step towards "righting the wrongs of history", but he would soon find his own troubles with corruption when his second son, Kim Hyon-chol, was sent to prison for receiving bribes in 1997.) In 1980, General Chun Doo-hwan was "inaugurated" as president as all four political parties were disbanded. In 1981, he would be "reelected" by the electoral college as the only candidate. ROKAF TRANSITION TO F-4D/E: In 1972, the RoKAF received 18 F-4Ds drawn from the USAF's 3rd TFW based at Kunsan AB. (Go to 3rd Bomb Wing for more information.) Initially these aircraft were "on loan" from the USAF.    Click on photo to enlarge From Juchan's Kim's RoKAF Aircraft. According to Service with the Republic of Korea Air Force, "In 1968, the Republic of Korea, having gotten rather nervous about border clashes with North Korea, ordered an initial batch of 18 F-4Ds. This order was filled using aircraft drawn from from existing USAF stocks rather than by new construction. The transfer program was assigned the code name Peace Spectator. The first four F-4Ds arrived in Korea in August of 1969. They were supplied to the 110th TFS of the 11th FW based at Taegu." "In 1972, the RoKAF received 18 more F-4Ds drawn from the USAF's locally-based 3rd TFW. These planes were supplied in return for the Korean government agreeing to transfer 36 Northrop F-5A/Bs to South Vietnam under the Enhance Plus program. Though we do not show any F-4Ds at Kunsan, there is one source that stated that Kunsan had a detachment of the 110th TFS, 11th FW from Taegu stationed there. Possibly this detachment existed only temporarily during the transfer. The F-4Ds were supplied to the 157st TFS of the 11th FW. These planes were officially only on loan to Korea, but the transfer was eventually made permanent. A few USAF F-4Ds were used by the RoKAF on short-term loan during the 1970s, but six were permanently supplied to the RoKAF in 1982 to make up for attrition, and a further 24 were delivered between December 1987 and April 1988. This last batch were equipped with Pave Spike laser designators. This final batch enabled the ROKAF to bring its two F-4D squadrons back to full strength and to equip a third. Ultimately, at least 70 ex-USAF F-4Ds were transferred to South Korea, the last being delivered in 1988."   ROKAF F-4Ds From Juchan's Kim's RoKAF Aircraft. Click on photo to enlarge "The RoKAF ordered 37 new-build F-4Es from McDonnell, receiving the first examples in 1978. The last of these planes, 78-0744, was the the 5068th and last Phantom to be built in the USA. These 37 planes were delivered under Operation Peace Pheasant II. They went to the 152nd and 153re TFS of the 17th TFW based at Chongju." "Subsequently, Korea has received an unspecified number of ex-USAF F-4Es. The US offered 24 surplus F-4Es in 1988 and 30 in 1989, but probably only the latter batch was actually delivered. It is uncertain exactly how many ex-USAF F-4Es are currently flying in Korea. Some Korean F-4Es are equipped to carry the AN/AVQ-26 Pave Tack laser designator pod. When the USAF's Korea-based 460th TRG disbanded in late 1990, 12 of their RF-4Cs were turned over to the RoKAF, along with a quantity of AN/ALQ-131 jamming pods. These were given to the 131st TRS of the 39th TRG based at Suwon." In the late-1970s the transfers of F-4Ds were being handled as the USAF transitioned to F-15s and Kunsan did support the ROKAF at Taegu with maintenance trainers. According to Bruce Ebert, then a crew chief with the 8th TFW from 1978-1980, "I do remember that some of our F-4s went to Taegu right around the time Kadena got F-15s. ... at that same time we gave/sold/transferred (or however that stuff works) some of our planes to the Koreans. But for whatever reason, some of the maint guys from Kunsan used to go to Taegu as maint trainers/advisors for the Koreans."  ROKAF F-4E 80387  ROKAF F-4E 80407  ROKAF F-4E 80744 F-5A/B FREEDOM FIGHTER: Starting in 1972, as a favor to the U.S., Korea transferred 36 F-5As and all its RF-5As to the Republic of Vietnam Air Force. To make up the difference, the US government agreed to supply Korea with F-4 Phantoms and later-model F-5Es. It would make sense to hold onto the F-86s until the F-5Es that were promised by the US arrived and then swap them out.  ROKAF F-5A 38399 From Juchan's Kim's RoKAF Aircraft. Click on photo to enlarge Fightertown says, "The Republic of Korea Air Force (Hankook Kong Goon) was one of the largest operators of the Freedom Fighter, receiving 88 F-5As, 30 F-5Bs, and 8 RF-5As. The first F-5s arrived in Korea in early April of 1965. 16 F-5As and four F-5Bs re-equipped the 105th Fighter Squadron of the 10th Fighter Wing based at Suwon, which achieved operational status on September 1, replacing F-86F Sabres. Another 14 F-5As were delivered to the 102nd FS, also based at Suwon."  ROKAF F-5B 21276 From Juchan's Kim's RoKAF Aircraft. Click on photo to enlarge "The RF-5As equipped a single squadron, and this unit continued to fly the RF-5A some time after the F-5A/F-5B had been replaced by the F-5E/F." "During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the F-5A and F-5B were replaced in front-line service with the RoKAF by later-model F-5Es and Fs. By the end of the 1980s, all of the F-5A and F-5B Freedom Fighters were out of RoKAF service. " "The RoKAF had originally planned to acquire the RF-4E for reconnaissance purposes, but this plan was abandoned and several F-5As were converted to RF-5A reconnaissance configuration with camera noses. These RF-5As were withdrawn from use in 1990 following the arrival of a second batch of RF-4Cs. This marked the last of Korea's early-model F-5s." 1980s: In 1985 President Chun Doo-hwan freed Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, and other political prisoners from a ban on political activity. In 1987 amidst growing cries of protest Chun Doo-hwan decided to step down and selected his choice for a successor as Roh Tae-woo, a former general. The National Assembly passed a constitutional amendment for direct election of the president. A significant change for the military was that it pledged to be "non-political". In other words, military personnel would be free to vote without coercion. Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung failed to agree on a united opposition candidate and faced Roh Tae-woo of the ruling Democratic Justice Party. 26 million voters went to the polls to elect Roh Tae-woo as a minority candidate against a badly divided opposition. Regardless, over 98 percent of the voters turned out to vote for the first civilian President since Syngman Rhee. The election was internationally monitored. (NOTE: Kim Young-sam would later claim that his Presidency was the first civilian government since Roh Tae-woo was from a military background.) On November 28, 1987 KAL 828 enroute to Seoul from the Persian Gulf was bombed by North Korean terrorists killing 115 people. One of the terrorists, Kim Hyun-hee, in her 1995 autobiography Tears of My Soul talked about her orders: "By destroying the plane we intend to increase the sense of chaos and ultimately to prevent the Olympic Games from taking place in Seoul. Other nations will not want to risk their athletes for fear that either their planes will be destroyed or that once in Seoul their athletes will not be safe from terrorist attacks. (NOTE: Kim Hyun-hee was extradited to Seoul, tried and sentenced to death. Her sentence was commuted and she was released.) In 1988, the official histories read "the Summer Olympics were held in Seoul without incident after the Republic of Korea refused to host them jointly in Pyongyang". In truth, the Seoul Olympic committee offered the ping-pong venue and another minor sport to Pyongyang realizing full well that North Korea would refuse. Pyongyang -- along with Cuba -- boycotted the Olympics and issued some very ominous threats that cast a cloud over the events. However, with the KAL 828 incident still fresh in their minds, some of the ROKAF units along with some 51st TFW aircraft were put on full-alert -- just in case. Luckily nothing occurred to interrupt the Olympic spirit. In 1988, the New York Times reported the possibility that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons. This would foreshadow the events of the 1990s where North Korea would push the Korea again to the brink of war. In the latter part of the 1980s, student activism peaked. At Osan AB, the front gate was closed regularly by students protesting the Kwangju Massacre and assigning blame to the U.S. warmongers. In addition the students blamed the U.S. for the separation of the two Koreas. These types of demonstrations were widely publicized around the world. For example, in 1988, the U.S. Information Service facility in Kwangju was repeatedly attacked by student activists. The agency was closed. At Osan Air Base, the Main Gate was often closed as student activists would show up with megaphones to make their statement. These demonstrations were more vocal than damaging. The area outside of Osan Air Base was starting to show the effects of the "Miracle of the Han" as some of the economic expansion started to appear in Kunsan. Planning work was being done to expand Pyeongtaek Harbor and there was an expansion as new companies moved into the city area to get away from the high costs of operating in Seoul. The opening of the Kyongbu highway through the Osan City toll gate provided easy transportation to Seoul. In the farm areas, most of the farm roads were being converted concrete roads. The bottleneck within Songtan was freed up by the construction of the Route 1 directly through Burak mountain by draining the old "Paradise Lake" and filling in the low-lying swampy areas. The first of the highrise apartments were built in 1980s along the reclaimed land along Route 1 to Pyeongtaek. Along with these high-rises many of the Songtan schools were expanded. This would mark the beginning of a building boom in the Songtan City. In the last half of the 1980s, the initial planning stages was underway for three national industrial complex construction projects -- Kunsan, Kunjang (Kunsan/Janghang) and the Agro-industrial Complex (in Seongsan/Seosu/Okku). No one could have envisioned how fast things in Kunsan would change after the ball was set in motion. The biggest change that affected the relationships between ROKAF and USAF was the change in the Americans perception of the average Korean. Two things had happened since the 1960s-1970s when Americans looked on Koreans as inferiors. First, the "third wave" of Korean immigration had taken place in the 1970s. These Korean emigrants were educated Koreans who bypassed the immigration quotas. By the 1980s, they had entered America's mainstream and no longer perceived as "THEM" foreigners (as differentiated from "US" Americans). Secondly, in the 1980s, there was a growth in Korea in the disposable incomes of workers. Though the government attempted to restrain the skyrocketing wages, they continued to grow in the form of expanded annual bonuses. In the blink of an eye, Korea had developed a middle class. It is important to point out that the amount of money one earns does not really determine if one is middle-class or not. If someone "thinks" that he is of the middle class, he "IS" middle class. Middle-class status is a state of mind. Once a person perceives himself as middle-class, he also assumes the values and goals of that class. He takes on the perceived characteristics of that class -- apartment, car, children in better schools, etc. Suddenly, Americans saw Koreans in a different light. They saw them no longer as inferiors as they had in the 1960s-1970s, but rather as equals. It is difficult to respect someone you consider inferior -- even one who considers you his friend. But it is easy to respect someone who you consider your equal -- even an enemy. The ROKAF and USAF in the 1980s saw each other as equals. F-5E TIGER II: At this point in time, we are uncertain exactly when the F-5Es arrived at Kunsan. We know that they were not at Kunsan in 1978, but they were present in 1987. As it would not be logical for the F-5A/B to be at Kunsan, we are assuming that Kunsan was equipped with the Korean-built F-5Es produced between 1982-1986. (NOTE: We speculate that the 111th FIS departed Kunsan when the F-86Fs left and was assigned to the 10th Fighter Wing at Suwon to transition to the F-5Es. When the construction of new bunkers to house the F-5Es was complete, the 111th moved back to its old home at Kunsan sometime between 1982-1986.) Kalani O'Sullivan remembers seeing three F-86s at Taegu in 1987 on a staff visit to the 11th TFW. Fightertown says, "The Republic of Korea Air Force (Hankook Kong Goon) is a major operator of the F-5, and flies all versions of the F-5 with the exception of the RF-5E." "The ROKAF received its first early-model F-5 Freedom Fighters in 1965, and operated a large number of F-5Aa, F-5Bs, and RF-5As. As a favor to the United States, in 1972, Korea transferred 36 F-5As and all its RF-5As to the Republic of Vietnam Air Force. To make up the difference, the US government agreed to supply Korea with F-4 Phantoms and later-model F-5Es. The first F-5Es entered Korean service in 1974, when 19 ex-Vietnamese Air Force aircraft were delivered. This laid the foundation for the acquisition of 126 new-build F-5Es and 20 F-5Fs. The first F-5Es were allocated to the 1st Fighter Wing (115th, 122nd, and 123rd Tactical Fighter Squadrons) based at Kwang Ju air base." "In 1980, South Korea signed an initial license production agreement for the manufacture of 48 F-5Es and 20 F-5Fs plus their engines. The Hanjin Corporation, utilizing some facilities owned by Korean Air Lines, assembled the last 68 of the 233 F-5E/Fs delivered to the ROKAF between 1974 and 1986. The General Electric J85 engines were assembled by Samsung (today known as Samsung Aerospace Industries). Work on the project began in 1981, and the first Korean built F-5 (an F-5F) flew for the first time on September 9, 1982. The Korean-built aircraft had all been delivered by 1986." Fightertown continued, "These F-5E/Fs replaced the previous force of F-5A/Bs, although some of these are retained for training. In ROKAF service, the F-5 is known as the Chegoong-ho (Skymaster). The South Korean government is very tight about security, and very little reliable information is available about serial numbers and unit allocations. However, it is believed that the F-5E equips the 115th, 122nd, and 123rd TFS of the 1st Fighter Wing based at Kwangju, the 102nd ,103rd, and 111th TFS of the 10th Fighter Wing based at Suwon, and the 201st and 203rd TFS of the 5th Fighter Wing (base unspecified). The Operational Conversion Unit for the 1st Fighter Wing retains some F-5A/Bs for training." (CORRECTION NOTE: The 111th TFS is part of the 38th Fighter Group at Kunsan Air Base.)
(From Juchan Kim's Homepage)  ROKAF F-5E 61650  ROKAF F-5F 10594 From Juchan's Kim's RoKAF Aircraft. Click on photo to enlarge ROKAF Transitions to New Aircraft According to International Air Force Directory; 1999-2000, South Korea's economic crisis is snapping at the heels of its ambitious defence plans, particularly its indigenous KTX-2 advanced trainer/light fighter being designed by Samsung Aerospace in concert with Lockhead Martin. The New ROKAFSince 1990, Korea has been pressing forward on its own after it experienced an initial shock when the U.S. announced that it wanted to downsize their forces by 25 percent under the Nunn-Warner initiative and Korea wanted to know why their "big brother" had changed so. The Koreans did not want the US forces to be downsized but was only able to retain them in Korea by a sizeable increase in their share of the support of these troops.This is when Korea looked at itself for the first time with new eyes as it entered the global marketplaces. It was one of the four dragons of Asia and it for the first time saw that it would have to stand on its own instead of being reliant totally on the U.S. for military hardware. At this point, it let contracts to its lagging shipyards to build its destroyers, LSTs, mine sweepers and submarines. It expanded its manufacture its own main battle tanks under license with the key item being technology transfer so that Korea could be self-sufficient in parts. It started on the building of the KF-16s as kits in order to gain experience in aircraft manufacturing and also gain much needed technology transfer. It opened research avenues into the design, procurement and manufacture of next generation helicopters and fighters. This was an aggressive program to upgrade its military forces hardware as well as gain the technology to build homegrown units to free itself from the U.S. stranglehold. Whether one likes it or not, Korea was pumping out destroyers, submarines, main battle tanks, fighter planes. However, by 2006, it was apparent that the ROK plans were to hit some major obstacles. The first was that the birth rate for Korea had dropped to 1.2 -- meaning that there were not enough births to sustain a viable society. As a result, the ROK forces were projected to be reduced in size. To make up for the manning decrease, the ROK military planned to upgrade their forces with high-tech weaponry. Here it met its second stumbling block -- money. The future of a shrinking population size would reduce the tax base, while the ROK was increasing expenditures for social programs and aid to the North. As such, there were projections for funding shortfalls that most certainly would hit the military first. In 2006, the orders for next-generation armaments were reduced in size. For example, the F-15K which was first anticipated to be a 200 aircraft order was reduced in 2005 to 40 aircraft with 20 more ordered (but not funded) in 2006. As to its reliance on its "big brother" -- that term has not been heard in the Korean press or on the mouth of any Korean for the past ten years. The U.S. was /never again be referred to as Korea's big brother. Korea no longer saw itself as subservient to the U.S. forces -- but rather as its equal ... and in most cases on their home turf, proved to be superior. By 2006, the majority of Koreans wanted the U.S. to leave Korea -- but qualified it with, "not just yet." This was because of the North Korean nuclear crisis was unsettled and the Roh Moo-hyun administration's rapproachement efforts had proved mixed results -- and some said "no returns." It still needed the U.S. Intelligence, high tech armaments and follow-on forces to balance the military equation. However, this did not mean that they liked the U.S. presence -- and some activists viewed the Americans as "occupiers." In 2006, after years of anti-Americanism, thwarted efforts to provide a unified front against North Korea, frustrations with the Roh Moo-hyun administration over US global positioning strategy (regional role in Northeast Asia), the US announced that it would no longer be a "providing patron" to the ROK military, but rather reshape the alliance so that it would become a "supporting partner." By June 2006, the message had become clear that the US-ROK alliance was in serious trouble. In June 2006, Gen Burwell B. Bell, USFK Commander, stated that the ROK needed thorough research and preparation for a new command structure if it is to take back wartime operational control of its forces from the US. Gen. Bell called for research into how land, sea and air forces should be composed in peace and war. In essence, the wheels were set in motion by the US to relieve themselves of CFC control, but the ROK was NOT prepared to accept the functions back. Most military analysts would agree with Gen Bell. Next Generation ROKAF AircraftKF-16C/D Falcon The operations for the fabrication of the KF-16 was set up in Sochon in 1990. The ROK initially attempted to negotiate technology transfer as a precondition for the contract, but the Samsung built the F-16C/Ds under license for the ROKAF with an order for 160 aircraft produced by 2000. An order for an additional 20 was signed to keep the production lines busy until the KTX-2 entered full production and bolstered the air force's inventory, while limiting the effects from delays to the F-X program.The reliability of P&W's engines has been questioned since 1997, which saw two separate crashes of KF-16s in August and September. In late February, another P&W-powered KF-16 fighter crashed when its engine caught fire after taking off from an air base. Dismissing reports that it recommended GE's engine for the F-15K based on price and reliability, Boeing said that it had no preference for a specific engine maker. The F-16s/KF-16s are in service with the 20 Tactical Fighter Wing - Sosan AB (120 TFS (KF-16C/D Block 52 LANTIRN); 123 TFS (KF-16C/D Block 52 LANTIRN)) and the 19 Tactical Fighter Wing - Chungwong AB (161 TFS (F-16C/D Block 32); 162 TFS (F-16C/D Block 32); 155 TFS (KF-16C/D Block 52 LANTIRN); 159 TFS (KF-16C/D Block 52 LANTIRN)) KT-1 Woongbee Basic Trainer KT-1 Basic Trainer The KT-1 basic trainer ("Woongbee') was acclaimed as Korea's first independently- developed aircraft at its unveiling in Nov 2000. The decision in 1988 to pursue technological research to expand the local aircraft manufacturing base and came after 10 years of intensive development. It was Korea's first aircraft designed entirely by computer. The ROKAF will take 85 KT-1s to replace T-41Ds and T-37s. (See KT-1 for more information) An armed version and its derivative as a light attack aircraft are under development and testing. This armed version can carry external fuel tanks, conventional weapons and is equipped with a mission computer, INS/GPS, Head-Up Display(HUD) and Multi-Function Display. 
The KT-1 basic trainers are equipped with 950 hp turbo-prop engines with a max airspeed of 648 kph and range of 1,700 kilometers. The aircraft was designed for basic use of the ROKAF measures 10.3 meters in length, 10.6 meters in width and 3.7 meters in height.
Golden Eagle KTX-2 Advanced Trainer/Fighter
"The concept for the KTX-2 was developed through joint studies by engineers in
Korea and at Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems, home of The Fighter
Enterprise, under guidance of the Republic of Korea Air Force." - Excerpt from
The Korean KTX-2 Advanced Trainer/Fighter.
In Jan 2004, Jane's Security News Briefs reported, "The Republic of Korea (RoK) Defense Procurement Agency has placed a production contract for 25 T-50 Golden Eagle supersonic advanced jet trainers with Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI)." In Feb 2004, GE Korea, the South Korean division of General Electric Co., said that the U.S. company signed a US$80 million deal with a South Korean jet manufacturer to co-produce jet engines. The deal calls for GE Aircraft Engines and Samsung Techwin Co. to produce 27 units of the F404-GE-102 engine for South Korea's T-50 advanced jet fighters. In July 2004, the T-50 was undergoing spin recovery tests to determine the limits of recovering from an out of control spin situation. One of the four test aircraft has been fitted with a spin recovery chute. By 2006, the ROK was attempting to market the T-50 on the international market in competition for sales in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. F-X Program with Boeing F-15K Selected amid Controversy: In recent years, Korea has started to ween itself away from American support. It has completed its KF-16 program run at Sochon -- though it has an extension for 20 more KF-16s to be built -- and is now looking towards the next generation fighter. The F-4 fleet is aging rapidly and the F-4D/E aircraft of the 11th TFW and 17th TFW must be replaced starting in 2004-2005. At the start, the FX envisioned a buy of 120 aircraft, but it was cut down to 40 aircraft. There were initially four foreign bidders vying for South Korea's 4.2 trillion-won ($3.23 billion) program to buy 40 fighters between 2005-2009, code-named the "F-X project." The initial competitors were Boeing's F-15, Russia's Su-35, French Dassault's Rafale and the European consortium Eurofighter's Typhoon. Boeing had the edge initially, though the European consortium offered some very lucrative incentives including technology transfers. In January 2002, a surprise twist occurred when the Koreans signed a MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) opening the way to possible assembling of Su-35s in Korea. Payments supposedly will partially offset by the defaulted $3.2 billion loan that Korea foolishly made to the Soviets in hopes of opening doors for its businesses.
Boeing F-15K
Boeing's F-15 and France's Rafale were the two strongest contenders. The U.S.
continued to speak of "interoperability" between the Koreans and U.S. forces as
the primary reason for choosing the U.S. F-15s -- not to mention that if the
bid didn't come through, Boeing's St. Louis plant for F-15s will close down.
"Identified only as a military officer, he accused the ministry of pressuring F-X evaluators to give favor to Boeing, saying that the ministry's sudden change of the evaluation rating standard is designed to set the scene for Boeing's winning the project. In February, the ministry ordered its F-X evaluation agencies to use the 60-100 band in terms of evaluation instead of 0 to 100, prompting speculation that it would give advantage to Boeing, which does not offer core technology items. Meanwhile, the 424-page document, drawn up by the Air Force, shows that the Rafale of French Dassault has scored the highest in every category of evaluation test, beating its competitor, the F-15K of Boeing Co. The classified document is one of two photocopies of the original, and insiders might have leaked it to the press with a purpose, sources said. The Air Force's evaluation rated Boeing's F-15K ``excellent'' in only two categories, such as reliability and support combat capability, according to the document. Boeing allegedly met only 30 percent of core technology requirements."
The whistleblower was later identified as ROKAF Lt. Col. Cho Joo-hyung who was
part of the initial evaluation team. He has been accused of bribery to the
amount of $8,400 (11 million won) for offering advice to one of Dassault's
Korean contract offices. Later, another Col. was arrested for leaking
information to the Dassault contractor, Comet. (NOTE: In Feb 2004, the ROK's highest court upheld the conviction of Cho Joo-hyung for bribery and leaking classified information in connection with the military's next-generation fighter procurement project in 2002. The Supreme Court sentenced Cho Joo-hyung, 51, to 18 months in jail with a three-year stay of the prison term.)
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