A. History of the DSC and NIS

"I stood by helplessly, witnessing the entire affair. Two big bull-dozers worked constantly. One made the ditch-type grave. Trucks loaded with the condemned ("Communists") arrived. Their hands were already tied behind them. They were hastily pushed into a line along the edge of the newly opened grave. They were quickly shot in the head and pushed into the grave...."

"I tried to stop this from happening, however, I gave up when I saw I was wasting my time. I was the only foreigner there...I think I'd rather have gone with the dead and gotten it over with quick and easy - then I wouldn't have these terrible nightmares.

The worst part about this whole affair was that I learned later that not all the people killed were communists.." (7)

It was Syngman Rhee, not the military, who initiated the political involvement of the military in intelligence activities. The turning point came in 1952 when Rhee proclaimed martial law-- and the presence of military police in the chamber of the National Assembly guaranteed passage of the constitutional amendment he sought over the objections of a recalcitrant legislative branch and still-independent judicial branch. Throughout Rhee's administration, two military units--the Joint Military Provost Marshal and the army Counterintelligence Corps (KCIC)--engaged in extralegal and violent political tactics, apparently not excluding the outright murder of politically undesirable people. Although the details never were disclosed fully, more than a few minor political figures' disappearances were connected to the two units. (60)

The Defense Security Command was formally activated in October 1977. This merger of the Army Security Command, the Navy Security Unit, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations produced a single, integrated unit under the direct command and operational control of the minister of national defense. Although technically subordinate to the minister, the DSC commander operated semiautonomously and typically had personal, direct access to the president. Given the disparity in service size, the old ASC predominated within the DSC. The strength of the DSC varied over time within a probable range of 5,000 to 7,000 people during the 1980s.

The DSC (and its predecessors) was created to deal with the real question of loyalty within a military on a divided peninsula. It was inspired by the Guomindang model, in which political officers monitored the military services for subversion or disloyalty. The DSC was responsible for monitoring the military for loyalty; safeguarding military information; monitoring domestic political, economic, and social activities that might jeopardize military capabilities and national unity; maintaining defense industrial security--both physically and in terms of counterespionage; countering North Korean infiltration; detecting espionage and anticommunist law violations; and conducting special investigations at the direction of the president.

The DSC assigned small elements to all major military units to monitor security and loyalty. These elements operated outside the unit's chain of command and performed a highly effective independent audit function. The DSC representatives never rivaled unit commanders as political officers occasionally had in communist military units. Their input into officer evaluations, however, often played a decisive role in career progression, giving DSC members influence far beyond their rank and producing friction between them and the "regular" military. Corruption within the DSC was difficult to verify, but political manipulations, misappropriation of operating funds, and undue influencing of promotions certainly occurred and were particularly rampant in the mid- to late 1970s. (60)

The National Security Act increasingly was used after 1985 to suppress domestic dissent. Intended to restrict "antistate activities endangering the safety of the state and the lives and freedom of the citizenry," the act also was used to control and punish nonviolent domestic dissent. Its broad definition of offenses allowed enforcement over the widest range, wider than that of any other politically relevant law in South Korea. Along with other politically relevant laws such as the Social Safety Act and the Act Concerning Crimes Against the State, it weakened or removed procedural protection available to defendants in nonpolitical cases. (34)

As of 1990, however, the ANSP remained deeply involved in domestic politics and was not prepared to relinquish the power to prevent radical South Korean ideas--much less North Korean ideas- -from circulating in South Korean society. Despite an agreement in September 1989 by the chief policymakers of the ruling and opposition parties to strip the ANSP of its power to investigate pro-North Korean activity (a crime under the National Security Act), the ANSP continued enforcing this aspect of the law rather than limiting itself to countering internal and external attempts to overthrow the government. The ANSP continued to pick up radical student and dissident leaders for questioning without explanation. (34)

"The law has been so widely applied that its subjects not only include novels and movies but also citizens' jokes during a drinking party," the report read. "It served not as a law, but as a chief tool to instill into citizens' consciousness that thoughts that deviate from government-prescribed political thinking should be punished." It is the first time in memory that a governmental body has criticized the law. Since its adoption in 1948 to counter internal threats generated by North Korea, the National Security Law has provoked controversy in civil society.

"The purpose of this law is to restrict anti-state activities which endanger national security, so that the nation's security and the life and liberty of the citizens can be secured," the law's first article says. Many civic groups and human rights activists say that the law has been twisted and used for witch hunts and political persecution. It has been used to imprison people who were thought to be inclined to communist ideology. (64a)

In Mar 2004, the U.S. military intelligence community was reported to be "frustrated in its attempts to obtain information on North Korea - including access to defectors - from the South's National Intelligence Service." Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy caused the present difficulties by gagging defectors from making embarrassing comments on the North. Supposedly, "defectors have had to keep a low-profile in South Korea, partly due to the protectiveness of South Korean officials concerned with offending the North and giving ammunition to US hawks." (61)

Fast, complete access to defectors is vital to the U.S. intelligence community in light of how little the CIA knows about the extent of Pyongyang's nuclear programs, but the access is being denied. The ROK relies almost exclusively on US intelligence information from satellite monitoring, but its intelligence in not reciprocal. The case of Mr. Hwang Jang-yop, who was a North Korean party secretary before defecting seven years ago is at the heart of the current problems. Hwang and a top aide who defected with him arrived in Seoul from Beijing, where they had sought refuge in the South Korean Embassy, several months before Kim Dae-jung's election in December 1997. Although the government was conservative until Kim's inauguration in February 1998, CIA officials had to wait several months before getting to see Hwang, and they never had the steady access they would have liked. Then, when a North Korean officer in charge of a missile unit and a former senior official at North Korea's Nuclear Research Institute came to South Korea in 2003, the ROK hid them in a rural area. (61) Hwang first claimed to have a list of "10,000" spies, but later dropped that to those he knew. However, he has not been able to meet privately with the U.S. intelligence sources. Even when he visited the U.S. in 2003, he was not allowed to be alone in any room with U.S. officials -- even though the American government guaranteed his safety.

Kim Ki-sam, 39, said he submitted the application to a refugee office in New Jersey of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Early last year, Kim was accused of violating the NIS Law (charges of leaking secrets obtained while performing his duties) and defamation and is now under the suspension of indictment. Since last January, he has reported about the corruption of former President Kim Dae-jung's government on various Internet media. Some of the irregularities he claimed include the political maneuverings which brought Kim the Nobel Peace Prize, illegal remittance of $1.5 billion to North Korea and illegal wiretapping by the NIS, as well as articles about weapon procurement corruption in both the Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam governments. Going to America on a tourist visa in March 2002, he is now living with his wife and two children in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. (33)

Today we greet the 43rd anniversary of the historic April 19 Popular Uprising, which recorded the first victory in the history of anti-US and anti-fascist movement of the south Korean people. The April pro-democracy resistance, in which the empty-handed uprisers destroyed the stronghold of colonial fascism and overthrew Syngman Rhee’s pro-US dictatorship, was eruption of the south Korean people’s pent-up resentment against the US colonial rule and their aspiration and will for independent and democratic politics and a new life.

The uprising, which demonstrated the powerful spirit of resistance and strong aspiration of the people for independence, democracy and reunification, dealt a heavy blow to the US colonial rule and reaffirmed the truth that a dictator who reigns over the people is doomed to meet a miserable end.

The anti-US and anti-fascist struggle in south Korea, which entered a new stage occasioned by the resistance, met a new turn on the occasion of the Gwangju Popular Uprising in the 1980s and has since then developed ceaselessly through the popular resistance in June 1987 that toppled down the fifth Republic military dictatorship.

The nationwide anti-US struggle for independence sparked off with the killing of two schoolgirls by a US armored vehicle in last June, in particular, was a patriotic struggle that followed the spirit of the April resistance 43 years ago, which shook the US colonial rule to its very foundation.

However, we have not yet realized the desire of martyrs. The United States, occupying this land for more than a half century, still violates independence and existence of our people, hampers the nation’s march to achieve reunification with its concerted efforts and threatens the destiny and existence of our nation with dangerous nuclear war moves against north Korea.

Owing to the anti-north maneuvers of the United States and pro-US traitors, the Korean Peninsula is faced with the danger of war and the June 15 inter-Korean joint declaration faces difficulties in its implementation. Today’s reality shows that south Koreans can neither free themselves from the fate of colonial slavery nor evade the danger of nuclear holocaust as long as the US troops remain here.

They should turn out all together in the struggle as the April 19 uprisers did, in order to terminate the US colonial domination, nuclear war moves and US military presence. No force in the world can check the advance of popular resistance. This is a precious experience the April 19 uprising left. All patriotic people should intensify the anti-US struggle by renewing the spirit of resistance and experience of the April 19 uprising.

Seoul
April 19, Juche 92 (2003)

B. Historical Perspective of Communism & Spies in the Cholla Area

The Korean Constabulary (forerunner to the ROK Army) was hastily thrown together by the U.S. Military Government in preparation for the U.S. withdrawal from Korea -- come-hell-or-highwater.(NOTE: The Constabulary was designated the ROK Army in December 1948.) The Communists, not happy with the 1948 national elections, staged a rebellion that quickly spread. The Cheju Rebellion from April 1948 to the spring of 1949, resulted in the deaths of at least 30,000 people. (20)

On 19 October 1948, Communists within the ROK Army's 14th Regiment mutineed after receiving orders to embark for Cheju Island to support counterinsurgency operations. The mutineers killed 30 officers and between 600 to 800 soldiers joined the rebellion. (20) (NOTE: The ROK Army banned the use of the number "4" in any unit due to the mutinous actions of the 14th Regiment.)

The Communist-led mutiny which began in Yeosu, South Cholla Province (Chollanam-do) quickly spread into other areas, including Sunchon, North Cholla Province (Chollabuk-do) leading to the deaths of 1,200 civilians and South Korean troops, 1,500 rebels and their supporters and much property damage. The rebels and supporters were advancing on Kwangju and Chonju, North Cholla Province (Chollabuk-do) before being stopped by government troops. An amphibious assault on Yosu failed and it took three days of intense fighting from inland to recapture the town on 26 October 1948. The ROK Army investigated the incident and released its report after the U.S. had pulled out. It blamed the rebellion on the "incautious recruiting by the former Military Government." However, the report overlooked political factionalism, organizational weaknesses and material deficiencies as causes to the unrest. Widespread purges and arrests occurred that reduced the ROK Army strength from 54,000 to 45,000 in the space of two months. (20)

Encouraged by labor and rural unrest that simmered throughout 1947, the South Korean Labor Party made one last attempt to prevent the formation of the Republic of Korea by staging a general strike and sporadic attacks on the police and economic targets in February-March, 1948. The continuing competition for power in South Korea and Russian intransigience convinced the U.S. State Department and General Hodge to surrender the idea of a Joint US-USSR commission on Korea and to turn to the United Nations for a new figleaf for withdrawal. (63)

The United Nations produced the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTOK), which could provide independent testimony on just who was doing what to whom. The UNTOK representatives found nothing very appealing about the Rhee regime, but they received absolutely no cooperation from North Korea in the matter of national elections or schemes for regimes of reconciliation and broad representation. United Nations involvement did not thrill Rhee since he had no more liking for European liberals than American liberals, but it gave his government a degree of respectability in the international arena it sorely lacked in 1948. For the Truman administration, passing some (if not all) of the responsibility for Korea to the United Nations gave the appearance of principled abandonment, yet left broad flexibility on handling Korean problems.

The failure of the general strike gave Pak Honyong and his immediate organizers pause, but they continued to plan for a general uprising sometime in the summer of 1948, depending upon how quickly they could gather arms, subvert the Korean National Police and the Constabulary, and organize partisan units throughout South Korea. On Cheju-do, always a hotbed of revolt, the island rebels ignored the broad schedule and started a guerrilla war in April, 1948, hoping to capitalize on popular resentment toward a repressive and corrupt governor and the incompetence and indiscipline of the island KNP and KC units.(63)

After six months of vicious and inept rural warfare, neither side could claim much advantage. The Cheju-do revolt, however, became a national problem when the 14th Constabulary Regiment mutinied during the process of moving to Cheju-do and set off a sympathetic civilian uprising in Yosu and Sunch'on as well as some neighboring villages. The southern coast of Korea (eastern Chollanam-do and western Kyongsangnam-do) blazed with battles throughout October, 1948, but the urban rising died under a determined Constabulary counteroffensive. (63)

The surviving rebels, however, established guerrilla bases in the Chiri, Odae and Taebaek mountains, aided by two smaller mutinies in the Taegubased 6th Regiment in November and December, 1948. Further assistance came in the form of refugee southern Koreans who infiltrated back to the south as partisans. By mid-1949 Rhee faced a significant rural partisan force in five of his eight provinces. Although both the Communists and the government forces widely misreported losses, incidents with casualties ran around an average of 1,000 a month between October, 1948 and October 1949, then jumped during the Winter Suppression Campaign, 1949-1950. The partisan war took on additional dimension when in May, 1949 regular units of the North Korean border constabulary clashed with infantry regiments of the South Korean army, as the Constabulary had been redesignated in December, 1948. For a year units up to regimental size staged operations on both sides of the border, focused principally on the Ongjin peninsula, the hills north of Kaesong, and the mountains that surrounded Chunch'on, the provincial capital of Kangwon-do, the gateway to the guerrilla bases in the Taebaek mountains.(63)

As long as it survived, the Rhee regime could and did exploit the guerrilla war to its political advantage. In November, 1948, the National Assembly passed a draconian National Security Law that outlawed the Communist party and gave the security forces detention and judicial powers that made Western lawyers quake, but would have surprised no Asian. Although the National Security Law gave a veneer of legalism to the anti-left vendetta - for such it was, reciprocity for the horrors visited upon the Korean National Police and its families - the Rhee government did not ignore the rightist challengers. Earlier in the year (August, 1948), the Assembly had passed the National Traitor Law, which gave the government power to arrest, to deny public office, and to confiscate property from any Korean who had served the Japanese colonial government in a leadership position (broadly defined) and whose loyalty now seemed suspect. (63)

The Korean National Police, for example, tried to use this law to purge the Korean army of its senior officers, the majority of whom had been junior officers in the Japanese and Manchukuo armies. Both laws and the general internal regulations of the KNP and Korean army allowed both organizations to purge their own ranks of suspected rebels. The Korean army rid itself of more than 4,000 officers and men, jailing about a thousand and executing around 200. The U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), about 500 officers and men, formed a strong bond with the army's surviving senior officers to protect the army from Rhee and the police while it recruited itself up to 100,000 and worked on its training and equipment problems. (63)

In 1949 the U.S. pulled all of its combat troops out of Korea, leaving only a Military Advisory Group in an area called "ASCOM City," an acronym for Army Service Command City. In April 1949, the remnants of the rebels fled into the Chiri mountains and were joined by North Korean guerillas. They established three bases (in the Chiri mountains, Odae mountains, and Andong area. In October 1949, some 3,000 guerillas and several hundred local supporters launched a winter offensive against such large towns as Andong, Chinju, and Pohang. Though they failed to occupy the towns, the stage was set for the Korean War. (20) On March 27, 1950, Kim Sam Yong and Yi Chu Ha, the two key guerrilla commanders in S Korea, were captured. The main body of the guerrillas including more than 600 cadres trained at the Kangdong Political Institute (N Korea) was virtually wiped out by this time. (23). However, Kim Il Sung convinced Stalin that 200,000 guerillas were awaiting the signal for operations in the South.

Task Forces Matthews and Blair cleared Namwon of enemy soldiers. In midafternoon Task Force Dolvin arrived there from the east. Task Force Matthews remained overnight in Namwon, but Task Force Blair continued on toward Chongup, which was secured at noon the next day, 29 September. That evening Blair's force secured Iri. There, with the bridge across the river destroyed, Blair stopped for the night and Task Force Matthews joined it. Kunsan, the port city on the Kum River estuary, fell to the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, without opposition at 1300, 30 September.

Eastward of and generally parallel to the course of Task Force Matthews and the 24th Infantry, Task Force Dolvin and the 35th Infantry moved around the eastern and northern sides of the all but impenetrable Chiri-san area, just as the 24th Infantry had passed around its southern and western sides. This almost trackless waste of 750 square miles of 6,000 to 7,000-foot-high forested mountains forms a rough rectangle northwest of Chinju about thirty by twenty-five miles in dimension, with Chinju, Hadong, Namwon, and Hamyang at its four corners. This inaccessible area had long been a hideout for Communist agents and guerrillas in South Korea. Now, as the North Korean forces retreated from southwest Korea, many enemy stragglers and some organized units with as many as 200 to 400 men went into the Chiri Mountain fastness. There they planned to carry on guerrilla activities. (62)

According to police records, Chung and one of her comrades, Lee Hong-yi, were scrounging for food in October 1962 and got into a scuffle with a villager who tried to snatch Lee's loaded carbine.

"I shot the villager in the leg. We went on to kill his wife and his brother and his brother's wife. We burned down their homes," Chung recalls. "They were pawns of American imperialists trying to turn in fellow compatriots. I have never killed innocent villagers. I have no regrets."

That December, Chung's other comrade, Lee Eung-jo, 53, was wounded as police tracked the fugitives. Chung says she was unable to carry him and finished him off -- at his request and in "the true spirit of comradeship." The following November, during a foray into a village, a peasant pressed an alarm, alerting two policemen lying in wait. Lee Hong-yi was killed and Chung was shot in her right thigh.

"Even bleeding, she was crawling to her carbine. I quickly overpowered her," says Park Ki-duk, one of the policemen who shot Chung. "She cursed us endlessly, calling all kinds of names and demanding that she be killed. Later I gave her some milk, and she threw it away. She was one tough broad. It's scary what communism does to an ignorant woman."

Kim Yong-nam, who was reported missing from a swimming beach on Sonyu island off Kunsan on August 6, 1978 when he was a freshman of Kunsan technical high school, was actually kidnapped by three North Korean agents belonging to an operations office in charge of Southward infiltration. At Kim Jong Il's order to kidnap new South Koreans for use in operations because those who defected to the north during the Korean War were too old, they were sent to the south and kidnapped Kim Yong-nam from a beach on Sonyu island on August 5 in the same year." (37)

Yi Myong-u, then a senior at Ch'onan Agricultural High school and Hong Kun-p'yo, then a senior at Ch'onan Commercial High School were also missing from the swimming beach at Hong island in South Cholla province on August 10, 1978. However, they were kidnapped by north Korean agents and are now working as instructors of so-called 'southernization' who train agents on South Korean realities and intonation so they can be sent to the south. It has been confirmed that the Ch'oe Chong-nam couple, who were recently dispatched to the south, and Kim Tong-sik, who infiltrated into Puyo in 1995, received southernization training from them. (37) (37i) (Ch'onan is in Ch'ungch'ong-namdo.)

Lee Min-gyo, then 17, and Choi Sung-min, then 18, who mysteriously disappeared while vacationing on an island in South Cholla Province in August 1977. ROK intelligence officials on Tuesday presented evidence on the case of two students missing for 20 years which pointed to their abduction by DPRK agents and showed that they are still alive in the DPRK. The Agency for National Security Planning (NSP) said it has confirmed that the two students were abducted by DPRK agents and are now being forced to work for a spy organization. Agency officials said they substantiated the kidnapping by questioning detained DPRK agents and other defectors. The agency disclosed a similar case November 20, saying three high school students reported missing in 1978 were confirmed to have been forcefully removed to the DPRK by agents. At a protest meeting in 2001, Mr. Choe Jun-hwa (71) and Ms. Lee Dong-kum (71) whose son, Choi Seung-min (41), disappeared in 1977 in Hongdo, South Cholla Province said: “A spy who turned himself in testified that our son was one of the trainers” and added: “our government’s reaction was to tell us to call the police should he return.” The old couple demands to know whether their son is alive or dead. (37b)

For the last 25 years, Kim Tae-ok, 70, has treasured the rice bowl of her son, Lee Min-gyo, whom she hadn't seen since he went to a beach in South Jeolla Province with his friend in summer of 1977. "I feel sorry that I could not give him a nice breakfast on the day he disappeared," Kim said. "Min-gyo's father hunted tirelessly looking for him before passing away in 1989," she said. Kim almost gave up her hope of finding his son when the National Intelligence Service informed her in 1997 that he was spirited away to the North to train North Korean spies. Min-gyo is one of 486 South Koreans who Korean authorities said have been abducted by the North since the end of the Korean War in 1953 and confirmed to be alive there. (37e)

Though John Moench's remarks in Taking Command deal only with Kunsan, the spying business in Korea was much broader and very active at the time. Infiltration was not only by spies who would gather information, the infiltration was also to "plant" deep-cover operatives with a long range view. These operatives were to infiltrate key infrastructure departments such as the railway system with the view that when North Korea attacked these operatives would be in place to shut down or disrupt the key infrastruction systems for transportation, communication and water. (2)

John commented on the spy issue in Taking Command, "It can be "taken with a grain of salt," but it is factual. I could write some interesting "spies" stuff that would not be believed by the lay individual -- most of it will die with me. Further comment in this review paragraph becomes speculative and imaginative. Phrases such as "firearms at the ready" add a dimension to the situation that was not present -- it is interpretive." Though John steadfastly states the general facts were true, the treatment in the book should be considered "interpretive." In other words, it is in the area of "fiction" loosely based on fact. (21)

North Korean spies called 'sleepers' are already in Japan. These spies are living in Japanese society as if they were ordinary Japanese citizens. Once they receive orders from North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, they will rise up and terrorize Japan. They are sleeping until they receive such order.

The question is how did they get into Japan in the first place.

Kenki Aoyama, a former North Korean spy in Japan, said to The Weekly Post, "When North Korea attempts to send a spy to Japan, they first identify a Korean who was a member of a North Korean organization in Japan that died young. Then, the intelligence agency secretly replaces him with its spy.

"Another method is, when North Koreans living in Japan visit their mother country as a group, North Korea replaces a member of the group with a spy who looks like him. The spy can infiltrate Japan without any intervention by the Japanese government." (38h)

The 'Man Gyon Bong,' a North Korean regular passenger and cargo ship makes 30 roundtrips a year between a North Korean port and Niigata port in Japan. The North Koreans use the ship to visit their country. Also, North Korean schools in Japan use the ship to conduct excursions to North Korea.

The North Korean intelligence has been slipping their spies among the passengers on Man Gyon Bong, according to Mr. Aoki. The North Korean spy who was arrested by the Japanese Police Department last year testified that he was given a written order from Kim Jong Il from an executive of the North Korean Unified Front when he was on board the Man Gyon Bong. (SITE NOTE: We suspect the North Koreans are slipping in their spies by posing as ethnic Koreans from China who are entering South Korea in search of work.)

Mr. Aoyama continued, "There are three groups of crew members on Man Gyon Bong. The captain and his assistants are responsible for operating the ship. They are under the control of high-ranked officials of the United Front who have a grip on the operations of North Korean organizations in Japan. When they arrive in Japan, they give orders from Kim Jong Il to the leaders of North Korean organizations in Japan.

"Another group aboard the ship educates North Koreans living in Japan with the philosophy of Kim Jong Il. When the leaders of North Korean organizations in Japan are called to the Man Gyon Bong ship, they are forced to pledge their loyalty to their 'Shogun Kim Jong Il.' If they are taken as unfaithful to Kim Jong Il, they are forced to pledge their faith again to Mr. Kim through cruel self-effacement. (SITE NOTE: This method of pledges were used with South Korean spies as well when contacted by infiltrators.)

The roles of spies infiltrated into Japan are just like those of 007 in the James Bond movies. Spies are coded in numbers and live in Japan under several fake names. As of two years ago, North Korea had been sending five-digit signals to Japan using the Korean language. The signals could be received by AM radios. Those signals were found to be secret orders from North Korea to 'sleepers.' Recently, those orders were switched to emails. The most important orders are considered to be directly sent to the sleepers through the hands of crew members on Man Gyon Bong. (SITE NOTE: In Korea, the codes are also used as was discovered in the pocket of a dead spy on a submarine. In Korea, the students contacted spies using emails. In Korea, the infiltrators still deliver the messages to sleeper cells, but bury the materials and messages in caches in the hills.)

According to Mr. Aoyama, the missions of the sleepers are divided into two categories. One is spying on Japanese industries and the other is to spy on military facilities of the Japanese SDF. Secret information they obtain is sent to North Korea on floppy disc or CD Rom. The Man Gyon Bong carries them to North Korea. (SITE NOTE: In Korea, this apparently is the same. For example, the North has started using female N.K. spies in the karaoke bars and restaurants in China to spy on ROK/Japanese businessmen and government officials. At the same time, infiltrators in have appeared along the DMZ.) (38h)

C. Long-term Nature of Spy Operations

July 3, 1996: A Filipino national, known as Professor Muhammad Kansu, Dept. of Arabic Studies, Dankook University, is apprehended while sending a fax to a Beijing-based North Korean espionage base at the Plaza Hotel in Seoul. The then 62-year-old Muhammad Kansu turned out to be Chung Soo-il of the North Korean Workers' Party, dispatched to the South in April 1984, after assuming a Filipino identity. (41)

Chung Soo-il - a.k.a. Muhammad Kansu of the Philippines - was born in November of 1934 to a North Korean family living in Yanbian, China. He moved to Pyongyang in June 1963 with his wife and children, where he taught at Pyongyang Foreign Studies University. He was selected as an anti-ROK agent in 1974. After laundering his passport in Lebanon and the Philippines, he entered the South in 1984, teaching Arabic Studies at Dankook University in Seoul. (41)

• Returned to North Korea four times for a debriefing on his activities. - first return: Jan. 17, 1987 - Feb. 13, 1987 - second return: July 15, 1990 - July 29, 1990 - third return: Feb. 1, 1992 - Feb. 13, 1992 - fourth return: Feb. 15, 1995 - Feb. 23, 1995
• April 29, 1984: Entered South Korea as a student at Yonsei University's Language Institute.
• Arrived in Philippines in April 1983. He was naturalized as a Filipino with the help of the Islamic Church.
• July 1982: Arrived in Malaysia. Taught Korean at a Malaysian college.
• August 1980: Entered Tunisia and got a job with a research institute with the intention of acquiring a Tunisian passport, but failed.
• January 1979: Left North Korea for Lebanon with a fake passport as 'Yo Chol-su.'
• February 1978: Obtained a Lebanese passport under the alias of Muhammad Kansu with the help of a Lebanon-based pro-Pyongyang group. (41)

Chung Soo-il married again while in South Korea. With his Filipino identity, he formed wide social circles with figures in the political, academic, and press sectors, collecting confidential information. He codified highly sensitive information on South Korean politics and military affairs, and sent them by international mail or by fax via Beijing to North Korea on over 80 occasions. (41)

Chung was a highly intellectual espionage agent who with his foreign passport gathered mainly highly confidential and sensitive information on South Korea. He was highly valued by the North. During his four visits between July 1987 to February 1995, he received the (North Korean) 'Motherland Reunification Award' conferred by the Workers' Party. He also toured the mythical revolutionary sites erected by Kim Il-sung as part of his sanctification projects, a tour course reserved for important persons or guests. He in turn swore loyalty, signing a declaration of loyalty to Kim Il-sung and his son Kim Jong-il. Chung returned to the South with short-wave radios, cryptograms, lethal suicide drugs, other new equipment, and $19,000 in cash for his work in the South. (41)

"During his school days at SNU, Ko volunteered as a militia during the Korean War and was imprisoned at a POW camp on Koje island. As he had confessed, he was thoroughly armed with socialist ideas from his school days. In addition, his uncle Ko Chong-ok, an SNU professor of Korean Literature, defected to the north during the Korean war and became a professor at Kim Il Sung University."

"Ko became a North Korean agent in September 1961, when he was won over by north Korean agents with letters from Chang Mae-yun, his SNU colleague, and his uncle Ko Chong-ok. Ko received orders from him to organize students and carry out spy activities at SNU, and was given the spy name of Kongsusan, and received $1,000, a table of random numbers, and a table of telegraph words. In 1966, he contacted a female agent who had infiltrated into the ROK, and received a new table of random numbers and table of telegraph words, and furnished a room in Songbook-dong as her safehouse. For a month, Ko helped her out by sending secret codes to north Korea in her stead. In 1971, during his visit to Pyongyang as an advisor to the north-south Red Cross talks, Ko secretly provided south Korean strategy for the talks to Kang Chang-su, who was disguised as a North Korean counterpart."

"In June 1989, Ko contacted Kim Nak-hyo, who has infiltrated into the ROK five times, and rented him a room in Chungjongno. Ko was ordered to provide Kim with the ROK's ability to develop nuclear weapons and information on professor Kim Sun-kun."

"Ko provided Kim Nak-hyo the information that the ROK was unable to make an atomic bomb due to US pressures, and that he would continue to study professor Kim. The information was submitted to Kim Nak-hyo via transliteration into English. [passage omitted on Ko's other spy activities, escape route via overseas in emergency] then Ko and Kim used halves of a copper pendant to identify north Korean agents. Ko recognized the Ch'oe couple with the copper pendant, and was ordered to hand over an analysis of the ROK's post-presidential election policy on north Korea. [passage omitted on talks with Ch'oe Chong-nam.] while preparing the requested data, he received a call on November 1 from an unidentified North Korean agent to go to the North Korean Embassy in Beijing immediately as it was an emergency."

"Ko tore up the orders from Ch'oe Chong-nam and the two-page policy data to get rid of the evidence, but investigators found them in the trash can in his office. Consequently, Ko has been found to be a deep-cover agent who thoroughly hid his identity, received orders from six agents, and carried out spy activities for the last 36 years."

The prosecution announcement pointed out that Hanchongnyon was manipulated from behind by the Southern Headquarters of Pomchonghangnyon (Pan-National Alliance of Youth and Students for Unification) which is under the control of the North Korean Workers Party’s unification front department.

First deputy director of the Seoul District Prosecutors Office Kim Won-chi told the press that most of the leading members of Hanchongnyon were found to concurrently hold key positions in the Southern Headquarters of Pomchonghangnyon which is an organization benefitting the enemy. He also said that Hanchongnyon’s subsidiary organization, Chotongwi (The Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland) has been indicted as an organization that benefits the enemy, as it was found to have inherited exactly the same political line of Chondaehyop’s Chotongwi which was ruled as an enemy-benefiting organization by the Supreme Court in 1992.

Chondaehyop (National Council of Student Representatives) is the predecessor of Hanchongnyon. An organization which benefits the enemy is liable to be punished under the National Security Law.

On the other hand, the Northern Headquarters of Pomchonghangnyon in Pyongyang was found to be directing the Southern Headquarters in Seoul to make such political demands as the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South and national unification through confederation.

The chairman of the Northern Headquarters of Pomchonghangnyon, Ho Chang-jo, 40, belongs to the Choson Student Council, and the Choson Student Council Chief, Li Kum-chol, is a member of the North Korean Workers Party’s unification front department.

Meanwhile, the prosecution authorities said that a total of 438 students were indicted on charges of staging illegal demonstrations or for using fire bombs during demonstrations, while 38 of them were additionally charged with violations of the National Security Law.

Hanchongnyon Chairman Chung Myung-ki, 24, and 33 other key leaders are still in hiding. (38b)

• The so-called Revolutionary Democratic party (RDP) was established under direct auspices of the North Korean Workers Party (NKWP). This espionage case is the one of a typical underground party that had instigate `revolutionary activities' in the ROK.

• the North won Kim Yung-hwan, who could exercise influence and had organizational foundation in the sector of student activists, over to the Northern side, sent him to the North and instructed him to establish a underground revolutionary leadership under the Juche banner.

• key members of Anti-Imperalist Youth League over to his side as a subordinate organization, admitted them on the spot to the NKWP and granted them code names such as Mt. Kwanak.
• He organized the RDP into a nationwide organization financed by funds from the North and became active behind-the-scene force

• the North came in contact with Ha Yung-ok, a diehard follower of Juche ideology and a central committee member of the RDP to consolidate the RDP under his leadership.

• First, this is the first case that a native South Korean Juche movement was won over to the North side and transformed into a revolutionist front organization acting on instructions direct from NKWP.
• Second, it was confirmed for the first time that the North had expended considerable effort in winning key members of the Juche faction over to the North from the very inception of the movement in the 1980's.
• Third, it was disclosed that the North tried to win students with potential for carrying future activities over to its side instead of older generation for immediate utilization, attempting foster them as influential members of the press and legal circles able to affect public opinion.
• Fourth, a North Korean spy couple infiltrated into the South assumed Malaysian nationality to carry out long-term activities following Kansu, a secret agent disguised as a Philippines national.
• Fifth, it was revealed clearly that the RDP was a cell organization, in accordance with North Korea's strategy of underground party organization, the organizational scale of which can be known only by person in charge and the members of which are strictly loyal to the command of their superiors.
• Sixth, it was confirmed for the first time that the so-called cyber espionage was utilized, taking advantage of state-of-the-art internet communication network as the means of communicating with the North.

Semisubmersible (Global Security.com)

A semisubmersible is a fast, three-engined boat used for inserting small teams of commandos. With a top speed of around 50 kts, it will race at high speeds towards its target and then submerge for the final approach. For longer-ranged missions it will launch from a mother ship designed to look like a fishing trawler. One such combo was sunk by Japanese navy/Coast Guard units in 2001 (One was found with US-built Mercury marine engines) Another lone boat was sunk by the South Korean Navy in 1998. While operating too far south to be alone, the mothership was never found. (55a)

The Defense Ministry said the spy vessel, an upgraded SP-10H model, belongs to the Operations Department of the North Korean Workers' (Communist) Party. Unlike older semi-submersible models, it can dive up to 20 meters and cruise at a maximum speed of 50 knots through the use of three powerful engines. It has two hatches and four rudders used for underwater navigation and is covered with special paint to help it evade radar detection, the ministry said.

The Defense Ministry allowed the media to view the inventory of contents recovered from the ship at a ministry compound. Among the equipment were 724 pieces of weaponry, communications equipment, wet suits and other stuff taken off the North Korean boat or from the bodies of its crew. Included in the list were four Czech-made submachine guns, an RPG-7 anti-tank gun, a 17-kg TNT can for self-destruction, a U.S.-made portable global positioning system (GPS) device, eight hand grenades, AK assault rifle ammunition, a walkie-talkie set, suicide poison capsules, a map of the southern coast, and compressed rations.

Of particular notice was the GPS, which was the size of a cellular phone. It was the first one of its kind found in an infiltration ship, the Defense Ministry said. One million yen and 568,000 South Korean won were also retrieved from the bodies. A ministry official induced that the infiltrators were attempting to either pick up a spy or land one. The mission appeared to be a failure, the official concluded, because no signs of infiltration were discovered during searches conducted after the ship was first detected. (55)

The infiltration vessels involved in both the Kanghwa-do and Impo-ri operations are believed to be the latest development of the cluster osprey class. This new craft has been operational since 1995 and the DPRK has apparently made it available for export. It displaces approximately 10 tons, is 12.8m long, has a maximum surfaced speed of 40-50 knots, and a submerged speed of 4-6 knots. The craft rides very low in the water and unlike its predecessors, which could only partially submerge leaving their pilot and passenger cabins above the waterline, this new class can submerge to a depth of 3m using a snorkeling system. It is believed that the vessel is either covered with a radar absorbing paint or fiber resin plastic (FRP) materials. This endows the craft with a very small radar cross-section and it is reportedly only detectable when moving at speeds of greater then 12 knots. The craft can carry up to eight people­four crew, two escorts and two infiltrators. This vessel is part of an ambitious building program conducted by the DPRK during the 1990s. In addition to the high-speed submersible infiltration craft, this program reportedly includes a 1,000 ton class infiltration submarine, a two man swimmer delivery vehicle/midget submarine which can dive to a depth of 5-8m, and a "stealth" patrol boat. This "stealth" boat is reportedly constructed with faceted surfaces covered with radar absorbing paint, has a crew of 30, is 38 meters long, and has a maximum speed of 50 knots. It is armed with a 57mm and 37mm gun mounts.

Over the years the DPRK has imported, reverse engineered, and indigenously designed and produced a wide variety of SDVs. These range in size from small 1 person to large 6 person models. The SDV found during the Tonghae infiltration was a battery powered, propeller driven, craft which measured 1.57m long and .33m in diameter. It has a speed of 2­3 knots and a range of approximately 3km. The SDV was designed to be launched by either a submarine or "mother" ship and transport 3­5 swimmers and their equipment. An almost identical SDV was found aboard the captured yugo-class SSM just 20 days previously.

For operations against Japan or the southern section of the ROK, infiltration craft are usually transported to their area of operations by a "mother" ship which operates from international waters. The "mother" ships are either a 50-100 ton vessel posing as a fishing vessel or a larger vessel operating as a cargo ship. The "mother" ship launches the infiltration craft at night from a point 25-50nm off the coast. A typical infiltration mission takes 6-8 hours to complete. This includes launching of the infiltration craft from the "mother" ship, insertion, landing, and finally recovery and stowage of the infiltration craft on the "mother" ship. For the actual landing operation the crew brings the vessel to within 100-200m of the shore. Here the two escorts exit the craft and either use a SDV or swim to reach shore. If they are recovering agents they now escort them back to the infiltration craft. If they are inserting agents, the escorts will secure the beach and then signal the agents to come ashore. Alternately, both the escorts and infiltrators use an SDV to reach the shore together. The escorts then ensure the agents' safe departure inland, clear the beach of any traces of infiltration and return to the infiltration craft. (51)

Further information on these spy boats came from the arms-laden North Korean spyboat that was sunk in waters west of Amami-Oshima Island in December after exchanging fire with coast guard patrol vessels. The 44-ton, 30-meter-long (100-foot-long) vessel sank off Amami Oshima Island in the East China Sea in December 2001 when its crew -- according to Japanese accounts -- apparently caused an explosion inside the ship after a chase and exchange of gunfire. It sank in the East China Sea (near the Chinese Shanghai EEC) in Dec 2001 -- and raised with Chinese permission. (57b)

Prior to its mission, the boat appeared to have been refueled for its mission off Japan by a ship outside the port of Shanghai. The ship normally carries a crew of 15. The ship could sustain 60 kilometers (35 miles) per hour, thanks to its V-shape stem and four 1,000-horsepower engines. (57b)

The stern of the boat featured a pair of doors that open outward -- a characteristic of North Korean spy boats -- used for launching semisubmersibles. (57a)

The 130-meter ship was armed with a 14.5mm heavy machinegun that has a firing range of 1,000 meters and looks like a Russian ZPU-2 anti-air heavy machinegun. New patrol ships featuring 40mm machineguns are expected to be introduced. (57)

The surprise was two anti-air missile launchers with a range of 5,000 meters according to the Japanese. (57) However, the missile has reportedly been identified as an Igla-2 surface-to-air missile, made in the former Soviet Union with a range of about 3,800 meters. (57a)

Also found were two shoulder-held rocket launchers, four 5.45mm-caliber automatic rifles, an 82mm antitank recoilless gun, and six hand grenades. One of the rocket launchers, which looks like a Russian RPG-7 rocket launcher, features a red star -- the national symbol of North Korea -- and Korean characters denoting it is a 1968-type No. 7 Firing Tube. (57) The automatic rifles, which look like Russian-made AKS-74 rifles, feature a carved seal of a North Korean red star on their surface.

The ship was disguised as a Chinese fishing vessel, bearing the name of a Chinese port on its stern. But a wooden board bearing a fake Japanese fishery registration number was also recovered, indicating that the crew members were ready to try and disguise the vessel as a Japanese ship. The Japanese coast guard also salvaged another wooden board bearing Korean characters that read, "Oh The Party, this child will be your loyal retainer for good." (57)

(2). Methods of Escape The methods for escape in 1969 was simply to try to dash in and out of the fishing boats to evade capture. In 1969, a ROK Destroyer had a running gun battle with a 50-ton spy boat off the southwest coast of South Korea near Imja Island. The spy boat attempted to evade capture by dodging in and out of the fishing boats. In the fire-fight that ensued, six ROK crewmen were seriously injured. Because inclement weather was closing in, it was decided to sink the 50-ton spyboat. Approximately 15 crewmen aboard perished. These types of running gun-battles have occurred periodically with the North Korean crews preferring suicide to capture. Being armed, these boats have also inflicted casualties on Korean boats as well. (47)

Now with the use mother ships to transport semi-submersibles to the area for insertion, detection is very difficult. The semi-submersibles are constructed of radar-inhibiting materials and when submerged present little or no visible area to locate. With the modern semi-submersibles, if they operate below 12 knots, they are virtually impossible to detect. The intent is to reach the mother ship operating in international waters to complete their escape.

---

E. Infiltrators

Infiltrators are highly disciplined and dedicated to Kim Jong-il. They will fight to the death and if trapped, prefer suicide to capture. These infiltrators are trained to "blend" into the South Korean society through language and customs training in a "southernization" course.

The following is a PARTIAL list of the infiltrators utilizing the coastline of Korea for entry.

• Jan 1968 — A 31-member commando team, disguised as South Korean soldiers and civilians, infiltrated within striking distance of President Park Chung Hee's office/residence complex (The Blue House) before they were intercepted by South Korean police; 29 commandos were killed and one committed suicide; one who was captured revealed that their mission was to kill President Park and other senior government officials.5 Two South Korean policemen and five civilians were killed by North Korean infiltrators.(38)
  
  Two days after the commando attempt on President Park, North Korea seized the U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo with a crew of 83 officers and men off Wonsan in international waters outside the 12- mile limit claimed by North Korea; the crew was finally released in December 1968, but not the vessel. (38)
• 20 Aug 1968, North Korean spy boat intercepted off Cheju Island. 12 North Koreans killed and 2 captured.
• In October 1968, one hundred and thirty sea-borne commandos infiltrated the Ulchin and Samchok areas on the eastern coast of South Korea; 110 were killed, 7 were captured, and 13 fled. North Korea described these armed infiltrators as "South Korean revolutionary armed guerrillas" engaged in the armed struggle to "drive out the U.S. imperialist aggressors and to overthrow their lackeys..." (38)
• On 30 Nov 1968, approximately 120 North Korean commandos landed near Samchok, ROK . 107 North Koreans were killed, 2 wounded and the remainder fled North. (49)
• Mar 1969 — Six North Korean infiltrators killed a South Korean policeman on guard duty in an eastern coastal area near Chumunjin, Kangwon province. (38)
• Jun 1969 — North Korean agents infiltrated Huksan Island off the west coast; 15 were killed. (38) A ROK Destroyer had a running gun battle with a 50-ton spy boat off the southwest coast of South Korea near Imja Island. The spy boat attempted to evade capture by dodging in and out of the fishing boats. In the fire-fight that ensued, six ROK crewmen were seriously injured. Because inclement weather was closing in, it was decided to sink the 50-ton spyboat. Approximately 15 crewmen aboard perished. (See 1969: Stars & Stripes article.)
• Jul 1969 Infiltrator wounded trying to sabotage the JP-4 pipeline that ran from the port of Kunsan into the base.
• Jul 1969 Four infiltrators killed outside Kunsan AB in floatation gear. Boat disguised as a fishing boat was captured at Oshikto. (See 1969: Stars & Stripes article .
• 5 March 1973 The ROK MND announced that two or three suspected NK espionage agents killed a civilian guard on an islet near Cheju Island. The men are believed to have escaped in a waiting boat. (SOURCE: 1973 8th Army Chronology)
• 30 May 1973 The ROK CIA announced the 23 Mar arrest of a Japanese couple and a Korean male resident of Japan on espionage charges. The trio are members of a five-man NK spy ring which used the cover of a Japanese/Korean joint venture firm for their activities. Two remaining agents were at large in Japan (SOURCE: 1973 8th Army Chronology)
• 15 June 1973 Convicted NK agent Kim Chun-bae hanged in Seoul Prison. He had conducted extensive espionage activities in the South for two years before his Mar 70 arrest by the ROK ASC. (SOURCE: 1973 8th Army Chronology)
• 29 June 1973 The ROK ASC announced the mid-Jun arrests of 11 NK agents who organized four espionage rings in Seoul and Pusan areas. The groups were establishing underground nets to undermine public opinion on continued American support to South Korea. (SOURCE: 1973 8th Army Chronology)
• 30 June 1973 ROK authorities disclose the recent cracking of a seven-member family of NK spies which operated in a rural area about 100 miles south of Seoul. These arrests raise the total reported agent apprehensions to 42 in the last two months. (SOURCE: 1973 8th Army Chronology)
• 24 July 1973 The ROK CIA announced the 7 Jul apprehension of a NK agent who had conducted operations in the South since Aug 81. Using Japanese citizenship as a means to freely enter the ROK, his mission was to infiltrate security and defense circles to collect information and recruit influential citizens. (SOURCE: 1973 8th Army Chronology)
• 7 Aug 1973 The ROK CIA disclosed the 15 Jul surrender of a NK agent who conducted espionage actifvities against the South for 12 years. The spy penetrated the Mindan, a union of pro-ROK residents in Japan and used this cover to carry out operations in both countries. (SOURCE: 8th Army Chronology)
• 25 October 1973 The ROK CIA announced the neutralization of a NK-oriented intelligence network which infiltrated government, commercial and educational institutions. Two key members have been arrested while a third reportedly committed suicide during questioning. (SOURCE: 8th Army Chronology)
• 15 December 1975 Lee Cha-hun, a 54-year old female NK espionage agent active int the South from May 68 until her arrest in Oct 72, is sentenced to life imprisonment by a Seoul court. (SOURCE: 1973 8th Army Chronology)
• Sep 1975 — Two North Korean infiltrators were intercepted at Kochang, Cholla Pukdo; one was shot dead. During the encounter, two South Korean soldiers were killed and two wounded. (38)
• 28 Apr 1978, a North Korean spy boat attacked a ROK National Police maritime patrol boat. One Rok killed and 4 wounded. 4 North Koreans killed. (49)
• 21 Jul 1978, a North Korean spy boat attacked a ROK National Police patrol boat. Two ROK killed and one wounded. 6 North Koreans killed. (49)
• Nov 1978 — A team of three North Korean armed agents killed four South Korean citizens—two in Hongsong County and one in Kongju County, Chungchong Namdo; and one at Osan, Kyonggido. (38)
• 23 Mar 1980, three North Korean agents infiltrating through the Han River Estuary were killed by ROK defenders. (49)
• 21 Jun 1980, a North Korean spy boat attacked a ROK Navy patrol boat. 2 ROK killed. 9 North Koreans killed and 1 captured. (49)
• Between 3-6 Nov 80 North Korean agentslanded on Hoenggan Island killing one ROK civilian and wounding five others before being caught. Three North Koreans killed. (49) Three North Korean infiltrators were shot to death at Whenggando, Cholla Namdo. One South Korean civilian was killed and six others wounded. (38)
• Between 1-6 Dec 1980, North Korean agents landed on Namhae Island off the southern coast of Kyongsang Namdo. . 3 infiltrators killed. 3 ROK killed and 3 wounded. (49) (38)
• Mar 1981 — Of three North Korean infiltrators at Kumhwa, Kangwondo, one was shot dead. (38)
• In June 1981 a North Korean spy boat was sunk off the coast of Sosan, Chungchong Namdo. Nine agents were shot to death and one was captured. (38)
• Jun 1982 — Two North Korean infiltrators were spotted on the east coast; one was shot to death. (38)
• 15 May 83, North Korean agents landed on east coast of ROK. One infiltrator killed. (49)
• 5 Aug 1983, North Korean agents attempted to land near Kampo on the SE coast. 5 infiltrators killed. (49)
• 13 Aug 1983, North Korean spy boat sunk east of Ullung Island in East Sea. 5 infiltrators killed. (49)
• 3 Dec 1983 North Korean agents landed at Tadaepo beach near Pusan. 3 infiltrators killed and 2 captured. (49) Two North Korean armed spies, Chon Chung-nam and Yi Sang-gyu, were captured at Tadaepo. (38)
• 09/1984 — A North Korean agent killed 2 residents of Taegu, South Korea, and severely wounded another before committing suicide. (38)
• 20 Oct 1985 a North Korean spy boat was sunk near Pusan. (49) (38)
• 2 Sep 1995 Kim Dong-shik and Park Kwang-nam at Onpyong-ri coast of Cheju Island on Aug. 29, 1995 , having left Nampo, North Korea in a vessel disguised as a fishing boat. They infiltrated the mainland on 2 Sep 1995 and were captured in Puyo on 24 Oct. (39)
• Nov 1995 — Two North Korean agents were intercepted at Puyo, about 100 miles south of Seoul; one was shot to death and the other was taken alive. The captured agent disclosed that he had infiltrated two months earlier, with a mission to contact anti-government dissidents, politicians, and an organization of underground cells. (38) (SITE NOTE: Kalani O'Sullivan remembers teachers at the institute in Kunsan City where he was teaching were recalled to active duty to aid in the search in the Sochon area. The agent reported as "shot" was said to have committed suicide.) (39)
• 30 July 1996 Ch'oe Chong-Nam and Kang Yon-Chong infiltrate Korea. They departed Nampo port in an infiltration boat disguised as a fishing boat and entered most likely at Koje-do. The two were arrested in the coffee shop of the Ulsan Korean Hotel on October 27, 1997. (38)
• 22 Jun 1998 a North Korean midget submarine was seized after it was spotted entangled in South Korean fishing nets off the South Korean town of Sokcho, south of the DMZ. When brought to shore three days later, the nine crew aboard were found dead inside from an apparent group suicide. (49)
• 12 Jul 1998, a body of a North Korean frogman was found on a beach south of the DMZ, along with paraphernalia suggesting an apparent infiltration/espionage mission. (49) Search for two other infiltrators proved negative.
• 20 Nov 1998 North Korean high-speed spy boat (apparently a five-ton semi-submersible) eludes pursuers in South Korean waters near the west coast island of Kanghwa, aborting an apparent operation to infiltrate agents into or ferry agents back from the South. (38) (55)
• 18 Dec 98, in a firefight, the South Korean navy sank a North Korean Improved Semi-Submersible Landing Craft (I-SILC) some 150 kilometers southwest of Pusan. The body of a North Korean frogman was recovered near the site. The vessel was first spotted two kilometers off the port city of Yosu.

SITE NOTE: INFILTRATORS AND SLEEPER CELLS: (Personal Supposition.) The North Korean pattern has been to have their "sleeper cells" assemble information directed by the North. Then the infiltrators would collect the data and take it back to the North for analysis. In 1969, four infiltrators in floatation suits were killed just outside of Kunsan AB. Their boat was discovered off Oshik-do (island) across from Kunsan AB. It was obvious that their mission was to make contacts with someone near Kunsan AB -- otherwise why would they land near the base. Infiltrating the base at night for surveillance would have been rather futile. Direct infiltration of the base would be foolhardy and an attack would serve no purpose. The 4th TFW had gone home and the F-100s were still at Kunsan under the 354th TFW -- and nuclear alerts still on-going but it had been going on for a decade by then. The conclusion is that were in Kunsan to pick up information of the base activities collected by an established "sleeper cell" near the base --and then using the location as a "safe house" separate to continue their missions. Because there were four infiltrators, it is assumed that they were contacting other cells. We suspect Kwangju -- as Kwangju AB had expanded after the 1968 Pueblo Incident --and Kunsan had the public transportation links to Kwangju. Infiltrators in Sochon and Puyo in recent years shows the practice continues.

Our supposition is that infiltrators have been entering the Kunsan area ever since Kunsan gained intelligence value with its nuclear alerts in 1958 -- and then increased surveillance when it became a true contingency base with the Pueblo Incident. Our position is that infiltration increased in 1959 and has continued unabated until the present time. The beaches are just too open to stop it.

(1). Ulsan Infiltrators However, most North Korean infiltrators are engaged in more low-key information gathering and the contacting of deep-cover cells. The infiltrators caught in 1996 was a husband-wife team from North Korea who had received "southernization" training. The two infiltrators were identified as Ch'oe Chong-Nam and Kang Yon-Chong. The ANSP were tipped off and "judged that the couple were North Korean agents dispatched to the south because of the way they acted and their tactics were similar to that of Kim Tong Sik, a North Korean armed agent who infiltrated into Puyo in October 1995 and approached movement activists." (1) (Puyo is about 50km north of Kunsan). The two were arrested in the coffee shop of the Ulsan Korean Hotel on October 27, 1997. The following are excerpted information from S Korea's Anjibu Arrests Alleged NK Spies

"Ch'oe Chong-nam was selected as an agent in 1984 while studying in the senior class at Sariwon University in North Korea. Kang yon-Chong was selected as an agent in 1986 immediately after graduating from a high school. According to a directive from the leadership of the Guidance Department for the agents in November 1990, they got married and gave birth to a boy who is now 5 years old and lives in Pyongyang. Thus, they are an agent team of an actual husband and wife who received agent training for over 10 years, as well as field-adaptation training in China on four occasions. They appeared to be the most elite of the agents." (1)

"As for the route of their infiltration, on July 30, they were supplied with pistols, poison guns, poison needles, radios, counterfeit IDs, and money. They departed Nampo port in an infiltration boat disguised as a fishing boat. [passage omitted on their landing route in South Korea - probably Koje-do] After the infiltration, they tried to understand the practical situation in South Korea by touring many places, including Kyongju, Pusan, Ulsan, Chonju, Kwangju, Ichon, and Suwon for over two months and rented a room for 200,00 won a month on the second floor of a Chinese restaurant in Kurodong, Seoul, thus securing a safe house." (1)

"Ch'oe Chong-nam and Kang Yon-Chong created six caches in Mt. Kwanak, Kyongju, the ceramic village of the folk village, and the sports park in Pongch'on Chapter, and buried all their espionage equipment. In addition to these caches, there are two other caches made by other agents for an emergency, bringing the total to eight.

Kang Yon-Chong (the wife) refused to testify and maintained her loyalty to Kim Jong Il. She committed suicide the very next day after swallowing a poison capsule, which she hid deep in her vagina, arrested her. Although she was taken to a hospital immediately, she died on October 31."

The South Korean coastline is too long to protect it from infiltrators. In 1959, the coast line was covered by barbed wire. Pill boxes or sandbag emplacements were all along the coast. However, the truth of the matter was that the ROK could not cover its coastline properly. It was an open sieve -- with many places for an infiltrator to enter unseen. However, most infiltrations were near major cities which contained the "sleeper cells." In recent years, most infiltrators that were found drowned on the shores have been near Inchon.

There is proof that "sleeper cells" exist within the Cholla area even today as evidenced by the multiple buried caches in the hills by infiltrators. These caches can then be accessed unobserved by the "sleeper cells." The infiltrators left materials for the "sleeper cells" in this manner so that if one cell was exposed, the other cells would not be compromised.

(2). Puyo Infiltrators The following is the story of two of two infiltrators from the North, Kim Dong-shik and Park Kwang-nam. Their activities illustrate how the North is engaging second-generation revolutionary guards in its anti-South operations. These espionage agents represent what the NIS calls the "new generation of infiltrator agents," carefully chosen to receive back-to-back assimilation education about South Korean language and environment -- the "southernization" training. (39) The "sleeper cells" in the local area most likely are in Puyo, Chonju and Kwangju -- and of course Kunsan.

Kim Dong-shik and Park Kwang-nam arrived by at Cheju Island via a spyship disguised as a fishing boat. They proceeded to the Songnam, Kyongi Province from the Sept. 2 infiltration to their capture on Oct. 24. They were planning to set up another major spy ring in the South and had dug dug seven caches of arms, cash and espionage materials throughout the nation, including Taejon, Ichon, and Namyangju. (40)

Reacting on a tip that a North Korean agent was active in Puyo -- about 40km from Kunsan -- anti-infiltration agents were sent to investigate. According to the NIS, in October 1995 an ambush was set up around the Chonggak Temple. When they tried to arrest two suspects, fire fight ensued and one infiltrator, Park Kwang-nam, escaped. Kim Dong-shik was captured. Army and police were called in on the search. ROK Army and reserve forces were both used in the search. About 20,000 security forces had been searching for the infiltrator in the Puyo area. Park was spotted on Oct. 27 at around 11:00 in the nearby town of Kopyong in Puyo County. He died on the way to the hospital after sustaining gunshot wounds. The infiltrator supposedly committed suicide -- though the news said he was shot. Propaganda materials of the infiltrators indicated that they were going to make contact with "sleeper cells" within the area and contact activist groups. (39)

An intense probe of the captured spy Kim Dong-shik revealed that;

• He first entered South Korea on May 30, 1990 through the coastline of Pomok-dong, Cheju Island. He made contact with Lee Sun-shil. Lee was a high-ranking agent, 22nd in the North Korean Workers' Party hierarchy, who had already built an underground subversion cell dubbed 'Namhan Chosun Workers' Party's Central Region, Chapter in South Korea. Kim worked with Lee for five months, before escorting returning agent Hwang In-ho to North Korea via Kanghwa Island near Inchon.
• Kim made his way to the South for the second time in April 1995. His mission was to deliver espionage equipment and pass on orders to the espionage agents already working in the South. He had also received orders to escort agents dispatched 15 years ago. He and Park Kwang-nam joined to form one team.
• They arrived at Onpyong-ri coast of Cheju Island on Aug. 29, 1995, having left Nampo, North Korea in a vessel disguised as a fishing boat.

The activities of Kim Dong-shik and Park Kwang-nam from the Sept. 2 infiltration to their capture on Oct. 24.

• Operating from motels in Songnam, Kyonggi Province, and the city of Taejon, the duo disguised themselves as victims of the collapsed Sampoong Department Store.
• They alternately used four elaborate counterfeit (South Korean) identification cards as they roamed the cities of Seoul, Taegu, and Kwangju, as well as areas of Kyonggi, Kangwon and South Chungchong provinces. They purchased medium-wave radios to decode message from the North, and also other items, such as clothes and watches, at Seoul's Lotte Department Store and Namdaemun Market.
• They boldly disclosed their identity, saying that they were 'persons from the North' and that they should 'join hands in the movement for reunification.' They aggressively sought out those also in the political and the NGO fields.
• In any event, they were planning to set up another major spy ring in the South. For that purpose, they dug seven non-manned posts throughout the nation, including Taejon, Ichon, and Namyangju, and buried enormous amount of cash, shotguns, guns with poison bullets, wireless communication apparati and other espionage equipment.
• Their possession of deadly weapons - including silencers, guns with poison bullets, and lethal suicide drugs showed that they were armed infiltrator agents.

Kim Dong-shik and Park Kwang-nam's activities reflect that the North is engaging second-generation revolutionary guards in its anti-South operations. These espionage agents are the so-called "new generation of infiltrator agents," carefully chosen to receive back-to-back assimilation education about South Korean language and environment.

• They are bold. Zeroing in on the fact that the North's Juche (self-reliance) Ideology is circulated within the social activists' circles in the South, the agents readily reveal that they are North Korean agents sent on a mission.
• The counterfeit identification cards they possessed showed sophisticated computer work was done to insert the infiltrator agents' real fingerprints, rather than simply swapping their photos.

In terms of their weaponry,

• The team was equipped to perform killings within a seven to eight meters range with high-caliber poison guns. They also possessed wireless communications equipment with a memory function that allowed them to radio home messages in a short time.
• Although their missions were short-term, at most two months, they carried huge amounts of cash: $61,100 and won (?) million.
• That cash, equipment, and weaponry were buried in a non-manned hole indicates that these items were intended to be passed on to other agents already working in the South

The case proves that the North has stepped up its infiltration and intelligence-gathering activities in the South, taking of advantage of the fact that its Juche Ideology was being circulated in some groups and of a generally lax public awareness of Communist activities in the nation. (40)

Even though there are ROK units all along the shorelines, the coastline is just too vast and wide open. This perception could be seen in 1990 when the ROK government simply threw up their hands and stated that it could not protect its shoreline from North Korean infiltrators. The shorelines for the most part are wide are now wide open for infiltration. However, it has been a blessing as more beaches are now opened for Koreans flocking to the beaches for summer. (40)

On the west coast, the preferred method is to use the smaller armed spy boats disguised as fishing craft to insert agents on the islands, while on the east coast -- stretching down to Pusan -- it appears to be the use of semi-submersibles or submarines.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the preferred method for infiltrators was through the use of 50-ton deisel-engined boats disguised as fishing boats. These boats carried their armament -- mounted machine guns -- hidden under tarps. They would attempt to blend in with a fishing fleet and when the opportune time came about, the infiltrator would make a mad dash for the coastline in a powered rubber raft. If operating close in, the infiltrators used floatation suits. In recent years, drowned infiltrators have been found in scuba suits.

During 1968, there was a dramatic increase in incidents along the DMZ. Seventeen U.S. soldiers and 54 wounded. 145 ROK soldiers were killed and 240 wounded. It was the most violent year in the history of the Armistice. There were also a dramatic increase in the amounts of infiltrations. In 1969 more than 150 North Korean agents were killed while attempting to infiltrate into the ROK from the sea.

(3). Other Chunchong & Cholla Province Infiltrators Ed Mullin wrote an incident in 1969, "Just around the time of that incident with the infiltrator boat there were three North Korean agents killed on the beach by Kunsan AB. They paddle ashore in flotation suits, they were spotted by the ROK Army and were killed in a fire fight." The Stars and Stripes article stated that the spy boat disguised as a fishing craft was captured and four infiltrators killed. The infiltrators were attempting to infiltrate Oshik-do 2 1/2 miles west of Kunsan -- and just outside the mouth of the Kumgang River and across from Kunsan AB. (47)

In Jul 1969 an infiltrator attempted to sabotage the JP-4 pipeline that ran from the harbor in Kunsan. The infiltrator was wounded.

On November 20, 1998, a North Korean high-speed spy boat (apparently a five-ton semi-submersible) got away from pursuers in South Korean waters near the west coast island of Kanghwa, aborting an apparent operation to infiltrate agents into or ferry agents back from the South. The boat, on which four to five agents were seen aboard through an infrared optical device, attempted to come ashore in the darkness. It wasn't chased after until four hours after it was detected, and it eventually escaped. After warning North Korea to cease "provocative actions," the South Korean Ministry of Defense disciplined six military officers for failing to capture or sink the boat. North Korea claimed innocence, saying that the South Korean charge was a premeditated anti-North Korean slander. This infiltration came on the day President Clinton landed in Seoul for talks with President Kim Dae Jung; it also coincided with the start of an inter-Korean tourism cooperation project involving scenic Mt. Kumgang (Diamond) north of the DMZ. (38) (55)

(4). Tonghae-area East Coast Infiltrators On the east coast, the North has used submarines, midget subs and semi-submersibles to insert infiltrators in recent years. The use of subs have been primarily along the east coast, but semi-submersibles have been known to be used on the west coast as well. On 18 September 1996, a North Korean Shark class submarine ran aground near Kang-nung and the crew were forced to abandon the ship and land on South Korea. The sub had two special forces agents who had finished a mission in South Korea and were picked up by the sub before the sub ran into a rock. 23 of the crew were killed in what appeared to be suicide-murder pact. The two men fought off an army of South Korean troops and remained at large for 53 days, during which time they killed 11 of the pursuers. One commando was captured, and one is believed to have escaped. (48) (53) Eleven crew members, clad in civilian clothes, were found dead and one, Lt. Lee Kang Soo (Li Gwang Su), 31, was captured while trying to pass through a village about two miles from the beach disguised as a S Korean villager. Lt. Lee told authorities that the sub lost power near Wonsan and drifted south and the crew was forced to abandon the ship. There were at least 25 people aboard the submarine. The 70-ton mini-sub is 60-foot long, made mostly of plastic to evade radar detection. A Czech-made machine gun, a North Korean-made automatic rifle, 175 rounds of ammunition, and 100 hand grenades were found. Clothes found aboard the vessel included three South Korean military uniforms. (39) (42)

After the two infiltrators were killed near the DMZ border, disclosures started to surface about the capabilities of the infiltrators and the incompetence of the South Korea searchers. The disclosures emerged from diaries and rolls of film found on the two spies when they were caught and killed. Authorities were accused of bungling the bloody hunt for 26 spies from the sub. Twenty-four were killed or found dead, one was captured and one escaped. Major newspapers criticized the "defect-punctured defense posture" where a taxi driver spots the sub instead of the Army units protecting the coast. In addition, there was sharp sharp criticism for a lack of coordination and several soldiers being killed by friendly fire. (50)

Because of the embarrassment, the investigation was swept under the carpet. The questions like: "Why were11 intruders were found dead together, all shot in the head, and why the three either killed or captured were found with just one pistol among them." The men were killed by automatic rifles, but no such weapons were found. South Korean intelligence officials have said the sub was manned by officers, including a colonel, from the North's special guerrilla forces. According to the captured agent, Lee Kang-soo, seven colleagues are unaccounted for, some of them espionage agents trained to survive for days in extreme situations. Two were involved in a shootout, but five were missing...yet the NIS stated only ONE was missing.

Diaries found on their bodies detailed their daily activities during the 49 days they were on the run, including a night at a crowded ski resort playing video games. The ski resort in Yongpyong, 18 miles from the submarine, was within what officials called an "airtight" zone set up by 60,000 South Korean soldiers, police and reservists.

Rolls of film the two men carried showed that the pair moved freely about and took pictures of many key military installations, including the headquarters of an army corps. According to their diaries, the two remained hidden nearly two weeks in underground shelters they dug in the side of a mountain and began moving north mostly during the daytime.

On the way, they ran into three civilians on a mountain and killed them with knives. They also strangled a South Korean army private who was collecting firewood. The private, initially listed as a deserter, was confirmed killed only after the body of one of the North Koreans was found dressed in his uniform. (50)

Over the years, there have been running gun battles between the ROK Navy and North Korea semi-submersibles that present a low-profile and are hard to spot. A semi-submersible resembles a submarine that is running along the surface with its body underwater and is exported by the North. (52)


Midget sub in tow

On June 22, 1998 a North Korean midget submarine was seized after it was spotted entangled in South Korean fishing nets off the South Korean town of Sokcho, south of the DMZ on the east coast. When brought to shore three days later, the nine crew aboard were found dead from an apparent group suicide. (38) The nine commandos were found shot to death inside the Yugo class submarine, the victims of an apparent murder-suicide.

Since the 1980s, the North Koreans have preferred to use midget subs to land infiltrators on the east coast as there is ample depth for submarine operations, as well as Taedong semi-submersibles. (30c) These semisubmersibles operate on the surface until near the insertion point, then ballast down and run in awash. They carry 6 including swimmers/saboteurs. The North has several 70-ton Yugo-class submarines, which normally carries four to five crewmen, for clandestine missions. In June 96, one of these subs was captured off the east coast. However, at times the larger submarines in the North Korean fleet is used. (29p) In 1995, a malfunctioning North Korean submarine was stranded on the South Korean east coast and only discovered when a taxi driver happened to be drive by. By the time the military arrived, the sub's crewmen were victims of murder/suicide. Three fled and two were killed but not after killing quite a few ROK soldiers and civilians in their flight. One was not recaptured. (48) (53)

On the west coast because of the tidal flats and the massive tides, the North continues to prefer the use of high-speed boats again disguised as fishing boats to land operatives on the outer islands. The boats are used to get the infiltrators within the range of shore where scuba gear and flotation devices can be used. Bodies of drowned infiltrators have been found on both coasts clad in scuba gear.

On 12 Jul 98 a body of a North Korean frogman was found on a beach south of the DMZ, along with paraphernalia suggesting an apparent infiltration/espionage mission. The body an infiltrator was found on a beach while attempting to land at Tonghae. The dead commando was found heavily armed with a machine gun, bayonet and hand grenade. A small underwater propulsion craft, capable of carrying 3 people was found nearby. Two other agents suspected of landing at same time because the type of underwater propulsion system is designed for three people. A villager reported two men in military fatigues with backpacks, but no infiltrators were found.

(5). Southern Coast of Korea Infiltrators On 19 Dec 1998 the ROK Navy sank an underwater North Korean semi-submersible spy vessel in a gunbattle off the South Korean coast which left at least one suspected infiltrator dead. The ROK forces chased the craft, carrying several commandos, in a 100 km high-seas pursuit lasting seven hours. (54) The spy vessel was first detected approaching the shore under cover of darkness by an Army coast guard in Yosu, South Cholla Province, some 2km off the coast, through an infrared optical device at around 11:15 p.m. Dec. 17. Army and Maritime Police patrol boats rushed to the scene, but the spy boat fled southeastward. They lost its track for about two hours. A Navy radar spotted the spy boat again at around 2:20 a.m. the next day, and then eight navy patrol boats, P-3C and S-2E anti-submarine aircraft and Lynx helicopters began to chase it down. An Air Force CN-235 aircraft dropped 170 flare bombs in the vicinity of the vessel, while a F-5 fighter hovered over the area. Naval ships once approached the spy boat as close as 100 meters, demanding the crew to surrender. But they ignored the warning and opened fire, slightly damaging a South Korean Navy patrol boat. The spy boat sank after being hit by 76-mm shells and depth charges nearly seven hours after it was first spotted. A North Korean frogman, with a hand grenade in his pocket, was recovered at around 8:10 a.m. He had sustained injuries to the head. No South Korean troops were wounded in the pre-dawn chase. (55)

The JCS said the submersible's mission was likely aimed at picking up or landing armed North Korean agents in the South. The five-ton semi-submersible, which usually carries a crew of six, was suspected to have come from the port of Nampo, North Korea and was typical of those used by North Korea for covert operations, a JCS official said.

The intrusion into South Korean waters is the latest since South Korea failed to catch a similar spy boat in the shallow West Sea off the island of Kanghwa on Nov. 20 last year. The boat, on which four to five agents were seen aboard through an infrared optical device, attempted to come ashore in the darkness. It wasn't chased after until four hours after it was detected, and it eventually escaped. Six officers were punished for the boat's escape. (55)

In March 1999, the semi-submersible was salvaged and four bodies, not two as previously believed, and hundreds of weapons and ammunition were retrieved from inside the salvaged North Korean spy boat raised a 150 meters from the sea. The body count for the boat's crew rose to six. Two other bodies had been found earlier. The first one was found floating in the South Sea on Dec. 18 when the spy vessel went down after being hit by South Korean Navy fire during an overnight chase. The second body was discovered on Jan. 22 by Navy divers at the bottom of the sea, with its leg tied by a rope to the sunken boat. The spy vessel, an upgraded SP-10H model, belongs to the Operations Department of the North Korean Workers' (Communist) Party. Unlike older semi-submersible models, it can dive up to 20 meters and cruise at a maximum speed of 50 knots through the use of three powerful engines. It has two hatches and four rudders used for underwater navigation and is covered with special paint to help it evade radar detection (55)

The Defense Ministry allowed the media to view the inventory of contents recovered from the ship at a ministry compound. Among the equipment were 724 pieces of weaponry, communications equipment, wet suits and other stuff taken off the North Korean boat or from the bodies of its crew. Included in the list were four Czech-made submachine guns, an RPG-7 anti-tank gun, a 17-kg TNT can for self-destruction, a U.S.-made portable global positioning system (GPS) device, eight hand grenades, AK assault rifle ammunition, a walkie-talkie set, suicide poison capsules, a map of the southern coast, and compressed rations.

Of particular notice was the GPS, which was the size of a cellular phone. It was the first one of its kind found in an infiltration ship, the Defense Ministry said. One million yen and 568,000 South Korean won were also retrieved from the bodies. A ministry official induced that the infiltrators were attempting to either pick up a spy or land one. The mission appeared to be a failure, the official concluded, because no signs of infiltration were discovered during searches conducted after the ship was first detected.

Because such spy vessels cannot make the long journey from the North alone, ministry officials suspect that a 50 to 100 ton mother ship had dropped it near the South Korean coast. The Navy had searched for the mother ship after the spy boat was spotted, but turned up empty. The mother boat would have most logically come from the North Korean port of Nampo on the west coast, cruised along the open seas between Korea and China, and then dropped off its cargo in the open seas some fives days after it would have left Nampo, the ministry official said.

The spy boat was first detected by an Army coast guard unit in Yosu, South Cholla Province, at around 11:15 p.m. Dec. 17 through infrared surveillance equipment. Navy patrol ships and Air Force helicopters and fighters rushed to the scene to start a seven-hour chase. The spy boat ignored repeated warnings to surrender and opened fired at the South Korean patrol boats. An examination of the ship showed that a 76-mm naval gun shell had struck its engine room, causing it to go down in seas about 100km southeast of Yosu.

North Korea routinely sends spy boats and submarines to the South to collect intelligence or deliver secret agents. A similar boat was spotted in November in the West Sea off the island of Kanghwa but it escaped back to the North. In June last year, a North Korean submarine was caught in a fishing net in the South Korean waters off the east coast. All the nine crew members were found to have killed themselves. (55)

Infiltrations have also been through Cheju Island. On 20 Aug 1968, a North Korean spy boat was intercepted off Cheju Island. 12 North Koreans were killed and 2 captured. The latest was recorded by Kim Dong-shik who was captured in Puyo.

He first entered South Korea on May 30, 1990 through the coastline of Pomok-dong, Cheju Island. He made contact with Lee Sun-shil. Lee was a high-ranking agent, 22nd in the North Korean Workers' Party hierarchy, who had already built an underground subversion cell dubbed 'Namhan Chosun Workers' Party's Central Region, Chapter in South Korea. Kim worked with Lee for five months, before escorting returning agent Hwang In-ho to North Korea via Kanghwa Island near Inchon.

Aug. 29, 1995 , Kim Dong-shik and Park Kwang-nam left Nampo, North Korea in a vessel disguised as a fishing boat. On 2 Sep. 1995 they infiltrated at Onpyong-ri coast of Cheju Island. They proceeded to the Songnam, Kyongi Province. Later, Kim was captured in Puyo on 24 Oct. 1995 and Park shot to death. (39)

---

F. Computers: The New Age of Espionage

We believe that the use of the internet has created a situation where the North Koreans have almost unlimited opportunity to gain access to state secrets -- and industrial secrets as well. The advantages to North Korean operatives are obvious. No longer will the high-risk job of gathering information be required. The North Korean spy network can "gather" the information through hackers operating in North Korea -- and only use the deep-cover spies to "verify" the information which is a much safer task. Instead of debriefing the deep-cover spies in North Korea, the internet provides an ideal source for "real-time" requests for information. Because the elimination of the physical interface between infiltrator and deep-cover spies -- as well as, the problems involved in being transported to North Korea -- the risks are reduced dramatically.

Prior to the 1990s, Korea was heavily absorbed in its heavy industries, but with rising labor costs and other factors, South Korea looked to ways to improve its high-tech industries. Soon the Korean companies invested heavily in chip manufacturing and as an extension computer technologies. However, it took a while to gear up, but by the mid-1990s, Korea stepped into the forefront of chip manufacturing.

South Korea Background: The personal computer has been around Korea since they were first introduced as the PC versions but were considered too expensive for the common man-on-the-street. Instead, the Video Game Rooms gained popularity with the "gaming" fever that swept the young. However, by the early 1990s, with the support of the government to provide inexpensive computers to the populace, the home computers in Korea became big business. When President KimYoung-sam assumed the reins of South Korea's government in 1993, he announced that internationalization would be its main focus. Accordingly, Kim formulated aggressive policies to facilitate a digital revolution, in preparation for the dawn of the 21st century. Thus was born "Korea Cyber-21" a vision to put a computer in every home. As a result of this program and a thriving economy, personal computers began to proliferate in South Korea -- almost to the point of obsession. (58t)

Once considered a luxury item in South Korea, personal computers quickly infiltrated the educational community, partly because the smaller computer manufacturers came out with lower-priced models that targeted the college-student market. Universities insisted that students word-process most of their reports and dissertations, forcing them to use computers even if they were not so inclined. Schools and manufacturers launched joint campaigns featuring laptop computers at half the market price. Inexpensive night and summer computer courses were offered at universities. Students learned how to operate personal computers and use application software. (58t)

PCs also began to appear in high schools and middle schools. Projects were initiated to encourage elementary-school students to take advantage of the possibilities offered by the Internet. For instance, in response to the government's computerization policy, South Korea's leading newspaper (Chosun Ilbo) ran a 1995 campaign called "KidNet" to motivate children to use the Internet. The campaign's slogan was "South Korea may have been slow to industrialize, but we will lead the world in computerization." To nurture the future leaders of the 21st century's "computerized society," elementary-school students were familiarized with the Internet. Chosun Ilbo proved exceedingly useful in popularizing personal computers at compulsory educational institutions. The newspaper carried articles about Kidnet, ran a page devoted to the Internet and installed PCs at schools in outlying areas. (58t)

The Kim Dae-jung administration publicly promised to give priority to computer-assisted education, but the days of heavy investment died down. However, IMF (International Monetary Fund) economic crisis in South Korea caused personal computer sales to decline. Public obsession with computers ebbed as well. Despite the downturn, the government continued to earmark funding for specific IT sectors -- ebusiness, semi-conductor manufacturing, etc. Despite the slowdown caused by the IMF conditions, the seeds had been planted in the schools and a new computer-literate batch of kids was born...one's who view their non-computer literate parents as "kom (computer) men (blind)." (58t)

However, though inexpensive computers started appearing in the mid-1990s, the biggest drawback outside of Seoul was the telecommunications linkages. Before 1995, most of the telephone lines in Korea were too "dirty" with noise to facilitate the internet in Korea. However, soon after the lines were "cleaned up" through improvements in the telephone system, the internet use increased in Korea. At first computer connections were limited to modem connections through telephone lines. And usage suffered as the relatively high cost of telephone services using modems. Then the DSL cable appeared on the scene and the market exploded. At first only limited to Seoul, the services soon expanded to other small and mid-sized towns.

The Korean government fostered the distribution of inexpensive Internet PCs. (58d) In 2002, 53 percent of all households had a computer. In 2003, 78 percent of all households had a computer. (58i) South Korea became one of the world's most Internet-savvy nations with more than half of its 47 million people having access to the Internet. The South Korean market for desktop personal computers was worth KRW2,400 billion (or US$1.9 billion) in 2002, having declined by 5.0% since 2001. Computer peripherals were the largest sector in the market, accounting for 60.0% of value sales in 2002. These included printers, TFT LCD screens and CD ROMs. Samsung Electronics Co Ltd was the largest player in the desktop personal computer market in 2002 with 33.8% of market share. (58t)

By promoting the distribution of inexpensive Internet PCs, numbers of PC users and online subscribers as well as sales of electronic shopping malls are increasing. (58d) But soon the advent of broadband services (DSL cables) to homes, the internet exploded. However, it was recognized in 2001 there was a deficiency in uniform actions by the government and the ISPs (servers). In addition, nationally there were signs that an unhealthy computer culture was developing. (58b) South Koreans are the world's most avid Internet surfers, followed by people in Hong Kong and the United States, according to Nielsen/NetRatings. A monthly study released in August 2001 by the measurement service showed that surfers in South Korea spent an average of 19 hours and 20 minutes online in July 2001, topping the list in Internet usage. In Korea, the most popular activity was the use of search engines and portals followed by accessing sites relating to the Internet, technology or telecommunications. The entertainment sites ranked third. The study also found South Korea surfers had an average of 26 sessions on the Internet. (58l) A Korean phenomena -- the PC Room (PC Baang) -- has also come into being because its connections are faster than most home-modem setups and the cost is relatively inexpensive at about $1/hour. (58v)

Information Technology (IT) has been a driving force in the South Korean transformation into an information based society. General trend of IT usage is growing with the domestic demand for computers (PC) increasing significantly since 1998. Demand for PCs increased notably due to the government's policy which promote distribution of Internet PCs for the public by introducing inexpensive Internet PCs. (58i) Unfortunately for the North Koreans, they are well-behind their South Korean counterparts. Computers are luxury items in the North and only special units are provided them. Internet cafes only came into being in Pyongyang within the last few years. But their significance is appreciated even by Kim Jong-il who promised that each North Korean army unit would receive a computer. The North has realized the computer's significance in a modern society and is trying to play catchup. Towards this end, the North entered the computer age recognizing its value in propaganda dissemination and hacking to obtain secrets by setting up a special army unit of hackers.

North Korea Background: In North Korea, the first Western computers brought into the North in 1981 were the Japanese-made Z-80. Although some citizens and special agencies had earlier brought into the country a few different models, the Z-80 was the first brought in in in any significant quantities. The North imported a large number of Z-80s for the purpose of making book management automatic at the People's Grand Study Hall (equivalent to the Central National Library in the South). (58q)

According to Cho Myung Chol, ex-professor at Kim Il Sung University, North Korea's history of computer games began at this juncture, as the computers were accompanied by a variety of games. Quickly the computer games spread across the country as other universities subsequently introduced computers -- including Kim Il Sung University and Kim Chaek University of Technology. The games, though primitive by tody's standards, fascinated the students merely as an entertainments. However, the party ordered an investigation of all computer game programs, stressing, "The enemies, using such a cunning method, are incessantly scheming to disrupt us from the inside." It is still the policy to censor all games to this day. (58q)

The western "experts" continue to call North Korea as a "technologically backward country." When dealing with the masses, they are correct. The new Internet Cafes in Pyongyang are for the privileged classes while the rest are computer illiterates. The military units are connected to an "intranet" system via computers, but not on the scale of the South Korean military. However when dealing with computer specialists, it is a different story. If a country is capable of developing nuclear technology, it most certainly has the capability to develop computer specialists. In 2002 at an exhibition of North Korean software in Beijing, Associated Press stated that about 100 software products are presented at the exhibition, and the range is really very wide, from translator software to video games. "North Korea is planning to achieve considerable success on the market of e-commerce, biotechnology, and machine intelligence software. Director of the North Korean Academy of Sciences Li Chen Jin says that the government provides large-scale funding to support science, thus making for a rapid upturn of the Korean IT-industry." (58s)

Mobile Phones and Digital Cameras The number of mobile telephones -- cellular phones and Personal Communication Service (PCS) -- have increased significantly since 1993. Korea ranked 7th in the world in terms of mobile telephone (cellular and PCS) subscribers. (58i) The small hand-held cell phone with its digital camera function is an amazing tool. To a North Korean operative, the device is a spy's dream tool. It can capture images for the transmittal of real-time data with low-risk of interception of data. Unless one is being monitored, the chances of being caught is very low. In fact, in the U.S. cell phones with digital cameras are now banned in many sensitive areas of business and the military. In the military, the cell phones are being banned in operational areas (such as Iraq) by the military under the guidelines of Operational Security (Opsec).

Even North Korea may have realized its effectiveness as a "spy tool" -- but more likely that it like the computer was a tool to access information of the internet. North Korea's mobile service began in November 2002, with products from Motorola Corp. of the United States and Nokia Corp. of Finland on the market in Pyongyang. In June 2004, the North Korean government has banned and recalled mobile phones from locals about a year and a half after it started providing the service. As late as May 2004, North Koreans were seen using mobile phones last month when the two Koreas held minister-level rapprochment talks. Experts believe North Korea introduced the mobile technology to make communications convenient but later realized the device caused floods of foreign culture into the reclusive country. Kim Yeon-Chul, an analyst at Korea University's Asiatic Research Center in Seoul, told Yonhap: "The North Korean authorities would be able to partially control the more-than-wanted distribution of information, at the same time enabling (a mobile phone's) role in communication. "But it's difficult at the moment to give a clear definition to the policy, because the subjects of the ban and its boundary are not clearly known." (58o)

But the phones also give access to the internet. There are more than 27 million Internet enabled phones in South Korea. And wireless gaming, a sector that increases airtime minutes substantially, is huge. According to Ovum, as much as 45 percent of mobile users in South Korea play wireless games. (58w)

However, the home-grown South Korean CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) technology has a weakness that transmissions on their cell phones can be intercepted -- making eavesdropping on conversations possible. It was for this reason that the USFK imported 1,000 cell phones for use by their key personnel -- instead of the Korean versions. The 8th Army's decision was to strengthen its security against terrorist activities. The U.S. 8th Army asked for cooperation from SK Telecom in March 2003 to let them use 1,000 phones made by Qualcomm in the United States, model Qsec 800. Though the ministry was never asked to grant permission, it conveyed messages that it would deny the request. The handsets were developed by Qualcomm and the National Security Agency. The U.S. government is calling for the security officials in the U.S. military and other agencies to use the scrambled communication equipment that comply with NSA standards. (58k)

Unfortunately, the Korean government is heavily invested in its own CDMA technology and cannot extricate itself from the dilemma of security versus supporting home-grown products. South Korean operators launched their CDMA2000 1X services way back in the fourth quarter of 2001. Seoul had earlier insisted that it was impossible to eavesdrop on communications over CDMA phones. An expert in the communications industry said that because Qualcomm, which developed the core technology for CDMA, developed these scrambled phones, it is clear that CDMA phones can be eavesdropped upon. (58k)

Incidentally, special chips can turn cell phones into so-called "spy phones," eavesdropping devices that can secretly and suddenly turn into microphones. The spy phones are sold worldwide, with the main customers being wealthy wives in China and Taiwan looking to catch their philandering husbands in the act. A special chip is inserted into an ordinary cellphone, and the phone's software is altered so that when the phone is called from a certain number, it will answer automatically without ringing, vibrating or lighting up, turning the phone into a bugging device that picks up any nearby sound. Though illegal in the U.S., some European spy phone vendors have touted the phones as a way to monitor teenagers. What is remarkable about the spy phone is that it can be turned on virtually anytime and anyplace, as long as the phone is on and the battery is charged. (58j)

Hacking and Viruses Though computers are a blessing for decreasing workloads, they are also vulnerable. As increases in per capita PC usage increased, so did the number of incidents of virus and hacking. Korea ranks number one in computer usage worldwide, but its ills with hacking and viruses have also compounded their problems. In 1997, there were 64; in 1998, 154; in 1999, 574; in 2000, 1943 (DDoS); in 2001, 5333 (MSQ Spida); in 2002, 15,912 (Root DNS Attack Open/Proxy, Child Porn); and in 2003, 28,179 (MS Vulnerabilities (Slammer/Blaster)). (58d)

In fact, the Korean system is a perfect example of "holes." (58) In 2001, the ROK Network Information Center (NIC) started to plan for this type of espionage under the Korean Information Security Agency (KISA) in response to hacking and virus. The Defense Security Command coordinates its efforts through the KISA to monitor cyber-attacks involving hacking attempts. The primary reason that hackers in Korea have achieved great successes was because of a lack of computer security consciousness on the part of computer managers. (58d) In other words, the computers were not updated with the latest "fixes" for operating systems (OS) vulnerabilities.

A national monitoring network was established in Korea in cooperation with ISPs to indicate problems with hacking/virus to isolate area. However, it appears that the monitoring is only done in a triangle stretching from Seoul to Pusan to Yeosu and back to Seoul. That leaves about one half of Korea unmonitored.

Industrial espionage on the part of the North would be aimed at fostering disruptions in the South Korean economy and unrest in the populace. The business espionage on the part of the North would be aimed at fostering disruptions in the South Korean economy and unrest in the populace. The companies most susceptible would be those with their own servers in the power, energy and financial services.

In April 2004, it was announced that North Korea had recently developed an anti-hacking software program called "Neung ra Firewall" capable of protecting computer information resources. The program was developed by the Neung ra Information Communication Service belonging to the Neung ra Company, according to the May edition of monthly Fatherland, a publication of Jochong ryeon, the pro-Pyongyang Korean residents association based in Japan. (58r) Using the idea of "reverse-engineering" that the North is famous for, one can assume that the knowledge gained in hacking into systems was used to construct the "Neung-ra Firewall." (58q)

The aim of the Roh Moo-hyun administration was to transform Korea into a "financial hub" with the key selling point being the internet in Korea. In fact, the ground breaking for the housing center to attract foreign business to Seoul was done in May 2004. However, the possibility of being hacked into increases with the use of the DSL cable connections. Thus with the introduction of the DSL cable in Korea the potential for "industrial espionage" increased significantly. Unless one has a personal firewall in addition to some intrusion detection software and anti-virus protection, the security on one's computers is inadequate. But simply having the software installed is not enough -- one must also ensure the latest updates are installed on the computers. (58g) This is the biggest failure of users -- the failure to update their systems against the latest vulnerabilities.

In June 2004, South Korea launched an investigation into suspected espionage in the high-tech industry after a string of attempts to sell secret company information to overseas sources. The probe was aimed at preventing possible industrial espionage in the fields of mobile phones, semiconductors and flat-panel displays, where South Korean companies have a competitive edge. (58x)

Also if only one computer in this intranet setup has a vulnerability (entry port where a hacker can enter), the whole system is compromised. In Korea, various viruses have wrecked havoc on the computers -- especially those in schools. The main reason was the failure of the users to maintain the security of their computers. For example, in the Korean school system, the computers are hooked up using a Local Area Network (LAN) system. In Korea, mandatory Internet training in schools starting from primary level began in 2001. However, despite being behind a firewall, the most common complaint is that the computers repeatedly "crash" because of being infected by computer viruses. This is the teachers' biggest complaint. The LAN system offers no protection if the administrators do not apply the latest "patches" or "fixes" to block these vulnerabilities. In the past, viruses have entered through known vulnerabilities that the administrators did not "patch."

The problem with most systems in Korea is "interconnectivity." In other words, most government systems are interconnected in intranet networks. However, many times a computer is connected to the internet -- which allows the hacker access to the intranet. This is a major vulnerability. If a hacker penetrates the firewall -- and many have -- the can gain access to the full extent to the secrets of the closed loop intranet.

A Rand Corporation report in April 1998, prepared for the US Air Force, recommends that the Pentagon stop modernizing all computer systems and communications links. The report's authors are former officials from the US Secret Service and the CIA's counterterrorism center. "Full interconnectivity may in fact allow cyberterrorists to enter where they could not [before]," it says. The report warns that terrorism "will focus on urban areas with strong political and operational constraints" -- meaning it will target major population and business centers like New York City. "The Internet -- and the window to it, the computer terminal -- have become two of the most important pieces of equipment in the extremists' arsenals, not only allowing them to build membership and improve organization, but to strike alliances with people and groups, even a decade ago, that they might never have known about or been able to easily communicate with," says a report prepared in April 1998 for the Chemical Manufacturers Association. (58m)

During a real-live situation in Korea, there is a distinct possibility that hackers will have limited success in shutting down or affecting communication between units. However, the USFK is confident that the upper-level Command and Control functions will not be affected. Tests performed during CONUS exercises have shown that hackers can have success in shutting down servers at the lower echelons or tactical units.

Email and Viruses In November 2003, North Korea promised a "secure" email service which "guarantees the privacy of correspondence." North Korea, which had virtually shut out the world of the Internet, has begun opening its electronic borders in recent years. The new email service is provided by Pyongyang's International Communications Centre, according to its official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). The brief KCNA dispatch from the provided few details on how to subscribe to the service. Few ordinary North Koreans are believed to have computer and email access. TV sets and radios come with fixed channels so that people can only watch or listen to government-controlled media. (58p)

Foreign visitors can link their computers to the Internet through international phone lines available in a few hotels in Pyongyang. An Internet cafe has also opened in the North Korean capital, according to recent visitors. (58p) However, these internet connections are foreign consumption and for the privileged class of Pyongyang society as the costs are well-outside the range for the normal North Korean.

North Korea's debut on the Internet poses a new security threat to South Korea. Starting in 1996, the ANSP stated that South Korean college students used email to pass information to North Korean spies. (2) Since that time the computer markets have exploded with Korea being at the top of the computer literate nations in the world. South Korea is among the world's most Internet-savvy nations with more than half of its 47 million people having access to the Internet. In 2001, prosecutors arrested six South Korean activists for exchanging unauthorised emails with North Korean officials. South Korea encourages economic and cultural exchanges with North Korea. (58p) But it remains illegal for South Koreans to exchange emails and letters with North Koreans without government permission.

Tracing links is no longer so easy. PC Rooms (PC Baangs) and immense internet traffic make it a near impossibility to identify any espionage without someone tipping the authorities first. South Korea has some 22,000 Internet cafes, also known as PC rooms. Many PC rooms are open 24 hours, but no minors are allowed after 10 pm. According to one survey, 25% of all Koreans access the Net from a public establishment, each person spending about two hours online every session. PC Rooms are popular because they are inexpensive, convenient and provide faster Internet access (with its DSL cable as compared to the telephone modem at home). (58v)

By responding by email from a PC Room to mailboxes on such free mailboxes (i.e., Hanmail.net), the risk of detection is reduced. This method also eliminates communications via radio transmitters that must be secreted and then used at night in such places as the Han River Park. The radio transmissions to the North can be picked up by radio scanners operating in the known frequency spectrums of infiltrators/spies. By using emails, the radio transmissions are eliminated.

But emails can also be used to accomplish a cyber-attack of the Korean internet through viruses or worms. Supposedly in 2004, Spam and viruses make up about 90 percent of Korean email. Consider the value to North Korean operatives of spreading a virus throughout Korea that knockout email communications at a critical period. Viruses are primarily spread by emails. Most Koreans now have a firewall or anti-virus program installed as a package when they purchase their computer. Unfortunately, many do not update nor properly use these programs leaving their computers unprotected. E-mail security companies estimate that between one-third and two-thirds of unwanted messages are relayed unwittingly by PC owners who set up software incorrectly or fail to secure their machines. Within these are the viruses. Hundreds of thousands of computers worldwide were infected by the "SoBig" worm and other viruses that are programmed to spawn gateways, known technically as "proxies" to relay spam.

The South Korean activists are all familiar with "bombing" a website with emails as a strategy to "crash" a website -- as it did when Apollo Ono won the Gold at the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City in 2002 and the Koreans forced the closure of the Olympics Committee website. The Korean activists also used it also to attempt to "bomb" the White House website as well during the March 2003 Iraq War furor in Korea. The idea is to overload a web site server with too many emails forcing it to slow down or crash. These are called "denial-of-service" (DoS) attacks. The most popular has been against U.S. government sites, and a DoS attacks in the past have slowed down White House Web servers. Even Korea had a spate of DoS attacks in 2000.

However, we believe the North will not use this method, but simply find ways of replicating emails to simply clog the servers and force a slow-down of the system, which in turn will snowball as the "SQL Slammer" did in 2003. This has the same effect as a DoS attack. As Korea Telecom (KT) handles most business server accounts in Korea because of its virtual monopoly granted by the ROK government, KT Hyehwa service in Seoul will be the primary target. In 2003, the "SQL Slammer" nearly brought Korea to its knees in an attack on KT Hyehwa service in Seoul.

Any Internet-connected computer could be running a proxy spam relay, but most of the malicious programs are written specifically for PCs that run Windows -- which has a monopoly in Korea. In Korea, Windows market share was 86.1 percent in 2002 and 96.1 percent in 2003. (58d) In the past, some spammers had sought out and exploited Internet-connected computers with misconfigured networking software. The latest and growing threat is code purposely written to create spam relay proxies in order to spread by malicious viruses. (58b)

In the past, Spammers looked for "open ports" to act as relays for their SPAM. For example an email server belonging to a hospital in South Korea had an open port and was acting as a relay for SPAM. When the SPAM was reported to the ISP and the hospital administrator, it was fixed. However, the new Spammers are getting smarter. (58c)

Stymied by a more concerted effort by ISPs to lock down their Internet mail servers, the spammers turned to the less vigorously protected home machines. (58b) In Korea's case this turned out to be most of the school computers that were simply set up and connected to the internet instead of being linked as a protected LAN (local area network) with a firewall or anti-virus protection. In essence, the schools were simply given computers without directives as to how to hook them up -- and without software to protect the computers. Recently, a child pornography SPAM site was identified as a Korean middle school computer which was a proxy SPAM relay. In another instance, the Korean education system "crashed" due to a computer virus spread from one computer to another. In the end, about 40 percent of the Korean education system's computers crashed. The list goes on and on.

The vulnerabilities of the Korean internet system was seen in 2003. Part of the problem was that most of the major ISPs used the Korea Telecom (KT) as a business server because of Korea's "protectionism" by allowing Korea Telecom (KT) a virtual lock as a business server sector. It was this reason that the "SQL Slammer" had the ability to shut down much of Korea's business internet connections. A worm call "Sapphire" or "SQL Slammer" carried a self-regenerating mechanism that enabled it to rapidly spread and bog down Internet traffic across the globe -- and crippled online services in Korea, one of the world's most wired countries in 2003. (58e)

Security experts blamed the worm for crashing almost all Internet services in South Korea. It was the first time South Korea's broadband and mobile Internet services have been shut down on such a scale, although hackers are fairly active in the country where 70 percent of households have Internet access. "It is highly likely hackers have launched an all-out attack on the country's Internet system," Yonhap news agency quoted an official of the Ministry of Information and Communication as saying. ...

The biggest impact appeared to be in South Korea, where police were called in to investigate. The infestation brought down the entire Internet service of the country's largest ISP, KT Corp, a company spokesman said. He said services were down for several hours in the afternoon but were recovering. However, the networks of number two operator Hanaro Telecom Inc and number three Thrunet Co were still experiencing trouble. The crash was triggered by a huge volume of transmissions flowing into KT's Hyehwa service in Seoul, officials said. All of South Korea's major high-speed Internet services use the KT server, so all suffered the same interruption. (58e)

"Digitizing" Korea and C4ISR Korean government has tried to create an efficient government by "digitizing" the government data and reorganizing work processes with information technology as the primary tool. (58i) The ROK Armed Forces have successfully digitized munitions and logistics and proceeded rapidly with digitization of the maintenance service system, administrative support system, and personnel education. (58h) Because of the importance of the C4ISR in the battlefield situation, the North Korean intelligence has to be very interested in penetrating these systems.

The development in science and technologies in South Korea was enabled mainly by the advances in IT technologies, but have also brought about a change in the warfare strategies from saturation bombing and physical espionage of old to precision targeting and paralysis of intelligence systems in the new era. The more a nation's defense relies on information technologies, however, the more vulnerable its security will be, said Chung Koo-don, a researcher at the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA). ``We understand the North's hacking skills stand at a high level, having little difficulty in paralyzing Internet networks by spreading virulent computer viruses or penetrating the online systems,'' Chung told The Korea Times. (56)

Information Technology (IT) has been the driving force in the area of C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, and Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance systems). However, there are "holes" by virtue that these are new systems where the bugs have not been worked out. The ROK MND has opted to develop their own systems based on the lessons learned from other countries attempts in the area -- rather than purchase off-the-shelf foreign systems. However, like any new system, there will be inherent weaknesses that hackers will take advantage of.

Information Technology (IT) is the "driving force behind the ongoing defense digitization and unfolding revolution in military affairs in the ROK armed forces, causing transformational changes in weapons systems, especially the C4ISR (command, control, communications, and computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems) organizational structures, and military doctrine." C4ISR was implemented from the top-down starting in 1991. C4ISR systems are indispensable for the development of the knowledge-based defense system, especially for the creation of the Common Operational Picture (COP) for integrated air, sea, and ground operations, which is the key to success in modern network-centric warfare.(58h)

At the tactical level, the ROK military began to construct a digitalized defense infrastructure by improving mobile telecommunication system for tactical units in the field. In general, the ROK MND approach is that it is more desirable to cultivate powerful software rather than to construct deluxe physical hardware systems because of budgetary limitations, technological constraints, and rapid IT advances in the commercial sector. (58h) (See Korea Marching to Their Own Drum: C4ISR for details on C4ISR.)

On 27 May 2004, Yonhap News quoted Defense Security Command (DSC) officials as saying that top graduates from Kim Il-Sung Military Academy, a military intelligence college, are handpicked and given intensive training in computer-related skills before being assigned to the hackers' unit. The DSC said last year that North Korea was training about 100 specialized hackers a year. Their tasks are to get into the computer networks run by ROK government agencies and research institutes and to attack computer systems when necessary. (56) However, some U.S. military agencies are skeptical of the North Korean hacker threat, (58m)

According to the opinions of those who monitor the North Korean military threat, although online terrorism from the North could pose a threat, Seoul's assessment of the reclusive nation's cyber warfare capability may be an overestimate. John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, warned that South Korea is a good target for Pyongyang in cyberspace. Peter Hayes, executive director of the Nautilus Institute, which published a study on North Korea's IT aspirations in 2002, echoed Pike's remarks. ``Clearly, there is an excellent programming capacity in the DPRK, including highly commercial and competitive capabilities,'' Hayes said in another e-mail interview. ``Obviously, the DPRK will be concerned both to counter cyber warfare directed at their intra-nets and to take the cyber-offensive during wartime. Thus, it would be prudent to assume that they have such a capacity.'' However, both felt the comparison to the U.S. CIA was an over-estimation. (56a)

The following article is from Brian McWilliams June 2003 article, "North Korea's School for Hackers" (58m):

North Korea's School for Hackers

In North Korea's mountainous Hyungsan region, a military academy specializing in electronic warfare has been churning out 100 cybersoldiers every year for nearly two decades.

Graduates of the elite hacking program at Mirim College are skilled in everything from writing computer viruses to penetrating network defenses and programming weapon guidance systems.

Or so South Korea's government would have the world believe.

Since at least 1994, military and intelligence officials in Seoul have warned of the growing threat posed by the "infowar" academy to the north, which they say was founded in the 1980s and is also known as the Automated Warfare Institute.

Most recently, South Korea's Defense Security Command raised the specter of Mirim at a cybersecurity seminar in mid-May, where a South Korean general noted that North Korea is "reinforcing its cyberterror capabilities."

Yet Pentagon and State Department officials say they are unable to confirm South Korea's claims that Mirim or any other North Korean hacker academy even exists.

And some U.S. defense experts accuse South Korea of hyping the cyber threat posed by its northern neighbor, which they claim is incapable of seriously disrupting the U.S. military.

"The KPA (Korean People's Army) is still predominantly an analog and vacuum-tube force," said Alexandre Mansourov, a professor at the Pentagon's Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. "We tend to overestimate the level of information-technology expertise in the North Korean military, and South Korea is especially guilty of this."

Representatives of South Korea's National Intelligence Service, as well as its Institute for Defense Analyses and Information Security Agency, did not respond to requests for more information about Mirim College or North Korea's information warfare capability.

Outside North Korea little is known about secretive Pyongyang's current infowar prowess, according to John Pike, president of GlobalSecurity.org, which maintains an online guide to North Korea's military.

But Pike said the militaristic nation, which spends much of its gross national product on defense, undoubtedly is working to digitize its military.

"It's not the sort of thing that a spy satellite is going to pick up," said Pike. "But even if the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) can't feed its own people, it's quite capable of developing and using the full spectrum of modern weaponry, including cyber."

Indeed, the regime in North Korea would be grossly negligent if it failed to beef up its information warfare capability, according to Mansourov. Its adversary South Korea, one of the most wired nations in the world, makes no secret that preparing for infowar is a top military priority, he said.

In its 2000 annual report, South Korea's Ministry of National Defense said a 5 percent budget increase was allocated mainly for projects such as "the buildup of the core capability needed for coping with advanced scientific and information warfare."

The report also revealed that South Korea's military has 177 "computer training facilities" and had trained more than 200,000 "information technicians."

Meanwhile, in North Korea the lack of basic necessities, such as a reliable electrical grid, presents huge obstacles to creating an information-technology infrastructure, according to Peter Hayes, executive director of the Nautilus Institute, which published a recent study of North Korea's IT aspirations.

Trade sanctions -- not to mention North Korea's guiding philosophy of "juche," or self-reliance -- have further isolated the DPRK from the Internet and many technological advances, said Hayes.

As a result, North Korea has been assigned only two "class C" blocks of Internet addresses, none of which currently appear active, according to data from the American Registry for Internet Numbers and Asia Pacific Network Information Centre. The DPRK's limited connection to the Internet reportedly comes from satellite links provided by a company in South Korea, and by land lines from China.

Similarly, North Korea's designated top-level domain, .kp, never has been implemented. The nation has only a handful of websites -- the most sophisticated being an online gambling site -- none of which are hosted in North Korea. Servers in China and Japan host the sites.

While Net surfing is available only to a privileged few of the 22 million North Koreans, leader Kim Jong Il is said to be a big fan of information technology. The dictator surprised many when he asked Secretary of State Madeleine Albright for her e-mail address during a historic visit in 2000.

Yet, despite being mostly disconnected from the Internet, North Korea reportedly has developed a vast intranet linking government offices throughout the country.

The DPRK has software development expertise that is "competent, if not world class," according to Hayes. He notes that programmers in North Korea's Pyongyang Informatics Center have done contract work for local governments and businesses in Japan and South Korea to develop a wide variety of software.

In fact, some in the Department of Defense have recently considered North Korea a viable infowar threat. In a 1997 Pentagon war game called "Eligible Receiver," National Security Agency computer specialists posed as North Korean hackers and reportedly were able to disrupt command-and-control elements of the U.S. Pacific Command.

The following year, Pentagon adviser and Rand consultant John Arquilla concocted a fictional scenario, published in Wired magazine, of a global cyberwar engineered by -- whom else -- the North Koreans.

In March 2001, a task force of the Defense Science Board concluded (PDF) that the Department of Defense was unable to defend itself "from an information operations attack by a sophisticated nation state adversary."

Experts are split, however, on whether North Korea's hacker-soldiers currently pose a serious threat to the U.S. military.

Should war occur on the Korean peninsula, a cyberattack by North Korea could disrupt the ability of U.S. troops to provide support, according to Arquilla. Such an attack would not necessarily emanate from North Korea's limited network.

"There are many places around the world from which (North Korea) could conduct cyberwar, places that have all the connectivity needed, and more," said Arquilla.

Arquilla said highly automated U.S. military processes, such as the "air tasking order" of an air campaign, or time-phased deployment of troops and equipment, could be disrupted by a North Korean cyberattack.

"In such cases, the disruption of American combat operations and logistics could make a very substantial difference in the overall military campaign," said Arquilla.

Mansourov, however, said North Korea is unlikely to be focusing its scarce IT resources on the development of a crew of hacker-soldiers.

"The Chinese are very good at this and have the resources to do it. But I don't think the KPA spends its efforts there. They are more focused on development of missile guidance and C4i (command-and-control systems)," said Mansourov.

Hayes said he believes North Korean hackers would not be able to create serious harm to the U.S. military's mission-critical systems, which are decentralized and largely insulated from the Internet.

"I'm sure they can get into some systems at a low level and maybe divert some things," said Hayes. "But in the big picture, a few hackers are not going to stop the flow of American men and material in a major war in Korea."

On the other hand, North Korea's highly centralized IT systems are prone to "amplifying and propagating bad military decisions" and are an easy target for physical attacks by smart bombs and other means, according to Hayes.

As for South Korea's recent claim that Pyongyang is ready to create "cyberterror," a State Department representative said North Korea is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since 1987, when a Korean airliner was bombed in flight.

Spokesman Lou Fintor said, however, that the State Department nonetheless remains "disappointed" with North Korea's response to international efforts to combat terrorism.

While details of North Korea's infowar force are available only in fiction and propaganda, Arquilla is convinced that the country may have marshaled a world-class offensive infowar capability.

"I believe that the North Koreans, whatever their limitations, have a capacity to think deeply and innovatively about military affairs," he said. "And what I have observed over the years convinces me that they are devoting considerable attention to cyberwar." (58m)

Lt. Gen. Song Young-Keun, commanding general of the DSC, said at a conference here that the DPRK was building up its "cyber-terror" capability on orders from its leader, Kim Jong-Il. "Following orders from Chairman Kim Jong-Il, North Korea has been operating a crack unit specializing in computer hacking and strengthening its cyber-terror ability," he said in a keynote speech. The conference was organized by the Korea Information Security Agency of the Ministry of Information and Communication to discuss the protection of security related intelligence. He said the DPRK military hackers were breaking into the computer networks of ROK government agencies and research institutes to steal classified information. ``The hacking capability of the unit is assessed as equivalent to that of the CIA of the United States,’’ according to Lt. Gen. Song. ``The unit is under operation with a view to stealing a wide range of information from our government agencies and research bodies,’’ he said. "On orders from National Defense Commission chairman Kim Jong-il, North Korea is operating a crack unit of hackers, and is strengthening its cyber-terror capabilities, collecting information from South Korean national bodies and research institutions through hacking." (56) An opposition lawmaker and DSC had made a similar allegation in May 2003. However, the DSC has also been unable to provide any examples of damage caused by North Korean hackers over the past few years. In addition, experts on the North Korean situation doubt that the North is comparable to the U.S. CIA in capabilities.(56a)

However, experts reject the claim by the Defense Security Command (DSC) of South Korea that Pyongyang's hacking unit is comparable to that of the CIA in the United States. Peter Hayes, executive director of the Nautilus Institute, doubted that the North had such high-powered capabilities due to its closed culture, and its lack of technology. Unfortunately, the logic does not hold water as hackers are not in the same category as a standing army. They are a small group dedicated to breaking into a classified computer-based information system. As to expertise, the North has ALWAYS kidnapped persons to fill holes in their technology systems. (56a)

The Koreans unfortunately have a false sense of security as their defense systems are connected via an intranet system -- a closed system behind a firewall. They feel that it would be difficult for the North Korean hackers to get into the military network since the nation’s armed forces use an intranet, which is NOT connected to the worldwide web. ``But what we should know is the vulnerability of the online computer network. It can collapse at any given moment if a single figure operating the system is infiltrated into the enemy’s side by spies,’’ Chung Koo-don stressed. (56) If just one computer is hooked up to the internet, a hacker will find it and any classified data on it will be compromised. In addition, such a computer will easily become the "gateway" to the intranet for the skilled hacker. The success of hackers in penetrating the U.S. defense systems speaks for itself.

These North Korean hackers will not only be after the "big fish" data bases, but also computers on military bases NOT connected to the intranet -- but connected to the internet. These are computers store non-classified military information -- and are linked to the internet for email use. The internet provides the hacker with an entry point -- and access to the computer's harddrive. These computers connected to the internet are highly susceptible to hacking -- even if protected by firewalls. Firewalls are not 100 percent foolproof. These computers contain non-classified information which, when placed with other information, can reveal "secrets" that require a higher classification. An example would be a computer in a unit commander's office used by a clerk to type reports, but also connected to the internet. The reports can give bits information about troop strength, training exercises which relates to real-life war plans, etc.

But the biggest danger from these computers is the user. In May 2004, "a rank-and-file soldier was investigated by the military security agency after leaking confidential information by accident through an Internet file-sharing service. The soldier let slip second-grade secret information in March while using peer-to-peer (P2P) software offered by a private Internet portal service provider." (56)

To realize how vulnerable the ROK system is we recommend an article Hacking U.S. Government Computers from Overseas. These document cases of breakins to some highly classified U.S. agencies. If those folks could get past the U.S. security systems, the same can be done to the ROK military system. (NOTE: This site, Totse.com also provides articles on the "how to" facets of hacking -- among some of its more off-beat articles.)

In 1998, a group, calling itself Masters of Downloading, or MOD, said in a statement that it had stolen the software -- the Defense Information Systems Network Equipment Manager (DEM) -- from the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), the branch of the U.S. Defense Department in charge of classified computer networks. The group claimed that they stole the software from a Windows NT server at DISA, and that about 30 individuals worldwide presently have copies. DISA verified that the software provided as proof was authentic. MOD said that the software is used to remotely monitor and manage U.S. military computer-related equipment, including routers, repeaters, switches, military communication networks, and GPS satellites and receivers. The suite's top-level interface is designed to "manage all the computer-related equipment used by the United States military," the statement read. With the DEM software, the group claims, the entire Defense Information Systems Network could be shut down for a period of time. "This is definitely not a good thing for the United States military, as they depend heavily on their computer systems and networks to quickly share data and information from anywhere in the world," the statement said. (58n)

The MOD group claimed its intentions were not hostile. However, the MOD group offered some network security advice for the US government. "It's simple: take all [classified] military systems off the Internet, place only [unclassified] Web servers on the Internet [and] keep the rest on a purely internal network," the MOD member said. (58n)

Broadband as a Vulnerability Broadband connections have a built in liability in that it lends itself to cyber-attacks. The primary idea of a cyber-attack on a system would be to cripple the South's infrastructure at critical times. Broadband services are often referred to as "all you can eat" because they allow users to spend as much time as they like online, and to download many megabytes of data at one flat rate. But they also offer a smorgasbord of opportunity to hackers. (58g) Businesses which run their own servers are most at risk of undergoing a cyber-attack. The areas to be targeted most likely be companies in the power, energy or electrical industries.

If a hacker can be likened to a tiger prowling through cyberspace, putting a broadband connection through a server is like putting fresh meat on your doorstep and yelling: "Here, kitty kitty!" If a test case exists for the rest of the world to examine how broadband affects internet security, it is South Korea. More than half of its home subscribers are hooked up to a high-speed connection, compared with 10 per cent of all internet surfers in Britain.

Symantec's Internet Security Threat Report shows that South Korea recorded the biggest percentage jump in the number of cyber-attacks in the six months to December 31 (2002). It suffered 12.8 per cent of all attacks — up from 7.4 per cent — putting it in second place behind the United States but ahead of China and Germany. America remained the top target with 35.4 per cent of total attacks.

The most likely industries to be targeted are power and energy and financial services. The report says: "As broadband becomes more accessible in other nations, their (South Korea's) exposure to and participation in malicious activity may also rise unless protection technologies are widely deployed." (58g)

According to Symantec most companies are not keeping pace with the increasing number of “vulnerabilities” (security flaws) in computer software. As vulnerabilities multiply, businesses are leaving themselves more open to attack by connecting to broadband internet services. The connections require a much higher level of security. The old virus checkers no longer are enough and nowadays one must have a personal firewall and some intrusion detection software. (58g)

Most at risk are those companies which install their own servers to handle transactions. The DSL connection to the internet allows a path for "business espionage" -- even with firewalls in place. The companies hiding behind their firewalls feel secure, but the truth is this form of "intranet" is NOT safe from a dedicated hacker. All they need is one computer hooked up to an internet connection -- and they will bypass the firewall. Once inside the company's intranet, all computers connected to the company intranet become fair game. With the Korean penchant for DSL connections, there are easy connection tap-ins on any rooftop where the DSL cables enter the building. If the businesses use wireless modems -- on computers positioned near windows -- to tie their office computers together, there is easy access to the information simply by focusing antennas and amplifiers on the office. The possibilities are limitless for "industrial espionage" through computers. (58g) Apply this same type of logic to the military environment and you can see that they too are susceptible.

North Korean Propaganda on the Internet As for distributing propaganda materials, since 2001 North Korea has publically announced that it is entering the internet in force. Currently pro-North Korea sites are "hosted" out of China, but can be reached by the millions of internet surfers in South Korea. Articles on "Jucheism" (Kim Il-sungs teachings of self-reliance) are now available to all in South Korea. The banned materials simply hopped onto the internet. In April 2003 the North (DPRK) started up Uriminzokkiri, a website in China to publish DPRK news releases and propaganda -- which poses a curious problem as the National Security Law prohibits viewing these materials, but now they are open to all. North Korea directly operates eight websites, including "Uriminzokkiri" and there are 26 pro-North websites abroad, including the Voice of National Salvation. The NSL gets vague in this area where reading the info is not illegal, but distributing it to forment discontent is.

Lt. Gen. Song Yong-keun, commander of DSC, said, "North Korea, through websites it directly operates or pro-North websites abroad, is strengthening its cyber-offensive, conveying guidelines for the struggle like issuing regime propaganda, condemning the "main enemy idea" (South Korea's designation of North Korea as the primary enemy) and calling for the withdrawal of USFK. (56)

Websites in Korea also face a problem with censorship. National Security Law (NSL) has been used as a form of censorship to imprison people for publishing material deemed to 'benefit' North Korea and now has been interpreted as materials on the internet. While certain left-wing political works are permitted for academic study, possession or reference to the same works by a student or activist with perceived 'pro-North Korean' leanings can become a criminal offense. (NOTE: This is one reason the North Korean spies prefer "academia" as its cover.) (30)

The problem for the Korean internet user becomes identifying what material is sensitive to protect oneself from the NSL. The answer is -- Everything. So the strength of the internet in providing unlimited information, also becomes the weakness for the NSL in determining what is "enemy-benefitting information." Once North Korea started publishing Juche materials on the web, EVERYONE could review and access "enemy-benefitting information." Kim Kang-phil, 35, worked as a computer programmer with an IT company in Busan when he was arrested on the 25 July 2002 and detained in Seoul Detention Center, charged under Article 7 (5) of the NSL for possessing "enemy-benefiting materials" and "for the worship and praise of an enemy benefiting/anti-state group". Kim Kang-phil, had developed his own website and enjoyed talking to people, exchanging information on film and books. In January 2002, Kim argued about Jucheism with a well-known Korean scholar on the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions' website. He aired his pro-Jucheist leanings in the discussion and also referred to North Korean publications , such as Tong-il Arirang and Baek-du san, to support his arguments. He received a one-year suspended sentence.

How about espionage instructions from the North Korean handlers? It would be simple create new sites ad infinitum where one could post the message and then kill the site. It is very simple to post a coded-message on an unlisted webpage -- without any of the metatags to attract search engine robots. The pages could also be disguised as data pages that appear on the Internet as simply a stream of incomprehensible numbers.

The deep-cover spies are issued "code books" to translate messages -- which are left by infiltrators in buried caches and picked up by the deep-cover spies later. The message traffic continues on the internet, but the face-to-face method is changed to reduce the risk of detection.

A deep-cover spy could view these pages at a PC Room (PC Bang) where back tracking to an individual would be a near impossibility. (58h) PC Rooms are everywhere in Korea and if the operative moves to different PC Rooms, the chances of detection are reduced.

---

G. Attitudes Towards Spies and Communism

(1). America (1959) versus Kunsan AB (1959) We feel that there is a dramatic contrast of America's reaction to spies and communism in 1959 when compared to the general malaise of the Kunsan AB troops when dealing with this issue of spies. While America was in the grips of "communist spy hysteria" -- especially after the Rosenberg trials and McCarthy hearings -- while at Kunsan, the thought of "spies" in their midst would have been the farthest from their thoughts.

• In America in 1959, there was a general fear of the spread of Communism -- painted as an "evil force." Communism was spreading around the world and communist spies -- especially in the Eastern Bloc nations or East Germany -- were making headlines. Fantastic stories of real-life double agents in British intelligence surfaced in 1951. The "third man" in this incident, Harold "Kim" Philby, became one of the most famous spies of the 20th century when he defected to the Soviet Union in 1963. (8)
  
  
• Communism in 1959 was still one bloc with the Soviet Union and China supposedly united. China invaded Tibet in 1950 and then came entered into the Korean War after McArthur vowed to cross the Yalu River. By 1953, the war had ended as a stalemate with the Chinese "volunteer army" as one of the signatories. China was viewed as a world threat because of its population. Suddenly in 1958, the Chinese started taking steps to become a nuclear power with the assistance of the Soviet Union. (24) In Aug 1958, the fight over Quemoy and Matsu erupted with heated air-battles was on-going -- and portrayed in Life Magazine as a fight of good against evil. (9) In 1960, Communism would split along ideological lines with Mao Tse Tung splitting away from the Russian sphere. (21b)
  
  
• The Soviets exploded on the space scene when Sputnik was launched on October 4, 1957. The world's first artificial satellite, about the size of a basketball, set off the space race between the two super-powers. The Soviets started to threaten the U.S. with its nuclear capabilities and the arms race in nuclear weaponry also sped up. At home children were still undergoing the air-raid drills of hiding under their desks in the event of a nuclear attack. During the years before the spy satellites, the U-2 aircraft was the U.S.'s eyes in the sky. The Gary Powers incident when a U-2 was shot down over the Soviet Union proved to be an embarrassment for the U.S., but it was understandable given the mindset of America at the time. (11)
  
  
• Still remembering the 1951 Rosenberg trials, American focused on the nuclear threat posed by Russia. Politically, the hearings of Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy to root out Communist sympathizers shocked and riveted the nation between 1953-1954. (10) Looking over your shoulder for spies would have been a natural act.
  
  
• The world of entertainment in 1950s was obsessed with espionage and fear of the Communist threat. John Wayne was in the movies in 1952 wearing an aloha shirt as he confronted the communist-controlled labor union in Hawaii. Playing a U.S. House Un-American Activities Committee investigator, he forgot that the U.S. Communist Party was legal in 1952. There was a national mindset about the threat of spies both foreign and domestic. (12)
  
  
• Ian Fleming's spy novels were all the rage -- Casino Royale (1954) was an instant success and soon followed by the "James Bond 007" series (1955-1965) (13) Back in America, the black-and-white TV aired the hit, "I Led Three Lives" starring Richard Carlson from 1953-1956 with Carlson protraying a double agent of the FBI who had infiltrated the Communist Party. (14) This cold war serial was soon followed by the more glitzy TV series, "I Spy" from 1965-1968 starring Robert Culp and Bill Cosby. (15)
  
  

However, at Kunsan AB, the morale and lack of concern by those up the chain of command had created a nightmare condition. John Moench articulated it best of the conditions at Kunsan in 1959. John stated,

"Logic would say that, if the job was important, the support would be important. With little attention given to support, it tended to seal in the minds of the men down the line that the job was not important. Telling the men that they were "on the front line of defense" had little impact when they looked around at the conditions at hand. Thus, too many men remained unmotivated, gave up, "went native," turned to drugs, simply no longer cared, felt cheated and dumped on, focused on personal enjoyment and survival, simply wanted to get out of Korea, lost "team motivation," etc. In total, "morale" was a hard nut to crack and, for many, the enemy became each other, the officers and especially the commanders, and, eventually, the entire service. ..." (16)

In short, the permanent party airmen didn't really care to think a lot about spies possibly being in their presence. Their base was wide open to "slickey boys" and the base perimeter defense was a joke. Being neglected by the USAF in not providing them with the manning or supplies to perform their support mission, the airmen keyed in on simply surviving. For the base leadership, talking about the threat with training films was not enough. The airmen simply could not fathom spies at Kunsan. The most that might be said could be that they felt a sense of "dread" -- unspoken and undefined -- over the threat of the Chinese across the Yellow Sea. However, in Korea, spies were not part of their reality -- though they recognized immediately the "slickey boy" threat. Though the officers might have understood the problems of potential spies, the enlisted ranks were too mired in staying afloat with reduced manning and no supplies to do their job. In Vietnam a few years later, the Air Force would learn how dangerous this attitude could be when the little houseboy during the day, would be the Viet Cong fighter attempting to kill Americans at night.

(2). Kunsan AB (1959) versus Kunsan AB (2004) (PERSONAL OPINION) We personally do NOT believe that the North will ever attack the South -- and the North's tirades and "saber rattling" are only a means of "regime preservation." If we believed there would be an attack, we would have left Korea long ago. However, this does not mean that we don't believe that these North Korean deep-cover spies exist on or near Kunsan AB. However, we have nothing to do with the USFK handling of the spy situation. Tracking down spies is in their balliwick.

Our opinion is simply that -- an opinion. We believe that there are deep-cover spies on or near Kunsan AB -- and to believe otherwise is sticking one's head in the sand and not paying attention to the facts. But who they are is another question altogether. If they haven't been detected in 35 years, it's doubtful that they'll be exposed now. Hopefully, somebody is keeping their eyes open on base -- but it's hard on a one year tour with no continuity.

• 1959: In 1959, espionage in general was too far removed from the reality of Kunsan AB to be taken seriously by the airmen. The true mission of the base was hidden from the airmen. In 1959, most Koreans would not have been trusted to even be in areas where classified materials were discussed. Though the threat of espionage was real, to the average airmen, it had no bearing on their life of simply trying to survive. However, in 2004, the USFK keyed in on the espionage from more sophisticated nations -- Russian and China -- but paid little attention to the North Korean spy apparatus.
  
  2004: Even today the USFK keys in on this "foreign" threat -- while turning a blind eye to the North Korean threat. This is the prevalent attitude amongst the Kunsan airmen in 2004. Though OPSEC is being preached over and over with the obvious terrorist threat, it has not impacted on the psyche of the troops that the threat may be Korean spies around them. The airmen focus on the physical threat from the NORTH across the DMZ, not a potential threat that may be coming from the Korean worker at the next desk. At most, one hears statements of false bravado on how the North Korean SOF trainees must touch the wire fence of Kunsan in order to graduate from their course -- which when analyzed is a scary statement as it admits that Kunsan's base defense is in sorry shape. (NOTE: The base perimeter is protected by sensors and other devices to prevent intrusion and to warn of chemical attack.)
  
  
• 1959: In 1959, espionage was a distinct reality to the Korean people of Kunsan. The common people did NOT trust the American's promise that it would remain to defend the country. They had seen the swift departure of the U.S. Occupation forces in 1949 and the ensuing ravages of war in their country. They had seen the North Koreans as they ravaged through Kunsan looking for the former workers of the Americans at Camp Hillenmeyer, constabulary and local leaders. If found, these people would be summarily executed. The Communists were a threat that was real -- not imaginary.
  
  Thus when the U.S. troops left Kunsan in 1955, many Koreans burned their pictures of working on base for they feared the North Koreans would invade again -- and the Americans would fall back again. It was hard to trust the Americans. On such person was Mr. Oh Tae.-il, 73, of Okku Village near the base. In 2002 he related how he worked with the 808th EAB at Kunsan until they departed in 1955. He destroyed all his pictures of the Korean War period when he entered the ROK Army for fear that his family might be endangered if the North should invade.
  
  At the same time, the Koreans knew that there might be communist spies hidden anywhere watching them again. Cholla was a hot bed of communist sympathizers and had a large North Korean population. Communist guerillas were still roaming the hills in the Chiri Mountains until 1963. The common people felt the fear personally.
  
  2004: However, in 2004, the Korean people of Kunsan were much different. The Miracle of the Han had reached Kunsan and high-rise apartments were sprouting everywhere. Cars clogged the streets and new highways linking the varied parts of Kunsan were expanding everywhere. Finally the retail department stores were building in Kunsan like in other major cities. At the same time, they knew the North Koreans were starving with tales of great suffering. The city was no longer only people of the area but a mix of people from all areas as the Kunjang Industrial area continued to expand. Though in the midst of an economic problem, the "good life" still was in evidence in Kunsan. Thoughts of "communist spies" seemed ridiculous to the common man -- though they had often heard the reports of captured spies. How could a North Korean believe their life was better than in the South? The common Korean could not fully understand the juche philosophy and Army first ideas of Kim Jong Il. How the cult society in the North operated was too foreign for the average person to fathom. Spies were NOT viewed as a threat. Instead, the average Korean viewed spying as an outgrowth of the military situation that positions the U.S. between the South and North. It was the U.S. impeding reunification and creating the troubles. If the U.S. would leave, there would be no need for spies and everyone will live happily ever after. In 2004, polls show that most Koreans view the U.S. as more of a threat to their security than the North. Times have changed.
  
  
• 1959: In 1959, potential spies from third-nation countries was a non-existent problem. In the 2000s, the USFK is faced with a new reality that its soldiers are consorting with third-nation nationals in the form of prostitutes from former-USSR countries. Some consider this a violation of the USFK regulations on security.
  
  2004: Starting in the 1990s, this has become an open problem as these bar girls work in A-town -- the bar row for Kunsan airmen. On one hand, the USFK has regulations concerning contact with persons from these countries, but on the other it has bars that hire these bar girls in the country on Korean "E-6" entertainer visas. These bars are considered essential in maintaining the morale of their soldiers. It's a problem that has no good solutions. The contacts with bar girls from Communist nations continues until today in camptowns throughout Korea.
  
  
• 1959: In 1959, ethnic Koreans of Chinese nationality working on-base was NOT a problem. Korea was too poor to attract them home. Korea was dirt poor and Koreans filled all the jobs.
  
  2004: However by 2004, the Koreans no longer wanted to engage in the "3D" trades (dirty, dangerous or demeaning labor) so foreign laborers were imported. They flocked to Korea illegally to seek jobs. In 2004, it was found that some ethnic Koreans of Chinese nationality were working for contractors on base through the use of "borrowed" ID cards. The contractor wanted and the illegal ethnic Korean worker wanted employment. Also as these contractors are involved in constructing the key facilities on base, what better way of finding out its weakness than collecting a set of blueprints for saboteurs to pour over? Subcontractors are constantly found wandering around in secured areas. However, to the Kunsan airmen, this is not even given a second thought.
  
  
• 1959: In 1960s, North Korea espionage was open and bumbling. For example, the 31 infiltrators in 1968 who were sent to kill Park Chung-hee wore South Korean military uniforms BUT were out of place with their BLACK CANVAS sneakers. Not very good planning.
  
  2004: In 2004, espionage is sophisticated and deeply buried. When it comes to North Korea espionage in the South Korea, one hears SILENCE. South Korea will not share its information gathered from captured spies with the U.S., though it relies on the U.S. intelligence for external defense. Though the U.S. has spy satellites covering all of North Korea, it has little concrete intelligence on the North's capabilities on the ground. The current row over nuclear capabilities in the north and how much armament it possesses is based strictly on supposition and extrapolation. With the latest fiasco in Iraq over WMD, the proof of putting too much faith in this data is obvious. But what about the reverse? The North, on the other hand, has pursued and obtained data on USFK operations, activities, plans with impudence. The documented cases of captured infiltrators and spies are too overwhelming to disregard.
  
  
• 1959: In 1959, Koreans were the house girls or the man doing a menial labor task. For them to be thought of as spies would have been laughable. In 2004, the Koreans had risen to positions of trust and as such, to suspect them of being spies was unthinkable. Thus the Kunsan hierarchy reasonably only stress OPSEC in the work environment and off-duty. That's the max they can do without causing panic.
  
  2004: If you warned the airmen of the potential existence of spies, you end up with young airmen believing that every time the cleaning lady goes to the bathroom unexpectedly, it makes her a candidate for being a spy. In addition, the Koreans have risen to positions of trust and to suspect them would be a nightmare. Instead of discussing the possibility of North Korean agents, they stress the threat of terrorists -- which in the current environment means Al Quida and fanatical "raghead" jihadists. The focus is all wrong.
  
  
• 1959: The Internet did not exist.
  
  2004: The biggest change is the Internet and its ability to instantaneously transmit information. Also information posted on the internet becomes a tantalizing source of information for "spies" -- even innocuous information contained on this site could become source material for any "spy" looking into Kunsan AB's weaknesses. In 1999, students contacted North Korean spies using email and passed materials through the internet. Though the espionage value of the material passed is questioned, the fact remains that the spies network was able to do this without having to be physically in the country. With the advent of PC-bangs (PC rooms) throughout the country, all a spy need do is sign in at an anonymous PC room, send his information to a Chinese email address and it will be forwarded to North Korea instantly. The internet is the ultimate nightmare for the NIS search for spies.
  
  In 2004, U.S. units such as Kunsan AB were withdrawing behind firewalls. OPSEC (Operations Security) and Force Protection are the catchwords in the fight against terrorism. The internet had become the military's nightmare with uncensored emails flying across the oceans. GIs were constantly being reminded not to talk about their work or mission. The problem of security leaks has become "real-time" damage unlike years past when information leaks flowed surrepticiously from spy to handler which took time.
  
  

So our opinion is that overall the attitude towards spies on Kunsan in 1959 and 2004 are the same, but for much different reasons. In 1959, the morale was so low that all the men thought about was survival. In 2004, the morale is high, but most could care less of spies because of their myopic one-year tour syndrome. The focus is on the mission to take the fight north, not the threat in ones own backyard. Most do NOT believe that deep-cover spies exist on Kunsan AB and feel no threat from them. Our position is that IF there were an attack under Phase III of Oplan 5027, Kunsan will be crippled from WITHIN -- not without. The North has had over 40 years to insert operatives, family and friends into positions on base in neatly protected positions of trust. To believe otherwise would be to stick one's head in the sand. However, we believe the North will use its much publicized leap into the internet to further its espionage activities instead of the tradition methods of infiltrators gathering the information.

---

FOOTNOTES:

1. (See North Korean Defector and Spy Operations to learn what North Korean spies are sent to accomplish.) The following article, note that the spies that were caught were initially recruited in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

On October 27, 1997, a husband and wife spy team was arrested in Ulsan. This sparked a massive manhunt for spies. According to an American intelligence source, the confessed husband-wife master spy ring had provided a list of 10 master spies in South Korea. They were presumably sent to Seoul on a mission to reorganize Pyongyang's deep-cover agents. The 10 spymasters that included members of the ruling and opposition parties, workers and others from all walks of life. Ko Young Bok, a renowned emeritus professor of sociology at Seoul National University (SNU) carried out spy activities for over 36 years. In addition, Sim Chong-ung, a core employee of the Seoul Subway Corporation, and his family were resident spies who carried out secret activities for over 40 years after having infiltrated into the major industries of the nation, including the railway and subway systems.

Portions of the following text excerpted from "S Korea's Anjibu Arrests Alleged NK Spies".

Ch'oe Chong-Nam and Kang Yon-Chong, husband and wife agents were dispatched by North Korea. Supposedly they were uncovered when they attempted to urge a man named Ch'oe, a core member of the Ulsan chapter of the National Alliance for Democracy and Unification, to go to North Korea with them and revealed that they were from North Korea. Their tactics were similar to Kim Tong Sik, a north Korean armed agent who infiltrated into Puyo in October 1995 and approached movement activists. They were arrested in Ulsan Korean Hotel on October 27 and launched an investigation.

In the course of the investigation, the ANSP confirmed that other spies were uncovered. On the list were 10 spymasters that included members of the ruling and opposition parties, workers and others from all walks of life. Ko Young Bok, a renowned emeritus professor of sociology at Seoul National University (SNU) carried out spy activities for over 36 years. In addition, Sim Chong-ung, a core employee of the Seoul Subway Corporation, and his family were resident spies who carried out secret activities for over 40 years after having infiltrated into the major industries of the nation, including the railway and subway systems.

Mr. Ko song-chin, chief of anti-Communist investigation section of the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP), stated, "As for the incident of the husband-wife team of spies dispatched by North Korea, Ch'oe Chong-nam was selected as an agent in 1984 while studying in the senior class at Sariwon University in North Korea. Kang yon-Chong was selected as an agent in 1986 immediately after graduating from a high school. According to a directive from the leadership of the Guidance Department for the agents in November 1990, they got married and gave birth to a boy who is now 5 years old and lives in Pyongyang. Thus, they are an agent team of an actual husband and wife who received agent training for over 10 years, as well as field-adaptation training in China on four occasions. They appeared to be the most elite of the agents."

The spokesman continued, "As for the route of their infiltration, on July 30, they were supplied with pistols, poison guns, poison needles, radios, counterfeit IDs, and money. They departed Nampo port in an infiltration boat disguised as a fishing boat. [passage omitted on their landing route in South Korea - probably Koje-do] After the infiltration, they tried to understand the practical situation in South Korea by touring many places, including Kyongju, Pusan, Ulsan, Chonju, Kwangju, Ichon, and Suwon for over two months and rented a room for 200,00 won a month on the second floor of a Chinese restaurant in Kurodong, Seoul, thus securing a safe house."

He continued, "The main tasks assigned to them when they were dispatched to South Korea were: * To contact Ko Young Bok, an honorary professor at SNU who was already won over by north Korea, to examine his activities, and through him, to win over a certain professor Kim at SNU to their side. * To contact Sim Chong-ung, head of a facility work team in the Tongjak chapter of the Seoul Subway Corporation and to encourage his activities and to report on feasible methods to paralyze the Seoul subways in an emergency. * To win over to their side a certain Chong, who was a core member in the Ulsan chapter of the NADU, and a certain Pak, who was a member of the executive committee of the Wansan District chapter in Chonju of a certain opposition party and who is presently a Chonju municipal council member. Additional tasks were: + To collect information on the South Korean situation, including the presidential election; + To obtain good-quality seeds of a corn stalk developed by Professor Kim Sun-kun of Kyongbuk University in order to send it as a gift of loyalty to General Kim Jong Il; + To acquire copies of citizen's registrations and identification cards and electronic resident cards; + To discover Hwang Jang Yup's hiding place. [passage omitted on their contacts with Ko Young Bok and Sim Chong-ung to give funds and instructions]

"Ch'oe Chong-nam and Kang Yon-Chong created six caches in Mt. Kwanak, Kyongju, the ceramic village of the folk village, and the sports park in Pongch'on Chapter, and buried all their espionage equipment. In addition to these caches, there are two other caches made by other agents for an emergency, bringing the total to eight."

"Kang Yon-Chong (the wife) refused to testify and maintained her loyalty to Kim Jong Il. She committed suicide the very next day after swallowing a poison capsule, which she hid deep in her vagina, arrested her. Although she was taken to a hospital immediately, she died on October 31."

Prof. Ko is in poor health and he has been undergoing interrogation in a hospital bed. He went to North Korea in 1989 as a member of a S Korean government delegation. A relative of his presumably recruited Ko to spy for the North. Ko has been sending intelligence data since 1989. Prof. Ko was active in the Sae Ma-ul (a Korean version of the New Deal) in the 1970's and has written a number of books. The ANSP spokesman continued, "Now, let me tell you about Ko Young Bok, an honorary professor at SNU who carried out spy activities for 36 years. While behaving as a conservative rightist, Ko became a prestigious figure by serving as the president of the Korea Sociology Society, chief researcher at the Institute of Modern Society, and advisor to north-south Red Cross talks."

"During his school days at SNU, Ko volunteered as a militia during the Korean War and was imprisoned at a POW camp on Koje island. As he had confessed, he was thoroughly armed with socialist ideas from his school days. In addition, his uncle Ko Chong-ok, an SNU professor of Korean Literature, defected to the north during the Korean war and became a professor at Kim Il Sung University."

"Ko became a North Korean agent in September 1961, when he was won over by north Korean agents with letters from Chang Mae-yun, his SNU colleague, and his uncle Ko Chong-ok. Ko received orders from him to organize students and carry out spy activities at SNU, and was given the spy name of Kongsusan, and received $1,000, a table of random numbers, and a table of telegraph words. In 1966, he contacted a female agent who had infiltrated into the ROK, and received a new table of random numbers and table of telegraph words, and furnished a room in Songbook-dong as her safehouse. For a month, Ko helped her out by sending secret codes to north Korea in her stead. In 1971, during his visit to Pyongyang as an advisor to the north-south Red Cross talks, Ko secretly provided south Korean strategy for the talks to Kang Chang-su, who was disguised as a North Korean counterpart."

"In June 1989, Ko contacted Kim Nak-hyo, who has infiltrated into the ROK five times, and rented him a room in Chungjongno. Ko was ordered to provide Kim with the ROK's ability to develop nuclear weapons and information on professor Kim Sun-kun."

"Ko provided Kim Nak-hyo the information that the ROK was unable to make an atomic bomb due to US pressures, and that he would continue to study professor Kim. The information was submitted to Kim Nak-hyo via transliteration into English. [passage omitted on Ko's other spy activities, escape route via overseas in emergency] then Ko and Kim used halves of a copper pendant to identify north Korean agents. Ko recognized the Ch'oe couple with the copper pendant, and was ordered to hand over an analysis of the ROK's post-presidential election policy on north Korea. [passage omitted on talks with Ch'oe Chong-nam.] while preparing the requested data, he received a call on November 1 from an unidentified North Korean agent to go to the North Korean Embassy in Beijing immediately as it was an emergency."

"Ko tore up the orders from Ch'oe Chong-nam and the two-page policy data to get rid of the evidence, but investigators found them in the trash can in his office. Consequently, Ko has been found to be a deep-cover agent who thoroughly hid his identity, received orders from six agents, and carried out spy activities for the last 36 years."

"Next, I will explain the espionage activities of Sim Chong-ung and his family. All three brothers of Sim's uncle, including Sim Ung-sop, defected to north Korea during the Korean War. Sim Ung-sop came to the ROK several times on espionage. Sim Chong-ung, Sim's grandfather Sim Sang-hyong, and cousin Sim Chae-hun have served as North Korean agents, while his aunt Kim Yu-sun, brother Sim Chae-man, cousin Sim Chae-ch'on have helped their activities by establishing an underground resident spy network by Using their home in Taegun-myon, Kimpo county, as contact base and a safe house."

"In September 1958, Sim Chong-ung who was then a 16-year-old second year middle school student on temporary leave from school, went to the north with his uncle, Sim Ung-sop, who was dispatched to the south, and received espionage training. He received orders to enter a transportation high school since the north can be victorious in the war to liberate south Korea if the railway is paralyzed. Thus, he was ordered to work in the railway sector after graduation."

"He was entrusted with operational number, Ch'olmasan 66, which signifies the railway, and returned to the South. He graduated from the transportation high school as ordered and was immediately appointed as a civil servant of the Ch'ongnyangri locomotive office affiliated with the office of Korean National Railroads."

"He once again went to the north in April 1966 and learned in detail about the core facilities of the Railway and received orders to recruit as many sympathizers as possible so that they can be used in case of an emergency. He received $1,000 and 3 million won for communication equipment such as radios and operational funds and returned to the south and continued to work for the office of Korean national railways."

"In 1984 when the Seoul metropolitan subway corporation was inaugurated, he volunteered to work for the Seoul Metropolitan Subway Corporation to continue his operations in Seoul. From then until now he has been working in the facilities field."

"In 1989, Sim Chong-ung made contacts with Kim Nak-hyo, who was dispatched to the south 11 times. He also reported to him on the condition of organizations of members of eight various social gatherings including alumni associations and friendship gatherings of the Subway Corporation which were formed in accordance with North Korea's order to rally with sympathizing forces. He received operational equipment such as poison capsules, radios, and a table Of random numbers, which he hid in cache, and received 3 million won to buy an automobile for operational purposes."

"In particular, in the process of holding contacts with the husband and wife spy couple who were dispatched to the south on six occasions, he drew up and submitted a pledge of loyalty to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, pledging that it was an endless honor to work under the leadership of General Kim Jong Il. He learned how to use up-to-date radios from the couple in such places as the Han River park and Mt. Kwanak."

"Upon orders, he reported on materials which he had gathered on items such as certificates of residence; identification cards of an intelligence corporation's employees; identification cards of employees of the subway corporation; contents analyzing the propensity of friendly gatherings; and movements of a certain Mr. Chong, the former trade union leader of the Subway, who is regarded as an influential man in the subway trade union."

"He also reported on various materials such as the Ch'ongdung voice, subway trade union news, and wage struggle news. Moreover, regarding the order to paralyze the subway which was in accordance with the teachings of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, Sim Chong-ung reported on methods to paralyze the subway noting that if the underground water management facility and the electricity management facilities are destroyed, the whole subway can be paralyzed."

"As such, he reported on the situation of core facilities and places where these core facilities were located. He even reported that in order to paralyze core facilities in an emergency, additional help would be needed from the north. As such, it was revealed that Sim Chong-ung secretly worked as a spy for 39 years to follow Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il's teaching that the railway and subway are of utmost importance. It was learned that north Korea's operational guiding department intentionally trained young people and placed them in the nation's railway and subway system infrastructure."

"Also, Sim Chong-ung's second cousin Sim Chae-ho went to the North with his uncle, Sim ung-sop, who was dispatched to the south in 1967, and joined the Workers Party and received orders to operate as long as possible in Seoul. He returned to Seoul after receiving espionage equipment such as radios and stayed in hiding. His aunt Kim Yu-sun acted as a liaison by delivering espionage equipment and providing hideouts for spies dispatched to the South."

"Confiscated equipment used by the agents are as follows: 205 items of 10 different types of lethal equipment, including three hand grenades, 170 live cartridges, four poison guns, 14 poison needles, and six poison capsules; 94 Items of 16 types of communications equipment, including six radio transmitters; code books; reagent bottles and paper for hiding letters; four forged identification cards; forged policeman's identification for emergency use; some 23 million won in cash, which is the remainder of some 30 million won they had received as operation funds; and explosion fuses found at Sim Chong-ung's residence."

"In addition, it has been confirmed through this investigation that the north Korean operations offices committed previous acts of terror and kidnappings. The shooting death of the north Korean defector Yi Han-tong at Sehyon-tong, Pundang in February was committed by a special agent team referred to as the 'sun-ho' team, consisting of Ch'oe Sun-ho and an unidentified man in his twenties."

"As professional terrorists belonging to the north Korean Social Culture Ministry, they were sent to the south about one month before the murder. After Returning to North Korea, they were named heroes and received plastic surgery on their faces. The plan was to dispatch them to the south again in the future."

"The couple agent team, Ch'oe Chong-nam and his wife, stated before they were sent to the south that they received instructions not to contact targets through a public messenger service shop because a special team had been disclosed after it had used a messenger service, and that in an emergency, they could use operational equipment buried in Pongch'on-tong by the special agent team before they returned to the north."

"In accordance with the instructions, the couple had received, the investigation team dug a Cache at the area mentioned and found an envelope, with 10 poison needles in it, from the Hansol Foreign Language institute located at Sehyon-tong in Pudang, and a copy of the daily local paper Kyoch'aro dated 20 January, which was used to wrap the radio transmitter. These facts back up agent Ch'oe Chong-nam's Statement."

"Kim Yong-nam, who was reported missing from a swimming beach on Sonyu island off Kunsan on August 6, 1978 when he was a freshman of Kunsan technical high school, was actually kidnapped by three North Korean agents belonging to an operations office in charge of Southward infiltration. At Kim Jong Il's order to kidnap new South Koreans for use in operations because those who defected to the north during the Korean War were too old, they were sent to the south and kidnapped Kim Yong-nam from a beach on Sonyu island on August 5 in the same year."

"Yi Myong-u, then a senior at Ch'onan Agricultural High school and Hong Kun-p'yo, then a senior at Ch'onan Commercial High School were also missing from the swimming beach at Hong island in South Cholla province on August 10, 1978. However, they were kidnapped by north Korean agents and are now working as instructors of so-called 'southernization' who train agents on south Korean realities and intonation so they can be sent to the south. It has been confirmed that the Ch'oe Chong-nam couple, who were recently dispatched to the south, and Kim Tong-sik, who infiltrated into Puyo in 1995, received southernization training from them.

"In accordance with the investigation results, the ANSP will continue investigating north Korean agent Ch'oe Chong-nam to completely uncover his activities and identity and then will treat him separately. Ko Young Bok, Sim Chong-ung, Sim Chae-hun, and Kim Yu-sun, who have been arrested on spy charges, will be turned over to the prosecution today."

"In accordance with the statements by the North Korean agents dispatched to the south and the spy ring within the country, the ANSP is also continuing investigations through references and secret examination of some 200 suspicious people in various fields."

2. ibid.

3. According to GlobalSecurity.org: OPLAN 5027 , "During Phase 1, US-ROK forces would conduct a vigorous forward defense aimed at protecting Seoul. Their campaign would be dominated by combined-arms ground battles waged with infantry, artillery, and armor. US air and naval forces would conduct close air support, interdiction, and deep strike missions. After Phase 1, US-ROK operations in Phase 2 would probably focus on seizing key terrain, inflicting additional casualties on enemy forces, and rebuffing further attacks. Phase 3, to start when the US ground buildup was complete and ROK forces were replenished, would be a powerful counteroffensive aimed at destroying the DPRK's military power. The war plan envisions amphibious assaults into North Korea by US Army and Marines at the narrow waist of North Korea. The entire resources of the US Marine Corps would flow there to establish a beachead, with substantial Army resources quickly conducting over-the-shore operations."

In the event of a North Korean surprise attack, the ROK will simply be fighting a holding action along the DMZ to keep the North from penetrating and awaiting the reinforcements from the U.S. air forces in Japan and Okinawa -- and later on with continental U.S. forces. If the forces break through -- which is a distinct possibility -- the secondary actions are to prevent the North from consolidating their gains around Seoul. Basically the USFK response will be:

• (1) Defend the base: ROK fighting holding action along the DMZ to keep the North from breaking through FEBA-FEBB-FEBC (Forward Edge Battle Areas A, B and C) anti-tank defenses. The USFK units will hunker down and survive the initial shock wave of the attack by defending their positions. During this period, Seoul will come under an artillery barrage from the North causing ten of thousands of casualties within the first hours. SOF infiltration by air and sea throughout Korea. Use of chemical warfare along the DMZ initiated with collateral civilian casualties. Highways clogged. Non-combatant evacuation initiated, but all infrastructure will be crippled by SOF and "sleeper cells" actions. Seoul at will be in mass panic clogging highways and trapping residents in Seoul.
  
  After the initial shock of attack, the air cavalry units (Apache Longbows) will unleash their high-tech weaponry (Hellfire missiles) against the invading troops. The major goal for the USFK Army units will be to prevent the North from consolidating its forces around Seoul if there is a breakthrough, but some USFK armoured units along the DMZ will be tasked with penetrating the DMZ and heading North.
  
  Scud B/Cs will be launched from the North against major Korean bases. For the USAF in Korea, F-16 squadrons will join the ROKAF to attain air superiority while A-10 units will be engaged in tank-killer operations. Base units will try to simply survive any chemical attacks and defend their perimeters against SOF activity. After air superiority is achieved, F-16s will join with ROKAF units in attacks on designated ground targets. (NOTE: It is assumed the North will cede air superiority very early after insertion of the SOF troops into South Korea.) However, B-52s from Anderson AFB, Guam will be in the air immediately to do saturation bombing of the DMZ. For the Navy, out of Yokosuka, cruise missiles will be flying -- and the nuclear subs out of Guam will launching their payloads as well. Overseas, SOF and "sleeper cells" will paralyze Japan by crippling its infrastructure.
  
  Marine expeditionary units will arrive within 24-48 hours using "fast ships" and off-load at Pohang.
  
  
• (2) Accept the Follow-ons: Once the initial attacks are over, the follow-ons will start arriving after 30 days. Their equipment is already in place and the forces will counter-attack. For other Marine units, the equipment is prepositioned on ships and these will start arriving at either Inchon, Ansong or Pusan depending on the situation.
  
  
• (3). Take the Fight to the North: The meaning is clear -- the North will be invaded and the regime toppled. Of course, the hope is that China will stay out of the fight as it would lead to WWIII. Oplan 5030 is the updated version that includes other options in attacking the North.

4.The 1973 Abduction of Kim Dae-jung by Park Jung Hee :

"The Yomiuri Shimbun reported on February 19, 1998 that South Korea's Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP commonly referred to as "KCIA") was indeed involved in the 1973 kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung from a Tokyo hotel. It reported that Dong-A Ilbo has obtained a copy of a secret internal memo of the ANSP - contrary to Kim Young Sam's claim that the Agency had no documents on this affair.

The document claims that Lee Hu Rak (the ANSP head in 1973 and the man who signed the July 4th North-South Joint Statement on July 4, 1972) ordered Lee Chol Hee, an operations group leader, to bring back Kim Dae Jung at any cost. The secret documents disclose the missions and names of the 25 agents involved in the abduction. The list includes then first secretary Kim Bong Chan (went by the name of Kim Dong Un at the time of the incident). Kim was the man who personally grabbed Kim Dae Jung from the Hotel Grand Palace in Tokyo on August 8, 1973.

Kim Dae Jung was in Japan to stir up support for his pro-democracy movements. He stayed at Hotel Grand Palace in Chiyoda ward, Tokyo. On August 8, 1973, he held a meeting in his room with two opposition figures, Yang Il Dong and Kim Gyong In. After the meeting Kim Dae Jung came out of his hotel room, when several KCIA agents pounced on him and dragged him into Yang Il Dong's room right next to Kim's.

There were two Japanese guests in the hallway and Kim shouted "Save me! These are murderers!". But the two Japanese believed they were witnessing a gangster feud and kept quiet. Kim was anesthetized in Yang's room and taken to an underground parking lot via an elevator. He was driven to a KCIA safe house, blindfolded and gagged.

With his face covered with wrapping cloth and his hands and feet bound, he was taken to seashore on a minibus. There he was transferred to a motorboat and taken to a KCIA spy ship. Once aboard, his limbs were tied to concrete blocks and his mouth was stuffed with sands to stifle his screams, after which, he was beaten senseless.

Lee Chol Hee contradicts Kim Dae Jung's claim that the agents planned to drown him. Lee said that his orders were to bring back Kim Dae Jung alive. Lee claims that he and his agents were against Lee Hu Rak's motive but they were forced to obey his orders.

Whatever their plan was, the US CIA was tipped off by the Japanese intelligence and American warplanes circled over the KCIA spy ship with Kim Dae Jung aboard. An American helicopter got close to the ship and warned the Korean agents, in no uncertain terms, to keep Kim Dae Jung alive.

Perhaps, it may be that the agents were ordered to keep Kim alive, but in case of troubles, to eliminate him. It is possible that when the US CIA uncovered their mission, they decided to destroy the evidence by disposing Kim's body cut up, but then the helicopter arrived. Kim Dae Jung's recollection closely matches this scenario.

On the night of August 13, 1973, Kim Dae Jung was thrown out of a car onto a street near Seoul, still blindfolded. Kim spent next three years under house arrest and could meet people only by sneaking out to safe houses in the middle of the nights.

5. The mysterious death in KCIA under the Yushin-Regime:

"Professor Tsche(age of forty two at that time) was being investigated through voluntary attendance at the Nam San branch office of Korea Central Intelligence Agency on October sixteenth 1973. Then he died on October nineteenth, three days later after his attendance. On October twenty fifth, the Korea Cenral Intelligence Agency (KCIA) announced about the Europe based group of spies. .. About Professor Tsche, they explained, "he was enticed by North Korea during his study at Cologne University (Universit t zu K ln) in West Germany and he went to Pyungyang by way of East Germany. So he was investigated under suspicion of espionage training for twenty days in Pyungyang" and they revealed "he killed himself by throwing himself by the pang of conscience after his confession." .. But his surviving family and acquaintance have insistd 'his death resulted from the rupture of the heart by maloperation of electric instruments of torture' and they have suggested he was murdered by autocracy consequently."

6. "The Tears of My Soul Kim Hyun Hee - A Korea WebWeekly Book Review" Kim Hyun Hee and a male agent (Kim Sung Il) planted a bomb on KAL 858, killing 115 passengers. She was captured, tried and sentenced to death. While waiting for her execution, she became a Christian and renounced Kim Il Sung. She was pardoned an d became an instant celebrity. Her book The Tears of My Soul became a best seller. Article gives details of life and bombing.

7. Book Review: Col. Donald Nichols, How Many Times Can I Die?. -- Book Review: US AF 6004th AISS -- Nichols was a Special Investigation Officer for the US CIC from June 1950 to May 1951 with the rank of Chief Warrant Officer (CWO). He commanded the 6004th AISS from May 11, 1951 to November 1957. The 6004th was re-designated as the 6006th AISS in 1953 and Nichols stayed on as its commander. His new mission was to train Rhee's spy agency, the ROKA 6006th AISS. 8. The privileged son of a British diplomat, Harold "Kim" Philby became one of the most famous spies of the 20th century when he defected to the Soviet Union in 1963 after a career in British intelligence. A student at Cambridge in the 1930s, Philby was drawn to Marxist ideas and was an associate of what came to be known as "The Cambridge Spies," Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean and Anthony Blunt. Burgess, Maclean and Philby were apparently recruited in the 1930s to be Soviet spies, possibly by Blunt. In the 1940s they began working for British intelligence, and Philby rose in the ranks to be a respected member of the intelligence community. In 1951, under suspicion of being double agents, Burgess and Maclean disappeared, surfacing in Russia in 1956 as defectors. Philby was questioned and accused of being "the Third Man," the one who warned Burgess and Maclean to flee as investigations closed in, but he was never officially charged. In 1963 Philby defected to the Soviet Union, and in his 1968 book My Silent War he claimed to have been a "double-agent" for the KGB, the Soviet spy agency, for nearly two decades. He lived the rest of his life in Russia, where he died in 1988, a recipient of the Order of Lenin and an official Soviet hero.

9. Global Security.org: "First Taiwan Strait Crisis: Quemoy and Matsu Islands".)

The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 18-29, 1962.

Richard Fieldhouse, "China's mixed signals on nuclear weapons," (1991) states, "The Sino-Soviet ideological rift grew so wide that the two nations entered what the CIA called "their own 'cold war," (6) and the Soviets reneged on their promises in June 1960. (7) By August 24 all Soviet aid to the Chinese nuclear program was over, and all Soviet advisers had left China. Nonetheless, the Soviet help saved China years of effort and incalculable cost, and permitted China to advance far beyond its existing indigenous abilities." In other words, China was on the road to becoming a nuclear power.

10. CENSURE OF SENATOR JOSEPH MCCARTHY (1954), Source: 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Resolution 301 (2 December 1954). -- The hearings of Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy to root out Communist sympathizers shocked and riveted the nation between 1953-1954.

Douglas Linder, "A Trial Account" (2001) -- The nuclear spy case shocked the nation in 1951.

11. Here Comes Sputnik! (http://www.batnet.com/mfwright/sputnik.html) (August 30, 1997) -- October 4, 1957, America was not #1 in space. Thus began the space race.

American History: Gary Powers -- Politics caused the sacrificing of Gary Powers who crashed his U2 in Soviet territory.

12. Big Jim McClain (1952) U.S. House Un-American Activities Committee investigators Jim McLain and Mal Baxter attempt to break up a ring of Communist Party troublemakers in Hawaii (ignoring somewhat, as do their superiors in the Congress, that membership in the Communist Party was, at the time, legal in the U.S.) 13. Ian Flemming.)

14. I Led Three Lives Richard Carlson starred as Herb Philbrook who infiltrates the Communist Party but is really a double agent of the FBI. This was the typical Cold War type series. A typical story line is In Episode 107 which the synopsis states, "Writer: Robert Wesley (Eugene/Gene Roddenberry) Seeking a mysterious woman for the Communists, Herb Philbrick discovers she is also wanted by the FBI for the theft of a nuclear isotope. Herb enters her house to investigate and discovers it to be filled with deadly radioactivity. He escapes after learning she hopes to sell the valuable isotope to Russia via the local Communist Party. Philbrick's FBI mission takes him into the house again where he completes the mission only after taking a hazardous risk"

15. I Spy (. I Spy (9/15/1965 - 9/2/1968) Produced by Sheldon Leonard, Mort Fine and David Friedkin; I Spy Cast: Robert Culp as Kelly Robinson, Bill Cosby as Alexander Scott)

16. Discussions with John Moench (2004) and from "Analysis -- Unit Designation" (2004):

17. Sang-Hun Choe, Associated Press, "Korea's last communist guerrilla remains defiant" (Aug 24, 2003) -- Chung Soon-duk, 70, was the last communist guerilla to be captured in South Korea. Chung, who followed her husband into armed conflict, held out in mountainous terrain until she was shot and lost her leg during capture in 1963. (Ed Wray/The Associated Press)

Korea's last communist guerrilla remains defiant

By Sang-Hun Choe
The Associated Press

INCHEON, South Korea -- Chung Soon-duk, the last communist guerrilla to be caught in South Korea, laments her "pathetic mess." She lost her right leg to a wound 40 years ago, and her left side is paralyzed from a stroke. She is hospitalized and needs a wheelchair to get around.

Yet when she recalls her days as an "anti-American unification warrior," the 70-year-old woman brims with bravado. She belts out old rebel songs, pumping her arm -- the only limb she can use -- to the beat:

"Comrades, shoulder your rifles. It's time for battle. Blizzards hit hard, but our hearts are boiling with hot blood. . . . We have orders, comrades, orders to search for the enemies."

Her life on the run ended in a shootout with police in the rugged Chiri Mountains on Nov. 12, 1963 -- a decade after the Korean War ended. "Disoriented communist bandit caught!" read a headline at the time.

With her arrest, South Korea finally declared an end to drawn-out operations against peasant "partisans" who fought the pro-U.S. government in Seoul long after the war. For Chung, the war never ended.

"All my life, I have been a unification warrior who struggled to free the fatherland from the Americans," she says at the hospital in Incheon, west of Seoul, where she lives.

Released from prison in 1985, Chung was a disabled outcast, disowned by her family for her tainted past. Police followed her, and she held only menial jobs. She associated with former rebels, but in 2000 the last of her comrades were allowed to go to North Korea, where they got a hero's welcome.

Chung was barred from joining them because South Korea returned only "unconverted" guerrillas. Faced with miserable prison conditions, Chung had signed a letter disavowing communism in hopes of getting better medical care and a reduced sentence.

She now regrets signing the paper. All she has left are her political beliefs and hatred of Americans. She calls reports of hardships in North Korea exaggerations and justifies the North's suspected development of nuclear weapons as defensive.

She blames the division of the Korean Peninsula on the U.S. troops who occupied the southern half as the Soviets took over the north to disarm Japanese colonialists at the end of World War II.

Chung's saga began shortly after she married at 16, when North Korea invaded the South in June 1950. Her peasant husband, Sung Suk-jo, collaborated with North Korean troops who promised "liberation" from landlords. He was among thousands of leftists who took up arms in the thick forests and jagged ravines of the Chiri Mountains when the tide of war changed.

Chung fled, too, and found her husband, but married couples were not allowed to fight in the same unit. She last saw her husband in January 1952 sitting before a bonfire in a snow-covered field. She heard later that he died in battle. As the war dragged on, she learned to read and write, worked as a cook and nurse and was promoted to deputy platoon leader, raiding police stations and ambushing South Korean police rangers, called "dogs" by the rebels. By 1955, most of the Chiri Mountain guerrillas had been killed or surrendered, but Chung and others fought on even though they had no communication with North Korea.

Police hunted them but also distributed leaflets promising leniency if they gave up. Chung's parents, coerced by police, roamed the hills pleading through a loudspeaker: "Soon-duk, please come down the hill and surrender!" Chung's unit dwindled to herself and two men, but they continued to elude capture. According to police records, Chung and one of her comrades, Lee Hong-yi, were scrounging for food in October 1962 and got into a scuffle with a villager who tried to snatch Lee's loaded carbine.

"I shot the villager in the leg. We went on to kill his wife and his brother and his brother's wife. We burned down their homes," Chung recalls. "They were pawns of American imperialists trying to turn in fellow compatriots. I have never killed innocent villagers. I have no regrets."

That December, Chung's other comrade, Lee Eung-jo, 53, was wounded as police tracked the fugitives. Chung says she was unable to carry him and finished him off -- at his request and in "the true spirit of comradeship." The following November, during a foray into a village, a peasant pressed an alarm, alerting two policemen lying in wait. Lee Hong-yi was killed and Chung was shot in her right thigh.

"Even bleeding, she was crawling to her carbine. I quickly overpowered her," says Park Ki-duk, one of the policemen who shot Chung. "She cursed us endlessly, calling all kinds of names and demanding that she be killed. Later I gave her some milk, and she threw it away. She was one tough broad. It's scary what communism does to an ignorant woman."

18. Kimsoft: "South Korea's "Spy" Agency - ANSP ("KCIA")". The enforcement arm of the Park Chung-hee regime.

The article states, "The Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP) was originally established on June 19, 1961 as the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) directly under the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction in the immediate aftermath of the May 16, 1961, military coup. Its duties were to "supervise and coordinate both international and domestic intelligence activities and criminal investigation by all government intelligence agencies, including that of the military." Its mission was akin to that of a combined United States Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The first head of the KCIA was Kim Chong-p'il. Kim, utilizing the existing Army Counter Intelligence Corps, built a 3,000-member organization--the most powerful intelligence and investigatory agency in the republic. The KCIA maintained a complex set of interlocking institutional links with almost all of the government's key decision-making bodies. The KCIA had a near- monopoly over crucial information concerning national security under the charter of the Act Concerning Protection of Military Secrets and, more importantly, possessed considerable veto power over other agencies through its supervisory and coordination functions.

The KCIA's practically unlimited power to investigate and to detain any person accused of antistate behavior severely restricted the right to dissent or to criticize the regime. The frequent questioning, detention, or even prosecution of dissidents, opposition figures, and reporters seriously jeopardized basic freedoms and created an atmosphere of political repression.

19. Narratives from servicemen at Kunsan (K-8) during the Korean War. Al Gould, 3rd BW, relates how he turned over an intruder to the ROK Army and the intruder was summarily executed on the spot. Gary Proudman, Capt. USMC, of the MACS-1 related how the bartender from their Officer's bar was a suspected spy because he spoke several languages. Charles Bustion, 3rd ABG Photolab, relates how he suspected a Korean assistant was a spy after disappearance of photographic materials.

20. Andrew C. Nahm, Korea: Tradition and Transformation: A History of the Korean People (1994), p (?)-- (NOTE: Reference books sent to Hawaii at this time; page number references require entry)

21. John Larkin, "South Korea's shady spy agency is being overhauled, but will it still be able to catch North Korean spooks?" Time Asia Magazine, (Jun. 16, 2003)

In the dark chambers of South Korea's notorious spy agency, Kim Nak Joong paid the price for consorting with the enemy. As a young scholar with an idealistic desire to see the Korean peninsula united, Kim traveled to the communist North as a self-styled peace broker. In South Korea 40 years ago, that made him a North Korean spy. The agency's interrogators beat him with a metal pipe, screaming at him to confess that he'd been sent by Pyongyang to foment revolution. "When I passed out, they'd throw ice water on me," recalls Kim, now a frail grandfather. "Or they'd put a wet towel over my face and pour water on it so I couldn't breathe. When I passed out, they'd beat me again."

Kim, who was convicted of spying and spent a combined 14 years in jail before being released in 1998, is just one of thousands of South Koreans who ran afoul of the country's National Intelligence Service (NIS). Founded in 1961, the agency was infamous during the cold war for its ruthless pursuit of enemies—real and perceived—of the country's right-wing, authoritarian leaders. As South Korea has evolved into a progressive democracy, however, the agency's vicious methods and anticommunist agenda have increasingly become an outdated national embarrassment. Now, the reform-minded administration of South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun has set about rehabilitating the agency—or, as some believe, castrating it.

Since taking office in February, Roh, a former human-rights lawyer, has filled top NIS posts not with professional spy chasers but with left-leaning protégés who, like him, favor peaceful dialog with militaristic North Korea. The agency's new director is former human-rights lawyer Ko Young Koo, who fought to get Kim Nak Joong, the aforementioned scholar, released a decade ago. "We need someone who will set the agency straight," Roh told his Cabinet in late April. New management is just the beginning. Under a reform blueprint announced last month, the agency's domestic-spying operations will be curtailed and its anticommunist bureau abolished, according to an NIS spokesman. Hundreds of operatives whose jobs were to infiltrate "subversive" groups, including labor unions, now have a more prosaic mission: lawfully gathering intelligence on foreign-business competitors overseas.

The overhaul is overdue. Latter-day corruption scandals involving the NIS, agents of which have been routinely called upon to do powerful politicians' dirty work, have crippled presidencies and dragged the agency's name through the mud. But conservative lawmakers are worried the housecleaning comes at an inopportune time, during a period of heightened tension over North Korea's nuclear-weapons development. The NIS will still ferret out North Korean spies. But the job of catching domestic sympathizers will be passed to the country's police. The fear is that the shift in responsibilities, as well as efforts to make the NIS more accountable, will make the agency a toothless tiger—giving freer rein to the thousands of North Korean agents believed to be operating in the South. "We seem to have forgotten that North Korea is communist and is still eager to reunify the two Koreas under communism," says lawmaker Hahm Seung Heui, a member of the bipartisan National Assembly's Intelligence Committee.

Critics see Roh's appointment of liberal lawyers and activists to run the NIS as a political gambit to further his policy of engagement with the North. With Ko at the helm, "the agency will be pro-North Korean," fumes Chung Hyung Keun, a conservative lawmaker and former spy catcher. Chung defends some of the NIS abuses, saying that too much focus on them has made martyrs of men like Kim Nak Joong, who Chung says was indeed a spy and accepted money from North Koreans. Adds Lee Dong Bok, a former intelligence official: "The agency is our last bulwark against North Korean aggression. It must be viewed by North Korea as a foe to be reckoned with."

Roh's predecessor, Kim Dae Jung—who said South Korean agents tried to kill him three times in his days as a democratic activist—also vowed to clean up the agency. But by the end of Kim's presidential term in February, he was embroiled in a scandal over charges that the NIS illegally funneled money to Kim Jong Il to buy the North Korean dictator's participation in a June 2000 summit. "Every new government promises to make the spy service neutral," says Ahn Chung Si, a political scientist at Seoul National University. "But they all end up abusing it." Roh may fare better. That would satisfy Kim Nak Joong, who admits meeting North Koreans but denies spying for them. "What I went through was beyond description," he says. "No one should have to go through it again."

—With reporting by Mingi Hyun

From the Jun. 16, 2003 issue of TIME Asia Magazine

21a. Chosun Ilbo, "Truth Commission Says NK Spies and Pro-North Guerrilla Contributed to Democracy" (July 2, 2004)

21b. Korea Herald, "N.K. spies not pro-democracy fighters: panel" (July 7, 2004)

21c. Yonhap News, "Convicted Pro-North Korean Figures Hired on Presidential Panel" (16 July 2004) -- Three convicted spies for North Korea found working as investigators for the Presidential Truth Commission

21d. Chosun Ilbo, "Uri Party to Propose Bill to Abolish National Security Law" (15 July 2004)

22. "History of Harm: The ugly past of the NIS," Time Asia Magazine, (Jun. 09, 2003)

1973 Scholar Tsche Chong Kil is found dead at NIS (then called the Korean Central Intelligence Agency) headquarters. Agents say he jumped from a seventh-floor window after confessing to spying for North Korea
1979 Agency chief Kim Chae Gyu, right, assassinates South Korean President Park Chung Hee and the chief of the Presidential Security Force, Cha Chi Chol
1987 NIS agents torture and kill student activist Park Chong Chol. An autopsy reveals his windpipe was smashed on the edge of a bathtub
1995—6 Spy-agency director Kwon Young Hae is suspected of siphoning about $155 million from the agency's budget to fund the New Korea Party's presidential-election campaign against challenger Kim Dae Jung
2001—2 Several senior NIS officials receive jail terms for taking bribes from businessmen
2003 Former NIS director Lim Dong Won admits the agency helped transfer $200 million to North Korea before the June 2000 summit between the two Koreas. A special counsel is investigating whether the transfer was illegal

23. Lee Wha Rang, "North Korea's Spy Agency Running Wild Again?," (July 2, 1998). -- Historical material on the communist agression in South Korea. The Bureau was originally created in the late 1940's. It was manned and managed by South Korean Communists. Like the ANSP, the Bureau has a checkered past - such as an attempted military coup against Kim Il Sung and an attempted assassination of South Korean President Park Chung Hee (who was shot by his own spy chief). Kim Il Sung had problems controlling the Bureau, and now Kim Jong Il finds the Bureau running wild again.

24. Samuel Lent, IHT, "Academic sentenced for aiding Pyongyang," (March 30, 2004) -- Details of conviction of Song Du Yul as a North Korean sympathizer in Seoul courts.

25. Brooke A. Masters, The Washington Post, "Alleged Spy for South Korea to Plead Guilty on Lesser Charges, Sources Say" (May 6, 1997) -- Details of the Robert Kim espionage for the South Koreans. While Kim did not receive money for his activities, he spied in return for a job that the South Korean Government promised him in lieu of remuneration. Facing treason charges, he pled guilty to lesser charges of gathering and transmitting information to a foreign government.

25a. CNN, "Man charged with spying for N. Korea" (February 7, 2003)

25b. Yonhap News, "Robert Kim Demands S. Korean Government Acknowledge his Work" (27 July 2004)



25c. David Scofield, Asia Times, "South Korea's 'heroic' spy" (12 June 2004) -- Robert Kim guilty of sedition but Korea view him as hero.

26. Donga Ilbo, "Deaths of 7,000 South Korean Spies Dispatched to North Korea by South Ignored By Seoul," (Feb 16, 2004) -- Blockbuster Korean movie "Silmido" of secret assassination force to North Korea that resulted in a rebellion of the group spurs action for recognition of Korean "spies" from 1950 to 1972.

Hankyoreh, "7,726 South Korean Agents Confirmed Lost in North Korea," (August 15, 1999)

27. Lee Wha Rang, "US CIA Operations in Korea - 1950-1955" - Early days in Korean War of CIA operations.

28. "Intelligence and Warning Systems: Implications for ROK-U.S. Combined Crisis Management," Volume 11 Number 4 (Winter 1999) -- Military Intelligence

29. Lee Wha Rang, "US Troops in Korea - Time To Get Out?" (May 10, 1998) -- History of

30. Amnesty International, "Republic of Korea Prisoners of Conscience: Silenced for Speaking Out" (Dec 2002) -- Description of groups that Amnesty International are concerned whose human rights have been violated.

31. John Larkin, Report, July 14, 1998. -- July 12, 1998 commando found drowned with submersible tow craft.

World Navies Today: North Korea (Nov 2001)

Approx. 22 Sang-O class coastal infiltration submarines
Displacement: 277 tons submerged Dimensions: 35.5 x 3.8 x 3.7 meters (116.5 x 12.5 x 12.1 feet) Propulsion: Diesel-electric, 1 shaft, 8.8 knots Crew: 19 + 6 swimmers Armament: 2 or 4 21 inch torpedo tubes in some units Small subs meant for coastal infiltration operations.

40+ Yugo class midget submarines
Displacement: 25 tons submerged Dimensions: 20 x 2 x 1.6 meters (65.6 x 6.5 x 5 feet) Propulsion: Diesel-electric, 1 diesel, 1 shaft, 160 shp, 4 knots Crew: 2 + 6-7 swimmers Armament: 2 21 inch torpedo tubes in some units For infiltration operations.

submersible infiltration craft
Displacement: 10 tons submerged Dimensions: 12.8 x ?? x ?? meters Propulsion: 3 outboard engines, 40-50 knots Crew: 4 + 2-5 swimmer Fully submersible infiltration craft.

8+ Osprey class semi-submersible infiltration craft
Displacement: 5 tons Dimensions: 8.6 x 2.5 x ?? meters (28 x 8 x ?? feet) Propulsion: unknown, 50 knots Crew: 6 (including swimmers/saboteurs) Operate on the surface until near the insertion point, then ballast down and run in awash.

N Korean Spy Sub Captured

32. AlRef.com, "Incidents and Infiltrations: Targeting South Korea" - Overview of infiltrations into South Korea 33. Chosun Ilbo, "Former NIS Official Seeks Asylum in U.S." (May 18, 2004)

33a. Chosun Ilbo, "N. Korean Missile Engineer in South Applies for Asylum in U.S." (4 July 2004)

34. Federation of American Scientists, "National Intelligence Service: South Korean Intelligence & Security Agencies," (July 18, 1999) -- Excellent information on the NIS

35. Country Studies, "The Kwangju Uprising" -- Source: U.S. Congress Library

36. Lee Wha-rang, "The 'North Wind' Project Was Kim Young Sam Behind It?" (March 18, 1998)

37. S Korea's Anjibu Arrests Alleged NK Spies.

37a. Notes on additional kidnaps:

• "What is New about Defectors?" (February ~ August 2000) -- News items on defectors and kidnapped people by North Korea
• South Korean fishing boat (#27 Tongjin-ho): In April 1999, North Korea claimed that these crewmen were "voluntary defectors" to the North.
• Reverend Ahn Seung-woon: As reported by Sang-ho Yoon, "North Korean Secret Agents in China Operate in the Guise of Defectors," Dong-A Ilbo in Korean, February 22, 2000.
• Rev. Dong-Shik Kim: Rev. Kim is reported to have been actively involved since 1995 in evangelical work among North Korean escapees/refugees in Yanji, Jilin Province, China, where he ran a restaurant. Chinese authorities reportedly are suspicious that Rev. Kim was kidnapped by North Korean agents but that, according to the South Korean foreign ministry, there was no official confirmation from the Chinese side. In 1999, Rev. Kim reportedly led a signature drive to urge the United Nations to recognize North Korean escapees as refugees. Yonhap in English 0006 GMT February 3 and 0624 GMT February 3, 2000.
• Rev. Dong-Shik Kim: According to a tape-recorded testimony of a former North Korean agent now in hiding in Jilin, China, "a substantial number" of North Korean refugees in China are actually North Korea's undercover agents disguised as refugees assigned to abduct North Korean escapees/defectors. As reported by Sang-ho Yoon on "the realities of abduction revealed by a North Korean agent" in China, Dong-A Ilbo in Korean, February 22, 2000.

37b. Korea Herald, "STUDENTS ABDUCTED BY NORTH KOREAN AGENTS: NSP," 12/10/97 -- Kidnap of Lee Min-gyo and Choi Sung-min; Also The Chosun Ilbo (August 16, 2000) -- Families protest N.K. kidnappings

37c. Shin Dong-heun, Chosun Ilbo, "FAMILIES OF KIDNAPPED FISHERMEN TO SUE GOVERNMENT," (06/08/00)

37d. The Korea Times, "HUNDREDS OF FEMALE NK AGENTS SPYING IN CHINA," (02/06/00) -- Spies spread into Bejing and Shenang karaoke bars and restaurants

37e. Seo Hyun-jin, Korea Herald, "South Korean Families Pressure Seoul on North Korea's Admitted Abductions" (Sept 20, 2002)

37f. Byun Duk-kun, Korea Times, "Wrongly Accused Spy to Get Hefty Compensation" (Aug 15, 2003)

37g. Don Kirk, International Herald Tribune, "Wrongly Accused Spy to Get Hefty Compensation" (Aug 30, 2000)

37h. KCNA, "Truth on "suspected kidnapping of Japanese girl"" (April 28, 1997)

37h. PolitInfo, "Human Rights in Korea, Democratic People's Republic" (April 28, 1997)

37i. NDFSK, National Democratic Front of South Korea Statement (Apr 21, 2003). -- Statement of the National Democratic Front of South Korea on the Apr 19th Student Uprising.

37j. NDFSK, Central Committee of the National Democratic Front of South Korea (Jan 1, 2004). -- New Years message of the Central Committee of the National Democratic Front of South Korea.

38. "North Korea: Chronology of Provocations, 1950 - 2003" This chronology provides information on selective instances of North Korean provocations between June 1950 and 2003.

Additional links:

KOREA: PAST & PRESENT -- Political History of Korea 1945 to Present

North Korea: Inter-Korean Affairs -- Inter-Korea history

South Korean Cultural Ecology - Part 1 -- Modern History: "The Old Days" (1905-1990)

South Korean Cultural Ecology - Part 2 -- Modern History: Industrial Society Change (1905-1990)

South Korean Cultural Ecology - Part 3 -- Modern History: Farmer's Plight (1905-1990)

South Korean Cultural Ecology - Part 4 -- Modern History: Pollution and Future (1905-1990)

38a. Country-data.com -- Overview of spying and espionage in Korea

38b. North Korea's KPS, "Workers Party Is Behind Hanchongnyon: Prosecution" (18 September 1996)

38c. Charlie Cho, The Ubyssey, Canadian University Press, "Oppressive Democracy" (14 Nov 96) -- Hanchongnyeon riots Aug 20-Aug 30.

38d. Sangwon Suh and Assif Shameen, Asia Week, "ASSAULT ON YONSEI" (30 August 1996)

38e. Guardian, "Japan Probes N. Korea Ferry for Spying" (January 29, 2003)

38f. The Tribune, (Changdirah, India) "S Korea frees last two North spies" (Aug 14, 2000) -- Shin Chong-ung, former railway official, and Cho Song-Il, former university professor, released from prison to celebrate the advances in reconciliation during Kim Dae-jung administration.

38g. Minjok Jungrun, "The Betrayal of An Intellectual, 'Ideology' Spies Lurk in All Parts of South Korea" (January 28, 1998) -- Abstract questioning how many more spies are in academia.

38h. The Weekly Post, "Inside News From Japan: The Weekly Post Special: What Will North Korean Terrorists in Japan Do?" (February 23, 2003) -- Analysis of What If North Korea attacks Japan with sleeper groups and SOF.

38i. Adam J. Hebert, Air Force Magazine, Vol. 87, No. 6 "Keeping Watch on Korea" (June 2004) -- US Air Force Magazine article on life in Korea

38j. Chosun Ilbo, "8 Korean Americans Blacklisted for North Agents" (14 May 1998)

38k. Hankyoreh, "The North Wind from Pyongyang ANSP Foreign Operations Reports" -- Unsubstantiated report

38l. Kimsoft, "Korean 'Businessmen' or Spies" -- Unsubstantiated reports of ANSP spy activity

38m. Chosun Ilbo, "Communication Among NK Spies Remains High, Arrests of NK Spies Drop" (17 Oct 2004) -- North spy communication same level, but spy arrests down. 39. Observation of Kalani O'Sullivan (2004). Occurred while working as a English teacher in Kunsan in 1995. Fellow teachers recalled to duty as reserves to search for infiltrator in Sochon. CNN World NewsThe suspected North Korean spy was shot to death after one of the largest manhunts in the country's history. The alleged infiltrator was shot and captured near Puyo, 30km miles north of Kunsan. He was taken to a Seoul hospital where he died. About 20,000 security forces had been searching for the infiltrator. Another alleged spy, who was captured in October, told interrogators the pair arrived in the south in August via the west coast island of Kanghwa. In another incident in September, South Korean troops on the border shot and killed an alleged North Korean infiltrator after he crawled out of a river dressed in a frogman's suit.

Observation of Kalani O'Sullivan (2004). Beaches that were fenced off in 1990 were slowly cleared to make parks and beaches. One example is the Changhang Beach Park (across the Kumgang River near the land mark smoke stack) which used to be a barb-wire enclosed area, but now sports restaurants and a small beach park. The observation posts are now unmanned.

40. NIS: "The Case of Kim Dong-shik, an Armed North Korean Agent Who Infiltrated Puyo, South Chungchong Province"

41. NIS: "The Case of Chung Soo-il, a spy who was sent to the South with the false identity of a Filipino"

42. NIS: "The Case of Submarine Infiltration on an East-coast Beach (Sept. 18, 1996)"

43. Other NIS resource pages: NIS: "Main Index Page" -- North Korean Activities; NIS: "Main Index Page for Spy/Terror Activities" -- Main Index page of Spy/Terror Activities and Historical background of spying in Korea;NIS: "Secret Intelligence Service of the Late Chosun Dynasty"; NIS: "Clandestine Activities of Mun Ik-jom in Introducing Cotton Seeds from China to the Koryo Dynasty"; NIS: "Espionage Activities of Prince Hodong"; NIS: "Jonathan Pollard confessed to spying on his country for Israel. What did that have to do with the summit?"; NIS: "A Decade as a Turncoat: Aldrich Ames`s Own Story "; NIS: "An employee of the Central Intelligence Agency was arrested November 16 for spying on behalf of Russia";

44. NIS: "The Revolutionary Democratic party incident and letters of apology by Kim Yung-hwan and Jo Yoo-shik";

45. NIS: "Terrorist Bombing at the Tomb of Burmese Hero in Brief OCTOBER 9, 1983 10:27 LOCAL TIME (12:57PM IN KOREA)";

46. NIS: "Bombing of KAL Flight 858 in Brief November 29, 1987. 14:05"; -- Airliner bombing to prevent interest in Seoul Olympic Games in 1988.

47. Narrative of Ed Mullin (2003). He wrote, "Just around the time of that incident with the infiltrator boat there were three North Korean agents killed on the beach by Kunsan AB. They paddle ashore in flotation suits, they were spotted by the ROK Army and were killed in a fire fight." The Stars and Stripes article stated that the spy boat disguised as a fishing craft was captured and four infiltrators killed. The infiltrators were attempting to infiltrate Oshik-do 2 1/2 miles west of Kunsan -- and just outside the mouth of the Kumgang River and across from Kunsan AB. (NOTE: Oshik-do no longer exists as it was incorporated into the tidal reclamation project as part of the Kunjang Industrial area. The GM-Daewoo automobile plant is near the area of this island.)

48. Submarines have been the favored way of infiltration in recent years for the east, while semi-submersibles favored for the tidal flats of the west coast. In September 1996, a North Korean submarine got stranded at Kangnung, South Korea, and its crew abandoned the ship. Eleven of the crew committed murder/suicide. The sub had two special forces agents who had finished a mission in South Korea and were picked up by the sub before the sub ran into a rock. The two men fought off an army of South Korean troops and remained at large for 50 days, during which they killed 11 of the pursuers. One was killed and the other evaded capture.

In June 1998, a submarine was discovered partially submerged about 11.5 miles (18.5 km) from Sokcho, a coastal town just south of the North Korean border. The South Korean navy towed the submarine to shore. The country's national news agency, Yonhap, reported that the vessel was a 70-ton Yugo-class submarine, which normally carries four to five crewmen. North Korea is believed to have several such vessels. Yonhap also said that the submarine's propeller got caught in a fish net that had been set to drift from a South Korean fishing boat. That boat spotted the entangled craft and then radioed maritime police and the military. Crew members on the fishing vessel said several men were seen moving about on the deck of the submarine, apparently trying to free their vessel. The crew members were never found.

In November, South Korea issued a protest to North Korea over intrusions into South Korean waters. The South Korean navy chased the suspected North Korean spy ship and fired warning shots, prompting the vessel to head into northern waters.

After this incident, a North Korean semi-submersible craft infiltrated into South Korean waters in the Korea Strait on 18 Dec 98. These semi-submersible craft are used to insert agents into coastal waters as they are very hard to spot. A running gun battle ensued and the craft was sunk.

Later a body was discovered on a beach of a suspected North Korean spy washed up on a beach at the weekend. The cause of death was suicide by poison ampule. The South Koreans demanded an apology, but North Korea denied the body was one of its agents. An alert was issued after the body -- clad in a wetsuit and goggles with a lightweight, sandy-colored zippered jacket underneath -- was found on a beach near Donghae, 117 miles (195 km) east of Seoul. The body washed ashore 2 kilometers (1.2 miles) from a major South Korean naval base.

49. 2d ID: DMZ Incident Reports -- Listing of incidents reported at Panmunjeon.

50. Paul Shin, Associated Press, "Spies cavorted as S.Koreans searched" (Nov 8, 1996)

51. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Asia-Research.com, "DPRK Seaborne Infiltration Operations: June - December 1998" (January 7, 1999)

52. Bill Getz, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, "Korea Delivers Semi-Submersible Gunships To Iran," (December 16, 2002)

N. Korea delivers semi-submersible gunships to Iran THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Published December 16, 2002

North Korea sent 15 gunboats to Iran last week aboard an Iranian freighter that arrived about the same time that U.S. and Spanish warships temporarily seized a shipment of North Korean Scud missiles, The Washington Times has learned. The gunboats included several special forces craft called semi-submersibles — vessels that move just below the surface of the water. The 15 gunboats were carried aboard the Iranian freighter Iran Meead that slipped into the port of Bandar Abbas one day before a North Korean freighter was seized and boarded several hundred miles to the south last week. The North Korean ship was found to be carrying 15 Scud missiles and warheads bound for Yemen. The gunboat delivery, traced by U.S. intelligence, highlights North Korea's role as a major weapons supplier to rogue states. President Bush has branded both North Korea and Iran part of an "axis of evil," along with Iraq. The gunboats were identified as six Peykaap coastal patrol boats, two Tir gunboats and five Taedong underwater vessels. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, who was in the Middle East last week, said North Korea is a major exporter of missiles and military technology to dangerous regions. "And they are putting into the hands of many countries technologies and capabilities which have the potential for killing tens and hundreds of thousands of people," Mr. Rumsfeld told reporters in Djibouti. "And needless to say, our hope is that that wouldn't be the case." The Taedong semi-submersibles were further identified as three Taedong-C and two Taedong-B vessels that each carry two, 32-centimeter torpedoes. The small submarines are used in special operations warfare and are a new type of weapon for Iranian naval forces, the officials said. The ship arrived in Bandar Abbas on Dec. 8. U.S. intelligence officials believe Iran could use the gunboat and torpedo craft to threaten U.S. ships in the region. The U.S. military is building up its forces in Southwest Asia in preparation for potential military operations against Iraq. Iran's naval forces have stepped up submarine patrols near the strategic Strait of Hormuz. Iran has three Russian-made Kilo submarines and scores of coastal patrol boats. Military intelligence officials view the submersibles as a serious worry. Adm. Thomas Fargo, currently commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, stated in 1998 that the Iranian submarine threat in the Persian Gulf was a "significant concern." "Submarines are offensive weapons, not defensive ones, and any torpedo capability would obviously give [Iran] the ability to interdict shipping through the Strait of Hormuz," said Adm. Fargo, who at the time was commander of the 5th Fleet based in Bahrain. Adm. Fargo said the strait, which carries a major portion of the world's oil, is a lifeline that is being watched carefully. U.S. officials said the delivery last week was the second shipment of North Korean gunboats to Iran this year. In March, North Korea sent another shipment of coastal patrol boats aboard the Iran Meead. Those types of patrol boats were not identified. The gunboat deliveries are part of a major buildup of naval forces by the Iranian military and come amid reports that Iran is working on nuclear weapons. The State Department said on Friday that Iran is concealing elements of its nuclear arms program. A nuclear complex near the town of Natanz involves some buildings that are being constructed underground that U.S. officials say are part of a covert nuclear weapons program. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said commercial satellite photographs of the facility show that Iran's claims that its nuclear program is for electrical power generation are doubtful. "You can tell that portions of the Natanz nuclear facility, the suspect uranium enrichment plant, ultimately will be underground," Mr. Boucher told reporters. "It appears from the imagery that the service roads, several small structures and perhaps three large structures are being built below ground and some of these are already being covered with earth. Iran clearly intended to harden and bury that facility." The concealment shows that Iran did not plan to declare the facility to the International Atomic Energy Agency and that it would be used to make fuel for nuclear weapons, he said. Iranian government and military officials in recent weeks have issued threats to take action against the United States if it attempts to use military force against Iran.

53. Troy P. Krause, "Countering North Korean Special Purpose Forces Threat," (April 1999) DPRK�es Submarines

The DPRK SPF forces can infiltrate the ROK coastlines through use of submarines. The DPRK Navy has twenty-four Romeo class diesel electric submarines of a 1950s Soviet design.27 These submarines are used primarily in the coastal areas and an excellent platform to deposit small units offshore. Their Navy also has four or five Whiskey class coastal submarines but may only be used for training due to a shortage of parts and the age of the equipment.28 Specially outfitted Sang-O submarines carry a small crew of nineteen and serve a sole purpose of coastal infiltration. Finally, the DPRK Navy possesses at least forty-five midget submarines ideally suited to infiltrate two to five man teams into the ROK.29 Despite the technological advantage of the south, such small submarines prove difficult to detect especially along the rugged coastlines of the Korean Peninsula.

One Sang-O submarines ran aground a reef 120 kilometers south of the DMZ on the East Coast of the ROK in 1996.30 A taxi driver first noticed several young men sitting beside a highway roadside, all in the same uniforms with military haircuts.31 The taxi driver reported the incident to the police beginning a massive manhunt that resulted in the deaths of twenty of the submarine's crewmen. There are reports that SPF commandos, the cargo on the submarine, killed the submarine's crewmen.32 Although this speaks well of the alertness of ROK's civilians to vigilantly report and pursue these KPA soldiers, it also demonstrates that the Special Purpose Forces can get past the coastal defenses of the 54. AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, "South Korea sinks North's spy vessel in gunbattle," (Dec 19, 1998)

55. ROK NAVY NEWS UPDATE: [Mar.24,1999]Four bodies, numerous weapons found inside N.K. spy boat

55a. Specwarnet.com: North Korea Special Forces -- North Korean special forces vessels

56. Agence France-Presse, "NKOREAN MILITARY HACKERS UNLEASH 'CYBER-TERROR' ON SKOREAN COMPUTERS," (05/27/04) -- North Korean military hackers break into classified ROK databases.

Ryu Jin, Korea Times, "North Korea Operates Hacking Unit" (27 May 2004)

Chosun Ilbo, "North Korea Cyberwarfare Unit Said To Attempt Penetration Of SK, Other Institutions" (27 May 2004)

Brian McWilliams, "North Korea's School for Hackers" (Jun. 02, 2003)

56a. Korea Times, "Is South Korea Exaggerating NK Hacking Threat?" (June 03, 2004) -- Global Security.com plays down computer threat. 57. Japan Times, "Raised vessel confirmed to be Pyongyang spy ship" (October 5, 2002)

57a. North Korea: Special Forces

57b. Hiroshi Yamazaki, "North Korean spy ship on display" (May 25, 2003)

57c. SEAL Delivery Vehicle [SDV] Advanced SEAL Delivery System [ASDS] -- Employment of SEAL Swimmer Delivery Vehicles (SDV)

58. Spam Friendly Carriers -- List of Spam friendly ISPs

58a. NIC (2001) -- Network Information Service (NIC) overview. Info on Korean Information Security Agency (KISA)

58b. Technology, "Your computer could be a 'spam zombie' New loophole: poorly guarded home computers" (February 18, 2004) -- Problems with unprotected computers.

58c. Tech Watch -- Technical Bulletin board

58d. KrCert/CC Activities, APEC Information and Telecommunications Workshop (21-26 March 2004) -- Work of KISC on Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) action -- part of KISA (founded Apr 1993)

58e. JANE MACARTNEY AND BERNHARD WARNER, Reuters, "Computer worm slows global Internet traffic"(Jan 25, 2003)

58f. Hacking U.S. Government Computers from Overseas -- A terrifying view of the ability of hackers to penetrate even the most secure of computer setups in America.

• 1. The Washington Post, March 30, 1996, "Argentine, 22, Charged with hacking Computer Networks;" The Washington Post, May 20, 1998, "Argentine Pleads Guilty to Hacking U.S. Networks;" Associated Press, "Argentine Computer Hacker Agrees to Surrender, says US Attorney," Detroit Free Press, Dec. 7, 1997.
• 2. USA Today, March 23, 1996, "Hacker Pair Illustrates Pentagon's Vulnerability;" and The Toronto Star, April 12, 1998, "How Datastream Cowboy Took U.S. to the Brink of War."
• 3. ABC News, "World News Tonight" with Peter Jennings, April 25, 1991. John Markoff, "Dutch Computer Rogues Infiltrate American Systems with Impunity," The New York Times, April 21, 1991.

58g. Times Online, "Managing for Growth: Why firewalls are needed to stop cyber-attacks" (March 27, 2003) -- Seoul susceptibility to DSL hacker attacks

58h. Napsnet Special Report, June 2003

58i. Information Technology Landscape in Korea

58j. "Spy phone can secretly eavesdrop on owner" (March 19, 2004) -- Chip in phone makes it a bugging device

58k. Wu Byoung-hyun, Chosun Ilbo, "USFK Seeks Nod for CDMA Set with Scrambler" (June 20, 2003) -- Row over secure handphones for USFK

58l. Reuters, "South Koreans: True Web Fiends" (August 24, 2001) -- Stats of Korean internet use 2001

58m. Reuters, "How to Fight a Cyberwar" (Apr. 20, 1999) -- Rand Report

58n. James Glave, "Have Crackers Found Military's Achilles' Heel?" (Apr. 21, 1998) -- Hackers steal classified programs.

58o. Yonhap News, "Mobile Phones Banned, North Korean Official Says" (3 Jun 2004)

AFP, "North Korea recalls mobile phones" (3 Jun 2004)

58p. Associated Press, "North Korea promises 'secure' email service" (November 29, 2003)

58q. Chosun Ilbo, "Personal Computers and Games in North Korea" (Apr.1, 2001)

58r. Global Security.com, "Weekly on North Korea" (April 2004)

58s. Pravda, "North Korea may become hi-tech leader" (2002-04-24) -- North Korea programs at computer show.

58t. Desktop Computer in South Korea (2004) -- Executive summary for desktop computers.

58u. Suseku Akira, "The Effects of Recession on Computer Education" (1999)

58v. ASSIF SHAMEEN, Asia Week, "Starting with a Baang Korea's PC rooms have a view on the future" (Sept 1, 2000)

58w. Dan Briody, "South Korea: A Window into The Future" (Jan 15, 2003)

58x. Yonhap News, "Gov't Launches Probe of Alleged Hi-tech Industrial Espionage" (June 8, 2004)

59. Defense Security Command: History -- Official History

59a. Donald McIntyre, Time Asia Magazine, "Secrets and Lies South Korea tries to confront its brutal past. But a commission comes up with less than half the truth" (Oct 7, 2002)

60. The Defense Security Command -- History of DSC

61. Christian Science Monitor, "Rift in Intelligence Sharing between ROK and US Reported" (11 March 2004)

62. Roy E. Appleman, SOUTH TO THE NAKTONG, NORTH TO THE YALU (1992) (See Task Forces Mathews and Dolvin Recapture of Chinju, Hamyang and Namwon for details.)

63. Allan Millett and Gen. Raymond E. Mason, "Understanding Is Better Than Remembering: The Korean War, 1945-1954" (1995)

64. Yonhap News, "Police Accused of Violating Rights in Security Law-related Cases" (June 2, 2004)

64a. Joongang Ilbo, "Rights body says security law should be changed" (3 June 2004)

65. Yonhap News, "Explosives Found Under High-Speed KTX Train Bound for Seoul" (3 June 2004)

---

RETURN TO MAIN TABLE OF CONTENTS

Return to Top

---

For comments or inputs, contact Kalani O'Sullivan.

NOTICE/DISCLAIMER: The content of this page is unofficial and the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of anyone associated with this page or any of those linked from this site. All opinions are those of the writer and are intended for entertainment purposes only. Links to other web pages are provided for convenience and do not, in any way, constitute an endorsement of the linked pages or any commercial or private issues or products presented there. None of this site has been endorsed by the DOD, the Air Force, the 8th Fighter Wing or Mickey Mouse. All Air Force links are publicly accessible through the world-wide web. If there is any discrepancy between eye-witness accounts and OFFICIAL DOD records, this site opts to lend credence to the eye-witness views.

---

Return to Top

9 May 2004 Links Purged: June 3, 2001 HTML Toolbox

---