January 2007

The following is excerpted from Marmot's Hole blog: Robert Koehler on 16 Jan where he translated a hangul article from Yonhap News:

He and his friends were visiting Seoul for the night—initially, they tried to get a room at the Dragon Hill Lodge, but there were no vacancies, so they hit the clubs in front of Hongik University instead, where he got very, very trashed. Even after he and his battle buddies split up, he continued to drink at a local “supermarket.” Asked if he remembers—oh, let’s see—beating and raping an elderly Korean woman, he said he couldn’t remember a thing. He did say, however, that he remembers being frightened after he saw the cop, was placed in handcuffs and people began to surround him.

The accused wrote a 1-page letter of apology at the police station and sent it to the victim through his lawyer. The soldier said that he actually likes to help people and that he’s not a violent man, but he was so drunk he lost his senses. He said he dishonored the victim, himself, his family and his nation, and he asked for forgiveness. He apparently ended his statement by asking for forgiveness once again and saying that he was originally scheduled to end his tour of duty in Korea later this month, after which he was supposed to head home to get married, but now he would remain in Korea to pay for his crime.

The attack took place near the Hongdae entertainment district. Troops were banned from the eclectic neighborhood of bars, discos and nightclubs from Dec. 2, 2002, until May 1, 2006, because of “force-protection concerns.” It was removed from the off-limits list last year after Korean National Police, U.S. military police and force-protection officials conducted a combined threat assessment, officials said.

Both U.S. Forces Korea commander Gen. B.B. Bell and acting 8th Army commander Maj. Gen. John Morgan issued apologied on 14 Jan. ``While no words can lessen the anguish of the victim or her family, I deeply regret and personally apologize for this terrible incident that has resulted in grave injury to a Korean civilian,’’ Major General John Morgan, acting 8th Army Commander, said. ``This vicious act is an affront to all soldiers. It taints both our reputations and the sacrifices made by all USFK Service members who live and work honorably within this great society,’’ General Morgan said. Morgan said a joint investigation is ongoing and the U.S. military is cooperating fully with Korean authorities. Later, Gen Burwell Burke, USFK Commander, stated, "I am shocked and horrified at the egregious nature of this crime, and I am extremely upset by this senseless act against an elderly woman. On behalf of USFK I want to express my personal apologies for the great suffering caused her and to the Korean people for this terrible incident." He ordered commanders on the peninsula to review their procedures for granting passes and controlling off-duty troops with the "intention of eliminating similar acts in the future," according to his statement. (Source: Korea Times and Hankyoreh Daily.)

The worry is if the activists seize upon this heinous act as a rallying point for anti-Americanism. Since the 2002 accident involving two school girls, the USFK has been swift to react to incidents from the highest levels.

GI Sentenced (Mar 2007) A Seoul court sentenced Pvt. Geronimo Ramirez on 9 Mar to four years imprisonment on charges of raping and beating a local woman in her late sixties earlier this year. The court said the defendant's claim that he had been too intoxicated to control his behavior at the time of the incident was not valid because the circumstances surrounding his arrest suggested otherwise. Police officers who were patrolling the area at the time heard the woman scream, ran to the scene and caught the soldier as he tried to escape, according to investigation officials. The court said the victim is still traumatized by the incident, a factor which was taken into account in sentencing. The defendant said he plans to appeal. (SITE NOTE: The four year sentence if very light considering the crime. Others noted that many times the sentence is reduced on appeal.)

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Gen Bell: Korea Wanted 'Immediate' Troop Control Handover (Jan 2007) According to Gen Burwell Bell, USFK Commander, the South Korean government originally wanted to take over wartime operational command of Korean troops from the U.S. immediately. But when the two countries started discussing the timetable for the control transfer, the U.S. said both nations need time to prepare. However, when the U.S. said that it could hand over full operational control in three years, South Korea changed its tune and insisted on leaving it until 2012.

USFK Commander Gen. Burwell Bell revealed the background story at a recent closed academic seminar on challenges from North Korea and the South Korea-U.S. alliance. The seminar was attended by U.S. Ambassador to Korea Alexander Vershbow, and South Korean lawmakers from both ruling and opposition parties, Chun said. (NOTE: The remarks were relayed by Grand National Party lawmaker Chun Yu-ok on her homepage.) Gen Bell was apparently referring to command transfer negotiations that took place early last year, given that Bell assumed his position as USFK chief in February last year. At the seminar, which was hosted by the East Asia Institute on Jan. 10, he also said the USFK is under stress about the state of Korea-U.S. relations.

Bell said he considered the South Korean government's suggestion for an instant handover of operational control incompatible with his conscience as a soldier. He and his aides concluded that South Korea would need at least three years to take over sole troop control and conduct the most important military drills by itself without hurting its own safety, the commander added. It was then that Seoul rejected the U.S. offer to transfer the command three years later and insisted on 2012. He could not understand what the South Korean government was thinking when it wanted the instant command transfer and became even more puzzled about Seoul’s shift in its stance to postpone transfer until 2012. Bell stressed that the Korea-U.S. alliance is very necessary, but U.S. forces are under stress due to the situation.

In the seminar, Bell also reportedly posed questions about Korea-U.S. relations and South Korea’s North Korea policies. They included whether South Koreans welcome the presence of U.S. forces and want them to stay, whether South Korea and the U.S. have fallen for a North Korean ploy due to the gap in their positions, what stance the South Korean government is taking on aid to North Korea after its nuclear test, including the inter-Korean Kaesong Industrial Complex, and who will take final responsibility in case of a war after the command transfer.

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Stealth Fighters to Korea (Jan 2007) On 10 Jan it was reported that the US was deploying stealth fighter planes to South Korea amid speculation that North Korea may be preparing a second nuclear test. The American military daily Air Force Times reported that a squadron of F-117A Stealth Fighters from Holloman AFB will soon be deployed to the South for four months. About 300 U.S. airmen and a squadron of stealth fighters are heading for South Korea on a four-month "routine" deployment, officials at the USFK said.

Supposedly the routine deployment was not related to a particular threat or event but was a measure aimed at maintaining a credible deterrent in the Western Pacific. Some speculate, however, that the deployment is to help the U.S. military prepare for a possible second nuclear test in the North. The fighters are equipped with radar-evading technology "could" participate in a joint military training by South Korea and the United States, called the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) exercise, scheduled for March.


F-117A at Kunsan (12 Jan 07) (Chosun Ilbo)

(SITE NOTE: The F-117As were part of the RSOI last year, but stayed afterwards indicating their mission was NOT the RSOI. The F-117As have been TDY to Kunsan AB in past years from 2003-2005, but did not come in 2006 as the US did not want to make any threatening moves as it tried to coax the North back to the negotiation table. Then the Oct 2006 nuclear test blew that strategy away. It is further interesting that 12 F-22As arrived at Kadena AB for an unspecified period with 250 personnel on 12 Jan -- similar to when the Elmendorf's F-15Es were at Kwangju in 2003. It was also announced that the USS Ronald Reagan would takeover from the USS Kitty Hawk as it standsdown for maintenance -- but still remains in the area -- similar to what happened in 2003 when the USS Vinson spelled the USS Kitty Hawk for drydock in Japan. The 7th Air Expeditionary Wing with the 5th Bomb Wing (B-52H) and 7th Bomb Wing (B-1B) like in 2003 still are postured at Guam. (Source: Global Security Org.)

It could be construed that the US is playing a power game with North Korea as it did in 2003 when it deployed the F-117As to Korea for the RSOI and then stayed for "additional training" for several months more. In military terms, the deployments were tests of what the U.S. military calls "flexible deterrent options" to ensure that an attack on South Korea by the North could be repelled quickly -- with a variety of options available. Other military analysts state that it also serves to give air crews a look at a potential combat theater and test the aircraft operating systems in the field. (See 2003: Low Key Buildup to see the similarities of this latest development and Mar-Jun 2003 -- and 1993 when the F-117As first showed up ostensibly for the Team Spirit 93 (which was shelved) at the time when Bill Clinton was ready to nuke the North.) (Source: Joongang Ilbo.)

There is also a remote possibility following the Korean thinking that the US is planning to pull some troops out of Korea to support Bush's new Iraq strategy could be a possibility. When the 2nd Bde, 2nd ID pulled out for Iraq, the F-117As were standing by at Kunsan in Jun 2004. (See Global Security Org and USFK Military: May 2004.))

The 49th Fighter Wing at Holloman Air Force in New Mexico announced the deployment of about 20 F-117A Nighthawk Stealth fighters to the Korean Peninsula as part of a training mission under cold weather conditions. It can carry a range of tactical ordnance in its weapons bay, including BLU-109B low-level laser-guided bombs, GBU-10 and GBU-27 laser-guided bombs and Raytheon AGM-88 HARM air-to-surface missiles. This is the fourth time since 2003 that the 49th Fighter Wing has been deployed to the region. North Korea has denounced previous deployments as preparations for invasion. (Source: Korea Times.) (SITE NOTE: One interesting -- but probably sensational journalism -- was a Chosun Ilbo comment on 11 Jan that "The Japanese press reported last year that F-117 deployed in Gunsan air base in 2005 flew to Teukgak, where North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is believed to live, to practice aerobatics." The F-117 was to be phased out in 2008 so this is the "last Hurrah" for the special warrior.)


Protest outside Kunsan AB (24 Jan 2007) (Tongil News)

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USFK Denies Troop Transfer to Iraq (Jan 2007) The USFK on 12 Jan 2007 stated that the United States has no plan to transfer troops in South Korea to Iraq under the U.S. government’s new Iraq policy. ``As far as I know, the new plan for Iraq will not affect the USFK presence,’’ Kim Yong-kyu of the USFK’s public affairs office, told The Korea Times. He dismissed media reports that the number of U.S. troops here could be further scaled back below the agreed 25,000 because of the augmentation of troops in the war-torn country.

After President George W. Bush announced on 10 Jan that the US will gradually send about 21,500 extra U.S. forces into Iraq, some ROK military experts and lawmakers questioned whether part of the USFK would be sent to Iraq, taking advantage of the ``strategic flexibility’’ of the U.S. military in South Korea. According to the media, "Seoul agreed last January to allow the United States to deploy troops stationed in South Korea to other parts of the world where the United States faces conflicts." (SITE NOTE: However, the only agreement was that the ROK publicly stated that it "understood" the US position BUT never gave its approval of the use of USFK troops. It holds to the line that the ROK must approve the use of any USFK forces outside of Korea -- a position the US finds untenable.)

Rep. Choi Jae-chun of the governing Uri Party on 12 Jan said, ``The transfer of U.S. troops in South Korea to Iraq is highly possible given there has already been a system that allows Washington to use its troops on the Korean Peninsula to deal with conflicts in other regions. ``Washington now has limited options because it faces difficulties finding soldiers to be sent to Iraq in their homeland. The U.S. military in Europe also has problems in transferring its troops to Iraq,’’ Choi said in a radio interview. Choi argued that Bush’s ``rare’’ phone call to President Roh Moo-hyun on 10 Jan could be a sign of the transfer of U.S. troops to Iraq. During the 10-minute telephone conversation, Bush explained to Roh his new strategy in Iraq and Roh expressed support for the plan for an additional troop dispatch, Chong Wa Dae said in a statement.

``When U.S. troops in South Korea were deployed to Iraq last time, the U.S. government didn’t notify Seoul of the plan nor consult us over the issue in advance,’’ said the legislator. ``President Bush just called Chong Wa Dae over the deployment, and we were just pressed to accept the U.S. decision.’’ (SITE NOTE: This is not true. The US warned, then cajoled, then promised benefits to get the ROK to send its promised 3,600 troops to Iraq. When the ROK dragged its feet past the required date, the US announced it was sending the 2nd Battalion, 2nd ID of 3,600 troops to Iraq. It was not a surprise. Even when the ROK sent troops six months later, it was only after it negotiated the ROK troops into the safe area of Irbil -- instead of freeing up US troops to combat duties.)

ROK Media Suspicion Over Strategic Flexibility (Jan 2007) The USFK on 22 Jan denied reports that the planned participation by its Air Force unit in an aerial training exercise, called Commando Sling, in Singapore in May is part of a plan to re-deploy U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula to other troubled regions. ``The deployment of F-16s from an air base here to Singapore is just part of the U.S. Air Force's routine training,'' USFK spokesman Kim Yong-kyu told The Korea Times. ``The Commando Sling exercise is an annual joint aerial training exercise, organized by the U.S. Pacific Air Forces.'' Kim also said that the training has nothing to do with an agreement on the U.S. military's ``strategic flexibility'' struck last January between Seoul and Washington. Over the weekend, local media raised the question that deployment of F-16 fighters from the 8th Fighter Wing at Kunsan Air Base to the aerial training of the U.S. and Singaporean Air Forces would be a strategic move to increase the USFK's flexibility as a regional force. (SITE NOTE: Now that the wartime control has been established, the ROK is becoming more and more concerned that the USFK will start moving its forces out of Korea. No more has been mentioned about the installation of the computerized impact scoring system at Chikdo off Kunsan on which the USFK threatened to pull out its USAF components. Nothing has been publicly released on the progress as of Apr 2007. (EPILOGUE: System completed in Sep 2007 -- BUT there are stipulations by Kunsan government. SEE Sep 2007.))

Seoul and Washington agreed in January last year to a ``strategic flexibility'' scheme aimed at changing the mission of U.S. forces overseas from stationary forces defending host nations to rapid deployment forces that can be promptly dispatched to other parts of the world where the United States faces conflicts. The agreement, however, highlights that any deployment of U.S. troops in South Korea will be implemented based on consensus from the Korean government. Seoul has been worried that USFK's intervention in other regional conflicts could have South Korean tangled in hostilities with other nations against its will. One case in point is the China-Taiwan dispute over the sovereignty of the self-ruled Taipei. (Source: Korea Times.)

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Flexing Muscle, China Destroys Satellite in Test (Jan 2007) China successfully carried out its first test of an antisatellite weapon last week, signaling its resolve to play a major role in military space activities and bringing expressions of concern from Washington and other capitals. Only two nations — the Soviet Union and the United States — have previously destroyed spacecraft in antisatellite tests, most recently the United States in the mid-1980s. The Soviet Union conducted roughly a dozen antisatellite tests from 1968 to 1982, Dr. McDowell said, adding that the Reagan administration carried out its experiments in 1985 and 1986.

Arms control experts called the test, in which the weapon destroyed an aging Chinese weather satellite, a troubling development that could foreshadow an antisatellite arms race. Alternatively, however, some experts speculated that it could precede a diplomatic effort by China to prod the Bush administration into negotiations on a weapons ban. An administration official who had reviewed the intelligence about China's test said the launching was detected by the United States in the early evening of Jan. 11, which would have been early morning on Jan. 12 in China. American satellites tracked the launching of the medium-range ballistic missile, and later space radars saw the debris.

The antisatellite test was first reported late Wednesday on the Web site of Aviation Week and Space Technology, an industry magazine. Aviation Week and Space Technology first reported the test: "Details emerging from space sources indicate that the Chinese Feng Yun 1C (FY-1C) polar orbit weather satellite launched in 1999 was attacked by an asat (anti-satellite) system launched from or near the Xichang Space Center." The event was the first successful test of the missile after three failures. U.S. "space tracking sensors" confirmed that the satellite is no longer in orbit and that the collision produced "hundreds of pieces of debris," that also are being tracked.

It said intelligence agencies had yet to "complete confirmation of the test." The test, the magazine said, appeared to employ a ground-based interceptor that used the sheer force of impact rather than an exploding warhead to shatter the satellite. Dr. McDowell of Harvard said the satellite was known as Feng Yun, or "wind and cloud." Launched in 1999, it was the third in a series. He said that it was a cube measuring 4.6 feet on each side, and that its solar panels extended about 28 feet. He added that it was due for retirement but that it still appeared to be electronically alive, making it an ideal target. "If it stops working," he said, "you know you have a successful hit."

White House officials said the United States and other nations, which they did not identify, had “expressed our concern regarding this action to the Chinese.” Despite its protest, the Bush administration has long resisted a global treaty banning such tests because it says it needs freedom of action in space. Under a space policy authorized by President Bush in August, the United States asserts a right to "freedom of action in space" and says it will "deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so." The policy includes the right to "deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests."

At a time when China is modernizing its nuclear weapons, expanding the reach of its navy and sending astronauts into orbit for the first time, the test appears to mark a new sphere of technical and military competition. American officials complained yesterday that China had made no public or private announcements about its test, despite repeated requests by American officials for more openness about its actions.

Low Earth-orbit satellites have become indispensable for U.S. military communications, GPS navigation for smart bombs and troops, and for real-time surveillance. The Chinese test highlights the satellites' vulnerability. The weather satellite hit by the weapon had circled the globe at an altitude of roughly 500 miles. In theory, the test means that China can now hit American spy satellites, which orbit closer to Earth. The satellites presumably in range of the Chinese missile include most of the imagery satellites used for basic military reconnaissance, which are essentially the eyes of the American intelligence community for military movements, potential nuclear tests and even some counterterrorism, and commercial satellites.

(SITE NOTE: While China's new weapon does jeopardize low-altitude U.S. reconnaissance sensors, it poses no risk to America's targeting and communications systems, which fly at a much higher orbit. The worry is that in case of a shooting war between Taiwan-China, the Chinese will take out the intelligence satellites leaving the military "blind". However, the worry for Korea is that if such an event did take place, the Chinese strategy will be to split the US naval forces -- as it has done in the past as recent as 2003 -- by escalating the Korean crisis simultaneously with its Taiwan provocations. Without the satellites, the intelligence gathering would have to be done by real time assets (U2-AWACS) -- which would be a dangerous proposition for all. There is an added complication in that the Japanese have spy satellites as well and any move on them will be an act of war involving Japan as well. The ROK has also added its spy satellites to the mix -- albeit not perfected as yet. Quickly such a situation could turn into WWIII.

On a more realistic standpoint, the US and other nations are piffed that the Chinese created a massive garbage heap with their target practice. Floating around the area for untold years -- posing a danger to other satellites at the same altitude -- the Chinese created a "minefield" of debris. This is really has a lot of scientists piffed at the Chinese.)

In late August, President Bush authorized a new national space policy that ignored calls for a global prohibition on such tests. The policy said the United States would “preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space” and “dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so.” It declared the United States would “deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.”

The Chinese test “could be a shot across the bow,” said Theresa Hitchens, director of the Center for Defense Information, a private group in Washington that tracks military programs. “For several years, the Russians and Chinese have been trying to push a treaty to ban space weapons. The concept of exhibiting a hard-power capability to bring somebody to the negotiating table is a classic cold war technique.”

The Bush administration has conducted research that critics say could produce a powerful ground-based laser weapon that would be used against enemy satellites. The largely secret project, parts of which were made public through Air Force budget documents submitted to Congress last year, appears to be part of a wide-ranging administration effort to develop space weapons, both defensive and offensive. The administration’s laser research is far more ambitious than a previous effort by the Clinton administration to develop an antisatellite laser, though the administration denies that it is an attempt to build a laser weapon. The current research takes advantage of an optical technique that uses sensors, computers and flexible mirrors to counteract the atmospheric turbulence that seems to make stars twinkle. The weapon would essentially reverse that process, shooting focused beams of light upward with great clarity and force. (Source: New York Times.) (SITE NOTE: The current worry is that the recent test reinvigorated American advocates for space-based weapons harkening back to the Star Wars years of Ronald Reagan. These forces have largely been silent since the fall of the "evil empire." If China follows up with more tests, the American space hawks will grow in strength and numbers and could find new allies in Congress. What ultimately will follow is a very unhealthy space race in weapons superiority of my deterent is better than yours.)

EPILOGUE: Navy Hits Sat, Probably Fuel Tank (Feb 2008) The Pentagon believes the Navy Standard Missile-3 fired from the USS Lake Erie at a decaying satellite likely struck the loaded, and toxic, fuel tank as intended. After an early delay because of rough seas, the Erie fired the SM-3 on the night of 20 Feb about 10:26 p.m. EST at the non-functioning intelligence satellite as it traveled in space about 133 nautical miles above the Pacific Ocean, according to a DOD statement. President Bush elected to attempt a shootdown because the satellite still had a full load of fuel. The Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg AFB, Calif., confirmed that the SM-3 had intercepted the satellite, which broke into pieces. Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on Thursday told reporters that the Pentagon has "a high degree of confidence that we got the tank." A definite answer won't come for another day or two as analysts review the data, but Cartwright did say initial views of the debris field show nothing larger than a football. (American Forces Press Service report by Gerry Gilmore) (SITE NOTE: The main message is that the US can do the same as the Chinese -- with the message to the Chinese as well. You can shoot mine, I can shoot yours.)

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Photographer accused in U.S. military leak (Jan 2007) Police began an investigation of a photographer accused of taking pictures of U.S. military facilities in Korea and Japan. The Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency announced on January 24 that it had been conducting a investigation on Mr. Lee (40), a photographer, for several months after obtaining a wiretap warrant. The police said it launched the investigation after receiving a tip that Lee had photographed weapons at U.S. military bases in Korea and had given the photos to the media. The 40-year-old, who was identified by his surname Lee, is accused of taking photographs of a U.S. nuclear submarine stationed in Korea and a U.S. military base in Hiroshima, Japan, and sending them to a Korean-Japanese contact in January 2004. "We are currently investigating the details of the case," said Kim Bok-chil, a police captain at Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency. Lee has not been summoned for questioning yet, Kim said. Lee had posted pictures of joint Korea-U.S. military exercises on his personal website last March when he worked a journalist, Kim added. Lee is also accused of leaking classified military information such as the locations of U.S. chemical weapons in Korea through his articles and contributions to the online media. Lee also allegedly sought help from a North Korean spy in Japan to gain entry to a U.S. military base in Hiroshima. (Source: Korea Herald.)

However, a representative of the progressive internet media site for which Lee worked said, "We did run an article with a picture of a nuclear submarine docked at Jinhae Port. But the picture was taken by some other environmental group. At the time, Mr. Lee was not able to take a picture of the nuclear sub." The representative also said that Mr. Lee wrote the special report under question on the chemical weapons status of the U.S. Forces in Korea being revealed to the public "based on the information the U.S. military disclosed in accordance with their Freedom of Information Act." (Source: Hankyoreh News.) (SITE NOTE: The US has chemical weapons in Korea??? A US nuclear submarine "stationed" in South Korea??? This is very sensational -- but untrue. The US will deny the use of chemical weapons and having them stored on ROK soil would be a disaster. The nuclear subs sometimes appear at Chinhae with nuclear-capable Tomahawk cruise missiles on board...but NEVER stationed here. What's really going on here???)

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Fate of the UN Command with Transfer of Wartime Control (Jan 2006) Gen. Bell, the USFK Commander who doubles as head of the United Nations Command, said it would be unavoidable to revise the roles and missions of the body, as the South Korean military "exercises independent command of its forces during armistice, crisis escalation and potential war." He said the U.S.-led United Nations Command will play a supporting role to Korean military's maintenance of the armistice after the wartime control transfer. Bell called for negotiations over a revision of the UNC roles and missions.

"The U.N. commander will have no command authority over any ROK forces, with the ROK military commanding the demilitarized zone and sea patrol in the Northern Limit Line (NLL)," he said, using the acronym for South Korea's official name, Republic of Korea. "And the ROK military will have the command authority of all forces in potential contact with an enemy." The NLL is a de-facto sea border between the two Koreas, which remain technically in a state of war. He added the future U.N. commander will likely assume a supporting role in the relationship similar to the future supporting role between the two allies. (SITE NOTE: This statement seems to be the precursor to shifting the UNC to Japan at Camp Zama -- the control of the DMZ is handed over to the ROK. Japanese bases were approved by the Japanese as support bases for Korea under the UNC dating back to the Korean War. Besides the DMZ which the US wants to shift to the ROK, the UNC performs mainly a ceremonial role.) (Source: Yonhap News.)

Bell Seeks "Enhanced" UN Command The UNC should be enhanced to assume immediate wartime operations as a key supporting command to the South Korean military, Gen Burwell Bell said on 17 Jan. At a news conference held in Seoul, Gen. Burwell Bell, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, repeated his emphasis on the need to revise the UNC roles and missions ahead of South Korea's regaining of wartime operational control from the U.S. military.

"It is important that we organize in peacetime as we will for war. There would be no time to make changes in our command structure while a crisis escalates," Bell told reporters. "We must organize ourselves so we have unity in our chain of command from armistice to crisis escalation and into war, should war break out," the U.S. general said. Some said Bell's remarks hint that the U.S. military aims to upgrade the roles of the UNC through consolidating its command system along with organization reshuffling. They said Washington intends to maintain its leading military role on the peninsula through enhancing the UNC which would replace the CFC. (SITE NOTE: The US has already stated that I Corps will set up at Camp Zama to handle Korean contingencies. According to the Army Transformation Roadmap of 2004, I Corps should transition to its UEx model by 2010. The next step is to move the UNC there. We believe Gen Bell is alluding to the move to Japan -- and needs to have this agreement in writing before any change in command lines can be started in Japan. Remember that Bell has previously stated that he wants to turn control of the DMZ over to the ROK as soon as possible.)

The two nations and other UNC member countries will work out these details in a near future, he said. Bell said the upcoming changes in the alliance command structure could harm the UNC commander's ability to quickly mobilize forces to enforce the inter-Korean armistice. He pointed out that once the Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command is inactivated, the UNC commander will no longer retain immediate access to South Korea's combat troops with his losing of command authority for them. "The inactivation of the Combined Forces Command and the transfer of ROK forces operational control to an independent ROK military command will, however, create a military authority-to-responsibility mismatch for the United Nation Command," Bell said. "Unless addressed, this situation will make it impossible to credibly maintain the armistice."

The UNC is a 16-nation body commanded by a four-star U.S. general overseeing compliance with the armistice agreement on the peninsula and supervising two transportation corridors through the Demilitarized Zone between South Korea and North Korea. (SITE NOTE: If the UNC moved to Camp Zama, the position would become a three-star position with a four-star in Hawaii. The position of the USFK would be downgraded as well to a three-star position -- and perhaps ultimately a two-star position if ground forces in significant numbers are removed from the peninsula.)

In case of a military crisis on the peninsula, the UNC will defend South Korea through the combination of multinational troops from member nations. The UNC maintains seven rear headquarters in Japan for logistical support in case of conflict. (SITE NOTE: Whether the UN nations will immediately jump back into the fray if North Korea attacks is debatable. The fact is that in 1975, Park Chung-hee stated that the ROK would be able to defend the ROK against the North as long as China did not intercede. The UN flags were lowered over all bases in Korea except at the DMZ. All UN troops, except for strictly ceremonial purposes, were withdrawn from Korea and Japan -- and returned home. The sad fact is the UN will not rush back into Korea -- they will debate, make resolutions and perhaps enter as a coalition under the UN Command again after months of debate.)

Bell also raised a need to enhance the roles of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the Military Armistice Commission. The two institutions are main UNC bodies mandated to supervise the armistice actions between South and North Korea. The MAC consists of 10 officers representing main belligerents of the Korean War while the NNSC comprises representing officers from neutral nations Sweden, Switzerland and Poland. Analysts said the basic guideline implicates that the alliance shape will face a bigger metamorphosis than previously expected along with changes in a wide range of military details. (Source: Korea Herald.)

When South Korea takes over wartime military command of its own troops sometime between 2009 and 2012, as the two nations recently agreed, it will create a "military authority-to-responsibility mismatch for the United Nations Command," Bell said. In other words, the U.N. commander no longer will have "immediate access" to South Korean troops the way Bell does now. Bell said the situation could make it impossible to maintain the Korean armistice — the U.N. command's main mission. "It is important that we organize in peacetime as we will for war," he said. "This is particularly true here in Korea, where crisis escalation could quickly — indeed almost instantaneously — lead to combat operations."

That, Bell said, leaves the question: "Is there a future role for the United Nations Command on the Korean peninsula?"

"The answer is yes — absolutely," he said. It must remain part of the deterrent and warfighting capabilities, he said. Bell said the issue is defining the U.N. Command's role when the South Koreans have wartime command.

He indicated the command could work the same way the U.S. military will: in a supporting mission. In that scenario, the U.N. commander "could assign forces supporting missions under tactical control of supported commanders," Bell said. The commander would "retain operational command over all supporting U.N. forces and those forces would also maintain their own lines of national command back to their nations." (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

NNSC Observers Meet for 3000th Time -- Doing Nothing (Jan 2007) On 23 Jan the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) met for a historic 3,000th time since Aug. 1, 1953. Swedish, Swiss and Polish delegates sat at the table straddling the demarcation line separating the Koreas. Because North Korea hasn't recognized the armistice since 1991 — and its Polish and Czech delegates left in 1993 and 1995, respectively — all three men entered the meeting from the South Korean side of Panmunjom. Maj. Gen. Sture Theolin of Sweden and Maj. Gen. Gerhad Bruegger, Switzerland, meet weekly. Polish delegate Brig. Gen. Anatol Czaban joins the meetings a few times each year. The commission reports to the senior member of the Military Armistice Commission. The NNSC's mission is to "supervise, observe, inspect and investigate military activities outside the Demilitarized Zone and to ensure that neither side violates the armistice by introducing or reinforcing military personnel and materiel for resumed fighting." Since the commission hasn't been allowed for decades to inspect ports for any military build-up, officials admitted their presence is largely symbolic.

In 2005, Gen. Leon LaPorte, then the U.N. commander, asked the Swedish and Swiss delegates to monitor the large annual U.S. South Korean training exercises criticized by North Korea as aggressive acts. Theolin said they monitor the exercises to ensure they are legitimate and defensive activities that do not violate either the letter or spirit of the armistice. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

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February 2007

Bell: Troop Misconduct on the Rise in S. Korea (Feb 2007) SEOUL — Servicemember misconduct is on the rise in South Korea, U.S. Forces Korea commander Gen. B.B. Bell stated in a recent message to his troops. Bell wrote that he is "seeing a statistical increase in servicemember misconduct, particularly involving under age drinking, alcohol abuse, curfew violation and sexual assault." He called the behavior unacceptable and wants the troops to know about potential lifelong negative consequences they could face. His message comes in advance of a long weekend; the military community is off work from Feb. 17 to Feb. 20 to celebrate President's Day and the Korean Lunar New Year.

Bell wrote that the safety record for 2007 so far has been "very good," but added, "We must continue to highlight safe and appropriate behavior in order to avoid misconduct and tragedy during the upcoming four-day weekend." Several U.S. troops are embroiled in the South Korean court system after holiday weekend incidents. Most recently, 23-year-old Pvt. Geronimo Ramirez is accused of raping a 67-year-old South Korean woman on Jan. 14 — part of the Martin Luther King Jr. holiday weekend. Officials said Bell considered the Ramirez case, among other unspecified factors, when deciding to place Hongdae off limits to the entire USFK community — civilians included — from 9 p.m. to 5 a.m. daily since Jan. 31.

And three other U.S. soldiers are charged in relation to a Nov. 11 brawl in Itaewon's U.N. Club during Veterans Day weekend. Pvt. Sylvester Antley Clark, 19, and Spc. Tydes Teron Whiten, 27, were charged with assaulting a club bouncer. Pfc. Mario Duprey, 22, has been charged with assaulting a police officer. Their next court case, also in Seoul Central District Court, is Feb. 23.

To mitigate risks, Bell directed his personnel to read "USFK Command Policy Letter #2, Command Safety," available at www.usfk.mil. The policy letter states USFK's philosophy "must be overarching but simple: supervise, educate, reduce risk, and seek out and eliminate conditions, practices, and habits that threaten the safety of people." Part of that philosophy is use of the "Under the Oak Tree Counseling," in which leaders talk to their troops before "weekends, holidays, passes, leaves, and other identified periods of high risk." "First-line supervisors will meet with subordinates to discuss and set conditions for their off-duty plans," according to the policy letter. The goal is to get a verbal contract through face-to-face meetings in which the troops agree to take appropriate steps to lower risks, according to the letter. (Source: Stars and Stripes.) (SITE NOTE: Korean progressive media also picked up on this message -- as justification that the USFK were "evil doers.") (SITE NOTE: The USFK troops at Army camps were very angry after female visits in barracks rooms was prohibitted in Feb 2007 -- meaning female soldiers cannot visit other male soldiers in their rooms -- not only the off-base female visitors. This followed an assault on a female soldier in the barracks.)

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Lawmakers Call for Delay of Control Transfer (Feb 2007) Lawmakers of the governing and opposition parties yesterday agreed to adopt a resolution calling for a delay in talks over the transition of wartime operational control of the Korean military from the United States to South Korea. ``The adoption of the resolution means Seoul should not stick to its target year of 2012,'' Rep. Ahn Young-keun, a member of the National Assembly's National Defense Committee said. (Source: Korea Times.)

Defense Minister Kim Jang-soo hinted that he and his U.S. counterpart would try to fix the timetable on the command rearrangements during their talks in Washington, D.C. in late Feb. Kim was to begin a four-day visit to the United States on 19 Feb and meet with U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates in Washington, D.C., on 20 Feb to discuss issues, including the relocation of U.S. military bases to south of Seoul. It was to be the first meeting of the two allies' defense chiefs since they both took office late last year. (Source: Korea Times.) (SITE NOTE: Unfortunately, the transfer of wartime control has gone too far. We have always stated that the US wanted to draw down in Korea since 1991 under the Nunn-Warner initiative. Roh's insistence on wartime control gave the opportunity to get out from under a bad agreement -- though the US knew full-well that the ROK cannot support its own defense without the US support. Thus the opening allowed the US to give up the wartime control but at the same time declare that the US would no longer be the "patron" but rather a "supporter" of the ROK defense. The anti-Americanism and the ROK antagonism in pursuing an opposite rapproachement strategy with North Korea has reinforced this feeling. Though a resolution is nothing more than a statement that has no legal force, it does indicate that intent of the ROK -- one that it has demonstrated with foot-dragging and haggling over relocation and cost-sharing -- to retain the USFK in Korea.)

Previously, lawmakers from the main opposition Grand National Party (GNP) opposed the transfer of wartime operational control, now exercised by the top U.S. military officer in South Korea. Throughout the process, retired generals, veterans, former defense ministers and conservative elements rallied against the move, but Roh forged ahead with his demands for wartime control. GNP Presidential candidate has stated in Feb 2007 that the ROK should renegotiate its strategic alliance with the US -- indicating the transfer of wartime control was a mistake. She called for the signing of a new security pact in Washington. (Source: Korea Times.) Now more and more of the members of the Uri Party are coming to the realization that it was a strategic mistake.

U.S. indicates Earlier Transfer of Wartime Command than Expected (Feb 2007) On 19 Feb, the Yonhap News reported that the United States had strongly indicated that it would allow South Korea to get back the wartime command of its troops, currently held by the U.S., around 2010, a couple of years earlier than the deadline agreed on between the sides, a Defense Ministry official said Monday. (SITE NOTE: The difference between US and ROK date of wartime control transfer has become very confusing with the USFK saying "2009" while the ROK saying "2012" and the media splitting the difference at "around 2010". In truth, no one is sure until an official agreement is made.)

"The U.S. side informed us during the Security Policy Initiative meeting in Seoul that three years is enough from now on," the official said, asking not to be named. South Korean Defense Minister Kim Jang-soo recently expressed the hope that he could fix the date for the transfer of the wartime command Friday when he meets with U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates in Washington. The two sides had agreed to set the transfer timing and present a detailed schedule for it by the end of July this year. (Source: Yonhap News and Korea Herald.) Korea Herald on 21 Feb reported that defense chiefs from the ROK and the US are expected to reach an agreement on the timetable for the transfer of wartime operational control during their talks in Washington. Working-level officials have narrowed their differences over the schedule and are reportedly close to an agreement on 2012 as the target year.

(SITE NOTE: Actually, we believe the transfer of wartime control could be in place much sooner -- perhaps by 2008 with all the mechanics sorted out later -- and actual transfer date in 2009. The bottomline is that the ROK will NEVER be ready for assuming wartime control and the biggest danger is that if the US waits longer, it will be sucked once again into the "patron" role. We believe that the mechanisms for a drawdown are in place.

In Feb 2007, we have observed that the US contracts for contractors are being curtailed in the Pyeongtaek area in general. This indicates that the drawdowns have reached a phase that reduced support for elements in the ROK -- though there seems to be an increase in contractor support at Camp Humphreys as could be expected with the increase in systems installations goes on. Though there is a great deal of housing construction going on on-base, these contracts were let before the wartime control fiasco hit the fan. Off-base the citizens are complaining because all the promises of a massive increase in personnel has not taken place and is impacting them adversely. In the meantime, consolidation of activities in the DMZ area around Camp Stanley continues -- and in fact, the USFK wishes to return more camps to the ROK under the LPP.

We believe the manning drawdowns under the Unit of Action processes (combining activities, reduction of manning numbers, deactivation of units, relocating units to the States) that has already left gapping holes in manning levels -- BUT only on the books. In other words, the units are being phased out and positions are being vacated by attrition -- without any fills -- but not affecting unit operations. We believe there are probably administrative holes throughout the USFK but mostly within the Army elements. However, we also believe that the USFK may potentially pullout the F-16s here in Korea over the unresolved use of Chikdo bombing range -- unless some positive signs of agreement are made with the Kunsan government (or the transfer of Chikdo to the Forestry service so the ROK government could control the island use. As of Apr 2007, there was still no public announcement on the opening of Chikdo per USAF demands. In Sep 2007, there was notification that the WISS system was in place on Chikdo, but the issues of a 7 ROKAF:3 USAF split of range time and the Kunsan City government threat that it would shut it down if government aid promises were not met. In addition, the environmentalists still will have to review the Chikdo area before there is a final ok.))

DOD, S. Korea agree on 2012 transfer of war command The DoD announced on 23 Feb that South Korea would assume wartime control over its own military forces on 17 April 2012. The announcement came after Defense Secretary Robert Gates met with South Korean National Defense Minister Kim Jang Soo on 23 Feb at the Pentagon. Originally, the U.S. insisted on a transfer date of 2009, but accepted Korea’s claim that a transfer before 2012 would not be possible considering the transfer preparation timetable for securing high-tech defense capabilities to deter the North on its own.

(SITE NOTE: Our original reaction was, "WTF???" This believed it must have been a misprint. But then we remembered what we also said repeatedly that the ROK is NOT prepared to accept its wartime control -- and probably won't be ready in 2012 either. However, when you read the fine print, the US wants assurances that the ROK will not weasel out of its commitment to accept wartime control. An official with the Foreign Ministry said yesterday that agreements such as the current one are technically not legally binding. However, since it is a formal agreement between two nations, it would be almost impossible to overturn it, considering the damage it could cause in the trust between the two sides.

The danger is any delay would mean the ROK would continue to use the US as its PRIMARY defense -- as in the Patriot missles; US naval landing craft (or Army fast ships; and Paladin artillery and ATACMS though not mentioned because the Seoul "return fire" mission was turned over to the ROK. The two allies agreed in November of 2003 to hand over 10 key military missions conducted by U.S. forces stationed here to the South Korean military. The transfer started in 2004 and is scheduled to be completed in December of 2008. The last mission transfer includes search-and-rescue operations of military personnel -- for which the ROK still has not procured any all-weather capable helicopters to support work in fog.

Chosun Ilbo stated: "In return, Washington is asking Seoul to guarantee it will not change its mind again no matter who wins the presidential election here in December. That would put paid to hopes in Korea that a new president could postpone the handover. The U.S. is asking Korea for “tangible measures” to earn its trust, citing Korea’s earlier failure to immediately implement a bilateral agreement when the situation changed. By tangible measures, the U.S. appears to mean establishing a military command that would take charge of troop control, and an earlier start to drawing up new military strategies once Combined Forces Command is dismantled, according to sources."

I wonder how the ROK will show "tangible measures" to earn the US trust. Perhaps it would be ordering the Patriot missiles that it has been promising for so long -- the latest was the used PAC-2s from Germany by 2007...huh??? Still not here. Maybe it will be the new Eurocopters to replace the choppers already on its last legs -- but whoops...it's still not off the drawing boards. Or maybe it will the procurement of the 40 more F-15Ks -- even though the original contract said that 280 would be needed. Or maybe it will be the Boeing AWACS deal's fulfillment without bickering and nitpicking on the contract price to delay the contract. Or maybe its demonstration of its ability to ensure its intelligence gathering capabilities after it refused the 4CI interfaces for the GSSC-K -- while its latest "spy" satellite can take pictures only as good as Google Earth with a French company trying to upgrade its "software" by sometime next year. Perhaps it will be the building of new landing craft to support its counter-attack capabilities as it does NOT have that capability -- as proven by the ROK stand-alone exercises last month where they had to "borrow" civilian ships to do the job.

Maybe the US doesn't really care about the "tangible measures" and only wants to ensure the GNP and DP will not throw monkey wrenches into the wartime control transfer mechanics. Though it is now down to 28,000 of the agreed to 25,000 personnel, all that is left is mostly "support" personnel to fit the definition of how the US will become a "supporter" versus a "patron."

The agreement for a 2012 date might be a strategic move because the US knows full well that the ROK can never accept in time the ten strategic missions it set as a prerequisite for handing off the wartime control. By accepting the 2012 date the US gets to continue reducing its troop levels, while preventing any renegotiations after the new GNP President (most likely) is elected.

Basically, the US gets to continue to move into a "support" role and expand its US-Japan Missile Defense System (with the ROK on the outside of the line after the ROK refusal to join) -- and complete the structure for relocation of the UN outside of Korea to Camp Zama, Japan where the I Corps will take the contingency operations for Korea. According to the Army Transformation Roadmap of 2004, I Corps should transition to its UEx model by 2010. Remember also that the Guam relocation of the 3rd MEU from Oki will not be complete until approximately 2012. It also needs time to negotiate the physical turnover of the DMZ to the ROK after the CFC is dismantled.

In the meantime, the ROK squirms in a trap of its own making. It has fallen from a G-4 position by being nudged out by India and will be dropped another notch by Russia in the near future. Its auto exports are all the keeps the GDP figures inflated -- while all the other economic statistics are dismal. With major social issues demanding major investments of money, the defense budget may be cut again -- or items procured, but never funded. The ROK is in a bad position now ... and the US may still be playing hardball, but in a different manner more civilized "kid-glove" manner.)

Early in Feb 2007, Defense Minister Kim Jang-soo said a new command responsible for wartime operation, command and control of troops was being considered in line with the new Korea-U.S. alliance structure.

South Korea also plans to beef up its intelligence-gathering ability, for which it has so far relied heavily upon U.S. forces. In November, the Korean military concluded a contract with Boeing Co. to purchase four airborne early warning aircraft worth $1.59 billion between 2011 and 2012. The Korean Air Force will deploy its first airborne early warning aircraft in 2011. The remaining three units will be delivered in 2012.

Korea currently depends on U.S. AWACS radar aircraft based in Okinawa, Japan for its aerial warning capability. Since Pyongyang's nuclear test in October, the South's military has adjusted its defense priorities, stressing early acquisition of surveillance and reconnaissance equipment, precision strike weapons and a nuclear defense system, Seoul officials said. Under a project codenamed SAM-X, the Defense Ministry is seeking to purchase 48 Patriot surface-to-air missiles from Germany, beginning in 2008.

South Korea has been developing early warning radars and a digital network command system called C4I (command, communication, control, computer and intelligence). The C4I system will enable the military to respond quickly to threats through in-time communications between headquarters and combat units. The Air Force will complete the radar development by 2012 in partnership with the Agency for Defense Development, a defense technology research institute affiliated to the Defense Ministry, and foreign experts, sources said. (Source: Korea Herald.)