Namsan Village Choga-chip (1968) (Bill Bayless) (NOTE: This house is to the middle right in the 1968 photo below. This photo taken from top of hill with a telephoto lens. This is the same house as in the 1953 photo by Robert Spiwak.)

Namsan Village (1968) (Bill Bayless)

In the mid-1970s during the major reconstruction in Shinjang, a road was built to the Namsan Village area. From the Main Gate it proceeded straight until the base of Hill 170 but did not extend up the hill whose paths still remained dirt covered. In the mid-1980s (between 1980-1983), the road and rail overpass to the Doolittle gate was built and the back gate opened. In conjunction with this construction, a new road (Mokcheon Village Road) was cut from the new access road to the Namsan village road. This road passed the Bravo Gate and then proceeded to a Y-intersection where one turned left to the Main Gate.

In the late 1990s, the small road up the hill in the Namsan Village area was paved with concrete. In the 2000s, this road was expanded and new apartments built on the hill. By the mid-2000s, other apartment complexes were being added in anticipation of the influx of personnel when the Yongsan Garrison was scheduled to close.

View Train Track from Namsan Village (1965) (Harry Tezlaf)

Namsan Village outside gate (1968) (Bill Bayless)

(L) Namsan Village near Hill 170 (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) (R) Namsan Village looking toward Bomb Dump Hill (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan)

(L) Namsan Village looking towards Songtan Catholic Church (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) (R) Namsan Village Yongwasa Buddhist temple with Rental Village under construction above it (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan)

(L) Perimeter Wall near Main Gate (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) (R) 1960s house on slope before dimple area of Hill 170 near Bravo Gate (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan)

(L) Deserted 1960s house overgrown near perimeter (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan) (R) Deserted house 1970s house on hill overlooking Shinjang area (2005) (Kalani O'Sullivan)

"BLACK PANTHERS" 35th TFS

"FLYING FIENDS" 36th TFS

"HEADHUNTERS" 80th TFS

Nuclear Alert with Det 1, 347th TFW After Nov 66, the 6441st TFW departed Yokota AB for Tahkli RTAFB, Thailand taking some of the F-105s of the old 8th TFW with it. The nuclear commitment was then switched back to the 41st Air Division again in Nov 66 with the F-105s of the 35th, 36th and 80th TFS. The 35th and 36th TFS converted to F-4Cs in 1967, but the 80th did not convert until 1968 after it was assigned to the 347th TFW.

The 347th Tactical Fighter Wing was activated on 21 Dec 1967 and organized on 15 Jan 1968. The 34th, 35th, 36th and 80th were transferred to the 41st Air Division on 15 Nov 1966 and transitioned to the F-4C. (NOTE: The 34th TFS was assigned to the 41st Air Division at the same time as the other squadrons on 15 May 1966 but was attached to 388th Tactical Fighter Wing in Korat RTAFB, Thailand flying F-105s. When the units switched to the 347th TFW in 1968, it also switched but remained attached to the 388th TFW still with F-105s.)

The 35th and 36th had transitioned to the F-4C in 1967. The 80th were still flying the F-105s and did not transition to the F-4C until after it was assigned to the 347th TFW. All three squadrons pulled the nuclear alerts at Osan.

The 347th TFW aircraft were standing alert at Osan when the Pueblo Incident occurred on 23 Jan 1968, but were ineffective to respond simply because they were standing a nuclear alert and their aircraft were configured for this mission. At USS Pueblo Veterans Association site, Edward A. Lewis of Salem, New Hampshire was assigned to the 6314th Support Wing at Osan in Jan 1968. He stated, "In January, there were about a half dozen aircraft each at Osan and Kunsan. They were TDY from Japan and were "specially configured." It would have taken too long for them to be reconfigured in time to aid the Pueblo. As it was, they were downloaded and uploaded several times over the next day or so until other aircraft could be flown in from Japan."

The 36th TFS as part of the Det 1, 347th TFW operations pulled nuclear alerts in the Diamond area at Osan AB according to AFHRA records since 1968 (F-105 (1968) and F-4C (1968-1971)) on one-month rotations. The 36th FS history shows rotations to Osan AB for "1 Oct–24 Nov 1968, 18 Feb–24 Mar 1969, 27 May–1 Jul 1969, 9 Sep–18 Oct 1969, 27 Dec 1969–31 Jan 1970, 10 Apr–9 May 1970, 20 Jun–11 Jul 1970, 4 Sep–2 Oct 1970, 27 Nov–26 Dec 1970" out of Yokota AB, Japan. (Source: 347th Wing and AFHRA: 36th FS.)

The following is excerpted from the 80th TFS Headhunter Site for the sister squadron of the 36th TFS:

"Throughout the 1968 - 1971 time frame the primary mission of the 80th was to deploy on a rotating basis with the 35th and 36th TFS to Osan AB, Korea, providing a nuclear strike alert posture against targets in North Korea, China and the Soviet Union. The squadron maintained several aircraft on fifteen-minute nuclear alert full time, and engaged in a vigorous conventional weapons training program. On several occasions the squadron reacted to provocations by the North Koreans by putting crews and aircraft on heightened states of air defense and conventional weapons alert.

In 1970 all PACAF F-4C Wild Weasel aircrews were transferred to the 80th. At this time the squadron was composed almost exclusively of Wild Weasel aircrews. These crews trained in Wild Weasel tactics while maintaining all weapons qualifications and pulling nuclear alert as a primary commitment.

On 15 February 1971, shortly after its twenty-ninth anniversary, the squadron was deactivated in a general reduction and realignment of US military forces in Japan, Korea and Okinawa. Shortly after this order was issued it was announced that the squadron designation would be reactivated in Korea without equipment and personnel. At the time of deactivation the 80th personnel, including all the Wild Weasel crews, were transferred to the 35 TFS and later in the spring these crews and all the F-4C aircraft deployed to Kadena AB, Okinawa to form the 67 TFS under the 18th TFW. A year or so later, the F-4C Wild Weasels, trained by and formerly in the 80th TFS performed with distinction in combat during Linebacker II.

Assassination Attempt on Blue HouseIn 1967, infiltration and violent confrontation along the DMZ increased to almost daily incidents. On 7 Jan 1968 ROK President Park Chung-hee presided over an emergency national security council meeting at Wonju to coordinate a "pan-national" anti-communist effort. An advisory body was formed to advise the President.

On 21 Jan 1968, a band of 31 communist agents were intercepted in the northern suburbs of Seoul by the Korean National Police. In the ensuing fire-fight, 5 agents were killed and one captured. Six civilians were killed, five wounded. The suicide team was dispatched on 16 Jan to destroy the Presidential Mansion. A captured agent identified the men as officers from the 2,400 man, 124th Army Unit, 283d NK Army Group, being trained for guerilla operations in the South. In the end, a total of 34 soldiers, policemen and civilians killed by the attack.

The Blue House Raid: The officers on the detachment knew that their mission might well decide the outcome of the Second Korean Conflict. North Korean Lieutenant Kim Shin Jo, a participant captured during the mission, explained that killing the ROK president "would create political problems within the South Korean government and would agitate the South Korean people to fight with arms against their government and the American imperialists."4 With one stroke, the spearhead group of the 124th Army Unit might push the Republic of Korea into chaos and open the way for reunification from the north.

Late on the evening of 17 January, the team changed into ROK Army uniforms, donned dark coveralls, and penetrated the U.S. 2d Infantry Division sector. They cut several holes through the famous chain-link fence and slipped the entire group through, all within thirty meters of a manned U.S. position. They moved carefully for two days and nights through the American division's sector. The North Koreans even camped the second night on a forested hillside within a few kilometers of Camp Howze, the U.S. divisional headquarters.

The infiltration went smoothly until the afternoon of 19 January, when the team unexpectedly encountered four South Korean woodcutters. Seizing on an opportunity to impart a bit of indoctrination to these representatives of the ROK's "oppressed masses," the special operators harangued the terrified woodcutters about the coming insurrection and the glories of North Korean communism. At the same time, they apparently gave some inference as to the nature of their impending raid. After a few hours, the KPA officers released the woodsmen unharmed with a stern warning not to go to the police. The special forces leaders calculated that their assassination mission was within hours of completion and that the civilians would probably not go to the police immediately, nor would the authorities believe such a wild tale.

This proved to be a fatal mistake on their part. The South Koreans went to the police that very night. The local police chief believed them and notified his chain of command, which reacted promptly in accord with Presidential Instruction #18. By morning, the ROK's new counterguerrilla structure commenced operations. Unfortunately, the ROK leadership did not know the exact mission of the 124th Army Unit, so the police and the military tried to guard all important sites and at the same time search the approaches to Seoul. Even with massive resources employed, however, the ROKs could not cover everything. The stealthy raiders entered the city in two- and three-man cells on 20 January. They quickly became aware of the frenzied atmosphere in the capital. Eavesdropping on busy police and ROK Army radio nets, the KPA team's leaders plotted the identities and movements of their foes. Obviously, the original plan had to be abandoned. The 124th Army Unit would have to improvise. The North Koreans were well trained, and their commander saw a possible way to make use of the heightened alert. Maybe they could still complete their mission.

Upon rendezvous that night, the men removed their coveralls. This revealed their ROK Army uniforms, complete with the correct unit insignia of the local ROK 26th Infantry Division. The team then formed up and prepared to march the last mile to the Blue House, the ROK presidential residence, posing as ROK Army soldiers returning from a counterguerrilla patrol.

The platoon marched smartly toward the Blue House, passing several National Police and ROK Army units en route. A scant 800 meters from the Blue House, a police contingent finally halted the platoon and began to ask questions that exceeded anything the raiders had rehearsed. The nervous North Koreans fumbled their replies. One suspicious policeman drew his pistol; a commando shot him. A melee then ensued in which two 124th men died. The rest of the North Koreans scattered and began racing for the DMZ.

ROK soldiers, police, and American troops cooperated in the massive manhunt that followed over the next few days. Several sharp encounters flared as the desperate North Koreans clawed their way toward home. Three more operatives were pursued and killed in the Seoul area. Subsequently, aroused I Corps (Group) units-to include both U.S. divisions-participated in successful sweeps that killed twenty-three and captured one of the North Koreans. Only two of the thirty-one northerners could not be accounted for-and they were presumed dead.

The liquidation of the Blue House assault team, however, came at a horrendous price. Three Americans died and three fell wounded in attempts to block the escaping infiltrators. ROK casualties totaled sixty-eight killed and sixty-six wounded-mainly army and police but also about two dozen hapless civilians. This cost hardly served as a ringing endorsement for all the security improvements developed and instituted throughout 1967.

Much had gone very wrong. The 124th cut right through the heart of the most developed segment of the DMZ barrier system. The embarrassing inattentiveness of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division said little for American military performance and strained U.S.-ROK relations. Indeed, the key event in the whole process revolved around a chance meeting with unarmed timbermen-random players not really part of the United Nations Command's anti-infiltration scheme. Fortunately for President Park, the loyal civilians notified the police, and the local authorities acted with alacrity. Had the KPA killed the woodcutters, the infiltrators might well have killed Park too. Even in the teeth of an alerted Seoul, the enemy nevertheless closed to within 800 meters of Park's residence, stopped more by luck and individual initiative than by a grand design.

Much had also gone right. The citizenry responded, the police foiled the raid, and a hasty but thorough amalgam of quick-reaction forces relentlessly pursued the North Koreans. The 124th Army Unit had gotten in, but they could not get back out-a tribute to the DMZ enhancements. In terms of anti-infiltration methodology, the delay and neutralization efforts had gone pretty well. Detection, however, still relied too much on the thin crust of regular forces along the DMZ. Most of the casualties occurred during attempts to track down the intruders. The allies were still finding too many of their prey only while being ambushed.

Nobody had much of a chance to reflect on lessons learned. U.S. and ROK soldiers were still tracking down the remnants of the Blue House raiding detachment when, as Bonesteel recalled, "the damned Pueblo occurred two days later and that really put the fat in the fire."

(Source: Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1968 by Major Daniel P. Bolger)

USS Pueblo (AGER-2) is a Banner-class technical research ship (Navy intelligence) which was boarded and captured by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) on 23 January 1968 in what is known as the Pueblo incident or alternatively as the Pueblo crisis.

North Korea stated that she strayed into their territorial waters, but the United States maintains that the vessel was in international waters at the time of the incident. More recently, facts have come to light that indicate that USS Pueblo was captured by North Korea at the instigation of the Soviet Union, which was seeking a cryptographic machine onboard to match with a key provided to the Soviets by the spy John Anthony Walker.

USS Pueblo, still held by DPRK today, remains a commissioned vessel of the United States Navy. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il has specified that it be used to promote anti-Americanism.

Initial operations

The ship was launched at the Kewaunee Shipbuilding and Engineering Company in Kewaunee, Wisconsin, on 16 April 1944 as United States Army cargo ship FS-344. She was transferred to the United States Navy in 1966 and was renamed USS Pueblo. Initially, she served as a light cargo ship, AKL-44, but shortly after resuming service was converted to an intelligence gathering ship, or what is colloquially known as a spy ship, and re-designated AGER-2 on 13 May 1967. AGER (Auxiliary General Environmental Research) denoted a joint Naval and National Security Agency (NSA) program.

The USS Pueblo was an old commercial freighter that was converted in 1967 into a US Navy ship capable of gathering signal intelligence. Think of it as the US version of all the Russian fishing trawlers you hear about with antennas popping out all over the ship. After completing initial training on the US west coast in November 1967, the ship traveled to Japan in preparation for a future intelligence gathering mission. The USS Pueblo left the naval port at Sasebo, Japan on January 11, 1968 on it's first intelligence gathering mission. The mission was to gather intelligence on Russian ships traveling through the Tsushima Straits and intercept electronic transmissions from North Korea. (Source: Rokdrop.com.)

Activity and conflict near the DPRK

On January 5, 1968, Pueblo left for Sasebo, Japan. She left Sasebo on January 11 with specific orders to intercept and conduct surveillance of Soviet naval activity in the Tsushima Straits and to gather signal and electronic intelligence from the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea.

On January 21 a modified Soviet style sub chaser, SO-I class, passed within two miles (4 km) of the Pueblo. The next day, two DPRK fishing trawlers (Lenta Class) passed within 25 yards (23 m) of Pueblo. That day, a North Korean unit made an assassination attempt against South Korean leadership targets, but the crew of Pueblo was not informed.

The ship was under specific orders to not create an international incident and to stay out of North Korean territorial waters. However, an international incident had already occurred that didn't involve the USS Pueblo when 31 North Korean commandos infiltrated across the Korean Demilitarized Zone to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-hee. The commandos were intercepted just outside the grounds of the Korean presidents home and all but one of the commandos was killed in a furious gun battle with South Korean soldiers January 21, 1968. Tensions were running extremely high at the time that the USS Pueblo was drifting in international waters only 30 miles from the coast of North Korea. On January 22nd the Pueblo transmitted a situation report to Japan explaining that a North Korean sub chaser and two fishing trawlers had come near the Pueblo in the last two days. Despite the increased tensions and the fact that North Korean vessels were conducting reconnaissance of the Pueblo the US Navy leadership in Japan felt no need to inform the USS Pueblo of the assassination attempt and mounting tensions in the area or increase the ships security level. Throughout the mission the ships threat level was kept at minimum by the Navy. They did make sure to radio the latest NBA scores to the Pueblo though. As far as the crew of the USS Pueblo knew, it was business as usual on the fateful day of January 23, 1968. (Source: Rokdrop.com.)

According to the American account, the following day, January 23, Pueblo was approached by a sub chaser and her nationality was challenged, Pueblo responded by raising the U.S. flag. The DPRK vessel then ordered her to stand down or be fired upon. Pueblo attempted to maneuver away, but was considerably slower than the sub chaser. Additionally, three torpedo boats appeared on the horizon and then joined in the chase and subsequent attack. The attackers were soon joined by two MiG-21 fighters. A fourth torpedo boat and a second sub chaser appeared on the horizon a short time later. The ammunition on Pueblo was stored below decks, and her machine guns were wrapped in cold-weather tarpaulins. The machine guns were unmanned, and no attempt was made to man them.

U.S. Naval authorities and the crew of the Pueblo insist that before the capture, Pueblo was miles outside North Korean territorial waters; the Koreans claim the vessel was well within the DPRK's territory. The mission statement allowed her to approach within a nautical mile (1.852 km) of that limit. The DPRK, however, claims a 50-nautical-mile (90 km) sea boundary even though international standards are 12 nautical miles (22 km).

The North Korean vessels attempted to board Pueblo, but she maneuvered to prevent this and a sub chaser opened fire with a 55 mm cannon. The smaller vessels fired machine guns into Pueblo, which then signaled compliance and began destroying sensitive material. The volume of material on board was so great it made it impossible to destroy all of it.

Just after lunch on the 23rd, three North Korean sub chasers were spotted approaching the Pueblo. The North Koreans signaled towards the Pueblo to identify themselves. The commander of the Pueblo, CPT Lloyd Bucher ordered his men to raise the American flag. After the flag was raised the North Koreans signaled that they were going to board the ship. CPT Bucher signaled back that the ship was in international waters. The North Koreans once again signaled that they were going to board the ship. At this time CPT Bucher ordered the crew to maneuver the ship away from the North Koreans. The North Koreans immediately tried to cut off the escape of the ship and opened fire on the Pueblo with their 57mm machine guns. Additionally two MIG-21s buzzed the Pueblo for added emphasis of how serious the North Koreans were. CPT Bucher ordered his crew to begin destroying all classified information and equipment and a distress call was radioed to Japan. Japan radio back that they acknowledged the distress call and that a rescue team would be mounted to assist them.

The North Koreans stopped firing and signaled towards the Pueblo to follow them. CPT Bucher thinking that a rescue team was enroute decided to comply, but only traveled at 1/3 speed in order to buy the ship more time for the rescue to come. However, no rescue was to come. It is important to remember that the United States was heavily involved in the Vietnam War at the time and the naval brass in Japan did not want to be the ones responsible for starting a second major war at the time that could have had disastrous consequences for the United States. They decided before they did anything they would have to get approval from the President of the United States. Before the US President even received word about what happened the USS Pueblo had already been captured.(Source: Rokdrop.com.)

Radio contact with Naval Security Group in Kamiseya, Japan had been ongoing. Seventh Fleet command was aware of Pueblo's situation. Help was promised but never arrived. More than likely, no one wanted to take responsibility for an attack on North Korean vessels attacking Pueblo. By the time President Lyndon Johnson was awakened, Pueblo had been captured and any rescue attempt would be futile.

Pueblo followed the North Korean vessels as ordered, but then stopped immediately outside North Korean waters. She was again fired upon, and an U.S. sailor, Fireman Apprentice Duane Hodges, was killed. She was boarded by men from a torpedo boat and a sub chaser. Crew members had their hands tied, were blindfolded, beaten, and prodded with bayonets.

While the naval brass were waiting for word from Washington the crew of the Pueblo continued to try and delay the North Koreans. However, the North Koreans again strafed the ship with machine gun fire and this time killed crew member Duane Hodges. CPT Bucher knew the charade was over and allowed the North Koreans to board the ship. The North Koreans quickly tied up and beat the crew and then drove the ship towards the port city of Wonsan. (Source: Rokdrop.com.)

Once Pueblo was in North Korean territorial waters, she was boarded again, this time by high-ranking North Korean officials.

Aftermath

Pueblo was taken into port at Wonsan and the crew was moved twice to POW camps, with some of the crew reporting upon release that they were starved and regularly tortured while in North Korean custody.

At Wonsan the 82 crew members of the Pueblo were taken off the ship and continued to receive brutal beatings from their guards as North Korean civilians cheered the capture of the Americans. The last time Americans had been at Wonsan was in 1950 when US Marines evacuated from the port after the Chinese military attacked the US military to aid their North Korean allies during the Korean War. The US Navy battleships had bombarded and destroyed the city before leaving. Wonsan was probably not the best location for an American to arrive in North Korea for the first time. (Source: Rokdrop.com.)

This treatment was allegedly worsened when the North Koreans realized that crewmen were secretly giving them "the finger" in staged propaganda photos. (SITE NOTE: The group photos showed members of the crew with their middle fingers against their face in a pensive pose or with the middle finger across their wrist. That the North Koreans did not catch it prior to releasing the propaganda photos to the world is a wonder.)

Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, Commanding Officer of the Pueblo, was tortured and put through a mock firing squad in an effort to make him confess. Eventually the Koreans threatened to execute his men in front of him, and Bucher relented. None of the Koreans knew English well enough to write the confession, so they had Bucher write it himself. They verified the meaning of his words, but failed to catch the pun when he said "We paean the North Korean state. We paean their great leader Kim Il Sung" ("We paean" sounds almost identical to "we pee on").

Following an apology, a written admission by the U.S. that Pueblo had been spying, and an assurance that the U.S. would not spy in the future, the North Korean government decided to release the 82 remaining crew members. On 23 December 1968 the crew was taken by buses to the DMZ border with South Korea and ordered to walk south across the "Bridge of No Return". Exactly 11 months after being taken prisoner, the Captain led the long line of crewmen, followed at the end by the Executive Officer, Lieutenant Ed Murphy, the last man across the bridge. The U.S. then verbally retracted the ransom admission, apology, and assurance. Meanwhile the North Koreans blanked out the paragraph above the signature which read: "and this hereby receipts for 82 crewmen and one dead body". Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, Commanding Officer of the Pueblo and all the officers and crew appeared before a Navy Court of Inquiry. A court martial was recommended for the CO and the Officer in Charge of the Research Department, Lt Steve Harris. But the Secretary of the Navy, John H. Chafee, rejected the recommendation, stating, "They have suffered enough." Commander Bucher was never found guilty of any indiscretions and continued his Navy career until retirement.

There is some debate as to whether Commander Bucher acted within his orders. It was clearly stated in his orders that Bucher was not to spark an international incident. The Americans allege that North Korea attacked and boarded Pueblo in international waters — a clear act of war, whereas the DPRK has stated the Pueblo was in violation of the territorial limit. Historically, U.S. ships engaged in the collection of intelligence would often approach the very limits of territorial waters and sometimes cross over for brief periods of time. Such actions would often prompt the target country to mobilize parts of their military and thereby provide more intelligence for the U.S. ship to capture. The question is posed whether or not Bucher should have kept Pueblo in the area after the first encounter of a gunboat. Those familiar with the operations of the ship point out that such encounters were routine while on station, and it was expected that Bucher would remain on station in spite of such events. Further, Bucher was not informed of escalating tensions between North Korea and the South Korean-U.S. bloc in the days leading up to the capture of Pueblo. Bucher died in San Diego on January 28, 2004, partly as a result of complications from the injuries he suffered during his time as a prisoner of war in North Korea.

Pueblo is still held by North Korea. In October 1999, it was towed from Wonson on the east coast, around the Korean Peninsula, to Nampo on the west coast. This required moving the vessel through international waters. No attempt to recapture the Pueblo was made. This move was done just before the visit of U.S. presidential envoy James Kelly to the capital Pyongyang. The present location of Pueblo is in Pyongyang, as a reminder to tourists of the North Koreans' strength.

The Pueblo (AGER-2) was the third ship named after Pueblo, Colorado. It remains today a commissioned ship in the U.S. Navy. It is widely, but incorrectly, believed to be the first American ship to have been captured since the wars in Tripoli. On December 8, 1941, the river gunboat USS Wake (PR-3) was captured by Japanese forces while moored in Shanghai.

Tourist attraction

USS Pueblo is one of the primary tourist attractions in Pyongyang, North Korea, having attracted over 250,000 visitors since being moved to the Taedong River. The Pueblo is now anchored at the very spot where the General Sherman Incident is believed to have taken place in 1866. Often tourists are led through the ship by a guided tour. Participants will first enter the ship for a 15-minute video shown from a small TV set mounted in the ceiling, explaining how the North Koreans captured the ship, with contemporary film footage. All areas of the ship are shown, including the secret communications room full of encryption machines and radio equipment, still in a partly disassembled state after they were inspected by North Korean technicians. One highlight of the guided tour is a photo opportunity where visitors may have their pictures taken while holding the rear-mounted machine-gun.

Operation Red Fox
23 Jan 1968 - 05 Feb 1969

On 23 January 1968 North Korean patrol boats seized the USS Pueblo, a US Navy intelligence-gathering vessel, in the international waters of the East Sea off Wonsan. One USS Pueblo crewmember was killed in the boarding and 82 were taken POW and held captive. The seizure, which took place a mere two days after a commando intrusion into Seoul, shocked the whole world, and there arose strong public demand in the United States for firm retaliatory action against North Korea. North Korea made the utmost use of the Pueblo incident in its crafty propaganda, believing that the United States, deeply involved in the Vietnam War then, would not be able to use the force of arms on the Korean Peninsula.


Crew of the USS Pueblo
(Click on photo to enlarge)

Between 26-31 January 1968 several 9th Air Force active units deployed to the Pacific in response to North Korea's seizure of USS Pueblo: the 4TFW sent 72 F-4Ds, the 354TFW sent 18 F-100s, and the 363TRW sent six RB-66s. In addition, several 9AF-gained ARC units were recalled to active duty: the 113TFW and 107th, 113th, 121st and 177TFGs. The 334th and 335th Fighter Squadrons, equipped with F-4 Phantom II fighters, rushed to Korea to support operations during the Pueblo incident. The squadrons returned to Seymour Johnson in June 1968. F-106 fighters were briefly deployed to Osan AFB in Korea in March of 1968 to provide air defense during the Pueblo incident.

The 347th Tactical Fighter Wing was activated at Yokota Air Base, Japan on 15 January 1968 . The mission was to provide air defense for the islands of Japan. Units assigned were the 34th, the 35th, and the 36th Tactical Fighter Squadrons (TFS); and the 556th and the 6091st Reconnaissance Squadrons. Aircraft assigned were the F-105 Thunderchief, the F-4C Phantom II, the EB-57 Canberra, and the C-130 Hercules. Between 23 Ocobert 1968 and 05 February 1969 all of the 347th Tactical Fighter Wing's F-4Cs were deployed to bases in South Korea to participate in the US response to North Korea's abduction of the USS Pueblo.

Six Air Force Reserve units were mobilized in the wake of the Pueblo Incident. The 120th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Colorado Air National Guard was ordered into active Federal service as a result of the Pueblo incident, along with three other F-100 tactical fighter squadrons: 136th Tactical Fighter Squadron, New York, 174th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Iowa, 188th Tactical Fighter Squadron, New Mexico. The 120th Tactical Fighter Squadron entered combat in Vietnam on 5 May 1968, two days after its arrival, and completed its 1,000th mission 51 days later. During the Air National Guard's eleven months of service in Vietnam, the four F-100 squadrons flew 24,124 combat sorties and accumulated 38,614 combat flying hours.

The 445th Military Airlift Wing was activated after the Pueblo was seized, on January 26, 1968. The activation of the 445th found many support personnel stationed at eight different stateside bases and aircrews flying more missions to Europe, the Caribbean, South America, and Southeast Asia. The Wing remained activated in support of the Pueblo incident for seventeen months until released from active military service on June 2, 1969. For superior performance and dedication during the Pueblo incident, the 445th Military Airlift Wing received its first Air Force Outstanding Unit Award.



On 22 Mar 1968 the 318th Fighter Interceptor Squadron deployed to Osan AB from McChord AFB, WA. This marked the first time in history that Aerospace Defense Command F-106 fighter interceptors had flown to a critical overseas area, using in-flight refueling along with tactical air units.

318th FIS

318th FIS on Alert (1968) (USAF Photo)


318th FIS on Alert (1968) (USAF Photo)

318th FIS a/c 59-0059 on alert (Winter 67-68) (Don Ward)

The following is from Pueblo.org/v2f/association/guests0799.html>USS Pueblo Site: My name is Harry Larrabee Sr, TSgt, USAF (Ret) and I was stationed with the 6922 Security Wing (United States Air Force Security Service) at Clark Air Base. About 1.5 hours after the ship was taken over by the North Koreans another Air Force Sgt and myself boarded an Air Force C-124 with two I Vans (intercept vans with R390A recievers and PT-6 recorders) and two S-141 Shelters (something like a COMSEC Van equipped to monitor LF, HF, VHF and UHF) tool boxes over stuffed with parts to repair R-390s and PT-6s for Osan Air Base in the Republic of Korea.

Upon our arrival sometime after midnight we set up the two S-141 shelters and the I Vans were set up the next day inside the compound on Hill 179 which housed the 6922 SW Det 2. For the next 60 days we upgraded the existing operations by rebuilding the receivers, recorders and TTY machines while some of the operations was moved to the I Vans. Each van was made up from 30(?) foot trailers which had both antenna and power inputs. While this was going on the other Sgt and I also pulled 24 a day stand-by on the S-141 shelters is ensure thier operation. (SITE NOTE: In Aug 2007, Nelson Carpenter wrote to make a correction. He stated the unit was Det 1, 6922nd Security Wing. The 6922nd SW was headquarted at Clark AB. The Detachment later evolved into Skivvy Nine.)

I do remember about 3 days after our arrival at Osan a North Korean Mig-21 flew from the DMZ to Osan Air Base and buzzed the base runway twice before heading back north. I myself was in one of the S-141 Shelters at the time talking with the operator at the time, this operator was listening to the Mig talking back to its base. We didn't realize at the time the aircraft was so