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USFK Organizational Chart

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USFK ORGANIZATIONAL CHART (2007-2008)

IF ANYONE FINDS ERRORS ON THE FOLLOWING CHART, PLEASE NOTIFY US AT kalani@kalaniosullivan.com SO THAT WE CAN UPDATE THE INFORMATION. (NOTE: WE ARE ONLY SEEKING INFORMATION AVAILABLE THROUGH "OPEN" SOURCES -- I.E., A UNIT NO LONGER A PART OF THE USFK. WE ARE NOT SEEKING INFORMATION OF ANY STRATEGIC OR TACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE.) To be truthful, because the USFK became super secretive of official information on the OPEN internet, this type of chart is almost impossible to update.

If one wanted to spend the time and effort, one could probably find out the info -- but as of Sep 2007, we have simply lost interest in this project as it is just too much trouble to maintain with info hidden behind the USFK firewall. However, be aware that massive changes are underway -- starting in Dec 2007 when Camp Zama was FINALLY designated as a Regional Center -- after years of denial by the DoD and USFK. The move of control of the UNC to the ROK will then move the UN elements under the I Corps in Japan at Camp Zama. The CFC is dying...dying...dying. The 8th Army is nothing but a figurehead organization, though it will remain around for a while longer.


The chart is constructed from multiple "open" news sources and documents. Because the US Army is changing to a new Unit of Action (UA) structure, there are on-going changes that are occurring at this time -- especially in the 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and 35th ADA units. The construction of Camp Humphreys will have to face many pitfalls in the future as major issues remain to be resolved and impacts on the operations of the units on this chart. The move from Yongsan still remains to be seen and the move off of the DMZ seems to be quietly progressing as units move to Camp Humphreys as on-base facilities/barracks are completed.

In 2002, the original concept was to close down the US presence in the Western Corrider, and build up a "super-Garrison" in the Uijeongbu-Dongduchon area under the Land Partnership Plan (LPP). This changed when the US decided to move off the DMZ down to Camp Humphreys in 2003 -- but not without a lot of turmoil from the ROK government and the LPP was amended in 2004. To add more troubles, the ROK refused to accept the USFK as a regional defense force. This threw other monkey wrenches into the works -- and is the reason why the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams are not assigned in the ROK. Then finally there is the transfer of wartime control to the ROK by 2012. There will be the dissolution of the CFC, probable move of the UNC to Camp Zama, Japan under I Corps, and the change of the USFK into a support role. Add to this that there is still the threat of the USAF elements moving out of Korea if the bombing range issues are not resolved. In addition, there is a shift of emphasis to the hub in Taegu for follow-ons as the USFK moves into a "support" role (vs. a "patron" role) while turning over ten critical missions to the ROK. Put all of these masses of inputs together and one sees why an up-to-date Organizational Chart is needed to sort out all the confusing mass of interrelated changes that are on-going.

Land Partnership Plan: On 29 March 2002, the USFK-ROK signed the Land Partnership Plan which the ROK treated as a "treaty" and was ratified by the National Assembly on October 30, 2002. Under the 2002 Land Partnership Plan (LPP), the U.S. military agreed to return more than half the land it uses as bases in South Korea. The area to be returned amounted to 41.14 million pyeong (135.8 million sq. meter), 55.3 percent of the 74.40 million pyeong currently occupied by the U.S. military. In exchange, the agreement called for 1.54 million pyeong of land to be newly granted to the U.S. forces. Under the plan, the USFK was to reduce troop installations from 41 to 23. The original LPP was predicated on the US forces remaining north of Seoul along the DMZ. Of its 41 major installations, the United States was to shut down 19, close parts of another four sites, create three new installations and expand some existing installations. In 2002, the United States has 95 military sites in South Korea. (Source: DynKorea.)

Originally the plan in 2002 was to retain Camp Bonifas, but return all of the other Western Corridor camps. The idea of a "super-Garrison" surfaced by combining Camp Stanley, Camp Jackson and Camp Red Cloud -- and having Camps Hovey, Castle and Casey being administratively classified as a single unit. All the other camps in the DMZ area were to be returned. The camps to be retained in Seoul and to the south were Yongsan Garrison, K-16 Airfield (Seoul AB), Camp Yongin, Suwon AB, Osan AB, Camp Humphreys, Kunsan AB, Kwangju AB and Chongju AB. R-510 in Ichon was to be used to replace Camp Page. In the south, Pohang was to be returned in exchange for a Camp Mujuk expansion which was to be upgraded for 3MEU deployments. Camp Carroll, Camp Walker, Camp Henry, Taegu AB were to be retained. Kimhae AB and Camp Chinhae were to be retained, while Camp Hialeah was to be returned. Noksan was to be merged and expanded. (Source: LPP)

Installations affected under Original LPP

Following is a list of U.S. military installations affected by the original Land Partnership Plan.
  • Closings The following major installations will close during the 10-year life of the Land Partnership Plan (followed by year each will close):
    • Camp Page, 2011
    • Camp Howze, 2006
    • Camp Garry Owen, 2008
    • Camp Kyle, 2007
    • Camp Long, 2011
    • Camp Eagle, 2011
    • Camp Giant, 2011
    • Camp Hialeah, 2011
    • Camp Greaves, 2011
    • Camp Nimble, 2011
    • Camp Edwards, 2007
    • Camp LaGuardia, 2006
    • Camp Essayons, 2010
    • Camp Market, 2008
    • Camp Colbern, 2008
    • Camp Sears, 2011
    • Camp Mobile (H-220), 2008
    • Camp Stanton, 2007
    • CNFK Det-Pohang, 2011
  • Partial closings (Listed with year of completion):
    • H-805 (Walker Army Heliport, Camp Walker, Taegu), 2007
    • Beta Site South at Osan Air Base, October 2002
    • Alpha Site, an ammunition storage area at Osan Air Base, 2008
  • New installations
    • New Camp Hialeah, at Noksan, west of Pusan
    • Camp Mu Juk, to undergo major upgrade and new construction.
    • CNFK Det-Pohang will move to Mu Juk
    • New Camp Page, on R-510, a South Korean Army airfield near Ichon, east of Seoul
  • New land grants (Site, estimated acres, required date):
    • Ichon (R-510), 160, 2007
    • Camp Stanley (prison rice paddies), 120, March 2003
    • Camp Stanley (remaining prison land), 125, 2009
    • CNFK DET Pohang, 0.6, 2002
    • Camp Mu Juk, 85, 2003
    • Incheon Mail Facility, 1.7, June 2003
    • DRMO Camp Carroll, 25, 2003
    • Camp Humphreys, 200, June 2005
    • Noksan, 140, 2008
    • Osan Air Base (Mustang Valley Village Plus), 8.8, Oct 2002
    • Osan Air Base (Delta Plus), 275, 2005
    • Osan Air Base (Northern Land), 128, 2011
  • Returned training areas, ranges (Site, location):
    • Rodriquez LTA #3, Sachong-Ri, Yongpyong
    • Rodriquez LTA #2, Yong-buk, Yongpyong
    • Rodriquez LTA #4, Taehoesan-ri, Yongpyong
    • Dagmar and S, Squads, Palmers, and Oklahoma, Paju-gun
    • River Crossing, Pap-yong myon
    • Kansas Range, Chang-dan Gun
    • Oklahoma Range, Chang-dan Gun
    • N. Carolina, Air Mobile — Edwards LTA, TA-504/520, Kyonggi-do
    • Camp Page LTA, Sachon-ri, Tongduchon
    • Tango, Chi-haeng-ri, Tongduchon
    • KCT-43, Yankee, Whiskey N., Hochon-myon, Tongduchon
    • Stanton LTA, Tuman-ri, Paju-si
  • Partial returns
    • Texas LTA & Range, Chang-dan-Gun
    • Mike, Tongduchon-si
    • Romeo, Kwangam-Dong
    (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

USFK Camps (1990s)


Outside political factors started to impact on the USFK. On 13 June 2002 at a village near Uijongbu, a US military convoy set out to undertake a training exercise at a range. As the convey passed along a narrow country road near Yangju City, Gyeonggi Province, one of the convoy’s armored vehicles, weighing approximately 57 tons, struck and killed two 14 year old Korean girls, Shim Mi-son and Shin Hyo-sun, as they walked along the side of the roadway on their way to a birthday party. Violent anti-American demonstrations swept the country. The ROK wanted jurisdiction, but the US invoked the SOFA and court-martialed the two individuals. Full apologies were issued by US civilian and military officials at various levels of authority immediately after the incident and repeated throughout the course of the legal proceedings. Even President Bush called President Kim Dae-jung to express his regret. When the soldiers were acquitted of involuntary manslaughter, more violent demonstrations ensued. (Source: Wikipedia: Yongsan Garrison.) In the end, Roh Moo-hyun riding on the coat-tails of anti-Americanism was elected to office of President. The violent anti-Americanism throughout Korea most likely significantly influenced the decision to immediately remove the USFK from the DMZ -- as well as Yongsan Garrison. Though mouthing words of the solidarity of the US-ROK alliance, there were shadows ahead that foretold of the difficulties the USFK would face in dealing with the Roh administration.

On 03 June 2003, General Leon J. LaPorte the head of US Forces Korea, announced in a forum at the Korean National Assembly that roughly 6,000 of the total 7,000 troops would be relocated. US and Republic of Korea officials agreed to a plan to realign American forces stationed in "The Land of the Morning Calm." In June 4-5 meetings held in the South Korean capital city of Seoul, according to a joint U.S.-South Korean statement, it was decided the operation would consist of two phases. During Phase 1 US forces at installations north of the Han River would consolidate in the Camp Casey (Tongduchon) and Camp Red Cloud (Uijongbu) areas. Both bases are north of Seoul and the Han, but well south of the demilitarized zone that separates North and South Korea. The 14,000-strong US Army 2nd Infantry Division, which provides troops to bases near the DMZ, is headquartered at Camp Red Cloud. During Phase 2 US forces north of the Han River would move to key hubs south of the Han River. US and Korean officials agreed to continue rotational US military training north of the Han even after Phase 2 is completed.

On 17 November 2003 the United States and South Korea agreed in principle to move most American forces south from the demilitarized zone along the border with North Korea. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was in the country's capital for the annual Security Consultative Meeting between defense officials from the two countries. Officials agreed to relocate American forces in the north of the country – primarily the Army's 2nd Infantry Division at Camp Casey – in two phases. First, they will be consolidated into a smaller footprint. Then they will be moved to the southern part of the country. Eventually, officials explained, US forces in Korea will be centered on two main "hubs" in the south. (Source: GlobalSecurity.org: Korea.)

In 2003 the numbers of closures changed under the LPP. The USFK was to close 28 of its 41 major installations and facilities, including three in Seoul. This was different from the 18 closures proposed in 2002 and reflected the Master Plan 2010 of the USFK -- announced in Jan 2003 -- for moving all the troops south of the Han River. This plan immediately created a furor in the ROK as it would remove the "tripwire" -- 2d ID presence on the DMZ -- that the ROK wanted to keep. In 2003, Osan Beta South area (outside the Beta Gate) was returned. By 2007, a road was being built that would connect the Seotan area directly through the Shinjang Mall area to Seojeong-ni.

Finally on 25 April 2003 the USFK announced its relocation plan that had been in the works. In the April "Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative" (FOTA) meeting, there was no decision on the "alternative site" that was put forth by the USFK. The "alternative site(s)" had become fixed -- at least for the USFK. Bottom line was that the USFK was moving -- with or without the Korean approval. Maj Gen James Soligan said the U.S. would relocate the U.S. camps in 25 districts of South Korea to two areas. The first area was the Osan and Pyeongtaek area in Gyeonggi Province; the second area was Daegu and Busan in Kyeongsang Province. He also said that the US would realign the US forces in Korea focusing on these two areas on a long-term basis. This resulted in cries of distress from the ROK and some tried to stave off the US action by requesting delays in the date of implementation. The ROK-US face-off over the USFK being used as a "trip-wire" ended with the unilateral announcement by the US Sec of Defense Rumsfeld at the Sep 2003 Security Consultative Meeting (SCM). All USFK forces would move to Camp Humphreys and Osan AB. In addition, the move out of Yongsan was set for 2008.

In 2004, the LPP plan was amended and approved by the National Assembly. The plan to move Camp Page to Ichon (R-510) was scrapped. (NOTE: In April 2007, the ROK government announced it would relocate seven of its military bases out of Seoul -- to make room for a housing project at Songpa, a southern Seoul suburb -- to Ichon about 80 kilometers south of Seoul. In accordance with the plan, the Defense Ministry said it intended to move four of the bases, including a special forces unit, to Ichon -- but not without protest from local residents. The relocation included some 6,700 troops of the Special Warfare Command. The SWC unit currently takes up more than 330,000 square meters of land.)

In Jan 2004, the Arirang Taxi Compound in Seoul, a taxi service annex for U.S. personnel and their family members, was the first area returned under the LPP after cleanup in 2003. The scrutiny of the ROK Environmental Management Corporation -- and the NGO group Green Korea -- on the cleanup of oil foretold the hassles the USFK would receive on future returns of land under the LPP.

In 2004, the USFK accelerated the base returns under the LPP. Camp Greaves and Giant were to close by 1 Nov 2004 -- instead of 2011 under the original LPP. Those camps closed and returned to South Korea in 2004: Camp Bonifas (Demilitarized Zone) and Camp Liberty Bell (Demilitarized Zone). Those six camps closed in 2004, but returning to South Korea in 2005: Camp Edwards (Paju); Camp Gary Owen (Paju); Camp Greaves (Paju); Camp Giant (Paju); Camp Howze (Paju); and Camp Stanton (Paju). In 2003, the demonstrations were mostly from student agitators from OUTSIDE the area who protested at the gates of Camp Humpherys, but in 2004, the farmers of the areas outside Camp Humphreys banded together to fight the expansion. Funds for construction shifted from Camp Stanley to Camp Humphreys and major projects were started inside the camp to build family housing and barracks.

The original LPP plan was based on grouping the USFK forces in three areas -- with one of them being around Camp Stanley and Camp Casey as a "super-Garrison." The LPP had to be amended -- and incorporate a reduction in US forces that was also resurfaced. The US military was restructuring into smaller, more mobile units. In Mar 2004, the US and ROK canceled land purchases for Ichon and Camp Stanley under the original LPP. The cancelled lands include 244 acres near Camp Stanley. Also scrapped was the purchase of 163 acres in Ichon, an area southeast of Seoul, that was to be used to replace Camp Page in Chunchon. Among the provisions of the amendment to the LPP, the land grants planned for Uijongbu and Ichon will be cancelled, and a larger grant of land at Camp Humphreys provided instead. (Source: Stars and Stripes, March 4, 2004.) Under the 2004 Amendment of the LPP, the US was to hand back 34 of its 41 bases. In Mar 2004, the U.S. and ROK negotiated an amendment to the LPP whereby the land grants planned for Uijongbu and Ichon was cancelled, and a larger grant of land at Camp Humphreys provided instead. On 1 June Yonhap News reported that the USFK had requested South Korea grant for 3.2-3.3 million pyeong of land in Pyeongtaek. Later the land was increased to 3.5 million and approved by the National Assembly.

The turnover of Outpost Ouellette to South Korea's military in late 2004 meant there would be no American soldiers manning the 248-kilometer Korean border except for in the truce village of Panmunjom, known as the joint security area (JSA). On 30 April 2004 the US suggested that ROK troops take over responsibility for guarding the Joint Security Area (JSA) of Panmunjeom from the United Nations Command (UNC). These were the first steps of pulling the last of the US forces -- except for those assigned to the UNC Security Battalion -- from the DMZ.

The 3000 man (later increased to 3,600 men) ROK unit to Iraq was scheduled to depart in April 2003 but was repeatedly slipped. Finally the US decided to withdraw the 2d Brigade of the 2d ID -- a total of 3,600 men -- in June 2004 to ship to Iraq -- though it denied that it had anything to do with the ROK's slipped promise. The next bombshell was in June 2004 at the FOTA, the US notified the ROK that it was pulling out a total of 12,000 troops and the relocation of Yongsan would be complete by Dec 2005. The 2d ID troops withdrawn in July 2004 were counted in the reduction.

In 2004, South Korea sought ways to cut down on expenses needed to move Yongsan in view of the U.S.-proposed reduction of the American soldiers stationed in Korea. The ROK agreed that the move off the DMZ was inevitable, but continued to try to make the "timeline" negotiable in order to stall the withdrawal. Initially the ROK and USFK agreed that the land in Osan-Pyeongtaek should be around 3.6 million pyeong. However, later the ROK proposed a scale-down of the land requirements necessary for relocating U.S. troops based in Seoul and DMZ in proportion to a planned U.S. troop reduction. The US is unwilling to negotiate on this point. The U.S. wanted 3.6 million pyeong while Korea wanted the size of land at 3.3million pyong. This was part of the strategy that the ROK was taking to reduce the costs of the move -- but was viewed as simply a stall to delay the relocation process as long as possible.

In 2005, the bases were consolidating under the LPP at a rapid rate and everything seemed well on track. However, the ROK insistence on pushing pollution resolution stymied the return to the ROK portions of the LPP.
  • Camp Bonifas -- Closure 2004 /Return 2004 (DMZ) : Turnover Command ROK Oct 2004/Reduction from 200 to 43 by 1 Nov
  • Camp Liberty Bell -- Closure 2004 /Return 2004 (DMZ) : Turnover Command ROK Oct 2004
  • Camp Edwards -- Closure 2004 /Return 2005 (Paju) : (Second Closure) Move to Stanley Nov 2004/Close Dec 2004
  • Camp Garry Owen -- Closure 2004 /Return 2005 (Paju) : Move Nov 2004/Close Dec 2004
  • Camp Giant -- Closure 2004 /Return 2005 (Paju) : Move Nov 2004/Close Dec 2004
  • Camp Greaves -- Closure 2004 /Return 2005 (Paju) : Move Nov 2004/Close Dec 2004
  • Camp Howze -- Closure 2004 /Return 2005 (Paju) Move Nov 2004/Close Dec 2004
  • Camp Stanton -- Closure 2004 /Return 2005 (Paju) : (First Closure) 16 Kiowa relocate US Dec 2004/Close Dec 2004
  • Camp Falling Water -- Closure 2004 /Return 2005 : Move Oct 2004/Close Dec 2004 (Uijongbu)

USFK Camps (2003)


The base realignment's next phase was to involve the return of six Western Corridor bases vacated by 2nd ID in 2005. The U.S. was scheduled to return the facilities to the South Korean government in December 2005 -- as is ahead of schedule on most. (See Seven Camps to close in 2005 for camp closures 2004-2006.) According to the Stars and Stripes on 29 Dec 2005, "Under the amended Land Partnership Plan between South Korea and the United States, Camp Humphreys will triple in size, growing from about 1,230 acres to 3,558 acres by 2008. An estimated $5 billion is to be spent on construction alone. Its population also will increase, from more than 11,000 to 45,000, U.S. military officials have said.

In May 2005, Army Brig. Gen. Steven M. Anderson, head of the newly established USFK (Advance Element), said that the U.S. military would soon begin staffing an office with engineering and other experts who will work on Camp Humphrey's expansion. However, the problems faced were the ROK reluctance to equitably share the costs, ROK failure to support positive action in procuring lands (that were supposed to started in 2004 and completed by Dec 2005). As a result the expansion failed repeatedly to complete the Master Plan. Then when the wartime control was agreed to return to the ROK in 2006, the Master Plan was again set back to the drawing board.

In 2005, President Roh continued to speak of his ambition to take over wartime operation within 10 years in his "self-reliant defense" vision -- which most consider unrealistic due to the $600 billion expense involved. Opinion was starting to surface that the US would give the ROK what it wanted -- dependent on the US falling back to Japan after the renegotiations of the USFJ Realignment. A unit of I Corps from Ft Lewis, WA arrived at Camp Zama, Japan to set up operations in 2005. I Corps return to Camp Zama would signal the shift of the Korean "contingencies" to the USFJ headquarters. According to the Army Transformation Roadmap of 2004, I Corps should transition to its UEx model by 2010. The main obstacle was Article 9 of the Peace Constitution. There was a rise in Japanese nationalism due to the confrontations with the North -- missiles over Japanese airspace, Taepodong missiles capable of striking Tokyo, and the nuclear threat -- and continued outrage over the 1970s abductions. The moves intensified to change the Japanese Peace Constitution. In the background, South Korea was taking over some USFK missions and ongoing American troop cuts by 12,500 to 25,000 by year 2008 were taking place. South Korean troops were working towards taking over 10 major operations that the USFK was previously in charge of, including Joint Security Area duty, close aviation support and counterfire artillery attacks.

Camp Gary Owens, Camp Stanton, Camp Edwards, Camp Howze were returned in 2005. (Camps Greaves and Giant were returned in 2004.) In 2005, Camp Page was starting to close and expected to be returned in 2006. Closing in 2005 and returning to South Korea in 2006: Camp Falling Water (Uijeongbu); Camp LaGuardia (Uijeongbu); Camp Sears (Uijeongbu) (vacated 2005); Camp Nimble (Dongducheon); Camp McNab (Chejudo); and UNC Compound Seoul. Camp Kyle and Camp Essayons vacated 2005. However, NGO activists pollution claims cause the ROK to stall the return. The gates closed on Camp Page and Camp Colbern in 2005.


Uijongbu (2003)


In Dec 2005, the ROK failed to meet its deadline for the procurement of lands of Camp Humphreys due to the growing organized protests in Daechuri. The government claimed it had procured 80 percent of the land, but the remainder would have to be condemned in the courts. After the lands were condemned, the villagers still refused to move. "Although we ordered locals to leave by the end of June (2006), we can't force them out," said Yoo Jong-sang, a government official in charge of the matter, said. "We will take legal action first by applying for an injunction." (Source: Chosun Ilbo.) The government waited for three or four months before taking action to forcibly move locals out of villages near the site. The lands would not be resolved until 2006 with the massive intervention of ROK Army troops and riot police. The area was cordoned off allowing only residents to enter via the roads -- finally giving up their fight in 2007 after public support waned.

In 2006, the disagreement over the return of the camps heated up over alleged pollution and stalled the ROK accepting back the camps. The US insisted that its responsibility ended with the clean up to KISE (Known, Imminent, Substantial Endangerment to Human Health) standards -- and the SOFA stated that the camps will be returned "as is." In other words, the USFK would clean up obvious hazardous waste contamination and SUBSTANTIAL endangerment hazards to human health -- not simply the existence of hazardous contaminants that exceed the safe limit by an arbitrary amount. In 2006, the USFK unilaterally pulled its contractor guards off the camps as it was paying $300,000 a month to guard these empty camps that the ROK refused to accept.

On 15 Jul 2006, Korea and the US agreed on the return to Korean control of 15 U.S. military bases around the country. The agreement broke a deadlock that has persisted since May 2005. In Jul 2006 South Korea accepted back U.S. camps Howze, Stanton, Giant, Greaves, LaGuardia, Nimble, McNab, Colburn, Bonifas near the inter-Korean border, Freedom Bridge, the U.S.-controlled United Nations Compound, CPX-AI firing range, Charlie Block, Koon-Ni Range (Maehyang-ni) and the U.S. military office at Seoul Station. Camp Page gates closed in 2005 and was vacated in 2006. Camp Hialeah vacated in Dec 2006.

Civic groups railed, however, at the U.S. refusal to fund an environmental clean-up at the base sites. The MND said the Pentagon informed them in June 2006 that the U.S. military had completed repair work involving fuel tank removal and sub-soil water at those 15 vacated sites. They are being returned to Korean control as of 15 July. Seoul will have to pay for any additional required work and turn the sites over to the local governments in the areas.

The USFK web site posted a long position statement in Jul 2006 about the bases where it flatly asserted that the Pentagon plans to return 59 base areas to South Korea by 2011 totaling 33,000 acres of land and valued at more than $1 billion to South Korea's government in the next two to four years. The USFK statement came after 18 months of disagreements about which nation should pay for pollution removal on the bases.

In Dec 2006, Sec of Defense Donald Rumsfield, the force behind the move out of Yongsan and off the DMZ in 2003, had been replaced. The ROK government announced that it looked like the transfer of the U.S. garrison at Yongsan to Pyeongtaek, originally scheduled to take place in 2007, would be delayed by five years to late 2013. The possibility of completing the transfer of Yongsan by 2008 as scheduled was low because Seoul City and the MND were still squabbling over the land use. The MND had planned to use monies from the sale of the land for commercial and apartment use to pay for the relocation costs. (NOTE: In the end, the Roh administration decided that the Yongsan Garrison will be turned into a park -- which left the question open as to where will the MND get the monies to fund the relocation. Also remember that the original MOU to relocate from Yongsan was signed in 1990 -- and the US has lost patience with Korea on this and many other matters.)

The ROK government again went into "negotiations" to delay the transfer from Yongsan and the competition of new base facilities in Pyeongtaek to 2013. In Feb 2007 Sec of Defense Robert Gates and ROK Minister of National Defense Kim Jang Soo issued a joint statement in Washington, D.C. (Source: Defenselink.) The joint statement excerpt read: "Following on the successful bilateral Security Policy Initiative (SPI) talks of February 7-8, 2007, Secretary Gates and Minister Kim reiterated commitments to work closely to accelerate the relocation of USFK units and facilities and the full implementation of both the Yongsan Relocation Plan and the Land Partnership Plan. Secretary Gates expressed appreciation for the Minister’s efforts in this regard and noted that the relocation, including the return of valuable lands to the Korea people, was an important step for both nations. In this regard, the two sides expressed their willingness to expeditiously complete the return of USFK facilities in accordance with the ROK-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)." This joint statement did not mention that they agreed to delay the move out of Yongsan to 2012 and shift the wartime control to 2012. This was later followed in Feb 2007 by the USFK announcement that it had agreed to shift the return of wartime control to the ROK in 2012. (Source: Yonhap News.) Along with this was the delay in the move out of Yongsan and off the DMZ until 2012 as well. However, Gen Bell, USFK Commander, vowed to fight the "delays" of the move to Pyeongtaek and promised that the USFK unit relocations would continue in a phased manner.

To reinforce the point, the USFK refused South Korea's demand for additional steps to decontaminate military bases that will be returned to Korea in 2007 under the LPP -- that had been causing delays in the move to Pyeongtaek. The Defense Ministry on 13 Apr 2007 said the two sides concluded their nine-month negotiations on plans to transfer 14 U.S. camps to the Korean military and local governments -- where the environmental cleanup was complete. The talks had been stalled over differences regarding the degree to which the U.S. military should clean up pollution in the soil. Of the 51 bases to be returned, 29 bases have undergone environmental surveys. Camp Page, Camp Edward and Camp Falling Water were to be returned in Apr 2007.

The agreement finds Seoul agreeing to shoulder as much as 40 billion won ($42 million) for the necessary environmental clean-up of the military installations. Out of 59 U.S. military bases that the U.S. agreed to return to South Korea by 2011 under the Land Partnership Plan, four bases, including a helicopter landing pad in Yongsan, have already been returned prior to the most recent 14 bases. A total of 18 camps, including four that already have been returned, are now back in Seoul's hands while negotiations for the return of the remaining 41 bases continues. As of Apr 2007, the tally is:
  • Camp Ames, Camp Dashboard, Camp Morse and Camp Salem -- (Closed: Dates unknown) These camps listed on GlobalSecurity.org under Korean Camps. However, these camps are NOT listed on US Army Camps Korea (USPACOM). Neither are these camps listed under LPP in 2002. It is assumed that these camps were inactivated under the Worldwide Base Closure programs or other troop reduction programs prior to 2002. We cannot find current information on the web about these camps as May 2007. (NOTE: Camp Ames: Operated at reduced level after 1992. (Source: FAS.))
  • Camp Bonifas/Camp Liberty Bell, Korea -- (Returned 2004 along with Camp Liberty Bell and Outpost Ouellette) Home of JSC. Small UNC Security Battalion presence
  • Camp Carroll, Korea -- Waegwan, Taegu
  • Camp Casey, Korea -- Uijongbu
  • Camp Castle, Korea -- Uijongbu
  • Camp Colbern, Korea -- near K-16 -- (Closed 2005)
  • Camp Eagle, Korea -- Wonju
  • Camp Edwards, Korea -- (Closed 2004)
  • Camp Essayons, Korea -- (Closed 2005)
  • Camp Falling Water, Korea -- (Closed 2005)
  • Camp Garry Owen/Camp Pelham, Korea -- (Closed 2004)
  • Camp George, Korea -- Taegu
  • Camp Giant, Korea -- (Closed 2004)
  • Camp Gray Annex, Korea -- Seoul area -- (Closed: Date unk)
  • Camp Greaves, Korea -- (Closed 2004)
  • Camp Henry, Korea -- Taegu
  • Camp Hialeah, Korea -- (Closed 2006) (NOTE: After the closure of Camp Hialeah, no more has been heard of the "replacement" of Camp Hialeah at Noksan, an industrial area to the west of Pusan noted in the 2002 LPP agreement. Instead, Camp Hialeah units moved to Camp Henry in Taegu.)
  • Camp Hovey, Korea -- Uijongbu
  • Camp Howze, Korea -- (Closed 2004)
  • Camp Humphreys, Korea -- Pyeongtaek -- In November 2003, it was announced that 240,000 p'yeong of farming land was to be expropriated from part of P'aengseong-eup [in P'yeongt'aek City. In 2004, the anti-war and unification NGO groups took the side of the farmers to assist their agendas and exploited the situation to inflame the community. The protests culminated in the violent confrontation in Jul 2004 where both demonstrators and policemen were hospitalized. In Mar 2004, the U.S. and ROK negotiated an amendment to the LPP whereby the land grants planned for Uijongbu and Ichon were cancelled, and a larger grant of land at Camp Humphreys provided instead. On 1 June Yonhap News reported that the USFK had requested South Korea grant for 3.2-3.3 million pyeong of land in Pyeongtaek. Later the land was increased to 3.5 million and approved by the National Assembly. The chief obstacle in the Future of the Alliance (FOTA) talks on 7-8 Jun 2004 was the size of the new, integrated U.S. military facility in Pyeongtaek and Osan. U.S. negotiators said they required 1,130 hectares (2,800 acres) to build a new base. South Korea offered 970 hectares plus an additional 30-hectare parcel, which would provide space for UN Command and Combined Forces Command headquarters. U.S. delegates reportedly requested that the Korean government provide 480,000 pyeong of land for the Osan/Pyeongtaek base site, in addition to the 3.12 million pyeong of land already provided, in exchange for returning an additional 11.18 million pyeong of land from U.S. 2nd ID bases along with the 41.14 million pyeong (135.8 million sq. meter) that the United States had already promised to return under the LPP. (See Relocation of USFK (2004) for details.) In Aug 2004, despite its agreement to procure land for the Pyongtaek relocation, the ROK was still offering "alternative" sites and stating that giving half of the land agreed on in 2004 was impossible. Donga Ilbo, "Government to Complete the Land Purchase Deal of the USFK Bases Relocation Site in Pyongtaek by Next Year" (7 Aug 2004) stated that the Ministry of National Defense announced that they planned to complete the purchase of the 3,490,000-pyong alternative site in the Pyongtaek area in the Gyeonggi province by the end of 2005.
  • Camp Jackson, Korea -- Dongduchon
  • Camp Kitty Hawk, Korea -- (Returned 2004 along with Camp Liberty Bell, Freedom Bridge and Outpost Ouellette) Home of JSC. Small UNC Security Battalion presence
  • Camp Kwangsari -- (Closed 2005 when WRSA-K terminated.)
  • Camp Kyle, Korea -- (Closed 2005)
  • Camp LaGuardia, Korea -- (Closed 2005)
  • Camp Libby, Korea -- Pohang (Closed: Date unk) -- Small presence to provide AFN in Pohang. CNFK DET Pohang relocates to Camp Mujuk. Listed on GlobalSecurity.org under Korean Camps. However, NOT listed on US Army Camps Korea (USPACOM).
  • Camp Long, Korea -- Wonju
  • Camp Market, Korea -- Pupyong, Seoul
  • Camp McNabb, Cheju-do, Korea -- (Closed 2005) Listed under LPP. However, NOT listed on US Army Camps Korea (USPACOM)
  • Camp Mobile, Korea -- Uijongbu
  • Camp Mujuk, Korea -- Pohang -- Marine Training Area, expansion complete; LPP land grant 2002; CNFK DET Pohang relocated to Camp Mujuk.
  • Camp Nimble, Korea -- (Closed 2005)
  • Camp Page, Korea -- (Closed 2005)
  • Camp Pelham/Camp Garry Owen, Korea -- (Closed 2004)
  • Camp Red Cloud, Korea -- Dongduchon
  • Camp Sears, Korea -- (Closed 2005)
  • Camp Stanley, Korea-- Dongduchon
  • Camp Stanton, Korea -- (Closed 2004)
  • Camp Walker, Korea -- Taegu -- Walker Army Heliport (H-805) closed under LPP in 2003, leaving only a small helicopter landing area on the existing site.
  • Camp Yongin, Korea -- (Closed 2004) Small presence with Combat Support Coordination Team #3 until CFC eliminated in 2012.
  • UNC Compound -- (Closed 2005)
Elements not directly under the LPP closures, but affected by LPP land grants for expansion and troop relocation impacts.
  • Fleet Activities Chinhae, Korea -- (NAVY) Naval contingency operations
  • Command Post Tango, Korea -- (ARMY) Camp Walker, Taegu
  • Command Post Oscar, Korea -- (ARMY) Camp Carroll, Taegu
  • K-16 Air Field (Seoul AB), Korea -- (ARMY) Songnam below Seoul
  • Kunsan AB, Korea -- (USAF) Previously land on the north end of the base returned to the ROK and incorporated into the Kunsan Airport. Expansion by 315 acres of land near the ammo dump has been done in 2007.
  • Kwangju AB, Korea (USAF)
  • Masan Ammo Depot, Korea -- (ARMY) near Pusan
  • Osan AB, Korea -- (ALL) Administers US operations at Osan and five collocated operating bases -- Taegu, Suwon, Kwang Ju, Kimhae and Cheong Ju – for reception and beddown of follow-on forces. Housing for future closure of Yongsan. Air Component Command with HTACC. The LPP granted Osan 411 new acres.
    • Beta Site -- South at Osan Air Base, Returned October 2002; Road from Seotan through area in work
    • Alpha Site -- Ammunition storage area at Osan Air Base; Scheduled for return under LPP in 2008
    • Mustang Valley Village Plus -- 8.8 acres, Granted Oct 2002 under LPP -- Construction in work for AF family housing
    • Osan Air Base (Northern Land) -- 128 acres, Granted under LPP in 2011; With dissolution of CFC, this land area may be cancelled.
  • Pusan Pier 8, Korea -- (ALL) Pusan Harbor The 837th Transportation Battalion (Terminal), manages the U.S. military’s seagoing cargo moving in and out of peninsula ports as well as the ship-delivered merchandise bound for the peninsula’s U.S. military commissaries and exchanges. Its personnel at Pier 8 in Busan harbor ensure the cargo clears customs and that contracted stevedores work pierside to load or unload it. Formerly headquartered at Pier 8, with soldiers living at Camp Hialeah in Busan, the battalion’s headquarters element moved to Camp Henry in Daegu in May 2006, after the Army closed Camp Hialeah. Although its headquarters now is at Camp Henry, other battalion employees continue to operate out of Pier 8, booking cargo shipments and otherwise handling the unit’s business, Calisto said. Of the battalion’s 48 personnel, 31 are South Korean nationals who typically have 18 to 20 years with the unit, Calisto said. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)
  • Busan Storage Facility -- (ARMY) Near Camp Carroll. The center consists of about 14 warehouses and 19 covered storage sheds that house supplies to shelter and feed troops based in South Korea. About 120 employees, most of them Korean, staff the center. Name officially changed from Pusan Storage Facility to Busan Storage Facility in May 2007. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)
  • Taegu Storage Area -- (ARMY) Camp Carroll
Elements impacted by the closure of the Yongsan Garrison in 2012. Relocation under a Memorandum of Understanding between the US and ROK.
  • Camp Coiner, Korea -- (ARMY) Part of Yongsan Annex. May become the US Embassy Compound after the USFK leaves Yongsan Garrison in 2012.
  • Camp Kim, Korea -- (ARMY) Part of Yongsan Annex
  • Corps of Engineers Far East District (FED) Compound, Korea -- (ARMY) Part of Yongsan Annex
  • Hannam Village, Korea -- (ARMY) Yongsan Housing area
  • Heliport (Yongsan), Korea -- (ARMY) New helipad constructed near Collier Field House on South Post in 2005 to replace a larger one near the 121st General Hospital. That landing pad closed because the US transferred 2.6 acres of the land back to South Korea to use as an entrance for their new national museum in 2005. (Source: Stars & Stripes.) (NOTE: In 1992, the Yongsan Garrison returned 77 acres to the ROK to build the new Korea National Museum and park.)
  • Yongsan Garrison, Korea (ARMY) -- Relocation 2012
On 1 Jun 2007 South Korea concluded its negotiations with the US on the return of nine U.S. military bases per a previous Security Policy Initiative (SPI) agreement. The process was concluded on 31 May as a joint committee under the SOFA approved and signed the agreement. The bases to be returned include Camp Page in Chuncheon, Camp Edwards and Camp Gary Owen in Paju, Camp Falling Water, Camp Sears, Camp Kyle and Camp Essayons in Uijeongbu, Camp Gray in Seoul and a bombing range in Maehyang-ri, Gyeonggi Province. The land totals 25.78 million square meters. They are the second batch of a total of 59 bases to be returned by 2011. Including these nine, the U.S. military has returned 23 bases this year.

According to a newly released Government Accountability Office GAO-07-1015 Defense Infrastructure report, p5, "A second area of concern is that PACOM's master plan, which provides details on the command's training limitations in Japan and several other challenges, does not provide details on the challenges the Air Force faces with training in South Korea. Senior USFK officials told us that these limitations could cause the United States to pursue alternatives, such as training in other locations, downsizing, or relocating that could affect overseas basing plans. In May 2007, USFK officials said that some progress had been made in addressing the Air Force's training challenges in South Korea and that they expected the needed upgrades to possibly be completed by mid-2007. We have previously recommended that overseas regional commands address residual value issues and that PACOM explain how it plans to address existing training limitations in our prior reports and, because these recommendations have not been fully addressed, we consider them to be open and also continue to believe they have merit." (SITE NOTE: The "residual value" refers to the Land Partnership Program (LPP) process in Korea. The GAO recommends that the USFK as a regional command seek "residual value compensation for U.S. capital improvements at installations returned to host nations." Currently the USFK is returning the bases "as is" according to the SOFA -- meaning that millions in buildings and infrastructure are returned to the ROK gratis.)

On p15 it repeats the statements on p5, "But while this year's plans provide information to respond to most of our prior recommendations, they do not address residual value—that is, the value of property being turned over to the host nation based on its reuse of property. Furthermore, PACOM's master plan does not describe the challenges the Air Force faces in training in South Korea, although it does describe for the first time the challenges addressing training limitations in Japan." ... "With respect to South Korea, PACOM provided information updating the status of the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation Plan,20 including a list of U.S. military camps and sites returned to the Government of South Korea, and describing the results from the October 2006 meeting between the Secretary of Defense and South Korea's Minister of Defense. "

(20) As discussed in our prior reports, within the provisions of the Land Partnership Plan and the Yongsan Relocation Plan, USFK intends to strengthen its overall military effectiveness by consolidating installations north of Seoul, including the Yongsan Army Garrison located in the Seoul metropolitan area, into two major hubs in the central and southern sections of South Korea. USFK expects the consolidation and relocation of thousands of soldiers to increase readiness, efficiencies, and cost savings; enhance quality of life; provide a lessintrusive presence; and increase training opportunities. (p21)
On p16 it continued, "This year, PACOM provided information on remediation actions taken by USFK before returning installations to South Korea, such as skimming fuel from groundwater at five camps. Last year, USFK also discussed its efforts to coordinate with the Government of South Korea on remediation of vacated U.S. bases; officials expect these efforts will accelerate the return of vacated facilities and areas to the Government of South Korea and the relocation of U.S. forces from Seoul and other locations. (SITE NOTE: It has not accelerated the return as progressives continue to protest the pollution on the bases.)

(21) On April 7, 2006, USFK announced a plan for the return of facilities and areas that have been vacated by the command to the Government of South Korea. This plan includes a number of measures designed to address issues identified in joint South Korea and U.S. environmental surveys of these vacated facilities and areas. For example, the plan calls for the United States to remove underground fuel storage tanks to preclude future leaks and initiate a technology process for skimming fuel from the groundwater at locations where this contamination was found." (p21)


Korean Bases/Camps (2003)

US Forces in Korea

US Forces Korea

In 2003, there were about 37,500 military personnel in the USFK area of responsibility, including about 225 aircraft of all types. However, by 2004, the entire scenario changed significantly and the USFK was to reduce its forces by 12,000. By 2007, the manning was down to 28,000 of the agreed to 25,000 personnel reduction. However, there will be further modifications to the numbers as the transfer of wartime control to the ROK will entail the elimination of the CFC and possibly the relocation of the UNC out of the ROK.


The number of troops deployed in the area does not fluctuate -- though there are increases in numbers during specific exercises such as Foal Eagle. Ground forces include a variety of units that are normally eployed in the region, which total about 10,000 troops. Forces in the region include Patriot missile batteries, Apache helicopter squadrons, a mechanized infantry brigade, an air assault brigade, various support, intelligence and other units.

The Air Force has two wings located in the USFK region with some 8,800 personnel, operating a total of about 100 aircraft of all types in 2003. However, there have been significant cuts in manning at both Osan and Kunsan AB due to the changing mission and agreed to troop reductions with manning at approximately 8,300. The specific number of aircraft is restricted so numbers operate on a "best-guess" basis. There are significant proficiency training problems as the ROK has failed to provide a dedicated bombing range for US pilots to maintain their proficiency after the loss of the Kooni Range. Though the USAF shares Chikdo range (70km off Kunsan) with the ROKAF, the range still has not been upgraded to a automated scoring system as of mid-2007. In 2006, then 7AF Commander threatened the removal of USAF units from Korea if the problem was not resolved.

US Naval Forces, Korea is particularly small, numbering around 270 sailors and between 50-240 marines. CNFK normally has no seagoing forces assigned, though its personnel are assigned to various joint, combined, and Navy billets throughout the ROK peninsula. These personnel are actively engaged in planning and execution of numerous operations and exercises throughout the Korean theater. Only one ship has been assigned to the region for over 30 years, that being the USS Pueblo captured on 23 January 1968 and currently docked as a floating "war souvenier" at Pyongyang. After the US agreed to return wartime control to the ROK, the ROK realized that it did not have the resources to launch any naval counterattack without 7th Fleet resources. As the US moves to a "support" role, there will be future US-ROK negotiations in this area.

US Non-military individuals in Korea can be divided into two categories, contractors and family members. There are roughly 4,000 contractors and and 11,500 family members in Korea at any given time. The problem of accounting for numbers of USFK personnel is that there are significant numbers of civilian contractor personnel and of military families at various facilities in the region further complicates accounting for total personnel numbers. In addition, there are "visiting" family members that causes the numbers to fluctuate as well. The USFK has made it mandatory for all family members to be accounted for -- whether command sponsored or not. As the move of units off the DMZ and out of Yongsan nears, there will be many changes in DoDs schools, housing and consolidation of taskings for contractors. In 2007, the USFK Commander was seeking support for a three-year controlled tour for Korea. (NOTE: Phase II Family Towers at Camp Humphreys opened in Sep 2006. Construction on new family apartments in Mustang Village, Osan AB underway in 2007.)

In 2005, the ‘Build to Lease’ concept was tested with a $26 million, 144-unit project for unaccompanied ncos and officers at K-16. It was the first of its kind for USFK and was to be constructed at virtually no cost to the U.S Army. It was to be completed in July 2007. This facility will be constructed, owned and operated by the private sector for the exclusive use of U.S. military personnel authorized to reside at K-16. The U.S. Army will lease the housing project on a pay-as-you-go basis for up to 15 years, renewable for up to another 15 years. The lease cost, approximately $3.5 million annually, will represent a 40 percent savings over off-post housing at the full Overseas Housing Allowance entitlements. New construction at Camp Humphreys will also be open to BLT construction once the Master Plan is complete.

(Go to GlobalSecurity.org at U.S. Forces Order of Battle: Table of Organization for a breakdown of the units by organizational designator. NOTE: As of May 2007, not updated.)

US Forces Japan

U.S. Forces, Japan, with its U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps elements, consists of approximately 47,000 military personnel, 52,000 dependents, 5,500 DOD civilian employees and 23,500 Japanese workers. Military Oplans for Korea rely heavily on immediate aid from the forces in Japan. In the event of a war, the assistance will be air support, naval support and immediate U.S. Marine intervention.

In May 2006, the USFJ Realignment Treaty was signed -- and the US moved swiftly to give the Roh administration what it wanted -- wartime control. Under this treaty, the Japanese agreed to foot 75 percent of the costs to relocate part of the 3rd MEU to Guam from Okinawa -- which were part of the forces that were supposed to arrive in the ROK within 24 hours (via fast ships) in the event of a DPRK attack. Basically, the treaty allowed the US breathing room to pull its forces back to Guam -- and build a force structure as a "supporter" of the Korean forces instead of its patron. Under this realignment, the Japanese also started to make moves to allow its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to assume a regional role. At the same time, the Japanese joined with the US in erecting a Missile Defense System (MDS) against North Korea's missiles through joint research and development. In 2006, the first of the X-band radars arrived in Japan, Aegis destroyers were equipped with SM3 missiles, and in 2007, the Japanese deployed the first PAC-3s within their major cities. Though the ROK was offered a chance to join into this MDS, it declined fearing it would upset its overtures to the North. In addition, the Japanese started making moves in 2007 to change Article 9 of the Peace Constitution that would allow the SDF to take on a regional defense role.

MILITARY FORCES IN KOREA:



  • U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN KOREA:

    • UNITED NATIONS COMMAND (UNC) -- The UNC, established on 24 July 1950, marked the first time in history that nations of the world united under the UN flag to repel aggression. The mission of UNC is to maintain the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, which resulted in the cessation of hostilities. (NOTE: Though the UNC controls the DMZ, the ROK passage to the Kaesong Industrial Area was simplified with the submittal of names by the ROK Ministry of Unification to the UNC in advance.) The Military Armistice Commission, which supervises implementation of the Armistice, is composed of officers from the UNC, north Korea and China. Under the agreement for transfer of wartime control to the ROK in 2012, the Commander of USFK has stated that he cannot perform the function. "The U.N. commander will have no command authority over any ROK forces, with the ROK military commanding the demilitarized zone and sea patrol in the Northern Limit Line (NLL)," he said,. "And the ROK military will have the command authority of all forces in potential contact with an enemy." He added the future U.N. commander will likely assume a supporting role in the relationship similar to the future supporting role between the two allies. (Source: Yonhap News.)

      A need to enhance the roles of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the Military Armistice Commission as the two main UNC bodies mandated to supervise the armistice actions between South and North Korea. Analysts said the basic guideline implicates that the alliance shape will face a bigger metamorphosis than previously expected along with changes in a wide range of military details. (Source: Korea Herald.)

      Recommendations from pundits are to transfer the UNC to Camp Zama, Japan, but as of 2007 there has been no official announcement. Bases in Japan are designated as UN supply bases so the mechanics are in-place -- leftovers from the Korean War.


    • ROK-US COMBINED FORCES COMMAND (CFC) -- CFC exercises operational control over Korean and American forces responsible for the defense of the Republic. Should our mutual policy of deterrence fail, Combined Forces Command would direct combat operations to defeat an enemy attack. The CFC is slated to be dissolved in 2012 when the ROK assumes wartime control of its forces. There are many problems associated with the transfer -- the most significant is the ROK lack of intelligence hardware (satellites) and intelligence gathering resources (UAV). The ROK is undergoing significant hardware upgrades in next-generation fighters and AWACS, but there are also questions over whether the ROK will have the finances to support its ambitious upgrade programs -- as it struggles to fund its ambitious social programs at the same time. As of 2007, the ROK still does have any Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and is still negotiating to buy "used" PAC-2 missiles. The strategic taskings are being transferred to the ROK -- with seven already completed -- but the remaining areas are questionable.


    • UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA (USFK) -- A U.S. Army four-star general serves as commander-in-chief of the United Nations Command, the ROK/US Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea. USFK includes all U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine, and Special Operations elements stationed in Korea. USFK headquarters is located on Yongsan Army Garrison, Seoul. (NOTE: The current reorganization of the USFK into a mobile, regional defense force along with the withdrawal of forces from the DMZ/Yongsan and elimination of the CFC, has caused pundits to recommend considering the removal of the 8th US Army (EUSA) as an "administrative" layer. If the EUSA is eliminated, there is speculation that the position in Korea may be reduced to a three-star position, with the four-star at the Pacific Command (PACOM) in Hawaii -- and the role of overseeing Korean "contingencies" falling to I Corps in Camp Zama, Japan. According to the Army Transformation Roadmap of 2004, I Corps should transition to its UEx model by 2010. To allay the ROK fears, the US promised that the USFK head position will remain a four-star slot, but it tactfully did not say for how long.)

      There have been arguably two separate, but related, transformations of the US military over the past decade that will continue for the foreseeable future. The first is the transformation from an industrial age force to an information age force. Vast leaps in information technology in the areas of intelligence and surveillance, command and control, as well as precision kinetic and non-kinetic weapons, are dramatically reshaping warfare. Before long, joint force commanders will be able to see the entire battlespace, identify key adversary centers of gravity, and rapidly communicate that information to friendly combat forces so they can use precision munitions to destroy/affect those centers. Put another way, a commander could defeat an adversary by disabling its ability to operate as opposed to bleeding it to death with mass attrition through sequential operations or produce the effects of mass without having to mass forces (air, ground, or naval). This approach would require the deployment of fewer forces (and thus enhance rapid mobility), reduce the length of the conflict, and limit collateral damage. In seeing the entire battlespace through advanced C4ISR capabilities, a commander would also be able to identify threats and communicate that information to forces in time to avoid them. In the context of air and space operations, the keys to threat avoidance and applying the right force to the right place at the right time are the closely related concepts of parallel warfare and Effects-Based Operations (EBO).

      The second ongoing transformation is that from a Cold War to a post-Cold War force. The military advantages America currently enjoys are in danger of eroding in the face of new, unique challenges in the post-Cold War security environment. The United States must prepare for new forms of terrorism, attacks on its space assets, information attacks on its networks, cruise and ballistic missile attacks on its forces and territory, and attacks by chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-explosive (CBRNE)-armed adversaries. It must also cope with the unique demands of peace operations, homeland security, urban operations, and low-intensity conflicts. To deal with this new security environment, where traditional concepts of deterrence may no longer apply, the US military must be able to conduct operations effectively across the entire spectrum of conflict against a broad range of potential adversaries. (Source: Air Force Transformation FAQ.)

      There have been significant disagreements between the ROK and the US over the shift to a regional role for the US forces. As of 2007, both parties have "agreed to disagree" with the ROK saying they "understand" the US position on its global positioning strategy, but will not concur with having any US forces on Korean soil being used in a regional defense role. In addition, developments of Mar 2006 with Japan agreeing to a restructuring of the USFJ has directly impacted on the USFK mission as some US forces supporting the USFK in time of war (i.e., 3MEU) were to be moved from Okinawa to Guam. (See USFK Website .)

      The Roh administration's rapproachment "Peace and Prosperity" policy -- in continuing Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine" policy -- has strained the US-ROK alliance to the point that it started to crumble around the edges. To the USFK, which is committed to the defense of Korea, the fact that the ROK will not name the DPRK as its "main enemy" creates friction. In the past, the ROK refused to approve Oplan 5026 (Theater Warfare) because it called for the invasion of the North ("taking the fight North") if the ROK were attacked.

      At the beginning of 2007, the USFK was sticking to its estimate that the transfer of wartime control could take place in 2009, but the ROK demanded the wartime control be slipped to 2012. In Feb 2007, Sec of Defense Gates agreed to the 2012 date, though demanding that the ROK pick up its cost-sharing responsibilities. The agreement for a 2012 date for the ROK to assume wartime control turned things upside down. The CFC was to move to Camp Humphreys/Osan AB and now the master plan has to accomodate the change. The CFC is to be dismantled and the UNC may move its functions to Camp Zama, Japan. In addition, the USFK commander has built his case before Congress that without control of the CFC, he cannot fulfill his tasking as the UNC commander. There is talk that the "Korean contingency" responsibility may shift to I Corps which is returning to Camp Zama as of 2006 from Washington state -- but nothing official. According to the Army Transformation Roadmap of 2004, I Corps should transition to its UEx model by 2010.

      In Jun 2007, a ROK JCS and USFK press release stated that, "Through a deliberate process incorporating multiple theater-level exercises and evaluations, the (ROK) JCS will achieve initial operational capability as the theater war fighting command by late 2009 and attain full operational capability by the end of 2011." The JCS will overhaul its organization to have sufficient capability to exercise independent wartime operational control by the target date. In the first major overhaul of the JCS in about two decades, the apparatus will enhance its operation department by the first half of 2009, becoming the Joint Forces Command. Eight combat institutions will be created in the organization. The allies will also establish a new joint military coordination system by 2009 to replace the current Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command. The Alliance Military Coordination Center (AMCC) will link the two separate commands of the Korean and U.S. troops, with its 10 subordinate institutions. The 10 institutions will cover joint operational planning, information sharing, crisis management, joint military exercises, combat tactics development, military cooperation abroad, logistics support and the C4I digital command system. Under the new alliance system, ground and naval forces operations will be led by the Korean military, while the United States will provide aerial-centric support to the Korean troops. The alliance's air forces will create a combined air and space operation center to enhance joint command for U.S.-led aerial operations in wartime. By 2009, the two countries will also repeal the allies' combined war scenario, codenamed OPLAN 5027 and draw up a new war plan designed for independent operations of the two militaries. (Source: Korea Herald.)

      There are many skeptics of the ROK's ambitious military upgrade plans from the standpoint that it simply does not have the money. Also the ROK has committed only 2.7 percent of its GDP annually for the past decade -- and by annually "reprioritizing" its upgrade programs, most programs were left unfunded. The net effect was very little was done in the way of meaningful upgrades. The second problem is that the ROK has always "gone cheap." For example, on its UAV program instead of going first class, it bought a cheap UAV that has neither the altitude nor the reliability required to provide it with any usable intelligence. Its Arirang multipurpose "spy" satellite produces pictures that are not capable of being used for intelligence -- and a French company has a contract to improve its imagery. Its C4I abilities are missing the "I" for intelligence -- and it still must rely on the US for intel. The other elements of the C4I formula are still in work because the ROK insists on developing its own indigenous C4I system.

      The procurement of its AWACS was a fiasco where the ROK kept going out for bids, but only Boeing met the specs. In the end, the ROK agreed to a contract with Boeing, but it appeared they wanted to renegotiate the price again. The list goes on and on. Because it delayed procuring next-generation helicopters, it has been forced into a bind whereby the Eurocopter makers are going to design a ROK copter from scratch. The ROK idea of using one chassis and motor for different mission aircraft proved to be a little too difficult -- and now the designers are at work, but the fleet is reaching its end of usable life expectancy. After five years, the ROK still has not procured a TMD (Theater Missile Defense) screen such as the PAC-3 missiles -- or even the used PAC-2 missiles from Germany which it has been haggling over the price with. Instead, it remains under the USFK Patriot PAC-3 umbrella -- but the USFK Commander Gen Bell has reminded them again in 2007 that they must move on getting their own TMD.

      A stagnating domestic economy since 2003 -- supported only by export growth -- will need massive expenditures for its promised social programs in the near future. In addition, the ROK plans to reduce its military manning by 2018 as falling birthrates will impact on eligible enlistees. The situation occurs as the US reduces its forces -- the ROK is reducing its forces as well. This is happening at a time when there is a DPRK nuclear crisis -- and a DPRK military that is supported by a "military-first" policy. Unmonitored ROK aid of food and supplies is alleged to go to the DPRK military first, then the power elite and finally to the people for which the aid is intended -- at a time when the UN's World Food Program (WFP) pulled out of the North because the DPRK refused to allow it to monitor its food distribution.

      In addition, there is an on-going disagreement over the "cost-sharing" formulas -- though the drawn-out discussion on relocation costs seems to have been resolved as of May 2007. As to cost sharing, the US wants the ROK to foot 50 percent of the burden, but the ROK instead wants reductions in the cost formulas because the US is removing 12,000 troops. This confrontation led in 2005 to the dismissal of ROK temporary workers as the USFK ran out of money -- after the ROK refused to increase its share. Because the cost-sharing has not been resolved, the USFK commander has hinted that under the circumstances, the move to Pyeongtaek from Yongsan and the DMZ may have to be "reevaluated."

      The friction has extended to negotiations on costs for relocations off the DMZ and out of Yongsan. Though the ROK has agreed to pay approximately 50 percent of the costs as of May 2007, there are still many unresolved issues. Due to delays for the move to Pyeongtaek -- which the ROK blames on activists -- many of the actions to open up the land remain up in the air. Some of these issues are the $500 million flood control improvements that are needed in Pyeongtaek, but the ROK claiming it does not have the landfill for the project.

      The refusal of the ROK to accept camps back under the LPP program over pollution concerns continues to be a thorn. The return of camps under the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) turned into a nightmare when the ROK refused to accept the camps because of pollution allegations -- while the US position is that the SOFA states the camps will be returned "as is" -- after cleaning up to KISE (Known, Imminent, Substantial Endangerment to Human Health) standards. In frustration in 2007, the USFK simply withdrew its civilian guards of vacated camps and left the camps in ROK hands -- whether they accepted them back or not.

      The USFK is involved in many disputes with the ROK over cost-sharing and even the ability of the USAF elements to use Chikdo Range -- located 70km off Kunsan. Persistent issues of anti-Americanism and political friction from the ROK "sunshine policy" support of North Korea (rapproachement) -- despite the fact that the USFK presence is predicated on the DPRK being the enemy.

      In 2007, the USFK commander requested Congressional consideration for turning the ROK into a controlled three-year tour, but there are severe limitations for a base such as Kunsan. Only 10 percent of the married are provided with housing here in South Korea against 74 percent in Europe and 72 percent in Japan. This is why South Korea is the country U.S. service people, especially command-level officers, most hate to serve in. However, the biggest problem with Korea is the one-year 'remote" tours impacts on continuity and constant training is required due to manning losses.



  • U.S. AIR FORCE USAF wings are structured to fulfill a mission from a specific base, and contain a headquarters and four groups: an operations group, a maintenance group, a medical group and a mission support group. Such a wing is referred to as a Combat Wing Organization, which is comparable to a brigade in the US Army. The Air Force Transformation Flightplan of 2004 called for the transformation from an industrial age force to an information age force. Vast leaps in information technology in the areas of intelligence and surveillance, command and control, as well as precision kinetic and non-kinetic weapons, are dramatically reshaping warfare. Before long, joint force commanders will be able to see the entire battlespace, identify key adversary centers of gravity, and rapidly communicate that information to friendly combat forces so they can use precision munitions to destroy/affect those centers. Put another way, a commander could defeat an adversary by disabling its ability to operate as opposed to bleeding it to death with mass attrition through sequential operations or produce the effects of mass without having to mass forces (air, ground, or naval). The HTACC at Osan AB plays a role in this. In seeing the entire battlespace through advanced C4ISR capabilities, a commander would also be able to identify threats and communicate that information to forces in time to avoid them. In the context of air and space operations, the keys to threat avoidance and applying the right force to the right place at the right time are the closely related concepts of parallel warfare and Effects-Based Operations (EBO).
    • 7th Air Force, Air Forces Korea (Osan Airbase) -- The Seventh Air Force role is to plan, direct, and conduct combined air operations in the Republic of Korea and in the Northwest Pacific in support of PACAF, US Pacific Command, United Nations Command, US-ROK Combined Forces Command, and US Forces Korea. Although primarily a combat ready command, 7 AF also provides assistance to non-combatants and civilians with the region. Rescue at sea, typhoon evacuations, and medical assistance to the needy are but a few of the instances in which the men and women of the Seventh Air Force have extended an open hand. In 2007, the 7th Air Force maintains readiness of more than 100 operational units and 8,815 personnel -- to drop to around 8,500. 7th AF, headquartered at Osan Air Base, includes the 51st Fighter Wing, 607th Air Support Operations, Air Intelligence and Air Operations groups, and the 8th Fighter Wing at Kunsan AB. (See 7AF.)


      In 2003 it appeared that the USFK would be moved to Osan-Pyeongtaek area in the long term, with the headquarters of the CFC and UNC moved to the area from Yongsan. However, the decision to turn the wartime control over to the ROK made in 2006 stopped this move in its tracks as the CFC will be dissolved and UNC possibly relocated to Japan. However, construction of family towers at both Osan AB and Camp Humphreys continues. In addition, other buildings are following the "BTL" (build to lease) concept as was done at K-16 (Seoul AB). In 2007, modifications are being made to the Master Plan for relocating soldiers from the DMZ and Yongsan to accomodate these changes.

      The wartime control issue has also thrown a monkey wrench into how the USAF will do business in Korea. The transfer of wartime control to the ROK in 2012 will result in the dissolution of the Combined Air Component Command (CACC) and remove the 7AF commander as its head. As part of the U.S. Air Force's plan to establish Warfighting Headquarters (WFHQs), 7 AF will evolve into a Warfighting Headquarters for United States Forces Korea, but in what form it will be as it is in a "support" role after the wartime control transfer is yet to be seen.

      What form the interface with the ROK will take is still unknown. The ROK has sought to develop indigenous systems for its intelligence gathering and defense systems. Unfortunately, it has been proven that the ROK simply does not have the capability at this time to "go it alone" in many areas. However, without accepting to "piggy-back" onto the US intelligence and C4I systems there will be major stumbling blocks in the future as the USFK moves to a "supporting" role -- versus the "patron" role it held in the past.

      In Jun 2007, it was reported that the USFK and ROK JCS had reached an agreement on the future shape of the alliance. The alliance's air forces will create a combined air and space operation center to enhance joint command for U.S.-led aerial operations in wartime. By 2009, the two countries will also repeal the allies' combined war scenario, codenamed OPLAN 5027 and draw up a new war plan designed for independent operations of the two militaries. (Source: Korea Herald.) Under this agreement, it appears that the HTACC will remain in place as the USFK's air force control center in support of the ROK forces who will be controlling the land and naval elements. It appears that when the OPLAN 5027 is eliminated, the concept of contingency forces for Korea will also be revamped for Korea.


      Combined Air Component Command (CACC)


      How the ROK and allied components will act in case of war is still under review. It appears that the US will commit the 7th fleet naval aerial forces with other air units from Japan in case of war -- as the USFK moves to a support role of the ROK -- instead of a direct combat role. The US military air actions will be controlled from the US HTACC at Osan, but how this will interface with the ROK which wants to develop its own indigenous system is still unknown. The bottomline is that the US will move into a "support" role starting in 2012 -- but no one really knows the impacts or what Oplans will be developed. These coordinated air warfare functions will most likely continue to fall under the HTACC at Osan AB even after the CACC disappears. The ROKAF AOC (Air Operations Command) is located on Osan AB along with the 37th Tactical Intelligence Group (TIG) and have had a close working relationship with the 7th AF components over the years. (See Osan AB ROKAF for details on the ROKAF at Osan AB.) In May 2007, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration said the office delivered control of the C4I system, which connects the Air Operations Command (AOC) and all air force units, to the Air Force. (Source: Korea Herald.) This would handle the "control" element of the C4I, but the ROK has serious deficiencies dealing with the "intelligence" aspects of the C4I formula, as well as "communications" between the services.

      The Hardened Theater Air Control Center at Osan AB is the largest Combined Air Operations Center in the world. The "Hardened" in the HTACC's designation derives from the 10-foot-thick walls, hence the nickname "Cheyenne Mountain of South Korea." The Hardened Theater Air Control Center's Defense Red Switch Network provided superior multi-level, self-authenticating, flexible, secure communications, which enhanced leadership's command and control effectiveness. Osan needs data supplied by its tenant reconnaissance/intelligence units. (See HTACC: War Room (Apr 2007) for stories about the HTACC.)

      There are significant pilot proficiency training problems in Korea as the ROK has failed to provide a dedicated bombing range for US pilots to maintain their proficiency after the loss of the Kooni Range. USAF pilots claim the lack of Weapons Impact Scoring System (WISS) at Chikdo has led to the inability to get documented bombing proficiency scores that affect their promotion eligibility. Pilots are having to be sent to exercises outside of Korea to obtain the required proficiency training. Instead of the ROK taking over the island and placing it under a government ministry (i.e., Forestry Ministry), the Roh administration has left the Chikdo range under the control of the Kunsan City government. In 2006, the 7AF Commander threatened the removal of USAF units from Korea if the problem was not resolved. As of May 2007, Chikdo range (70km off Kunsan) still has not been upgraded with WISS system. The scheduling of range time has always been a problem in Korea, but has intensified after the loss of the Kooni Range near Maehyang-ri, Hwasong due to the relentless onslaught of environmental NGO activists -- and constant barrage of erroneous information in the media. The USAF currently must share both the Pilsung and Chikdo ranges with the ROKAF and proposed sharing formulas leave much to be desired. (EPILOGUE: The WISS System installed in Chikdo in Sep 2007, but Kunsan government has made stipulations that could shut the range down. The ratio is seven to three for ROKAF: USAF use.)

      • 5th Reconnaisance Squadron -- U-2 -- , The 5th Reconnaissance Squadron, nicknamed the Blackcats, flies the gliderlike U-2s on daily missions that can last 11 or 12 hours. There's no rest for a unit that delivers information capable of deciding a battle's outcome. After two decades of being the warfighter's eyes and ears in Korea, the 5th has flown more than 7,000 operational sorties. Using data-link capabilities in near real-time, the 5th RS provides fresh images to the 694th Intelligence Group for dissemination to policy-makers and combat troops.
      • 607th Air Operations Group
      • 607th Air Support Group
      • 607th Air Support Operations Group (ASOG) -- The 607 ASOG is primarily responsible for supporting the Korean Theater Air Control System (KTACS) by maintaining ground radar sites, with air and tactical air support provided by a tactical air control center, air support operations center, forward air controllers, tactical air control parties, as well as providing weather support, all tied together with communications personnel and equipment. Additionally, the 607 ASOG is responsible for reception, staging, operations, and integration of all joint command and control augmenting forces in the Korean theater. The 607th ASOG has units throughout Korea, at Osan Air Base, Yongsan Army Garrison, Camps Humphreys, Red Cloud, Stanley, Casey, Walker, Page and Stanton Army Installations, including the Third Republic of Korea Air Liason Office (TROKA-ALO) .
      • 694th Intelligence Group (formerly the 607th Air Intelligence Group) under the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency designated in Apr 2008. 607th Air Intelligence Group
      • 607th Air Intelligence Squadron -- (NOTE: The 607th Air Intelligence Group was deactivated and reactivated as the 694th Intelligence Group under the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency in Apr 2008.) The squadron is comprised of six flights of approximately 180 officer and enlisted personnel. 607 AIS works with its ROKAF counterpart, the 37th Tactical Intelligence Group of Osan AB. The 607 AIS provides the Combined Forces Air Component Command (CFACC)/Commander, Seventh Air Force (7AF) with the Intelligence support necessary to plan, conduct, control and coordinate air operations in accordance with the tasks assigned by the commander, Air Component Command (CACC) and the commander, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). Specific functions include indications and warning, analysis, targeting, collection management support, exploitation, and dissemination of all-source Intelligence information in support of combat planning, combat operations, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) management, and combat readiness of 7AF and subordinate units to include theater gained assets. The 607 AIS is primarily an Aerospace Operations Center (AOC) and Distributed Ground Station (DGS) tasked unit. (NOTE: The new ROK AOC is located on Osan AB as well and the intel is shared with the 37th TIG (ROKAF) of Osan AB.)
      • 607th Air Space and Satellite Communications Squadron
      • 607th Accounting and Finance Squadron
      • 554th Red Horse Squadron (CRHS)
      • 51st Fighter Wing (Osan AB)
      • 8th Fighter Wing (Kunsan AB)
      • Kwangju AB (Kwangju) -- The 51st Fighter Wing, headquartered at Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea, maintains and administers US operations at Osan and five collocated operating bases -- Taegu, Suwon, Kwang Ju, Kimhae and Cheong Ju – for reception and beddown of follow-on forces. The Wing's 51st Logistics Support Squadron plans, programs and initiates actions for the rapid reception and beddown of US forces deploying to the Republic of Korea during contingencies or wartime by maintaining five collocated operating bases and seven munitions storage sites. The 90th FS from Elmendorf used Kwangju AB for over 90 days during rising tensions with the North in 2005. However, with the US moving to a support role when the ROK takes over wartime control in 2012, the PAC-3 Patriots were moved to Camp Carroll and the base has reverted to a exercise combat turn location. Assets at Kimhae were relocated to Camp Carroll when Camp Hialeah in Pusan was closed in 2006. Contingency bases are Taegu, Suwon and Osan -- with the follow-on reception at Camp Humphreys. NEO evacuations will operate through Camp Humphreys as well.

        The United States Air Force has a continuing requirement to maintain adequate supplies of ammunition and explosives within the ROK to support wartime and contingency operational plans. Since capabilities are limited on USAF-controlled installations, the US obtained additional storage capabilities through a concept known as MAGNUM (Munitions Storage Activities Gained by Negotiations of USAF/ROKAF Memorandum). MAGNUMs are a concept unique to Korea, where USAF-titled munitions are stored at facilities which are owned, operated, and protected by the ROKAF. Accordingly, the USAF has very little control over the storage of munitions within these areas and no authority to enforce the maintenance of Q-D clear zones. As a result of encroachment by the Korean civilians into the explosive clear zones, there are large numbers of exposures around the MAGNUMs. There is a permanent exemption from US DOD Q-D standards for off-installation and ROK exposures created by storage of USAF munitions at MAGNUM locations. This exemption applies for all off-installation and ROK violations created by the originally sited net explosives weight (NEW) of storage structures located at the Osan, Kunsan, Suwon, Kwang Ju, Sachon, Taegu, and Cheong Ju MAGNUMs.
      • USAF Tenant organizations such as 607th Weather Squadron with detachments throughout Korea


    • 51st Fighter Wing (Osan AB) (OS, "Charging Mustangs") South Korea and the United States agreed 17 January 2004 in a meeting held in Hawaii, US, to relocate all the US troops currently stationed in Seoul. The two allies reached the agreement at the end of a two-day meeting named "Future of the ROK (Republic of Korea)-US Alliance Policy Initiative" talks. All the 8,000 US troops, including the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) and the United Nations Command (UNC), will move out of Seoul to Pyeongtaek before 2006. Only the USFK general command office along with 50 relevant personnel will remain in Seoul. South Korea will shoulder all the expenses of 3 billion US dollars of the relocation. (See 51st FW Osan Airbase Homepage) The 51st FW plays an integral role in the ability of the USFK to receive and integrate follow-on forces on the peninsula by maintaining support elements at ROK air bases, including Kwangju AB. (See kalaniosullivan.com: Osan AB for history of Osan AB and Songtan City from its beginnings to present.)

      Osan AB is also home of the ROKAF Air Operations Command (AOC) and the ROKAF Air Defense Command (ADA). (NOTE: The ROKAF took over the ADA commitment in 1991, but the ROK Army in 2006 stated that it would create an ADA command built around its ATACMS/MLRS systems.)

      Under the original 2002 LPP program, Osan Air Base returned Beta Site South, a long-standing point of contention between the U.S. military and the city of Pyongtaek, and Alpha Site, an ammunition storage point several miles from the base was returned to Korea. In exchange, the ROK granted Osan 411 new acres. One parcel, called Mustang Valley Village Plus (8.8 acres) deeded in 2002, is the current site of new Air Force family housing construction. The LPP new land grant included the Osan Air Base (Delta Plus), 275 acres in 2005. It also included the Osan Air Base (Northern Land), 128 acres to be granted in 2011 for expansion due to the CFC/UNC relocation. The latter may be renegotiated with the current changes to wartime control.

      Currently residents of Seotan-myon in Pyeongtaek are protesting an Air Force decision to buy a 462,000-sq.m site (114.1 acres) in the area supposedly for "a base to be built by 2010." That site is near a 2.11 million-sq.m (518.9 acres) plot earmarked for the U.S. military. A Defense Ministry official said, "The 462,000-sq.m site will be developed to secure a safety zone for an Air Force ammunition depot. It has nothing to do with the expansion of the U.S. military base." (Source: Chosun Ilbo.) (NOTE: The "safety zone" problem for stored munitions has been a problem for over thirty years and identified in numerous USAF inspection reports over the years -- along with safety problems for the transportation of the ammo to the flightline.)

      • 51st Wing Staff Agencies: Inspector General (IG); Comptroller (CPTS); Safety (SE); Chapel (HC); Judge Advocate General; (JAG); Protocol (CCP); Command Post (OC); Public Affairs (PA); Military Equal Opportunity (MEO); Historian (HO)
      • 51st Operations Group
        • 25th Fighter Squadron (green, "Assam Dragons") -- 20 - A-10/OA-10


          A-10 Thunderbolt II A-10s were initially an unwelcome addition to the arsenal in the eyes of Air Force brass. The Air Force prized the high-flying, high-performance F-15 Eagle and F-16 Fighting Falcon jets, and were determined to leave the dirty work of close air support to Army helicopters. Attempts to transfer the A-10 to the Army and the Marines were at first prevented by the 1948 Key West Agreement, and then by the A-10's impressive combat record during the Gulf War in 1991. Shortly after the war, the Air Force gave up on the idea of replacing the A-10 with a ground attack version of the F-16. The A-10 has superior maneuverability at low speeds and altitude, thanks to straight, wide wings with downturned "droop" wing tips. These also allow short takeoffs and landings, permitting operations from rugged, forward airfields near front lines. The plane can loiter for extended periods of time and operate under 1,000 feet (300 m) ceilings with 1.5-mile (2.4 km) visibility. It typically flies at a relatively slow speed of 180 knots (200 mph or 320 km/h), which makes it a much better candidate for the ground-attack role than fast fighter-bombers, which often have difficulty targeting small and slow-moving targets.

          The 'Warthog' is exceptionally hardy, to the point that some have likened it to an airborne tank. Its strong airframe can survive direct hits from armor-piercing and high-explosive projectiles up to 23 mm. The aircraft has triple redundancy in its flight systems, with mechanical systems to back up double-redundant hydraulic systems. This permits pilots to fly and land when hydraulic power or part of a wing is lost. Flight without hydraulic power uses the manual reversion flight control system; this engages automatically for pitch and yaw control, and under pilot control (manual reversion switch) for roll control. In manual reversion mode, the A-10 is sufficiently controllable under favorable conditions to return to base and land, though control forces are much higher than normal. The aircraft is designed to fly with one engine, one tail, one elevator and half a wing torn off. Self-sealing fuel tanks are protected by fire-retardant foam. Additionally, the main landing gear is designed so that the wheels semi-protrude from their nacelles when the gear is retracted so as to make gear-up landings (belly landing) easier to control and less damaging to the aircraft's underside.

          A-10 Thunderbolt II


        • 36th Fighter Squadron (red/black, "Flying Fiends") -- 24 - F-16C/D Block 40


          F-16 C/D Fighting Falcon -- The F-16 Fighting Falcon is a compact, multirole fighter aircraft. It is highly maneuverable and has proven itself in air-to-air combat and air-to-surface attack. It provides a relatively low-cost, high-performance weapon system for the United States and allied nations.

          In an air combat role, the F-16's maneuverability and combat radius (distance it can fly to enter air combat, stay, fight and return) exceed that of all potential threat fighter aircraft. It can locate targets in all weather conditions and detect low flying aircraft in radar ground clutter. In an air-to-surface role, the F-16 can fly more than 500 miles (860 kilometers), deliver its weapons with superior accuracy, defend itself against enemy aircraft, and return to its starting point. An all-weather capability allows it to accurately deliver ordnance during non-visual bombing conditions.

          The original F-16 was designed as a lightweight air-to-air day fighter. Air-to-ground responsibilities transformed the first production F-16s into multirole fighters. The empty weight of the Block 10 F-16A is 15,600 pounds. The empty weight of the Block 50 is 19,200 pounds. The A in F-16A refers to a Block 1 through 20 single-seat aircraft. The B in F-16B refers to the two-seat version. The letters C and D were substituted for A and B, respectively, beginning with Block 25. Block is an important term in tracing the F-16's evolution. Basically, a block is a numerical milestone.The block number increases whenever a new production configuration for the F-16 is established. Not all F-16s within a given block are the same. They fall into a number of block subsets called miniblocks. These sub-block sets are denoted by capital letters following the block number (Block 15S, for example). From Block 30/32 on, a major block designation ending in 0 signifies a General Electric engine; one ending in 2 signifies a Pratt & Whitney engine. (Source: Global Security.org: F-16


          F-16 Fighting Falcon


        • 55th Airlift Squadron (ALS) ("Double Nickel") (JUN 2007: C-12J AIRCRAFT TRANSFER TO 459TH AS, YOKOTA AB) - C-12Js -- VIP transportation in-country. Formerly 55th Airlift Flight (ALF). In November 2000 Osan AFB’s 55th Airlift Flight completed its first-ever deployment where the C-12J unit supported a joint U.S./U.N. humanitarian aid mission to strife-torn East Timor. Operating for 125 days from Royal Australian Air Force Base, Darwin, Australia, four members of the flight and two Raytheon maintenance contractors formed the 55th Expeditionary Airlift Flight. The 55th EALF ferried passengers and supplies for US Support Group East Timor (USGET) on the nearly daily four-hour round-trip flights between Darwin and the austere Komoro airfield at Dili, East Timor.

          In Jun 2007, it was reported that three C-12 pilots from the 55th Airlift Squadron from Osan will merge with the 459th Airlift Squadron of Yokota AB. He also noted the seamless transition of the new planes and pilots has kept the unit mission capable during the swap. “We received planes today (29 Jun) and already have a mission for them tonight,” he said. “We are mission-ready on day one.” Three C-12s, two from Osan and one from Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, will replace the four C-21s of the 459th AS. Two already have been delivered to Yokota, while the third is being retrofitted and is scheduled to arrive in October. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

          C-12J Huron The C-12J aircraft is the military version of the Raytheon Beech 1900C. Developed from the Super King Air business twin turboprop, the 19-seat Beech 1900C Airliner was first flown in September 1982 and entered service in early 1984. With its Pratt and Whitney PT6A-65B engines, it has a cruise speed of 268 knots with a certified ceiling of 25,000 feet and a range of 1,555 miles. Since its introduction in 1984, Raytheon Aircraft's Beech 1900C Airliner has been known as "the workhorse of the sky." The Beech 1900C consistently earns high marks for its large-airliner styling and passenger comfort. A later version of the Beech 99, the model 1900 is recognized as the favoured tier-3 aircraft. It is passenger friendly, highly reliable, and much appreciated by both maintenance and aircrews alike. A total of 250 1900Cs were delivered between 1984 and 1991 to regional airlines, special mission operators and corporations. Production then switched entirely to the current version, dubbed the 1900D, which has a taller cabin. Some commentators suggest that the Beech 1900C had some defects, and that to rectify these shortcomings while improving on the technical aspects, Raytheon went on to manufacture Beech 1900D, the most popular 19-seater aircraft in the world.


          C-12 Huron


        • Operations Support Squadron (OSS)
      • 51st Maintenance Group
        • Maintenance Operations Squadron (MOS)
        • Maintenance Squadron (MXS)
        • Aircraft Maintenance Squadron (AMXS)
        • Munitions Squadron (MUNS)
      • 51st Mission Support Group
        • Civil Engineer Squadron (CES)
        • Mission Support Squadron (MSS)
        • Logistics Readiness Squadron (LRS) -- The 51st Fighter Wing, headquartered at Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea, maintains and administers US operations at Osan and five collocated operating bases -- Taegu, Suwon, Kwang Ju, Kimhae and Cheong Ju – for reception and beddown of follow-on forces. The Wing's 51st Logistics Support Squadron plans, programs and initiates actions for the rapid reception and beddown of US forces deploying to the Republic of Korea during contingencies or wartime by maintaining five collocated operating bases and seven munitions storage sites.
        • Security Forces Squadron (SFS)
        • Services Squadron (SVS)
        • Communications Squadron (CS)
      • 51st Medical Group
        • Aeropspace Medical Squadron (AMDS)
        • Medical Support Squadron (MDSS)
        • Medical Operations Squadron (MDOS)
        • Dental Squadron (SGD)
      • Tenant Units
        • Headquarters Air Component Command (7AF-ROK)
        • Air Force Audit Agency
        • Det 1 33rd Rescue Squadron (Departed 2006 return to Kadena.)
        • US Army Contracting Command Korea
        • 3rd Battlefield Coordination Detachment (Tenant)
        • 731st Air Mobility Support Sq (Tenant) -- Aeroport squadron
        • 5th Reconnaissance Sq (Tenant) -- U-2 See 7th AF
        • 31st Special Operation Sq
        • 303rd Intelligence Squadron (Tenant) -- Skivvy Nine
        • 35th ADA Bde, C & D Battery (Tenant) -- See 8th US Army
        • 1st BN, 43rd Air Defense Artillery (Tenant) -- See 8th US Army



    • 8th Fighter Wing -- (WP, "Wolfpack") (Kunsan AB) Kunsan AB is home to the 8th Fighter Wing, which is made up of two F-16 fighter squadrons, the 35th Fighter Squadron and the 80th Fighter Squadron. The 8th Fighter Wing "Wolf Pack", comprised of the 35th Fighter Squadron "Pantons" and the 80th Fighter Squadron "Juvats", performs both air-to-ground and air-to-air missions in support of numerous taskings throughout the Pacific. During peacetime, the 8th fighter Wing reports to 7th Air Force, headquartered at Osan Air Base, ROK. Seventh Air Force reports to headquarters, Pacific Air Forces at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. In contingency operations, the 8th Figher Wing becomes part of the Air Component Command, located at Osan, and report to U.S. Forces Korea Command, and the United Nations Command, located in Seoul. (See Kunsan AB Homepage.) (See Wikipedia: 8th FW for unit patches.) (See kalaniosullivan.com: Kunsan AB for history of 8th FW and Kunsan AB from its beginnings to present. Updates on wing stopped in 2004.) According to the Air Force Times, Kunsan is replacing older Block 30 F-16s with newer Block 40 F-16s from Eielson, Alaska. ``The aircraft are being swapped to bring Kunsan's fleet up-to-date with the latest F-16 upgrades,'' Capt. Tiffany Payette, spokeswoman for the 8th Wing, was quoted as saying. The first group of Block 40 aircraft arrived in October, she said, and the swap will be completed early next year. (NOTE: The F-22s are moving to Alaska.)


      7th AF Commander Lt. Gen. Wood and 8th FW Commander Col Brown meet Kunsan Mayor Moon Dong-shin -- on the day Col Brown took command of 8th FW (25 May 2007) (USAF Photo) (See Gunsan City site.)


      Kunsan City civic relations is important from the standpoint that Chikdo Range -- about 70km off the coast of Kunsan -- is controlled by the Kunsan City government. The use of the range -- and the conditions of usage -- are in negotiations with the city. Kunsan City approved the use of Chikdo, but some of the conditions were very restrictive. In the past, civic activists have sought to block the USAF usage of the range completely.

      Kunsan Air Base to expand by 315 acres on land deeded to it during the Korean War -- but later unused. The land was used by residents for farming, but now flagged as "no farming allowed." A fence is being erected around the area. Procurement of lands required. Area supposedly to house the 3rd Battalion, 2d Aviation Regiment (GSAB) which flies the CH-47 presently from Camp Humphreys. (Source: Stars and Stripes.)

      On Kunsan AB, the ROKAF 38th Fighter Group started its transition from F-5Es to KF-16s in Nov 2006. In Jun 2007, the ROKAF 111th FS joined the USAF 35th FS in joint air exercises with F-5s and F-16s to defend the base. In the past, there was very little interface in exercises between the USAF and ROKAF, except during Foal Eagle. Expect more joint exercises as the 38th FG transitions to KF-16s.
      • 8th Operations Group
      • 8th Maintenance Group
        • Maintenance Operations Squadron (MOS)
        • Maintenance Squadron (MXS)
        • Aircraft Maintenance Squadron (AMXS)
        • Munitions Squadron (MUNS)
      • 8th Mission Support Group
        • Civil Engineer Squadron (CES)
        • Mission Support Squadron (MSS)
        • Logistics Readiness Squadron (LRS)
        • Security Forces Squadron (SFS)
        • Services Squadron (SVS)
        • Communications Squadron (CS)
      • 8th Medical Group
        • Aeropspace Medical Squadron (AMDS)
        • Medical Support Squadron (MDSS)
        • Medical Operations Squadron (MDOS)
        • Dental Squadron (SGD)
      • Tenant Units