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PYEONGTAEK AND KOREA MILITARY EVENTS

2006

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Acknowledgement: Special thanks to Jack Terwiel , Capt, USAF (Ret) of the Osan Retired Activities Office for photos of base (past and present). Special thanks to Jackie Turner , 7th AF Historian, and John Okonski , 51st FW Historian, for their assistance with photos and guidance on the history of Osan AB. Special thanks to Ms. Jin Dal-lae and other staff members of the Jisan-dong Ward Office for taking the time to research and provide historical materials on Songtan and Pyongtaek City. Thanks to the Shinjang 1-dong Ward Office for taking time to provide information on the roads in the area. Thanks to the Seojong-dong Ward Office staff and Chief of the ward Office, Choi Yun-su , for their help in providing maps to unravel the confusing boundary issues. Much of the information on Pyongtaek City and the Songtan area was extracted from the Pyeongtaek City History, Pyeongtaek Si Sa .



1970s View of Osan AB (USAF Photo)





CAMP HUMPHREYS HISTORY

Camp Humphreys (K-6) Camp Humphreys is 4 miles northeast of the city of Pyongtaek, and adjacent to the town of Anjung-ri. It is 1 mile northeast of Seojeong-ja and approximately 30 miles south of Osan City. Camp Humphreys is located 55 miles south of Seoul on Highway #1 and eight miles east-southeast of Highway #1 on highway #45. It is eight miles west of the Bay of Asan on the west coast of Korean peninsula.

The immediate area around Camp Humpreys is mostly agricultural and consists mainly of rice fields. There are some rolling hills in the vicinity, but for the most part the elevations are less than 150 feet. Urban areas are situated mostly to the northeast of the airfield.

The Ansong River passes 3 miles to the northwest of the camp. The Ansong River flows from the east to west toward the West Sea. About 12 miles west of Camp Humphreys the river widens and empties into the Asan Bay, near the now defunct Koon-ni Range.

Weather Although Dujeong-ri is next to Camp Humphreys, to the south, most of the haze and smoke that affects the airfield comes from Pyongtaek and Seojeong-ja. The numerous areas of water around Cp Humphreys has a significant effect on the local weather. The abundant moisture is responsible for most of the fog and stratus which occurs in the area. This is especially true from the spring through fall. Generally flat terrain from the south through west allows advection of fog and stratus from the river, bay, or West Sea. Even when no fog or stratus is over the Asan Bay/West Sea, the extra moisture advected with a light westerly wind at night can cause problems when combined with radiational cooling.

The Ansong River to the northwest can also contribute to the fog problem. The river is very close to the airfield and fog is advected in during periods of light northwesterly flow. When an easterly wind occurs during the night or early morning fog will normally not form, or will dissipate rapidly. Since the mountains the east help to produce a downslope wind this results in a drying and adiabatically warming effect in the low levels.

Another good moisture source for fog are the irrigated rice fields which contain standing water during the growing season (May-September). There are various seasonal effects from the local bodies of water. The West Sea provides moisture for snowshowers during the winter as cold air is advected over the relativel warmer West Sea. Although Cp Humphreys is somewhat protected, if the winds are from 260-300° then snowshowers will be advected over the airfield.

During the spring and summer land/sea breezes can set up during periods of weak pressure gradients. The Asan Bay can channel winds when the prevailing direction is 270-310°, this is especially common during the winter after a frontal passage. Thunderstorms occur mainly during spring through fall with most of the convective activity associated with the polar and monsoonal front. Airmass thunderstorms usually occur further inland over the mountains. (Source: Global Security.org for details of Camp.)

HISTORY

Japanese Colonial Period

Pyeongtaek Air Field was first constructed in 1939 by the Japanese Navy as a supply depot using conscriptees as coolie labor. The 20,000 "conscriptees" were taken from the local area and "housed" in prison camp-like conditions until the work was completed. At that time, the building up of the low-lying areas was done by coolie labor -- with the laborers hauling sand and dirt on their backs. Korean reports claim that the treatment of the laborers was inhumane, but during the World War II such actions as "conscripting" individuals for coal mines and other "national" industries was a common practice in both Korea and Japan. One report stated that workers were released one day a week to return home as most of the "conscriptees" were from the local area.

The airstrip was added during WWII for basic flight training by the Japanese and listed as Pyeongtaek Aerodrome. The airfield was sod with a 12" under layer of packed sand that was the standard for Japanese airfields of the day. After the war, the Pyeongtaek Aerodrome became listed on maps as Pyeontaek Aerodrome. (Source: Pyeongtaek Si Sa (History).) The airfield was plotted on the 1949 Aeronautical Map of the Kyonggi area.

During the Post-war US Occupation of Korea, the US Military Government allowed Pyeongtaek Air Field to fall into a state of disrepair. Korea had no Air Force to speak of besides Japanese aircraft hastily gathered at Kimpo Airfield in Seoul. There was no constabulary (forerunner to the ROK Army) established at the time. Pyeongtaek Air Field sank into oblivion and noted on the maps as an emergency landing strip.

After the Americans pulled out of Korea in 1949, the airfield remained abandoned -- and anything of value was stripped from the base. Remember that after World War II, the country was desparately poor and anything with metal was salvaged for resale. The airfield for all intensive purposes ceased to exist.


Korean War

Then in 1950, the North Koreans launched their attack on the South. At first the primary base for the USAF was at Suwon AB which had been built up during the Military Occupation years. Later in 1951 the directives were issued for the construction of Osan AB and construction started in Jun 1952. As a "minor" airfield, Pyeongtaek Air Field was given a K-number of "K-6" and the dirt strip was initially used by the 6147th Tactical Control Group as Forward FACs. The air field was rapidly upgraded by the 841st Engineering Aviation Battalion -- working also on Osan AB -- with perforated steel planking to create a landing strip for the T-6s. The unit relocated to the area from Taegu where it had pulled back to after the initial Chinese assault that expelled the allies from North Korea. Soon the FACs were joined by the Marine VMF-121 flying their AD Skyraiders specializing in close air support because the Skyraiders could operate off of undeveloped strips.

6147th TACGP (1951-1952) At the onset of the Korean War, the base was renamed K-6. The first to move into the area after the Chinese had been pushed back in 1951 was the 6147th Tactical Control Group (Mosquitoes Forward FAC) who flew out of there until they moved to Chunchong Airfield (later Camp Page).

Perhaps the most important element of Air Force close air support was the extensive use of airborne forward air controllers who flew 'low and slow' to search and mark targets for other aircraft to attack. Under the call sign "Mosquito," the airmen and T-6s of the 6147th Tactical Control Group provided forward air control for the duration of the war.

The Air Force continuously improved its methods of directing close air support in Korea. Advances in radar, communications, vehicles, aircraft and tactics all helped airmen to protect troops on the ground. The airmen of the Air Force, along with Navy and Marine aircrews, provided more air support to ground forces than ever before.

To meet an urgent need for close air support of ground forces in the Korean Conflict, North American manufactured LT-6s flew "Mosquito" missions spotting enemy troops and guns and marking them with smoke rockets for attack by fighter-bombers.

The 6147th Tactical Control Group, was comprised of three squadrons. The 6148th and 6149th TCS flew FAC missions, while the 6150th operated three-man Tactical Air Control Parties on the ground, using radio equipped Jeeps. These TACPs consisted of a Mosquito pilot, a radio technician, and a Jeep mechanic. New Mosquito FACs were required to serve 60 days with a TACP. TCG aircraft included C-47's as Airborne Command & Control Centers.

FAC T-6 "Texans" were LT-6G models, of which 97 were built. These differed from the trainer version in having additional radio equipment and four to six underwing racks for rocket launchers. Each rack held three 2.5" smoke rockets, or one 5" rocket.Two .30 caliber machine guns could be carried in pods under the wings, but these were generally not installed in order to improve performance, and because Senior Officers discouraged FACs from engaging targets themselves.

The "Mosquitoes" lost 33 men and 42 aircraft in Korean operations, flying 4,902 sorties. [Source: Squadron/Signal Publications, USAFAM]

Air Force veteran, former T-6 pilot and Mosquito Association member Orville Long spoke about his own combat missions in the highlighted aircraft. "The 6147th Tactical Control Group was the first and only Air Force unit to take the T-6 into combat and give the airplane its baptism of fire," Long said. "The T-6 proved its worth and the fact it could sustain considerable damage from ground fire, and still fly," he said. [Source: USAF Museum]

VMF-121 "Wolf Raiders" (1951-1957) The Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California, was designated as the permanent station for VMF-121 prior to the Korean War. On 16 April 1951, the squadron reported to Air FMFPac and was assigned Douglas AD "Skyraider" aircraft - one of the first two squadrons in the Marine Corps to be equipped with these heavyweight attack bombers. On 2 October 1951, VMA-121 departed El Toro and boarded the USS SITKOH BAY at San Diego. On 18 October 1951, the USS SITKOH BAY docked at Yokosuka. After a brief stay in Japan, on 22 October, the squadron was assigned to MAG-33 for duty at K3 airfield, Pohang, Korea. (Source: Forum.)

VMA-121 deployed to K-6 Airfield at Pyongtaek, ROK to conduct strike missions in support of infantry operations. The Squadron dropped more bomb tonnage during the Korean War than any other Navy or Marine Corps squadron, devastating enemy airfields, supply dumps, bridges, and railroad yards. During the Korean War the Squadron insignia depicted Al Capp's "WolfGirl" from the comic strip L'il Abner. The "Wolf Raiders" of VMA-121 remained in South Korea for several years after the cease-fire in 1953 finally returning to MCAS El Toro in 1957 and traded in its AD Skyraider aircraft for the F9F-8B. (Source: Wikipedia.) (SITE NOTE: VMF means Fighter and VMA means All-weather Fighter)

Anti-aircraft Defense Artillery (1951-1955) At the start of the war, the anti-aircraft defenses were handled by the segregated 76th Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) unit. The unit was integrated later in the war for the worst of reasons. The Army hierarchy condemned the actions of a colored unit that fled the battlefield and with a broad brush painted all black units as being unreliable. White NCOs were integrated into the units, though most of these individuals in working under black NCOs praised their leadership. The 76th AAA was one of the last units to be integrated.

The units used Quad 50s -- four 50 caliber machine guns mounted in tandem for low-level protection and 40mm Bofors for high-altitude attacks. When the unit departed Korea to be disbanded, their 50 caliber "Quad-50s" and 40mm Bofor anti-aircraft weapons were turned over to the ROK Army.

VMF-513 "Flying Nightmares" (1953-1955) The strip was upgraded with a longer runway to handle jet aircraft. In 1953, the Marine E-3As moved from Kunsan AB (K-8) to Pyeongtaek AB (K-6). VMF(N)-513 remained at Kunsan until June 6, 1953 when they moved to Pyongtaek (K-6). However, In the Jan 1996 Marine Night Fighter Association (MNFA) Newsletter, then Lt.Col. Dave Severance recounts that the move took place physically on June 1, 1953. He said, "Col. Hutchinson had promised the Wing Commander (1st MAW) that the squadron would make the move without any loss of missions. ... With the amount of radar gear to keep functioning and with two engines to maintain on the F3Ds, turn-around times were sometimes delayed for a day or more. To meet our commitment most of the aircraft flying missions the night of 31 May would have to land at K-6 and require little or no maintenance. The plan was for all the test benches to be unplugged at K-8 early on the morning of 1 June, move them by C-117s (I think that was the "flying boxcar" designation) and plug them into preconstructed electronic bays at K-6. Other transports were to move the remaining materiel and personnel.

Dave Severance continued, "VMF(N)-513 was commited to fly their all-weather missions whenever there was atleast one field in Korea predicted to be at or above minimum conditions for aircraft landings, and visibility was sufficient for takeoff at K-8. During my 9 months with the squadron, I recall only one night we could not fly...that was the night of 31 May. Every field in Korea was socked in with fog. That meant that on the morning of 1 June our planes were ready for a mission. All we had to do was "gently" lift them off for a short flight to K-6, "tenderly" set them down on the new runway...and we were ready to meet our commitments the night of 1 June. Thanks to a bad break in the weather we were assured of meeting Col. Hutchinson's promise not to miss a mission on the move to K-6!"

Ron Stout said, "the Air Force engineers hurriedly built us a nice new 10,000 foot concrete runway at K-6 (Pyongtaek). Unfortunately they laid the concrete in winter time so that in the spring frost heave caused a large hummock to appear at mid point. That hummock made our night take-offs a very exciting proposition since it could tear the nose wheel off our plane if we hit it in the three point position." A minor correction, the Air Force had no Engineers. The folks he speaks of were the 841st Engineer Aviation Battalion (SCARWAF). "SCARWAF" means "Special Category ARmy With Air Force." This unit would later replace the 808th EAB maintained the runway at Kunsan. (NOTE: In the Jan 1996 Marine Night Fighter Association (MNFA) Newsletter, then Lt.Col. Dave Severance remembers the new strip as 5,000 feet.)


(1954) (Ken Gates)



(1954) (Ken Gates)


From Ron's statement we see that the 841st EAB (out of Osan AB) had built this runway over the "winter" and they moved in April. This indicates that the move was NOT a snap decision -- but a planned move.
  • The Marines needed a longer runway for its F3D-2 Skyknight to support the new escort mission role for the B-29s. The Korean War was the first prolonged experience with the runway requirements of jet aircraft in war. The need for long, reinforced concrete runways resulted in inflexibility in air basing, with major impacts on air operations and requirements for aviation engineers to build and maintain suitable runways. It was difficult to share a runway with so many other units at Kunsan.
  • Second, the runway at Kunsan was in very poor condition -- and getting worse. The taxiways were described as "tar holes". It was one of the reasons that the 474th Fighter Bomber Wing (FBW) lost one of its squadrons to Taegu during the very confusing FEAF fighter-bomber reorganization plan of March 1953. In April 1953, the 474th FBW was redesignated as the 49th FBW and reduced to only two F-84E/G squadrons. Though the runway had just undergone major repairs in March-June 1952, it was deteriorating again by the spring of 1953. One F-84 aviator noted that Kunsan was the only place he had ever landed on HALF a runway as the graders & rollers were working on the other half.

  • Third, the move would cluster Marine shore-based aviation units together and ease maintenance and logistics problems. K-6 (Pyongtaek Airfield), at the present day site of Camp Humphreys, was originally constructed by the Japanese. However, the 931st Engineer Aviation Battalion (SCARWAF) repaired and built a new runway to accommodate the VMA-121, MAG-12 (flying the AD Skyraider) and the 6147th Tactical Control Group (flying the T-6 Mosquito as FACs). The VMA-121 "Green Knights" had been deployed to Pyongtaek (K-6) since mid-1951 to conduct strike missions in support of infantry operations. Flying missions as long as 14 hours, the AD Skyraider became the "Heavy Haulers" who could carry 9000 pounds of ordnance and drop them with high accuracy. The squadron dropped more bomb tonnage during the Korean War than any other Navy or Marine Corps squadron, devastating enemy airfields, supply dumps, bridges, and railroad yards. It would be sensible to cluster shore-based Marine units together.

  • Fourth, in 1953 the conflict had become one of trench warfare along a stalemated front. There was savage fighting for pieces of worthless real estate. In addition, details of the truce were being ironed out at Panumjon, but negotiations kept dragging on. By March 1953, the 28,000 Marines along the front expected another Chinese push and tensions ran high. Therefore, moving the night fighter unit closer to the front would seem reasonable. The Chinese push came in June 1953 causing the U.N. forces 50,000 casualties from the Chinese attacks -- mostly ROKs.

  • Fifth, a night jet interceptor was required nearer to the front. The F-94s had proven to be totally inadequate. The 319th FIS had been posted on strip alert at Suwon at the end of 1951 in case any enemy night intruders came South. Unfortunately the problem-plagued F-94A had a radar that you weren't sure if it would still be working a minute later. After the lackluster experiences with the F-94B in combat -- especially after the mid-air collision in 1953 proving the unreliability of its radar -- I would think that some planners might feel that it would be wiser to move the only other jet night fighter (the F3D-2) in the theater up closer to the front just in case enemy jet night intruders should come South. At the same time this would provide F4U-5Ns for the slower "Bedcheck Charlie". This line of reasoning is validated by the fact that four F4U-5N Corsairs from TF-77 were permanently shore-based at Kimpo under 5AF in June 1953 to counter slower prop-driven night intruder threats.
For these reasons, it would make sense to move the F3D-2 closer to the front lines for night air interdiction, ground support, backup for night CAS -- and its new mission of escorting the B-29s over the north. However, the growing friction between the Marines and the USAF leadership at Kunsan probably speeded up the process considerably. (Source: VMF-513)

Flying Operations at K-6: One story of flying at Pyongtaek is told in "Anecdotes of the VMF(N)-513, The Flying Nightmares", Flight Journal (June 1998), by Joe Rychetnik. Joe relates the tale of Frank Wilson, who recalled hunter-killer flights up and over the 38th Parallel, seeking out enemy aircraft that were violating the terms of the cease-fire. One night, a team flying from K-6 (Pyong Taek) discovered a radar target ahead, flew up close to the large bomber and dismissed it as a wandering B-29. To embarrass the Air Force pilot, the F3D pilot put on an airshow of barrel rolls and other antics in front of the plane before returning to base. On landing he learned there were no B-29s in the air, and he had missed a chance to down a Russian bomber! His C.O. glued to a desk, flipping aircraft ID cards for eight hours a day, in the dark, for two weeks." (NOTE: In the Jan 1996 Marine Night Fighter Association (MNFA) Newsletter the bomber is identified as a Yak and the C.O. who levied the punishment on the showboating pilot was Col. O'Connor.)

In Air Power, January 1986, it tells of the Navy coming to "assist" the Marines at Pyongtaek. The article says, "The most interesting cruise was that of Detachment 44N commanded by Jerry O'Rourke in 1953 aboard the USS Lake Champlain (CVA-39). The "Champ" left on an east coast deployment to Korea. As Jerry O'Rourke related. "We got there via Athens, Aden, Colombo, Ceylon and Yokosuka - one or two days in each port and lots and lots of steaming. We were immediately sent on the line two days after our arrival in Japan. On the line, we tried to do the night fighter job, but the bosses didn't want us to fy at night (ruined the movies on the hangar deck) and, besides, there were no Commie aircraft up at night anyway and that's the Air Force's job! So we tried day time combat air patrol, bombing reconnaissance, anything to justify our large size and peculiar catapult characteristics."

The article continues, "I had heard about VMF(N)-513 being ashore at K-6 ( Pyongtaek) and once I began to understand that the Navy really didn't want us aboard. I pushed and pushed to be sent ashore with the Marines. We finally were sent the orders and started flying combat with 513 the next night."

Life at K-6: Ron Stout related an anecdote about the Air Force at K-6. He said, "The Air Force had an officers club at K-6 that our pilots regarded as much more plush than their own which was abuilding at the time and pretty raw. So when the Air Force lads extended an invitation for our squadron officers to join them in a get-together they accepted with alacrity. A few days later our C.O. received a letter from the AF engineers C.O. accusing our folks of not being true officers and gentleman because after their visit several decorative items and some paintings were discovered to be missing from the AF club."

He added, "I don't know what our C.O. 's response to this vile canard was, but our officers club looked a lot less raw and undecorated after the soiree with the addition of several new decor items." To the Marines it was a "tradition" to "capture" a prize from another Service. The USAF considered it "thievery."

Before you say, "tsk...tsk" about this theft. Listen to what Paul Noel, Col, USMC (Ret) said about this story. "A major sin is to steal from another Marine or Marine unit --- although the latter has eased when aviation squadrons 'confiscate' momentoes from sister squadrons. To steal from another Armed Service, especially in a forward area, is a Marine avocation!!!!! Extra points if it is Navy!!!!" ... One time at K-6, I and several other officers went with the Group XO in his sedan and made off with a framed picture, probably a naked babe, from the local K-6 USAF unit O Club. This was more like a retaliation fraternity prank, although the Air Force folks did not see it that way." He continued, "The key is Marines do not steal from anyone for themselves personally -- but OK for the good of the unit --- as long as it is not from another Marine unit. Some where there would be a brother being hung out to dry. This is tradition and ancient history, but you will not find it written in an official document. Today? I hope the same."

Ron Stout then continued on about the vehicle situation at K-6. "Marines were always envious of the Air Force's seemingly endless supply of convenience items,not the least of which were what seemed to be a jeep for every airman who wanted one. Our squadron had a jeep for the C.O. and one for the exec or ops officer and both were WW II types that were badly worn."

He went on, "After we moved to K-6 and observed the AF's impressive supply of vehicles, there suddenly appeared freshly painted jeeps that happened to bear the serial number's of squadron personnel on the hood in place of the usual inventory number." He added, "Squadron lore had it that when we turned in our WW II vehicles for replacement by the Korean era vehicles. 513 had 15 jeeps in inventory, one weapons carrier (authorized), and four 6 X 6's as opposed to the T.O. authorized 2."

Paul Noel commented about this war-time practice of "boring" jeeps, "Stealing jeeps got so bad (short term) that driver would remove the rotor from the distributor when the jeep was parked. Not to be snookered, we carried a rotor in our pocket, took the jeep, and eventually abandoned it (after removing the rotor for future use.) I had a maintenance group that set a record of 30 min flat to 'liberate' a jeep trailer from the Navy, repaint in MarCorps green, stencil on new numbers, and have back up paper work."

Ron added finally, "The ongoing generosity of the Air Force lads who ran our base was greatly appreciated and made our lives much more comfortable. I hope it didn't inconvenience them too much." We're quite sure that the Air Force officers who "lost" their vehicles were glad to oblige. Right...and the tooth fairy wears combat boots.

Ron also commented on the how the NCO and Officers Clubs were built. He said, "In the same vein as the borrowing habits of the Marines was the "bargaining" within and between ranks. In some instances officers and enlisted troops would want a favor from one another that didn't fall within the definition of "military" so that whatever was wanted from the other had to be negotiated as a favor. When 513 moved to K-6 the enlisted and officers clubs were at mainside, an inconvenient walk at night when we needed to relax from the rigors of the day or after night missions." He added, "The officers and enlisted troops of 513 secured lumber and whatnot to build an officers club and an E club but the officers didn't have enough manpower to get their club built in a hurry. Negotiations were begun and eventually agreeement was reached on terms favorable to each side." He continued, "The enlisted troops found out that a Captain (pilot) was an expert stone mason in civilian life.In an exchange the captain would build a fine stone fireplace for the enlisted mens club and "volunteer" enlisted troops would show up to help build the officers club. Today,if anyone at Camp Humphreys wonders how that shack that served as the peons club happened to have such a magnificient stone fireplace, they can thank a Marine captain who's name escapes me and the two poker losers who feverishly pitched mud for him."

He added, "As an aside. One of the smartest moves the enlisted men of 513 made was getting our premiere poker player Corporal Bill Knoerr appointed to co-manage the "E" club. Due to an earlier indescretion Knoerr had to live on $7 a month pay. However, his poker skills were such that he was able to supplement his pay and live a normal life. His poker skills also translated into a bargaining ability that allowed our club to be both comfortable and prosperous during Knoerrs tenure as co-manager with Roy "Moose" Simolin." Ron went on, "After watching my friend Knoerr in action,however, I vowed never to play poker against him in my life.I've kept that promise all these years. Knoerr parlayed his skills into a job at Eastern Air Lines from where he retired as an L-1011 senior captain."

They remained at Pyongtaek (K-6) until March 1955 when the unit moved to Atsugi NAS, Japan. (Source: VMF-513)


Camp Humphreys (1960-1980)

After the Korean War, the camp reverted to a backwater support camp where the biggest danger was described as boredom. In 1962, the airfield was re-named Camp Humphreys, in honor of CWO Benjamin K. Humphreys, of the 6th Transportation Company (Light Helicopter), who died in a helicopter accident near Osan-Ni, Kyung-Gi Do, Korea. Prior to this, K-6 was considered a "sub-post" for units in Seoul.

The Humphreys District Command was activated in 1964 as a separate installation command of the Eighth US Army. Later it was designated as the 23rd Direct Support Group which provided all direct support; supply and maintenance; storage of all conventional ammunition in Korea; AG publications and training aides; and operated the Eighth Army Milk Plant. In 1974, with the activation of the 19th Support Brigade, this was designated as US Army Garrison, Camp Humphreys.

The 177th USASA Operations Company (successor to the 330th ASA CO) was originally located at Mia-ri at the north edge of Seoul. They moved in 1960 to K6 (later Camp Humphreys) near Pyong-tek (close to Osan AF Base). The 177th was the largest single ASA operations company in Korea. The antenna field at K6 was probably some four acres in size. In the early sixties everyone lived in quonset huts and operated out of tactical vans backed up to the operations building The OPS building was expanded into an H configuration in early 1965. They were on one side of the base by themselves, away from other Army units at Humphreys. By the late sixties the men were better housed in five two-story concrete block buildings, with two men to a room. Such luxury! They shared a mess hall with the Signal Corps and had a barber shop and a small PX. There was a library, movie theatre, USO and a large PX on the other side of Camp Humphreys. The two remote DF detachments on P-Y-do off the west coast and at Socho-ri on the east coast remained operational, as did the CRITICOM relay station. (Source: Clark Page: NASAA Site.) (SEE NSAA: 177th ASA for photos of the camp in late 1950s-1960s)


177th Co. Area (R) 177th Operations Building (1963-64) (NASAA Site)



177th Operations Building (1963-64) (NASAA Site)



(L) 177th Area (R) PFC Charlie Simpson in front of crafts shop (1961) (Charlie Simpson)



K6 Lower Four Enlisted Men's Club (1961) (NASAA)



Main Gate of K-6 (1961) (NASAA)



(L) Ken Regan and Charles O'Connell in front of 3rd Platoon Quonset (R) Cinderblock Replacement Barracks for Quonsets (1962) (Charles O'Connell)



Camp Library (1962) (Charles O'Connell)



Movie Theater with Main PX to left (1962) (Charles O'Connell)


Cold War: Air Defense Artillery During the Cold War, the weaponry of the air defense artillery changed to missiles with the Nike-Hercules aimed at high-altitude bombers, while the Hawk batteries covered the major camps/bases for low-altitude aircraft. (SITE NOTE: Though the US will not admit it, there were nukes associated with the Nike-Hercules units in Korea. The intent was to have an airburst that would knock out anything in the vicinity -- but no one mentions what would happen to the folks sitting under such an airburst.) The Hawk batteries were strictly low-altitude anti-aircraft. When the Nike-Hercules was deployed to Korea by the Army, the 12th Ord Det and the 16th Ord Det (GM) (DS) were located at Camp Humphreys and supported the 4/44th ADA (NIKE) and 6/44th ADA (HAWK) Nike-Hercules and Hawk ordnance units. The 16th Ordnance Detachment (GM) (DS) was at Camp Humphreys from 1960-1965.

Charles Rudicil stated from 1964 - 1965 "the 12th Ord Det (GM)(GS) was located in Camp Ames and provided backup to the DS Detachments. Mostly they did the missile rebuild program that was in effect at the time. Actually, though I was assigned to the 12th, I never spent a day with it. When I arrived in Korea, there were 23 Missile Support Detachments and 5 conventional automotive support companies assigned to the 4th Ord Bn.

He continued, "The CO, LTC Mearns, set up a "Guided Missile Office, South" at Camp Humphreys, staffed it with a Captain, a WO, and a MSG, and placed the 5 southern missile detachments under the operational control of the GMO, South. Guess who the WO was? The Captain, later Major, was Gerald Harber and the MSG was Jerry Brown. The 12th Ord Det, the 16th Ord Det (GM)(DS) at Camp Humphreys, and the 30th Ord Det (GM)(DS) at Sea Range were the Nike units, supporting the 4/44th ADA (NIKE) and the 6/44th ADA (HAWK). It was not a very good arrangement but the best they could do with the large number of units assigned to the 4th Ord Bn.

He went on, "About halfway through my tour, 8th Army started playing with the COSTAR TO&Es and formed a Guided Missile Company, North (Provisional) and a Guided Missile Company, South (Provisional). All of the NIKE detachments, to include the 226th General Support Detachment at ASCOM Depot, were assigned as platoons in the South Missile Company, which was assigned to the 55th Trans Bn (AVN). I was assigned to the Operations Office (the old GMO, South) of the South Missile Company and we were given the job of making the COSTAR concept work. We were still messing with it when I departed Korea, and when the ADA won the battle with Ordnance over control of support detachments, the 4/44th DSP was formed from the remnants of the South Missile Company. (Source: The 12th Ord Det, the 16th Ord Det (GM)(DS) at Camp Humphreys.)
The 30th Ordnance Company (GMGS) Nike Platoon was at both Camp Ames and Camp Humphrey from 1968-1977. Company Headquarters was originally at Niblo Barracks in Seoul. Moved to Camp Humphrey in middle of 1973. The Nike-Hercules assets were turned over to the ROK Army in 1977-1978 and the unit disbanded. (Source: Nike Ordnance.com .)

The Direct Support Platoon, 4th Battalion, 44th ADA (later changed to 2nd Battalion, 44th ADA) was at Camp Humphreys from 1968-1977.

Racial Tension Violence at Camp Humphreys Racial tension between blacks and whites became a problem -- as it was throughout America and the military worldwide. On Martin Luther King's birthday, 300 soldiers marched peacefully in Camp Stanley -- but the point was that the blacks felt that they were being denied promotion and equal treatment. Racial incidents increased. In June a riot in Itaewon left 13 injured and area was placed off-limits.

Camp Humphreys had a race riot in April. On 13 Apr 1971 after three days of racial incidents in Anjong-ni village outside of Camp Humphreys end as the village was temporarily put off limits. Several US soldiers were arrested on charges of arson and larceny. (Source: The US Military Experience in Korea 1871-1982, p148, Command Historian's Office, USFK/EUSA)

Offbase, Korea had a history of problems between minority soldiers and Koreans in the past. The tensions between black and white servicemen increased, spread through various camp areas in Korea, and exploded on the weekend of July 9, 1971, in the village of Anjong-ni. The village of Anjong-ni outside Camp Humphreys was placed off-limits after the riot between Americans and ROK citizens. Ironically, 400 bar hostess protested the off-limits as they could not make a living. Anjong-ni was placed back on limits in August 1971.
(Source: 8th Army Chronology)

(SITE NOTE: It should be noted that during this time period, the US draft was still in effect. The blacks in the Air Force were all volunteers and of the upper percentiles in intelligence tests and high school graduates as a minimum -- with many having a few years of college. These individuals were not normally prone to violence. However, during the Vietnam War years, blacks in the US Army were amongst the lower intelligence percentiles and education levels. They were drawn mostly from lower-income, inner-city blacks who grew up feeling the weight of injustice in American society. Many had minor criminal records that were waived for entrance into the Army. As a general rule, blacks in the US Army were more prone to violent behavior than the USAF blacks -- and also more vocal in protests over perceived injustices to blacks. For example, from 22 to 25 May 71 at Travis AFB as a result of racial discrimination and broad anti war sentiment, airmen wage a 3 day uprising . Fighting off MPs and local police reinforcements, they effectively shut down operations at the base -- including fire damage to barracks structures. (Source: Chronology Riots.)

The 8th Army historical records indicate the unrest amongst the black soldiers throughout Korea over perceived inequities in the society -- and US Army as a whole. Though blacks in the USAF did reflect the many of the same ideas as the general black populace of America, they were more likely to "blend" and attempt to work racial Equal Opportunity and Treatment (EOT) problems through the "system."

Racial violence broke out in Sept. with 60 Army and USAF personnel involved in a brawl near Osan AB. Four were hospitalized, while 31 were injured including 4 Koreans. Korus Magazine published for the first time in 1973. (SITE NOTE: According to the Pyeongtaek History, on 12 Nov 1973, a free-for-all broke out involving approximately 50 Americans. One Ya Jae-young was hurt and required treatment. No other details. Outcome of this incident unknown. (Source: Pyeongtaek City History CD, "Pyeongtaek Si Sa.") We believe the 12 Nov 73 date is actually 12 Oct 73 as there were no other racial incidents in the 8th Army Chronology (1973). We believe that Ya Jae-young was the cab driver in the Jwa-dong area that was dragged from his cab and robbed by blacks that started the incident.)

After the racial riots of 1973, the DoD instituted a policy dealing with "racial awareness." The USFK policy instituted "Black History Week" along with the observance of Martin Luther King's birthday. All soldiers arriving in country were given training on the racial problems as part of its "awareness" training.

Mike Barth's Recollections of Life 1973-1975 Mike Barth stated, "I was at Field Station Korea from November 1973 to December 1975 and worked as a traffic analyst (TA) and later as a traffic ident (TI) guy on trick with the Hogs. The TI work was definitely the more interesting." At that time, the camp was still referred to as "Pyeongtaek Air Field Station" (K-6) The following is excerpted from his webpage at Mike Barth's webpage: Field Station on the The National Army Security Agency Association (NASAA) website. (SITE NOTE: Awaiting permission for use of the following materials and photos. Request sent on 22 Aug 2006.) Mike Barth wrote:

If I remember correctly, there were ten (count 'em, ten) bars in the village of Anjong-ni outside of Camp Humphreys. However, the passage of time has made my memory cloudy. As soon as I get through the pictures, I'll flesh out this list. My feeble memory recalls only:

  • Duffy's Tavern
  • T Club
  • Top Hat
  • Maxim Hotel
  • U.N. Club
  • Paradise Club
  • Seven Club
  • The Galaxy (thanks, David!)
  • The Peacock (again, thanks, David!)
  • What was the 10th club? I swear there were ten of them.


And who could forget the other landmarks, like the Conscientious Brown Door and the OB Bar?

Duffy's Tavern was the main hangout during my time, although there would be temporary allegiances to other bars for periods of time. It was still Duffy's that held our loyalty, though. On warm summer days, I remember sitting outside on the terrace drinking OB and listening to "Alice's Restaurant" and other classics along with dozens of familiar faces from FSK. There was also SAC-7, the Saturday Afternoon Club at 7 pm, where it got really drunk out. I had a pretty good time there, as I recall. And Duffy's was always a good place to hold the after-mids party, in the days when we still worked three rotating tricks.

During one of those memorable after-mids trick parties, we made up a batch of Purple Jesus. It was a combination of soju (clear liquor, taste similar to corn whiskey); OB beer (which still makes me nauseous to this day); makli (looks like milk of magnesia and is a byproduct of making rice wine); and Korean champaigne (sickeningly sweet, like Koolaid with bubbles and an alcohol content). That stuff got poured together into a chamber pot (a 'binjo' pot) and was passed from hand to hand around the table for everyone to take a drink. The rule was, if anyone put the pot down or if anyone puked, we would fill it up again. It was pretty awful and alarmingly potent. The party deteriorated after that, but a good time was had by all. After being up on Mids all night, the rest of the day would turn into a real haze as we drank crap like Purple Jesus and got into all other sorts of trouble. Those were the best parties, though. We would get between 20 and 40 guys participating, depending on the timing (if the end-of-mids fell on a weekend, we would get a load of day beggars to come play with us, in addition to the usual trick trash). I must have gone to a dozen or two dozen memorable after-mids parties, but I don't remember much. That is, I don't remember much that I'm going to tell on myself. However, during one of these parties at Duffy's Tavern, the DJ put on Barry Sadler's "Ballad of the Green Berets," to which I did an impromptu striptease act. (It must have been fate, because five years later I was at Fort Bragg, paying for my sins while attending the SF Qualification Course. But that is a different story module than my Korea days). Here is a picture of an after-mids party -- click here to see a picture of me "gettin' naked" at one of those parties. The pictures of me "gotten naked" are omitted in the interest of decorum.

When LTC Toomey took over command in 1974, we were renamed "Toomey's Tigers" and the next thing you know, there was a tiger motif popping up all over the station. There was a giant tiger statue erected (click here to see a picture) and the messhall began featuring "Super Tiger Burgers" on the menu daily. A Super Tiger Burger was basically a big hamburger with secret sauce (ketchup, mayonaise and pickle juice), but they were pretty good. That tiger statue was pretty lame, though. I was there when FSK went coed. We got our first contingent of WACs in 1974, which sort of changed things around as well. We had never sent anyone around to take the EMHO report before, but on the first day that a female came to work for the operations officer, she was sent around to collect one from the NCOs on duty. Jack Keister, who was the head TA in the Black Dragon shop, drew a .45 from the watch office and accompanied her on her rounds. The EMHO report, pronounced EEEM-OHH, was the Early Morning Hard On report. What a classic -- although it only worked once. It was sexual harrassment, but that wasn't against the rules back then, although in fairness it should have been. One good thing about being there during the transition is that I got to experience going from the ultra-macho, guys-only atmosphere to the mixed gender atmosphere. I did learn that women could do pretty much anything I could do, include pee standing up if they were of a mind to, and that was a pretty healthy lesson to learn for me at such a tender age.

Another interesting thing that started up during my tenure was the outdoor rock concerts. Essentially, these Korean bands would set up and play outdoors a la Woodstock. Like Woodstock, it also rained every damn time, but nobody really cared. We would sit out in the sun (while it lasted) drinking Boone's Farm wine and anything else we could get a hold of, and I don't really remember hearing any of the music. I do remember waking up covered with mud, soaked to the skin, and trudging back to the ASA compound with the Mother of All Hangovers and my good buddy Larry Schultz at my side.

Other happy memories include:

  • Catching cabs up to Osan Air Base to raise hell in their village (one does not always poop in one's own nest). Moose, are you out there? Remember stealing that radio and getting beaten on with stove tools? And Tom Sutherland, I remember you knocking the door off of the hinges of the OB Bar (or something similar) up in Osan and triggering a near-riot at about 10 minutes to curfew. What a wild ride back to Camp Humphreys!
  • Riding the kimchee bus out to Pyong-taek, then riding the dog up to Seoul to drink icy-ass-cold Budweiser at the Naija Hotel in those tall, chilled Pilsener glasses. (click here to see the Naija Hotel entrance. Sorry -- never took any pictures of the Pilsener glasses).
  • I remember Makli houses (off-limits, but the chow was good). I was sitting in one with my buddy Tucker (Harley Farrow, one of the true sons of Kentucky) one evening after another one of his escapades, when in walked four MPs. This makli house had two tables and a dirt floor and was in an alley off of an alley, so I was surprised to see the gendermes at our table all of a sudden. The head MP said, "Don't you know you aren't supposed to be in a makli house?" and I replied "Is this a makli house? I thought it was a restaurant. I'm kind of new here." If you look at some of the people pictures in the accompanying pages, you'll see I looked all of 13 years old and so people tended to believe me when I expressed wide-eyed innocense. Anyway, the MPs said "Well, you guys have already ordered your meal, so we'll just let it go this time, but don't let us catch you in here again" and then started to leave, when one of them turned real quick and said "Where did you get that blood on your shirt?" Looking closer, he saw there was blood on the side of my head, too. I said (honestly, for once) "Damned if I know. Am I bleeding? What's going on?" Turns out there was a little gash on the side of my head, but to this day I have no idea of where or why it happened, other that whenever I was out and about with Tucker, something always seemed to happen (mostly to me). No harm, no foul, though. They left us to our meal.
  • MPs always seemed to get a bad rap, but they were always pretty good to me. I did enough evil to warrant being put under the jail, but I just seemed to get away with everything. I think it was my birthday when I got exceptionally liqoured up at the NCO club and had Becky, one of the new WACs, paint my fingernails for me. I didn't even slow down and just kept partying my ass off. About 4 in the morning, someone shook me awake. I was in the MP guard shack that you had to go through to get out into the village after showing your pass (although if you flashed it quick enough, a meal card would accomplish the same thing as a pass). There was a curfew from midnight to 4 am, so this was right at the end of the curfew. The MP was shaking me awake from a sound sleep on the counter of the guard shack, where I had apparently gone to sleep sometime during the curfew hours. The MP said I could go home now (assuming I was heading into the village). He said that they were going to lock me up in the drunk tank, but they were just burning with curiousity about the painted fingernails on my left hand (a nice shade of purple -- UGGGHHH!) and wanted to know what the story was. They figured if they sent me over to the MP office/jail, they'd never find out. I was still out of it, but when they asked me about the fingernail polish, I just stared at my left hand (the one with the paint) and shrugged my shoulders. I then did an about face and headed back to the ASA compound and my warm bunk. Becky explained about the fingernail polish later that day, or otherwise I would have never known where it came from.
  • Christmas in Korea - twice. But as long as the village was open for business, Christmas was pretty much like any other day.
  • I remember mess hall movies that cost either 50 cents, 75 cents, or a dollar, depending on whether it was any good or not. I saw some pretty good movies for 50 cents and 75 cents, but the dollar movies just weren't the same. One of our favorites was Angie Dickenson in "Big Bad Mama" which I still see on the late-late-late show occaisionally. Damn, I loved that movie. You got to see Angie's breasts and butt and everything (well, almost everything).
  • I remember the curfew running from midnight to 4 a.m., and the time we sneaked back into the camp at 12:30 through the barbed wire one night after we got caught out after curfew. Thank God we weren't infiltrators. The Korean guard wouldn't take twenty bucks to let us cross over in a relatively dry spot, so we had to wade through the rice paddy and come in through a gap in the drainage ditch. I'm not sure it was worth the effort, but it turned into a challenge when the guard wouldn't let us sneak in on the dry part.
  • One Christmas, myself and Larry Schultz drank a whole bunch of beers and were staggering back to the barracks (he to the E-5 NCO palace, myself to the enlisted scum barracks) when Larry suggested we decorate a tree. He pulled a baby pine tree out by the roots, and we went up to his room and stuck it in a can on his table. We sprinkled talcum powder on it and used pull tabs from beer cans and anything else we could find to decorate it (and drank many more beers). Larry went to an empty room, stole a matress and threw it on the floor for me. In the morning, we were awakened by the house boy coming into the room. He looked around the room astonished at the carnage, and just stood there with his mouth hanging open. Larry cocked up on one elbow, looked over at the houseboy and said "Mr. So, you KNOW I always entertain for the holidays!" It was one of the funniest moments of my life, punctuated by Mr. So cussing in Korean, slamming the door and tearing off down the hallway. Click here for a picture of Larry Schultz (et. al.)
  • Myself, Faron Hall and James "the Witherman" Withers were the TIs on C Trick in 1975. We worked rotating trick -- 6 days on, 3 days off, six swings on, three swings off, then start all over again. The mid trick was fixed at this time -- volunteers, one and all, who never seemed to see the sun. One of our favorite escapades was to send a volunteer down to the NCO club before it closed at 11 pm (when the swing shift was ending) to buy a case of beer, then we would sit up all night drinking beer and playing monopoly. Faron Hall was competitive and took it a lot more seriously than myself or the Witherman -- we would start cheating after awhile just to keep it interesting, and then deny, deny, deny when we got caught. Sometimes, when the magic hour of 4 a.m. crawled around (and curfew was over) we would head downtown to stir up the locals, especially at the Conscientious Brown Door. Its a wonder we were not murdered.
  • Although I made a princely sum of money in those days ($350 a month takehome, if I recall), it was hard to make it stretch over the entire length of a month. We could buy five bottles of liquor a month at the Class VI store on main post, and at the beginning of the month, those bottles would probably be Jack Daniels, which was around $5.00 a bottle. Toward the end of the month, we would be pooling our pennies to buy some Old Stillbrook, which was $1.85. Old Stillbrook (or Old Sunnybrook, I don't recall exactly) was pretty smooth after awhile, but those first few drinks were pretty heinous. Me and my buddy Harley "Tuck" Farrow would imbibe from the bottle and then head into town for mischief on our day off. What a life, except Tuck could get into a great deal of mischief when he put his mind to it, so it was always a real adventure.
  • One of our favorite tricks while drinking either type of whiskey was the "double-inverted moon". You stand back to back and link arms at the elbows, drop trousers, and one guy bends forward at the waist and the other guy throws his legs up in the air. Seen from behind, it is two guys stacked back to back shooting a moon -- a "double-inverted." Of course, liquor has a way with balance, and the double-inverted would most often turn into two guys crashing into the side of a bunk while a couple of other guys laughed at their antics.
  • "Chicken Dinner" and "Beanbag" -- if you've got to ask, I ain't gonna tell you. Larry Schultz, you know who I'm referring to. (Source: Mike Barth's.)

(L) Welcome to HHC (R) Front Door to the NCO Club Why did I never take any pictures of the inside? (1973) (Mike Barth)



(L) Some sorry individual pulled a bunch of the letters off of the NCO OPEN MESS sign. I wonder who pulled that crap? (I know but I'm not telling). (R) The Toomey's Tiger Statue I know this is hard to see, but it looked like some papier mache art project my kids bring home from school these days. Those darn Super Tiger Burgers were good, though. (1973) (Mike Barth)



(L) This is a view of the Beggar Hootch in the foreground, as seen from the third floor of one of the two enlisted pukes barracks. Over the top of the beggars hootch (for senior officers), you can see the mess hall. Over the top of the mess hall, you could see the NCO club, if you were a mind to. Off to the left is part of the wide expanse of rice paddies and swamp the separated the ASA Compound from the rest of Camp Humphreys and from Anjong-ni. (R) One of the numerous rock gardens (rock garden -- ROK garden -- how ironic is that?) that were erected in 1975. What the heck, as long as I didn't have to build it... (1973) (Mike Barth)





(L) This is a picture taken during the going away party for SSG Gwen Conners, although everyone called him Hummer (he could TELL a tall tale, and was quick to do so). I don't remember everyone's name, but here goes: Row 1 (seated): Mr. Kang (one of the Korean houseboys), Mike Barth, Hummer, Jack Keister with soon-to-be wife in his lap. Next Row: Tuck Farrow sitting in Larry Schultz' lap; Korean soon-to-be wife of the guy behind her, whose name escapes me; Mr. Di'Agostino, Nancy, Russ, "Twiggy" (James Altwegg), a comely Korean girl, unknown, and on the end is Gene (who was at Ramusan prior to coming to FSK in 1975). Back Row: Johnny (manager at Duffy's Tavern, where this was taken), Jim Early, "Pete" Peterson, Becky, Rich Carlson standing in front of "Mac" (Gary MacDonald), Ernie Cook. (R) My little slice of heaven -- My Bunk Area (1973) (Mike Barth)



Main Gate to Camp Humprheys (1973) (Mike Barth)



Anjong-ni Main Street as seen from camp gate. (1973) (Mike Barth)


Cold War: 557 MP Company By the mid-1970s, it had several 3 story concrete block barracks as well as quonset huts. The camp had an NCO/EM club and an Officers club, Bowling Alley, Craft and Hobby Shop, Katusa Bar, PX, Class 6 store and several other stores. (Source: 557th MP Co..)

In 1977 a new 12 lane bowling center equipped with automatic pinsetters was opened in May and construction was completed on a $500,000 gymnasium in Nov. A mobile tape dubbing center was established to provide soldiers with an opportunity to reproduce reel-to-reel tapes, records, cassettes, and cartridges from a wide variety of music. (Source: USFK/EUSA Annual History 1977.

SITE NOTE: The website of Mr. John "Maddog" Madden, the 557th MP Company Website is highly recommended for a historical look at GIs at Camp Humphreys during the late 1970s.


(L) 557th MP Company (R) Main Gate Camp Humphreys (1977) (John Madden)



(L) CPX Gate (R) CPX Gate Camp Humphreys (1977) (John Madden)



(L) Perimeter Road (R) Burial mounds off-base near camp (1977) (John Madden)



(L) Anjung-ri from Main Gate (R) Anjung-ri Village (1977) (John Madden)



(L) Anjung-ri Main Streets (R) Anjung-ri Main Street (1977) (John Madden)



(L) Anjung-ri Near Folly Club (R) Anjung-ri Top Hat Alley (1977) (John Madden)



(L) Top Hat Club Drinking Oscar (Jan 1977) (R) Top Hat Club: Ms. Kim, John Madden, Ms. Chai, Homer Larch (1977) (John Madden)



(L) Camp Humphreys (Summer 1976) (R) Folly Club (1977) (John Madden)



(L) Anjung-ri from Quarry Gate Area (1977) (R) Rice Field with Oxen tilling fields (1977) (John Madden)



Camp Humphreys: 1980-2006

1980s The sprawling helicopter base used to be a backwater spot offering dusty roads and temporary Quonset huts — and very few creature comforts. Camp Humphreys and its neighboring town of Anjong-ni didn't share a good relationship back then, either. The racial violence in the 1970s where the local populace clashed with blacks leading to off-limits actions were still fresh in peoples minds. The town itself had remained the same with only one narrow road leading to the main gate of the camp.

In 1985 Camp Humphreys was restructured to support wartime missions and was designated the 23d Support Group. The 23rd Area Support Group was originally constituted as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 23rd Direct Support Group in the Regular Army on 24 November 1965. The unit was activated on 1 January 1966 in Korea. The unit was reorganized and redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 23rd Area Support Group on 4 May 1971. On 15 November 1974, the unit was inactivated in Korea. The 23d Area Support Group was reactivated on 16 August 1985 at Camp Humphreys, Korea.


Anjeong-ni Outside Main Gate (Circa 1980) (Unknown)



Anjeong-ni Outside Main Gate (Circa 1980) (Unknown)


1990s In 1996 a separate US Army Support Activity for Area III was activated to provide base operations and community support. A $9.7 million Community Activities Center opened in 1998. It included an auditorium, a cybercafe, a travel office, pool room, indoor swimming pool, meeting rooms, a trophy shop and a McGregor's restaurant. Humphreys also was home to Daytona West, the Army's only go-cart track in Korea.

2000s U.S. and local officials claim Humphreys and Anjeong-ni enjoy one of the best community relationships in the country. In 2000, the town built the camp a new walk-in gate in return for a narrow strip of land along the camp fence. That land was used for street widening, so the narrow street that runs through the business section of Anjong-ni could be turned into a multi-million dollar, vehicle-free shopping and entertainment mall.

In 2001, Anjong-ni was changing with the widening of the road to the main in the business district of town. However, the changes at Humphreys were even more dramatic. Construction projects totaling $138.1 million began. They included:
  • Three high-rises with 180 family apartments. The camp now has only six family quarters, those built only a couple of years ago.
  • An Army and Air Force Exchange Service shopping mall including a main exchange, a Four Seasons store, vendor shops and U.S. franchise fast-food restaurants.
  • A 30,000-square-foot commissary, three times the size of the current one.
  • An 80-room transient lodging facility that includes a restaurant.
  • Five new enlisted barracks that includes two-person suites and "Lazyboy recliners."
  • Two new bachelor officers quarters.
  • A Child Development Center and teen center with a music room that offers musical instruments for rent.
  • Improvements to the camp’s airfield that is said to be the busiest U.S. Army airfield outside the United States.
  • A Department of Defense Dependents School for kindergarten through sixth grade.


In 2000, Area III commander, Col. Glenn DeSoto, said "Over the years, we’ve been so mission-oriented we’ve kind of let the aesthetics go.""Now, we’re trying to balance both mission and aesthetics." DeSoto said a new $900,000 tree-lined sidewalk will give people assigned to Humphreys a place to walk or run safely, he said. "We’re also totally repainting the installation," he said. "A lot of our buildings go back 30, 40, 50 years and they haven’t been painted since they were built. We won’t stop until every building here has been rehabilitated and painted." One of his favorite expressions these days is, "Don’t stand still very long or we’ll paint you." During the rehabilitation, workers are also removing asbestos, DeSoto said. Humphreys has a large lower-rank community who are not permitted to have cars, DeSota said. Because of this, they’re locating barracks and support facilities as close to operation’s areas as possible. The family housing, school, child development and teen centers all are being built adjacent to each other. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

The May 24, 2000, groundbreaking ceremony for a 3-phase family housing project at Camp Humphreys. Phase I is the first of three buildings which will each have 60 field and company grade officer, warrant officer and senior noncommissioned officer multi-story apartment family units. The 5-story buildings will include 3 (1400/1350 sq. ft.), 4 (1450 sq. ft.) and 5-bedroom (1550 sq. ft.) apartment. This first phase, a nearly $12 million project, will also provide central hot water, heating and air conditioning, kitchen range, refrigerator, washer, dryer, garbage disposal, dishwasher and telephone/TV systems. Other support facilities will include utilities, water wells, grading, parking, walks, area lighting, children's play areas, multi-purpose courts, landscaping, drainage, and a perimeter wall around the complex. At least 5% of the units will be accessible and easily modifiable for the handicapped. The first phase completed in March 2002. (Source: Global Security.org for details of Camp.) (SITE NOTE: This construction is completed along with a new Exchange, Commissary, Post Office and centralized shopping area. This was termed as "old construction" meaning that it was already on the books before the decision to relocate the 2d ID from the DMZ area. Approximately 1600 families will be relocating to Camp Humphreys entailing new construction. The new Alaska Mining Co. next to the Bowling Alley opened in 2004. Heavy construction is proceeding with ground being excavated on the base and soil being transported to off-base land fill locations. However, the camp perimeter has not been expanded as of Dec 2005.

In Feb 2006, it was announced that the finishing touches were being put on a newly built twin six-story barracks complex set for occupancy in Mar 2006. Each building can house 204 troops in its 102 rooms. Each room gets two bunk beds, four chests of drawers with three drawers each, two lamp tables, two desks, two desk chairs, two TV armoires, and one refrigerator and one microwave. Barracks rooms have a bathroom and shower to be shared by two occupants and wiring for phone, Internet and cable TV service.

Outside are four covered bicycle racks, two covered picnic areas with barbecue pits, a basketball court and a volleyball court. The $27.5 million complex has gone up in the installation’s Zoeckler Station area and also features a dining facility that is set for completion by 23 June 2006. Each building has two elevators, an exercise room, laundry room and mudroom, common kitchen area, lounge and storage areas for each occupant. The one-story ground floor dining hall will accommodate 800 diners. It will include a carryout food area and islands for hot and cold foods, a salad bar and other amenities now common in Army dining halls.

The barracks will house soldiers of the Army’s 501st Military Intelligence Brigade, which will eventually be based at Camp Humphreys. Meanwhile, brigade units set to move in are Headquarters and Operations Company, and Company A, both of the 527th Military Intelligence Battalion; Company B, 532nd Military Intelligence Battalion; and elements of Headquarters and Service Company, 3rd Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation).
Camp Humphreys is also a growing community with new construction of troop barracks, BOQ s, a youth center, an 80 room lodge, a mini-mall and family housing to name a few. On Camp Humphreys there are six family housing units that are designated for the command positions and their Sergeants Majors. Phase I of a three phase program of 180 units has just opened in August 2003. With new construction and renovations of BOQ s and troop billets, many soldiers are being issued statements of non-availability to reside off-post. The Housing Office on Camp Humphreys assigns family housing, BOQ/SBEQ s and offers referral services for off-post housing. Family members are authorized to visit with service members during their tour to Korea. Permission is required in advance to ensure that the visit is not longer than 30 days. Camp Humphreys Lodging is available on a space available basis for family members or hotel arrangements can be made through the Lodging office. (Source: ArmedForces.net.)

On 1 Jun 2006 it was reported that workers were in the early stages of building a new fitness center at Camp Humphreys that officials say will be the U.S. military’s biggest in South Korea. The center — complete with a gym, indoor pool, running track and four-story parking garage — is one of three fitness facilities currently under construction at Camp Humphreys. The post is slated eventually to become the U.S. military’s top headquarters installation in South Korea and its largest installation on the peninsula. The center is an $18.4 million project set for completion in January 2008. Going up next to Soldiers’ Field, it will stand three stories and measure 109,512 square feet of indoor space.

Among the larger center’s features will be an eight-lane, 25-meter indoor swimming pool; a 626-foot indoor running track, separate rooms for cardio fitness, circuit training, free weights and group exercise; basketball and racquetball courts; a martial arts training room, and climbing walls. Blueprints also call for locker, shower, sauna and steam rooms, an equipment-issue area, administrative offices, classrooms and a multipurpose meeting area for social activities. Also planned are a lounge and snack bar and an outdoor recreation pavilion. The parking garage will house 200 spaces and be connected to the center by an enclosed sky bridge.

Work began in January at Camp Humphreys on two other gyms, each to cost about $7 million. One, in the MP Hill section of the post, is due for completion by February 2007; another, in the post’s Zoeckler Station area, is to be completed by May 2007. Each will be a two-story structure with 45,000 square feet of space. Of the three new facilities, only the largest will have a pool and running track. Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction Company Ltd. is building the largest facility. The other two are being built by the Namwha Construction Company Ltd. Both firms are under contract with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)


Family Housing Camp Humphreys (2002)


Major Units at Camp Humphreys (2006)

  • 23rd Support Group -- The 23rd Area Support Group conducts noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) of US Citizens and allied nationals if required, and conducts Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration (RSO&I) in the groups AOR and assigned TAAs and establishes and operatees GS LOGBASEs. Provides Direct Support maintenance (DS), aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM), as well as supply support for Class I, II, III, IV, VII, and IX products throughout the theater of operations. It performs ammunition stock accountability, visibility, and surveillance for all US titled munitions in support of EUSA and ROKA. On order, it provides title transfer operations, DS/GS ammo support to EUSA, and CIS to ROKA and US Marine Forces, Korea.
    The 23rd Area Support Group is headquartered at Camp Humphreys in Pyongtaek, 130 miles northwest of Taegu. The 23rd Support Group is also responsible for the 6th Ordnance Battalion and the 194th Maintenance Battalion.
    The 23rd Area Support Group was originally constituted as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 23rd Direct Support Group in the Regular Army on 24 November 1965. The unit was activated on 1 January 1966 in Korea. The unit was reorganized and redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 23rd Area Support Group on 4 May 1971. On 15 November 1974, the unit was inactivated in Korea. The 23d Area Support Group was reactivated on 16 August 1985 at Camp Humphreys, Korea. (Source: GlobalSecurity.org.)

  • 194th Maintenance Battalion -- The 194th Maintenance Battalion, located at Camp Humphreys and Wonju, consists of a headquarters and Headquarters Company, a direct support maintenance company, a supply company and two aviation intermediate maintenance companies. Its missions include aircraft recovery operations, direct support maintenance, hot refuel, water purification operations and intermediate level aircraft maintenance. Through the enhanced engine repair activity, the 194th Maintenance Battalion provides a cost avoidance program saving several million dollars per year ($26 million in FY-94). (Source: GlobalSecurity.org.)

  • 348th Quartermaster Company
  • 520th Maintenance Company
  • C Company, 52nd Aviation Regiment -- On 16 January 1996, the Company A, 3rd Battalion, 501st Aviation Regiment was officially re-designated C Company, 52nd Aviation Regiment. The Company has continued in this mission to the present day providing aircraft maintenance support throughout Korea wherever and whenever needed. (Source: GlobalSecurity.org.)

  • 6th Cavalry BDE -- The 8th U.S. Army's Multi-Functional Aviation Brigade (MFAB) was officially formed as the 2nd Aviation Brigade -- 16 June 2005 marked the activation the 2nd Multi-Functional Aviation Brigade (MFAB). The newly consolidated aviation unit includes Apache Longbow attack helicopters, UH-60 Blackhawk utility helicopters, CH-47 Chinook medium lift helicopters and manages the Eighth Army C-12 Huron (fixed wing aircraft) detachment. The 8th U.S. Army aviation took a big step by transforming its brigades into multifunction aviation brigades when elements of the 17th Aviation Brigade consolidated with the 3-6 Attack Helicopter Battalion from the 6th Cavalry Brigade. The 6th Cavalry cased its colors, but the spirit lived on in each trooper who will carry it forward to the MFAB.
    In late 1995 the 6th Cavalry Brigade received orders to move its flag from Fort Hood to the Republic of Korea. This move was accomplished in July of 1996. The 6th Cavalry Brigade stood up its headquarters at Camp Humphreys, Korea on 24 July 1996. To augment the Brigade, the 5-501st Attack Helicopter Battalion was redesignated as 1st Squadron, 6th Cavalry Regiment, 6th Cavalry Brigade in July of 1996. In December 1996, the 1st Battalion 43rd Air Defense Artillery was assigned to the brigade. This last addition to the brigade creates a unique organization that provides the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command and United States Forces Korea with critical force protection assets, as well as, lethal deep strike capability. (Source: GlobalSecurity.org.)

    • 3rd Squadron, 6th Cavalry Bde -- On order, 3-6 Cav transitions to war, conducts security operations along the flanks of Combined Forces Command(CFC) in the Republic of Korea(ROK). On order, attacks to disrupt, attrit, or destroy North Korean Army(NKA) forces/targets in support of CFC campaign. In the Korean theater, by 1999 the three Apache battalions were dedicated to missions critical to the OPLAN: support of 2d Infantry Division operations (1-2 Aviation), and anti-special operations forces (anti-SOF) and deep attack operations (1-6 and 3-6 Cavalry). Although the DPRK Scud Belt is within range of Combined Forces Command (CFC) attack helicopters, it is highly unlikely that an attack helicopter battalion will be dedicated solely to Theater Missile Defense [TMD] operations due to prioritization.
      After six years of duty at Camp Humphreys, the 3rd Squadron, 6th Cavalry Brigade folded its colors to begin the transition from Korea to Fort Hood, Texas. In traditional cavalry style, the colors were carried by horseback to an awaiting AH-64D Longbow helicopter, signifying the transition the cavalry has taken, and continues to take -- the next move forward is equipping the unit with the new Longbow helicopter. This transition was part of the ongoing Army transformation that is replacing all AH-64A model Apache helicopters with the D model. In order to accomplish this mission, all the Apaches from 3rd Squadron were sent back to the United States in early May 2005.
  • 52nd Ordnance Company -- Explosive Ordnance Disposal
  • 343rd Support Center
  • 46th Transportation Company (MDM/TRK)
  • 751st Military Intelligence Bn
    • HSC, 3rd Military Intelligence Bn
    • Ops Company, 751st MI Battalion
    • B Company, 532nd MI
  • Pheonix Aviation
  • 3rd Military Intelligence Bn
    • HSC, 3rd MI Bn
    • A Company, 3rd MI Bn
    • B Company, 3rd MI Bn
  • 2nd Battalion, 52nd Aviation Regiment -- The mission of the 2nd Battalion, 52nd Aviation Regiment is to transition to war rapidly and provide theater aviation General Support to the CINC, CFC, USFK, and EUSA flying the CH-47 Chinooks. The unit was constituted 16 January 1996 in the Regular Army as the 2d Battalion, 52d Aviation, and activated in Korea. (Source: GlobalSecurity.org.) Flies CH-47 Chinooks.

    • HHC, 2nd Bn
    • A Company, 2nd Bn
    • B Company, 2nd Bn
  • 557th Military Police Company
  • 249th Military Police Detachment
  • 2nd Military Police Detachment (CID)
  • 6th Military Police Group (CID)
  • A Company, 304th Signal Battalion
  • C Company, 168th Medical
  • 560th Medical Company (A)
  • 568th Medical Company (A)
  • 665th Medical Detachment (DC) Dental
  • 1st Detachment, 176th Finance Bn
  • B Det, 516th Personnel Service Bn
  • 2nd Platoon, 66th AG Company (Postal)
  • 25th Trans-Movement Control Team
  • Detachment 2, 607th Weather Squadron
  • 607th Combat Communications Squadron
  • 4th Platoon, Co. A, 249th Engineer Bn
  • 7th ROK Air Force Comm Service Group
  • 2nd Maintenance Company (TMDE) -- Precision Measurement Equipment Laboratory (PMEL) (TMDE = Test, Measurement, Diagnostic Equipment)
  • Eighth US Army Flight Sim Fac
  • Logistic Assistance Office
  • Pyongtaek Bulk Fuel Terminal
  • 22nd Korean Service Corps
  • Project OLR-Korea
(Source: GlobalSecurity.org.)

Expansion of Camp Humphreys and LPP Under the 2002 Land Partnership Plan (LPP), the U.S. military agreed to return more than half the land it uses as bases in South Korea. The area to be returned amounted to 41.14 million pyeong (135.8 million sq. meter), 55.3 percent of the 74.40 million pyeong currently occupied by the U.S. military. In exchange, the agreement called for 1.54 million pyeong of land to be newly granted to the U.S. forces. In Mar 2004, the U.S. and ROK are negotiated an amendment to the LPP whereby the land grants planned for Uijongbu and Ichon was cancelled, and a larger grant of land at Camp Humphreys provided instead. On 1 June Yonhap News reported that the USFK had requested South Korea grant for 3.2-3.3 million pyeong of land in Pyeongtaek. Later the land was increased to 3.5 million pyeong and approved by the National Assembly. (See Anti-US Expansion Protests in the Pyongtaek Area (Jan 2006-???) for detailed 2006 chronology of events.)




PYEONGTAEK AREA EVENTS

January 2006

Pyeongtaek Expansion Plan (Jan 2006) On 6 Dec 2005, the South Korean government released details of a plan to spend $19 billion to improve infrastructure, upgrade technology and expand public space in Pyeongtaek, future home to much of the U.S. military in South Korea. The 15-year plan calls for changes from improving the city's seaport to building a high-tech agricultural center to soundproofing buildings, according to the Korean Ministry of Government Administration and House Affairs. One estimate projects that Pyeongtaek's population will more than double in the next 15 years, from 360,000 to 800,000 by 2020.


Korea Base/Camp Location Map


However, it stated that 80 percent of the land for the Camp Humphreys move was procured, but 20 percent still needed to be "condemned" through the courts. Though construction at Camp Humphreys is underway, the expansion of the perimeter has not taken place pending the procurement of the remaining lands. The land procurement process was to have been completed at the end of 2005. Until the land is formally transferred to the USFK, the perimeter expansion cannot take place.

Joongang Ilbo, 5 Dec 2005 stated the government would invest more than 18.8 trillion won ($18.1 billion) by 2020 to develop Pyeongtaek. The Home Affairs Ministry said the money is to help increase the population of Pyeongtaek to 800,000, from the current 360,000. The ministry said nearly 1.5 trillion won will be spent to improve farms, build industrial complexes and develop tourist facilities near Pyeongtaek Lake. The Defense Ministry also said it will invest nearly 1.4 trillion won on roads, parks and noise-proof facilities for residents. The ministry will also construct housing for relocated residents. More than 16 trillion won will be invested to develop harbors in the region along with other industrial development projects. (Source: Joongang Ilbo, 6 Dec 2005.)

The 15-year plan calls for changes from improving the city's seaport to building a high- tech agricultural center to soundproofing buildings, according to the Korean Ministry of Government Administration and House Affairs. Some of the money also will go toward buying land to house U.S. military operations there. Of the $19 billion, about $4.4 billion is expected to come from public coffers. South Koreans are looking to private investors and businesses to fund the remaining construction and growth. Because the proposal includes spending money over several years, the National Assembly would have to approve funds each year.

The key point is that the year is 2020, but the military move to the area is 2008. The Ministry of Defense was to invest 1.4 trillion won ($1.3 billion) in Pyeongtaek, but the specifics have not been released. It could be construction at Osan AB or Camp Humphreys -- but as of Dec 2005, it was unknown. Currently the ROK government is not committing itself to any firm plans. The other areas of development were on the books previously. The plan to attract industry to the area and therefore increase the population to 800,000 has seen some setbacks as the ROK just approved the building of factories in Seoul AGAIN after blocking the construction to force industry expansion in the suburbs. However, company relocations to China and other areas have drained Seoul of its industrial base. The industrial development in areas outside of Seoul has been only lukewarm. There is growth, but not on the massive scale anticipated as foreign investors and small/medium size industries as a whole have been reluctant to relocate -- especially with a stagnant economy and low consumer demand for goods.

The news for Pyeongtaek was that there would be a heavy investment in the area in conjunction with the move of the US military move into the area. According to the Chosun Ilbo on 22 Dec 2005, "A new international business town will be built on 17.82 million sq. m in Pyeongtaek in Gyeonggi Province, the new home of the U.S. Forces Korea. Apartments and houses for 64,000 households will be built starting in 2009. The Ministry of Construction and Transportation on Thursday unveiled its development plan for the land in Pyeongtaek's Mogok-dong and Godeok-myeon. Besides housing, the ministry will build an international business center and administrative complex as well as international schools needed for the children of U.S. personnel. The Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs on Dec. 5 unveiled a plan to invest W18 trillion (US$18 billion) in Pyeongtaek by 2020 to develop it into a regional hub on the back of the USFK relocation."



Site alterations for American military base vex the allies (Jan 2006) On 9 Jan it was announced that the US and the ROK were haggling over U.S. demands for additional construction work at Camp Humphreys. "We are reviewing a request by U.S. Forces Korea to raise the level of the ground by two to three meters (7-10 feet) at the new base site in Pyeongtaek," a senior official at the Ministry of National Defense said. The request was made in November, he added.


Camp Humphreys (K6) (Pyeongtaek Times)


According to the official, the United States said the 2,328-acre site was vulnerable to flooding from a stream nearby (Ansong River). The additional work, he estimated, would cost up to 600 billion won ($607 million), and Seoul rejected the request both for reasons of cost and because it would be difficult to find enough soil to raise the elevation that much. The U.S. military estimated the cost of the additional work at $505 million, he added. (SITE NOTE: The difficulty in finding fill is hogwash as the ROK simply cuts mountain down to get the soil as a standard practice. There is a small mountain range about 7 miles south of Camp Humphreys with tops to 958 feet. Larger mountains are located NE-E-SW, all within 20 miles with tops to 2293 feet directly south and tops above 1000 feet mainly southeast.)

At a meeting last month to discuss the matter, Seoul reportedly said that embankments along the stream would provide sufficient protection; Washington reportedly disagreed, calling for protection that would ensure the safety of the base in a 50-year or 100-year flood in the area. Seoul is responsible for the land cost, construction costs and moving expenses for the Yongsan Garrison in Seoul, but will foot the bill only for the land to be used by the U.S. 2d Infantry Division, now stationed north of Seoul. The United States will pay for new facilities and for moving its troops into their new quarters. The ministry reportedly will commission its own study on the question of vulnerability to flooding as it prepares for more bilateral meetings in March. (Source: Joongang Ilbo.)

Readers of the Lost Nomad Blog commented that the "stream" (jeon) is really the Anseong River (kang) and in their opinion it is a legitimate concern. The area in question are now rice paddies. Some posted that the Camp Humphreys flood of 1998 is an example of this being a flood plain area -- though the levees appear to be 25-30 feet high. The problem is that the flood waters have a tendency to bypass the levees and follow the roadways -- as they do in Seoul during its annual floods.

On 21 Jan Defense Minister Yoon Yoon Kwang-ung denied any alleged discord between the allies. The two sides have reportedly been at odds over a U.S. request for raising the ground at Camp Humphreys. Last November the U.S. military asked the Korean government to fund the flood control project.)


February 2006

Claim Stray Bullet Hits House outside Camp Humphreys (Feb 2006) According to the Stars and Stripes on 16 Feb, a Korean man who lives near Camp Humphreys told local police a bullet from the installation struck his house on 9 Feb. Police in Pyeongtaek said they found a hole about 4 inches in diameter in the side of the house. But they turned up no evidence it had been produced by a bullet or other projectile. The house is in Pang-sung, a section of Pyeongtaek City that includes Anjung-ri, where Camp Humphreys is located.

Police said a lab sample they took from the hole would be sent to the Korean National Institute of Scientific Investigation for analysis. They identified the resident only as a 58-year-old man with the last name Lee. Police said Lee told them a loud explosion shook his house Feb. 9 around 4 a.m., and he thought his boiler had burst. He later discovered the hole, he said, and believed it came from a weapon fired inside Camp Humphreys, police said.

U.S. Forces Korea said in a written statement Tuesday that South Korean police on the afternoon of Feb. 9 “conducted an investigation of a possible stray bullet from Camp Humphreys. “Investigators found no evidence of a stray bullet or believed that any damage was caused by the U.S.,” the statement read. "Upon completion of the investigation, the KNP closed the case due to lack of evidence.”

Meanwhile, a civic group opposed to the U.S. military’s presence in South Korea staged demonstrations in Seoul to call attention to Lee’s complaint. The Pan-Korean National Task Force Against Expansion of U.S. Bases in Pyeongtaek demonstrated outside South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) and the U.S. Embassy, calling for a careful investigation of Lee’s complaint, said Kim Yong-han, a leader of the Task Force. Kim said his group wants anyone responsible for endangering Lee to face “punishment.” The MND referred queries to USFK.


Constitutional Challenge Rejected on Pyeongtaek USFK Move (Feb 2006) On 24 Feb it was reported that the Constitutional Court rejected a petition by Pyeongtaek residents to declare the agreements between South Korea and the United States in 2004 to relocate U.S. military installations unconstitutional. The petition was filed by about 1,000 people, most of them Pyeongtaek residents. It claimed that the move, which they said was agreed to without the concurrence of the National Assembly in violation of the Constitution, would put unreasonable burdens on Korean taxpayers. The court said the petitioners had no standing in the matter, saying that they would have had to demonstrate a direct attack on their constitutional rights, which they had not.


Ministry of Defense Form "Special Team" for Yongsan Relocation On 26 Feb 2006, the Defense Ministry said it would organize a separate body to deal with the relocation of the U.S. base from Yongsan to Pyeongtaek. An official said, "The ministry plans to launch a team in March to take care of the relocation. The team will be in charge of negotiations with the United States and the construction of U.S. bases." The team will be composed of around 80 government officials from the foreign, construction and environment ministries, combining previous departments related to the project. "Local governments and the ministries could not agree on the construction of facilities at the bases, including electricity, roads, railroads and others," the official said. He added that the body will be established under a presidential or prime ministerial decree. (Source: Joongang Ilbo.)

(SITE NOTE: With the move to take place starting in 2006, it is strange that another layer of bureaucracy has been added to the mix. It is also strange that the ministries cannot agree on the construction of facilities even though this was previously negotiated at the Ministerial level -- and now want to "negotiate" at the working level. In one sense it is a good idea, though the USFK created a position at Camp Humphreys headed by a Brig General in 2005 to coordinate the various aspects of the move already. In another sense we are wary that this could be simply another foot-dragging move as it will be by Presidential or Prime Minister decree. However, at the same time, the Minister of Defense warned that the move from Yongsan cannot be delayed without reprecussions from the US. The FINAL plan for the relocation to Camp Humphreys from the DMZ area and Yongsan still had not been approved by the ROK as of Feb 2006.)


March 2006

Rowdy Camp Humphreys Soldier Gets Jail and Discharge An example of a soldier out of control was epitomized when Pfc. Kellyene A. John was sentenced to one year in prison, a bad conduct discharge, reduction to E-1 and total forfeiture of pay and allowances. On 1 Mar the seven-member jury found John guilty of an array of charges. Of four counts of assault, she was found guilty of three -- including punching one soldier in the head; and punching another on the back of the head, shoulder and then hitting his head with a beer bottle Three of the assault counts and one of the drunk-and-disorderly counts grew from 7 Sep 2005 events at Camp Humphreys. According to the prosecution, the violence began when John's boyfriend took offense at another soldier who made no response when John asked for a cigarette. The boyfriend confronted the soldier, setting in motion a series of violent incidents. (NOTE: Her boyfriend had a separate court martial and received jail time, but no discharge.)

Other charges stemmed from an off-base Osan AB incident. The charges involving misconduct toward a noncommissioned officer and resisting apprehension arose from a 5 Sep 2005 incident in which Air Force security police assigned to Osan Air Base were summoned to the nearby Asia Hotel on a noise complaint from hotel staff. The officers were sent to a hotel room in which John was an occupant. During a noisy confrontation with the officers, John, the jury found, was disrespectful to 51st SFS USAF TSgt. George F. Roach by yelling and bumping him with her head. She disobeyed his lawful order to back up and cease screaming.


April 2006

Camp Humphreys FINALLY has Master Plan for USFK Relocation -- BUT WHOOPS... (Apr-May 2006) On 11 April 2006, the Chosun Ilbo reported that Brig. Gen. Steven Andersen announced that a long-awaited master plan for the move to the new base has been agreed in consultation between the US and ROK side. Andersen said the already existing 547 million sq.m Camp Humphreys there will serve as the core of the base, with an additional 8.55 million sq.m in Daechu-ri and Dodu-ri added to the grounds. Personnel at the base will increase exponentially from 9,000 people to 44,531 by the end of 2008. Of that number, 14,491 will be U.S. service members -- with the rest being dependents.

The Master Plan that the two countries are jointly writing is a key blueprint in deciding the specific reorganization timetable, design standard of buildings and size, total relocation costs, and the sharing of costs between the two countries for relocating. The U.S. takes the initiative in framing, but it has to discuss and review details with Korea. The Ministry of National Defense is concerned about the MP delay following the illegal farming situation by some residents and members of the pan-national committee against the expansion of U.S. military bases in Pyeongtaek.

But on 27 Apr 2006, the Donga Ilbo ran an article that the Master Plan was again delayed until September. Details were sketchy but it appears that the cost-sharing issues are the primary problem. The repeated delays have sparked concerns that the original plan to finish relocating by 2008 could be hampered. The article is as follows:

US Base Relocation Plan Delayed Again

APRIL 27, 2006 03:10 by Sang-Ho Yun (ysh1005@donga.com)

It was found that the U.S. government told the Ministry of National Defense (MND) to postpone drawing up the Master Plan (MP), a core step in the reconfiguration of U.S. army bases in Korea such as Yongsan base in Seoul and the Second Infantry Division to Pyeongtaek in Gyeonggi Province, from the end of June to the end of September.

The MP that the two countries are jointly writing is a key blueprint in deciding the specific reorganization timetable, design standard of buildings and size, total relocation costs, and the sharing of costs between the two countries for relocating. The U.S. takes the initiative in framing, but it has to discuss and review details with Korea. (SITE NOTE: Under the 2004 Land Partnership Plan (LPP) Amendment, the US was to hand back 34 of its 41 bases in return for land at Pyeongtaek -- and land near Pohang (Camp MuJuk). However, pollution issues have ground this process to a standstill and the USFK is spending $400,000 a month guarding empty bases pending return to the ROK. In addition, there is a possible fiasco in the U.S. base relocation project as the relocation plan has faced severe protests from some local residents and an anti-American civic group. As of April 2006, the MND had still not secured the land that would be transferred to the USFK -- though it was to be completed by Dec 2005.)

The MP was originally scheduled to be finished by the end of last year, but it was deferred to the end of June and then again to the end of September. The repeated delays have sparked concerns that the original plan to finish relocating by 2008 could be hampered.

Tough going in discussions on deciding the share of relocation costs, a core issue in negotiation, between Korea and the U.S. is said to be the reason for the prolonged MP process. (SITE NOTE: Reports have said South Korea’s cost-sharing is estimated to reach up to $5.5 billion with respect to costs for the provision of land for new U.S. military facilities and the relocation of the headquarters of the USFK and related facilities in Yongsan, Seoul. The United States is expected to pay as much as $4.5 billion for the U.S. Army’s 2nd Infantry Division stationed north of Seoul to Pyongtaek, some 70 kilometers south of Seoul.

In March last year, Leon J. LaPorte, former commander of the USFK, told the U.S. Congress that Washington would only have to pay 6 percent of the total cost for the relocation project. In a recent interview with the Stars and Stripes, USFK commander Gen. B. B. Bell called on Seoul to cover 50 percent of the defense sharing cost. Currently Seoul covers some 40 percent. (Source: Korea Times.) The problems surfaced by Korea in the return of the bases due to pollution concerns as well as the US demand that the land at Pyeongtaek requires $500 million in flood control improvements are significant factors. The US is wrangling with the process as the Realignment of the USFJ has been just about completed and may determine the fate of the CFC as it appears that I Corps is moving to Camp Zama from Fort Lewis. This may also affect the master plan as elements from Yongsan are in support of the CFC -- which may disappear in the near future. There are many variables that are still up in the air. However, the process is speeding up. Reuters reported on 30 May 2006 that Japan approved a final plan to tighten security ties with the US and reorganize US troops in the country, part of Washington's strategy to make its forces more flexible in the face of modern threats. Cabinet approval of the plan paves the way for streamlining the approximately 50,000 US military personnel in Japan and giving Tokyo a bigger role in the key alliance, the central pillar of its post-war diplomacy.)

The MND has so far stated that detailed relocation schedule, total costs, and the share of each side’s payment can come out only after the MP is finished by the end of June. (NOTE: As of Aug 2006, the US and ROK still could not decide on the cost share as the ROK wanted to pay even less than it paid in 2006, while the US wants the ROK to increase its cost-share as a G-10 nation.)

Regarding the U.S.’ delay notice, the MND will suggest to the U.S. that completing the framing of the MP as soon as possible would be in the best interests of both countries as another deferment to draw MP could disrupt the whole related schedule.

In particular, the MND is concerned about the prospect of another unfavorable factor by the MP delay following the illegal farming situation by some residents and members of the pan-national committee against the expansion of U.S. military bases in Pyeongtaek City, Gyeonggi Province, a place to where the bases would be relocated. (Source: Donga Ilbo.) (SITE NOTE: As of 28 Apr, it was still uncertain if the delay in the MP was approved by the ROK. According to the Stars and Stripes, the MND was still "considering a U.S. request to extend the deadline for a “master plan” on expanding the U.S. Army’s Camp Humphreys." An MND spokesman said officials were reviewing the U.S. proposal, but was unable to provide additional details. The Korea Times reported on 28 Apr, however, that the MND had accepted the U.S. proposal in mid-April and set a new deadline in September.)
ROK Surveyors Start Three Months Late A geographic survey of the Camp Humphreys site started on 15 May, some three months later than planned. A team of surveyors from the Korea Cadastral Survey Corporation measured the boundaries of the site and set up markers at 50-100 m intervals. The survey will continue until the end of the month, a Defense Ministry official said. “Once the KCSC completes its job, the two military authorities will conduct a joint survey of the site,” the official added.

USFK Command and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Far East District will separately conduct an investigation of the sites where foundations are to be laid, with excavation work planned in some 115 areas. (SITE NOTE: There are some serious disagreements dealing with flood control still unresolved.)

Meanwhile, the government will wait for three or four months before moving locals out of villages near the site. "Although we ordered locals to leave by the end of June, we can't force them out," said Yoo Jong-sang, a government official in charge of the matter, said. "We will take legal action first by applying for an injunction." (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)


May 2006

Anniversary of Kwangju Incident (May 2006) Activists attempted to link the Kwangju riots to the fight over the disputed lands outside of Camp Humphreys. The Pan-National Committee publicized the effort via the internet and progressive newspapers, but the turnout was less that expected. The plan of the activists failed as there was not an upsurge of popular dissent -- and the protest fizzled. There is less interest in politics amongst students and there is a shift to a conservative viewpoint as indicated on numerous surveys. Much of this is due to dissatisfaction with the "reformist" policies of President Roh -- and spills over into the activism which is normally associated with the "progressive" or left-leaning position.

BACKGROUND: "Kwangju incident" of May 1980 was in fact a major 10-day civil uprising in the ROK that resulted in the death of 191 Koreans. It erupted on the 17th of May and control of Kwangju was restored on the 27th of May. (NOTE: The term "rebels", "rebellion", and "revolt" cause harsh responses from Koreans with respect to this incident. Instead the preferred terms are "democracy fighters" or "freedom fighters". The term "riots" and "civil disorder" are unacceptable by the people of Kwangju as it embodies the idea of "mob rule.") However, recently released documents show that as early as 7 May, U.S. officials in Seoul and Washington were aware that the Korean military was planning to use Special Forces trained to fight behind the lines in a war with North Korea against unarmed student and worker protests spreading throughout Korea.

Military leaders feared that North Korea would move to take advantage of the ROK's mounting instability. General Chun Doo Hwan believed that when civilians are unable to cope with the extreme dangers to national security stemming from political, economic and social chaos, the Armed Forces must carry out their duty of preserving national security. (Source: Heritage.org.)

The demands for the early adoption of a new constitution, the end of martial law, and the resignation of General Chun Doo-Hwan as Acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency grew louder. Several thousand university sutdents in Seoul, Chonju, and Taejon held campus rallies and clashed with he police early in May. Kim Yong-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung called for the end of martial law and suspension of plans to revise the constitution and instead call a National Assembly session.

On May 14 and 15, some 100,000 students from 45 universities in the country demonstrated in force and their street actions grew so strident and riotous as to paralyze public security. The disturbances peaked on May 15 when 72,000 students filled the City Hall and Seoul Railway Station Plaza, raided police stations, burned police vehicles, and hurled stones and Molotov cocktails at policemen, injuring some 600 of them and killing one. Communist agitators were suspected to be part of the riots as the slogans bore a clear Communist origin.

On 15 May Korean military informed U.S. commanders in South Korea that it was moving two Special Forces brigades to Seoul and the area of the Kimpo Airport "for contingency purposes" and "to cope with possible student demonstrations." These included the 13th and 11th brigades of the Special Forces on 6 May and 7 May respectively. The 7th Brigade was stationed outside Seoul supposedly in reserve for any outbreaks in the Cheonan and Kwangju area. The ROK military took seriously students' statements that they would rally off campus on May 15 if martial law is not lifted before that date.

On May 17, President Choi Kyu-Ha, who assumed office after the assassination of Park Chung-hee in Nov 1979, proclaimed a heightened state of martial law to curb student violence. The same day, President Choi visited the Kwangju area and called for a dialogue between dissidents and government mediators. However, within hours he permitted the strongest type of government action to occur with military intervention -- an act that represented a breach of credibility. The universities were closed and demonstrations prohibited. Kim Dae Jung was arrested and charged with plotting to overthrow the government and attempting to incite riots by funneling money to student agitators.

On 18 May, Kim Yong-Sam was placed under house arrest. Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Chong-Pil were arrested. The day after Kim Dae-jung's arrest, student riots broke out in Kwangju, the capital of South Cholla province, Kim's native region. It was the largest and severest regional disturbance in the history of the country. It started with 300 students of Chonnam and Choson universities but soon snowballed into an uncontrollable disturbance as citizens of Kwangju were incensed by the news of the arrest of Kim Dae-Jung, their favorite son whose political base was in the area. When troops entered the city, violence erupted, forcing the soldiers to withdraw. Negotiations dragged on for days. In the meantime, rioters seized control of the entire city; many armed themselves with weapons taken from police and military installations.


Note the empty carton of Bacchus tonic drinks.




From May 19-22, some 200,000 citizens and students clashed with police and military forces. After breaking into armories, the rebels obtained weapons and ammunition. Government actions to quiet the Kwangu case were ineffective. On 19 May, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington that "about 30,000 students are rioting in the streets in Kwangju" and "have apparently been joined by an undetermined number of others (workers, etc.)...ROK military is using gas, APC s and helicopters with loudspeakers in an attempt to disperse the crowds, but without apparent effect." The military was using CS gas -- a banned form of tear gas.

On 21 May, Police and troops responded with special degree of severity, partly because of the spirit of the challenge, but possibly because that was how they felt they should treat Cholla people -- leading to accusations that regionalism was involved. Two brigades of Special Forces sent by Chun Doo-hwan were later held responsible for killing hundreds of people in a massacre that drew worldwide attention. On 22 May, the Kwangju consulate reported "massive insurrection in Kwangju is still out of control and poses an alarming situation for the ROK military who have not faced a similar internal threat for at least two decades." It was estimated that "at least 150,000 people are involved" and said "there has been great destruction." He said the Korean military as "concentrating defense on two military installations and a prison containing 2,000 leftists." It was reported that the "December 12 generals" -- members of the coup -- obviously felt threatened by the whole affair.

On May 22, Special Forces paratroopers stormed Kwangju and subjugated the rebellion, but the insurrection resulted in the death of several hundreds and several hundreds wounded. (NOTE: To this date, these numbers are questioned by Kwangju residents who claim "thousands" were killed or wounded.) However, to this day, the US maintains that Special Forces responsible for the rampage in Kwangju were "employed without the knowledge of the United States." They claim that they had no idea Special Forces were being used for the suppression of student demonstrations. U.S. officials had no indication they would be sent to Kwangju with orders to kill -- and use bayonets against peaceful demonstrators.

News of the use of the Special Forces prompted the US to make a decision on 22 May to allow the 20th Division to be released from the joint command to enter the city during the early morning hours of May 27. (Source: Kimsoft.) On 23 May, the authorities claimed Kim Dae-jung had arranged for demonstrations to begin around the country in hopes that they would topple the government.

The Special Forces were deployed to the Kwangju area from Seoul because the Korean Army had a "perceived need to have a brigade located in the hotbed of dissent in the ROK-South Cholla Province," By the 26th of May, in the minds of the military authorities, the Kwangju riots had become a full-scale insurrection. At dawn on the ninth day of the standoff, army forces moved in and regained control of the city. The official death toll resulting from the incident was placed at 189. (Later increased to 191 -- though activists claim it was over a thousand killed and wounded.)

On 27 May the Korean 20th Division moved into the city. After it was clear that they had retaken Kwangju with "a minimum of force", the Carter administration continued its policy of pushing Mr. Chun towards moderation. Some Korean officers were criticized President Choi and questioning the official government line on the Kwangju Uprising.


In August, President Choi resigned accepting responsibility for the Kwangju Incident. As soon as this happened, Chun Doo-Hwan who had retired from active duty after receiving his fourth star, threw his hat in the ring for the office. Members of the National Conference for Unification nominated General Chun, and on Aug 27, Chun was elected president. In September, Kim Dae-Jung was sentenced to death for inciting the riots in Kwangju. However, the intervention of President Reagan led to the exile of Kim Dae-Jung to America.

There are continued claims that the death toll was above a thousand. A national cemetary in Kwangju was established for those killed in the "incident" giving them status as "freedom fighters."

However, over the years, the pictures of people armed with bricks facing off against tanks has been publicized. However, the photos of the "freedom fighters" at the armory -- they do not like the term "rioters" -- show they were heavily armed. If you were the military, would you treat these people armed with 50 cal. machine guns, BARs and shotguns kindly? The reason is that myth of unarmed civilians against tanks is dispelled. In the past, the anniversary posed an opportunity for college students to battle the riot police throughout the country -- a sort of "rite of passage." However, in 2006, the mood has shifted as students are more worried about getting a job and have swung to conservative viewpoints.



June 2006

Pyeongtaek merchants ask Col Taliento to resign (June-July 2006) In the on-going story of how Col. Michael Taliento has taken HIS problem and made it THEIR problem. According to the Stars and Stripes about 300 South Korean merchants gathered outside Camp Humphreys’ gates on 26 June to demand Col. Michael J. Taliento’s resignation following his decision to place two local bars off-limits to soldiers. The problem lies is in the simple fact that the US military drinking age is 21 while the off-base ROK drinking age is 20. The bars are located on the ROK territory and Col Taliento is mandating restrictions based on something that is NOT illegal off-base. In the past, Taliento mandated that the clubs enforce the underage drinking rule by checking IDs at the door. However, the US military would NOT provide any military personnel to enforce its rules. It is very plain to see the injustice of this system.

Taliento told the Stars and Stripes he placed Duffy’s Club and the Bay Watch Club off-limits for serving alcohol to underage soldiers. The USFK raised the legal drinking age for its personnel to 21 on Nov. 1, 2004. South Korea’s drinking age is 20. The USFK perception -- which Taliento is mandating -- is that if off-base bars sell alcohol to underage USFK personnel, the USFK can place those bars off-limits. Taliento stated that "I represent the command," and have to "enforce the command policies and the law," he said. But he stressed that he doesn't have the authority to override USFK regulations.

Taliento said undercover Army Criminal Investigative Command agents tracked the violations several weeks ago as part of a joint crime suppression team with South Korean police. (NOTE: In the past thise "joint crime suppression team" did NOT appear to include any KOREAN police in the sting operations. Taliento seems to construe that ROK police acquiescence to a "monitoring" operation is "active" participation in a sting operation. Under Korean law, these "entrapment" circumstances have been ruled in 2006 by the Korean Supreme Court as illegal when it threw out a conviction of a drug smuggler entrapped by the ROK Police. In effect, the USFK Army CID knowingly allowed the underage parties to enter the club creating an "entrapment" scenario. According to the bar owners is was a "sting operation" in which the bar owners were set up to fail. The agent who ordered the alcohol was of legal drinking age while the agent who paid was underage. Kim Ki-ho of the Anjung-ri Merchants Association said USFK personnel on 30 June admitted fault in the recent undercover investigations.) “They basically monitored and evaluated the effectiveness of the ID-carding process,” Taliento said. He added, “We had told the community we would do these checks.” The two offending bars were not doing the ID checks and they attended an Area III Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board to explain their side of the story where Taliento made the decision to place the clubs off limits -- informing the club owners of the decision by letter on 23 Jun and the ban went into effect on 26 Jun.

South Korean news reports stated that merchants at the protest claimed Taliento was acting like an “occupying forces commander,” who was enforcing his own rules that affected the local economy. One Anjung-ri business leader said local merchants see Taliento’s enforcement efforts as overzealous, and want the U.S. military to replace him. The merchants were to held a 3 p.m. demonstration on 27 Jun outside the camp’s main gate to underscore their objections to Taliento.

The merchants also claimed Taliento enforces a midnight, not 1 a.m. curfew, during weekend nights. Taliento said that's not the case, but that his December decision to curtail late-night bus service on Humphreys may have led to that belief. He said that discipline problems, including underage drinking, fighting and other misconduct were occurring on the buses, which were running until 2 a.m. Under current rules, the last bus runs from the main gate to the barracks area at midnight, meaning soldiers must either be on the bus, pay for a taxi or hike a couple of miles home late at night. But that doesn’t mean that they can’t stay out until 1 a.m., he said. (SITE NOTE: The net effect is that if the bus service stops at 12, the soldiers must be out of the bars by 11-11:30 to get a ride to the barracks. Taliento cannot claim any "misconceptions" as he -- following common-sense -- knew the consequences of his decision.) Taliento stated that he would reinstate the old bus schedule provided “that we have in place a tenant commander support program that helps place leaders on the buses and around the installation where we have had cases of misconduct,” he added. (SITE NOTE: Again he admitted that it was HIS problem, but it in fact impacts the community. In admitting it was his problem, he also stated his solution but he has taken no action since DECEMBER 2005 to implement such action.)

Taliento said he was confident that the situation would be resolved through “communication and dialogue,” and will talk to association leaders this week. “There needs to be a shared sense of ownership and responsibility,” in the support of these USFK policies, he said. “… It’s my hope that this will be resolved. (SITE NOTE: The last time Taliento used his "communication and dialogue" technique in 2005, he forced all bar owners and bar girls into a "training session" at an off-base hotel under the threat of off-limits sanctions. At the "training session" he called the bargils to their faces prostitutes and the bar owners brothel owners and trained them on the "law" as he saw it dealing with off-limits sanctions. The owners in turn promised to terminate any workers found guilty of prostitution -- knowing full-well that the ROK police would not arrest any workers -- and terminate contracts with agencies found to be involved in human trafficking.) (Source: Stars and Stripes.)


Banners of Anti-Taliento Stand (2 Jul 06) (Lost Nomad)



Banners of Anti-Taliento and Letter (2 Jul 06) (Lost Nomad)


On 28 Jun, reports stated that the bar owners put themselves off-limits to GIs starting on 26 June. Angry Anjung-ni bar owners strung some "less than flattering signs strung up above the ville lambasting the CP Humphreys commander", according to a blog report.The signs claim the local commander has ruined their local economy and their livelyhoods. Every bar establishment had an apology letter taped to their door explaining they are closed because they just can’t take the interference anymore, and are shutting themselves down indefinitely. The letters indicated that they remained supporters of the soldiers, the US Army, and the US, but their angry was directed at Col Taliento for his "overzealous" use of off-limits sanctions using "credible evidence" as his justification.

The merchants were holding daily protest rallies to dramatize their opposition to Taliento saying the bars would remain closed until further notice. They also faxed a letter to USFK commander Gen. B.B. Bell urging Taliento’s removal as Area III commander -- which the USFK stated had been received, but would not comment on.

Protest ends on 30 June (June 2006) South Korean merchants halted a weeklong protest against the Area III commander and once again opened their bars and nightclubs to U.S. military personnel. Kim Ki-ho of the Anjung-ri Merchants Association and Yi Hun-hi of the Korea Foreigner Tourist Facility Association met on 30 June with Area III commander Col. Michael J. Taliento Jr. and Brig. Gen. Steven M. Anderson, deputy commanding general of U.S. Forces Korea (Advance Element).

Bar owners objected to Taliento’s decision, saying the agent who ordered the alcohol was of legal drinking age while the agent who paid was underage. They called it a “sting operation” in which they were set up to fail. Kim Ki-ho said USFK personnel in the meeting admitted fault in the recent undercover investigations. Kim said future checks are to be conducted by U.S. military personnel, members of the merchant’s association and Pyeongtaek city officials. And while bars are required to do everything they can to prevent sales to minors, they won’t be held responsible for personnel who legally buy alcohol then sneak it to underage buddies.

Taliento promised to reinstate late-night bus service that had been suspended in a move local merchants believed forced troops to return to base an hour before their official weekend curfew. Taliento has said discipline problems — including underage drinking, fighting and other misconduct — forced him to suspend the late-night on-base bus service in December. According to Kim, Taliento said the on-post service will begin running until 1:30 a.m.

Kim also said that merchants and U.S. officials have agreed to meet monthly to discuss ongoing problems and seek improvements and solutions. “I am not entirely satisfied with today’s agreement, though some of our proposals and complaints are accepted,” Kim told Stars and Stripes. “There are still plenty of things that need to be fixed and improved.” Kim said military patrols through the district seem excessive and tend to create a hostile environment for off-duty troops trying to enjoy themselves. “When stationed in foreign nations, you have to get a good grasp of local people’s sentiments and try to understand them,” he said. You can’t win by “ignoring and fighting against residents’ feelings.” (Source: Stars and Stripes.)


June 2006

Five Clubs Become "21 and Over" Clubs (July 2006) Less than a month ago Yi Hun-hui, president of the Korea Special Tourist Association, Pyeongtaek Chapter, and Kim Ki-ho, president of the K-6 Merchants Association, called for Taliento’s resignation after he had placed two bars off-limits. Hundreds of bar workers gathered outside the camp to protest and the bars closed their doors to all U.S. troops for about a week. When they met and signed an agreement on June 30, Kim told Stripes that the U.S. military admitted fault in conducting undercover investigations at the bars. Kim later backtracked, telling Stripes that he had misunderstood what Taliento said at the meeting. As Taliento toured the bars, owners were quick to say they were following guidelines on keeping alcohol away from underage troops. Nearly every club had a sign posted on doors or in windows.

At five clubs in Anjong-ni, effective immediately, customers must be 21 to even make it in the door. Previously, all the bars welcomed underage customers as long as they weren’t drinking alcohol. But the merchants must address potential drawbacks to that plan, he acknowledged. A policy soldiers perceive as “restrictive” could chase them from Anjung-ri to other areas, he said. The party district outside nearby Osan Air Base is only a $20 taxi ride away from Camp Humphreys. But there are other clubs in Anjung-ni that are still allowing underage troops inside, and it is viewed that not many people will leave the area looking for someplace better to party.

A June 30 agreement between Taliento and two merchants’ associations required two clubs — the previously off-limits Duffy’s and Bay Watch — to ban U.S. troops younger than 21. Yi Hun-hui, president of the Korea Special Tourist Association, said this week that he decided to bar underage troops from his Enterprise Club. The owners of two other clubs — Maxim and Dixie Bell — also decided to ban anyone under 21.

Taliento said the recent flare-up with the merchants wasn’t the first — and probably won’t be the last. When he arrived in 2004, he said, the military was taking a serious look at what was happening in the entertainment districts outside its gates, and he was given direction to tackle the problems. “I took that guidance and began to engage with the local community,” he said. The work included on- and off-base office visits and training and education sessions. The military created signs the bars could hang to warn troops of the drinking age, hand stamps so busy bartenders could keep track of which soldiers are old enough to drink, and calendars that show the day, month and year someone would have to have been born to be of legal age.

Taliento said the military made those efforts to “help them help us manage our policy.” (SITE NOTE: Why should the USFK have to FORCE the ROK bar owners "manage THEIR policy"? Though minor in real world business dealings, on a higher level it is a matter of sovereignty rights where an external national interest is dictating policy to another national interest. But this is simply a mind-game subject.)

In the agreement, the merchants agreed to:

  • Check all patrons’ identification cards.
  • Join in frequent inspections for the enforcement of underage drinking.
  • Participate as observers with city officials during Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board meetings.
  • Participate in a joint advisory committee with city and base officials to discuss issues and resolve problems related to underage drinking, prostitution and human trafficking and other unacceptable behavior.
  • Remove derogatory banners and cancel demonstrations.


In return, Taliento agreed to:
  • Lift the off-limits restrictions on Duffy’s and Bay Watch clubs as long as they banned U.S. troops under the age of 21.
  • Not to hold club owners responsible if adult patrons purchased alcohol for underage troops.
  • Work to extend the on- base shuttle bus service before Aug. 1.


Taliento said he will have a Commanders' Engagement Program in place by Aug. 1 that will clear the way for the return of late-night base shuttle buses. He ended the late-night service last year due to discipline problems, including fights on the buses. Merchants had complained that even though troops can stay out to 1 a.m. on weekends, they felt like they had to be back by midnight so they could catch the last bus back to their living areas. Taliento said it'll be important to continue talking with city officials and merchants to find balance and "a way ahead that serves both of our interests."

The move to keep troops younger than 21 — U.S. Forces Korea's legal drinking age — out of some of Anjung-ri bars follows a recent row between the merchants and the U.S. military's Area III leadership. In late June, Area III commander Col. Michael J. Taliento Jr. placed two bars off limits after an undercover investigation found they were selling alcohol to underage soldiers. In response, merchants associations closed all the bars to U.S. personnel, held daily protests and asked U.S. Forces Korea commander Gen. B.B. Bell to relieve Taliento of his command. On June 30, five days after the protests began, Taliento signed a memorandum of agreement with the K-6 Merchants Association and the Korea Special Tourist Association, Pyeongtaek Chapter. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)


August 2006

K-16 Build to Lease Concept The “build-to-lease” concept is being used successfully at a housing project under way at K-16 Air Base in Seoul, the first such project worked through U.S. Forces Korea. It calls for contractors to front the money to build, operate and maintain the housing and U.S. officials to agree to lease it for 15 years.

Contractors must price construction competitively, establish and stick to a schedule, provide a letter of credit equal to 20 percent of the total development cost and follow U.S. law pertaining to the leases. Program manager Richard Bryon with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers said contractors also must work with the Corps of Engineers, which will conduct technical reviews of bid proposals, provide construction oversight and certify any facilities before final acceptance. Bryon said all the buildings must meet standards — including Corps of Engineers’ safety standards — “before the customer starts paying rent.” At Camp Humphreys, the customer is the Installation Management Agency-Korea Region Office (KORO).

U.S. officials hope to have two three-tower family housing clusters and one four-tower cluster of senior-leader quarters contracted and completed by 2009. They plan to release a request for proposal this fall; contractors will have 60 days to respond.Five to eight potential contractors are to be qualified by next summer, and the top two bidders will earn the contracts and are to start construction by fall 2007. Officials stressed the dates aren’t set in stone, but the contract will call for the family housing to be built within 24 months and the senior quarters within 20.

The build-to-lease concept already is being used in Seoul. Under it, South Korean contractors are constructing a housing tower according to detailed U.S. standards. In return, USFK agreed to lease it for 15 years.

While only about 5 percent of U.S. troops here have their families living with them, the goal is to increase those percentages, officials said. (SITE NOTE: Previous USFK stats listed 10 percent as the number of in-country families, but may have included families of contractors and DoD civilians.) “It may go up to 20, 30, 50 (percent) or whoever wants to bring their families,” said Kevin Shanahan, housing engineer with KORO, which will determine the housing units’ size and design. The key to keeping the troops and their families happy, Shanahan said, is to let them feel like they’re still living in the States when they’re within the camp’s perimeter.(Source: Stars and Stripes.) (SITE NOTE: We noticed in the article that there seemed to be some waffling on the Sep 22nd submission date that may be delayed due to expected announcements from the October SCM. If there are cuts or dramatic curtailments of manning -- especially over the cost-sharing issues -- there may be reductions in the needs for housing. As of August, this was all speculation.)


November 2006

Camp Humphreys' New Temporary Gates (Nov 2006) Camp Humphreys primary gate for construction has been the CPX gate to support the trucks entering the base to the construction sites. The Main Gate and CPX gate have been the primary entry points for years.

Now temporary gates are in use to support the construction going on to expand the facilities. The existing temporary construction gates are Mool gate, a gate at the post's MP Hill and the Hamjeong gate south of MP Hill, officials said. The Mool gate is the only temporary gate currently in use. Construction vehicles use it but are restricted to a work site in its immediate vicinity and not permitted to traverse other parts of the post.

The newest temporary gate is going in on the post's north, near the Desiderio Army Airfield runway. Workers at Camp Humphreys are building a temporary gate that will enable construction vehicles headed for the Zoeckler Station work site to bypass one of the post's more traffic-heavy areas. Zoeckler Station, in the post's northeast, is currently the site of several major construction projects.

Ultimately there will be four temporary gates. Post officials can't open the other construction gates to traffic until the South Korean government transfers to the U.S. military lands on which those gates are located, Barkley said. South Korea is in the process of turning over thousands of acres to the military to enable Camp Humphreys to expand under terms of a South Korea-U.S. agreement. In addition, South Korea's defense ministry is weighing what safety and other impact the newest gate's use might have on bordering village Wonjong-ri.

New temporary gate at Humphreys will be on north side of post

By Franklin Fisher, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Friday, November 3, 2006

PYEONGTAEK, South Korea — Workers at Camp Humphreys are building a temporary gate that will enable construction vehicles headed for the Zoeckler Station work site to bypass one of the post’s more traffic-heavy areas. Zoeckler Station, in the post’s northeast, is currently the site of several major construction projects. Those projects include a $27 million twin barracks and dining hall complex set for a grand opening Nov. 9.

The newest temporary gate is going in on the post’s north, near the Desiderio Army Airfield runway. Currently, most construction vehicles must enter and leave Camp Humphreys through its CPX gate. Once workers finish the new temporary gate, Camp Humphreys will have four temporary construction gates. “They all are intended to alleviate construction traffic, which will make the roadway safer because it will divert traffic from the heavily traveled and heavily populated areas of the installation,” Camp Humphreys spokeswoman Susan Barkley said. “It also is a positive because it will reduce the stress on the infrastructure,” she said. “If you’ve got, say, a heavy cement mixer full of cement, instead of traveling all the way from the CPX gate to Zoeckler Station, they’ll only have to go a shorter distance. So there’ll be a lot less wear and tear on the roads.”

Vehicles moving between the CPX gate and Zoeckler Station construction site currently travel past Beacon Hill, the post’s main gate, and its pedestrian, or so-called “walk-in gate.” “The area is constant traffic and people crossing (the) street, especially from pedestrian gate,” said Ronnie Lee, chief of master planning for the Army’s Area III Support Activity public works department. “However, the portion between the new gate and the Zoeckler Station construction site — there’s no heavy traffic at all.”

The existing temporary construction gates are Mool gate, a gate at the post’s MP Hill and the Hamjeong gate south of MP Hill, officials said. The Mool gate is the only temporary gate currently in use. Construction vehicles use it but are restricted to a work site in its immediate vicinity and not permitted to traverse other parts of the post.

Post officials can’t open the other construction gates to traffic until the South Korean government transfers to the U.S. military lands on which those gates are located, Barkley said. South Korea is in the process of turning over thousands of acres to the military to enable Camp Humphreys to expand under terms of a South Korea-U.S. agreement.

The post eventually will triple in size and become the U.S. military’s main installation on the peninsula. In addition, South Korea’s defense ministry is weighing what safety and other impact the newest gate’s use might have on bordering village Wonjong-ri, Lee said. Lee said defense ministry officials told him they met Monday with village representatives and intend to hold another meeting soon “to try to come up with … something mutually agreeable.” (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

New Barracks Complete (Nov 2006) On 9 Nov Camp Humphreys opened its latest facilities. The $27 million complex in the post’s Zoeckler Station section consists of two six-story barracks and a one-story dining hall that can serve about 376 servicemembers per meal. The complex also features volleyball and basketball courts and a covered picnic area.

It's the largest barracks complex in Korea at this time. The complex will house and feed troops of three Army military intelligence battalions. As of 3 Nov about 110 soldiers had moved into the barracks. They began moving in Oct. 15. The dining hall has been serving three meals daily since Oct. 21. Each 102-room barracks building can house two soldiers per room. Rooms have a bathroom with shower and are wired to accommodate phone, Internet and cable TV hookups.

Each building has an exercise room, laundry room and mud room on the first floor; a common kitchen on the second; storage areas on the third, fourth and fifth floors; a lounge on the sixth, and two elevators, said Greg H. Reiff, resident engineer for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Far East District resident office, Camp Humphreys. The new barracks now house soldiers from the 532nd and 3rd military intelligence battalions. Soldiers of the 527th Military Intelligence Battalion are to begin moving in later.

Meanwhile, construction continues at Camp Humphreys’ MP Hill section on a similar but even larger barracks-dining hall complex. Two eight-story barracks towers and a dining hall that can serve 1,300 troops during a single mealtime are part of a $55 million project that also includes additional construction elsewhere on post. Construction on the MP Hill complex began in August and is to finish in June 2008. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)


Landfill work at Camp Humphreys is first step in expansion (Nov 2006) Blanketing a 200-acre tract with a thick layer of dirt will be the first big step in getting land near Camp Humphreys ready for the post’s eventual expansion. The post is slated to triple in size and become the U.S. military’s chief installation in South Korea in coming years under a South Korea-U.S. agreement. The post will expand onto a 2,328-acre expanse of land near Camp Humphreys, which is in Pyeongtaek. A key first step is covering that expanse with landfill.

The first part of that landfill project will occur on what planners call Parcel 1, which borders Camp Humphreys’ southwestern portion. Bids were still out on the contractors to handle the landfill job through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Far East District. Contract award was to be in Nov with the beginning of actual landfill work in early 2007 and finishing in about a year. Other Parcel 1 work also will be under way in that period. The landfill is needed to make the ground a more suitable surface for eventual building construction and will be laid over the entire expansion area.

The U.S. military plans to spend an estimated $5 billion on construction as part of the Humphreys expansion. Plans call for building an array of structures, including barracks, headquarters, motor pools, training areas, family housing complexes, schools, and numerous shopping and recreational facilities. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

(SITE NOTE: Landfill is a problem at Camp Humphreys. The landfill that was excavated on Camp Humphreys found to be oil-contaminated (black soil) was trucked to an unknown location off-base for disposal by the contractor. Sources would only say it is "far away" from K-6. The soil that was not contaminated was reused as landfill on base in the construction of new facilities or dumped close to the camp. It appears that the US Corps of Engineers is distancing itself by making this a contractor problem and removing itself from US responsibility. Some would question this strategy.)


Camp Humphreys expansion: Yongsan relocation plan approval expected in Dec. (Nov 2006) Several key events that will shift the Camp Humphreys expansion project into higher gear are due within coming months, said Army Col. Kurt J. Stein, deputy commanding general of the U.S. Forces Korea (Advance Element), the following are slated for construction on the first 200-acre portion of the land onto which Camp Humphreys will expand:

  • a barracks and a dining hall.
  • a battalion headquarters.
  • vehicle maintenance shops.
  • administrative buildings.
  • a physical fitness center.
  • a sports field.
  • a religious education center.
Construction on the first of those buildings is to start in 2007, after an estimated 3 million cubic yards of soil is brought in as landfill.

The post will expand its boundaries onto a neighboring 2,328-acre expanse the South Korean government has set aside for the project. A major step will be completion of a “master plan” for shifting U.S. forces to Humphreys, including those stationed in and north of Seoul. “We anticipate agreement on the final Yongsan relocation master plan in December,” he said, “and that’ll be a major accomplishment.”

The plan is “simply a document that will realign the units, organizations, functions and roles into the Camp Humphreys hub,” Stein said. Also part of the relocation plan is the move of the Army’s 2nd Infantry Division, headquartered at Camp Red Cloud in Uijeongbu, north of Seoul. The eventual move is part of a larger plan under which the U.S. military will consolidate its forces into two regional hubs, one in Pyeongtaek in west-central South Korea, the other in the Daegu-Busan region in the peninsula’s southeast. The bulk of U.S. troops will be stationed at Humphreys, and USFK and 8th U.S. Army will move their headquarters to there from Yongsan Garrison.

(SITE NOTE: When they first started the "hub" idea back in 2003, "regional hubs" were discussed. At first they looked as though they would designate Camp Humphreys/Osan AB/Pyeongtaek Harbor as one regional hub, and the Taegu/Pohang/Pusan area as the other regional hub. In Feb 2003, Donald Rumsfeld stated that he envisioned a force concentrated around "an air hub and sea hub." He did not elaborate, but it was apparent that he spoke of Pusan as the "Sea Hub" in South Kyongsang Province with a large training area near Pohang, just above Pusan in North Kyongsang Province. The air hub was not so clear, but Osan and Pyongtaek were mentioned. In Mar 2003, the Ministry of National Defense announced that wo bases in urban areas; Uijeongbu and Dongducheon would be moved south of the Han River initially, and the Yongsan Base in Seoul would be moved within four years, instead of the eight years, which had been set previously.

Once the ROK realized the implications of the US move and the loss of its "tripwire" in the move south of the Han River, the ROK balked at every step of the way to block the relocation. The Future of the ROK-US Alliance (FOTA) never got past the relocation issue because of South Korea's position. In 2003, the Pentagon wanted to see the realignment started in the 2004 fiscal year with a move out of the Yongsan headquarters in Seoul to be followed by a redeployment of troops near the DMZ. This was not to happen with the constant foot-dragging of the ROK. The USFK continued to talk of US bases on the peninsula being reorganized into two hubs, one in and around Osan, the other in the Daegu and Busan region. The Busan/Daegu hub would be the center for a buildup of troops in case of a war on the peninsula. This was the first time the USFK had announced this idea - and it would change the Land Partnership Plan signed in March 2002, which dictated the location of U.S. bases through 2011.

The action by the MND to "stall, deny and deflect" on the relocation issue signals the start of a confrontation between the USFK (which wishes to move as soon as possible) against the ROK (which wishes the USFK forces to remain as a tripwire ad infinitum). After much discussions, the DoD started to refer to the ground forces hub at Camp Humphreys and the air hub at Osan AB (with Kunsan AB secondary). As the US-ROK alliance disintegrated, the concept was that there was Pyeongtaek Harbor as the NEO evacuation port and a Camp Humphreys battalion was formed to handle the evacuation taskings and follow-on support requirements. The term "sea hub" moved to the background as the Pusan camps were being returned to the ROK -- though at the same time, the ROK was building up deep water piers and container facilities between Pusan and Chinhae that in time of war could be used for military ships. The Pohang range talks stalled though Marines built up training facilities in the area.

In 2003, the Pentagon revealed its broad outlines of the Global Positioning Strategy that called for a broad realignment of troops in Asia that would include moving Marines out of Japan and establishing a network of small bases in countries such as Australia, Singapore and Malaysia where the US has never had a permanent military presence. The move included the transfer of troops away from the demilitarized zone in the ROK, represent the third phase of a sweeping plan by the Pentagon to reposition US forces around the world to be closer to areas it considers unstable while cutting the US presence in Cold War-era strongholds such as Germany. What this meant was that the US troops in Korea would be open for use as regional forces to react to any regional conflict. As this meant that the ROK would lose control of its "tripwire" this became an open sore -- and in the end in 2005, the ROK simply stated it understood the US position, but did not agree to it, while the US remained steadfast on its policy -- biding its time for the USFJ Realignment process to go forward.

The President Roh resurfaced his "independent defense vision" which threw everything into turmoil. The MND plan in Mar 2003 outlined how to transform the military into a more high-tech and elite force, but the weak link of the military was intelligence gathering, with 90 percent of its strategic intelligence coming from the Americans. So the plan called for investments in intelligence gathering tools, such as AWACS planes and advanced systems for command, control and communication. Though the plan was unrealistic in our opinion, Roh pressed forward with this idea causing the US to figure out ways to transfer strategic missions to the ROK -- that the ROK MND did not want because of its limited budget as Roh's ambitious, but ill-planned social programs siphoned away more and more funds.

The relations between the ROK and US proceeded downhill rapidly as the ROK reintroduced its rapproachment policies with the North, while the US leaned towards pressuring the North into a regime change. Further roadblocks such as the KEDO project, the six-party talks, the ROK refusal to accept the Oplan 5029 and Oplan 5030, etc. etc. etc. The US-ROK continued to mouthe the phrases of the alliance being strong, though there were wide cracks appearing. (Source: 2003: USFK Relocation) (SITE NOTE: On 2 Dec 2006, it was reported that the US-ROK agreed on Oplan 5029 at the SCM in Oct 2006, but none of the specifics were released.)

In 2004, the USFK accelerated the base returns under the LPP. The first bases Camp Greaves and Giant to be returned in Nov 2004 under the LPP instead of 2011. Because of the ROK foot-dragging to send its troops to Iraq promised in Mar 2003, the 2d Bde 2d ID relocated to Iraq in Aug 2004 -- with a follow-on to Fort Carson, CO. The US remained firm on 12,000 troop reductions by end of 2005. However, the move out of Yongsan was delayed to 2008. Interrelationship of moves to recombine 5AF at Yokota with 13th AF in Guam along with I Corps to Camp Zama and relocate Okinawa Marines to Camp Fuji. The never-ending story of the Future of the Alliance (FOTA) continued with negotiation after negotiation -- and the US playing hardball. (Source: 2004: USFK Relocation) However, the ROK National Assembly was up in arms when they estimated the total cost of the moves at $4.9 billion -- and as they initiated the removal from Yongsan, they would pay the entire cost. However, they immediately started to finaggle and squirm out of the agreements while the USFK made concession after concession, but still the ROK wanted more reductions. (Source: Military Com)

In 2005, the Security Policy Initiative (SPI) replaced FOTA -- as the US gave up on the unfruitful negotiations and the new SPI indicated that the ROK-US alliance was showing signs of being in deep trouble. However, the US and ROK kept blathering on about the solidarity of the alliance -- though the international media worried that the opposite was true. There were major changes underway in ROK and Japan to shape a REGIONAL force -- hopefully as a coalition. At that point, Roh drew the battlelines by stating OFFICIALLY that the ROK would NOT allow the USFK to become part of a Regional force. Being on a collision course, the ROK ended up stating that it "understood" the US global strategy and had no control over the use of US forces -- and left it at that. The US remained steadfast that the USFK would be a regional force, but it became clear that the stationing the US ground forces in Korea would only end in more heartburn. ROK cost-sharing remained in dispute and finally the ROK refused to increase its cost share causing the USFK in turn to lay off ROK temporary workers. The closure of Kooni Range after constant hassles with the ROK and activist protests, but turned up the difficiency of inadequate range time. Very little was heard of the Pusan-Pohang-Taegu area hub as the USFK concentrated on shutting down the Pusan and Cheju camps -- keeping a low-profile in these areas. Assets at Kimhae were moved to Camp Carroll and Camp Hialeah was preparing for its shutdown. (Source: 2005: USFK Relocation.)

Then in 2006, the US-ROK alliance "collapsed" (meaning the abrupt USFK change in policy to engage the ROK in a confrontational mode) after June 2006, the terms "regional hub" resurfaced again as the US pulled the Patriots out of Kwangju and relocated them to Camp Carroll. The outlook is for the ground forces to be greatly reduced despite what the USFK states today -- with Camp Carroll being the "hub" for follow-on troops, without any real ground force presence, as well as NEO evacuation taskings. This confrontational mode occurred right after the USFJ Realignment was approved by Japan which agreed to foot a major portion of the costs to relocate the part of the 3rd MEU to Guam and relocate other units in mainland Japan. The key element was the movement of I Corps to Camp Zama to takeover "contingency operations" in Korea -- in effect, replacing the CFC structure. With this new dynamics of Japan and the US forming a Missile Defense System and Japan moving to take on a regional presence, the US started talking about the US involvement in the defense of Korea as primarily one of massive air superiority and naval airpower -- meaning USAF assets and the 7th Fleet assets including nuclear submarines equipped with cruise missiles instead of a large stationary ground force. On top of this, an ultimatum was levied in Sep 2006 that the USAF would get the Chikdo Range or else the USAF was leaving. Then the decision to operate "separate" commands came after the ROK finally got its wish for wartime control of its forces. The reprecussions of this ROK decision to take back its wartime control are yet to be seen as the ROK is not ready, not equipped, does not have the military 4CI infrastructure, etc. etc. etc. -- that only it has itself to blame for reducing the defense budget from 8.0 percent of GDP under Kim Young-sam to less than 3.0 percent under Kim Dae-jung and now 2.7 percent under Roh Moo-hyun. The ROK's pipe dream of a self-reliant national defense is about to be put to the test -- and now there is a panic as the ROK realizes the true costs of such a policy.

Camp Humphrey will be reduced to 25,000 or less after 2012 -- and it now looks as though it will be much less after the US Army realignments that has eliminated the 8th Army and consolidating functions within the ROK for all units. The "air hub" at Osan/Kunsan is still unresolved as far as we know in Nov 2006 -- and the US might just shut down the air component if the ROK does not resolve the Weapon Impact Scoring System (WISS) and range time issues. As of Nov 2006, there were rumors everywhere that the USAF was leaving. And the biggest questions is that the USFK are talking of handing wartime control over to the ROK by 2009 -- while the ROK is still talking about 2012. In our opinion, the ROK won't be ready for wartime control even in 2012 as it is going to be forced to reduce its manning as the eligible age recruits will be declining after 2018 as the ROK has become an unsustainable society with a 1.2 birthrate.)
Another major step will be setting up a “project management consortium,” a staff of South Korean and U.S. members who will oversee the design and construction phase of the expansion. “They will be the ones who actually execute — track, monitor and report,” Stein said. The consortium is to be in place within the next several months, he said.

A third key step will be the laying of landfill on “Parcel 1,” the 200-acre tract that is the first portion of land scheduled for construction. Landfill work is expected to begin sometime in early 2007 and end within about a year. “And we’re still tracking to begin construction on the first buildings in 2007,” at Parcel 1, Stein said. Eventually, workers will lay landfill on the remaining portions of the expansion site, officials have said. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

(SITE NOTE: One can only hope that the Master Plan that was to be finalized in June -- then July -- then Sept -- then Dec -- ??? will finally be approved. However, we see major problems ahead for the Master Plan. At the heart of the Master Plan completion is the resolution of cost-sharing and relocation costs.

The US and ROK appear to have reached conflicting assessments on the relocation cost of the USFK. According to the Korea Times on 27 Apr 2006, Gen LaPorte testified before a U.S. House committee in March 2005 that the U.S. government would only have to pay 6 percent of the cost, estimated at $8 billion, of the total cost for the relocation project.

But the Defense Ministry refuted the reports, saying related negotiations are still underway. ``It is wrong that South Korea will cover the expenditure for the BTL (Build to Lease) program,'' Col. Kang Yong-hee at the ministry's public affairs office said. ``I believe the cost will be covered by the U.S., or it will at least be shared.'
(Source: Korea Times.)

The Korea BTL Program announced that the initial Korea BTL project for a 144-unit UOQ facility at K-16 Airfield was underway. On November 2, 2005 on Yongsan Garrison, the project Lease was awarded & executed. U.S. Forces Korea will occupy the facility under a 15-year lease. The team of BAUM Architects and Seohee Construction will construct the project and act as the Lessor through the jointly owned special purpose corporation, SB Sungnam Co., Ltd. Shinhan Bank provided the project financing. Groundbreaking for this precedent-setting project occurred on December 9, 2006. Delivery of the facility is scheduled for July 2007.

On a date to be announced, the Government intends to pre-qualify a contractor base for the build-out of family housing, unaccompanied housing and to-be determined commercial space at Camp Humphreys through the issuance of an RFP (Request For Proposal). The Government intends to qualify a number of contractors that may deliver discrete projects among potentially numerous facility components necessary to complete the leased facility sectors at Camp Humphreys. The purpose of this procurement is to allow the Government greater flexibility in the acquisition and delivery of leased facilities once the land delivery, site preparation and the master planning processes are finalized. (Source: Korea BTL.)

On 10 Aug 2006, the Stars and Stripes reported that about 250 construction industry representatives met in Seoul to learn how to bid for “build-to-lease” housing projects needed as U.S. Forces Korea moves its forces south on the peninsula. The “Korea BTL Industry Forum” focused on projects for family and unaccompanied housing on Camp Humphreys, where most U.S. forces on the peninsula are to move in coming years. U.S. officials hope to have two three-tower family housing clusters and one four-tower cluster of senior-leader quarters contracted and completed by 2009. They plan to release a request for proposal (RFP) this fall; contractors will have 60 days to respond. Five to eight potential contractors are to be qualified by next summer, and the top two bidders will earn the contracts and are to start construction by fall 2007.

Officials stressed the dates aren’t set in stone, but the contract will call for the family housing to be built within 24 months and the senior quarters within 20. During the forum in a Sofitel Ambassador Hotel ballroom, U.S. officials gave what they called a “cookbook” on how to submit competitive business proposals to the mostly South Korean audience. Briefing potential contractors such things as basic designs, timelines and maintenance agreements were officials from U.S. Forces Korea, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Installation Management Agency-Korea Region Office (KORO) and contracted program adviser Colliers/Knighthorse. There was a “conscious effort … to develop a straightforward approach that can be easily understood by Korean companies,” said Darrin Kennedy of Colliers/Knighthorse. His colleague, Joseph Faccone, said the original request for proposal will be released “when it’s appropriate” for the U.S.-South Korean alliance. He suggested contractors not go into an “emotional tailspin” if the RFP isn’t released by Sept. 22.

The build-to-lease concept already is being used in Seoul. Under it, South Korean contractors are constructing a housing tower according to detailed U.S. standards. In return, USFK agreed to lease it for 15 years. While only about 5 percent of U.S. troops here have their families living with them, the goal is to increase those percentages, officials said. “It may go up to 20, 30, 50 (percent) or whoever wants to bring their families,” said Kevin Shanahan, housing engineer with KORO, which will determine the housing units’ size and design. The key to keeping the troops and their families happy, Shanahan said, is to let them feel like they’re still living in the States when they’re within the camp’s perimeter.

Potential contractors were advised to follow the guidelines available on the project Web site, www.koreabtl.com. “We want to have fair, open competition and let the best proposal win,” Faccone said. “All we need from you is to follow the cookbook, fill in the numbers and give us a good deal.” (Source: Stars and Stripes.)
On 6 April 2006, the Defense Ministry announced that the total relocation plan would cost $7 to $9 billion and South Korea would bear $5.5 billion of that cost. 43% of South Koreans said the cost should be shared equally between Seoul and Washington because both nations have a common strategic interest. 27.2% believed that Washington should pick up more financial responsibility because the military alliance in the Korean peninsula is part of the U.S. global strategy. Only 2% said that South Korea should foot the entire bill because the alliance was to protect South Korea.

Unfortunately, the ROK is mixing apples and oranges when talking about cost-sharing. The support of the USFK is one issue, while the relocation of the USFK is another. As to relocation costs, Gen LaPorte said 94 percent of the relocation costs would be footed by the Seoul government, including 53 percent that South Korea promised under the 2004 agreement regarding the base relocation project and the remaining 21 percent would be covered by South Korea’s defense cost-sharing contribution.


However, what Gen LaPorte said about the cost-sharing was that the US government paid 60 percent of the non-personnel costs. The South Korean government support equaled 40 percent of the command's non-personnel costs. In a recent interview with the Stars and Stripes, USFK commander Gen. B. B. Bell called on Seoul to cover 50 percent of the defense sharing cost. Currently Seoul covers 38 percent.

When one compares the USFJ with the USFK one sees that the USFJ received $4.4 billion in host-nation support in 2006 and expect $1.2 billion in 2007 and 2008. On the other hand, the USFK received only 680 billion won ($707 million) for 2005 and 2006. The ROK cost sharing squabble is NOT complete as the ROK wants to REDUCE its support, while the US wants the ROK to INCREASE its support.

According to USFK, that formula accounted for about 40 percent of the American military cost in 2005 and was expected to cover only about 38 percent of 2006's costs. That money is used to cover local supply contracts, construction projects and salaries for Korean workers at the U.S. bases, according to USFK. In the past, the U.S. has argued that South Korea should pay more; Japan, for instance, pays about 75 percent of the cost of its American military presence. South Korea, however, has argued that as U.S. forces shrink here, so should the bill. The U.S. military is in the midst of a plan to remove 12,500 troops from the peninsula, from 37,500 to 25,000. Currently, there are about 29,000 U.S. troops here. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

The US is pressing the point that the Congress mandated that the host country must foot 75 percent of the bill for stationing US troops on their soil -- but will settle for the ROK footing 50 percent of the bill. The Korean press started trying to interpret what Rumsfeld meant by "equitable" as the ROK pays 38 percent of the cost sharing ($680 million a year) -- but also wants to reduce it further. The Master Plan hinges upon this cost-sharing of both support and relocation costs. The Yongsan move costs were fully ROK initiated -- but the ROK wants to wiggle out of those costs as well. Watch the National Assembly and Uri Party for more moves to renege on their part. The move from Uijongbu of the 2d ID is shared by both but this is still being hassled out.

We are only outsiders reading newspapers, but from our perspective the Master Plan is far from settled -- despite the contractors views that it is on-track with minor changes due to the CFC being split away. Reports have said South Korea's total cost-sharing (support share and relocation costs) is estimated to reach up to $5.5 billion with respect to costs for the provision of land for new U.S. military facilities and the relocation of the headquarters of the USFK and related facilities in Yongsan, Seoul. The United States is expected to pay as much as $4.5 billion for the U.S. Army's 2nd Infantry Division stationed north of Seoul to Pyongtaek, some 70 kilometers south of Seoul. The problem is that recent National Assembly reports show that the ROK still thinks its share should be in the $3.2 billion range.

There are other problems with the Master Plan that surfaced when Korea refused the return of the bases due to pollution concerns though the SOFA stated the bases would be returned "as is." The amount required to repair environmental damage to the old military base sites is another area of contention. 41.4% South Koreans believe the U.S. should shoulder the entire bill. Another 32.6% want the U.S. to take up most of the cost. Another 22% said it should be shared equally. In addition, there is the US demand that the land at Pyeongtaek requires $500 million in flood control improvements while the ROK claims that it is impossible due to the land fill issues -- and then simply refused to talk about it.)



Seohee Construction Gets Landfill Contract for First Parcel The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded a $29.7 million contract to Seohee Construction Co. Ltd. of Seoul on 17 Nov and on 20 Nov issued clearance to start work. The 200-acre tract is the first portion of land scheduled for construction. The first work on the site will go forward on “Parcel 1,” a 200-acre portion of the overall expansion site, officials have said. The contract calls for Seohee to blanket the parcel with landfill and put in roads and a drainage system. An estimated 3 million cubic yards of soil is to be laid down there, officials have said. Later, a separate contract will be issued for building construction, Monaco said.

The parcel is to be the eventual site of a barracks and dining hall, battalion headquarters, vehicle maintenance shops, administrative buildings, physical fitness center, sports field and a religious education center, project officials have said. Building construction is to begin in 2007, they’ve said. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)




December 2006

South Koreans in Pyeongtaek mixed on U.S. realignment plan According to a 12 Dec Stars and Stripes article, four out of 10 South Koreans in the Pyeongtaek area have favorable or very favorable feelings about the future U.S. military presence in this port city about 40 miles south of Seoul, according to a survey recently released by a South Korean government think tank. Of 1,000 people surveyed in Pyeongtaek in April, 41.9 percent said they have a positive perception of the American military’s planned growth, which will relocate U.S. headquarters from Yongsan Garrison in Seoul to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek. But 38.3 percent said they disliked or strongly disliked the increased presence, which is a joint project by the South Korean and U.S. governments.

Another 19.8 percent said they had no strong feelings one way or another, according to the survey done by the Gyeonggi Research Institute, a provincial government research center that covers the area from north of Seoul down past Pyeongtaek. When asked about the move of the 2nd Infantry Division — a unit now stationed closer to the North Korean border that includes thousands of young, single soldiers — opinions shifted. Nearly one in four Pyeongtaek residents said they strongly disliked the move.

Kim Dong-sung, the researcher who headed the study, said this week that some of the most surprising findings involved what he called misconceptions by local residents of U.S. soldiers. Kim said many local residents imagine soldiers as rude and heavy drinkers, an image he said is more akin to experiences from the 1960s and 1970s.“It is very important to break that kind of old image,” he said during a telephone interview last week. Kim, who is on sabbatical this year at the University of Maryland at College Park, was in South Korea to present the survey’s findings to a group of government officials and residents in late November. (SITE NOTE: In order to reverse this perception, the ROK media must not jump on every incident involving a USFK military member as though it were a national outrage. The sensationalism panders to the underlying anti-American feelings in the Korean public in general. In a recent trial, a soldier hit a woman with a bottle over vague circumstances. Though the act deserves punishment, the treatment in the press was out of proportion to the numbers of cases of brutality by Koreans to both males and females while under the influence.)

The overall report also included partial results from a questionnaire by 211 U.S. soldiers on Yongsan Garrison and K-16 Air Base, Kim said. That portion of the research was headed by U.S. Forces Korea’s community relations office, Kim said. Kim said the survey’s purpose was to hear from Americans and South Koreans about their perceptions of each other. Kim said he hopes by exposing these perceptions, both governments might work to foster better relationships between the groups.

The questions asked of U.S. soldiers ranged from their exposure to the Pyeongtaek area residents to the benefits of the relocation plan. Nearly four out of five soldiers thought the move would benefit Pyeongtaek’s economy, according to the partial results released. Four out of 10 Pyeongtaek residents also thought their local economy would benefit from the move, according to the survey, which is available in Korean at: www.kydi.re.kr.

When asked to rank the advantages of the move, 42.7 percent of those surveyed named the local economy, followed by 19.8 percent who said national security, 17.4 percent said new jobs, 8.3 percent said more subsidies for the local government and 5.3 percent said cultural exchanges between the two nations.

When asked to rank the disadvantages, 30.2 percent said they feared a larger influence of drinking and prostitution in the area, which might in turn influence younger South Koreans. Tied for second on the list was rising crime and environmental impacts, such as noise pollution, at 23.1; third was restrictions on land use for private citizens at 14.8 percent and fifth was lower property values at 6.5 percent. (SITE NOTE: Korea has a sex industry that is estimated at $22 billion per year. Red light districts are sanctioned in most cities. Unregistered prostitutes that once worked in the red light districts have now moved into the neighborhoods after the police crackdown (mostly for international media show) in 2005. Besides, the GI business is considered "cheap trade" by the Korean prostitutes who have left it to Filipinas and other foreign nationals from impoverished countries. As to alcohol, those familiar with Korea know that drinking is part of the fabric of group dynamics in business and leisure. Thus the influence of GI drinking and prostitution are minimal.)

Kim made several recommendations to both governments in his report. He urged the South Korean government to give Pyeongtaek local officials a larger voice when making decisions and assuaging conflicts that arise between the local community and U.S. servicemembers.

To the Americans, Kim urged the commands to take a more active role in promoting the community relations programs already in existence. According to his survey, three out of four people know little or nothing about USFK’s Good Neighbor Program, a campaign that brings together U.S. servicemembers and South Koreans in a wide range of civic activities. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)


South Koreans want U.S. troops to bring families A South Korean government research group will survey U.S. servicemembers with the hopes of encouraging more troops to bring their families along for long-term assignments. The Family and Women Development Institute of Gyeonggi Province plans to interview U.S. servicemembers early next year to discover what aspects of South Korean life might attract more families.

Of the 29,500 servicemembers assigned to U.S. Forces Korea, only about 10 percent get financial support — including housing — to bring their families along. Because of that restriction, most assignments here last only a year. As the U.S. forces centralize at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek in coming years, leaders hope to change that shortened, solitary assignment into a three-year stint with orders to bring family members along.

In tandem with that move, local leaders say they want to provide housing and social needs that will better fit foreign families. Last week, the Gyeonggi governor Kim Moon-soo requested help from USFK commander Gen. B. B. Bell to conduct the survey. The local officials also are planning a trip to Okinawa to study examples of U.S. military families living abroad. (Source: Stars and Stripes.) (SITE NOTE: The only problem with this is that the ROK refuses to increase their cost-sharing which directly impacts upon the accompanied tours in Korea. This is why the ROK is NOT the area of choice for most personnel because of the unaccompanied tour. In the USFJ, 75 percent of married personnel are accompanied tours, while in Korea only 10 percent are accompanied. Even those that were accompanied live in substandard housing on the camps near the DMZ -- and even worse off-base.)







Message for the GIs at Daechuri


Anti-US Expansion Protests in the Pyongtaek Area (Jan 2006-???)

Background: NGO Activist Group Position on US Relocation

(See Protests in the Pyongtaek Area (Mar 2005 - Dec 2005) for background. See My Hometown: Archive for video of background on Daechuri with interviews with residents. This is a very compelling video of the residents viewpoint. They are being forced to relocate with a pitiance of funds that will not be able to purchase new land. The government has not offered land swaps. The video tells of how the people reclaimed the land that the government now wants to transfer to the USFK. The video shows their anger at the situation. It also shows how the villagers futilely try to prevent riot police and MND personnel from entering their village by blocking their path. Though they are fighting a losing battle and being used as pawns by some activist groups, their message is one of a farmer and his land. Their anger at the Central Land Expropriation Committee refusal to meet them in Aug 2005. The video shows the sadness surrounding the situation as they realize that their plight is hopeless -- but vow to fight to the end in Nov 2005. We highly recommend all Americans at Osan and Pyeongtaek view this video with English subtitles to get a sense of the farmers plight. )

Camp Humphreys Expansion (2002-2006) The Camp Humphreys expansion has come a long way since the ROK initially dragged its feet to prevent the move as they did not want their "tripwire" on the DMZ to disappear. However, it is STILL not signed, sealed and delivered. The ROK may receive its wish to have back its wartime control in the near future -- by 2012 ... OR SOONER. If the Combined Field Command is eliminated, there will not be a need for a large presence in Korea as they will move to Guam or Japan. This will leave in a hole of its own making -- and Camp Humphreys may be relegated to "follow-on" storage area -- with a minimal caretaker force.

Under the 2002 Land Partnership Plan (LPP), the U.S. military agreed to return more than half the land it uses as bases in South Korea. The area to be returned amounted to 41.14 million pyeong (135.8 million sq. meter), 55.3 percent of the 74.40 million pyeong currently occupied by the U.S. military. In exchange, the agreement called for 1.54 million pyeong of land to be newly granted to the U.S. forces.

In June 2003 after much hassling and recriminations, denials, posturings and setbacks, the USFK announced that the 8th Army was leaving Yongsan and moving south of the Han River to hubs in Osan and Pyeongtaek and Taegu/Pohang. The chief obstacle in the Future of the Alliance (FOTA) talks on 7-8 Jun 2004 was the size of the new, integrated U.S. military facility in Pyeongtaek and Osan. U.S. negotiators said they required 1,130 hectares (2,800 acres) to build a new base. South Korea offered 970 hectares plus an additional 30-hectare parcel, which would provide space for UN Command and Combined Forces Command headquarters. U.S. delegates reportedly requested that the Korean government provide 480,000 pyeong of land for the Osan/Pyeongtaek base site, in addition to the 3.12 million pyeong of land already provided, in exchange for returning an additional 11.18 million pyeong of land from U.S. 2nd ID bases along with the 41.14 million pyeong (135.8 million sq. meter) that the United States had already promised to return under the LPP. (See Relocation of USFK (2004) for details.)

In November 2003, it was announced that 240,000 p'yeong of farming land was to be expropriated from part of P'aengseong-eup [in P'yeongt'aek City], the heads of 71 villages got together and formed the P'aengseong Response Committee. Since 26 Dec 2004, they have been on a sit-down strike in a tent on a farm road. The villagers took 24-hour shifts watching out for and impeding moves from the Ministry of Defense to expropriate their land. (Source: Korea Herald, 30 Jan 2004.)

In 2004, the anti-war and unification NGO groups took the side of the farmers to assist their agendas and exploited the situation to inflame the community. The protests culminated in the violent confrontation in Jul 2004 where both demonstrators and policemen were hospitalized. (See Pyeongtaek Events: Protests above.)

In Mar 2004, the U.S. and ROK are negotiated an amendment to the LPP whereby the land grants planned for Uijongbu and Ichon was cancelled, and a larger grant of land at Camp Humphreys provided instead. On 1 June Yonhap News reported that the USFK had requested South Korea grant for 3.2-3.3 million pyeong of land in Pyeongtaek. Later the land was increased to 3.5 million and approved by the National Assembly.

The chief obstacle in the Future of the Alliance (FOTA) talks on 7-8 Jun 2004 was the size of the new, integrated U.S. military facility in Pyeongtaek and Osan. U.S. negotiators said they required 1,130 hectares (2,800 acres) to build a new base. South Korea offered 970 hectares plus an additional 30-hectare parcel, which would provide space for UN Command and Combined Forces Command headquarters. U.S. delegates reportedly requested that the Korean government provide 480,000 pyeong of land for the Osan/Pyeongtaek base site, in addition to the 3.12 million pyeong of land already provided, in exchange for returning an additional 11.18 million pyeong of land from U.S. 2nd ID bases along with the 41.14 million pyeong (135.8 million sq. meter) that the United States had already promised to return under the LPP. (See Relocation of USFK (2004) for details.)

In Aug 2004, despite its agreement to procure land for the Pyongtaek relocation, the ROK was still offering "alternative" sites and stating that giving half of the land agreed on in 2004 was impossible. Donga Ilbo, "Government to Complete the Land Purchase Deal of the USFK Bases Relocation Site in Pyongtaek by Next Year" (7 Aug 2004) stated,

The Ministry of National Defense announced that they plan to complete the purchase of the 3,490,000-pyong alternative site in the Pyongtaek area in the Gyeonggi province by the end of 2005. The site was designated for the relocation site for bases of the USFK's Yongsan and the 2nd Division."

Nam Dae-yon, public information officer at the Defense Ministry, said on 6 Aug 2004, "Currently, Korea and the U.S. are discussing ways to purchase a 740,000-pyong site around Camp Humphrey, a USFK base in Pyongtaek, and to complete the purchase of the remaining 2,750,000-pyong by next year." He responded to the Dong-A Ilbo article on 6 Aug, which stated, "The U.S. has requested half of the Pyongtaek site within this year," by explaining, "It is true that the U.S. has suggested that, but discussions are currently in process to adjust the schedule since the request is impossible in practice."

The ministry added, "The area around Hoihwa-ri, Seotan-myon in Pyongtaek that was mentioned as the alternative site (the second area around the Osan Air Force Base, as covered in the Dong-A Ilbo on August 6) is being reconsidered to other areas, but the rest of the site will continue to be offered as the alternative site for the USFK base."

In addition, the ministry also intends to implement plans to support the local residents with the Special Law on U.S. Forces Bases Relocation Plan, which is scheduled to be submitted to the National Assembly next month. Details of the special law include establishing a collective relocation site, providing rental housing, founding the life stability subsidy, and others, considering the damages to the local residents caused by the USFK bases relocation. (NOTE: In Nov 2005 they announced the "International City" as "compensation" to the Pyeongtaek people for the "damages" the soldiers will do to their community.)
On August 8, 2005, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced it would begin the process of imminent domain and take by force the remaining 1,200,000 pyeong of land not yet purchased by the MND. Military officials stated on August 8 that of the 3,490,000 pyeong of future land necessary for base expansion in Pyoengtaek and Paengsong, and Osan Air Base, deliberations over 2,290,000 million pyeong of land had already been concluded. According to the Land Management Project Board, the arbitration process over the remaining 1,200,000 pyeong of land was proposed in September. The arbitration judgment was concluded in November. And in December, the process of land take over was begun.

As of Aug 2005, of the 3,490,000 pyoneg of land to be transferred for base expansion, 96% of the land for Osan Air Base and 60% of the land in the Paengsong region (Camp Humphreys) had been signed and transferred to the MND. About 200 families lived on 680,000 pyeong of land that had not yet transferred to the MND (650,000 pyeong in the Paengsong region and 30,000 pyeong around Osan Air Base). Land not yet transferred also included 200,000 pyeong owned by Sejong University, and 208,000 pyeong of land whose ownership and registration is unclear. Also included are ancestral and inherited land. The end of November was the tentative date when the arbitration process for the Land Management Process was to be decided. The MND stated that if land owners requested to sign an agreement before this date, they would deal with the [land transfer] process. The MND also stated, "There will be no significant difference in compensation between those who sign an agreement with the MND and those who seek compensation elsewhere." (Source: Antigizi.or.kr.)

According to the Stars and Stripes on 29 Dec 2005, "Under the amended Land Partnership Plan between South Korea and the United States, Camp Humphreys will triple in size, growing from about 1,230 acres to 3,558 acres by 2008. An estimated $5 billion is to be spent on construction alone. Its population also will increase, from more than 11,000 to 45,000, U.S. military officials have said.

It eventually will be the site of U.S. Forces Korea headquarters, Combined Forces Command, United Nations Command and other units and organizations including ground combat and aviation forces, officials have said. While much construction already is under way at Camp Humphreys, the enlarging of its boundaries awaits completion of the South Korean government's land purchase effort."


Ministry acquires 80% of land for U.S. base

The Defense Ministry said yesterday it has purchased nearly 80 percent of land necessary to build a new U.S. military base in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province. The ministry has requested a local court to allow for it to claim the remaining 20 percent, it said in a statement.

The purchasing begun June 14 to implement an agreement between Korea and the United States to reposition U.S. troops in the Yongsan Garrison and the 2nd Infantry Division to Pyeongtaek, 70 kilometers south of Seoul, by 2008.

As of Dec. 22, the ministry had completed buying about 2.75 million pyeong, or 78.9 percent of the total 3.5 million pyeong land required with consent from the residents and landowners. One pyeong equals 3.3 square meters. It deposited the remaining 0.73 million pyeong in the court for expropriation. It failed to buy the land plots due to disagreement with landowners over compensation or due to failure to find the owners.

The deposited land will be soon expropriated in accordance with legal procedures, the ministry said.

"The Defense Ministry will cooperate to establish a win-win strategy for the project with local residents and government by building residential towns for the moving-out people, executing 30 billion won allocated for supporting the local government," the ministry said.
Pan-Korean Committee Viewpoint The "Pan-Korean Committee Against the US Base Extension to Pyeongtaek" claimed the agreement to relocate to Pyeongtaek was unfair in cost sharing and infringes upon the health of the people due to environmental damage as well as infringements on their human rights as lands will be taken away for use by the USFK. The following is a 9 Sep 2005 article by the Pan-Korea Committee, an umbrella group of Unification, Environmental, Anti-war and Social Welfare activist groups with a common interest in preventing the move of the USFK to Pyeongtaek.

Movement against US Military Base Expansion for the Peace and Independence of The Korean peninsula (2005/09/09)

You Young-Jae
Head,Policy Subcommittee, PKC
(Pan-Korean Committee against US Base Extension to Pyong-Taek)

  • 1. US Military Hegemony and Strategic Transformations

    The US Armed Forces after the Cold War persue deterrence in Eastern Asia, military strategy for swift victory under outbreaks of war and Asia-centered military strategy, which defines China as a potential threat. This shows that the US Forces are focusing on Northeast Asia more than ever. To achieve this, US forces are undergoing military transformation into rapid reaction forces equipped with advanced weapons and capacity to handle network wars of the 21st century and continue the US military hegemony in the future.

    To maximize the effect of the military transformation, the US forces are promoting the GPR (the Global Posture Review), which claims that relocating overseas bases in Europe and Northeast Asia must be done to maximize swift mobility.

  • 2. US Military Relocation in the Asia-Pacific Region

    With the planned relocation, the ultimate object of the US Armed Forces, stationed in Korea, is changing from defending South Korea from North Korea to gaining rapid mobility for the defense of the Asia-Pacific region and blocking China. Under the deceptive concept of strategic flexibility, Korea-US negotiations are done in secret so the danger of US military relocation cannot be recognized by citizens.

    Table 1. Changes with US Forces Korea
    Present Future
    Range of activity Republic of Korea Asia-Pacific
    Objective Defensive Aggressive
    Characteristic Fixed-post ground forces Navy/air mobile forces

    • 1) Reorganization

      Last June, the US 2nd Infantry Division has completed its transformation into a Unit of Employment X (UEX), a unit sized between a corps and a division. The transformation gave the 2nd Infantry Division greater flexibility and fire power, equipped with state-of-art weapons systems centered on C4I, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), Abrams (AIM) tanks, and M270A1 Multiple Launch Rocket System.

      Under its broader military transformation plan, the US military is creating three new unit of action (UA), unit of employment X (UEX) and unit of employment Y (UEY)to replace the current fourthe brigade, division, corps and army. The 1st Brigade under the Division was transformed into a Unit of Action (UA), which became two to three times more powerful than before. The 8th Army will be also transformed into a Unit of Employment Y (UEY), a higher level unit than UEX, by the end of this year. Besides, the US is planning to establish the first overseas air combat command in the Asia-Pacific region, Northeast Asian Air combat Command, by transforming the 7th Air Force based in the K-55 Airstrip in January next year. This series of changes will bring rapid mobility and greater agility to the US Armed Forces.

    • 1) Relocation and Reduction

      In accordance to the GPR, the US Forces Korea is scheduled for relocation to Pyeongtaek, Daejeon and Busan by the year 2008. Accordingly, the Yongsan Army Garrison and the 2nd Infantry Division are moving to Pyeongtaek, where they have an air base and a naval port to serve a good military post for rapid reaction forces. In the process, the 37,000 US Forces Korea will be reduced to 25,000.

    • 2) Relocation of US Forces, Transfer of Missions, Reduction of Forces

      According to the agreement last year, Korea and US have decided to relocate Yongsan Army Garrison and the 2nd Infantry Division to Pyeongtaek and transfer 10defense missions of US forces to Korean military. During this process, missions including guarding the joint security area at Panmunjeom and counter-fire battles would be transferred and the cost is an estimate of 118.7 billion won. Also, by 2008, 12500 US forces will be reduced. Due to the relocation, 3490 thousand pyeong(=3.058?) of new base would be constructed. 4570 thousand pyeong of US military base is already stationed in Pyeongtaek but the military is expanding to build a larger base. The reason for Yongsan Army Garrison and the 2nd Infantry Division for moving to Pyeongtaek, is becuase they would have an air base and a naval port to serve a good military post for rapid reaction forces.

    • 3) Capacity Building of the Combined Forces

      By 2006 the US is spending 11 billion dollars to improve 150 parts of the ROK-US Combined Forces. This money, which is about seven to eight times of North Korea's military budget for a year, will either maintain or buy new Apache Longbow helicopters, Patriot missiles (PAC-3), M1 tanks and improve C4I (Consultation, Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) systems.

      The US has also arranged for immediate take-off within 24 hours with the Theater Support Vessel (TSV), which can carry a striker brigade and fly from Okinawa to the peninsula within one day, and the C-17 Globemaster, the most essential carrier for striker brigade, which can fly from the US to the peninsula in 11 hours without any additional oil supply on the way. In accordance, the US expects South Korea to increaseits military expenditure and buy their weapons. Cooperative self-reliant national defence is the way South Korea complies with the US request, buying new weapons apt for the new strategies

    • 4) Legal Aspects of US Forces Korea's Expansion

      Taking advantage of high-level meetings between governments, ROK-US Security Policy Initiative (SPI) meetings and strategic flexibility meetings, South Korea and the US are putting efforts to discuss legislation regarding the ongoing changes. It is to gain legitimacy and justification for the expansion of the Combined Forces' duties. By giving new interpretation of the SOFA, the two countries are up to make a joint security declaration that will allow expanding the role of the Combined Forces and changing the operational control authority as well.

      In addition, the ruling party is pursuing for the overseas dispatch bill, which allows overseas dispatch of the Korean forces in case of the UN peace keeping operations (PKO) and emergency relief without the national assembly's consent. The bill, however, does not comply with the five principles of the PKO agreement among the parties to armed conflict, impartiality, limited use of weapons and does not have any persuasive reasons for leaving out the assembly's consent. The bill is only believed to support the expansion of the Combined Forces and the transition to an aggressive alliance.


  • 3. Problems with US Base Expansion in Pyeongtaek

    • 1) Threat to Peace of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia and the permanent stay of US Forces

      When based in Pyeongtaek, the US Forces can escape from North Korea's shooting range, which, combined with its advanced weaponry and increased mobility taking advantage of the K-55 Airstrip (Songtan)and the naval port, makes it easier for the US to attack North Korea and contain China. It becomes also able to dispatch forces out of Korea in the Asia-Pacific region, making Korea a US outpost ready for aggressive wars.

      Such intention is proven in ample evidences including the statement from the US delegation at the first meeting of the South Korea-US Future of the Alliance (FOTA) in April 2003 that the current disposition of the 2nd Infantry Division is not suitable for war execution; the Korean delegation's preparation materials for the third FOTA meeting, which refer to the chances of US intervention in China-Taiwan conflict or conflicts between potential regional hegemonies such as China and other countries in the region; and the statement by William Fallon, US Pacific Commander, at the US Senate Armed Services Committee on March 8, 2005 that the US Forces will increase mobility in the Asia-Pacific region in the near term.

      Military tension and conflicts will be increased around the Peninsula, accordingly, which may put Korea right in the middle of a war the US wages and its consequences in the worst case.

      The relocation is also an effort to seek for a stable post where the US Forces can be stationed as long as they wish. The Yongsan Base, located right in the middle of Seoul, is considered to encourage anti-American sentiment among people in Korea. Naturally, a new base in Pyeongtaek would enhance stability in the eyes of the US Forces.

      Building environment of long-term stability for the US Forces has been on the agenda for the relocation negotiation. The Yongsan Relocation Agreement also states that a timely relocation would contribute to an enduring structure of the US Forces Korea. The US Forces made it included in the Agreement that the new base would be equipped with enhanced facilities, based on which they are now demanding the most advanced facilities.

    • 2) Threat to the residents' right to live and the violation of human rights

      After the relocation of US Forces, the base would be expanded by 640thousand pyeong in Seotan region and 28.5 million pyeong in Pangsung region. In the scheduled expansion area, lives 535 households and 1372 residents. The US army base and US air force base is already stationed in this area.

      In 2003, the media reported the discussion between the Korean government and US Forces regarding the relocation of Yongsan Army Garrison and the 2nd Infantry Division to Pyeongtaek. The residents wanted to confirm the facts, however no government officials or Pyeongtaek city officials would confront the residents nor listen to them. In the process of discussion government excluded the residents' opinion, and only after the agreement had already passed the legislature did the government tried to hold a conference.

      The US army stationed in the Pangsung region is on the land where the farmers ( the residents) filled the sea with tremendous amount of labor. The only job done by the government was assessing a tax. Now, however, the government is trying to seize their property under " national security." Giving the rich land that will provide quality rice to the US military base is equivalent to giving their child away, so the farmers have organized (hangul name of group) and have been fighting fiercely.

      The situation of Daechu region shows how the resident's life is being torn down. Daechu region used to be where US army is currently stationed. When Japanese army retreated, US army kicked the residents out to expand their base. Therefore another expansion plan caused indignation among elderly residents who will lose there home once again.

      The residents have been enduring noise pollution, environmental pollution, military crimes for the past decades. However, now that the US Forces demand the residents to submit their house and land, there is a heavy opposition movement among residents. To settle this opposition, the Korean government is offering to provide compensation for the residents and the city of Pyeongtaek, but the compensation is not enough to maintain current living standards. In addition, after the expansion military facilities in Pyeongtaek will increase dramatically, and the danger of wartime will buid up, so depite the governments support the economy and the development of the city will face serious problems and the residents will suffer from military crimes and educational, environmental and cultural damage.

      Due to the relocation process the frequency of take-offs and landings have increased so the residents are suffering from heavy noise pollution. On top of this some helicopters fly at 11 pm or even midnight, the residents in the region is suffering from lack of sleep. The expansion will threaten the lives of the residents.

      The public officials and the police are violating even the basic human rights of the residents because the expansion is part of a national policy and is indispensible. An officer from the Ministry of National Defense would disclose his identity to the residents. The police inspected the town without proper uniforms. and overnight, they snatched away the rocks that the residents have gathered for a town event. The Ministry of National Defense tried to conduct compensation conference without informing the residents beforehand, which resulted in physical conflict with the residents. During these conflicts the police took the residents to the police station, committed violence and used abusive language without formal uniforms.

      These kinds of human rights violation originates from the public officials's arrogant attitude that the expansion process is for "National Security" related to "US Forces" For them, the residents of the region are not a respect citizen whose rights deserve to be protected, but only a subject that should be expelled from the town.

    • 3) Unfair Cost Sharing

      While the military relocation is executed in accordance to the military transformation represented by the GPR, most of the cost occurred from the relocation will be covered by the Korean government. Korea is responsible for all the costs occurred in purchasing land requirements, designing, construction and equipments as well as for the cost of moving, and the forces' lodging and allowances during the period. It is stated in the agreement that because Korean government demanded the relocation of Yongsan base Korean government is responsible for all the costs. However, because the exact amount is not stated it is an unfair agreement where Korean government will have to pay whatever the US military demands. Also, the relocated facilities are required to be built with improved functions. Furthermore, the fact that the relocation was demanded by the US due to the military transformation was completely disregarded.

      The revised Land Partnership Plan (LPP) requires the US government to cover the 2nd Infantry Division's cost of moving. Precedents and the US documents predict, however, the opposite.

      Overall, the relocation negotiation is against the Constitution and unfairly desirable to the US interests. Otherwise, the US State Department did not evaluate the relocation negotiations above target.


  • 4. Significances and Challenges of Anti-US Base Expansion Movement

    • 1) Secure Peace in Northeast Asia and Block military transformation into Asia-Pacific mobile forces

      The US is concentrating its efforts to build rapid mobility in the Asia-Pacific region. South Korea and the US have come to agreements for the purpose through the FOTA meetings and taking advantage of high-level meetings between governments, ROK-US Security Policy Initiative (SPI) meetings and strategic flexibility meetings, South Korea and the US are putting efforts to discuss legislation regarding the ongoing changes.

      Neighboring countries would not seat and watch the US expanding its military bases in the region. North Korea has already test-fired a missile with a shooting range over 100km, which is assumed to have targeted Pyeongtaek. China expressed concerns on being targeted by the US Forces Korea. The US aggressiveness in Pyeongtaek would increase tensions and threats of war in the Peninsula and in the region. In this sense, the opposition of expansion of military base in Pyeongtaek is not only for Pyeongtaek residents only, but for the peace in the region.

    • 2) Save the living rights and the community of Pyeongtaek residents

      To farmers, land is life itself and it is especially so to the residents of 60s and 70s in Pyeongtaek who are too old to start a new life. Thus, depriving land from the residents is depriving them of right to life.

      Pyeongtaek is a community that has maintained the tradition of helping each other. In its effort to persuade the residents, however, the government has come in between and antagonism and distrust has slit the community into pieces. Our struggle, in this respect, is to protect the right to life and the community.

      The residents have been fighting everyday against the government's unilateral land expropriation policy since last September 1st, by candlelight movement. Joining this fight is consolidating our security and peace and protecting our future.

      Since the Peace March against Pyeongtaek military expansion and for Peace in Korean peninsula on July 10th, numerous individuals and organizations are making a base-pilgrimage to Pyeongtaek. Currently, the residents and (hangul name of group) is preparing a festival for the prevention of military expansion on December 11th. We pursue the support and collaboration of many people to fill the Hwangsaewool field with the yellow flags that stands for the opposition of military expansion and we will unite our effort with other international peace movements to fight against US military forces.
(Source: Green Korea.)

Protests Continue

Normally the winter season brings calm as Koreans are normally "fair weather" protestors -- meaning the weather has to be clear. Normally the protests end in about the end of November and pick up again in the spring. However, the protests in the Pyeongtaek area have continued unabated because the situation is still not resolved. In Dec 2005, the ROK government revealed plans for an "international city" in Pyeongtaek and asked the citizens for their understanding. The "international city" -- most likely to be built in the Seojong-ni area outside of Osan AB -- is a blatant bribe to the citizenry of Pyeongtaek to support the move to the area. (See Pyeongtaek Expansion Plan (Jan 2006) for details.)

Pyeongtaek in Gyeonggi Province, which is soon to be vacated by the US military, will be transformed into an industrial park and an international city equipped with a foreign school and a business center by 2020. (SITE NOTE: We hope the word "vacated" is a misinterpretation. The Pyeongtaek Mayor's Office stated, "In parallel with the proposed relocation of the US Forces in Korea, Gyeonggi plans to construct a free international city and international peace city in the northern and southern areas, respectively, as national projects.") In addition, the Pyeongtaek High-Speed Train Station will be built there and a 2 million pyong (6.6 million m˛) hinterland city will be built in Poseung-myeon.

The Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs announced on December 5 (2005) that the government plans to invest 18 trillion and 801.6 billion won by 2020 and develop Pyeongtaek City as the international hub city in the western sea region. Once the development is completed, the government estimates that the population of Pyeongtaek City will grow from the current 360 thousand to 800 thousand in 2020 while the gross production of the region will grow from 5 trillion won to around 25 trillion won. The government has put the most importance in the development of Pyeongtaek, which is close to China across the Yellow Sea, as an international hub city. In two globalization districts (with an area of 6.5 million pyong (21.5 million m˛)), a foreign school, foreign residential complex, international business center, high-speed train station and administrative town will be built. The globalization district project is the most important part of the development project and a total of 5 trillion and 674.3 billion won will be allocated for it. By attracting special colleges and foreign schools, the government plans to develop a global work force.

In order to develop the Pyeongtaek o Dangjin Port as the central port of the Seoul metropolitan area and the central region of the country and the center of the Yellow Sea region, the government will try to designate the area as a free economic zone, develop an international logistics complex and expand the Poseung Industrial Park. (Source: Korea Real Estate Information Center.)

The creation of this International City is a Gyeonggi Province initiative. See Chosun Ilbo for June 2003 article.)
Though the land was supposed to be procured for the move of the troops off the DMZ by Dec 2005, the ROK government had only procured 80 percent with the remaining 20 percent -- mostly land directly outside Camp Humphreys -- to be condemned (expropriated) through the courts. However, the ROK did not initiate legal action until Dec 2005 typical of the "foot-dragging strategy" the Roh administration has undertaken from the start. Until the entire land agreed upon -- the base cannot expand its perimeter. The need for this land was agreed upon in 2003 in the Future of the US-ROK Alliance (FOTA) discussions when the decision was made to relocate the forces -- with initial land procurement date set for 2004. "Renegotiations" set the date to Dec 2005 and now it will be slipped further. (SITE NOTE: The return of land under the LPP is significantly different from this process as the LPP land was consists of land the ROK government did NOT pay any rent on. It has been used rent-free by the ROK -- and provided to the USFK for use. The new land around Pyeongtaek must be procured by the ROK government and placed under the Ministry of Defense before transfer to the USFK for use. Thus the process requires a much more complex process of locating ownership and procurement. If the owners refuse to sell, the land must be expropriated (condemned) for government use.)

In addition, there is a looming conflict over the USFK demand that the area between the river and the camp be raised to prevent flooding under the 50-year and 100-year flood plain plan. The USFK demanded this be included in 2005, but the ROK has been opposed to the $500 million price tag increase -- as well as objections that there is not sufficient fill available to complete this project. (See Site alterations for American military base vex the allies (Jan 2006) for background.) As such the NGO groups have continued their protests in the Pyeongtaek area. The latest ploys have been to attack the use of contaminated bases to slow the relocation process -- as well as "renegotiating" the cost sharing process. These last two contention areas were resurfaced in Jan 2006.

10-11 Dec 2005 On 10-11 Dec 2005, there was a small protest march from the Pyeongtaek Train Station to City Hall, but the march was peaceful. However, it is very unusual for there was a cold snap that had hit the country.


Pyeongtaek Protest (11 Dec 2005) (Tongil News)


13-14 Jan 2006 With the "expropriation" (condemnation) action through the courts of the last 20 percent of the farm lands -- along with the latest delay because of the USFK demand for fill of the low lying area -- NGO groups feel emboldened to press on with their protests.

The following is from Croceviaterra:

Proposal for International Solidarity Action on Behalf of Pyeongtaek Peace

We appeal to all peace loving people around the world to participate in International Solidarity Action and join our struggle to live in peace, free from fear of US military bases.

Plans for US base expansion announced by the US and South Korea government in 2003 threatens the peaceful lives of Pyeongtaek residents as well as the peace and stability of the entire Northeast Asia region. The expansion of US bases in Pyeongtaek is a plan devised by the US military in preparation for a new type of war on the Korean Peninsula. Rather than moving towards peace and reconciliation, the Korean Peninsula is reverting towards a direction of confrontation and war. The expansion of US bases brings the threat of war not only to the Korean Peninsula, but carries the potential for large-scale military confrontation in the entire Northeast Asia region.

Pyeongtaek Residents have now been lighting their candles for almost 500 consecutive days in a defiant effort to defend their land with their lives. At present, the Korean government has nearly completed the land expropriation procedure, and warned in 2006 that they will begin forcefully evicting residents from their land. The South Korean government has plans to take away land from approximately 830 residents who have not sold their land in resistance to base redevelopment plans. The government also plans to forcefully evict those residents. Pyeongtaek farmers are about to lose the land they love as their own life. Farmers' right to their land and life will be stomped on as families are torn apart and farmers are kicked out from their homeland.

Having already experienced the loss of their land not too long ago, most residents wish to live and die on the land that they currently live on. The hopes of residents should not be a dream, but their right: their right to life and their right to work. For sixty years, Pyeongtaek residents have put up with suffering and struggles stemming from US military bases. Their bloodstained tears must stop. Expansion of US military bases and the purchase of tremendously expensive military hardware will not only affect Pyeongtaek residents, but also poor and struggling city dwellers.

On December 11, 2005, people across the entire country gathered together in Pyeongtaek to participate in a large peace march to protest against the expansion of US bases in Pyeongtaek. This was the second major event held in Pyeongtaek to protest against US bases. Fourteen international delegates, including Jose Bove of the Federation of French Farmers, Irma Maria Ostroski of MST (Viecampes movement in Brazil), and Okinawa-Henoko activists visited Pyeongtaek. After taking a tour of the U.S. base, international activists attended a meeting of the Pyeongtaek Residentąs Action Committee, informal meetings, and the candlelight vigil with Pyeongtaek villagers. Our representatives met with the international delegation and decided to commemorate January 14th as the Day of International Solidarity Action. January 14th marks the 500th day of Candlelight Vigils in an effort to defend the land in Pyeongtaek.
On 13 Jan 2006, a protest march with farm tractors and vans proceeded towards Camp Humphreys to commemorate the 500th day of the Pyeongtaek Farmers' Protest, but was stopped by a barricade of riot police buses that blocked the route. The relatively small group of between 400 jostled with the police, but as the standoff stretched into the night, it was resolved after local police arrived to disperse the crowd. Their permit was only for the daylight hours -- and the Constitutional Courts has upheld the right of the police to ban nighttime rallies. Though angered, the group dispersed.




Pyeongtaek Farmers' Protest (13 Jan 2006) (Tongil News)


On 14 Jan 2006 a peaceful rally was held in Pyeongtaek on an elementary school grounds. The group marched through the streets in darkness -- to flaunt the NHRC's latest "recommendation" to allow night-time demonstrations. About 4000 protestors turned out to celebrate the 500th day of the protest. Our old friend Rev. Mun Chon-Hyun, the radical Catholic priest from Kunsan noted for his inflamatory rhetoric, flowing white beard, and walking cane, attended the rally. A large bon-fire topped off the festivities.






Pyeongtaek Protest (14 Jan 2006) (Tongil News)


6 Feb 2006 Very little heard of any protests in the Pyeongtaek Area during the winter as litigation proceeds to make way for the Camp Humphreys expansion, while other projects for Pyeongtaek expansion continue. However, in the lull, the activist groups are busy rallying the populations and starting on projects in preparation for the "Spring Offensive." The farmer groups who will lose their lands continue their protest in vinyl covered buildings and in meeting halls in deserted homes. The local schools are starting to have projects where the children paint portraits of the local farmers to show their support, and college students have erected protest sculptures along the roads in anticipation of the spring demonstrations. Farm vehicles sprout signs supporting the local farmers movement.

There is also the problems with the costs for flood control that the USFK insists must be made along the river, which the ROK refutes.

(L) Land where Camp Humphreys will expand into (R) Levee work along Pyeongtaek Lake in preparation for Camp Humphreys expansion projects (Tongil News)



(L) Fr Moon Jeong-hyun, Anti-War Activist Group, meeting with leaders (R) Small "symbolic" protest to stop the Camp Humphreys Expansion (Tongil News)



(L) Protest sculptures erected by college students along roads (R) Daechu Elementary School decorated with portaits of local farmers to show their support (Tongil News) (NOTE: Site of protest rally on 12 Feb 2006)



(L) Deserted building used as Farmers Meeting Hall (R) Farmers Protest Group continues to meet in vinyl house (Tongil News)


12 Feb 2005 The National Police Agency said it would limit contact between activists and riot police at a rally scheduled for 12 Feb to protest the relocation of United States Forces Korea bases to southern Gyeonggi province. The Pan-South Korea Solution Committee Against U.S. Base Extension in Pyeongtaek, the rally organizer, earlier announced that 5,000 people would participate in the protest near the U.S. Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek. The demonstration by the Pan-Korean National Task Force Against Expansion of U.S. Bases in Pyeongtaek is set for 1-8 p.m. at Daechu-ri Elementary School outside Camp Humphreys' northwest sector. To prevent violent clashes, police in full riot gear would be INSIDE the U.S. base, police said, and uniformed officers would patrol outside with observers from the National Human Rights Commission. At a similar rally last July, hundreds of protesters and police were injured in scuffles. It also planned a candlelight vigil on 12 Feb at Pyeongtaek train station.

On 13 Feb the Joongang Ilbo lauded the police and protestors avoidance of "more wire agency photos of protest-linked violence in Korea. Sobered by the deaths of two farmers last November and calls from the parents of riot police to end what they called a "culture of violence" in demonstrations, thousands of opponents of U.S. plans to establish a new military base in Pyeongtaek marched peacefully yesterday and respected police lines. Uniformed regular police guarded the "no-trespassing" line along the marchers' route. Heavily-armed riot police in battle gear were positioned inside existing U.S. bases in the area, but were not needed." (SITE NOTE: However, it should be noted the violent element who battled the police in Jul 2005 -- the student activists, mostly from the radical Seoul colleges, were NOT present in the march. The march consisted of Fr Moon and mostly local farmer groups. None of the Unification NGO group nor union banners were shown in photos.)

Police estimated that about 3,000 demonstrators took part. Some fireworks were touched off, and the demonstration ran beyond its allotted time, but a police officer dismissed those problems as only minor infractions. Both protesters and police said they felt a difference. "Unlike in the past, it was nice to see the police holding back and guaranteeing our right to protest," said Son Young-woo, 36. A riot police officer who said he had seen action before agreed that things were different. "Last July, I felt that my life was being threatened, and I was afraid before I came here today. I am thankful that the protesters respected the police line." A lot of preparation went into making sure things would stay calm. Riot police were out of sight and organizers also posted people along the police line to help keep the march orderly. (Source: Joongang Ilbo.) (SITE NOTE: The main point was the non-violence was highly organized. The NHRC was there with observers. If there was violence, the protestors and the NHRC which had condemned the riot police for excessive violence when pipe-wielding protestors suffered head injuries and died. If there was violence, public support would have evaporated. There was a lot of items for show -- such as the Fr Moon, a catholic priest, bowing at the shamanistic altar where a pig's head with bills stuffed in its mouth was set up. Large posters were raised showing rice fields with bombs superimposed. At the Daechu Elementary School, the children flew kites while the adults railed against the Camp Humphreys move -- creating nice backdrops for photo ops.)


(L) Reverend Moon leading protest march (R) Police line up on the "no trespass line" (Tongil News)



(L) March along fence line (R) Bonfire at Daechu Elementary School (Tongil News)



Group of ministers lead the Farmers in prayer for protest (Tongil News)


24 Feb 2006 Tongil News ran photos of the farmers planting their rice crop is a communal activity with the Fr Moon Jeong-hyun, Anti-War Activist Group, in attendance. The event was simply to keep the movement in the spotlight. The news that the Constitutional challenge of the move to Pyeongtaek was rejected by the Constitutional Court so the activists need to regroup. (See Constitutional Challenge Rejected on Pyeongtaek USFK Move (Feb 2006).)

3 Mar 2006 Tongil News ran photos and interviews with protest leaders such as the Fr Moon Jeong-hyun over the ROK government securing the disputed lands with a barbed wire fence. Also the Daechung Elementary School which had been used for protest rallies was placed off-limits to the protest group. In addition, the government would dig up the roads to prevent passage. OhMy News ran an article on the plight of the protestors.


Fr Moon with farm protest leader (3 Mar 2006) (Tongil News)


The following is a story in the Stars and Stripes about the recent event.

Reports: Contested land outside Humphreys to be sealed off

By Franklin Fisher, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Sunday, March 5, 2006

PYEONGTAEK, South Korea — The South Korean Ministry of National Defense will use barbed-wire fences and security checkpoints to seal off some 2,000 acres of contested farm land outside Camp Humphreys, according to South Korean news accounts.

An MND official did not dispute the Yonhap News agency report Friday when contacted by Stars and Stripes but said the ministry would make no comment until it issues a statement on the matter Tuesday.


Disputed Land Cordoned Off (3 Mar 2006) (Tongil News)


The South Korean government took control of the land outside Camp Humphreys in 2005 so the U.S. military eventually can transform the post into its main installation in South Korea. Under an agreement between the United States and South Korea, the camp will triple in size by 2008, and its population will grow from more than 11,000 to about 45,000.

But some farmers complained that the deal forced them off land their families have farmed for generations.

And it's led to protest rallies outside or near Camp Humphreys by South Korean activists. A rally last July saw some 7,000 protesters face off against 10,000 riot-equipped South Korean police.

According to the Yonhap report, MND also will dig large holes in roads to hinder travel into the area and use the Daechu-ri elementary school grounds to warehouse equipment for the project.


Daechuri Elementary School being used by Protestors for Tractor storage for rallies (Mar 2006) (OhMy News) (NOTE: Government use of grounds denies its use to the protestors.)


Daechu-ri is a farming village whose rice fields in places reach virtually to the edge of the Camp Humphreys perimeter. It has been a hotbed of farmer opposition to the planned expansion and the school grounds have been a frequent rallying place for groups staging anti-expansion rallies. According to the South Korean news outlet Newsis, South Korean authorities have warned local residents that trespassing on the land will lead to criminal charges and heavy fines.

The MND also has asked Pyeongtaek City's Korea Rural Community and Agricultural Corporation to shut off the farming water supply, Newsis reported. And it's asked the Korea National Agricultural Cooperation Federation to deny bank loans to the farmers.

Some villagers said they would begin farming the land March 17, Yonhap reported.

And an activist figure who has led past Pyeongtaek rallies protesting the expansion told Stars and Stripes on Friday his organization will back the farmers in this latest turn in the conflict. "Our organization will … fight against MND policy," said Kim Yong-han, a leader of the Pan-Korean National Task Force Against Expansion of U.S. Bases in Pyeongtaek.
4 Mar 2006 A small protest was held on 4 Mar in the streets of Daechu-ri near Anjung-ni to demonstrate the groups concerns. Other acts were in the form of displays to publicize their plight. The march was peaceful, but the group vowed to continue its fight although the government would attempt to block them from their fields.


Anjungni Protest (4 Mar 2006) (Tongil News)



Anjungni Protest (4 Mar 2006) (Tongil News)


6 Mar 2006 A small protest was held at the gates of Daechu Elementary School where the protestors led by Fr Moon chained themselves to the gate. The police moved in and evicted the 250 protestors. Then the protestors marched to the cordoned area and were met in a face-off with regular police blocking their way. Neither side had weapons -- protestors no pipes or shredded bamboo nor police with armor or batons -- so the confrontation was simply pushing. The march was basically peaceful with signs proclaiming, "This Land is Ours." The impression of the Stars and Stripes article was that Riot Police were used. In fact the police were regular uniformed officers. The Riot Police were positioned INSIDE Camp Humphreys along the fenceline.


Protest at Daechu Elementary School Gate (6 Mar 2006) (Tongil News)


South Korean police fears of violence led to their aborting the 6 Mar attempt to force protesters — some of whom had chained themselves together — from a school near Camp Humphreys. Police on 6 Mar had positioned themselves near the school, where demonstrators had scheduled a 9 a.m. rally. But as the day progressed, police dropped any plans of immediately clearing the school grounds. Police detained about 30 demonstrators Monday, including those who had chained themselves together. But they released the demonstrators later in the day. The 6 Mar confrontation between police and demonstrators at the Daechu-ri Elementary School produced no injuries and protesters remained in place. The protesters have said they would hold firm in resisting the South Korean government's efforts to buy land adjoining Camp Humphreys and let the U.S. military use it. Some farmers have rejected the government's land payments and are refusing to leave. Some have said the buy-up forces them off land their families have farmed for generations. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)


Face off at Cordoned area (6 Mar 2006) (Tongil News)


The Stars and Stripes on 8 Mar ran the following article:

1,100 riot police evict protesters near Humphreys

By T.D. Flack and Franklin Fisher, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Wednesday, March 8, 2006

SEOUL -- South Korean riot police and protesters clashed Monday over contested farmland outside the U.S. Army's Camp Humphreys, according to South Korean officials.

About 1,100 Korean riot police were on hand early in the morning as about 60 officials served a mandatory eviction notice to people living on land purchased by the South Korean government. The government took control of about 2,000 acres of farmland outside Camp Humphreys in 2005 so the U.S. military eventually can transform the post into its main installation in South Korea. Under an agreement between the United States and South Korea, the camp will triple in size by 2008; its population is projected to grow from more than 11,000 to about 45,000.

About 250 residents gathered at the Daechu-ri elementary school, site of many protest rallies, on Monday morning to protest the planned eviction, according to the Ministry of National Defense. Police officers moved in to forcibly evict the residents after they were warned three times to disperse but refused.

Pyeongtaek police said they had removed about 20 people who were guarding the school's gate. They also cut the chains off of seven or eight protesters who'd chained themselves together to act as a human shield.

Police officials, contacted late Monday, said the violence was ongoing and they were unable to comment on the number of arrests or injuries among protesters or police.

Camp Humphreys officials took several precautions, as they have routinely when a demonstration has been scheduled near the installation, said Susan Barkley, a spokeswoman for the Area III Support Activity. "This is something that is always done, it wasn't just for this particular for today," Barkley said of the precautionary measures.

Camp Humphreys officials put three locales off-limits to servicemembers -- Daechu-ri, Bongjong-ri and Wonjong-ri -- Barkley said. The restriction began at 3 p.m. Sunday and was to continue until midnight Monday. ?hat? except for residents traveling to and from home, she added.

Officials also banned vehicles and pedestrians inside Camp Humphreys along that "northern end" of the post that borders the rice fields of Daechu-ri, Barkley said. That restriction began at noon Sunday and was to end midnight Monday, she said.

"Other than that it's been business as usual" for the installation, Barkley said.

Ministry officials did not dispute, but wouldn't confirm, South Korean news reports late last week that stated the MND will use barbed-wire fences and security checkpoints to seal off the contested area.
On 9 Mar the Stars and Stripes stated that South Korea's Ministry of National Defense has neither disputed nor confirmed media reports that it plans to seal off some 2,000 acres of contested farm land near Camp Humphreys. The reports said the MND plans to enclose the land behind barbed-wire fences and set up security checkpoints in the area to prevent farmers from farming it this month. The farming season traditionally resumes in March with the arrival of spring weather. An MND official said the ministry would release a statement on the matter later. However, the MND has continued to delay any statement.

(SITE NOTE: The problem is political. A government hardline could cause farmer protests over the potential US-ROK FTA agricultural opening and WTO rice import quota to spill over into this issue. Having exhausted its legal means to stop the loss of the lands, the NGO groups are now playing emotional cards of aged farmers trying to survive on the land of their ancestors. The chaining themselves to the gates of Daechuri school was all symbolic garbage intended for media publication in "progressive" newspapers.

With the May elections approaching, the government does not want to provide more ammunition for farmer protests which have turned violent in the past. Opinion could turn against the Uri party as being anti-farmer with a potential loss of a sizeable amount of votes. Spring is also the start of the protest season as Koreans are normally fair weather activists -- and the hotter the weather, the hotter their tempers. If the government erects the barriers AWAY from the boundaries of Camp Humphreys, it becomes the protector of the barrier and the confrontational force. The USFK is eliminated from the picture. In other words, the bad guys become the ROK government. This is a quandary.

However, to NOT act will drag out the situation indefinitely. The USFK is looking to this issue to judge the ROK commitment to the move. If it leaves the disputed area open to potential attacks on the Camp Humphreys fence line, the ROK government will stand openly accused of being uncommitted to the move.
13 Mar 2006 The following is an editorial in the conservative Chosun Ilbo denouncing the "traveling circus" meaning the protestors that converge on the site for their own agenda.

However, the editorial is also one-sided in that it condemns Fr Moon Jung-hyun, a Catholic priest from Kunsan who heads the anti-war faction (See Go Peace). Though we disagree with Fr Moon's viewpoint, we do not doubt his sincerity in his anti-war beliefs -- and ultimately anti-US presence in Korea. We have documented Fr Moon's travels first in Kunsan then onto Seoul and then in the DMZ area. At the time, we resided in Kunsan and breathed a sigh of relief as he moved his protests to other areas of Korea -- making life in Kunsan easier without the constant protests. Now we live in Songtan and Camp Humphreys is next door, so now we again pay close attention to Fr Moon. Fr Moon is a master of playing to the media and he should not be underestimated. After his arrival on the scene in Pyeongtaek, the ENGLISH on signs saying "Yankee Go Home" disappeared -- to be replaced by Hangul only signs. The current tactics play to the Korean people -- not to the international press. They know that anti-Americanism publicized in the international press will damage their campaign. The ploy is to influence the Korea people with symbols of old age farmers being torn away from their ancestral lands. These are powerful images to the Korean people dealing with the Korean respect for the elderly, for farmers, and for their ancestral homes.


Cordoned off area and Anti-War artwork (11 Mar 2006) (Tongil News)


In the article, it also mentions the Puan area and condemns the "traveling circus" for inflicting damage on the area and then leaving without an apology. At the time we lived in Kunsan and Puan was where we went on the weekends to the beach. The situation was the local farmers protested the government and local leaders agreed to the nuclear dump site without asking the local people. The direct benefits that were offered to the present site location residents was NOT the same offer made to the Puan people. The Puan people would have received a pitiance from the Roh administration while the Province reaped the major financial benefits. In the end, the locals did NOT want the site in their area despite all the promises of financial gain -- but the government persisted because no one else in the country wanted it in their backyard. The local government official who approved the deal was attacked and hospitalized. Violent protests were held and parents kept their children out of school -- just shy of the 120 days where the children would be set back a year. (See NGO Protests: October 2003.) This was a completely local protest -- though there were supporters from outside that joined the protest. (See Nuclear Protests in Puan and NGO Protests: November 2003: Violent Puan Protests and Fr. Moon at Anti-Iraq War rally.).)

Beware of the Traveling Circus

Daechu-ri, a small village of 150 households in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province has turned into a focal point for anti-American activists. It is here, the proposed new home of the U.S. Forces Korea's Yongsan garrison, that outside forces are waging their war over the rights and wrongs of the U.S. military base, with the villagers perforce swept up in the debate.

Conflicts between land owners and the authorities over compensation for expropriated land are nothing new. But in the village, it is outsiders who purport to be fighting the righteous battle on behalf of the villagers for reasons of their own. In the latest standoff, staff from the Defense Ministry, armed with a court decision, attempted last Monday to commandeer the building of a disused primary school as their local base but were rebuffed by members of a group calling itself the National Committee to Deter the Expansion of U.S. Bases, who chained themselves to the school gates.

Moon Jung-hyun, a priest and chairman of the committee, appears at nearly all such protest sites under grand titles like "executive chairman" or "joint representative." He has led a vigil to remember two schoolgirls killed by a USFK armored vehicle in 2002, and protests against the Saemangum reclamation project in North Jeolla province, a bullet-train tunnel under Mt. Cheonseong and a nuclear waste dump in Buan. Having moved his registered residence to Daechu-ri in February last year, the padre is now bent on turning the villagers into anti-U.S. fighters, with their new fellow resident at the helm.

The committee is an affiliation of the usual suspects: the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, Lawyers for a Democratic Society, the Korean Peasants League and the Korean Federation of University Student Councils. A manifesto for the committee says it has been set up to "focus the struggle on the Pyeongtaek U.S. military base" on account of all the other struggles members are engaged in: the abolition of the National Security Law, against troop dispatch to Iraq, against opening of the rice market, for the protection of non-regular workers…

In other words, they went to the village looking for a fight. Their activities can hardly benefit the villagers. "Since the relocation of the USFK aims to set up a forward base favorable to launch a preemptive strike on North Korea and a blockade of China, the expansion of the Pyeongtaek base must be prevented," the manifesto says.

The websites of various organizations have lately been sprouting a banner that says, "Let's Go to Daechu-ri." It will be remembered that protesters from across the nation also descended on the town of Buan to stop the nuclear waste dump being built there, with the result that the project and its attendant benefits simply went elsewhere. Then they left. History records no apology from the protest tourists to the town's frustrated residents. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)
14-15 March 2006 On 14 Mar the various farmer groups protesting the FTA agreement (red banners) -- along with elements of the anti-War movement protesting the Foal Eagle-RSOI Exercises (blue banners) -- joined with the Daechu-ri farmers (yellow banners) to march on the cordoned off area. The rice planting season was starting and the plan was to enter into the cordoned off area and start tilling the soil. Trucks carrying tractors were stopped on the road leading into the cordoned off area.

On 15 Mar the South Korean government took control of the land and work crews began setting up fencing and digging trenches across roads to prevent farmers from working the rice fields, something growers have threatened to begin doing on 17 Mar in defiance of the expansion plan. "We are planning to set up barbed-wire fences," an official at South Korea's Ministry of National Defense said on 15 Mar. Some residents of Daechu-ri have said they are ready to face arrest and even death rather than allow the South Korean government to evict them from their homes.

According to the Stars and Stripes on 15 Mar South Korean authorities under heavy police escort took the first steps toward sealing off a large tract of contested farmland that is to eventually become part of an expanded Camp Humphreys. About 120 workers under contract to the MND operated under the protection of some 4,300 riot-equipped Korean National Police officers who were moved into the area. The buses were parked just outside of Daechuri, but initially the riot police were not called in to keep a low profile.

The assembled farmers marched to the area of the construction and then supposedly gained control of two backhoes -- though we only have seen photos showing one. At this point plain clothes police were called in to make arrests, while the riot police were used to surround the backhoes -- and prevent the protestors from using it as a propaganda source.

The small protest group then pressed against the riot police lines. Some protestors -- including Fr Moon -- were arrested as they staged a "sit-down" in front of the police lines. The protestors started a scuffle in the moat-like ditch about 4 feet deep that had been dug by a large backhoe tractor within the cordoned area. Some leapt into the ditchand had to be dragged away by the police. Some local residents who opposed the expansion scuffled with South Korean riot police and four female protesters were injured and taken to area hospitals. One photo showed a woman crying loudly in the mud behind the riot police line. (The Tongil News ran coverage on the women hospitalized -- with one appearing to have a broken arm. Unlike the Stars and Stripes report, Tongil News listed five under treatment: Kim Weol-ju, 60; Yi Eun-pom, 72; Yoo Sung-ae, 64; Yi Yeon-ja, 65; and Kim Dae-im, 53.)

Amnesty International claimed police used excessive force against several elderly farmers and human rights activists during protests to resist forced eviction from their land in Daechuri. It said the residents of Daechuri village, mostly farmers in their 60s and 70s, suffered bloodied noses and were pushed over while resisting the latest eviction attempt on March 15 and also during an earlier attempt to evict them on March 6. "Most of these villagers are very old and it is distressing to hear of force being used against them," said Rajiv Narayan, East Asia researcher at London-based Amnesty International. "Given their age, the police should take special care to ensure they are not hurt and to allow prompt medical treatment if they are - which does not appear to have been the case so far."

Thirty-four protesters were arrested on March 15, including prominent human rights activist Park Lae-goon of Sarangbang Group for Human Rights and Cho Baek-ki of the Catholic Human Rights Committee. It was reported that 20 families out of 210 in the village have already left their land and another 80 families would eventually leave the village. "We urge the government to carry out a fresh consultation. It should ensure the villagers are not left homeless and give them reasonable compensation and alternative farming land close to their new homes."

However, Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung on 20 Mar that the government can't delay the enforcement of the allies' deal any longer. Yoon said, "The government enforced legally approved and inevitable measures in Daechuri," for national security. (Source: Korea Herald.)
Riot police only had shields without body armor so as not to escalate any conflict. Throughout this protest, it was apparent that the demonstration was to incite public outrage and the demonstrators posed with banners in front of the riot police lines for the media. It was also apparent that the riot police -- already under attack for supposedly using "excessive force" in other riots -- were attempting to not provoke any other incidents.

The farmers then started fires using the rice chaff. The fire soon consumed itself leaving smoldering ashes. The demonstration was small in scope, but used all the dramatic publicity effects that are the stock-and-trade of Fr Moon.


Riot Police Gather at Daechuri (15 Mar 2006) (Tongil News)



Farmers and NGO Groups Rally at Daechuri (15 Mar 2006) (Tongil News)



March to Cordoned Area (15 Mar 2006) (Tongil News)



Digging of ditch in Cordoned off area (15 Mar 2006) (Tongil News)



Protestors and Fr Moon hauled away from Ditch (15 Mar 2006) (Tongil News)



Protestors and Riot Police at Ditch (15 Mar 2006) (Tongil News)



Protestors Fire and Riot Police at Ditch (15 Mar 2006) (Tongil News)



Protestors Fire and Smoldering Field at Ditch (15 Mar 2006) (Tongil News)


16 Mar 2006 According to the Stars and Stripes on 16 Mar, the Ministry of Defense said it was aborting efforts to seal off the large tract of contested farmland slated to become part of an expanded Camp Humphreys — but only temporarily. A spokesman said the ministry still intends to seal off the land and evict residents who have refused to move out.

But officials have decided they will not disclose beforehand when government officials and their police escort will return to the area because they don't want to alert the holdout residents; instead, the officials will show up unannounced.


On 16 Mar, villagers again attempted to get to the fields with tractors loaded on the backs of trucks but were stopped by police on the narrow country road leading to the cordoned off area. Small protest rallies were held in Daechu-ri. On 17 Mar, a small procession of tractors made it into the cordoned off area by going across the rice fields and using rice paddy roads (soft-shouldered dirt) where police vehicles could not follow. The banners were affixed on the tractors and front hoes as they made their ways across the fields. The buses of the riot police remained inside of Camp Humphreys.

USFK Camp Humphreys officials, meanwhile, imposed travel restrictions on several areas outside the installation in case of further trouble between police and protesters. Inside Camp Humphreys, officials banned vehicles and pedestrians along the northern perimeter road, between the Third Military Intelligence Battalion headquarters area and the main gate of the South Korean Ministry of National Defense Compound in the Zoeckler Station section of the post.

Also off-limits since 15 Mar was the entire town of Anjung-ri, including the commercial district just outside the post's main gate, frequented by many Camp Humphreys personnel. That restriction was to remain in effect until 8 p.m. 17 Mar.

17 Mar 2006 On 17 Mar there was a face-off between farm tractors and the lines of riot police on the road leading into the Daechuri area. The lines of tractors were stopped by the police and turned around. Besides some vocal harangues by the farmers, the protest was peaceful. In the cordoned off fields, a small demonstration was held again proclaiming the "The land is ours."

In Daechuri, the farmers in tractors symbolically started to till "their" lands in defiance of the government order -- without any police in attendance. Approximately 263 acres of land were tilled. (NOTE: Tilling -- turning over the earth with tractors -- does not mean planting which would force the government to take action.) (SITE NOTE: See Save Pyeongtaek Farmers for the site of the activist farmer group.)

According to the Stars and Stripes South Korean farmers who oppose the expansion of Camp Humphreys plowed up a section of rice fields on 17 Mar in a show of defiance against the government's claims to control of the land. "Although several thousand South Korean riot police stood ready in the area, authorities did not deploy them against the protesters, who plowed the land despite a government no-farming order. But officials said Friday they detained four people on charges of assaulting police officers and obstructing officials in the execution of duty. Two of the four were college students; the others were activists opposing the camp expansion, police said." (NOTE: As of 22 Mar all activists had been released except two.)

"The government has taken legal control of the land and most residents have moved from their former homes. But some resisters have barricaded themselves inside the grounds of the local Daechu-ri Elementary School and have refused to leave. They include farmers and other local residents, as well as activists helping to lead the opposition. The South Korean Ministry of National Defense on Thursday said it will eventually clear the remaining holdouts from the area and seal it off so the expansion can proceed. They said they would not disclose when they would so they can show up unannounced."

In Seoul, the farmers holding up stop-sign shaped placards with "Stop the Migun K'ichi" (soldier camp) on them protested in front of the Ministry of Defense building over the use of their farming lands for the expansion of Camp Humphreys. The small protest was peaceful. (SITE NOTE: See Antigizi.or.kr for the site of this group.)

f The off-limits status of the entire town of Anjung-ri was extended "until further notice," a Camp Humphreys spokeswoman said Friday night. It had previously been set to expire at 8 p.m. 17 Mar. (NOTE: It was later cancelled when the protestors called off their scheduled 25 Mar protest in front of the Main Gate.) Later it was announced the Anjung-ri off-limits was lifted on Friday. The following villages and travel routes to them temporarily are off limits to U.S. military personnel: Daechu-ri, Bonjong-ri, Wongjong-ri, Nae-ri, Dodu-ri, Hamjeong 1-ri, Hamjeong 2-ri, and Duejeong-ri. The ban does not apply to personnel entering those areas on their way to or from work, Humphreys officials said.

Inside the post, officials have banned vehicles and pedestrians along the northern perimeter road, between the 3rd Military Intelligence Battalion headquarters area and the main gate of the South Korean defense ministry compound in the Zoeckler Station section.

22 Mar 2006 The NGO activist groups called for a four-day protest at the Camp Humphrey main gate on 22 Mar. The demonstrations were to begin on 22 Mar (Saturday) and run through 25 Mar (Tuesday), from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. each day. Camp Humphrey announced that because of the protests the main gate may be closed without notice.

Lawyers for a Democratic Society, which is part of the Daechu-ri protest committee, announced it would defend activists who face government action for resisting efforts to clear the land and evict the remaining residents. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

25 Mar 2006 Activists who oppose the expansion of Camp Humphreys called off the four-day rally they had planned to start 25 Mar outside the post's main gate. Local merchants who support the Camp Humphreys expansion then canceled a counterprotest they had scheduled for 25 Mar, averting a potentially violent clash between the two groups. The problem for the activists is that they could not muster support from other activist groups as farmers were in Pusan and Tonghae protesting the first shipments of rice under the new WTO rice deal. The focus was also on Europe with the human rights conference in Brussels.

Had the protests gone as scheduled, a confrontation between the two sides could have sparked "big trouble," said Kim Ki-ho, president of the Anjung-ri Merchants' Association. The merchants are angry with the demonstrators because recent anti-expansion protests led Camp Humphreys officials to place Anjung-ri off-limits temporarily to U.S. servicemembers, a restriction they have since lifted. Such restrictions cut into the business the local bar and restaurant district does with servicemember clientele, Kim said. Accordingly, he said, merchants see the rallies as harmful to local business. "So merchants members are very angry about that," Kim said. The merchants want the protesters to hold their rallies outside key South Korean government and U.S. military offices in Seoul, Kim said.

9-14 April 2006 According to the Stars and Stripes on 9 Apr, protestors stopped the government from digging up and filling the irrigation ditches with concrete. However, Korean news footage showed the government digging up the canals and pouring concrete into the sections. (SITE NOTE: Without water the fields are rendered useless. However, the government had to be on the lookout as the bypassing of the blocked sections using the farmer backhoes to dig ditches is still a potential area that must be watched closely. The problem is that the government does an action for show and then does not prevent their acts from being undermined.)

According to the news footage, there were few protestors involved -- with most employing "lay-down" techniques to stall the operations. Riot police (unarmed) picked up and physically carried the individuals from the scene. The protestors were a very small group and were greatly outnumbered by riot police.

Supposedly the farmers "dug up" the concrete blockages, but most likely they simply bypassed the blocked portions. The government had blocked three of the four irrigation ditches and by 14 Apr, the three ditches were flowing. The government then stated that they wanted to start a "dialogue" with the protestors to explain the situation.

On 14 Apr the protestors staged a protest where approximately 2,000 protestors showed up in the Daechuri area. Merchants in the Anjungri area have stated that they would not welcome the protestors in their area as they are dependent upon Camp Humphreys for their livelihood -- and are the major beneficiaries from the expansion of Camp Humphreys by 2008. The protestors were further hampered as other farmer groups were engaged in protesting the import of foreign rice at the docks as well as protests in Seoul over the US-ROK FTA opening the agricultural markets.

In the meantime, the Ministry of Defense asked the local Korean National Police to "protect" the perimeter, but the local police stated that it was not there job to become involved in "protecting" land in which the USFK does not reside. In other words, the local police refused to become involved in accepting responsibility for keeping the farmers off the land.

17 April 2006 The Ministry of Defense (MND) started pursuing plans to establish 2.85 million pyeong of land around Daechu-ri as a military facility protection zone. According to military officials on April 16, as soon as late April, the MND will hold a military facility protection zone examination committee meeting with the vice minister of defense as chairman, and recommend to the minister of defense to set the area around Daechu-ri as a military facility protection zone.

Consequently, military forces and equipment will be allowed to be deployed there, and the MND will be able to directly control the land. It has been reported that after setting the area around Daechu-ri as a protection zone, in order to prevent civilian access, the MND will mobilize engineer equipment and soldiers and start the job of building a barbed wire fence that will surround all 25km around the protection zone.

According to the Donga Ilbo on 16 Apr, "Such plans of the MND come as a result of its failure to halt the illegal farming activities of local residents and "Pyeongtaek USFK Base Expansion Opposition Committee" members. To stop the move, it tried to close down irrigation canals in two separate occasions: once on March 15 and another on April 7. The MND used about 700 employees of a private company on April 7 and closed down two irrigation canals that provided farming water to field around K-6 (Camp Humphrey) by filling them up with concrete, but local residents used excavators and restored the canals in only four days."

It also seems that Gyeonggi Police Commissioner Eoh Chung-soo's statement that he could not accept MND's request for security forces, since the planned base relocation area is not a military facility protection zone, played a role in the decision of military authorities. According to Military Facility Protection Zone Law, if the minister of defense requests to police for security forces, the police must cooperate with such request. The third article of Military Facility Protection Zone Law stipulates that areas required for the facilitation of military operations, and for the protection of military facilities or the safety of local residents are set as restricted protection zones. According to military authorities, when set as a military facility protection zone, the exertion of property rights as well as the reconstruction or additional construction of local residents becomes strictly controlled, and military guards will be deployed in order to restrict the access of civilians. (Source: Donga Ilbo.)

23 April 2006 It was reported on 23 Apr that the MND submitted an application for provisional measures to the court regarding trespassing and farming prohibitions on the 2,850,000-pyeong site in Daechu-ri, Pyeongtaek City, Gyeonggi Province, being set aside as the planned location of a U.S. military base. This is a part of groundwork to designate the site as a Military Installation Protection District in order to prevent unlawful farming by residents and civic group members. (SITE NOTE: Supposedly the Suwon Court approved the ministry request regarding trespassing and farming prohibitions until 7 May.)

A military source said that the MND asked the court for the off limits and farming prohibition on the 2,850,000-pyeong site in mid-April. The MND application reportedly said that "as the U.S. force relocation is a national enterprise, which Korea and U.S. agreed to and the National Assembly approved, and the ownership of the site had been transferred to the nation, any kind of farming activity or trespassing should be prohibited."

A military official said, "Once the court accepts the prohibitive measures application, those who trespass or unlawfully farm on the site will be subject to fines or detention." The MND will deploy military construction support to stretch barbed wire around the 25-kilometer outer area of the site after moving forward with legal measures to strengthen the ownership of this site. At the same time, the MND is planning to obtain the national defense minister's sanction to designate the site as a Military Installation Protection District. In addition, the MND was informed by legal advisors that although rice seed residents have sown has grown over four to five centimeters long, the residents cannot claim ownership of the crops since the site is owned by the nation. (Source: Donga Ilbo.)

In the face of this announcement, the protestors held a candlelight vigil on 23 Apr in Daechuri led by the Fr Mun. The group of 800 protestors conducted a peaceful protest that affixed lanterns to the fence of Camp Humphreys as a symbol of peace while participants held up signs depicting M-16 rifles with roses in the barrels.

The situation is touchy in that the USFK can NOT involve itself in the tussle to gain control of the land, and worry that any force used against the elderly farmers might result in a backlash of anti-Americanism that might spread across Korea. Amnesty International has reported that the riot police used excessive force against the elderly protestors. The situation remained as a stalemate with the MND seeking to negotiate with the farmers to aid them in relocating. Supposedly 20 families have relocated, but 200 have remained. (See Korea Herald for details of situation as of 27 Apr 2006.)

The following article appeared in the Stars and Stripes on 25 Apr 2006 about the current impasse dealing with the rice crops.

Villagers fight Camp Humphreys by planting rice crop

Interpretation of S. Korean law could thwart expansion

By Franklin Fisher, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Tuesday, April 25, 2006

PYEONGTAEK, South Korea — Farmers opposing Camp Humphreys' expansion have planted a rice crop on nearby lands despite South Korean government efforts to prevent their doing so, a Catholic priest helping lead opponents of the expansion disclosed late last week.

In addition, said Father Mun Jeong-hyeon, the farmers and other residents of Daechu-ri village are "on alert" in expectation that the South Korean Ministry of National Defense might deploy troops to oust them from the contested lands.

Such a move, he told Stars and Stripes in a telephone interview last week, would likely swing South Korean opinion in favor of the residents, who have vowed to resist eviction. The public would see military action as a reminder of the 1980 Kwangju Uprising in which government troops killed a large number of pro-democracy protesters, he said. Daechu-ri, in Pyeongtaek, borders part of Camp Humphreys. The disclosure that rice planting has gone forward heightens tensions in the ongoing standoff between the resisters and South Korea's Ministry of National Defense.

Mun said the planting of a rice crop is significant because of a South Korean court ruling in an unrelated case, which, if applied to Daechu-ri and depending on how it might be interpreted, could block the government from disturbing the crops once the stalks grow past a few centimeters. "That's why MND is in a hurry to destroy the rice fields, because they are afraid to see the rice bud," Mun said. The ministry recently made several abortive efforts to seal off the land and thwart farmers from planting a new spring crop.

But each time, government officials backed off after resisters scuffled with police and commandeered or blocked construction vehicles. And when government workers filled several irrigation canals with concrete, then departed, resisters promptly moved in and took out the concrete. Some resistance leaders and others remain barricaded inside the grounds of the Daechu-ri elementary school, which is just yards from the Camp Humphreys perimeter.

The South Korean government bought 2,328 acres of farmland last year to enable Camp Humphreys to eventually triple in size and become the U.S. military's primary installation on the peninsula by 2008. The expansion is part of an agreement between the United States and South Korea. A defense ministry spokesman declined Friday to be interviewed on any matters regarding the situation in Daechu-ri. Thus far, authorities have relied on masses of blue-clad riot-equipped Korean National Police officers to handle anti-expansion rallies that activists have been staging since last summer.

But Mun said he is worried over recent South Korean media reports that the government may call in military forces to seize control of the land and evict the resisters. Mun cited reports that defense ministry officials have discussed having the contested lands declared a military facility protection zone. Such action, according to the reports, would allow the defense ministry to deploy troops to the area and wrest it from the resisters. "Up to now they could not establish their project," Mun said of the defense ministry. "So they would like to push ahead and dispatch soldiers." The appearance of soldiers would be unacceptable to resisters and the general public, Mun said.

Hyun In-taek, an international relations professor at Korea University in Seoul, said Friday that the standoff leaves the authorities in a dilemma, and raises the prospect that the Camp Humphreys expansion could fall a year or more behind schedule.

The situation is made even more delicate, he said, because South Korea heads into local elections May 31. "So it is very, very sensitive, very, very delicate," Hyun said. "If the government [uses] force, then probably more people might have more sympathy on the farmers, because they are weaker." On the other hand, said Hyun, if the government "cannot control them, then probably the whole timetable will be delayed. We are targeting that 2008 is the year that the U.S. military will move to that area … so this year could be quite crucial."
28 April 2006 The MND announced that it would put up a barbed wire fence around farming land in Pyeongtaek designated as the new site for U.S. Forces Korea headquarters BEFORE rice planting begins. This statement was odd as the farmers have already defied the MND and started rice planting. The impact appears to be that the MND wishes to prevent further rice planting. According to the MND this would be accomplished BEFORE 10 May.

The ministry was trying to prevent locals and activists from planting rice there because they hope to delay construction of the new USFK base. The fence will be some 20 km long and 1.80 m high and surround the entire farmland. The ministry will be able to finish the work in a day and is considering whether to hire private contractors or mobilize military engineering troops for the work. (SITE NOTE: This appears to be simply stringing concertina wire. As of 1 May, officials were still exploring whether to declare the farmlands a military zone, which would include establishing checkpoints and other restrictions to public access. MND officials said on 27 Apr that South Korean military forces would be used to guard the barbed-wire fences.)

Meanwhile, some 1,000 leaflets comparing protests against the base to the 1980 Kwangju Democratic Uprising have been distributed in Pyeongtaek. Under the title of "Pyeongtaek May Become a Second Kwangju," the leaflets demand, "The defense minister should resign because he defines the people of Pyeongtaek as enemies." (SITE NOTE: Though it was unclear who distributed them, the Pan Korea Committee is certainly at the root of this effort. The Fr Moon, the Catholic Priest heading the Daechuri protests, used to be the head of the anti-War NGO activist group and these tactics match this groups style to link the "fight for democracy" with anything that they oppose. The intent is to enflame the imagination of young students who provide the "shock troopers" of the protest as the farmers are much to old to protest -- and the other farmers are engaged in protests over the FTA and WTO rice market openings.)


Small Unannounced Protest at Main Gate of Camp Humphreys (28 Apr 2006) (Tongil News)


The MND said even if it mobilizes military forces to build the fence, they will not be allowed to carry batons and shields. "They will be unarmed and have construction equipment only, so they will not confront residents there directly," it added. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.) (SITE NOTE: This is in response to the Amnesty International claim that the MND and riot police used excessive force to oust elderly farmers protesting the eviction. Due to the delicate nature, the riot police have remained INSIDE Camp Humphreys and only appeared when there was a direct confrontation. Even then the riot police have attempted to remain unarmed -- except when the farmers started hurling mud and stones at them whereupon they picked their shields. None of the photos found on the Tongil News site have shown the riot police with batons -- only defensive armor.)

The Stars and Stripes reported on 28 Apr that South Korean authorities would move soon to oust activists and others who have refused to give up their homes on farmlands near Camp Humphreys. The action, said Brig. Gen. Gyeong Jang-ho, chief of the U.S. Affairs division in the MND, would include an effort to clear resisters from their barricaded makeshift headquarters inside the Daechu-ri Elementary School and elsewhere on the contested lands. And it would aim to halt farmers from any further rice planting, which is seen as a potential obstacle to the government's control of the land. (SITE NOTE: Brig. Gen. Gyeong Jang-ho said South Korean military units would be used to help force protesters off the land before May 10. Both civilian contract workers and military engineer troops would aid the effort against the farmers, Gyeong said.)

Most residents have moved out, but those refusing to go say it would be difficult for them, especially the elderly, to find work and start life over elsewhere. Some also say the government's money offer was too low. A ministry official said Wednesday that the operation against the school compound would occur sometime between April 27 and May 7. Gyeong said movement against the farming would come between April 27 and May 10. He said it has yet to be determined whether the move to halt farming would include tearing out crops already planted.

Gyeong said officials were aware of a South Korean Supreme Court ruling in an unrelated case that, depending upon how it's interpreted, could bar the government from disturbing the rice crop once stalks grow past a few centimeters. He said defense ministry officials were examining how that ruling might apply to Daechu-ri. Conclusions are expected within 60 days. But he emphasized, the ministry is determined to go forward with its plans for the farm acreage and is determined to take whatever lawful means were necessary to do so. Officials also are weighing other possible measures against farming, including setting up barbed wire fencing in certain parts of the contested area. The government previously has made several abortive attempts to stop farming. In each attempt, government officials called off the effort in the face of scuffles with resisters and police. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)


Fr Mun Honored at 1960s-style Protest Rally (29 Apr 2006) (R) Art sculpture on Daechuri Elementary school grounds with Peace Dove (Anti-war group) (27 Apr 2006) (Tongil News)


29 Apr 2006 An unannounced protest against the expansion of a U.S. military base south of Seoul drew hundreds of South Koreans to the entrance of the MND, near a main gate at Yongsan Garrison. The protest had no incidents. Two groups of protesters gathered near Yongsan and the ministry to protest plans by South Korea and the United States to move the U.S. Forces Korea headquarters south and triple the size of Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek. The first group of 80 people gathered closer to Gate 5 from 8:30 to 10 a.m., police said. The second, larger group of about 300, many apparently college students, gathered near the ministry's entrance to protest both the Humphreys expansion and tuition costs. (SITE NOTE: The students at the peaceful protest were an off-shoot of another violent student protest on 29 Apr. Some 5,000 university students led by the leftist Hanchongyeon student union rallied in downtown Seoul urging the government to nullify universities' decision to raise tuition fees.) Traffic flow at Yongsan was temporarily affected, but Yongsan was not the target of the protests.

Meanwhile, in Daechuri the protestors held a 1960s-style rally that dealt more with symbolism than anything else. The leader Fr Moon was honored at the rally and the typical burning of images and sing-along performances and dance routines were held. It appears that the protestors have backed off and are awaiting the next move by the military -- the eviction of the protestors from their land. At that point, the protest movement will have a cause. 10 May is the deadline for the eviction so the next actions are by the MND.

1 May 2006 Hoping to persuade the residents of Pyeongtaek city to drop their opposition to the relocation there of the U.S. military base now in Seoul, the Defense Ministry negotiators on 1 May instead wound up in a stalemate. At the first meeting on 30 Apr, the two sides agreed to resolve the issue through dialogue. But at the meeting at 5 p.m. 1 May, neither side budged from its stance. The ministry had announced that it would evict residents and protesters in the city in Gyeonggi province from April 27 to May 7, but decided instead to hold the meetings. (NOTE: The Suwon Court gave the restraining orders for the residents farming and trespassing up to 7 May.)

The ministry asked residents to stop farming on the site and let a limited number of government officials enter the village to conduct measurements and a geological survey for the transfer. Major General Park Gyeong-seo, a representative of the ministry, said the transfer would start this month because the delay could aggravate relations between South Korea and the United States. The relocation is supposed to be completed by 2008, but an official with the ministry said last month that the final timeline would be decided once a master plan is submitted in September.

Representatives of the residents refused the proposal, arguing that they have almost finished planting their rice. They once again asked the ministry to reconsider the entire transfer plan. Kim Ji-tae, the leader of the residents' group, did not attend the meeting. Mr. Kim said he would not attend the meeting unless Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-woong did so also; the minister did not. Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook also had a meeting on the issue yesterday with Mr. Yoon, the defense minister, Lee Taek-soon, the commissioner-general of the National Police Agency, and other related government officials, and asked them to consider ways to help residents move from the site and find new ways to earn a living. (Source: < a href=http://joongangdaily.joins.com/200605/01/200605012240554339900090409041.html>Joongang Ilbo.)

On 1 May the A senior Defense Ministry official said talks to resolve a stalemate over farmland in Pyeongtaek under claim from the ministry to enable the relocation of a United States military base may be abandoned if key figures of the farming community keep boycotting them. "(We) will continue to hold dialogues with the local residents and activists of the 'Pan-national Committee to Deter the Expansion of U.S. Bases'. But (we) will not advance the dialogue any further without representatives," said Maj. Gen. Park Kyung-seo, the chief of the government's U.S. base relocation task force.

The 'Pan-national Committee to Deter the Expansion of U.S. Bases' is an umbrella protest group composed of 138 nationwide civic organizations including well-known civil rights campaigners Moon Jung-hyun and Moon Kyoo-hyun, both Catholic priests, as well as various anti-American government groups. Since last month the Defense Ministry has had a series of talks with the farmers and civic activist groups to try and find a peaceful resolution to the dispute. However, the dialogue has stalled because representatives of the pan national committee and farmers have refused to participate in the talks. (Source: < a href=http://www.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2006/05/02/200605020037.asp>Korea Herald.)

2 May 2006 On 2 May, the ministry gave the protestors until 12 p.m. the same day to return to the negotiating table, but they refused, saying the ministry had no intention to sit down together with them for talks. MND officials said they would send military and other forces to the contested area unless the farmers state by noon on 2 May whether they will: (1) Cease immediately any further farming on the contested lands. (2) Pledge to avoid any further actions that could obstruct or harm government employees as they go about putting up fencing and otherwise preparing the lands for the Camp Humphreys expansion.

According to the ministry, the two sides failed to find common ground on compensation and a construction timetable because of the civic activists' ulterior motive: a demand for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea. The minister stressed the government has sought compromise with Pyongtaek residents in a sincere manner, citing a total of 150 rounds of talks with farmers and activists since 2004, including three in April. The protestors claim the tight deadline left scant room for careful discussion among the villagers. "That's why I can say MND didn't have intention to have real discussion and they just pretend to have discussion," Father Mun Jyeong-hyeon, the Catholic priest helping to lead anti-expansion resistance, said. The ministry supposedly sent letters giving the holdouts until the end of June to leave, according to Fr Mun, but in May demanded they leave before 7 May. (SITE NOTE: The government will wait for three or four months before moving locals out of villages near the site. "Although we ordered locals to leave by the end of June, we can't force them out," said Yoo Jong-sang, a government official in charge of the matter, said. "We will take legal action first by applying for an injunction." (Source: Chosun Ilbo.))

3 May 2006 The MND and the police have agreed to put up barbed wire fences around the area ear-marked for Camp Humphreys expansion in order to keep protestors from occupying the Daechuri elementary school and working the fields there. The government plans to mobilize a huge force of some 14,000 troops to evict the resistance on 4 May, raising fears of violent clashes with residents, activists and members of the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions camped out at the Daechu-ri Elementary School. The government in a statement said if things proceed quickly, the eviction and demolition of the school and installation of the fence could start early on the morning of 4 May. Some 110 companies of police (or 11,000 riot policemen) and 3,000 troops consisting of engineers and unarmed guards as well as private security firms have been mobilized for the operation.

In response to the news, protestors called on all supporters to gather at the school and make a stand. A large-scale conflict seems unavoidable as local residents and activists have decided to fight. The Pan-national Committee to Deter the Expansion of U.S. Bases said, "We urge the Defense Ministry to stop the deceptive dialogue game, withdraw the violent ultimatum, and once again engage in true dialogue. If the ministry forces its way into the branch school and farmlands, we will fight to death." Already leaflets have compared the situation to the 1980 Kwangju Democratic Uprising, which was bloodily suppressed, and now there are slogans in the vein of, "We will unite with the workers of the North to fight against the U.S.," all of which bodes ill for the eviction. (SITE NOTE: This is as close to a declaration that there are pro-North Korean elements in the protest groups. This is the face-off expected after the negotiations to convince the protestors to leave failed. The anti-war element is counting on the radical student elements to join the fray. In Tongil News on 3 May, the photos showed that there were increasing numbers of youths massing at Daechuri in anticipation of a faceoff and holding rallies publicized by the Korean press.)

4 May 2006 The massive 10-hour operation to throw the activists out of their impromptu headquarters at Daechu-ri Elementary School saw 471 protesters from outside including students and members of civic groups and the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions arrested. There were near 100 reports of injuries. Police decided to punish all the violent protesters according to the law. Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung said in a statement, "The actions by some activists to use the people of the area as pawns in a political battle against a national project is detrimental both to the citizens living in the area and the national interest." Meanwhile, the National Human Rights Commission dispatched 13 investigators to the scene to ascertain no human rights violations occurred in the day's conflict. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

(See US in Korea.org video of the protest. The video illustrates how violent the protestors were and also if you look closely how restrained the riot police were using only their shields against protestors (without batons) while being attacked with splintered bamboo poles. The riot police were slapped by women in the face and didn't react. Overall, the video shows the riot police used almost super-human restraint -- though they had overwhelming numbers to decisively crush any resistance with force. Any claims of abuse by the protestors are disbunked by this video assemblage. See Save the Pyeongtaek Farmers for links to Voice of the People videos of the various stages of development.)
The operation began in early morning, with some units on scene by 2 a.m. or earlier. By 4:30 a.m., long convoys of police buses and construction vehicles, red lights flashing, converged on Daechu-ri from several directions. About 115 companies of police or some 11,500 started to pour into the area at 4:30 a.m. Along with the police were the reporters from TV and newspapers. The riot police were deployed to the area to clear protesters from their barricaded makeshift headquarters inside Daechuri Elementary School, while 3,000 unarmed soldiers, including 500 military engineers, were preparing for the fence construction. Engineers started setting up the wire fence around 7:30 a.m. with the help of 15 UH-60 helicopters.

More than 11,000 South Korean police and 2,000 soldiers began work to evict residents from a small farming village starting at 6 a.m. Riot police armed with batons and shields confronted some residents wielding long sticks, while engineering corps soldiers set up barbed wire around the designated area. Residents, many of whom are elderly farmers, hoped to remain in their hometown. The residents' struggle to protect their hometown has also been joined by a number of activists opposing the U.S. base relocation project. (Source: Yonhap News.)

Starting at 6 a.m. the about 3,000 riot police armed with batons and shields started to move into the area around the Daechuri Elementary School. Facing them were the activists -- mostly college students -- who had arrived the day prior and were massed in the school grounds while others lined the streets to greet new arrivals. The students attempted to block the streets with a sit-down, but the police approached the school through the rice fields.


(L) Rally at Daechuri (R) Sit down to block the roads (Tongil News)



Activists lining the road to greet supporters (Tongil News)


At about 8 a.m., the police neared the Daechuri Elementary School and were met with a fire break set up by the protestors. The flames were doused and the police advanced on the compound. Police stormed the compound at 9:17 a.m., were inside the school building by about 10 a.m. When the police entered the school ground they were attacked by activists with pipes and long bamboo sticks. Riot police armed with batons and shields fought pitched battles with hundreds of locals and activists wielding splintered bamboo sticks and hurling rocks. The activists were not prepared for the massive onslaught. Even though the police were only armed with shields and batons, their sheer numbers overwhelmed any protest. When the activists attacked the police line, they were separated easily and then beaten to the ground with shields -- and then stomped by boots of the police. The attack on the police line with steel pipes was not taken kindly by the police and TV footage showed activists with bloodied heads being hauled away from the scene. Interestingly, the TV news did not show any of the police officers who were injured by the protestors.


(L) Police Move Towards Daechuri Elementary School (R) Protestors set field afire (Tongil News)



(L) Police Move Through Fired field (R) Face off with Protestors inside Compound (Tongil News)



Start of the Confrontation



(L) Police in control of School Yard (R) Face off with Protestors inside Compound (Tongil News)



(L) Police move on School Building (R) Police Protect their heads (Tongil News)


After securing the playground area. Fire trucks were called in to direct their firehouses on the buildings more for psychological effect. The police then moved into the building while using their shields to protect their heads from the objects hurled down on them from the students in the second floor. According to the Stars and Stripes, "The hot, hazy day saw fierce close-quarters clashes in which frenzied protesters who were holed up inside the school smashed out windows and hurled at police whatever objects came to hand, including stools, window frames, paint cans, metal pipes, rocks and bottles. Police countered with riot batons and shields. At several crucial intervals, they trained water cannons and hoses to tumble protesters from their places."


(L) Police move on School Building (R) Police confrontation in Stairwell (Tongil News)



(L) Police move on School Building (R) Protestors hangon to window frames to fight removal (Tongil News)



(L) Inside of Building (NOTE: Splintered bamboo that act as knives to slice police) (Tongil News) (R) Police Enter Building


Around 10 a.m. the police entered the building as a few protestors attempted to block their entrance. Force was met with force and again bloodied protestors were hauled out of the building. The students then attempted to have a sitdown on the floor, but the police simply dragged them out as they tried to hold on to anything to prevent their removal.

The activists led by Fr Moon Jung-hyun then climbed to the roof of Daechu Elementary School to protest. Those on the roof displayed signs in defiance, but were convinced to come down peacefully due to the futility of the situation. TV footage showed Fr Moon climbing down the ladder, though he walks with the assistance of a cane. Once the protestors were cleared off the roof, the wrecking crews moved in to demolish the school. Large backhoes punched in the windows. The fire department then doused the building with water before the heavy equipment started the demolition of the building. In the meantime, the temporary "vinyl houses" that had been used by the protestors were also cleared away. While police worked through the day to take control of the school floor-by-floor, room-by- room, workers used backhoes to knock down trees, statuary, scaffolding, basketball backboards and other school playground items. Work gangs also hauled down a long plastic shelter the resisters had used for candlelight vigils and other meetings. By 5 p.m. the last resisters were in police custody and work crews were beginning to ready the structure for demolition. The large "forkcranes" (backhoes) made short work in demolishing the structure's front wall. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)


Protestors led by Fr Mun atop the Roof (Tongil News)



Vinyl houses on school grounds torn down (Tongil News)


From 100 to 150 police officers were injured, police officials said. About 37 protesters were injured in the course of the day, a South Korean government official said. However, the Korean newspapers reported that about 120 policemen and protesters were injured in the clash with 471 initially arrested, but the numbers climbed to 524 by the end of the day. The National Human Rights Commission dispatched 13 investigators to the scene to ascertain no human rights violations occurred in the day's conflict.

Police said 210 were injured in the incident -- 117 police officers and 93 protestors -- and the vernacular dailies Kyunghyang Sinmun and Hankyoreh also claimed injuries to some of their reporters covering the scene. However, there are questions whether law enforcement authorities went for excessive force in suppressing the demonstrations, with some observers ridiculing the methods of the police raid as a ``rabbit hunt.'' Park Soon-hee, a human rights adviser at the National Police Agency (NPA), who was at the protest scene, criticized police suppression as an ``embarrassing moment.'' (Park Soon-hee is NOT with the KNP, but instead part of the National Human Rights Commission under President Roh. The agenda of the NHRC is questionable -- and many of its efforts have done serious damage to the morale of the riot police -- as Roh intended.) ``It would not be so far-fetched to call Thursday's situation a `blood bath,'' Park's aid in an interview with local radio broadcaster CBS. He described Thursday as a ``dark moment'' of the Roh Moo-hyun administration. ``It seemed as if law enforcement authorities were conducting a military operation on their own countrymen. Police officers were beating down protestors with their batons and shields and there were a lot of bloody faces out there,'' Park said. The civic group Sarangbang Group for Human Rights released a statement denouncing the police suppression of the Pyongtaek rallies, going as far as to compare the incident with the Kwangju uprising of 1980 when more than 200 pro-democracy protestors were killed during a government suppression of the rally. (Source: Korea Times.)

Injured Protestors Constrained (Tongil News)


After the demolition had rendered the building unusable, residents shouted their rage at the riot police. In TV footage, the old residents of Daechuri could be seen venting their frustration on the police lines by throwing dirt and stones at close range at the riot police.


Daechuri Elementary School Demolished (Tongil News)



Protestors led by Fr Mun atop the Roof (Tongil News)


While the police were beginning to mass around the Daechuri Elementary School, the army sent in their engineering teams to string the concertina wire around the protected area. At 7:30 a.m. the Defense Ministry sent in a force of some 3,000 including 600 army engineers and 700 private security personnel as well as earthmovers and other heavy equipment. The group made headway on a 29 km barbed-wire fence near Camp Humphreys.


Army Engineers setting up barbed wire fences (Tongil News)



(L) Army Engineers at work (Tongil News) (R) Army Engineers setting up barbed wire fences (Korea Times)



(L) Army Engineers setting up barbed wire fences (R) Helicopters bringing in supplies (Tongil News)



Army Engineers setting up barbed wire fences (Tongil News)


The operation ended at 4 p.m. At that time, the ministry informed the Pyeongtaek mayor the area is now a military facility protection zone. From now on, no one will be allowed to come and go at the site aside from traveling on designated roads. Any construction or expansion of buildings in the area will have to be discussed with the military authorities. (Source: Chosun Ilbo and Tongil News.) Military engineers erected 15.5 miles of barbed-wire fencing around the contested farmland. Authorities were tol keep a guard force in the area, which will be subject to access restrictions common to military installations. Military guard posts were set up every 100m on the fence perimeter, and an unarmed team consisting of two soldiers was standing security duty. Furthermore, tents were set up near every guard post.

All the news programs featured the story on the evening news -- with many attempting to show the history of the area. Some news programs showed the new "villas" being erected in anticipation of the military families that will be arriving in the area. Others showed the "human interest" stories of old residents with complaints against the GI presence. Interestingly, none of the bar owners association was interviewed -- only scenes of Americans in Anjungri outside Camp Humphreys (K-6). The Defense Ministry denounced the "outside" agitators. Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung said in a statement, "The actions by some activists to use the people of the area as pawns in a political battle against a national project is detrimental both to the citizens living in the area and the national interest."

5 May 2006 5 May was Buddha's Birthday and a national holiday -- though called Children's Day by everyone -- but hundreds of protestors again scuffled with the police and soldiers in Daechuri. (See Go Media Action for video of students breaking through police line and joining those inside Daechuri. Most of the scuffles were ineffectual and the students were attacking without weapons.)

The Defense Ministry said it was considering providing army engineers dispatched to Pyongtaek with protective gear such as shields, batons and gas masks to ensure their safety. The ministry also planned to build more barricades near the wire fences. During the 5 May confrontation, dozens of soldiers were injured. Eleven were injured seriously enough that they were taken by helicopter to a military hospital. Two of the soldiers were severely wounded. The Defense Ministry said it is considering providing army engineers dispatched to Pyongtaek with protective gear such as shields, batons and gas masks to ensure their safety. The ministry also plans to build more barricades near the wire fences.

Videotape footage shows that single protestors did make it through the concertina wire -- hastily dropped off by helicopter -- that was strung only one row deep and not anchored yet. The army military police were seen chasing them down the intruders and containing them using force as the protestors struggled. In other instances, the riot police chased the protestors through the rice paddies. Later that evening, the villages cut through the wire with wire cutters and entered the cordoned off area. This time according to a plan by the village leaders, they attacked unarmed soldiers inflicting great bodily harm to some soldiers. (SITE NOTE: We saw videos of the attacks on the soldiers on 5 May inside the protected area -- taken from long distance on the outside of the concertina wire. The soldiers didn't have a chance. The protestors forced their entry by cutting the fence and then attacked the soldiers -- all unarmed because of the sensitivity of the situation -- with bamboo pikes (slim bamboo splintered at the end and very flexible to act like a knife at the end of a whip). The soldiers didn't have a chance -- the pikes were 8 feet long and the isolated soldiers were simply sliced up like sashimi. These are the radicals that the USFK is facing in the street protests. These are the Hanchongreon "storm troopers" and radical elements of the KCTU.)

Korean TV showed footage of the interviews with the military who were attacked. It appears that public sentiment is shifting to the Ministry of Defense because of the radical attacks -- and the people involved are NOT from the Daechu area. The Chosun Ilbo printed clips of the video footage that showed that the activists were the ones attacking the unarmed solders. "The footage contradicts activists' claims that they were violently handled by soldiers, showing activist chase and kick retreating soldiers (above), and soldiers jump into ditches to avoid protestors wielding bamboo sticks whose ends were split to make them more lethal. (Source: Chosun Ilbo, 9 May 2006.))




Army Engineers securing fence line


``We requested court warrants to arrest 37 protesters wielding iron pipes and bamboo sticks against law-enforcement authorities to disturb the lawful eviction of activists from state lands,'' said Lee Kwi-nam, chief of the prosecution's public security bureau. The 37 arrested protesters are all affiliated with student organizations and labor groups, and do not include farmers, Lee said, adding that the prosecution will sternly deal with those who ``challenge government forces.'' The prosecution also plans to request warrants for between 60 and 100 demonstrators for cutting wire fences around the base site which is designated a military protection zone, and beating unarmed troops guarding the site on 5 May. Prosecutors are seeking to arrest those who allegedly masterminded the fence-cutting scheme, including Kim Ji-tae, head of Taechuri village. (Source: Korea Times.)

The following is a news article in the Donga Ilbo on 6 May. The interesting point is that the largest numbers of arested who were from the outlawed Hanchongryeon -- which President Roh wanted "legalized."

Tensions Remain High After Base Clash

MAY 06, 2006 03:06 by Kyung-Hyun Nam (bibulus@donga.com)

On May 5, Daechu-ri, Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, the site of a massive confrontation just a day before was as tense as the cloudy weather. Sporadic clashes between police, military, and protesters continued.

About 100 local residents and members of civic groups held a protest at Daechu-ri Peace and Arts Park demanding that the police release all those detained and that the minister of defense resign for the May 4 violent crackdown.

There was a scuffle between police and crowd in the process of dispersing the crowd by police which regarded the demonstration as an unreported illegal one.

In addition, about 400 members of civic groups who were barred from joining the demonstration held demonstrations in Bongjeong Nonghyup, Gyeyang intersection, and Dodu-ri area. Some members that passed through the police line directly confronted soldiers on their way to Daechu-ri.

On the barbed wire that surrounded the rice paddies was military warning signs reading, "This area is military facility protection zone and unapproved access is prohibited."

Military guard posts were set up every 100m on the fence perimeter, and an unarmed team consisting of two soldiers is standing security duty. Furthermore, tents have been set up near every guard post.

On the access road to the village, a significantly increased number of police stood guard. The local residents had to show their ID to get in and out, and outsiders were restricted from entering the area. The police commented, "Since it has been designated as a military facility protection area, about 20 companies or 2,000 police will be deployed in all times in order to guard facilities."

Some local residents showed their determination to farm until the very end. As a matter of fact, rice buds are growing in artificial ponds in Dodu-ri, and residents say they plan to plant the rice buds in about 10 days.

Of the 524 that have been placed under custody in the process of carrying out court orders, only about 10 are local residents. The rest were members of anti-war and anti-American groups.

Police announced that there were 15 residents, about 250 Hanchongryeon member university students, 65 from opposition groups such as the Anti-American Youth Group, 40 from the Democratic Labor Party, 15 from the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, and 130 that were street vendors and evictees. (SITE NOTE: The Hanchongryun or KFUSC (Korean Federation Union of Student Councils), which sees itself as representative of all college students in Korea, faces the worst crisis of its history, with the student unions of Dongguk, Kyungpook National University and Dankook universities also planning to jump ship. Dongguk University's union said it will pull out and refuses to pay the W6 million (US$6,000) annual membership. Dankook University's student council is considering the same move, while student union leaderships like that of Kyungpook National University were specifically elected on a promise to break with Hanchongryon. Recent violence by radical student organizations was the last straw. Seven Korea University students face disciplinary punishment after illegally detaining nine professors for 16 hours. The Yonsei University president is working elsewhere after being driven out of his office some 40 days ago by radical students who are occupying the university administrative building. Some 50 pro-North Korea students of Joong-Ang University also occupied the president's office and painted walls and floor with slogans. In response, other students put up banners which read "No More Violence" on campus and met to denounce the occupation. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.))

Police plans to request arrest warrants for 10 radical protesters involved in the illegal demonstration and release the rest without detainment.

As for catholic priest Moon Jung-hyun, who held a protest on the roof of Daechu Elementary School, police told him to report to court on charges of violating laws concerning demonstrations and protests. However, it has been confirmed that none of the three key activist members that had been issued an arrest warrant, including Mr. Kim, who had his issued on April 29, are under custody. (SITE NOTE: The police would NOT arrest the key leaders for fear of making them "martyrs" to the cause. This is the last thing they needed -- a martyr in jail.)


The police, who spearheaded the effort to demolish Daechu Elementary School, are concerned about negative public opinion due to the high number of casualties caused by the police's forced entry, and ordered injured police officers and riot police to post up replies to Internet postings criticizing police intervention. It has also been reported that the police has set a policy to actively respond to radical Internet postings of exaggerated or distorted reports. (Source: Donga Ilbo.)
For the first time, the riot police are encouraging their policemen to respond to internet allegations -- and are intent on denying the radical element usage of the internet to their advantage.

8 May 2006 From the Uri Party and President Roh there has been silence about the incident. Though the president is fond of speaking to the public directly via the TV or internet, he didn't say a word of concern about the affair until 5 May in which he said, "We've been greatly indebted to the U.S., but we cannot afford to be obliged to the U.S. forever." An editorial in the Chosun Ilbo pointed out that it sounded like an invitation to the anti-American activists. Though the MND continues to condemn the incident and the Prosecutor's Office continues to state it will prosecute the protestors, there seems to be a road-block being erected on the part of the courts and the Uri Party. The courts seem to feel the protestors pose no flight risk and do not need to be arrested. However, the Prosecutor's office also is NOT going after the leaders FIRST -- instead attempting to round up the followers. Then there are problems that many of the attackers of the ROK military were apprehended outside the fence as they tried to escape -- thus making it more difficult to prove that they were involved in the attack. The Uri Party is not making any comment because it does not want to offend the Democratic Labor Party radicals whose members were involved in the Daechuri incidents. They need their votes to pass their legislation. However, conservative papers are condemning the protestors, but the progressive papers are showing their support for the "people's movement."

On 8 May, the MND announced that the soldiers were provided with helmets, shields and batons for "self-protection." The MND then stated that the protestors would be "court-martialed" -- as there are laws provided for destruction of military property. This is in response to the protestors cutting the concertina wire and attacking the unarmed soldiers. The prosecutor's office requested arrest warrants, but the courts turned down most stating that the individuals did not show a risk of fleeing or destroying evidence.

The Anti-American elements geared up for a massive 10,000-strong protest on the weekend on 13-14 May. According to the police, the opposition groups planned to stage a demonstration in memory of the 1980 Kwangju Democratic Uprising, with which they have compared their movement. On14 May the police said the activists aimed for demonstrations in Daechu-r, Dodu-ri and Pyeongtaek City. In response, the police stated that they would attempt to block entry into the Daechuri area. However, the activists equated the crackdown by Chun Doo-hwan in Kwangju and this eviction of farmers from legally obtained lands to stir up feelings of anti-Americanism, hatred of the military dictatorship and inspire the young radicals to violence in the name of "democracy." "There is absolutely no relation between the two, and the opposition groups are distorting the truth when they compare the soldiers patrolling the site of the base" to the brutal suppression of the Kwangju Uprising that saw many protestors killed, a police officer said. (Source: Chosun Ilbo, 9 May 2006.)

11 May 2006 The activist groups were relatively quiet though small demonstrations made the news every night. The nation was focused on the possible confrontation on 13-14 May. Some 20,000 protesters from various locations were set to hold two major rallies, 13 May in Seoul's Gwangwhamun district, and 14 May in Pyeongtaek. In Pyeongtaek, the activists will hold simultaneous demonstrations with the activist groups at Daechuri and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) protesting at Pyeongtaek City Hall. (SITE NOTE: The police warning to the US Embassy warned on 3,000 activists on 13 May in Seoul and 3,000 activists on 14 May in Daechuri. At Daechuri about 2,000 initially showed up on 14 May, while the KCTU rally had about 350 people in Pyeongtaek.)

The government was attempting to use the press to show that the activists did NOT have universal support in the ROK. Unlike the massive anti-American demonstrations of 2002 in which ALL Koreans condemned the US, this demonstration seems to lack the popular support despite constant efforts in the leaders rhetoric to link this "struggle" to the Kwangju Uprising.

According to a survey, eight out of 10 Koreans were against the violent protests against the relocation of the U.S. military base to Pyeongtaek City, Gyeonggi Province. The research firm TNS conducted a telephone survey on May 7 on 1,000 men and women over 19 years old at the Office for Government Policy Coordination's request and published the results on 11 May. According to the survey, 81.4 percent of the surveyed thought that "violence should not be used to solve the problem, no matter how big it is." But 17 percent answered, "The relocation of the U.S. army base should be deterred, even if violence is used." (Source: Donga Ilbo.) 65.6 percent are opposed to civic activists' involvement in the issue. The survey also showed 74.5 percent feel it is premature for U.S. forces to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula while 22.2 percent voted against both the U.S. presence here and the base relocation plan. (SITE NOTE: This is basically the same results as seen in 2005. The majority of the people do not want the US to leave Korea -- YET. In other words, most Koreans support the Americans leaving Korea, but the majority do not feel it is the right time. Thus the opinion of not supporting the violent protests, does not necessarily mean the ROK citizenry supports the indefinite presence of the USFK.)

On 11 May, representatives of about 300 civic groups expressed support for the Camp Humphreys project, 70 kilometers south of Seoul, and called on leftist activists to cancel mass rallies planned for the weekend. The groups said they would hold their own rallies in Pyeongtaek on May 20 and in Seoul on May 23. Meanwhile, the Pan-national Committee to Deter the Expansion of U.S. Bases, a coalition of 138 leftist civic groups, reaffirmed its plan on 10 May to go ahead with mass rallies in Seoul and Pyeongtaek. The Anjungni Chamber of Commerce is vehemently against the anti-US military protests for business reasons and have vowed to confront any protests in their area with a counter-protest. The Paengseong Storekeepers United Association plans to hold a demonstration supporting the relocation of USFK bases in front of Camp Humphreys on May 14, with about 200 members participating, making demonstrations both of supporting and opposing the relocation be held on the same day. (Source: Donga Ilbo.)

Tongil News ran an article on 11 May showing the various activist Catholic/Protestant/Buddhist priests/monks gathered at the site of the now demolished Daechuri Elementary School to pray in unison on 11 May 2006. The activists are making the most of photos of elderly women and farmers praying and pleading with the police lines. Meanwhile, the government continued to demolish the irrigation canals to the land and dug ditches near the fence line. In addition, the single concertina line was now a double concertina line with added barricades. Both sides were massing their forces and planning their strategies for the 13-14 mass demonstrations promised by the activist groups.

On 12 May in a prepared statement, Prime Minister Han Myung-sook said that her government admitted there had been a lack of dialogue between the authorities and the residents before going ahead with the plan. (SITE NOTE: Some people may dispute this statement.) But she said that the government will now make a concerted effort to resolve the ongoing dispute by sharing opinions with the people concerned.

The Police are also beefing up their forces -- but silently the ROK Army is also ensuring their forces are protected as well. Preparing against the illegal demonstration, military engineers also wore protective gear and strengthened their security posture by increasing the number of guards. Furthermore, they established a multi-level defense line by digging deeper the ditch surrounding the outer fence perimeter up to a depth of three to four meters, and setting up additional barbed wire inside the water-filled ditch. Soldiers were digging trenches inside a concertina-wire barrier and filling them with about three feet of water. They also were backing the barrier with a five-foot high bank and have placed 20 barricades on roads into Daechu-ri.

Police stated that they would block all roads to Daechuri village to prevent demonstrators from approaching the land designated for the base expansion. Police said they will deploy riot police at the entrances of expressways on Saturday to block demonstrators coming from Seoul from entering the town. On Sunday, 18,000 riot police will be deployed on the farmland to deter the planned rally and guard the fenced-off site. In April, officials said they would allow holdout residents to stay in Daechu-ri until the end of June. There, thus far, they remain -- but some claim they have "hidden" some 600-800 outsider protestors in their homes.
(SITE NOTE: The government will wait for three or four months before moving locals out of villages near the site. "Although we ordered locals to leave by the end of June, we can't force them out," said Yoo Jong-sang, a government official in charge of the matter, said. "We will take legal action first by applying for an injunction." (Source: Chosun Ilbo.))

13 May 2006 Yonhap News stated that thousands of anti-U.S. activists and students hit the streets in Seoul to protest plans to expand Camp Humphreys. The police issued a warning that 3,000 were expected between 4 - 8 pm, but the protest was a bit larger. At 5:30 it was estimated that 3000 had gathered in protest. At night, some 6,000 protesters staged a candlelight vigil next to the Gwanghwamun intersection in central Seoul in which they called for the release of activists detained during protests against the expansion earlier this month.

Tongil News showed a small number of students from Hanchongryeon staged a protest at the Ministry of Defense. About 700 student activists rallied in front of the Defense Ministry in Yongsan, Seoul, urging the defense minister to resign and take responsibility for the two bloody clashes between activists and riot police. The Defense Ministry deployed 1,000 soldiers inside the office area to cope with possible infiltration. Besides throwing stones over the KNP buses blocking their way at the MND, no major clashes with riot police were reported.

13 May saw rallies of altogether 45,000 members of the coalition in Seoul. They gathered in places like Yongsan near the Defense Ministry and converged on downtown Gwanghwamun around 7 p.m., blocking roads leading to Jongno, before 2,000 of them moved on to Hongik University late at night. Meanwhile at Daechuri at 11:20 at night, 11 farmers sat peacefully on the road leading to Daechuri along the police line blocking the way into the town.


(R) Candlelight Vigil (L) Gathering in Streets (13 May 2006) (Tongil News)



Hanchongryeon Students at the Ministry of Defense (13 May 2006) (Tongil News)


Since early morning on 13 May, police forces blocked the main roads that lead to Daechu-ri and Dodu-ri, Wonjeong and Bonjeong intersections, setting up two to three lines of police barricades as well as checkpoints. Small groups of police occupied the Daechuri Elementary School to prevent it from being a rallying point.

Daechu-ri villagers, meanwhile, continued farming by plowing their rice paddies with tractors and sowing rice seeds. Police concerned with a possible clash with the villagers did not halt the plowing. (Source: Donga Ilbo.)


(R) Army Gathering Long Bamboo Sticks (L) Riot Police moving into area (13 May 2006) (OhMy News)



(R) Riot Police in area (L) Dug up area with Barricades (13 May 2006) (OhMy News)


14 May 2006 Camp Humphreys issued travel restrictions for 14 May. Bus service on Sunday between Camp Humphreys and Osan Air Base was halted but shuttle buses running inside Camp Humphreys was not be affected. Government vehicles were banned from driving off-post Sunday except for "essential" missions. Pyeongtaek's train station, adjacent shopping district, city hall and adjacent downtown areas were also off limits. An off-limits restriction on travel in or between all villages bordering Camp Humphreys was extended. The only exception was for people going to or from their homes. Travel was banned along the northern perimeter road inside the camp, as well as walking, hiking, running or biking in the area west of Camp Humphreys to the Anjung River.

A total of 100 people including Daechu-ri residents and committee members, held a "Pan National Meeting for Peaceful Farming" at Peace and Art Park in Daechu-ri. The rally was peaceful -- but police were also standing by just in case at the Daechuri Elementary School.

Early in the day Yonhap News reported that between 2,000-4,000 militants, shouting "Yankee go home," clashed with riot police in a remote farming village on Sunday, opposing plans to expand a U.S. military base there. The demonstrators from the Hanchongryeon, or the Federation of Korean University Student Councils, and the Korean Confederation of Trade Union attempted to enter Daechu-ri in the beginning of the morning but failed thanks to a block from the police. (SITE NOTE: Finally, Yonhap News printed the phrase "Yankee Go Home" as Korean sentiments. Though the protestors have been stating this on their signs all along -- only it was usually in hangul stating "American Soldiers Go Home" -- the news media has refused to use this phrase in English translations of news reports. For the video of protest go to OhMy News.)

To bypass the police cordon, the unarmed students gathered at a remote school and walked several kilometers along paddy dikes to reach the village where they confronted police and rallied for about eight hours on a road in Bonjeong-ri, Paengseong-eub. The protest broke up at about 4:30 p.m. Some 1,000 students scuffled with the riot police while trying to break through the police cordon line. After being deterred from entering the villages, protesters staged sit-in demonstrations in front of the police line. According to Yonhap News, "Withdraw U.S. military forces. Pyeongtaek is our land," protesters shouted as they kicked and punched riot police who formed human barriers against them. ... Students, many of them wearing gauze masks apparently to conceal their identity, vowed to break through the police lines. A South Korean military helicopter showered down leaflets warning that protesters who would violate the fenced-off military zone could face punishment under military laws." Separately in the center of Pyeongtaek, a city of 350,000, several hundred protesters, mostly workers, held a rally, demanding the cancellation of the U.S. base expansion project. After the rally, the workers planned to march a few kilometers through the city and may try to join the students, organizers said. (Source: Yonhap News.)

Riot police and protesters scuffled during the protest. Some 196 companies of riot police numbering 20,000 were mobilized to stop the protests, in which 36 protestors were taken into custody for throwing stones at police. Five people were taken to nearby hospitals, including two policemen, after smaller clashes between police and protestors. But by Korean standards, the protest was peaceful and residents of the area were notable by their absence. (SITE NOTE: The students usually attack when they have a numerical advantage on their side. The students were outnumbered three-to-one so some of their confrontations lacked any violent conviction. On TV it showed the students striking a policeman to the head, and immediately a baton was swung at the activist from the another policeman. However, the police did not pursue or attack -- only defend. The riot police were ordered to use restraint -- or else.)

The feared large-scale violence, however, was averted as protestors refrained from using lethal tools like steel pipes or bamboo sticks while police stopped short of full-scale suppression. The government and some local residents' groups have complained that the turmoil there was imported by activists opposing the U.S. military presence in Korea. Four thousands protesters who had gathered from around the country tried to converge at a farm village inside the designated base area, which has been fenced off and is guarded by military troops and riot police. Failing in that effort, the demonstrators moved on to a nearby village where they waved placards, shouted slogans through loudspeakers and in many villagers' eyes made a nuisance of themselves on what should have been a peaceful Sunday in rural Korea.

There was a small counterdemonstration by 150 residents of other nearby villages, who gathered to show their support for their American soon-to-be neighbors and their contribution to the local economy. Through their own loudspeakers, the local demonstrators ordered the anti-base group out of the area; some pushing and shoving ensued. (Source: Joongang Ilbo.)


(R) Massing for March (L) Students Harassing Police at K-6 Fence (14 May 2006) (OhMy News)



(R) Police Move into Area (L) Protestors March into Area (14 May 2006) (OhMy News)



(R) Massing for March (L) March to Police Line (14 May 2006) (OhMy News)



Confrontation (14 May 2006) (OhMy News)


15 May 2006 Teams from the Korea Cadastral Survey Corporation began measuring the boundaries of the expansion site on 15 May, the first of several preliminary steps to ready the land for development. The next step is for a historical survey team to complete its inspection. Then the USFK will conduct its own independent survey of various sites.

16 May 2006 The Korean media continued to "evaluate" the protest that fizzled in depth. The the Pan-National Committee to Deter the Expansion of U.S. Bases said the police blockade last weekend prevented its demonstrations then from being carried out "satisfactorily."

Despite the outcome that was not as planned, the committee started to make plans for another large-scale protest at Daechuri on June 11. The last time the activists tried to link the protest to the Kwangju riots -- though the similarity of the two escaped everyone. This time around the activists are trying to link the protest to the anniversary to the deaths of two middle school girls crushed by an Army tracked vehicle on 13 Jun 2002. This led to the massive anti-American demonstrations and swept President Roh -- who jumped on the hate US bandwagon -- into office. However, the committee is scheduling the protest for 11 Jun so more people can attend. The Korea Confederation of Trade Unions, the Korean Federation of University Student Councils, the Democratic Labor Party and affiliated organizations that constitute the coalition plan for protests that draw some 10,000 participants.

After the protest fizzled, there was a backlash by conservative newspapers against the Pan-National Committee actions and they have for the first time started to voice opinions that are just a fraction away from calling the activists "communists." The shift is partially due to the multiple-published surveys that more of the young are shifting to conservative views -- and the expectation of a rejection of the progressive Uri Party in the May 31st elections -- along with the rejection of "pro-North Korea" policies of Roh Moo-hyun. The conservative papers feel more confident in attacking the Roh administration as they have a bone to pick with Roh over the press law (now under deliberation in the Constitutional Court). The Chosun Ilbo had an editorial on 18 May that stated, "In the minds of the Pan-National Committee, the Republic of Korea is a country that should never have been born or should be absorbed into the North Korean system as soon as possible. That became clear during the protests against the Pyeongtaek base. Protestors planted not the Taegukgi ? the South Korean flag -- but pan-Korean flags in the rice fields. They attacked troops from the Republic of Korea with split bamboo sticks and cut barbed-wire fences to trespass on military facilities. The Pyeongtaek coalition says on its homepage it opposes the relocation of U.S. bases "because it is designed to launch a preemptive attack on North Korea." That betrays a mindset more concerned about the security of the Kim Jong-il regime than the Republic of Korea. They live here, but their true fatherland is elsewhere." (SITE NOTE: This indictment against the activist groups was the first time we had seen such words in print in Korea. We have been saying this same thing for years, but this is the first time a KOREAN has agreed with us.)

18 May 2006: Holdouts Given More Time Meanwhile, the government will wait for three or four months before moving locals out of villages near the site. "Although we ordered locals to leave by the end of June, we can't force them out," said Yoo Jong-sang, a government official in charge of the matter, said. "We will take legal action first by applying for an injunction." (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

In April the Ministry of Defense had given the holdouts until June to move -- but now has extended the time to the end of October. Obviously the reason is that the master plan has not been approved -- and the USFK has requested an extension for the master plan as there are so many obstacles -- the primary one being the cost-sharing issue.

However, the question that came out was -- DID THE ROK GOVERNMENT REALLY OWN THE LAND IN THE FIRST PLACE? IF IT DOES, WHY DID THE GOVERNMENT WANT TO GO TO COURT? The answer came back that the government did NOT want to exacerbate the conditions by using force in evicting the elderly farmers -- regardless that the government had the supposed right under law. Instead, it went to the courts to gain clear rights to the land -- and thus bypass another ruling that land with rice growing above a certain height cannot be turned over. Farmers earlier this spring defied a government farming ban at the site and planted a new spring rice crop in hopes of delaying the expansion project. The government position was that they owned the land BEFORE the farmers planted the rice. This needed to be clarified IMMEDIATELY as the rice was sprouting at the time.

According to the Stars and Stripes South Korean authorities have extended by four months the deadline for holdout residents living near Camp Humphreys to move from their homes. "We have to consider their right to live there," one of the officials said, speaking on condition of anonymity. The government would follow the court's rulings in the eviction matter, and would seek a court's go-ahead before using force to evict the holdouts, the source said.

The residents are living on part of a 2,328-acre expanse of farmland that the government bought -- the exact term was "expropriate" (condemned) -- in 2005 toward Camp Humphreys' eventual expansion. While most residents have moved out, some have refused to leave. About 90 or more families are still living in two villages near Camp Humphreys — Daechu-ri and Dodu-ri. One official said authorities believe the holdouts number about 300, mostly in Daechu-ri. On 18 Mar the task force team under the Prime Minister's Office telephoned leaders of the protesting residents, and invited them to talk about additional compensation measures. The residents rejected the talks, and demanded that the police chief and defense minister step down. They also asked the soldiers guarding the site to leave so they can resume farming. Thus the position of the residents is one of unwillingness to relocate regardless of compensation.

On 18 May, an open letter in English was circulated to solicit international support. The Anti-gizi (Anti-camptown) posted the letter on their site on 6 June 2006.) It read in part,

"Toward the Peaceful Solution of the Pyungtaek Problem: 5.18 Declaration on Emergency Situation --The government must be ready for the totally new negotiation for the relocation of the US bases!-- May 18th, 2006 26 Years Ago Today When 5.18 Gwang Joo People's Struggle Broke Out! We got together here with the desperate sense of crisis, as democracy, human rights, and peace were overridden.

We are now in a very serious situation enough to doubt our eyes. The green berets with clubs in their hands were ordered in. There was collision between military forces and civilians. The Ministry of National Defense designated farmers' land without any military facilities as a military security zone, set up the barbed wire arrangements and barracks. It threatened residents and peace lovers by declaring that those who damage the barbed wire arrangements would be punished by the military law. On the 4th and 5th of May, about 560 members of Pan-S. Korea Solution Committee against US base extension in Pyungtaek (KCPT) got hurt by the police. While 624 people were being arrested by the police, they suffered infringements on human rights such as language abuse, sexual harassment, and the examination of the naked body. They also took members of KCPT to the police station without warrants, and made residents panicked by rummaging the village at midnight. Although KCPT promised to have a peaceful rally over and over again, it was blockaded by 20,000 policemen on May 14th. They infringed on the freedom of meeting secured by the Constitution. The passages to Daechuri and Dodu-2ri are now controlled by the police. They also issued a summons against leaders of KCPT."
In a surprising twist, Kim Dong-min, co-president of the Citizens' Coalition for Democratic Media, a left-leaning media monitoring civic group, resigned on 19 May amid harsh criticism over his column on May 12 for Government Briefing, a news portal operated by the Government Information Agency. He stated liberal media groups -- including the daily newspaper Hankyoreh, and online media such as OhmyNews, PRESSian, and the Voiceofpeople -- had printed favorable articles about the protesters in Pyeongtaek. (SITE NOTE: These are radical anti-American news sources. Hankyoreh is a supporter of the Roh administration policies.) In his column Mr. Kim asserted that the liberal media presented one-sided claims by the Pan South Korea Solution Committee against U.S. Base Extension and were excessively tolerant of the protesters' violent rallies. Expressions used in Hankyoreh's reports such as "war" and "military operation" to describe the riot policemen's preparations for the rallies exaggerated and distorted facts, he said. "In Hankyoreh, there was only brutal oppression by the authorities and peaceful actions by residents, but no reports about the violent protesters, which seemed to be led by Hanchongryon, a student activist group," he wrote. Reacting to Mr. Kim's column, members of the monitoring group and liberal media groups turned on him and forced his resignation. (Source: Joongang Ilbo.)

20-21 May 2006 A series of rallies for and against the U.S. army base relocation were held one after another in Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, over the weekend, but did not cause any conflicts. According to the Stars and Stripes on 19 May about the 20 May pro-American rally at Anjungni, "Pyeongtaek merchants who say they're fed up with anti-U.S. protests plan a large rally Saturday to voice support for Camp Humphreys' eventual expansion and the continued U.S. military presence in South Korea. Organizers said the rally aims in part to counter recent, violent anti-U.S. protests by activists who oppose the expansion project and want a U.S. military withdrawal. "They just say, 'All the GI go back to the States,'" Kim Ki-ho, president of the Anjung-ri Merchants Association, said of the anti-expansion protesters. The association is sponsoring Saturday's pro-U.S. rally. "We don't want" U.S. forces to leave South Korea, Kim said. "We need American soldiers … to stay in Korea for our … defense from North Korea or China, something like that." The Association predicted 4,000 people would join the rally, set for 2 p.m. near the post's main gate. They include South Korean military veterans, merchants and clergy, and others from 30 to 40 organizations in the Seoul-Pyeongtaek region.

On 20 May a total of over 1,500 members of conservative groups, including the Paengseong Merchants Association in Pyeongtaek, the War Veterans Social Club in Pyeongtaek, and the National Council for Advancement, held a rally for governmental authorities before the main entrance of Camp Humphreys (K-6), a U.S. army base, to denounce the opponents of base relocation. The conservatives insisted that the government accelerate the relocation to strengthen the Korea-U.S. alliance and national security, saying that "no attempt to bolster leftist ideological conflicts challenging governmental authorities should be excusable."

On 20 May Kim Ki-ho, head of the Anjung-ri Merchants Association, said about 2,000 people, about half of them South Korean military veterans and the rest Anjung-ri residents, held a peaceful two-hour rally Saturday afternoon to voice support for the expansion plan and for the U.S. military's continued presence on the peninsula. The speakers also warned anti-U.S. protesters that they face a hostile reception in Anjung-ri from local merchants irate over loss of business resulting from the demonstrations as the GIs have gone to the Shinjang Mall at Osan AB for bar entertainment. Kim said the merchants are ready for physical confrontations with anti-U.S. protesters should they select Anjung-ri as part of their march route for any future rallies in Daechu-ri. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)
The Pyeongtaek Affairs Committee consisting of civic society groups in Pyeongtaek held "a marathon race against the U.S. army base relocation to Pyeongtaek" in the Pyeongtaek public stadium on the morning of 21 May. The marathon was publicized in Tongil News, but there was not a large turnout and was mainly students that ran along the main boulevards.

The voluntary activities for rural communities, which the Korean Teachers and Education Workers' Union and the Coalition of Korean University Students scheduled on rice field in Daechu-ri over the weekend, were cancelled. (Source: Donga Ilbo.) After the attack on Park Geun-hye, chairwoman of the Grand National Party while campaigning on 20 May, the polls show that there was a negative reaction against all the "progressive" parties -- as one of the persons arrested was a dues-paying member of the Uri Party.

Meanwhile, the Paengseong Affairs Committee (PAC), comprised of residents in Daechu-ri and in Dodu-ri, Paengseong said yesterday that the Special Commission on USFK Affairs under the Prime Minister's Office proposed an official talk to resolve the relocation issue on May 20. An official of the PAC said, "The special commission called some PAC senior management members on May 17 requesting an online talk, which we rejected. But, at this time, we are planning to notify the time and place for the requested talk after discussion with residents, since the request was delivered through an official letter." (SITE NOTE: The willingness to enter into negotiations is a positive step and indicates the realization that protests did not achieve the results they intended. There was no national support for their protest -- and the dwindling numbers of activists joining the protest has led to their decision to open negotiations. Though given an extension until October to move out, the ROK government has gone to court to eliminate the last potential legal roadblock over the rice fields that have been planted. If the courts rules in favor of the government, the farmers will have lost everything -- and the farmers will be evicted on disadvantageous terms. There will be no more negotiations.)


The cartoon compares President Roh Moo-hyun to the attacker of Park Geun-hye, Chairman of the GNP, who had her face slashed with a razor knife while campaigning on 20 May 2006. In the photo, President Roh is the attacker and the helpless elderly female is Daechuri (right). The cartoon is from the radical left news source, Tongil News, and shows the frustration of the left-leaning activists as the support President Roh and the Uri Party had once given the activists has vaporized. Instead, now Roh is now viewed as the attacker of the elderly farmers as he represents the government.


2 June 2006 The government held a first formal meeting with residents of Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province on 2 Jun to discuss the relocation of USFK headquarters there. The two sides agreed to deal with the problem through discussions from now on after violent protests last month turned the site into a battleground. (SITE NOTE: The residents saw the futility of fighting as the national support by activists did not materialize -- leaving the residents to face the consequences.)

Kim Chun-seok, the assistant secretary of a Special Commission on USFK Affairs, and two other officials met with Lee Sang-yeol, the leader of the residents organization in Paengseong and two others. "As this was only the first meeting since formal dialogue was proposed, we mainly just listened to what the residents had to say," Kim said afterwards. Their demands include an apology for damages due to the base relocation, and release of those arrested in the protests. (SITE NOTE: The chances of getting an apology for damages is slim but the release of those arrested is possible after a "cooling off" period. Currently the national sentiment is against the violent protestors who were captured on tape with sharpened bamboo poles.) "The main thing is that we've agreed to solve the problem through talks, and we will discuss the points of contention at our next meeting" on June 7, Kim added. The government said last month that if the residents came forward, it could discuss additional compensation for those whose homes and farmland were expropriated to make way for the base. (Source: Chosun Ilbo.)

7 June 2006 Pyeongtaek District Court issued an arrest warrant for Jitae Kim, chairman of the Paengsung Countermeasures Committee. A Statement by Pan S.Korea Solution Committee against US Base Extension in PT stated there was a substantial warrant review dealing with the arrest of Jitae Kim that lasted over 2 hours. Via his attorney, Mr. Kim mentioned to the court how unfair, indemocratic and even dangerous the project of the US base expansion is. Mr. Kim was returned to jail.

Residents demanded in the meeting with the police that they release Mr. Kim and stop measuring the land. but the results were negative. Father Mun Jeong-hyeon began to fast and one activist in prison also started to be on a hunger strike to support him. (Source: www.antigizi.or.kr.)

18 June 2006 On Sunday, June 18th, 2006 approximately 5,000 people from around Korea marched in Pyeongtaek toward Daechuri and Doduri, vocalizing their opposition to the expansion of the American base there according to activist sources. The Stars and Stripes warned USFK forces to stay away from the area. However, the World Cup fever sweeping the country detracted from media attention on this protest.


(L) Protestors Rally for March on Daechuri at 12:30 (18 Jun 2006) (Tongil News); (R) Daechuri Protestors Enter Through Rice Fields (18 Jun 2006) (Tongil News)


In preparation, the ROK Army behind the concertina wire armed themselves with bamboo spikes. Unlike the protestors in May who attacked the unarmed ROK soldiers with splintered bamboo acting like sashimi knives, these pikes were made of two slender eight-foot long bamboo poles taped together for strength -- as defensive weapons in case the protestors attempted to breach the concertina wire. No confrontations were reported.


(L) ROK Army behind concertina wire with bamboo pikes to repel any potential attacks. (18 Jun 2006) (Tongil News); (R) Army helicopters over ROK Army controlled area in Daechuri (18 Jun 2006) (Tongil News)


Approximately 200 supporters were inside the village, despite heavy police opposition, shouting from the rooftops. The activists were confronted by the riot police on the roads and at one point, it turned into a pushing contest as the protestors tried to push a "container house" blocking the road out of the way with the protestors pushing on one side and riot police on the other. The protestors finally managed to march from Daechuri to Doduri and back to Daechuri by marching through the rice fields.


(L) Protestors on Daechuri rooftop (18 Jun 2006) (Tongil News); (R) Daechuri Protestors Shoving Match with Container house (18 Jun 2006) (Tongil News)



Daechuri Protestors Enter Through Rice Fields (18 Jun 2006) (Tongil News)


College students in small inflatable rafts -- approximately eight -- sailed out onto the river between the main area of Pyeongtaek and the villages, apparently to hold a demonstration on the water. They then crossed the river and into the village as the police stood by, helpless, and very much occupied with the 5,000 marchers who were all marching on the villages from various parts of the area.


(L) Protestors on Rafts (18 Jun 2006) (Tongil News): (R) Daechuri Protestors Confront Riot Police on Roads (18 Jun 2006) (Tongil News)


It is reported that the Korean national police force mustered for the day numbered some 11,000 men. There are no reports of excessive violence or serious injuries.


Riot Police Buses with Protest Banners along road (18 Jun 2006) (Tongil News)


Save Pyeongtaek Farmers reported that the government's planned date to begin demolishing empty homes in the villages was 30 June. "The government has signed contracts for "hired civilian workers" who are known to be plain clothes ex-military strikebreakers." A campaign to find "peace observers" to protect homes was started but there was little public support expected. On 30 Oct, the government's planned to start the forced evictions of all residents. Calls were made for "Peace observers" and village defenders to be living in the villages before this time. Many reported that the 18 Jun action "reinvigorated" the movement to save the farming villages, which was dealt a major blow on May 4th, with the destruction of the Daechuri primary school and the laying of Concertina razor wire around the villages. Many villagers expressed their renewed hope that they will, indeed be able to keep their homes. (Source: Save Pyeongtaek Farmers.)

4-7 July 2006 The activist movement has been sidetracked by the US-ROK Fair Trade Agreement negotiations...with protestors disrupting the meetings and staging large protests in Seoul. As such, the local area has been relatively quiet. KBS aired a special on "60 Minutes" that attempted to equate the Daechuri struggles with the activists in Okinawa and Japan -- but never mentioned the glaring differences between the Japanese activist aims and the ROK aims. In the TV special, the farmers were given air time to voice their grievances -- but it seems to be all too late. The special did show the abandoned houses that were leveled -- while the die-hard farmers were still planting their crops despite the eviction order.

On 4 July, anti-American activists began a five-day march from Seoul to Pyeongtaek to protest plans to expand Camp Humphreys. Fifty members of the Pan-National Committee to Deter the Expansion of Pyeongtaek U.S. Base were to walk 91 kilometers from the presidential office of Cheong Wa Dae to the town of Daechuri. They will hold rallies outside the Defense Ministry in Seoul and a detention house in Pyeongtaek where some of their colleagues are being held in custody. The coalition also said popular actors Choi Min-sik, movie director Bong Jun-ho and other prominent figures from various sectors have joined their 571-member group. However, this march was over-shadowed by the FTA protests and the pending missile "test" launches by the North. There did not appear to be much support for the march -- except by the farmer groups, but they were tied up in Seoul with the FTA protests.

7 July 2006 Activists planned a march on 7 July with about 200 people who were to march from Suwon Train Station to Suwon Air Base and from Osan Subway Station to Osan Air Base’s main gate. They were expected to stay overnight outside Osan -- and most likely a counter-demonstration by the Merchant's Association would probably be scheduled as the area would most certainly be declared off-limits and cut into the area business.

The planned demonstration at Osan AB fizzled and the only indication of a protest was the large banner at Shinjang mall that stated the the Shinjang Mall Merchants "Emphatically Object" to any protests that damaged their business. Notice that it was not a condemnation of the protest -- only a condemnation of effects to their business. In other words, the meaning was to protest somewhere else. This was not a political message -- simply a "keep out" sign from the businesses.

8-9 July 2006 On 8 July the march was to continue to Pyeongtaek City Hall, then to Pyeongtaek Train Station and from there to Daechuri. On 8 July Yonhap News reported that 400 protesters rallied outside the Pyeongtaek train station. However, on 7-8 March nothing appeared in the Tongil News that would normally monitor the march. Instead all the attention was detracted by the 100,000 that were expected to demonstrate against the FTA in Seoul on 9 July.

More than 40 South Korean protesters who opposed Camp Humphreys’ expansion were jailed in Pyeongtaek after violent clashes on 8 July with pro-U.S. residents and local police. Police said 42 protesters were jailed for holding an unauthorized rally outside a local police station. Police said they were members of the Task Force To Oppose the Expansion of the U.S. Bases in Pyeongtaek. The protesters spurned a police order to halt the rally and then resisted when officers sought to disperse them, according to the Gyeonggi Provincial Police Agency. (Source: Stars and Stripes.) 300 members of the Nationwide Response Committee Against Expansion OF U.S. Base Expansion(NRC) marching from Pyong-taek Station to Daechu-ri on 9 July were blocked by 100 egg-throwing merchants, and decided to end (their march), out of concern for their safety. They are to gather again at Pyong-taek Station at 1pm, July 9th and march toward Daechu-ri.

A van containing three protesters of the NRC drove toward the entrance of Daechu-ri, a village near Camp Humphreys, to check reports that a large group of pro-U.S. South Korean demonstrators was formed to block any anti-U.S. rally in the village. The activists said that around 9 p.m. the van was met by 200 members of the Anjung-ri Merchants Association at the Won-jung Intersection, which is the entrance to Daechu-ri, Paeng-sung Town, Pyong-taek City. The Anjung-ni merchants allegedly blocked the van's path, pulled the occupants from the van and began beating them. The activists were quoted as saying three members of its group were attacked, and that one man remained hospitalized for treatment of cuts and fractures, including a head injury. An NRC member Mr. Kwak (age:33, Daechu-ri, Paeng-sung Town) sustained head injuries and was treated at a nearby hospital. Mr Kwak claimed, "Upon hearing that merchants had gathered at Won-jung Intersection, I went there to see if marchers' safety can be ensured, when merchants swore at us and dragged me off the van, and hit me with square bars." Five companies of riot police were deployed around Anjung-ni, in anticipation for clash between merchants and NRC, but no police presence where the violence occurred. (SITE NOTE: Later in July the activist groups protested that the police had done nothing to apprehend the culprits. The police reaction was to simply disregard the message in disgust.)

Kim Ki-ho, president of the Anjung-ri Merchants Association, said on 10 July that at least two association members were injured in the clash with the protesters and were hospitalized. One senior member of merchants' organization said, "I have not heard any specific facts on the violence. We, merchants, had endured enough for last two years. We won't tolerate out-of-town entities interfering (our affairs.) We will stop them with our force." (SITE NOTE: This hostility to the activists is the same that was seen on 7 July at Osan AB's main gate by the Shinjang Mall merchants. Some GIs read a "dollar motive" for the merchants actions, but this not be any more so than in Osan AB. The problem is that the activists are targeting THE MERCHANT areas for the protests. The merchants are making no political statement -- only a business statement. Don't screw with the monies I earn. I need to survive after the hard times the base/camp have placed me under with their off-limits/underage drinking/curfew sanctions.)

Nothing was reported of the 9 July march to Daechu-ri, but all non-residents of the area were turned back by Police roadblocks. The march was overshadowed by about 100,000 people who were expected to show up near Seoul City Hall to protest the ROK-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.

22 July 2006 First the hysteria of the North Korea missile "tests" on 4 Jul, Typhoon Ewiniar and then the monsoon floods in early July prevented any protests -- as Koreans are primarily "fair weather" protestors. Thus the Pyeongtaek protests against the Camp Humphrey expansion by the evil "mikgun" (soldiers) of 8 Jul was rescheduled.

The march directly to Daechuri failed due to the roads being blocked by the police buses. After the obligatory pushing match with riot police, the protestors then marched to Daechuri using the back roads and farmer lanes between the fields. The marchers were followed by an entourage of photographers that were hoping for a violent confrontation. Instead it was a rather boring face-off and then the march to Daechuri via the back roads. The protest was peaceful with a crowd estimated at 700 people.

More and more Koreans are shunning the move as the reality is starting to alight that the US may simply pull out if the protests continue. If this should happen, the effects on the local economy may be devastating. Thus the populace is simply staying away from these protests. However, expect more protests as the September deadline for the Camp Humphreys Master Plan completion -- or perhaps lack of it -- nears.


(L) Protestors on chant defiance against the "Migun Kiji" (Soldier Camp) (R) Protest Performance condemning Roh, Bush and MND (22 Jul 2006) (Tongil News)



Protestors on march through fields (22 Jul 2006) (Tongil News)



Protestors on march through fields (22 Jul 2006) (Tongil News)




31 July 2006 On 31 July there was a small candlelight vigil headed by Fr Moon at Daechu-ri. The small group performed skits, but the demonstration did not attract much media attention. The public support for the Daechu-ri farmers has been waning as the spotlight shifted to the ROK-US FTA protests along with the North Korean missile test issues. Though the radical Federation of Student Councils (Hangchongyreon or FTC) has centered its focus on the base expansion, it is focusing its attention on the camps/bases -- not the farmer issue. At this time, it appears the activists have deserted their brethren in Daechu-ri that they said they would join with in their fight "to the death."

On 31 July, a small group of perhaps ten people chanted in front of the Osan AB Main Gate protesting the "Strategic Flexibility" policy of the US in Northeast Asia. Though the Tongil News had an article on this protest, most of the article dealt with the supposed "danger zones" (noise, fire, explosive, missile targeting, etc.) surrounding Osan AB. Unfortunately for these protestors, the situation is out of their hands -- and there is nothing more to be said on this issue. The US will forge ahead with its policy -- while the ROK has "abstained" from giving its approval. The die has been cast and in the October Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) expect to hear some bad news for Korea. The concerns for life at Osan by contractors may become an issue.

The Shinjang Mall businesses position on these protests is that they "emphatically disapprove" of these protests that affect their businesses. Protests tend to shut the Main Gate and stop GIs from spending their money downtown.


(L) & (R) Protest in front of Main Gate at Shinjang Mall (31 July 2006) (Tongil News)



(L) & (R) Protest in front of Main Gate at Shinjang Mall (31 July 2006) (Boram O'Sullivan)


12 Aug 2006 10 a.m. anti-U.S. civil gathering in front of Pyeongtaek Train Station with 2,000 attendees. The group then march from the station toward Daecuh-ri. The group was confronted by riot police with the unification group separated by container buildings. The protestors were mainly college students wearing Unification blue t-shirts with red bandanas to cover their faces. Besides the students pulling over one container building, the confrontation was non-violent. At 7p.m. a candlelight rally was held.

At Osan AB in anticipation of a possible protest, five buses of riot police arrived. Because of the heat, none of the riot police suited up and instead made their presence seen throughout the Mall area by marching in groups in their black and red T-shirts. But no protestors showed up.

The protests at Pyeongtaek was off-set by a rally at Seoul Station with 5000 people, including 10 former defense ministers, 500 generals and many old veterans wearing their uniforms and ribbons. Protestors demanded a halt to discussions to dismantle the CFC and an official apology from Roh, calling on politicians to make clear their opposition to dismantlement of the joint command structure. They also demanded that what they said were pro-North Korean groups pulling strings behind the scenes be investigated. After the speeches, the protestors marched peacefully to Namdaemun (South Gate).

13 Sep 2006 A sign that the Daechuri issue is a lost cause is that the activist leader Fr. Moon showed up in September at activist rallies protesting the Fair Trade Agreement. He started with the Missile Defense System (MDS) protests in 2000 in Kunsan, moved to the hate campaigns in Seoul in 2002, then moved to Daechuri in 2004 to protest the move to Pyeongtaek. He is still at the forefront of the Camp Humphreys protests, but it looks like he might be moving on again.

On 13 Sep hundreds of workers on Wednesday began demolition work at a site designated for expanded U.S. military facilities. Before the work started at 7 a.m., 18,000 police officers and 485 construction workers made the rounds of 90-170 houses in four villages from which people were evicted to make sure that no one remained there. The initial demolition was of only 88 of the 220 houses in the four villages to be evacuated; the razed homes were those owned by residents who have already received government compensation for their land and dwellings.

Ten buildings occupied by protesters were excluded from the project, in an apparent effort to avoid - or at least delay - further clashes at the site. A total of 40 houses were excluded from the demolition work because the remaining occupants and protesters occupied them. Some farmers and organized protesters have defied government orders to leave the site and attempted to block government efforts to evict them.


Daechuri Demolition (13 Sep 2906) (Korea Herald)


The Defense Ministry gave advance notice that the removal would come sometime in the week. The demolition was originally planned for July, but was delayed due to the government's prolonged negotiations with residents, according to officials. The Ministry of National Defense, aided by police, razed abandoned houses on 13 Sep at Daechuri. The police had sealed off the area before the demolition work began, although some protesters have been squatting in a few of the houses. After police officers confirmed which buildings were to be demolished, each house was flattened in about 10 minutes by construction workers with heavy equipment.

Former residents of the houses have moved to other locations after agreeing to a compensation deal with the government. About 590 out of 680 households have left the region. The remaining 40 houses, where protesters are camping, and common utility buildings such as warehouses were not included in the demolition plan, the ministry said.


Daechuri Demolition (13 Sep 2906) (Korea Herald)


Dozens of local farmers and anti-U.S. activists protested near the police cordon and occasionally scuffled with riot police, though no serious injuries were reported. Police detained 23 activists who attempted to break through a police barricade that led to the site allocated for the U.S. base. In Seoul, a protest organization complained to reporters in front of the Defense Ministry headquarters about the day's events. "Because the government used force to tear down the houses, many people were injured and arrested," said the Pan-South Korea Solution Committee Against U.S. Base Extension in Pyeongtaek. (Source: Joongang Ilbo and Korea Herald.)


2 Oct 2006 According to theDonga Ilbo Paengseong County held a Residents Harmony Feast at the Western Multipurpose Hall. The feast was held outside of the site reserved for the base, and the Local Countermeasures Committee which is opposing the move did not attend, making it a party which only half the members attended.

Around 100 people were present, such as 10 locals opposing the move, 70 locals from Daechu-ri, Dodu-ri, Yoo Jong-sang deputy secretary of planning at the Office for Government Policy Coordination, Park Gyeong-seo head of U.S. army base relocation project at the Ministry of National Defense, Mayor of Pyeongtaek Song Myeong-ho. The "feast" lasted for two hours.

This was the first event that took place since talks between the government and Pyeongtaek National Countermeasures Committee for the Obstruction of U.S. Army Base Expansion was discontinued in June of this year. It took six talks with the opposing locals to prepare this event.

Park Jong-myeong (66, Dodu2-ri), representative of locals, said, “There have been many conflicts between the people who left the town and those who remain, but we are all victims. From now on, we wish the government would confer with the locals to promote a project that will not bring about disunion.” Yu also said, “I wish today’s event will become a place where the locals and government can forget about the hostilities created in the process of promoting the relocation project, and make harmony with each other.”

However the event did not go smoothly, with the leaders of the Local Countermeasures Committee absent, and some opposing locals shouting, “Stop this deceptive event,” near the end. Head of the Cooperative Enforcement of Pyeongtaek National Countermeasures Committee, Park Rae-gun (45), claimed, “How can it become a Residents Harmony Feast, just because some opposing locals are present. The government’s attitude is very sneaky. On the outside, it asks to hold talks, but behind everyone’s back, it uses conciliatory measures, and holds parties to show to the media.”

Business Director of Paengseong Locals Countermeasures Committee Kim Taek-gyun (42) said, “With village head of Daechu-ri Kim Ji-tae in confinement, and the locals holding a candle ceremony everyday to defend their homeland, this sort of event will only bring new confrontation and conflict.”

The Office for Government Policy Coordination announced, with 40 more locals of Daechu-ri, and Dodu-ri agreeing to move out, 50 out of 92 families opposing the forced removal remain in the U.S. army relocation site. Last month the government demolished 90 empty houses, and soon it will complete the master plans for the formation of the relocation base, and commence work on the foundation such as trial digging of cultural assets and construction of drainage facilities. Development of the site will start as of next April. (Source: Donga Ilbo.)

14 Oct 2006 Mimicking the Shinjang Mall US-ROK Friendship Culture Festival, the Anjung-ri Merchants Association hosted the Korean/American One Heart Festival on 14-15 Oct in the shopping and bar district just outside of Camp Humphreys. “We hope that the festival will bring U.S. soldiers and local people to seek one heart, unified, after undergoing the Daechu-ri conflicts,” , Kim Ki-ho, the association's president said. “The festival will help us to strengthen our friendship and boost the local economy.” The protests prompted military commanders to place some areas outside base off-limits, including shopping district Anjung-ri. In turn, the merchants complained of lost business. Kim said the group has invited Col Taliento, Area III Commander who they have been at odds with in the past, to the festival, as well as military members and Insuni, a famous South Korean-American singer. Other events slated include traditional folk music, a childrens’ drawing contest and karaoke contests. The festival also was to include a 1.5-kilometer march at 1 p.m. Saturday, starting outside Humphreys’ main gate. (SITE NOTE: The Festival was on the same dates as the Osan AB Air Power Day which drew crowds from outside the local area, as well as Camp Humphreys.)

3 Nov 2006 Police they planned to keep riot police units around Camp Humphreys. The 14 units comprising 1,400 riot police will replace police troops to more effectively secure the site designated for a U.S. military base expansion. Police have dispatched 32 rotating units to fend off attempts by local residents and anti-U.S. activists to break into the fenced land. (Source: Korea Herald.)


Beefing up security (8 Nov 2006) (Tongil News)


8 Nov 2006 According to the Joongang Ilbo on 7 Nov 2006, a South Korean man convicted of fostering violent resistance to the Camp Humphreys expansion project in Pyeongtaek has been sentenced to two years in prison. Kim Ji-tae’s sentence in Suwon District Court came after he was convicted of instigating violent protests on farmland near Camp Humphreys, according to the JoongAng Ilbo report.

Kim Ji-tae, village chief of Daechu-ri and chairman of the Paengsung Countermeasures Committee, was taken into custody on 5 Jun after the violent attacks at Daechu-ri. At the time, residents demanded in the meeting with the police that they release Mr. Kim and stop measuring the land. but the results were negative. (Source: www.antigizi.or.kr.)

The court said Kim was personally responsible for violence that has marked opposition to the project, and that he had fostered defiance of public authority, the report said. “Considering that Mr. Kim was a catalyst for a large-scale violent protest in which bamboo sticks and iron pipes were wielded, his crimes cannot be taken lightly,” the report quoted a judge as saying. The report quoted one activist, Choi Yeon-chul, as saying the sentence was out of proportion with those of similar cases. The activist accused the court of trying to inhibit future protests. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

(SITE NOTE: The government is finally taking a stand on the Camp Humphreys expansion and sending a message to activists that further violence will not be tolerated in the project to be started next year with land fill operations off-base. However, though Kim was sentenced to two years in jail, most of these types of offenses usually end up with suspensions for two-three years...meaning that he will probably be quietly released on probation. In fact, the violence was at the hands of the student activists from Hanchongryon acting as the "soldiers" for the violent demonstrations.)

22 Nov 2006 On 20 Nov antiwar activist Cindy Sheehan, center spoke to about 75 area residents of Daechuri. (Sheehan's son Casey died in Iraq in 2004. She has since gained international prominence as an activist opposing the Iraq war and the Bush administration.) Sheehan and about 20 other activists from the United States spoke against the project during a candlelight vigil in Daechuri in a show of “solidarity” with local residents opposing the installation’s expansion. Sheehan was part of a group of about 20 activists from the United States who are in South Korea this week to oppose the expansion project and a proposed South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement.

“The farmer group had invited me to come to observe” the conflict over the expansion, Sheehan told Stripes before a candlelight vigil in the village. “This gives me a lot of concern … that our military is doing that to them.” Sheehan said the expansion project was objectionable partly because it has resulted in the dislocation of residents, separating them from their farms, schools and homes. “I think it’s a human-rights issue,” she said.

Monday night’s candlelight vigil in Daechu-ri went forward inside a large concrete building a short distance from the camp’s perimeter. Seventy-five area residents sat on silver-colored mats, candles burning in front of them. Most appeared elderly or of middle age. The visiting activists spoke briefly in turn, praising the residents for resisting the expansion.


Protest Group against Base Expansion (22 Nov 2006) (Tongil News)


A succession of speakers called for the ouster of the U.S. military from South Korea, and deplored variously Bush administration “militarism” and U.S. foreign policy. “I am humbled by your courage and your integrity and your perseverance,” Sheehan told the residents. “In the United States and here in Pyeongtaek you have a great struggle … we’re all struggling against Georgie Bushy and his militarism.” Sheehan’s sister Dede Miller, of Los Angeles, told the audience, “I’m just very sorry for what my country is doing to yours.” Miller said she and Sheehan would work to “stop the crazy people that are running our country right now.”


Sheehan with pin of her son killed in Iraq (22 Nov 2006) (Tongil News)



Sheehan sisters with misspelled signs (22 Nov 2006) (Tongil News)


When a bus transporting the activists pulled up to the police checkpoint that blocks entry into Daechu-ri a phalanx of blue-clad police was in position behind steel barriers, the first two ranks of officers equipped with riot helmets and shields. After an interval of about 10 minutes, police allowed the bus to proceed through the checkpoint. The candlelight session lasted about an hour and the activists were scheduled to spend the night in Daechu-ri. Sheehan and other activists were allowed into that zone to hold a candlelight vigil and spend the night with the village’s residents. Sheehan also took time during the protest to remember her son, Spc. Casey Sheehan, who died in Sadr City, Iraq. She held up a picture of him on a button and posed for photographers. “We are not against the troops themselves,” Sheehan said as a few soldiers in uniform walked along an overpass above the protesters. “We’re against their leaders who deploy them carelessly.” (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

(SITE NOTE: According to blog posts, Camp Humphreys was locked down for an hour and a half because of the activists presence. Our opinion is that this is simply a publicity stunt (photo op for the NGO activists) as the Daechuri matter is all but over. Notice that the "protest" only lasted an hour. The shame is that these "outsiders" are giving false hope to the elderly farmers who are going to be legally displaced. The NGO activists were using the elderly farmers for their own anti-American purposes by offering the elderly farmers hope that the entire process can be reversed. The truth was that the battle was over. Their cause is lost.

The Sheehan sisters were also being used as dupes. It was pathetic to see the Sheehan sisters who knew nothing of the base expansion plans being manipulated to condemn the "military base expansion and repression in Pyeongtaek." They were used as dupes by the NGO activist groups. They were photographed holding up their American passports and signs that had "base" misspelled (bsae) or hangul signs that they had no idea what was on them. We noted that the button with a her deceased son's photograph also had "Camp Casey" on it though he never served there as far as we know. Again the activists were providing materials that could be photographed to create a false impression -- and for use later in their anti-American "Yankee Go Home" campaigns. To see the success of her being used as a dupe, see Time Magazine Asia Edition for her mouthing the words of the NGO groups on what the South Koreans supposedly want. (NOTE: In Cindy Sheehan's defense, the blogs from GIs in Korea were filled with false rumors about Cindy Sheehan including statements that son Casey was raised by his father from her first marriage. Snoopes declared this a false rumor. She and her husband, Patrick, were high school sweethearts who wed while both were in their early 20's and who have been married only to each other for over 28 years. The couple had four children together, of whom Casey was the oldest. Both parents raised Casey together, first in the southern California community of Norwalk and later in the northern California town of Vacaville, where the Sheehans moved when Casey was 14. In Aug 2005, her husband filed for divorce. (Source: Snoopes.))

We feel their presence will be used by the NGO activists in the same manner that Green Korea United did in inviting foreigners to condemn the Maehyangri (Kooni Range). Their support added the appearance of international legitimacy to their protests. The propaganda was NOT for international dissemination -- but to stir up the student activist groups and convince them that the world was on their side. Soon after these anti-War activists from Puerto Rico, Brazil and other places posted to the site, the students set about quoting these "authorities" as proof of their international support. Their "victory" at the Kooni Range has spurred the activists on to use the same strategy now at Camp Humphreys. This is why the group of protestors included individuals who were American "in appearance" -- and why the Sheehans posed with American passports. We say "Americans in appearance" because the other "Americans" in the group could have been Nigerian blacks and New Zealand caucasians for all one knew. NGO groups have done this in the past using photographs of foreigners at protests to create a false impression.

The NGO groups also used Sheehan as publicity in other venues. Sheehan showed up at an FTA protest on the part of the "farmers group" in Seoul which has nothing to do with her activism in the States to get the US out of Iraq or Women for Peace (Code Pink) -- though now she proclaims that her activism has expanded to "George Bushy and his militarism." She was being used as a publicity puppet. Sheehan claimed, "The farmer group had invited me to come to observe" but in actuality, the Pan Korea NGO Committee provided the invitation.

Sheehan's presence didn't amount to a hill of beans -- and no one in the USFK would even recognize her presence. The squabble is out of the hands of the activists -- and now will be fought in the next phase of a face-off between the USFK and the ROK government over cost-sharing, relocation costs, and land-fill issues for flood control on the expansion area. These have a direct bearing on the implementation of the Camp Humphreys relocation Master Plan. These will be the issues the NGO activists will attack next through National Assembly support and the progressive media to delay the off-base expansion flagged to start in 2007. The first 200-acre parcel at Camp Humphreys is to start being land-filled in early 2007, but the other off-base areas in low-lying areas are still in question.)
Then Peace activist Cindy Sheehan and a handful of other Americans on 21 Nov in the afternoon held their passports in front of South Korean riot police outside a main gate onto Yongsan Garrison, requesting a meeting with U.S. Forces Korea’s commanding general. Last week, she and Medea Benjamin, a member of a women’s peace group called Code Pink, requested a meeting with Gen. B.B. Bell to discuss the expansion of Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek. They were told no one appropriate could meet with them.

Their blue booklets and their chants for the U.S. military to halt base expansion plans south of Seoul went unanswered during the 40-minute long protest. “My father served at this base,” Sheehan said as she stood in front of Gate 5 at Yongsan Garrison. “I have the right as an American to come onto this base.” Unfortunately, she doesn't have a clue as what it entails to gain entry to a USFK base. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

18 Dec 2006 According to the Stars and Stripes on 18 Dec, a South Korean judge in Pyeongtaek imposed jail sentences on six people convicted of leading violent protests against the Camp Humphreys expansion project. Pyeongtaek Chief Judge Sung Ji-yong on Friday sentenced three people to 18 months in jail after they were convicted of interfering with the execution of government duty and holding unlawful protests. Three other people drew 18-month jail sentences for convictions on the same charges, but Sung suspended the sentences for two years. Last month, a man convicted of fostering violent resistance to the expansion project was sentenced to two years in prison. Kim Ji-tae was sentenced in Suwon District Court for instigating violent protests on the contested lands near Camp Humphreys.

In related news, residents who have refused to move from land earmarked for the Camp Humphreys expansion are there unlawfully and must leave, South Korea’s high court ruled. The Seoul High Court, however, set no deadline for the 74 residents to vacate their homes in Daechu-ri and Dodu-ri villages, which border Camp Humphreys. The MND has agreed not to demolish the homes of the remaining holdout residents until they leave.

But South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense on 18 Dec said a deadline would be set for sometime in January or February. An MND spokesman noted that is also the period in which workers are slated to have begun the first phase of development of the land.

The court’s ruling upheld the relocation efforts, saying the government had legally bought the land and was within its rights to insist the remaining residents leave. The court also noted that the government was making payments to those asked to move. South Korean army troops have since turned the tract into a restricted-access military zone with razor-wire barriers, water-filled trenches and other obstacles. Troops now garrison it round-the-clock. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)


Miscellaneous Links:




USFK MILITARY EVENTS

January 2006

See Changes in Japan and Guam will Affect the ROK (Jan-Mar 2006) (See Revising Japanese Peace Constitution May Spell Big Trouble for ROK (Dec 2005) for background.)


Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership (Jan-Mar 2006) In their summit in November 2005 in South Korea, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and his U.S. counterpart, George W. Bush, agreed to start the high-level talks, officially named the "Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership," in 2006. This dialogue between the diplomatic heads of both countries, ROK Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, is a high level regular forum launched after the ROK-U.S. summit talks held in Gyeongju, Gyeongbuk last November. "The meeting will be held for the first time in the middle of January (19 Jan). There are just a few nations having such talks with the U.S.," Ban Ki-moon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said. According to South Korean officials, the United States regularly holds strategic alliance talks with Japan, Australia and Israel so this is nothing out of the ordinary. However, it is not coincidence that it comes almost simultaneously with the new agreement between the US and Japan that will take effect in Mar 2006.


Condoleezza Rice, Sec of State (Feb 2006)


Discussion ItemsThe topics was to cover not only bilateral issues, such as the North Korean nuclear standoff and the South Korea-U.S. alliance, but also global and regional issues of mutual concern, including global terrorism and the political situation of Northeast Asia. Specifically, the agenda was to include talks on the transfer of U.S. Forces Korea camps, strategic flexibility, the redemption of Korea’s Operational Control Authority, free trade agreement negotiations between Korea and the U.S., and other pending issues. In addition to the ongoing struggle between Japan and China over sovereignty, Japan’s views toward its past history and other potential conflicts in Northeast Asia will top the agenda.

There were major military issues that needed to be discussed. First was the reluctance of the US to release technology that would allow the ROK to buy Isreali AWACS aircraft. Second was the issue of the WRSA-K which went defunct in Dec 2006. The ROK has munitions that supposedly would only be able to support its ROK forces for 30 days -- instead of the 90 days which it is planned for. Then we have the ROK move to "demilitarize" the DMZ which defeats the US presence in Korea. Of utmost importance was the use of the USFK forces in a regional peace-keeping role that the ROK opposes but states that it has no control over the USFK forces in a back-handed slap at the US.

The other main issue was the war-time control of the ROK troops by the ROK -- which would spell the death knell for the Combined Forces Command (CFC). With the current developments in Japan and Guam, the ROK had better be careful to NOT ask for too much. They may get what they wish for and it will be a point of no return for the ROK-US alliance. In 2005, the 5th AF moved to Guam and 13th AF moved to Hickam. Hickam will be an overall Pacific area war-fighting force, but a special force will be dedicated to the Korea flashpoint. It appears that Guam will be the headquarters of this force with the building up of the 36th Air Force Expeditionary Unit on Guam -- along with the relocation of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Unit headquarters element with 7,000 troops to Guam. The sub-unit at Camp Zama with I Corps could replace the CFC function in the blink of an eye -- and everything is downhill for the ROK after that. The US moved a brigade with all its heavy armor with three months notification (2d Bde, 2d ID to Iraq in 2004) to never return -- and the same could be done for the rest of Korea. This is an open threat that no one wants to mention publicly.

The Results: According to Yonhap News on 19 Jan 2006, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced agreement on "strategic flexibility" of American troops stationed in South Korea, a policy allowing U.S. forces to swiftly move to and from host nations to areas of conflict or of other military needs. On strategic flexibility, the statement reflects both the needs of the U.S. and concerns of South Korea. "The ROK, as an ally, fully understands the rationale for the transformation of the U.S. global military strategy, and respects the necessity for strategic flexibility of the U.S. forces in the ROK," the statement reads. "In the implementation of strategic flexibility, the U.S. respects the ROK position that it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people." (SITE NOTE: Bottomline is that the US as before was going to proceed with its strategic flexibility -- with or without the ROK's permission. In essence, it states the ROK is welcome to stay out of the regional role the US and Japan will now jointly pursue. The US specifically states that it does NOT EXPECT the ROK's participation in its strategic plans for the region -- but this is also can be read as meaning the US does NOT WANT the ROK participation at this time. The painful episodes of getting the ROK support for the Iraq coalition in 2003 ended in the US pulling out the 2d Bde 2d ID from the ROK after Roh's foot-dragging to send 3,600 troops in 2004. Interestingly, the ROK used the same example to illustrate that the US-ROK alliance could deal with deployments, "The government explains that the two countries are capable of dealing with emergency situations because they share a relationship based on trust, and points to the deployment of 3,600 USFK troops to Iraq in 2004 as an example."

HOWEVER, the ROK interprets the statement, to mean that when conflicts occur between China and Taiwan or the U.S. and China, the USFK must have the consent of South Korea if they are to be engaged. The ROK objects to the USFK forces being used in a regional role as it may leave a security vacuum if the troops are deployed. Until this use of USFK forces is put to a test, no one really knows what will happen. The specific details have not been agreed upon regarding the strategic flexibility of the USFK. Therefore, a possible conflict over USFK operations cannot be ruled out. There is a possibility of a conflict of national interests between the U.S., with its global strategy responsibilities, and South Korea, with its top priority being stability on the Korean peninsula. In Seoul on 21 Jan anti-war protestors showed up with signs that said, "Cancel the ROK-US Strategic Consultation" as they interpreted the agreement to mean that the US would use Korea as a base of operations in case of a regional dispute involving the Korean neighbors.

The drive toward military innovation that has gained momentum since the 1990s has further accelerated the relocation of U.S. forces stationed overseas. The revolution in military affairs (RMA) refers to a fundamental transformation in military operations and strategy that transpired in the process of amplifying combat capabilities by linking ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and PGMs (precision guided munitions) with highly sophisticated C4I (command and control, communication, Computer, and Information) via advanced IT technology.4) The so-called system-of-systems that obtains accurate information through sophisticated battlefield awareness capabilities and relays it to the shooter has proved its effectiveness in wars in the Gulf, Kosovo, Afghanistan and, more recently, Iraq.

One salient aspect of this transition has been Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s strong commitment to parlaying future-oriented military capabilities such as air power and Missile Defense (MD) into leading roles in future warfare. The hard lesson from the Vietnam War was that air power should be applied to the depths of enemy territory in order to strategically paralyze the enemy command system and thus, take the initiative at an earlier stage of the war––a strategy first conceptualized in the context of air land battle. After long-range bombing campaigns via air refueling achieved remarkable results in Kosovo and Afghanistan, U.S. top brass came to a clearer realization that large-scale ground forces no longer play a conventional role. In addition, the RMA dramatically enhanced combat effectiveness for the U.S. military, which led to the recognition that its forces, ground troops in particular, could be concentrated. As a U.S. military analyst recently predicted, “when the system of systems is in place sometime in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the actual personnel levels of the U.S. armed forces will no longer provide much indication of their ability to safeguard American interests.

Other striking changes include enhanced lift capabilities and improved deployablity of rapid deployment forces (RDF). Airlift aircraft like the C-17 have allowed for rapid airlift of cargo and marines, reducing the need for advance deployment of large-scale ground troops. The Stryker, an RDF unit, which replaced the former 2ID brigade that was withdrawn from Korea in 1992, can dispatch light infantry troops together with light armored vehicles to any part of the world. This attests to the desire of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff for a global base installation that would keep U.S. troops overseas to a minimum and also enhance responsiveness to various regional conflicts. The U.S. Department of Defense is known to be planning to reorganize 2ID into light mobile infantry forces and realign them to locations where they can move swiftly. Therefore, a part of 2ID might move to Osan where it would facilitate airlifts, or somewhere near Pyongtaek Port where troops would be dispatched in navy vessels to regions in conflict. (Source: EAST ASIAN REVIEW AUTUMN 2003.)

Two USFK soldiers in full battle-gear lie wide awake on their bunks, ready to be dispatched at a moment’s notice to a trouble spot anywhere in the world under a new policy of “strategic flexibility” the Korean government finally agreed to endorse on Thursday. “Bad luck,” the Korean soldier on the next bunk commiserates. (20 Jan 2006) (Chosun Ilbo) (NOTE: Notice the stereotype Americans with the white "big nose" and black "big lips" -- in all anti-American cartoons, these stereotypical images of Americans persist.)


The touchier issues of the ROK defense capability and its change in status of the US from a patron to "supporting partner" was side-stepped and these discussions will be left to the Secretary of Defense and ROK Ministry of Defense. The turn over of wartime control of the CFC and the WRSA-K discussions will be part of these talks. The timing of this and the equivalent Japanese government talks are interesting. It is also interesting that the Japanese Defense Ministry officials, JSDF officials and Diet members involved in military affairs were all visiting Washington in Jan discussing the details for the upcoming US-Japan Reorganization and Restructuring of the JSDF pact expected in Mar 2006. Any major changes in the ROK-US military agreements are contingent on the outcomes of the Japanese agreement -- and progress on changing the Article 9 of the Japanese Peace Constitution.)

On 21 Jan 2006 Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung said that he opposed any expansion of South Korea's military operations outside the Korean Peninsula because it could cause security instability and trigger an arms race in East Asia. South Korea "basically understands and respects" Washington's needs for flexible troop deployment incorporated in its new global strategy. "But we are concerned about the possibility for us to be implicated in Northeast Asian conflicts against the will of Koreans because of the 'strategic flexibility.' Following the agreement, the two sides will resolve U.S. forces' flexible movement on a case-by-case basis when a crisis emerges in the region. (Source: Korea Herald.)

Although Seoul and Washington have a wide range of bilateral channels, the point of the new strategic dialogue was for the two countries to commit to regular meetings every year. Kim Sook, director-general of the North American affairs bureau at the South Korean Foreign Ministry, said there will be follow-up negotiations at the deputy-minister level. U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns is expected to visit Seoul around April for these discussions, Kim said. Ban and Rice are expected to hold a second round of the strategic dialogue later this year. At the same time, the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in Oct 2006 will address the security/defense issues. (SITE NOTE: Our opinion is that these talks separate the two conflicting interests of the US State Department and the US Defense Department. The two pursue different strategies and methods to achieve the same goals. In the past -- especially under Colin Powell -- the two US Departments were at odds with each other strategies.)

The key initiatives set down for future strategic dialogue include "cooperation and coordination of efforts to promote freedom, democratic institutions and human rights worldwide, cooperation on fighting terrorism, strategies to fight transnational pandemic disease, and developing approaches to multilateral peacekeeping and to disaster management." (SITE NOTE: This involves common-sense cooperation efforts in combatting the recognized common enemies of the avian flu and terrorism -- while agreeing to cooperate in the Iraq mission and global disasters.)

At a regional level, the two countries agreed to "maintaining a strong U.S.-ROK alliance to contribute to peace and stability in Northeast Asia, leading possibly to an eventual regional multinational mechanism for security cooperation." On the North Korean nuclear issue, the two ministers reaffirmed that Pyongyang "must return promptly" to the six-party talks and that the focus of future discussions in Beijing must be on steps to implement the Sept. 19 joint statement. The parties "touched upon" the six-party talks and talked about human rights issues in North Korea. (SITE NOTE: This is mouthwash. Sweet-smelling gargle that politicians spit out. The Roh demand for "war-time control" and the US reaction of shutting the CFC down was side-stepped. South Korean-Japanese relations, South Korean-Chinese relations and how the foreign minister viewed those relationships were discussed. The US has informally stated that the ROK furor over the Yasukuni Shrine impedes good relations. The US-Japan are in sync on North Korean actions, but the ROK will go its own way...which is something that WEAKENS the alliance. The refusal of the ROK government to address the human rights abuses in North Korea that is plain to the world which the US condemns further weakens the alliance.)

Ban and Rice also emphasized economic ties between their governments, discussing "ways to further deepen bilateral economic cooperation." Trade officials of the two countries have suggested that an agreement is imminent on starting negotiations for a free trade agreement. (SITE NOTE: The Roh administration wishes to have a one-sided FTA which benefits the ROK, but does nothing for the US. The ROK's protectionist practices -- and now substituting red tape for the protectionist tariffs -- continues to be a road block. There was talk of it at the start of Jan 2006, but the talk soon became one of "maybe later" by mid-January. The opening of the beef market was in work after the ROK closed it due to the "mad-cow disease" scare. The outlook as of March 2006 was dim for any agreement on a FTA in the near future.)


Activist View of Strategic Flexibility Agreement (Jan 2006) The response from the anti-war NGO activist groups was immediate with strong claims that the Government had "sold out" Korea. The following is from an essay, "Strategic Flexibility of U.S. Forces in Korea", by Lee Chul-kee. Lee Chul-kee, a professor in international relations at the Dongguk University, writes, "We must build a cooperative multilateral security system for Northeast Asia, instead of a bilateral alliance system. Peace and reunification of Korean peninsula will be possible only when Northeast Asian order becomes multilateral, balanced and cooperative." We notice that Lee parrots Roh Moo-hyun's "cooperative economy" with the North, multilateral alliance (meaning China, North Korea and South Korea) and Korea being the now discredited "balancer" role between the major powers. Lee's views reflect the myopic self-centered activist positions of the anti-war and Unification groups positions on the "Strategic Flexibility" issue. Throughout their arguments underlies their skewed self-centered national outlook that Korea is somehow essential in the US world "hegemony" plans -- when in truth, Korea is simply a "player" -- not a "shaker and mover."

The following was reprinted in Nautilus on 11 Mar 2006.

The news flashed from Washington at dawn of the last 20th was in a word shocking. At the first Korea-US ministerial-level 'strategic dialogue' held in Washington, Korean side suddenly accepted the "strategic flexibility of the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK)" which had been the top diplomatic and security issue pending between two countries.

At the Korea-US summit meeting held in November last year at Gyongju, the two presidents agreed to hold "a ministerial-level security dialogue" regularly. Korean government boasted this agreement as its diplomatic achievement. But what Korean side did at most at this first "security dialogue" was just to accept the "strategic flexibility of the USFK" which Washington has been persistently demanding from the Korean government.

The content of the joint statement issued after the strategic dialogue is almost unbelievable. It's like a 'document of surrender' to the U.S. in the field of diplomacy and national security. It has accepted not only "the strategic flexibility of the USFK" but also all what the U.S. has been demanding from Korea, namely: the strengthening of Korean cooperation to the "war on terror" which Washington is using as a pretext for its military aggression and pursuit of hegemony; cooperation to "the spreading of freedom", a new cause for the second-term Bush administration; Seoul's active participation in "the U.S.-led initiative against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction(PSI)" which is actually targeted on Pyongyang.

The joint statement is just disappointing to us. The efforts of our peace-oriented civic groups and sensible experts that have been warning against the potential danger of "the strategic flexibility of the USFK" seem to have come to nothing. The earnest desire of our people for a more balanced Korea-US relationship appropriate for the new era, freed from the current subordinate relationship of Korea to the U.S., and for the nation's future-oriented diplomatic and security policies, has been frustrated. There seems to be no more hope for a 'balanced diplomacy' and 'self-reliant national defense'.


Without going through any public debate and obtaining a national consensus, the Korean government has, behind closed doors, decided on such important issues that are directly linked to our peninsula's security and the nation's future, and has suddenly accepted the U.S. demands.

In a speech at the officers' commission ceremony at the air-force academy on March 8th last year, President Roh Moo-hyun said that "Korea will never be involved in conflicts in Northeast Asia without our consent" and that "this is a firm principle that can never be compromised". He has broken this promise even in less than a year. Then, we wonder why he created a fuss last year by bringing up the doctrine of "the Korea's balancer role in the Northeast Asia".

We cannot understand why Korean government hung out a white flag to the U.S. so hurriedly, accepting all of its demands. Perusing the content of the Korea-US joint statement, we cannot see any hint of Korean delegates having agonized over the pending issues and assiduously negotiated with the U.S. side. It seems that they agreed to the U.S. text only revising a few words for face-saving.

The responsible Korean negotiators should be held accountable for this outcome. They have demonstrated their lack of vision for future, lack of insight into the situation, a blind kowtow to the U.S. and incompetency, deception to the people. They seem to be more tuned to Washington than to President Roh. It is a reprise of their negotiating stances previously displayed in the negotiations with the U.S. on the dispatch of Korean troops to Iraq and relocation of the Yongsan USFK base. security team's perception of the situation and negotiating strategies.

Their professed plan has been that Seoul accepts the U.S. demands on so-called "global issues", while Seoul plays the leading role in the issues of the Korean peninsula. So, Korean government seems to have dispatched its troops to Iraq and obediently accepted the U.S. demands on the relocation of the Yongsan US military base. On the other hand, Seoul expected to lead negotiations on Pyongyang's nuclear issues and South-North relations. But such a naive idea of the Korean government has been adversely exploited by the U.S. side. Our expectations that the Bush administration would moderate its policies on the North and its nuclear issues, in return for our sending troops to Iraq, have not yet been met.
(SITE NOTE: This is utter garbage. The ROK promised to send 3600 troops to Iraq in Mar 2003, but only after Roh tearfully told the nation he did so to "protect" the nation -- implying that the US had threatened the security of the nation. However, Roh waffled and delayed until the US simply got fed up and pulled out 3600 troops of the 2d Bde, 2d ID (the exact same numbers as Roh promised) and sent them to Iraq -- though the press releases stated it was because of the escalating tension in Iraq. The ROK continued to waffle until they could find a "safe" place in Irbil in the stable Kurdish semi-autonomous territory. That the 2d Bde, 2d ID never returned doesn't seem to enter into Professor Lee's logic that the US does NOT want to be in Korea and is playing "hardball" with the ROK after having to endure the anti-Americanism his party fostered. The activist position is that somehow the US should "repay" the ROK favor of sending troops to Iraq -- but fails to see that the US saw it as the ROK "repaying" the favor of stationing troops in Korea. The ROK slapped the US in the face -- and now the 2d Bde, 2d ID is gone from Korea forever.

As to the Yongsan issue, for over a decade, the ROK activists have demanded that the USFK leave Yongsan -- but after Donald Rumsfield said "enough" in 2003 and said that USFK was pulling out of Yongsan without any more delays, the activists suddenly changed and said the the US was dictating the move.)
It seems that Korean government has accepted the "strategic flexibility of the USFK" in anticipation of the U.S. changing its North Korea policies which Washington has been hardening recently by raising the issues of Pyongyang's human rights and counterfeiting of U.S. currencies. But also this time, Seoul was betrayed by the U.S. Now, the U.S. has an easy way to make its demands accepted by Seoul; if Washington increases the fear of war in Korea and takes a hardline, then Seoul government will become obedient to it. Now, both hard-liners and moderates in Washington are respectively toying with the Seoul government. In addition, this time Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon also might have had an illusion that Washington would support his candidacy for the post of Secretary General of the United Nations if he accepted the U.S. demands and pleased it.
(SITE NOTE: Added hogwash. It is the ROK that is attempting to "sit on the fence" while the Bush administration has stated simply: "you are either with us or against us." It is that simple. The ROK has chosen to be against the US. Though it is a G-12 nation, the activists in their myopic nationalism cannot see that they are tweaking the nose of the last remaining superpower on earth. They are set to lose greatly if they persist.)
We are afraid of the negative effect the Seoul's acceptance of the "strategic flexibility of the USFK" will soon have on the situation of Northeast Asia including Korean peninsula. The "strategic flexibility of the USFK" is the concept that the USFK will no longer be confined to Korea only dealing with the military situation of the peninsula, but they will also flexibly pursue various military objectives outside the Korean peninsula. It means that, from now on, the role of the USFK will be transformed to that of implementing Washington's Northeast Asian and global strategies rather than that of war deterrence to North Korea.

As a result, the USFK will be mobilized for America's military aggressions now being conducted here and there under the name of "war on terror". Especially, the main reason for Washington's pursuit of the "strategic flexibility of the USFK" is to prepare for a military action against China. In other words, the primary target of the "strategic flexibility of the USFK" is China. It's very certain that the USFK will be mobilized in case military conflicts occur in the Taiwan Strait between China and Taiwan.
(SITE NOTE: This is true about attempting to contain China, but this is not new. This policy of Chinese containment was outlined immediately after WWII and the rise of the Communists under Mao Tse Tung. After the Korean War, the animosity between the US and China was solidified -- especially after China invaded Tibet and Nepal and border areas of India. In 1957, Eisenhower authorized the forward positioning of nuclear weapons STATIONED IN KOREA and aimed at China -- which at the time was starting its nuclear programs. After it achieved nuclear status -- and subsequent ICBM capability -- it has had a bullseye painted on its military targets ever since.

But to be serious about the matter, the Chinese have also been using the Taiwan issue as a means to split the forces defending Korea and Japan. The best example was when Kim Il-sung brought the world to the brink of nuclear holocaust by his announcement that he had nuclear weapons. President Clinton wanted to attack the North, but Kim Young-sam refused to permit the use of ROK troops against the North. At this time, the Chinese started to conduct exercises by repositioning its missile batteries along the coast across from Taiwan. At the same time, its fleet moved into the Strait of Taiwan for "training exercises." The US 7th Fleet that was positioned off the coast of North Korea was split with the carrier Kitty Hawk and three quarters of its carrier group dispatched to position themselves between the Chinese and Taiwan. This only left the Aegis destroyers with their cruise missiles off the coast of North Korea. Effectively, the Chinese had split the US forces -- in fact, creating a situation where the US was at a disadvantage in both Taiwan and Korea.

The Taiwan issue is very simply democracy versus communism dating back to the 1953 Matsu blockade. The US, and now Japan, have drawn the line that Taiwan will remain a democracy as long as it wants to be -- but if it decides to join China, that is its choice like Hong Kong. Japan sees that if Taiwan falls, Okinawa and adjacent island groups would subject to Chinese encroachment. The espoused "one China" policy of the US is a balancing act as the US still provides military hardware to the Taiwanese government.

Currently the US and Japan openly criticize the military buildup in China. China is undergoing a reorganization from a manpower heavy organization to one that seeks to upgrade its forces with high-tech military hardware. From AWACS capability to increasing the submarine fleet to seeking to turn itself into a "blue water navy," the threat to Taiwan and Japan seem obvious. Though the ROK has attempted to straddle the fence, it is currently siding with China both from an economic standpoint, but also with the view of opening dialogues for a military alliance in the form of its discredited "balancer" role in Northeast Asia.)
Mr. Kim Sook, Director General of North American Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, has alleged that the possibility of the "strategic flexibility of the USFK" being applied in future is not high. On the contrary, it is a concept that can be applied immediately, because it is a core strategic concept for "military transformation" of the U.S. military forces, and for strengthening military hegemony of the United States.

It is a well-known fact that the global strategic goal of the United States is to check and blockade China that can potentially challenge the U.S. global hegemony in the 21st century. Therefore, the principal role of the U.S. forces in Asia including the USFK is changing to that of checking China. The current move to strengthen the naval and air power of the USFK and enlarge their naval and air bases is also intended for China.
(SITE NOTE: We agree that China is -- and always has been -- the target. But Professor Lee doesn't see that Korea is simply a shrimp swimming amongst whales. The way things are shaping up is that the ROK is AGAIN being shaped into a buffer zone through the ignorance of people like himself and President Roh. The US is pulling out -- not immediately, but it is pulling out in slow increments -- but if it decides to go, it can be as swift as the 2d Bde, 2d ID which departed with four months notification. With the Japanese reorganization of the JSDF complete and the new Missile Defense Line drawn now between North Korea/South Korea in the Sea of Japan -- the ROK is on the outside in a buffer zone.)
The Korean Ministry points out that Korea-US joint statement includes a conditional clause which says that "in implementing the strategic flexibility, the U.S. will respect the Seoul's position that Korea will not be involved in regional conflicts of Northeast Asia without the consent of Korean people". The ministry boasts this as a diplomatic achievement of balancing the positions of the two sides.

However, such an assertion is a deception to Korean people or reveals their incompetence to perceive the situation.

First; Even though we admit the assertion of the ministry, it is either a big retreat from the existing government position or to admit that the government has so far cheated the people. The Korean government has maintained that although it recognizes the "strategic flexibility of the USFK", it is opposed to applying it to Northeast Asia including China. Though the conditional clause in the joint statement says that Korea will not directly be involved in regional conflicts in the Northeast Asia, it doesn't say that the USFK will not participate in any military action in the region. Seoul Government has to clarify why it has changed its position so much.

Second; even if Korean forces will not directly participate in the U.S. military action against China, Korea will be plunged into a military confrontation with China, if only the USFK are put into military operation against China or the USFK bases in Korea are used for anti-China military operations. Korea will be used as "an advance operation base" of the U.S. and the USFK will act as "foremost troops" to blockade China.

Furthermore, there is no guarantee that Seoul will not directly intervene militarily in the Northeast Asia at the heels of American troops. There is a great possibility that the U.S. will ask for a direct or indirect intervention of Korea, on the ground of the Korea-U.S. alliance. In this case, it is doubtful that Seoul can reject the U.S. demands and pressure.

It is also unrealistic to assume that the "strategic flexibility of the USFK" will not be applied to Northeast Asia, because the main target of this flexibility is China. It's like asking a cattle thief not to steal a cattle.
(SITE NOTE: The arguments of Professor Lee are infuriating as they try to promote some truly stupid arguments. First, the US has ALWAYS stated that "strategic flexibility" would be applied WORLD-WIDE -- and Northeast Asia is in the world ever since George Bush announced his vision for the new military BEFORE the Sept 11th tragedy.

However, he is correct that Korean bases would be used as "forward bases" in a regional conflict -- it is common sense if the USFK is to assume a regional role. The real gripe that Professor Lee has is that the ROK will be left undefended from the North. But at the same time, his group talks out of the side of their mouths stating that their "brothers" to the North would not attack them as the ROK seeks rapprochement.

Professor Lee is wrong that the US troops will contain China. It simply cannot contain them as long as they remain within their own boundaries. The US is attempting to "contain their influence" -- especially by weakening their support for North Korea.

The US worry is that China is attempting to become a "superpower" like the US based upon its economic strength coupled with its military might. It is reducing its manpower heavy military and shifting to high-tech hardware upgrades for its air and naval forces. It is upgrading its navy into a true blue-water navy as well as increasing its submarine fleet. It is estimated that by 2025, it will have a military capable of facing off against the US if it continues at the present rate of procuring foreign technology along with the hardware.

The US knows that it cannot contain the Chinese by military might. All it can do is make any open conflict so costly that the Chinese needs to rethink the consequences before they attack.
In this way, the USFK are being reorganized into regional forces for Asia whose main objective is to check China. The USFK bases are being transformed into advance bases for blockading China. The $11 billion worth of weaponry that the U.S. is going to additionally deploy in Korea, allegedly for filling up the gap caused by the recent reduction of the 2nd division troops of the USFK, are in fact mostly Patriot missiles for Missile Defence (MD) and intelligence-gathering equipment intended for China. The U.S. is not only reinforcing its Patriot missiles (PAC-3) at Osan air base near Seoul but also deploying PAC-3 at Kunsan and Kwangju bases in South Korea. Deployment of such PAC-3 lengthwise on the peninsula is clearly targeted on China.
(SITE NOTE: This idea that the USFK bases are being transformed into advance bases to "blockade" China is preposterous. One wonders if he can do simple mathmetics -- Chinese numerical superiority versus US high-tech weaponry. Now that China is upgrading to high-tech weaponry, the US could not -- even if it wanted to -- blockade anything from China.

As to his stating that the PAC-3 missiles prove the aggressive intent of the US against China, he is sadly misinformed. The PAC-3 is a DEFENSIVE system -- unlike the ATACMS that the ROK has procured -- so the use of the PAC-3 as an example of offensive capability is faulty. However, Lee is right that the $11 billion was for upgrading US systems and the "mirror-game" of calling it "an investment in Korea's defense" was a political trick to get the ROK to increase its share of its defense. The ROK refused. That is the impasse now. The US is being reorganized for mobile deployment -- while the ROK is organized for fixed positioning based on its Korean defense structure.)
Meanwhile, acceptance of the "strategic flexibility of the USFK" signifies not only the change in the role of the USFK but also the fundamental change in the nature of the Korea-U.S. alliance. This is because the change in the USFK's role and that in the Korea-US alliance are like two sides of a coin. As the USFK will be transformed into regional mobile troops, the Korea-U.S. alliance will become a regional alliance. This means that, under the name of the Korea-U.S. alliance, Korean armed forces can be mobilized for the U.S. military operations and military needs outside the Korean peninsula. Korean troops will have to join any war of aggression waged by the U.S.
(SITE NOTE: Lee uses "sophistry" here to make a nonsensical conclusion by stating the because there is a ROK-US alliance, the ROK regional force and will become sucked into a regional conflict because they are part of the ROK-US alliance. This type of logic (A=B and therefore, B=C) is played by college sophmores. The truth is there is NO mechanics whereby the ROK would be automatically committed to a regional role. They could only be committed to such a force -- if, and only if, the ROK government approved it through the National Assembly. The Japanese have declared Taiwan as in its strategic sphere and its defense was in its national interests. The ROK has NOT done any such action. It cannot be committed unless it wants to. Under the current Strategic Flexibility agreement, it only recognizes that the USFK forces are a regional unit.

The main point that the activists do NOT talk about is that over the years, the US has used its USFK forces in a regional role by deploying its units to such exercises as Cobra Gold in Thailand or Cope Thunder in the Philippines -- but ALWAYS there was a "backfill" by units from stateside or Japan to balance the temporary numerical loss. In the case of the USAF elements, most of the time Marine air units or elements of the 3rd Fighter Wing at Elmendorf have backfilled. For the Army units temporarily deployed, there have been elements from the Reserve and National Guard units that were rotated in for "training.")
Already, we can read such intentions here and there in the joint statement. It suggests that the Korea-U.S. alliance should endeavor to overcome the challenges it faces regionally and globally. Just before attending the Korea-US "strategic dialogue", Minister Ban said at a regular press briefing on last 11th that the fact the two countries have decided to hold a regular ministerial "strategic dialogue" reflects that "the Korea-U.S. alliance has developed to the stage of holding strategic consultations on Northeast Asian and global issues, beyond the Korean peninsula."

At the Korea-U.S. summit meeting held in May 2003, the two presidents said through a joint statement that they agreed to build up "a comprehensive and dynamic alliance". In this way, Korean side has in fact already accepted the U.S. demand.

In last May, Gen. Charles Cambell, commander of the Eighth U.S Army in Korea, said that "the Korea-U.S. alliance is transforming into a regional alliance and that the operational sphere of the Korea-US joint forces can be extended to Northeast Asia". This remark also reveals the U.S. intention to make the Korea-US alliance a regional alliance.

Such a change in the nature of the Korea-U.S. alliance violates the Korea-US Mutual Defense Treaty. The treaty stipulates its casus foederis as "the occurrence of armed attacks from outside" and limits its geographical bounds to "the territories under the administrative control" of the contracting parties. Thus, the original nature of the Korea-US alliance is a "defense alliance" which is confined to the Korean peninsula, pursuant to the objectives of the Korea-US Mutual Defense Treaty.

Therefore, acceptance of "the strategic flexibility of the USFK" is to deviate from the objectives of the USFK's stationing in Korea. Furthermore, If Korea-US alliance doesn't remain as a "defense alliance" limited to the Korean peninsula, and if its role and territorial coverage are expanded, it will be transformed into a "regional alliance" intended for the blockade of China, and into a "hegemony alliance" or "aggression alliance" contributing to the U.S. military hegemony. Therefore, if the Korean government accepts the "strategic flexibility of the USFK", it has to revise the Korea-US Mutual Defence Treaty and get an approval of the National Assembly beforehand. Otherwise the acceptance will be invalid.

It's hard for Seoul to accept such a transformation of the Korea-US alliance because it can lead to a military confrontation with China and the worsening of security environment for Korea. Korea may have to go to war with China if Korean troops are mobilized to military conflicts on the Taiwan Strait. This means a deterioration of security environment for Korean peninsula. In that case, the peace and reunification of Korean peninsula will be almost impossible.
(SITE NOTE: This is horse-puckey. The first step is that the ROK must identify Taiwan as being of "strategic importance" to its national interests -- which is has not done. Japan on the other hand has done so and therefore is positioned to side with the US in such a conflict. The ROK has not.

The danger for Korea is that the Chinese and North Korean strategy is to split the US forces. In 1994 when Kim Il-sung first brought the peninsula near the brink of war, the Chinese stepped up moves that were intended to split the forces. The naval forces off North Korea were split with the carrier and support elements sent to the Taiwan Straits. All that was left was an Aegis destroyer with cruise missiles targeting the North. THIS IS WHAT WILL HAPPEN AGAIN.

But to the ROK activist this is an impossibility with their rapprochement efforts. This was fine in 2003, but now in 2006, many South Koreans are questioning what is being gained from the outflow of aid to the North. It has NOT changed anything. Now the US is fed-up with the ROK actions. If it wants to feed the North, then it should sign a peace accord. That is the bottomline. The ROK wants its cake and to eat it too -- with the US footing the bill. This is about to end within the next few years.

IF China attacks Taiwan, the Chinese strategy is to divide the US forces. But now there is a big change in the wind with the Japanese about to become a regional military power after the changes of Article 9 of the Peace Constitution. In addition, it was to sign the USFJ Restructuring agreement in April 2006. The ROK under Roh Moo-hyun has demanded the "wartime control" which has given the US the "out" to get out of Korea. With the transfer of the CFC, there is no more need for the US troops in Korea. Roh wants control by the end of 2006 and the USFK just MIGHT give it to Roh. George Bush put out a simply statement in 2003 to the ROK. "The US will not stay a minute longer in the country where we are not wanted." It was a warning for anti-Americanism in Korea -- and the problems with the US-ROK Alliance as well.
Some argue that it is unavoidable to accept "the strategic flexibility of the USFK", if Korea-US alliance has to be maintained at all. Otherwise, they say the USFK may withdraw from Korea. Then, will the USFK really withdraw from Korea if Seoul does not accept U.S. demands? Now we have to think about this mistaken myth realistically.
(SITE NOTE: Lee lives in the world of fantasy that most Korean activists inhabit. They first mistakenly believe that Korea has strategic importance in the geopolitical games of the world. It does NOT. The world has changed. Its only value is as a buffer zone -- an member of neither side.

The second is that they simply cannot accept that the US has ALWAYS wanted to leave Korea. Up to the 1970s, the ROK was important, but soon the US started to withdraw its troops with the 7th ID leaving in 1971 and the DMZ being turned over to the ROK -- with the promise that the US would fund the ROK military upgrade programs with new weaponry. Carter wanted to pull ALL the troops out as part of his Presidential campaign but was dissuaded. In the late 1980s, the Nunn-Warner Initiative surfaced to again remove the troops from Korea and was only stopped in 1994 when Kim Il-sung brought the world to the brink of war. Thus Lee's fantasy world is based on fiction.

The only sticking point for America was where would the US troops be stationed if it wasn't in the ROK. The answer has come with the new mobile forces being drawn back to the mainland US and being capable of deployment on short-notice on C-17s. THIS IS HAPPENING NOW. 8,000 troops (and 9,000 dependents) of the 3rd MEU from Okinawa will relocate to Guam.

In Mar 2006, the new USFK Commander, Gen Bell, aluded to more troop cuts after "wartime control" has been given to the ROK -- and strengthening the UN function which implied the CFC function was eliminated. In fact, since January 2006, the USFK has been ACTIVELY talking about swiftly giving the ROK its "wartime control." There are massive changes about to take place in the ROK-Japan theater, but we are not certain where it will lead.)
Will the USFK withdraw from Korea, giving up its 105 military bases scattered all over the country? Can Washington so easily give up South Korea that provides, without a complaint, $700 million annually as a direct contribution to the USFK and bears $3 billion annually as a direct or indirect share of expenses for them? Will the USFK withdraw from Korea, giving up the new, cutting-edge Pyongtaek U.S. military base that Seoul is going to build with billions of dollars, which will become the largest single U.S. military base in the world and the advance base for China? Will the USFK withdraw from Korea with their Patriot missiles that they are deploying in Osan and Kwangju bases along the western coast for missile defense against China?
(SITE NOTE: This paragraph is mind-boggling in its complete stupidity. The ROK did NOT pay for its defense until 1991 after the first major revision of the SOFA since its inception in 1963. The ROK has systematically been cutting its defense expenditures since Kim Dae-jung took office. It stood at 8 percent of GDP under Kim Young-sam, but dropped to 2.8 percent of GDP under Roh Moo-hyun -- and will remain there until he leaves office. The US wanted the ROK to spend 3.2 percent of GDP -- though most flashpoint countries like India and Israel spend 6 percent of GDP. In other words, if the ROK is NOT interested in its defense, then why should the US???

The Camp Humphreys relocation is turning into a nightmare with the ROK dragging its feet -- plus resurfacing the cost sharing and payments for improvements to the land, etc. The US is getting fed up...and mumblings are now heard at the Congressional level. The Patriot system as explained before is a "defensive system" and his logic that it is "offensive" is out in left field.)
The strategic importance of the USFK bases and South Korea for the U.S is growing further as the U.S. containment strategies against China become more concrete. As President Roh said in Los Angeles, "Korean peninsula is not a place which the U.S. can give up easily even if is not happy with South Korea, because of the peninsula's strategic position".
(SITE NOTE: We disagree. As we explained before, the ROK's importance in the current geopolitical world is its position as a buffer between China and Japan -- and of course, North Korea as a buffer between China and the West. This is about to change in the near future as the US is plainly getting ready to disengage from Korea.)
Also, we have to change the idea that an alliance can be maintained only by stationing a large army in the partner country. The U.S. doesn't keep a large army in Thailand and Philippines even though it has concluded military alliance treaties with them. New Zealand has the ANZUS Treaty with the U.S., but it is denying the calling and landing of U.S. naval vessels and war planes carrying nuclear weapons, on the strength of its denuclearization policy. But we haven't yet heard that this has resulted in any worsening of their bilateral relations and U.S. economic sanctions against New Zealand.

(NOTE: We smile at the Professor's lack of knowledge in these areas. Thailand is in a "caretaker" status with assets prepositioned and bases maintained with a small force. This is what Korea may become very shortly if things continue to deteriorate. The Philippines is a case where the US was asked to leave and since that time, the Filipinos are being exported throughout the world as cheap labor -- look at Shinjang Mall. It screwed up big time and now wants to reverse itself, but the US is not ready to return with its political instability. As far as New Zealand, it is reacting to the same political anti-nuclear pressures as Japan has for years. Remember that where the French conduct their nuclear tests are in New Zealand's backyard. The US has no problem with this -- though it is inconvenient.)
As a matter of fact, the U.S. will have an enormous strategic benefit just to keep South Korea as an ally, even though it cannot station any soldier on the Korean soil. The U.S. should be most thankful only for keeping Seoul from entering into alliance with China or becoming militarily close to it.

(SITE NOTE: This is typical activist nonsense. The US has been deeply concerned that the ROK has continued to form military alliances with the Chinese. Because of its continuation of its North Korean policies and closer relations to China, the US is becoming more and more distant. The US-ROK Alliance is in big trouble.)
What the U.S. really fears is the emergence of a situation where growing anti-American sentiment and public opinion for the withdrawal of USFK necessitate American troops to leave Korea, because this will seriously jeopardize the global strategies of Washington.
(SITE NOTE: After the events of 2002, the ROK has lost a lot of goodwill amongst the American people -- simply by word of mouth of the anti-Americanism that is prevalent in Korea. The big loser if the US draws down is the ROK. The reality is business is that security of one's investments is the prime key. Moody will NOT increase the national credit rating because of the North Korean situation. If the US left, the business investments will collapse. That to the Professor is something he cannot believe in his self-appointed importance of Korea as the center of the universe.)
The greatest danger of "the strategic flexibility of the USFK is that Korea will be firmly incorporated into the global hegemonic strategy of the U.S. The global strategy and Northeast Asian policy of the United States are to check and blockade China through the US-Japan alliance as the main axis and Korea-US alliance as the subsidiary axis.

But they will force a confrontation and a division in Northeast Asia, creating a new cold war order in the region. If confrontation and enmity persist in Northeast Asia, peace and reunification of Korean peninsula will become remote and national division will be perpetuated.

Korea cannot have a future-oriented security policy without a critical self-reflection on its security policy which is subordinate to Washington. Korea must make efforts to extricate itself from America's military strategy and policy framework. Korea must change its perception and idea. Self-reliant national defense and amelioration of security environment for Korea depend on how much room Korea will have for independent security strategies and policies free from the U.S. military strategies and policies.
(SITE NOTE: As of Mar 2006, the US is the one that is starting to extract itself out of the military relationship. It is talking of increasing the UN commitment in Korea -- implying that the CFC will NOT exist in the near future. Without the CFC, there is no need for US troops in Korea.)
If the existing Korea-US alliance system rather endangers our national security and aggravates our security environment, we cannot but raise a basic question whether such an alliance system is really necessary. Therefore, it is necessary to fundamentally reexamine the Korea's current security paradigm that entirely depends on the Korea-US alliance system. We must build a cooperative multilateral security system for Northeast Asia, instead of a bilateral alliance system. Peace and reunification of Korean peninsula will be possible only when Northeast Asian order becomes multilateral, balanced and cooperative. This depends on how much Korea can effectively play the role of a balancer in the Northeast Asia.
(SITE NOTE: Lee still clings to the idea that Korea can become the "balancer" which even now "progressives" are stating as an unrealistic proposal. The bottom line is that the ROK is a shrimp swimming with whales. It started its military upgrades 15 years after its counterparts in North Korea and Japan -- then after Kim Dae-jung took over, it slowed down its upgrades. Now it is so far behind Japan that the two are not even in the same class. From space launches to spy satellites, indigenous designs of its aircraft, Aegis ships, AWACS, Radar, Missile Defense research, etc. the Japanese with a smaller force, has greater capabilities than the ROK. Now it is openly in the US camp in its military strategies -- while the ROK will be left outside the "umbrella." And of course, the Chinese don't really look at Korea as "allies" -- but rather as competitors for defense contracts.)
Suit filed against Roh over Strategic Flexibility (Mar 2006) On 20 Mar 2006, Rep. Roh Hoe-chan from the Democratic Labor Party filed a suit with the Constitutional Court against President Roh Moo-hyun, claiming the president infringed parliamentary rights over ratification of the treaty. This is the first time in judicial history that a National Assemblyman has filed a lawsuit against the president. The lawmaker saud the president and Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon pressed ahead with the deal with the U.S. government and forced acceptance of the agreement through a joint announcement in order to avoid parliamentary ratification in January. Rep. Roh also said he is considering a bill to ban the movement of U.S. forces outside the peninsula as part of his campaign to abolish the strategic flexibility agreement. However, the government dismissed his claims as groundless, saying the agreement doesn't require parliamentary ratification because it doesn't violate the Korea-U.S. mutual defense treaty. (Source: Korea Herald.)


Gen LaPorte: Seoul Can Take Wartime Command "When Ready" (Jan 2006) Gen Leon J. LaPorte stated on 26 Jan 2006 in his farewell address before retirement that South Korea will recover wartime operational control of its armed forces when its military capability improves enough to achieve a ``self-reliant'' defense posture. In 2005, Gen LaPorte called the Combined Forces Command (CFC) the "cornerstone" of the US-ROK military alliance on the 25th Anniversary of the CFC hinting that if the ROK persisted in their demands for a "self-reliant" defense, the USFK may be dramatically altered. (SITE NOTE: Without the CFC, there is no reason for the USFK to exist --IF ALTERNATIVE BASING ARRANGEMENTS EXIST. The US has been attempting to disengage from South Korea since the 1970s under Nixon, 1980s under Carter, 1990s under the Nunn-Warner Agreement, 2000s under Bush. The precedent has been there since 1949 when the US laid out the Dean Acheson line that led to the Korean War. The bottomline is that the US has ALWAYS wanted out of Korea -- but ALWAYS determined to protect Japan first. This has ALWAYS been the reality.)

The main point is that the US strategic belief is that the role of air power has changed the face of warfare on the peninsula. It is the belief that once the air war has been neutralized, the ROK Army can defeat the North by themselves with the assistance of the US Army (attack helicopters and fire suppression directions). In effect, the US forces are changing to high-tech and become smaller and more mobile. This in turn will impact the face-off of two static forces (North and Forces) which is based on 1950s strategies. The US believes that its air power will disintegrate the North's centralized command and supply in the early stages of the war leaving the North's forces without support or direction. This is the central crux of the much discussed Oplan 5029. The first role is to contain the North's forces until the reserve forces arrive. Then the fight will move North to collapse the North Korean regime.

LaPorte stated that the U.S. government fully supports the transfer in responsibility in the ROK-U.S CFC. As for the timing of the transfer, however, LaPorte said, ``I don't believe there is any set timeline at this point. I think that has to be discussed further.'' ``The United States is prepared to move as rapidly on this issue as the ROK government or its military believe it is prudent to do,'' said LaPorte. When Sec of Defense was pressed on setting a timeline, he replied that it would be "appropriately accelerated" when the time was right ... meaning just about anything. (SITE NOTE: However, in viewing the regional situation, it is plain to see that the developments in the ROK are contingent upon the Japan-US Military Restructuring treaty to be signed in Mar 2006. If Article 9 of the Japanese Peace Constitution is changed, the change would be indeed accelerated. The CFC function could be moved to Camp Zama under I Corps -- where elements of the 1 Corps was moved in July 2005. The USFK in the ROK would be reduced to a three-star position with the four-star already residing at Camp Smith in Hawaii in the new combat command created in Aug 2005. 5th Air Force has already been relocated from Yokota, Japan to Anderson, Guam -- and 13th Air Force relocated to Hawaii. If the picture is not getting clearer -- the 3rd MEU Hq section will relocate from Okinawa to Guam. Many changes are still up in the air on the Japan treaty -- but it will certainly "accelerate" things once signed. During the brinksmanship in 2004 with the massive buildup at Guam, the use of Guam as a staging base for action in Korea was tested. The carrier group exercised off Guam -- while at the same time stood ready for deployment to waters off Korea. When it was drawn down, a "Contingency" Group was formed to handle future influxes of troops. The mobility section of the Anderson area was changed to civilian contract meaning that they are building up a long-term deployment center.)

The USFK maintains about 30,000 troops here as a deterrence against North Korea. The number of troops is to be reduced to 25,000 by 2008 under Washington's plan to reorganize its global forces. In his New Year's news conference, President Roh Moo-hyun unveiled plans to speed up talks on the issue of regaining wartime command from the United States at an early date, within this year if possible. He described the matter as a ``very complex issue,'' referring the current armistice on the Korean Peninsula.

``By resolution, there are 17 nations that have continued to say they would support South Korea during times of crisis. So if you have changed commanders, an issue such as the U.N. command and support of U.N. nations also have to be addressed,'' he added. (SITE NOTE: Without the CFC, the mainly ceremonial UN command could be dissolved. However, the political problem is that IF the North attacked after the UN command was resolved, it would not be easy to mobilize a world force again. The ROK is betting everything that the North will NOT attack.)

South Korea reclaimed the authority to control its military during peacetime in 1994. But wartime control has remained in the U.S. hands since the Korean War. As part of efforts to achieve a ``cooperative but more self-reliant'' defense capability, the Roh administration has sought to take back control of its military during wartime from the U.S. government. The two countries plan to launch SEPARATE task forces responsible for studying the issue in an in-depth manner next month. (Source: Korea Times.)

Gen. Leon J. LaPorte told local press on 27 Jan, “The United States is prepared to move as rapidly on this issue as the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea military believes it prudent to do.” “Determination has to be made in terms of capabilities,” the general said. The statement came a day after South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun said he hoped for an agreement by the end of the year for Seoul to remain in charge of its own forces if conflict erupts. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)


US to Give Seoul Digital Map (Jan 2006) The U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency promised to deliver the ``digital topography intelligence" to South Korea. It will provide the digital maps and video images, which will help South Korean cruise missiles fly close to the ground to avoid radar detection. Supposedly this was communicated to Kim Jang-soo, Korean Army Chief of Staff, on his visit to Washington. This would be part of the turn over of the "critical tasking" for return artillery fire if the North opened a barrage on Seoul.

The digital map is the exploitation and analysis of geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. It contains information, collected from U.S. military spy satellites, that could be used ``in times of emergency'' to conduct surgical strikes.

The South Korean Army has an outdated version of the digital map, which also was provided by the United States in 1993. It reportedly has not been updated since. South Korea's commercial satellites are currently used to produce digital maps, but they are not suitable for military operations due to relatively poor resolution of images. Not date was given as to when the data will be transferred.

South Korea's Air Force has also planned to import a military software, named Digital Point Positioning Data Base (DPPDB), from Washington to enhance its ability of attacking underground bunkers. But it has faced troubles, as the software is one of the items that are regulated by the U.S. Arms Export Control Act. The military forces frequently use DPPDBs for precise coordinate derivation to support the targeting and mission planning requirements of a variety of weapons systems. It is called a data base as it is made up of the rectified aerial imagery and the support data needed to exploit that imagery. (Source: Korea Times.)

(SITE NOTE: The US has become wary of allowing technology to be transferred to the South as it may end up in the North -- and the protection of confidential material is also suspect. There is very little trust between the ROK and US in the intelligence area. The interesting point is that it has been a decade since the ROK had the updated imagery. The point is that the US has been reluctant to share intelligence with the ROK. But the date being 1993 would place the last update in the Kim Young-sam administration when there supposedly was no conflict between the US and ROK. After Kim Dae-jung took office -- and especially after his "sunshine policy" was announced -- the flow of intelligence was limited. But the distrust worked both ways as the ROK refused to share any first-hand intelligence received from defector debriefings.)


Preparations underway in Pusan for Turnover of Camp Hialeah (Jan 2006) U.S. military units and organizations are to vacate Camp Hialeah by August 2006. The installation is to be shut in December. Closing Camp Hialeah comes as part of a larger plan. The United States is shutting down many installations around the peninsula before shifting the bulk of its forces to two regional hubs, one in Pyeongtaek, the other in the Daegu-Busan region.

The Pusan American School will close after 46 years because it's located inside the Army's Camp Hialeah, which the U.S. military will vacate in 2006 and turn over to South Korea in 2007. Pusan American opened in 1960 as a small elementary school, adding a high school in 1967. It now has about 30 staff, including teachers, clerical and other employees. Of this year's students, 71 are from the U.S. military community. The other 24 are U.S. citizens whose families work in the Busan area. They pay tuition, ranging from about $14,640 to $16,830 per year and will have to find other means of education. As soon as classes finish, the movers will arrive.


February 2006

US and ROK Military Alliance in Big Trouble (Feb-Mar 2006) Starting in openly in 2003, the whole fiasco of the US-ROK alliance continued unabated with the ROK refusing to pay for its "share" of its defense and openly supplying aid to the North. However, both the ROK Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Defense continued to maintain the relationship was strong. In turn, the US and USFK officials ALWAYS used terms to indicate the alliance was solid and unshakeable. (See Military Events: US and ROK Military Alliance in Trouble (Apr 2005-Dec 2005).)

The tensions are not new -- they have ALWAYS been there from the start of the Roh administration in 2003. The following is excerpted from CNS.news in 2 Jan 2003.

Amid continuing tactical differences between Seoul and Washington and attempts by North Korea to drive a wedge between the two allies, South Korean lawmakers Thursday planned to discuss concerns about a possible reduction of U.S. forces in their country. (SITE NOTE: It was not the North driving the wedge -- it was Roh trying to drive a wedge between the US-Japan alliance. The tri-national agreement to act with "one voice" on the North Korean problem became a farce with the ROK attempting to be the negotiator in the nuclear talks. The North has told the ROK to its face that it does NOT want it to be in this role -- and only wants bilateral talks with the US.)

South Korea's parliamentary intelligence committee would discuss recent reports about a cutback in the number of American troops "and map out measures to deal with it," the official Yonhap news agency reported. The committee would also hear from the head of the country's national intelligence service about North Korea's nuclear intentions. (SITE NOTE: The US cutback came after Roh dragged his feet on sending his promised 3,600 troops to Iraq. In the space of three months, the 2d Bde 2d ID's 3,600 troops departed for Iraq. The point was made... and the 2d Bde 2d ID left to never return to Korea.)

Pyongyang has kicked out U.N. on-site inspectors who had been monitoring nuclear facilities mothballed under a 1994 accord with the U.S. It also threatened to pull out of another international pact, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). (SITE NOTE: The KEDO Project died in Jan 2006...and the North did pull out of the NPT.)

Reports indicating that a U.S. response to those moves could include economic sanctions and interception of revenue-earning missile shipments caused a stir in South Korea, whose outgoing and incoming presidents both favor dialogue and worry that sanctions could lead to war. (SITE NOTE: The US in 2006 is no longer feeling restrained and is applying economic sanctions and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is now in place. However, on 29 May 2006, the Associated Pressreported that the PRC and ROK have canceled participation in a multinational naval security exercise. The drills began on 27 May with Japan and three other participants -- the US, Canada and Russia. The ROK said it was because of concerns that part of the exercises may upset the DRPK.)

President-elect Roh Moo-hyun, who takes office next month, voiced skepticism about the U.S. approach, telling a press conference Washington should discuss options with Seoul rather than decide on its own what steps to take. "If the United States makes and announces a unilateral decision, and South Korea follows it, it can't be called real cooperation between the two countries," he said. Roh campaigned for office last month on a platform that included calls to change the U.S.-Korean relationship from one of protector and protected, to that of equals. He was elected on a wave of anti-U.S. sentiment, some of which was directed against the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea.
Signs that the Alliance Changing The fact is that there is indeed some deep problems as the ROK under Roh Moo-hyun continued to move towards the left and attach itself to the North. The crux of the problem is that the ROK in supporting the North has negated the very reason for the existence of the USFK. The ROK has continued to push for a "self-reliant defense" with the ROK having authority of its forces in case of a war.


Cracks in US-ROK Alliance (Chosun Ilbo)


The ROK-US tried to work out the problems under the Future of the Alliance (FOTA) talks but that did not work out. Then they decided to shift it to the Security Initiative (SPI) and finally at ministerial level talks At the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in Oct 2005, Donald Rumsfeld announced that the US would no longer be a "patron" of the ROK military, but rather become a "partner" in the relationship. In other words, the US was NOT going to pay for the massive upgrade programs that the ROK needed to undertake to become "self-reliant," but would remain a "partner" -- under the Mutual Defense Treaty -- to "support" the ROK in case of hostilities.

At the same time, the US agreed to "accelerate appropriately" the process that would turn over the war-time control to the ROK -- but left the time-table open. In Jan 2006 USFK out-going commander Gen. LaPorte stated the turnover rotated around the ROK having the capabilities to assume the role. The ROK embarked on a program to upgrade the ROK forces with hi-tech weaponry. Unfortunately, the bill would be $692 billion over a period of 15 years -- that the ROK simply cannot afford with its present shortfalls in funding. (NOTE: The ROK is a formidable force, but nothing that is even in the same league as the high-tech weaponry of the US. However, the ROK assumptions is that the North will not attack its "brother" and therefore, much of the defensive hardware is not required. For example, after years of debate, the ROK still does not have its own PAC-3 Patriot defenses -- and continues to "negotiate" with Germany for its used PAC-2 missiles -- and after four years it is supposedly to be finalized in 2006. Another example is that the ROK assumed the artillery suppression role in case the North fired on Seoul -- but the US had to provide it with the digital maps and video images as their data had not been updated since 1993. (See US to Give Seoul Digital Map.) The problem is that the US is reluctant to provide it with the Digital Point Positioning Data Base (DPPDB) software to enhance its ability of attacking underground bunkers as the software is one of the items that are regulated by the U.S. Arms Export Control Act. In fact, the US refused the sale of its UAV to the ROK. The biggest cliffhanger is the changes to Article 9 of the Peace Constitution and the Japan-USFJ Restructuring to be signed in Mar 2006. Once changed, the basing of troops in Guam and Japan may lead to the elimination of the CFC -- and reductions in USFK forces.)

US Stance on North Korea Hardens The failure of the last round of six-party talks where the North demanded that the US back off on its financial sanctions as a prelude to resumption of the talks. The US position was that the sanctions had nothing to do with the nuclear issue. The fight had raged for some time in the US between the moderates who wanted the nuclear problem to be resolved through the six-party talks and the hard-liners who wanted the North to be isolated and brought to heel by economic sanctions. The hard-liners finally prevailed. The Bush dictum of "you're either with us or agin' us" was put into effect. The US State Department put out the word of the hardline stance -- and US Ambassador Vershbow to Korea started the vilification campaign of the North -- who shot back that Vershbow was a "tyrant" masquerading as a diplomat. His remarks were seconded by the Secretary of State Rice, but Vershbow continued to act as the lightning rod.

The Bush administration took a three-prong attack on the North. The first was to attempt to cripple the North financially and isolate it from its sources of revenue -- drugs (mostly metamphetamines), contraband (primarily counterfeit brand-name cigarettes), counterfeiting (primarily US "supernotes") and sales of WMD. After 15 years of investigations, the counterfeit money issue was pursued with a vengence. The US approached Asian countries to garner support to force the North to stop its counterfeit operations. The US brought charges against the Bank of Macao for its money laundering operations for the North and shut down its operations. However, the ROK took the position that it needed more "proof." The North's commercial companies used for the money-laundering operations left Macao for mainland China. The Chinese started their own investigation and reached the same conclusion. Then the US put a full-court press on Asian countries to support the US position with briefings of Asian allies to provide them with evidence the US had garnered.

On 8 Feb 2006, it was reported that Kang Sang Choon (66), Kim Jong Il’s chief of staff and secretary of the Worker’s Party of North Korea, was arrested by Chinese police in Jan 2006 for illegally transferring real estate ownership in Macau. Kang was released the following day. According to a number of sources familiar with North Korea, shortly before Kim Jong Il visited China (from January 10 to 18), Kang was arrested by the police after it was revealed that he had illegally transferred ownership of a patch of land he owned there three or four years before. The South Korean government has recently confirmed this fact. Kang was known to have been arrested during Kim’s visit to China, which led to various suspicions on the background of his arrest. (Source: Donga Ilbo.)
As the North was identified as a "terrorist state" the US froze the assets of companies doing business with the North. It then added the charges of contraband cigarettes that were being smuggled throughout the world. But in this respect, the US was more worried that the North Koreans ability to smuggle cigarettes into the US, could also be used to smuggle in WMD.

The KEDO Project for the North's nuclear reactor project was finally put to bed -- after years of the ROK attempting to keep the project open. The ROK had promised electrical power to the North on condition that it give up its nuclear ambitions -- but it seems the Unification Ministry has "forgotten" about the nuclear ambition caveat and is progressing with the project as though the nuclear problem was resolved. This has brought criticism from former President Kim Young-sam and a slew of critics who say the South can't even provide enough for the South, much less provide a multi-billion dollar project to the North. (See KEDO Project Finally Dead!! (Jan 2006) for details.)

The US had hoped to once again have a unified tri-national front on the North Korean problem -- but the ROK continued to be adamant that it would support rapprochement with the North through "humanitarian" aid and commercial enterprises. On the other hand, the Japanese were in sync with the US purposes and had closed off the flow of money and espionage to the North by limiting ferry ships entry until they could meet the safety and insurance requirements. In June 2003, nearly 2,000 inspectors went to the port of Niigata to check for customs and immigration violations, infectious diseases, and safety violations on the North Korean vessel Man Gyong Bong-92. North Korea responded by immediately ceasing all ferries traveling between the two countries and cancelled a port visit by an unnamed vessel believed to be involved in espionage. (NOTE: Ferries have restarted visits.) In 2006, there were other considerations for the Japanese cooperation with US efforts as the Japanese prepared to submit the Article 9 changes to the Peace Constitution -- spurred by the threat North Korea poses of a nuclear missile attack -- and sign the Japan-USFJ restructuring package in Mar 2006. However, the ROK has taken the stance that rapprochement was more important and has expanded its programs to support the North's economy -- most noticably through its tourism and Kaesong industrial sites.

Then the US sought concensus with its Asian partners to cease food aid to the North until it could have verifiable inspections on the distribution of the donated foods. This had been a primary criticism of the World Food Program (WFP) before it ceased its food operations in the North in Dec 2005 at the request of the North. The WFP departed the country upon the North's request. The North stated that it no longer needed the food aid because it has sufficient food from its domestic production as well as "other sources." This shifted the burden of supplying the North with sustenance on the Chinese and South Koreans. Japan sided with the US and stated it would cease its promised food aid until its abduction issues with North Korea were resolved. After the stopping of international food aid, the ROK continued to supply "humanitarian" aid to the North, including rice, fertilizer and clothing shipments.

The third step was to attack the North through the spread of weapons of mass-destruction (WMD). The North had been providing SCUD missiles and submersible boats to countries to obtain hard currency. The US used the "proof" of the North supplying uranium to Libya -- and then linked the North to the rogue Pakistani nuclear scientist in its nuclear program. It then sought to link it to Iran in its nuclear ambitions -- and in Jan 2006 with the Iranian issue being referred to the UNSC, the taint had rubbed off on the North.

That the US is tracking every North Korean vessel leaving their ports is a given. With the US spy satellite capabilities and advanced imagery techniques, there is very little the North Koreans can hide -- even if they load the ships at night. In 2003, a North Korean vessel with missiles was stopped by Spanish naval forces after being tracked by US spy satellites that it was carrying missiles -- but later released as the missiles were found to be a legal sale. In 2004, there was the well-publicized shipment of heroin that was dropped in Australia and the North Korean ship was stopped on the high-seas and the crew arrested. Thus the US spearheaded in May 2003 the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) through international agreements and partnerships that would allow the US and its allies to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and seize illegal weapons or missile technologies. It envisions partnerships of states working in concert, employing their national capabilities to develop a broad range of legal, diplomatic, economic, military and other tools to interdict threatening shipments of WMD and missile-related equipment and technologies. On June 4, 2003, during testimony before Congress, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton announced that the United States had, within the previous two months, intercepted aluminum tubes likely bound for North Korea's nuclear weapons program and a French and German combined effort had intercepted sodium cyanide likely bound for North Korea's chemical weapons program are examples of recent interdiction successes. (Source: GlobalSecurity.org.)

On July 23, 2003 a USA Today report indicated that the United States had reached an agreement with Japan, Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, and Spain to intercept North Korean ships suspected of carrying narcotics or weapons materials. Since 2003, international exercises have been conducted in both the Mediterranean and Coral Sea areas.

In 2006, the ROK did not want to join the PSI for fear of its impacting its relationship with the North, but it also feared world public opinion if it didn't join the fight against nuclear proliferation and WMD. As such, it said it would send "observers" of the training exercise -- but would not participate. The U.S. in trying to broaden participation in Central and East Asia in the PSI put a "smiley face" on it by saying that South Korea is not a participant in the U.S. initiative on detecting and interdicting weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but is "cooperating closely with the efforts." However, on 29 May 2006, the Associated Pressreported that the PRC and ROK have canceled participation in a multinational naval security exercise. The drills began on 27 May with Japan and three other participants -- the US, Canada and Russia. The ROK said it was because of concerns that part of the exercises may upset the DRPK

ROK Resorts to US Lobby to Polish its Image With the rising anti-Americanism in Korea (i.e., the Oct 2005 MacArthur Park statue incident and the violent July 2005 protests at Camp Humphreys), the public opinion in the US was slowly turning against the ROK and US congressmen were openly questioning the US-ROK alliance.

Things had deteriorated to a point that in Nov 2005 it was reported that the Korean Embassy in Washington was enlisting the help of a professional lobbyist -- run by a Korean American -- as part of efforts to improve the country's battered image in the U.S. Congress. It was to be the first time in 30 years since the illegal lobbying activities of maverick fixer Park Tongsun in the mid-1970s blew up in a scandal known as "Koreagate" -- leaving lobbying since then to the embassy staff. A diplomatic source said whenever the Korean government faces criticism in Congress, it blames "misconceptions" among congressmen when it should be blaming inadequate PR. Supposedly the campaign was to cost $1.2 million. (Source: Chosun Ilbo, "The Gov't Needs W1.2 Billion to Deceive America," 2 Nov 2005.) Ironically, a month later the arrest of South Korean businessman Tongsun Park -- the 1970s "Koreagate" lobby -- again tarnished the ROK lobby effort. He was accused of accepting millions of dollars from Iraq in the UN oil-for-food scandal and arrested by the FBI in Houston in Jan 2006. (See Former "Koreagate" Figure Indicted in Food-for-Oil Scandal: Korean Image in US Gets Dirtier and Dirtier (Jan 2006) for details.) The ROK lobbying was not looking to be off to a good start.

Situation Comes to a Head After the US surfaced the counterfeit currency issue, the South attempted to sit on the fence claiming it needed more proof. (See Counterfeit "Supernotes" Furor Continues (Jan 2006) for details.) On 23 Jan, the visiting U.S. delegation met with Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) and the Korea Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) officials to discuss the counterfeiting issue. A U.S. investigation team headed by the Treasury Department's deputy assistant secretary for terrorist financing and financial crimes, Daniel Glaser, presented Korean officials with its evidence that North Korea is engaged in counterfeiting U.S. dollars. The team was met by Kim Sook, the director-general of the North American affairs bureau in the Foreign Ministry.