---

This page is graphically intense with long load times due to photos. However, the photos and narratives by the men who served at Osan Air Base makes the wait well worthwhile. The opinions expressed are those of the author and in no way represents any official statement of Osan AB or the USAF.

---

If you wish to listen to some golden oldies from 1940s-1990s, click on the selection on the list below. There are about 80 full-length songs to choose from. (NOTE: Song audio degraded due to space limitations, but adequate for computer listening.) Click For Music 1940s: Billie Holiday_As Time Goes By 1940s: Kate Smith_God Bless America 1940s: Mills Brothers_Glow Worm 1950s: Big Bopper_Chantilly Lace 1950s: Bill Haley Comets_Youre Never Too Old To Rock 1950s: Coasters_Yakety Yak 1950s: Danny And TheJuniors_At The Hop 1950s: Del Shannon_Handyman 1950s: Doris Day_By The Light Of The Silvery Moon 1950s: Fats Domino_I Hear You Knockin 1950s: Freddie Canon_Palisades Park 1950s: Nat King Cole_Ramblin Rose 1950s: Pat Boone_Love Letters In The Sand 1950s: Red Skelton_Pledge Of Allegiance 1950s: Ricky Nelson_Listen To The Rhythm Of The Falling Rain 1950s: Ritchie Valens_Boney Maronie 1950s: Ritchie Valens_Donna 1950s: Ritchie Valens_LaBamba 1960s: Beach Boys_Surfin USA 1960s: Beach Boys_Barbara Ann 1960s: Beatles_Strawberry Fields Forever 1960s: Bobby Vee_Go Away Little Girl 1960s: Chubby Checker_The Twist 1960s: Chuck Berry_Johnny Be Good 1960s: Crosby Stills Nash_Teach Your Children 1960s: Dean Martin_Make The World Go Away 1960s: Elvis Presley_Blue Suede Shoes 1960s: Elvis Presley_Love Me Tender 1960s: Harry Belafonte_Day O 1960s: James Darren_Goodbye Cruel World 1960s: Johnny Mathis_Chances Are 1960s: Kingsman_Louie Louie 1960s: Marcels_Blue Moon 1960s: Marvin Gaye_Lets Get It On 1960s: Paul Anka_Put Your Head On My Shoulder 1960s: Harry Belafonte_Day O 1960s: Righteous Brothers_Youve Lost That Loving Feeling 1960s: Johnny Mathis_Chances Are 1960s: Peter Paul Mary_The Marvelous Toy 1960s: Roy Orbison_Only The Lonely 1960s: Roy Orbison_Pretty Woman 1960s: Sam The Sham_Wooly Bully 1960s: Shirelles_Soldier Boy 1960s: Silhouettes_Get AJ ob 1960s: Simon And Garfunkel_Bridge Over Troubled Waters 1960s: Thunderbirds_Hippy Hippy Shake 1960s: Tony Bennett_San Francisco 1960s: Ventures_Apache 1970s: Bette Midler_The Rose 1970s: Cher_If I Could Turn Back Time 1970s: Commodores_Three Times A Lady 1970s: Crystal Gayle_Ill Do It All Over Again 1970s: Dione Warwick_Ill Never Love This Way Again 1970s: Engelbert Humperdink_Release Me 1950s: Fleetwoods_Mr Blue 1970s: Lovin Spoonful_Rain On The Roof 1970s: Mamas And Papas_Age Of Aquarius 1970s: Mamas And Papas_California Dreaming 1970s: Mamas And Papas_Monday Monday 1970s: Tina Turner_Whats Love Got To Do With It 1970s: Tony Orlando And Dawn_Tie A Yellow Ribbon 1970s: Troggs_Wild Thing 1980s: Aaron Neville Linda Ronstadt_All My Life 1980s: Bruce Springsteen_Born In The USA 1980s: Kenny Loggins_Footloose 1980s: Kim Carnes_Betty Davis Eyes 1980s: Kris Kristofferson_Loving Her Was Easier 1980s: Lee Greenwood_God Bless The USA 1980s: LindaRonstadt_Desperado 1980s: Linda Ronstadt_Thatll Be The Day 1980s: Marie Osmond Dan Seals_Meet Me In Montana 1980s: Michael Jackson_Billie Jean 1980s: Michael Jackson_You Are Not Alone 1980s: Michael Jackson And Friends_We Are The World 1980s: Michael Jackson_Ill Be There 1980s: Phil Collins_In The Air Tonight 1980s: Ricky Nelson_Garden Party 1980s: Ronnie Milsap_Lost In The 50s Tonight 1990s: Kenny G_Auld Lang Syne 1990s: Luther Vandross_Id Rather 1990s: Ricky Martin_Livin La Vida Loca Free JavaScripts provided by The JavaScript Source

---

PYEONGTAEK AND KOREA MILITARY EVENTS 2006

---

RETURN TO MAIN TABLE OF CONTENTS

LAND PARTNERSHIP PLAN: BACKGROUND

U.S., S. Korea sign pact to reduce bases; troop levels not affected By Franklin Fisher, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Sunday, March 31, 2002

The United States on Friday signed a landmark accord with South Korea that will close nearly half its installations, hand back thousands of acres and invest in better living and working conditions for its troops.

The Land Partnership Plan (LPP) entails no cuts in the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed here. The Korean National Assembly still must ratify the accord. Of its 41 major installations, the United States will shut down 19, close parts of another four sites, create three new installations and expand some existing installations. The United States has 95 military sites in South Korea.

The commander in chief for U.S. Forces Korea, Army Gen. Thomas Schwartz, and South Korean Defense Minister Kim Dong-shin were among the LPP’s signers during ceremonies Friday afternoon in Seoul.

"We’ve been working hard for the last two years on all the details," Schwartz said, "and we came up with a plan with which we both are satisfied … it takes the U.S. footprint and reduces it about 59 percent."

"With the Republic of Korea growing like it is, it’s important for us to recognize that growth, and to make a plan that will reduce that footprint," Schwartz said. "So we take 41 major installations and we take it down to 23."

Under the LPP, the United States will return about 32,000 acres through 2011.

The United States expects to invest $1.1 billion over the next 10 years to provide quality living and working conditions on its remaining installations. "It is estimated that we could have cost savings or cost avoidance in the neighborhood of $70 [million] to $120 million a year based on the consolidation," said Army Col. Robert E. Durbin, the chief U.S. negotiator for LPP.

South Korea will give the U.S. military about 1,270 acres to provide room for the troops and equipment that would move.

Major installations to be closed over the next 10 years are: Camps Page, Howze, Garry Owen, Kyle, Long, Eagle, Giant, Hialeah, Greaves, Nimble, Edwards, LaGuardia, Essayons, Market, Colbern, Sears, Stanton, Mobile (H-220), and the CNFK Detachment — Pohang.

The Army will continue to operate Camps Hovey, Castle and Casey but will reclassify them administratively as a single installation.

"With the urbanization and urban sprawl over the years, we find those camps or stations either almost in the center, or within the city," Durbin said. That "creates a problem for force protection, a standoff," Durbin said.

"And it provides a problem for access routes" for tanks and other military vehicles, Durbin said.

The Marines at Camp Mu Juk near Pohang will get a full-scale makeover with new barracks and unaccompanied officers’ quarters, new administrative buildings and a motor pool. The Commander, Naval Forces Korea Detachment — Pohang will move to Mu Juk.

"So what LPP is going to let us do immediately is fix the most troublesome conditions, fixing the water and sewage and providing them a new barracks, so the Marines and sailors down there have a decent place to live," said LPP negotiator Army Col. Daniel Wilson.

Camp Hialeah in Pusan will be moved to a site at Noksan, west of Pusan.

Several installations are set for "partial" closing, including Walker Army Heliport (H-805) in Taegu.

The Army will shut down its heliport operation at Walker, leaving only a small helicopter landing area on the existing site.

The helicopters and crews there will shift to the Army’s Camp Carroll in Waegwan. Hangar and other flight operations facilities will be built at Carroll, Wilson said. Osan Air Base will return Beta Site South, a long-standing point of contention between the U.S. military and the city of Pyongtaek, and Alpha Site, an ammunition storage point several miles from the base. The LPP grants Osan 411 new acres.One parcel, called Mustang Valley Village Plus, will be the site of new Air Force family housing. Camp Humphreys will gain 200 acres. That’ll make room for units from several camps marked for closure — Market, Colbern, Eagle and Long. And a large land grant — 125 acres in two parcels — is in the works for Camp Stanley. A South Korean civil prison adjacent to Stanley will relocate to Camp Howze, and the land it now sits on will become part of Stanley.

One provision of LPP aims at more efficient mail delivery. With a grant of 1.7 acres at Incheon International Airport, the United States will close the Kimpo Mail Facility at domestic Kimpo Airport. No U.S. site will be closed or land returned until new land and facilities are ready. Only then will the United States relinquish land and facilities. The 2nd Infantry Division will cut 19 major installations to four.

The LPP permits the United States to jointly use 36 South Korean military ranges, many of which it already uses. It also allows the military to set up safety zones — to be enforced by South Korean authorities — around parts of installations where explosives or other military activities might pose a hazard. Reaction was mixed among some South Korean civic leaders.

Lee Jae-young, director of Taegu’s Nam-gu ward, said he favored the LPP. "We welcome it, but it should have been done earlier," Lee said. However, one Taegu civic leader was more critical. "We basically welcome today’s agreement," said Kim Dong-ok, chief secretary of the Taegu Civic Group for the Retaking of U.S. Base. The group has pressed the U.S. Army to relinquish H-805, seen by its critics as a bar to municipal development and a source of noise pollution. He said questions remain as to how much South Korea’s share of the LPP’s financial cost will be, how much land it ultimately will end up having to grant the United States, and whether the plan will be carried out quickly enough. Kim said his organization will monitor the LPP’s progress.

In Chunchon, news of the signing drew only cautious support from one civic leader. "We are happy … but we think there are many other issues left," said Yu Jong-bae, of the Chunchon Civic Union for Participation in Self-Government. "We agree with the LPP in part," Yu said. But he questioned whether financial costs would be handled fairly, and whether possible ailments from aircraft noise and other environmental problems would be pursued properly. "We will confer with the government and offer some solutions," Yu said. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

---

Installations affected

Following is a list of U.S. military installations affected by the Land Partnership Plan.

• Closings The following major installations will close during the 10-year life of the Land Partnership Plan (followed by year each will close): Camp Page, 2011 Camp Howze, 2006 Camp Garry Owen, 2008 Camp Kyle, 2007 Camp Long, 2011 Camp Eagle, 2011 Camp Giant, 2011 Camp Hialeah, 2011 Camp Greaves, 2011 Camp Nimble, 2011 Camp Edwards, 2007 Camp LaGuardia, 2006 Camp Essayons, 2010 Camp Market, 2008 Camp Colbern, 2008 Camp Sears, 2011 Camp Mobile (H-220), 2008 Camp Stanton, 2007 CNFK Det-Pohang, 2011
• Partial closings (Listed with year of completion): H-805 (Walker Army Heliport, Camp Walker, Taegu), 2007 Beta Site South at Osan Air Base, October 2002 Alpha Site, an ammunition storage area at Osan Air Base, 2008
• New installations New Camp Hialeah, at Noksan, west of Pusan Camp Mu Juk, to undergo major upgrade and new construction. CNFK Det-Pohang will move to Mu Juk New Camp Page, on R-510, a South Korean Army airfield near Ichon, east of Seoul
• New land grants (Site, estimated acres, required date): Ichon (R-510), 160, 2007 Camp Stanley (prison rice paddies), 120, March 2003 Camp Stanley (remaining prison land), 125, 2009 CNFK DET Pohang, 0.6, 2002 Camp Mu Juk, 85, 2003 Incheon Mail Facility, 1.7, June 2003 DRMO Camp Carroll, 25, 2003 Camp Humphreys, 200, June 2005 Noksan, 140, 2008 Osan Air Base (Mustang Valley Village Plus), 8.8, Oct 2002 Osan Air Base (Delta Plus), 275, 2005 Osan Air Base (Northern Land), 128, 2011
• Returned training areas, ranges (Site, location): Rodriquez LTA #3, Sachong-Ri, Yopyong Rodriquez LTA #2, Yong-buk, Yonpyong Rodriquez LTA #4, Taehoesan-ri, Yong-pyong Dagmar and S, Squads, Palmers, and Oklahoma, Paju-gun River Crossing, Pap-yong myon Kansas Range, Chang-dan Gun Oklahoma Range, Chang-dan Gun N. Carolina, Air Mobile — Edwards LTA, TA-504/520, Kyonggi-do Camp Page LTA, Sachon-ri, Tongduchon Tango, Chi-haeng-ri, Tongduchon KCT-43, Yankee, Whiskey N., Hochon-myon, Tongduchon Stanton LTA, Tuman-ri, Paju-si
• Partial returns Texas LTA & Range, Chang-dan-Gun Mike, Tongduchon-si Romeo, Kwangam-Dong

(Source: Stars and Stripes.)

GAO Report: Basing Uncertainties Necessitate Reevaluation of U.S. Construction Plans in South Korea, July 2003

GAO recommended (1) a reassessment of construction projects planned or under way in South Korea as ongoing studies of overseas presence and basing are finalized and (2) the development of a detailed South Korea-wide infrastructure master plan to guide future construction planning. DOD agreed with GAO's recommendations and indicated actions it is taking to address them. www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-643.

Results in Brief: Although broad in scope, the Land Partnership Plan, as approved, was not designed to entirely resolve U.S. military infrastructure issues, and it did not address some of the more challenging land disputes, such as the relocation of U.S. forces from the Seoul metropolitan area. However, the LPP represented a step forward in addressing U.S. military infrastructure issues in South Korea related to improving servicemembers' quality of life, combat readiness, and relations between South Korea and U.S. forces. From a cost standpoint, the LPP encompassed about $2 billion of the $5.6 billion that the U.S. military and South Korea planned to spend to improve the U.S. military infrastructure in South Korea from 2002 through 2011. The LPP was intended to resolve 49 of the 89 separate land disputes (55 percent) that were pending in South Korea in January 2003. Of the land disputes the plan did not address, the most politically significant, complex, and expensive dispute involving the potential relocation of U.S. forces from Yongsan Army Garrison, located in the Seoul metropolitan area.2 A previous agreement between the United States and South Korea in 1991 called for the relocation of U.S. troops stationed there and the return of garrison lands and facilities to South Korea. The South Korean government had agreed to pay for the costs of the relocation; however, the relocation did not occur due to its anticipated high cost.

Ongoing reassessments of U.S. overseas presence and basing requirements are expected to change U.S. basing in South Korea significantly beyond that envisioned under the LPP and would diminish the need for and alter the locations of many construction projects, both those associated with the plan and those unrelated to it; in addition, costs could increase. The Department of Defense is conducting multiple studies related to future overseas presence, and available information indicates that at least tentative decisions have been made to reposition, over time, U.S. troops away from facilities in Seoul and away from areas north of Seoul. The full results of these studies and related negotiations may not be available for several months; consequently, sufficient information is not currently available to determine the full magnitude of modifications to existing basing arrangements that will be required. However, we were told that the United States would likely concentrate its forces in far fewer, though larger, installations than were envisioned under the LPP. According to a U.S. Forces Korea official, until recently there had been about $1.3 billion of ongoing and planned construction associated with improving military infrastructure at Yongsan Army Garrison and U.S. installations located north of Seoul—areas where there is uncertainty about the future U.S. presence. However, U.S. Forces Korea officials recently announced that they were reviewing these projects and that over $1 billion of the ongoing and planned construction had been put on hold. Further, the Department of Defense recently submitted a budget amendment to the Congress to cancel about $5 million of construction projects planned for the garrison and to redirect $212.8 million of construction planned for the garrison and northern installations to an installation located south of Seoul.

Our review of the LPP identified some key challenges that could have adversely affected the implementation of the LPP, as originally approved, and which also could affect future U.S. military construction projects throughout South Korea with the larger-scale changes now likely. First, the plan is dependent on substantial amounts of funding that South Korea expects to realize through land sales from property returned by the United States, host-nation-funded construction, and U.S. military construction funds. The extent to which these sources of funding would be available to support broader infrastructure changes is unclear, particularly the relocation of forces from Yongsan Army Garrison. While the South Korean government is expected to remain responsible for providing funding for this relocation, the Yongsan Army Garrison property reportedly would be used for municipal purposes and would not be subject to resale to provide funding to support relocation of U.S. forces, as is the approach to basing changes under the LPP. At this point, insufficient information is available to determine precisely how many replacement facilities will be required for U.S. troops moving out of Yongsan Army Garrison and facilities north of Seoul and any difficulties that might be encountered in obtaining the funding. The LPP also relied on using up to 50 percent of South Korea's host nation funding,3 which would have limited the availability of these funds for other uses. To what extent these funds would be used for additional troop relocations is not yet clear. Second, implementation of the LPP involves a closely knit series of tasks to phase out some facilities and installations while phasing in new facilities and expanding other facilities and installations. U.S. Forces Korea was developing a master plan to manage this complex task and control future changes to guide its implementation of the LPP, but in light of the expected broader repositioning of forces in South Korea much greater changes in the numbers of affected bases and locations are anticipated. These changes, not yet finalized, suggest the need for a revised road map to manage and guide future facilities requirements and changes in South Korea. We are making recommendations in this report to the Secretary of Defense to (1) require a reassessment of planned construction projects in South Korea as the results of ongoing studies associated with overseas presence and basing are finalized and (2) prepare a detailed South Korea-wide infrastructure master plan to manage the changing infrastructure plans for South Korea. In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense agreed with our recommendations and pointed out that it is taking actions to ensure that all planned construction projects support decisions regarding global presence and basing strategy and that all master plans are adjusted to support these decisions.

U.S. interests in South Korea involve a wide range of security, economic, and political concerns. The United States has remained committed to maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula since the 1950 to 1953 Korean War.4 Although most of the property that the United States once controlled has been returned to South Korea, the United States maintains about 37,000 troops in South Korea, which are currently scattered across 41 troop installations and an additional 54 small camps and support sites. According to U.S. Forces Korea officials, many of the facilities there are obsolete, poorly maintained, and in disrepair to the extent that the living and working conditions in South Korea are considered to be the worst in the Department of Defense (DOD).5 We observed many of these conditions during our visits to U.S. facilities and installations in South Korea. While improvements have been made in recent years, U.S. military personnel still use, as shown in figure 1, some Korean War-era Quonset huts for housing.

Background

Improving overall facilities used by the United States in South Korea will require an enormous investment. At the same time, rapid growth and urbanization in South Korea during the last several decades have created a greater demand for land and increased encroachments on areas used by U.S. forces. Consequently, many of the smaller U.S. camps and training areas that were originally located in isolated areas are now in the middle of large urban centers, where their presence has caused friction with local residents; urban locations also limit the ability of U.S. forces to train effectively. Figure 2 shows the boundaries of Yongsan Army Garrison and other U.S. installations that have become encircled by the city of Seoul.

Historically, DOD reports difficulties filling its military personnel assignments in South Korea, which are generally 1-year hardship tours in which 90 percent of the assigned military personnel are unaccompanied by their families. A DOD survey conducted in 2001 found that Army and Air Force personnel considered South Korea as the least desirable assignment and that many soldiers were avoiding service in South Korea by various means, including retirement and declining to accept command assignments. U.S. Forces Korea has wanted to make South Korea an assignment of choice by improving living and working conditions, modifying assignment policies to increase accompanied tours to 25 percent by 2010, and reducing the out-of-pocket expenses for personnel to maintain a second household in South Korea.

To address these problems, military officials from the United States and South Korea signed the Land Partnership Plan on March 29, 2002. The LPP, as originally approved, was described as a cooperative U.S.-South Korean effort to consolidate U.S. installations and training areas, improve combat readiness, enhance public safety, and strengthen the U.S.-South Korean alliance. The United States views the plan as a binding agreement under the Status of Forces Agreement, not as a separate treaty. However, U.S. Forces Korea officials told us that South Korea views the plan as a treaty requiring approval by the South Korea National Assembly and that approval occurred on October 30, 2002.

The three components of the plan are as follows:

• • Installations—establishes a timeline for the grant of new land, the construction of new facilities, and the closure of installations. The plan calls for the number of U.S. military installations to drop from 41 to 23. To accomplish this, the military will close or partially close some sites, while enlarging or creating other installations. •
• Training areas—returns training areas in exchange for guaranteed time on South Korean ranges and training areas. The plan calls for the consolidation and protection of remaining U.S. training areas. •
• Safety easements6—acknowledges that South Korean citizens are at risk of injury or death in the event of an explosion of U.S. weapons, provides a prioritized list of required safety easements, and establishes a procedure and timeline for enforcing the easements.

The costs of the LPP must be shared between the United States and South Korea. U.S. funding is provided from the military construction and operations and maintenance accounts and from nonappropriated funds. The South Korean government provides host nation funds and funding obtained from sales of property returned to South Korea by the United States. As a general rule, the United States funds the relocation of units from camps that it wishes to close, and South Korea funds the relocation of units from camps South Korea has asked to be closed. The execution of the LPP is shown on figure 3.

The target date for the completion of the LPP was December 31, 2011, although the timetable and the scale could be adjusted by mutual agreement. More information on the plan as originally envisioned is included in appendix II.

U.S. military infrastructure funding in South Korea involves multiple organizations and sources. It involves 10 organizations from the United States (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Special Operations, Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Defense Logistics Agency, Department of Defense Dependents School, Medical Command, and Defense Commissary Agency), as well as construction funded by South Korea. These organizations provide funding for military construction using five different sources of money—U.S. military construction funds, U.S. operations and maintenance funds, U.S. nonappropriated funds, South Korea-funded construction, and South Korea combined defense improvement program funding. Figure 4 shows the sources of funding for $5.6 billion that, until recently, was planned for infrastructure construction costs for U.S. installations in South Korea during the 2002 through 2011 time frame.

Pollution Stalls Return of Camps under LPP (Feb-Nov 2006)

Squabble Over US Base Contamination (Feb 2006) Seoul and Washington are locked in tough negotiations over who should deal with contamination on U.S. bases that are to be returned to South Korean ownership, a government source said. The conflict has delayed the U.S. base relocation plan, a major agreement struck between the two allies in 2004 as part of Washington's realignment of all its overseas forces.

On 5 Feb 2003, the USFK agreed to a "joint environmental examination" of bases. On 30 May 2003, the MND and USFK signed an agreement to clean up all bases to be returned to the ROK before they are turned back to ROK hands. Though we felt at the time that this had a great potential risk, but we believed the U.S. was playing a game that would allow it to vacate the DMZ as expeditiously as possible under their global repositioning plan announced in March 2003 and at the time was being implemented worldwide. Though the ROK wants to drag its feet on the removal troops from the DMZ for a multitude of reasons, the USFK was attempting to remove any stumbling blocks before it actually moved.

According to a government report to the National Assembly in September 2005, toxic contaminants above the safe limit were detected underground in large quantities at 14 out of 15 bases checked by the joint investigation team. Included in the contaminants were substances of the BTEX group, which include benzene, ethyl benzene, toluene, and three isomers of xylene. BTEX substances are known to be a serious hazard to public health and are linked to cancer, as well as being an environmental pollutant. (Source: Korea Times.)

However, the USFK position is that it agreed to clean up to KISE (Known, Imminent, Substantial Endangerment to Human Health) standards. In other words, it would clean up obvious hazardous waste contamination and SUBSTANTIAL endangerment hazards to human health -- not simply the existence of hazardous contaminants that exceed the safe limit by an arbitrary amount. This area is in "intense negotiations" that the environmental groups claim is behind closed doors and lacking "transparency."


Camp Closure under LPP (Jan 2006)

Background on Pollution Issue and SOFA Agreement (2003) On 5 Feb 2003 the Choson Ilbo ran an article on the SOFA. This was the hash-over from the SOFA agreement on "agreed upon items" initialled off on by the Ministry of Justice and the USFK to hopefully defuse the growing tension. However, there were some new twists that were added such as the "joint environmental examinations" of land that was to be returned to Korea under the Land Partnership Plan. Some of the other items seemed rather strange and needed more clarification before we dared to comment. These SOFA Joint Committee Meetings were NOT negotiations, but rather meeting of both sides to work out the mechanics of the SOFA as it exists -- providing interpretations and procedures to implement the SOFA.

THIS IS THE KEY POINT. The agreements listed as attachments to the SOFA were NOT negotiated SOFA agreements, but rather "understandings" on SOFA implementation of environmental issues.

New SOFA Implementation Agreed

by Kwon Kyung-bok (kkb@chosun.com)

Improvements in the implementation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) were discussed Wednesday during the 182nd SOFA Joint Committee, headed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade's North America Bureau Director Shim Yoon-jo and the deputy commander of United States Forces Korea Lieutenant-general Lance L. Smith.

The committee agreed that USFK soldiers suspected of drunk driving will be stopped at sobriety checkpoints and required to take breathalyzer tests in the future. Owners of vehicles will also need to submit documentary evidence of insurance when registering their automobiles.

Also if a soldier causes a traffic accident while off duty, the Korean victim will be able to recover damages before the decision of the court is given. Previously, victims of car accidents caused by US soldiers could only recover damages after a court ruling.

Moreover, starting this month, a joint environmental examination will be conducted on all land and facilities returned to Korea by the US military. The examination has only been applied when the US military in Korea caused an environmental contamination until now. Thus, examinations of the 28 facilities and three training centers of the US army bases that will be returned to Korea by 2011 according to the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) will take place.

Both parties agreed to take the case of two schoolgirls accidentally killed by US military vehicles in June as a momentum, and give prior notice to neighboring residents when exercises take place. In addition, the rights and interests of Korean workers in US army bases will be protected, as they will be handled according to Korean law.

SITE NOTE: On 5 Feb 2003, the USFK agreed to a "joint environmental examination" that we felt at the time played directly into the hands of Green Korea, a vocal anti-USFK NGO environmental group. This group was responsible for the organization on the May 2003 Sangmangeum March from Pusan to Seoul that gathered international attention.

Under the original SOFA agreement (prior to the environmental attachments), the USFK was NOT liable for cleanup and could return the bases/camps in "as is" condition. However, President-elect Roh supported changes in the environmental provisions of the SOFA. According to the current SOFA, the camps returned under the LPP was to be handed back "as is." This provision had not been changed dramatically from the original SOFA.

To be realistic, there will be some environmental damage to ANY land occupied by the USFK by operational units for a significant amount of time, though areas used as storage areas will be minimal. This was due to the fact that in the past, there was no environmental concern on the part of the military anywhere in the U.S. and world in general. In addition, it will be almost impossible to assess how much damage to the water tables was done by the Koreans themselves. In the U.S., the Superfund continues to try to cleanup the environmental damage to these U.S. bases -- some active and some long closed.

A negative environmental report is just what the Green Korea NGO group wants to demand compensation/cleanup and then spread the compensation to include areas surrounding the camps. Green Korea envisions the U.S. picking up the tab. This is because Korea refuses to cleanup its own back yard -- and continues to be some of the worst polluters in the world for dumping toxic wastes secretly in forests and rivers -- while the Seoul government actively suppresses any Environmental Protection Agency monitoring by cutting off its funding from 1992 on.

The "joint environmental examination" was a bothersome addition as it played right into the hands of Green Korea, a vocal anti-USFK NGO environmental group. However, if the USFK sits down to renegotiations with negative environmental reports, the USFK negotiators may be at a handicap.

In the U.S., the Superfund continues to try to cleanup the environmental damage to these U.S. bases -- some active (Pearl Harbor, Hawaii) and some long closed (George AFB, CA). A negative environmental report is just what the Green Korea NGO group wants to demand compensation/cleanup and then spread the compensation to include areas surrounding the camps. Green Korea envisions the U.S. picking up the tab. This is because Korea refuses to cleanup its own back yard -- and continues to be some of the worst polluters in the world for dumping toxic wastes secretly in forests and rivers -- while the Seoul government actively suppresses any Environmental Protection Agency monitoring by cutting off its funding from 1992 on.

We were only guessing in 2003, but the ROK has a much more lax standard for pollution than the U.S. and we surmised that the USFK lawyers had advised them that the cleanup operations could be to ROK standards. To clean up to U.S. standards would be a disaster. However, by 2006 new standards are now in place after many areas -- including Pyeongtaek -- complained of pollution from the nearby bases/camps.)

Camp Howze Pollution Off-base (2002)

On 30 May 2003, the MND and USFK signed an agreement to clean up all bases to be returned to the ROK before they are turned back to ROK hands. According to the agreement, the USFK was to test for and repair cases of environmental contamination. To implement the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), the USFK was to be financially responsible for environmental damage on 55 percent of the land it now uses, including 28 bases in cities and three training camps that will be returned to the Korean government by 2011. Seoul agreed to be financially responsible for repairing environmental damage occurring on U.S. bases that will be newly provided.

On 30 May 2003 Shim Yoon-joe, director general at the Foreign Ministry's North American Bureau, and Lieut. Gen. Lance Smith, deputy commander of the USFK, inked two sets of agreements concerning USFK soldiers during the Korea-U.S. Joint Committee meeting on the Status of Forces Agreement in Seoul. According to their environmental agreement relating to U.S. bases, South Korea and the United States will conduct environmental contamination surveys if needed in case of returns or projected grants of USFK facilities and areas.

The U.S. side will bear the financial burden if contamination is found in its military sites, which will be returned to the South according to the Land Partnership Plan (LPP). "The environmental agreement is the strongest that we have with any of the alliances. The agreement allows mutual consultation throughout the entire process," Smith said during a news conference. "We will never meet all the demands of the activists and some of the more extremists, NGOs. But we're making every possible effort to make sure that we operate as safely as possible." Smith said.

(SITE NOTE: Though we felt at the time that there was a great potential risk, we believed the U.S. was playing a game that would have allowed it to vacate the DMZ as expeditiously as possible under their global repositioning plan announced in March 2003 -- and at that time being implemented worldwide. Though the ROK wanted to drag its feet, the USFK was removing any stumbling blocks before it actually moved.

We were only guessing at the time that the ROK had a much laxer standard for pollution than the U.S. and we surmised that the USFK lawyers had advised the USFK that the cleanup operations could be to ROK standards. To clean up to U.S. standards would be a disaster. Most likely cleanup operations would be contracted out to Korean companies instead of American companies to eliminate activist claims that the Americans were cheating -- and also to avail themselves of Korean companies cleaning up to lower standards. The acceptance of the bases cleaned up by Korean companies would not provide Green Korea with ammunition to protest at a later date.

We have since learned that the pollution issue is indeed handled under contract. However, the destruction of hazardous waste materials by incineration is handled under contract by ROK companies. The cleanup of identified soil areas of spills or contamination is in the hands of military personnel. The problem of soil being removed for excavation and used as land fill in other locations is a problem. Currently soil being removed from Camp Humphreys for excavation worked has been trucked off base -- and if the soil is determined to be "oil-soaked," it is refused. Where the soil goes after refusal we don't know -- and we didn't ask. Procedures do exist for the incineration of contaminated soil.)

The problem arises once the camp has been returned to the ROK under the provisions of the LPP. At that time, does the South have redress to claim the camp was polluted by the USFK -- AFTER it signed off on the acceptance under the guidelines of the SOFA environmental agreement. In the US, the Department of Defense does assume responsibility if the pollution can be proved to have been caused by the military under the "polluter pays principle." However, the problem in the US is that the onus of proof lies with the accuser. In the case of BRAC bases -- the bases returned for civilian uses -- the new user must prove that the DOD was responsible and the pollution did not occur after the property changed hands. In reality, the DOD will fight tooth-and-nail against any claim after the BRAC ownership has taken place. The DOD will also take the same position on land that is leased. Because of this problem, special insurance is provided to handle the costs of litigation.

(SITE NOTE: We were concerned in 2003 that this agreement would lead to being trapped into U.S. "Superfund" type commitments as the bases were occupied long before the current standards were adopted. The truth is that it is uncertain where pollution comes from as the ROK companies are also notorious for dumping toxic waste into streams or burying them in the green belt areas. Under the original SOFA, the USFK would return the lands to the ROK "as is." In other words, the USFK had an "out" for returning the lands, but signed it away. It appears our fears were well-founded in that the ROK is now using the environmental issue to stall the LPP program -- and in turn the relocation of forces in Korea.

However, the USFK position is that it agreed to clean up to KISE (Known, Imminent, Substantial Endangerment to Human Health) standards. In other words, it would clean up obvious hazardous waste contamination and SUBSTANTIAL endangerment hazards to human health. This means that it was not responsible for the pollution to the water table contributed to by the pig farmer outside the fenceline of former Camp Gary Owens and such pollution problems. It was only limited to pollution that posed SUBSTANTIAL health risks. This may be in the sub-notes of the negotiations, but was NOT in the SOFA paragraphs that was on the USFK website for public viewing in 2003.

(SITE NOTE: Under the Land Partnership Plan, the USFK was to hand back the camps no longer required back to the ROK in a "win-win" situation. Under the SOFA the camps would be returned to the ROK "as is." However, in 2003 due to the protests of activists that condemned the USFK for any spill and made public headlines over the controversy. At the time, we complained that the ROK companies were being prosecuted for dumping tons of toxic waste into the streams -- and fined. While a USFK employee who dumped a few gallons of formaldahyde into the drain was taken to court and prison sentences were demanded. Bending to the public sensitivities, the USFK amended the SOFA to agree to joint cleanups if required and joint inspections of facilities.

We feared that this would be a prelude to opening a floodgate of claims by activists of damage -- in hopes of starting up a "Superfund" like they have in the US. Such an idea would be disastrous. The USFK has maintained that it has been proactive in actions on the environment and has "voluntarily" spent monies on environmental actions. For example, Gen Laporte in Jan 2006 stated that in 2005, the USFK "voluntarily" spent $1 million to replace underground tanks. However, civic groups, such as Green Korea United, dismissed LaPorte's remarks as ``self-praising,'' saying the removal of fuel tanks is something the USFK was obliged to do under U.S. law.)

(SITE NOTE: In Pyeongtaek, the city officials are at the forefront of claims that Osan AB and Camp Humphreys have polluted the off-base areas with spills that leaked off-base through drainage canals.)

NGO Activist Group Position (Feb 2006) According to Green Korea claimed that 14 of 15 returned USFK camps were found to have ground and water pollution. "Ground is contaminated mostly by TPH, BTEX, Lead, Zinc, Cadmium and Copper etc, also water is polluted by TPH, Benzene, Phenol, PCE and Xylene etc." The Green Korea article continued that the Ministry of Environment to reported to the National Security Committee that it would cost $100 million to clean up Yongsan Garrison. It claimed that the ROK government and local governments would have to take all responsibility for the pollution AFTER a camp is returned. It went on to state that the ROK government should evaluate the pollution status and demand the USFK accept responsibility. (NOTE: Green Korea is involved in highly political environmental areas such as the Saemangeum project. However, it has focused exclusively on the US over the Kuni Range conflicts -- leading to the US finally simply closing the range. Once done, the Green Korea is now targeting Chi-do range off Kunsan which is being used as a replacement site.)


Table of Pollution (Mar 2006) (Green Korea United)


Table of Pollution (Mar 2006) (Green Korea United)

Green Korea claimed that according to "Tab A to the joint environmental information exchange and access procedures," Korea and US agreed in 2003 they will start joint research for contamination 1 year before the return of the bases and any discovered pollution would be cleaned up by the USFK. Chuncheon City where Camp Page used to be located received the results of the environmental pollution report only ORALLY.

Green Korea claims that "experts" are expecting at least 20 ~ 30 years will be needed to clean up the contamination. The Minister of Environment was questioned by members of Committee of Environment and Labour during the inspection regarding contamination of U.S. Army bases in Korea and he promised that the Ministry of Environment will try to solve problems of information release, execute precise research for pollution and correct imperfections in the clean up process through the SOFA.

In a statement, the environmental group Green Korea United urged the USFK to immediately clean up the pollution left behind, following the environmental standards of the host nation. ``The USFK must take responsibility for the pollution at its bases on its own money, not on that from South Korean citizens,'' Lee Jong-hak, a member of Green Korea United, said.

According to Green Korea United, on 13 Feb, a poll 79.1 percent of Koreans stated, "It's your mess, you clean it up." However, the US position is that it will clean up only eight types of pollution.

A recent poll suggests that the US should be held responsible for clean-up costs of pollution withing US military bases. Recently, Gen. LaPorte, the former commander of US Armed Forces, Korea (USFK), proposed that the US would clean up only eight kinds of pollution cases. It appears as if negotiations between the US and Korea have entered its last phase, and the US has made its final gesture regarding issues of clean-up costs. Although the Korean people have the right to know and participate in this negotiation process, the two parties have kept the public in the dark regarding negotiations.

The US claimed it would clean up pollution within military bases according to KISE (Known, Imminent, Substantial Endangerment to Human Health). However, KISE's ineffectiveness was cleary demonstrated in the Philippines where people suffered from pollution left behind by the US military. Moreover, the pollution assessment does not include critical information such as the degree of exposure to local people. Nor does the assessment indicate how pollution spreads and how pollution reaches the local people. Since the pollution assessment does not include such necessary information, the KISE provision (Known, Imminent, Substantial Endangerment to Human Health) should not be applied based on this type of assessment.

Korean people's rights are being hampered by this veiled negotiation process which is based on insufficient information and invalid provisions (KISE). Therefore, Green Korea United conducted a public opinion poll to inform the ROK and US governments of Korean public opinion regarding base environmental issues. The poll selected over 1,000 Korean males and females nationwide who over 18 years old.

The following present key findings from the poll:

• 1. Pollution assessments should be transparent to the public: Yes 92.7 % No 3.9% (cf) the US is against revealing the assessment
• 2. Information pertaining to negotiations should be made public: Yes 88.7% No 6.4%
• 3. Who should be responsible for the cost of cleaning up pollution within US military bases: the US 79.1%, Korea 4.0% Both countries 10.8%
• 4. Korea should be responsible for the cost of cleaning up pollution: 4.0%
• 5. Agree to raise taxes to pay for cleaning up pollution within US military bases (if Korea pays for cleaning up): Yes 22% (certainly 2.0%+with hesitation 20.0%) No 74.3% (Absolutely not 47.9%+probably not 26.4%)
• 6. Possible Solutions to US military base pollution
  • a. Amending SOFA (Status-of-Forces Agreement) 59.6%
  • b. Korean government should strongly demand the US take responsibility for environmental pollution 25.1 %
  • c. Making pollution assessments transparent to the public 10.
  (Source: Green Korea United.)

(SITE NOTE: This specific incident was well-documented at the time and hailed as an example of the cooperation between the ROK and US in resolving polluton contamination. The oil came from leaking tanks on Yongsan and appeared in the drainage systems of the subway station. Once identified, it took very little time for the USFK to identify the source, and it readily admitted its fault. In the aftermath of this incident, all underground fuel tanks in Korea were inspected, repaired and/or replaced at all USFK bases with supplementary budgetary funds. This suit is obviously politically motivated as "pollution" is now a "hot topic" with the Seoul mayoral race coming up. It is also the current ploy of environmental groups to seek judgements from "friendly" Seoul District courts against the ROK government and then prod the ROK government into asking the US to pay for its "share."

But the biggest question is: "Why now?" Why wait five years before filing a lawsuit? It is strictly political. The Mayor of Seoul is the front runner for nomination to the Presidency -- and he must retain his office in the May 2006 elections to achieve that goal. This suit plays to the NGO activist groups that he is going to hold the US accountable -- even if it means he has to sue the ROK to get at the US.)

Defense Chief Calls for Easing Rules on US Base Pollution

By Jung Sung-ki Staff Reporter

Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung on Monday urged the Ministry of Environment to loosen its environmental standards for U.S. bases here that are to be returned to South Korea for the smooth process of the U.S. base relocation plan.

Yoon stressed the U.S. side is engaging in negotiations over the base contamination issue in an ``unprecedented and positive'' manner compared to similar cases in other nations, calling for a speedy conclusion of the matter. ``The U.S. military has been stationed here to meet our nation's security demands,'' the minister said during a press briefing at the ministry. ``I hope our people will understand this and give support for the controversial issue.''

The current pollution standards pushed by the environmental authorities are ``too strict'' to narrow the gap between the two sides, Yoon said.

A spokesman for the Ministry of Environment, however, dismissed Yoon's complaint.

``Of course, our ministry understands the positions of the Defense Ministry and the U.S. side,'' Song Jae-yong, an official at the Environment Ministry's public affairs office, told The Korea Times.

``But this issue is not a matter that should be concluded in a hasty manner as it is important enough to have serious impact on our people's health, environment and taxpayers' money,'' Song said, adding that his ministry will keep its position on safety standards under the South Korean law.

The environmental squabble has put on hold the U.S. base relocation pact struck between Seoul and Washington in 2004. Under the agreement, the United States Forces in Korea (USFK) is required to return in stages 34 of 41 military bases scattered around the country by 2011. (SITE NOTE: This may be the final straw -- the Koreans signed the SOFA which has the status of an international treaty approved by the National Assembly and US Congress. The actions of the Environmental Ministry has the potential of backfiring on the ROK.)

In exchange, the U.S. military will build two consolidated bases in the Pyongtaek area, about 70 kilometers south of Seoul, by 2008.

Since 2003, a joint survey team involving officials from the Ministry of Environment and the USFK has conducted on-site inspections at relocating U.S. bases.

The government asked the USFK to clean up environmental pollution at 14 out of 15 bases found to be contaminated beyond safety standards under the law, an official at the Ministry of Environment said.

However, the USFK is rejecting the request, citing different and lower standards set by the U.S. government. The USFK argues it is under no obligation to clean up any bases if the contamination is not a ``known, imminent and substantial endangerment (KISE) to human health,'' he said.

Adding to the complex dispute, the U.S. military's Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with South Korea, revised in 2001, fails to clarify which country should take responsibility for cleaning up contaminated bases. Recent reports said pollution in a U.S. installation in Chunchon, Kangwon Province, was 100 times higher than the country's standard. The permissible levels of kerosene and lead in the soil are 500mg/kg and 100mg/kg, respectively.

(SITE NOTE: The SOFA stated that the bases would be returned "as is." This was very plain -- and agreed to by the ROK in 1991. The "amendments" added later were simply "understandings" that the USFK would work jointly with the MND to clean up the bases, but the USFK states the agreed upon level was KISE levels.)

At a National Assembly session on Jan. 26, Hwang Kyu-sik, vice minister of defense, said the cost of cleaning up 13 bases concerned that were found to be seriously contaminated is estimated at between $300 and $400 million. (Source: Korea Times.)

(SITE NOTE: The MND denial means that the Roh administration has backed the Environmental Ministry -- and the US must be wary of the next steps. The Roh administration is NOT an ally in fostering the move to Camp Humphreys. In addition, the conviction of the Roh administration procuring the land -- that was to be completed by Dec 2005 -- was proven to be hot air in Mar 2006 when the MND backed off on evicting the farmers whose lands were expropriated legally.)

(SITE NOTE: This technique of "bioslurping" is used to cleanup stateside bases identified under the "Superfund" to pump out the pollution caused by dumping fuels directly into the ground over a period of years. However, under the current "known, imminent, substantial endangerment" (KISE) criteria, this would only be aimed at those areas with massive contamination -- or potentially hot spots like the Yongsan garrison.)

(SITE NOTE: The problem with the Korean environmentalists is that the ROK has some of the worst polluters in their midst, but the environmentalists don't issue a peep. On 8 Jul 3006, the discovery of waste oil yesterday has disturbed 200,000 residents residing near a tourism site on the Hantan River in Jeongok-eup, Yeoncheon-gun, Gyeonggi province. The police suspect the waste oil was dumped under cover of rain during the early morning hours. According to the Yeoncheon police, some 100 to 200 liters of unidentified waste oil flowed down from the bank of the Hantan River and polluted the waterway. A tap water reservoir in Gyeonggi province serving Paju city and other areas which takes in 65,000 tons of river water everyday is 40 kilometers downstream of the spill site. The local government there dispatched 60 officials to the Hantan River to clean up the spill. The officers set up 125 meters of fences around the banks, sprayed 20 barrels of oil treatment agents and laid absorbent matting to contain the spill and prevent further contamination. Approximately 40 liters of the waste oil was decontaminated. THERE WAS NOT A PEEP FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS!!! (Source: Joongang Ilbo.) Later there was a massive contamination of the Naktong river with chemicals 900 times above safe levels as the waters flowed into the water treatment center. The companies were identified and "warned." THERE WAS NOT A PEEP FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS!!! This was a repeat of the phenol fiasco of 1991. (Source: Doosan.) )

SITE NOTE: We believe that it is time for the US to task its top lawyers in the State Department to move the issue to the international courts. The ROK refusal to accept the camps according to the agreement reached in the SOFA is at the center of this dispute. The ROK simply cannot arbitrarily "interpret" the SOFA which is a treaty. The US needs to sue the ROK for abrogation of a "treaty" as the SOFA is an international treaty approved by the ROK National Assembly and the US Congress.

The wording on the return of the lands is very specific in the documents. It is time that the ROK learns that it cannot abrogate international treaties at whim. The schedule under the LPP should be maintained. Once the US cleans up the bases to the KISE levels agreed upon and all salvagable equipment is removed, the camps should be returned to the ROK -- whether they want them or not. If the ROK wants to join the suit in the international courts it is free to do so -- but the US should be the one to force the issue.

We believe the US has an airtight case -- and the ROK "leftists" led by Roh Moo-hyun need to know that the US is playing hardball. The bottom line is that the US MUST not allow the ROK to delay the schedule for the movement of troops out of Yongsan and the DMZ -- and slow the return of wartime control. The ROK has repeatedly used this same ploy using the civic groups to orchestrate a situation to support the government agenda. In other words, the government claims inaction due to the demands of people, but in reality, the situation was orchestrated by the government.

---

January 2007

Abandoned Transformers contain PCBs (Jan 2007) Electrical transformers containing hazardous materials deserted by U.S. forces when they closed down several bases in South Korea last July are posing a threat to the environment and human health. According to a report submitted by the Ministry of the Environment to lawmakers, a sample test of 17 of 391 deserted transformers located at 10 U.S. camps in the process of being returned from the U.S. to Korea found that transformers at four bases contained PCB levels exceeding the allowed 2 milligrams per liter. (SITE NOTE: The US was the first to ban PCBs in transformers in the 1970s and overseas bases were forced to remove any transformers containing PCBs and they were supposedly shipped out of Korea for disposal. In the mid-1990s, all USFK bases were ordered to remove these PCB transformers. All transformers were identified and logged into USFK logistics computers for removal. This was a major program, along with underground tank removals. More information is needed on these allegations -- and what specific location these transformers were located at. We also question this because some areas of these camps belonged to the ROK Army/USAF -- and was under their purview.)

At now-defunct Camp Colbern, just south of Seoul, in Hanam, Gyeonggi Province, PCB levels were found to be 88.16 miligrams per liter, about 44 times permitted levels. PCBs, or polychlorinated biphenyls, are chemicals not readily decomposed. They have proven carcinogenic if they accumulate in the human body, and have also been known to cause genetic mutation. PCBs were used in transformers as an additive to enhance the performance of insulating oil, but after they were confirmed as hazards, many countries including South Korea have banned their future use. (SITE NOTE: The operative word is "future" use. Existing transformers remain in place and will be replaced on an attrition basis. In essence, they have to show signs of leakage or explode before they are replaced.)

PCBs are one of 12 hazardous materials, including dioxins and the pesticide DDT, designated in 2001 as dangerous materials by the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. In the report, the ministry suspected that around 60 transformers among 391 deserted in above ten bases could contain the material over permitted levels.

Previously, U.S. Forces Korea supposedly promised to remove all PCBs from South Korea before relocating or closing the ten bases. However, among the total of 444 electric transformers in the ten bases, they classified only 53 as being contaminated with PCBs and left the remaining 391 intact. (SITE NOTE: This means that the USFK removed 53 transformers identified in its data base. The question then arises is how the ROK tested the remaining sealed transformers. Labels on transformers or part numbers were sufficient to identify these transformers.

Late last year, the Ministry of the Environment confirmed the existence of the hazardous material in the areas where U.S. camps used to be located. But the ministry had not released any information about this finding until they verbally addressed the issue with some lawmakers recently. The environment ministry then submitted information regarding the PCB findings over to an environmental panel of SOFA, the status of forces agreement between Seoul and Washington regarding legal matters relating to the U.S. military presence in South Korea. (SITE NOTE: This could possibly be a simple logistics error being used for the activist NGO groups political agenda -- or a ploy of the Roh administration to delay the transfer of the base by playing up the matter in the media. The question that the NGO groups are NOT publicizing is how many of these admitted "dangerous" PCB transformers still exist throughout Korea. As far as we know, there has been NO effort to remove these transformers except through attrition. In effect, the ROK does not consider these transformers as "imminent" threats -- and thus are only using this matter as ploy in furthering their political agenda.)

The environment ministry then recommended to the Ministry of National Defense that it should halt proceedings to reclaim the ten bases if the U.S. proves unwilling to take any further measures to ameliorate the problem. The cleanup of the transformers is made especially difficult because it is nearly impossible to pinpoint which transformers in the bases were contaminated with PCBs unless all of the remaining untested 374 transformers are examined. In addition, South Korea does not have the technology to safely remove the PCBs, and must depend on other nations to do so for it. (SITE NOTE: The US under the SOFA agreement is responsible for only those items that fall under the KISE (Known, Imminent, Substantial Endangerment to Human Health) standards. In other words, it would clean up obvious hazardous waste contamination and SUBSTANTIAL endangerment hazards to human health -- not simply the existence of hazardous contaminants that exceed the safe limit by an arbitrary amount. This area is in "intense negotiations" that the environmental groups claim is behind closed doors and lacking "transparency." Transformers that contain PCBs do NOT fall under this category.)

Interestingly, on 25 Jan, it was reported in Yonhap News that South Korean researchers had developed a new technique to process large quantities of environmentally hazardous polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) insulating oils. The team led by Lee Myun-joo at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) said it used a high-density electron beam to expel chlorine ions from PCBs and change the properties of the compound. This allows the material to be recycled for further use or be incinerated without concern over environmental pollution. Thus this is NOT a big issue at all as the ROK now has claims that it can process the PCBs in large quantities.

---

February 2007

U.S. Set to Return 15 Bases (Feb 2007) The United States is expected to formally return 15 of its military facilities to Korea in Feb 2007. The two sides have recently made headway in negotiations on the sticky issue of clearing contamination of the installations. They are the first batch of 59 bases that U.S Forces Korea agreed last year to return to the Korean government by 2011. The agreement was in line with the U.S. military's 2004 plan to consolidate its installations across Korea.

The two sides have been negotiating details of the transfer plan. But the talks have been stalled after reports of severe environmental degradation on some U.S. bases. According to the Korean media, Korea and the United States have been split on how to divide the cost for the decontamination of the bases before they are returned to Seoul. However, from the USFK standpoint there is no "split" as the SOFA states that the bases would be returned "as is" -- though the USFK voluntarily committed to removing underground tanks. Last July, the U.S. military informed Seoul that it had finished decontaminating the 15 bases. The official base return has been on hold as both sides have taken administrative steps including the confirmation of the reported decontamination.

An environment survey of 29 bases as of last June showed that 26 of them were contaminated. The Seoul government has been insisting on stricter criteria for the cleanup, based on Korea's antipollution laws. If adopted, it is estimated the decontamination will cost up to $500 billion. The United States, on the other hand, claimed Korea's demand was excessive. Citing a memorandum under the Status of Forces Agreement, the U.S. military has been arguing it will remove only the polluted fuel tanks inside the bases concerned, which would cost them some $2 million.

The Korean government also faced criticism from civic groups that it caved in to the U.S. pressure. The U.S. military has recently expressed regret over the delayed relocation of U.S. bases to Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province. The Seoul government appears to speed up the handover to secure funds for constructing the new base in Pyeongtaek. Seoul has planned to pay for part of the new base by selling land from the 15 installations being returned. Officials in the areas where those 15 bases are located are encouraged by the early return of the bases, which will help their regional development plans.

"We had much trouble in attracting investment from the private sector because of the lack of a specific schedule for the transfer," a Gyeonggi Province official said. Uijeongbu, Paju and Dongducheon city governments have pushed their own development plans in accordance with the agreed base return, but have been frustrated by the delayed transfer.

---

April 2007

Seoul to Foot Bill for Cleaning up U.S. bases/camps (Apr 2007) On 13 April, Seoul and Washington finalized the return of 14 U.S. military bases to Korea but the agreement finds Seoul agreeing to shoulder as much as 40 billion won ($42 million) for the necessary environmental clean-up of the military installations. Out of 59 U.S. military bases that the U.S. agreed to return to South Korea by 2011 under the Land Partnership Plan, four bases, including a helicopter landing pad in Yongsan, have already been returned prior to the most recent 14 bases. A total of 18 camps, including four that already have been returned, are now back in Seoul’s hands while negotiations for the return of the remaining 41 bases continues. The USFK refused South Korea's demand for additional steps to decontaminate military bases that will be returned to Korea this year. The Defense Ministry on 13 Apr said the two sides concluded their nine-month negotiations on plans to transfer 14 U.S. camps to the Korean military and local governments. The talks have been stalled over differences regarding the degree to which the U.S. military should clean up pollution in the soil.

Under an agreement with Washington called the Land Partnership Plan, the United States will return 59 bases to South Korea by 2011. Until now, Seoul and Washington have been at odds over how to split the cost related to the environmental cleaning process. Choi Hong-jin, an official with the Environment Ministry estimated on 13 Apr that the total cleaning bill, depending on the land’s future usage, could range anywhere from 9 billion won to 40 billion won, mostly for soil damaged by toxic waste associated with military activity. “The Defense Ministry will use a government budget for the clean-up cost and then consult with provincial governments on how to use the available land,” said the official.

The U.S. Forces Korea last year informed Korea that it has finished decontamination work at 15 bases, claiming that under the SOFA it only has to remove polluted fuel tanks inside the bases. Of the 15 installations, a shooting range in Maehyang-ri is excluded this time due to an ongoing environmental survey there, the ministry said in a statement. The 14 bases are the first batch of 59 bases that U.S Forces Korea agreed last year to return to the Korean government by 2011. The agreement is in line with the U.S. military's 2004 plan to consolidate its installations across Korea. A total of 29 bases have conducted environmental surveys.

The Seoul government has been insisting on a stricter criteria for the cleanup under Korea's antipollution laws. It demanded U.S. forces take additional measures to clean up eight types of pollution, including underground oil storage tanks, blind shells, leaked fuels and materials containing polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB).

Last June the ministry estimated that the clean-up cost of 29 bases that had already been surveyed would range from 27.9 billion won to 128 billion won. The Ministry of Environment predicted this will cost as much as 40 billion won (US$42 million), but private environmental organizations say the budget will be in the hundreds of billions of won. Other experts have estimated that the total clean-up cost of all 59 bases could be as high as 400 billion won. A government official said that the conditions for the return of the bases were agreed to out of concern for the national interest. “It’s true that we have to shoulder the clean-up cost, but this is a result of considering the alliance with Washington,” said the official.

Civic groups such as Green Korea United criticized the government on 13 Apr for giving in to Washington on the issue. “The U.S. soldiers have left and they left Korea a lot of waste. This should not serve as an example for other bases to be returned in the future. U.S. forces need to be asked clearly to take responsibility,” said the organization in a statement. The Environment Ministry and Rep. Dan Byung-ho of the Democratic Labor Party said 10 out of the 14 bases were not decontaminated properly where hundreds of oil storage tanks had polluted the ground. "If the pollution doesn't get cleaned properly, contamination will be a big issue in the near future when the local government tries to develop the areas," an aide at Dan's office said.

At a July 2006 SOFA meeting, South Korea and the U.S. agreed on the return of 15 U.S. military bases. The only base among them that has yet to be returned is the Kooni Range in Maehyangri, southwest of Seoul, where an environmental survey has not been completed. The two sides on 13 Apr signed separate reports on the base return without any clauses on those additional measures. Fourteen bases that will be transferred to Korea include Camp Greaves, Camp Liberty Bell, Camp Bonifas, Camp Stanton, Camp Giant, Camp Howze in Paju, the U.N. Compound in Seoul, Camp Nimble in Dongducheon, Camp LaGuardia in Uijeongbu, Camp Colbern in Hanam and Camp McNabb in Jeju. Critics say the agreement would affect the transfer of 45 other bases, which will pose a huge financial burden on local governments that take them over. (Source: Korea Herald and Joongang Ilbo.)

(SITE NOTE: As a reminder of how it was in the beginning, the 1960 CINCPAC Command History -- AS THE FIRST ISSUE BEFORE SOFA DISCUSSIONS COULD BEGIN -- stated: "The Embassy stated to the ROK Foreign Minister that the US would only consider facilities and areas at this time. COMUS-K (Commander US Forces Korea) recommended that the ROK not be required to compensate for any improvements or construction by the US because no such provision was included in the Japanese agreement. In addition, the draft stated that the US would not be bound to restore the areas to their original condition upon release. COMUS-K was doubtful that the ROK would accept any demands for compensation of improvements." Thus 47 years ago, the US was committed to this position for the SOFA -- and now it STILL is committed to this position -- the camps are returned "as is" and the improvements to buildings and infrastructure are not compensated.

As we stated before, the SOFA continues to state that the bases would be returned "as is." However, in renegotiations of the SOFA, the USFK agreed to cooperate with the ROK in upgrading the environmental conditions on the base/camps in Korea -- to include the replacement of underground fuel tanks. The SOFA agreement itself was NOT changed with regard to the return of bases/camps/areas no longer required to the ROK.)

---

USFK to Turn Over More Camps 2007 (Apr 2007) The turnover marks another step toward the release of a total of 59 bases from U.S. to South Korean hands. The announcement this week by Korea’s Defense Ministry came after talks between the two nations in Washington on 18 Apr. The turnovers are based on a 2004 agreement. Many of the U.S. bases already are closed, but South Korea had balked at accepting them because of environmental cleanup concerns. Some of the bases included in this week’s announcement are Camp Page, Camp Edward and Camp Falling Water. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

Seoul, Washington conclude negotiations on nine U.S. bases (Jun 2007) On 1 Jun South Korea concluded its negotiations with the US on the return of nine U.S. military bases per a previous Security Policy Initiative (SPI) agreement. The process was concluded on 31 May as a joint committee under the SOFA approved and signed the agreement. "After taking necessary steps for the efficent use of the land at an early date, the government plans to consult with local autonomous bodies to map out how to use the returned land," the Ministry of Defense said in a press release.

The bases to be returned include Camp Page in Chuncheon, Camp Edwards and Camp Gary Owen in Paju, Camp Falling Water, Camp Sears, Camp Kyle and Camp Essayons in Uijeongbu, Camp Gray in Seoul and a bombing range in Maehyang-ri, Gyeonggi Province. The land totals 25.78 million square meters. They are the second batch of a total of 59 bases to be returned by 2011. Including these nine, the U.S. military has returned 23 bases this year.

The agreement, however, comes amid strong protests from civic organizations over the cost of cleaning up the bases that they claim to have been polluted and contaminated beyond repair through years of US use. "We concluded the negotiating process as of (May) 31 as the sides had agreed to conclude it by June 1 at recent defense talks known as the Security Policy Initiative in Washington," said an official, who asked not to be identified. (Source: Yonhap News.) (SITE NOTE: The Korean media used the term "relocation" in place of "return under the LPP Program" in order to hype the image that the LPP is tied cost-wise to the move to relocate to Pyeongtaek.)

USFK returns closed facilities (Jun 2007) U.S. Forces Korea officials confirmed Wednesday they had returned closed military facilities to South Korea, a week after South Korean activists rallied to protest the June 1 transfer of nine camps. The closed facilities are the last of 24 camps, closed between 2004 and mid-2006, that South Korea last summer agreed to accept from the United States. The U.S. had spent as much as $400,000 a month last year guarding the empty bases while waiting for the transfers to take place, USFK spokesman David Oten said. The United States has pushed in recent years to return closed bases, valued at more than $1 billion, as part of the transformation of its forces on the peninsula. South Korean officials initially refused to accept them because of environmental concerns.

According to the status of forces agreement between the two countries, USFK must return land it has been using to South Korea when it is no longer needed. That agreement says USFK can return the land without removing pollutants beyond those posing “known, imminent, and substantial endangerments to human health.” U.S. officials announced in April 2006 that they would go beyond those requirements and remove underground fuel tanks at all returned bases, heavy metals from firing ranges and fuel contamination of groundwater at five camps.

South Korea officials agreed to accept 15 closed facilities in July 2006, and issued a statement that said negotiations had fallen short of their expectations, but they tried to get the best outcome. USFK officials have said they will return 59 camps totaling more than 33,000 acres in the next three years. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

---

May 2007

Closed bases draw Korean activists' ire (May 2007) A small group of South Korean environmental activists gathered in Seoul on 30 May to blast their country's decision to accept nine more closed U.S. military facilities. Sixteen members of the environmentalist group Green Korea United and four people who live near the former Koon-ni Range gathered for about an hour outside South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade building in Seoul to demand a full-scale environmental cleanup of the returned bases.



Camp Closure Protest (30 May 2007) (Tongil News) (NOTE: Green Korea United brings up Maehang-ri (Kooni Range) and the dummy bombs left at site.)

They condemned South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun's administration for accepting the facilities and presented a letter of complaint to the ministry. A Ministry of National Defense official said Wednesday that the decision to accept the facilities was made during Security Policy Initiative talks between U.S. and South Korean officials last month. The status of forces agreement between the countries states that USFK can return land without environmental treatment of pollutants beyond those posing "known, imminent, and substantial endangerments to human health." In return, South Korea receives the sites and infrastructure, which USFK estimates as worth more than $1 billion, at no cost.

When the United States began its push in recent years to return closed bases as part of the transformation of its forces, South Korea balked and refused to accept the facilities. In April 2006, USFK announced that it would go beyond its SOFA requirements by removing underground fuel tanks at all returned bases and heavy metals from firing ranges. USFK also contracted with a South Korean company to remove fuel contamination of ground water at five closed camps. After 18 months, South Korea finally accepted 15 closed facilities in July 2006.

A joint statement South Korea's ministries of defense, environment and foreign affairs at the time stated, "Although negotiations fell short of the expectations of our government, we believe we have done our best to draw out the best outcome, based on seeing other overseas examples." USFK officials have said they will return 59 camps totaling more than 33,000 acres in the next three years.


Camp Closure Protest (30 May 2007) (Tongil News)

Outside the MOFAT on 30 May, activists carried signs demanding that the United States clean up its bases and calling for South Korea to re-open negotiations. Green Korea's Seo Jae-chul said the U.S. military is avoiding its responsibility in cleaning up the land. And the South Korean government, "remains silent," and accepted contaminated lands, Seo said. He added that a "equal and reciprocal alliance between Korea and the U.S. cannot" exist until the issue is resolved. After a series of speeches, the activists brought a big box covered in pink wrapping paper with a matching ribbon. A statement on the box explained it was the gift of returned bases from the United States to South Korea. When they ripped the paper off the box, the contents included a fake "PCB Poisons," explosives and oil-contaminated containers. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

The Korean media is still attempting to hype the pollution angle in their stories. According to a government report submitted to the Assembly's environmental committee, an estimated $85 million will be required to clean up land to a level allowing fruit cultivation; and decontaminating lands to allow rice growing will require $19 million. The Korea Times stated, "Earlier this year, Rep. Woo Won-shik of the pro-government Uri Party, said some U.S. bases returned last year contain dumped electronic transformers with toxic polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) exceeding national environmental standards, citing a parliamentary report. The report indicated that dumped transformers in Camp Colbern in Gyeonggi Province have a PCB concentration of 88.16mg/l, 44 times higher than the permission level of 2mg/l, said Woo. The toxicity of PCBs varies considerably. The most commonly observed health effects in people exposed to large amounts of PCBs are skin conditions such as chloracne lesions and rashes." (Source: Korea Times.)