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USFK MILITARY EVENTS (2002)
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Land Partnership Plan:
Under the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), the USFK will close 28 of its 41 major
installations and facilities, including three in Seoul. It will also shut down
three training ranges in Paju, Tongduchon and Pochon. The operations will be
consolidated into other "stable" camps. The USFK will return a total of 41.14
million pyong of land over the next 10 years -- more than half of the granted
lands. Overall, the additional land to be returned is around 2.5 million
square meters, while the US will get about 2.7 million square meters in the new
agreement. According to the Korea Times on 29 March:
Cps. Grant, Stanton, Edwards, Howze, Greaves and Garry Owen in Paju will be
consolidated with Cp. Casey or Cp. Stanley in Tongduchon, while the six small
bases, including Cp. Kyle, which are located in Uijongbu and Tongduchon, will
be merged with Cp. Casey or Cp. Stanley.
Cp. Colbern in Hanam, Kyonggi Province, and some part of Cp. Long in Wonju,
Kangwon Province, will be consolidated with Cp. Humphreys in Pyongtaek,
while 260,000 pyong of government-granted land outside the Kunsan Air Base will
be returned to the government.
Meanwhile, the two sides agreed that 1.54 million pyong of new land would be
granted in return for USFK's consolidation of bases and training facilities.
The U.S. requested 500,000 pyong of new land in Osan, 300,000 pyong in
Uijongbu, 240,000 pyong in Pyongtaek, 2,000 pyong in Inchon, 200,000 pyong in
Ichon in Kyonggi Province, 31,000 in Chilgok and 100,000 pyong of land for a
marine corps training facility in Pohang, North Kyongsang Province.
If you've ever seen the camps up near the DMZ, you'll know that they should
have been consolidated a LONG, LONG time ago. For example, Camp Gary Owens in
Munsan still has Jamesway buildings from the Korean War era and quonset huts
that are left overs from the 1960s. Some of these older buildings have had
dry-vit insulation added on the exterior but the interiors haven't been
upgraded. Right outside the fence within 50 yards of the main MP shack is a
pig farm -- so it smells bad and you know the water table is polluted. With
the heavier equipment, the base roads had to be strengthened with a new bridge
being built at the main gate. Trying to upgrade these sites is like flushing
money down a toilet. In addition to the substandard facilities, the training
for the heavy tanks require them to go to the Korean Training Center (KTC)
situated above Tongduchon. In Sept 2002, all of Camp Gary Owens went to the
KTC for a month-long exercise leaving about 130 folks behind to take care of
the tiny camp. Finally, there's the question of Camp Grant about five minutes
down the road with a duplication of service facilities.
During Congressional hearings in 2001, Army Sgt. Dwayne Dozier said he lived in
a 50-year-old building that had 10 small, one-man rooms. "The Korean-vintage
latrine and shower facilities are located outside the building, about 25 feet
away," he said. "You can imagine the courage it takes to go to the bathroom in
the middle of the night in January. Therefore, getting a good night's rest is
not always easy." Dozier and other NCOs told similar stories. "Everything is
worn out," he said. "The original plumbing, heating and electrical system needs
to be completely replaced. In fact, water has to be run a few minutes before
using it due to the rust-colored appearance." Others testified that the living
quarters for service members were substandard with electrical, plumbing and
heating problems. There were problems with mildew on clothes in their closets
and sewage backing up in the shower drains. Drinking water was from bottled
water as tap water was unsafe for drinking.
Defensively, the ROK Army took over the DMZ in the 1970s -- and then in 1992
took over Panmunjon as well. The ROK artillery and armor are arrayed all along
the DMZ as the first line of defense -- and the U.S. Army armor is really only
the second-line of defense. There is some logic to keeping the U.S. heavy
military equipment in different locations to prevent a single North Korean
strike from destroying them -- but with current satellite surveillance methods
of North Korea forces near the DMZ, there is ample advance warnings for
dispersal of the units equipment in heightened alerts. Army aviation units at
Chunchon (Camp Page) will be downgraded as the Koreans upgrade their own attack
helicopter forces with the procurement of 36 AH-X Attack helicopters for the
South Korean Army by 2005 and the 500 planned Korean Military Helicopter (KMH)
that will replace the current ROK Army chopper fleet.
The consolidation of the smaller camps into Camp Casey or Camp Stanley -- with
all the new facilities -- is a good idea. The former camptown called "Little
Chicago" is right outside the gates of Camp Casey -- and Camp Stanley is only a
mile down the road. Mount Soryo resort park is nearby and the hills of
Tongduchon hide the streams that many Koreans flock to in the summer. Camp
Casey and Stanley are very large camps -- though Osan would be larger only
because of its runways. To the rear of the camps are hills making it an
attractive location as well.
The monetary benefits to Korea under the small warehouse management
facility manned mostly by South Korean employees, caused no property
damage or injuries are obvious. The Korean
government stated, "The government will finance the project with proceeds from
the sale of facilities and areas to be returned. On the part of the Korean
government, the project requires no additional cost beyond funds that are
already programmed." It will cost nothing -- and the government should make a
very, very healthy profit as well. Camp Page could be converted into a
regional airport. Some of the lands like the heliport at Taegu and Camp
Hialeah could be converted to civil uses as Taegu and Pusan have no where else
to expand. These lands are worth today in the billion of dollars. Even the
smaller pieces of real-estate like Camp Market in Inchon and Camp Kim in Seoul
are worth multi-millions of dollars in real estate value. The Korean
government is getting a real good deal with the return of these pieces of real
estate in prime locations.
Though not mentioned in the article, the 260,000 pyong OUTSIDE the base is most
certainly is the Kunsan Airport aircraft taxiway and parking area that was once
INSIDE the base. It is now fenced off and the taxiway leading into the base is
blocked when not in use. The connecting gate is opened only for the
arriving/departing flights. The terminal area/parking lot was constructed
outside the base perimeter.
Though this action will NOT resolve the Kunsan protests over land use, it
will remove one more stone that the protestors had to throw aimed at Kunsan AB.
Under the LPP agreement, the U.S. forces will relocate Camp Kim in Seoul, Camp
Hialeah in Busan, Camp Page in Chuncheon, Camp Market in Incheon, Camp Walker
Heliport in Daegu and other installations from Dongducheon, Uijeongbu, Paju and
Hanam. In exchange, the Korean government will purchase land to allow expansion
at Camp Stanley in Euijeongbu (1 million square meters), Osan Air Base (1.65
million square meters), Camp Humphries in Pyeongtaek (1.2 million square
meters) and Pohang (500,000 square meters); and dedicate one training ground
for US use. What makes this interesting is that over the years -- starting in
1993 -- the civic leaders in Osan and Pyongtaek have been vehemently against
the expansion in their areas.
Under the LPP the first planned community effort will be about 1,500 family
houses at Camp Humphreys at an upfront cost of about $675 million. There are
also plans for 500 units at Camp Carroll and 500 units at Yongsan. Including
Kunsan and Osan, the total cost would be around $700 million. The total
community plan includes housing, commissary, post exchange, schools and other
quality of life facilities.
What we find surprising was the mention of the return of Camp Hialleah to
Korea. In 1993, Pusan wanted the land back but offered the U.S. forces a
undeveloped flood plain in exchange. That was a ridiculous offer that killed
the negotiations in 1993. The offer of more land in Pohang up the road seems
attractive, especially considering that there is NO feasible expansion possible
in Pusan.
One wonders what kinds of protests will erupt in the future over the LPP
agreement. Like the relocation of Seoul's garbage dumps to adjoining
provinces, it may turn into a "NIMBY" issue-- Not in my backyard. Having a
U.S. military base in one's town in the present anti-U.S. climate is something
that most modern civic leaders would care to be without -- especially with the
promise of demonstrations and controversy that surrounds any U.S. military
base. We'll see what unfolds when Korea tries to purchase lands for expansion.
The initiative will entail no cuts in the 37,000 U.S. soldiers in Korea. The
base closure will concentrate on facilities for combat forces in the northern
part of the nation. The plan calls for U.S. troops to realign around seven
hubs across the nation, with Yongsan Garrison in central Seoul continuing to
serve as a command and control center. This certainly is NOT happy news for
the City of Seoul who have already drawn up plans for the conversion of Yongsan
Garrison. The March 28 article in the Korea Herald is as follows:
U.S. military to return more than half of granted land to Korea over 10 years
The U.S. military in South Korea will close 28 major installations and return
more than half of granted land to the Korean government over 10 years,
officials said yesterday.
Defense Minister Kim Dong-shin and Gen. Thomas A. Schwartz, commander of the
U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), signed an agreement for the land partnership plan
(LPP).
The signing wraps up more than one year of negotiations for realignment of U.S.
forces and efficient use of land in Korea.
The plan calls for USFK to close 28 of its 41 major installations and
facilities, including three in Seoul. It will also shut down three training
ranges.
But the initiative will entail no cuts in the number of U.S. soldiers in Korea,
which now stands at 37,000, said Col. Robert Durbin, USFK assistant deputy
chief of staff.
Consequently, USFK will return a total of 41 million pyeong (one pyeong equals
3.3 sq. meters) of land to the Korean government. In return, Korea will grant
1.54 million pyeong of land needed for the relocation of troops and equipment.
The Korean government will also construct and provide replacement facilities
for nine installations that will be closed at the request of the Korean
government.
The U.S. forces will also be granted limited joint use of available Korean
military training areas.
The plan will be implemented in stages over the next 10 years.
The LPP will reduce the number of major U.S. bases in Korea from 41 to 23 and
the size of land granted to USFK from 74 million pyeong to 32 million pyeong,
officials said.
"The base consolidation will help settle many civil petitions related to
private land occupied by U.S. forces," Brig. Gen. Kwon Haing-keun, chief of
Yongsan Project Office at the Korean Defense Ministry said.
The base closure will concentrate on facilities for combat forces in the
northern part of the nation, he said.
Maehyang-ri shooting range in Gyeonggi Province, which residents demanded that
U.S. forces close, is not included in the plan.
The implementation is estimated to cost 3.3 trillion won ($2.5 billion).
The Korean government will spend 1.49 trillion won to purchase land for new
grants and build replacement facilities, Kwon said.
The United States will spend 1.84 trillion won to upgrade the remaining
installations.
"The government will finance the project with proceeds from the sale of
facilities and areas to be returned. On the part of the Korean government, the
project requires no additional cost beyond funds that are already programmed,"
the official said.
In November, the two governments signed a letter of intent for the land-swap
plan, while agreeing to work out final details within the next four months.
At that time, they agreed that the U.S. side will return 20 facilities and 1.4
million pyeong of land and Korea will grant 750,000 pyeong.
During the four-month negotiations, eight U.S. facilities were added to the
list for return, he said.
Gen. Schwartz said the LPP is a "win-win" situation, as it will prove
beneficial to both Korea and the United States.
"While the number of U.S. forces assigned in Korea will remain constant, the
United States benefits from consolidation onto fewer, more efficient
installations that will promote balanced readiness, enhanced force protection
and better quality facilities for USFK in Korea," he said.
The plan calls for U.S. troops to realign around seven hubs across the nation,
with Yongsan Garrison in central Seoul continuing to serve as a command and
control center.
Under the LPP agreement, the U.S. forces will relocate Camp Kim in Seoul,
Camp Hialeah in Busan
, Camp Page in Chuncheon, Camp Market in Incheon, Camp Walker Heliport in Daegu
and other installations from Dongducheon, Uijeongbu, Paju and Hanam.
(jjhwang@koreaherald.co.kr)
By Hwang Jang-jin Staff reporter
Our personal opinion is that this is the smartest move the USFK could make in
view of the current Korean environmental protests going on. The Korean
environmental activists wish to have the U.S. government foot the bill for
cleanups of U.S. camps/bases. Under the current SOFA agreement, the U.S. is
not liable for any cleanup if it returns the lands to the ROK. The 1966 SOFA
states that everything is given "as is" when transferred back to Korea...and
this provision remains in effect. (See
2001 SOFA
for environmental concerns.) Though the ROK has consistently sought an
environmental provision, the 2001 SOFA only contains a Memorandum of Special
Understandings on Environmental Protection.
Undaunted, the Koreans are still pressing for an environmental agreement under
the SOFA. The basic Korean premise is to have the Americans pay for past
"wrongs" dealing with environmental damage. The U.S. has thus far refused to
be baited into this area.
If one considers the "Superfund" in the U.S. set to pay for the cleanup of old
military bases with pollution problems, you will understand the massive
monetary impacts if the U.S. agrees to be baited into this item. In addition,
the Koreans themselves have been notorious for polluting their own environment
-- much more so than the Americans. However, there is no mention of the Korean
culpability as well to this environmental pollution. The agreement still has
not been reached in this area. In the interim period, the U.S. is returning its
unused sites to the Koreans as fast as it can. Once returned to Korean control,
they were no longer negotiable as environmental concerns. Thus under the Land
Partnership Plan, the return of unused land is a very wise move.
What is VERY interesting is that some environmental groups are protesting the procurement of the promised 1.54 million pyong of new land because of the pollution problems from other sites.
In effect, they are saying we'll keep the returned lands but we shouldn't give you new lands. Not very realistic. Green Korea United, a non-governmental environmental organizations (NGO) with 10 chapters throughout Korea and 15,000 members, protested the provisional 750,000 pyong figure while the negotiations were going on in August 2001. The Green Korea: Report #9 stated:
USFK Requested 750,000 pyong of new land.
We say, No! No More Land for the USKF Military Use in Korea
Under its land readjustment plan, the U.S. military has a plan to return to South Korea 40 million pyong of land (some 132 million sq. meters) currently used by its troops over the next 10 years. Under the "Land Partnership Plan (LPP)," the United States requested that in return the Korean government grant them 750,000 pyong of new land for their consolidated bases and training facilities. The plan calls for the closure of at least 15 large U.S. installations and training facilities in three areas.
Not Surprising News: "US Soldiers Avoid Service in Korea"
NO COMMENT AS THIS IS OLD NEWS TO A LOT OF OLD GI'S. In making the pitch to
Congress to get funding for the Yongsan, USFK admits that Korea is the place
soldiers don't want to be -- outranking the Middle East and Kosovo. Article
from
Chosun Ilbo
dated 22 Jan 2002.
US Soldiers Avoid Service in Korea: Research
Korea is the most avoided location for US Forces, as research shows that some
60,000 GIs, half of the number of soldiers who were offered assignment in Korea
for the three years since 1989, have refused the posting.
Steve T Walberger, commander of the USFK 34th Support Unit, said that a work
satisfaction survey on US forces in Korea, Japan and Europe conducted by US
Congress inspection team revealed that Korea was the least favored assignment,
followed by Middle East and Kosovo.
According to data recently announced by USFK, the refusal rate on placement to
Korea was twice that of the average in the army, as solders avoid the
assignment because of poor work conditions and having to live separately from
their family.
While 57% of the 37,000 US soldiers stationing in Korea are married, only 10%,
or 2,100 live with their family members, far less than the 72% of US forces in
Japan and 74% in Germany. Some 85% of all US soldiers living separate from
their family and on foreign assignment are concentrated in Korea.
General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander of USFK, testified at US Congress
questioning session in March 2001 that 45% of the 8,000 Army and Navy housing
units in Korea are 25 years or more old, and 20% of the 9,624 USFK buildings
are temporary structures, emphasizing that 40% of the GIs in Korea are living
in inappropriate conditions. Some 74.7% of all buildings, and 83.7% of housing
structures in the USFK Yongsan Base are over 40 years old.
Korean Defense Service Medal Approved
This is something that some folks have been seeking for many years. The Korea Defense Veterans Alliance started the campaign in 1999 to achieve "equal treatment with other deployments including authorization of a service medal and full combat recognition for service in defense of the Republic of Korea." Other veteran groups soon joined in. AMVets supported the award of a medal in its 2001 convention. Congressman Elton Gallegly (R-Ventura County) created the legislation to create the medal in 2001.

Subject: Korea Defense Service Medal Act
Date: 2 DEC 2002
PRT No.: HQ021202009
Released by: National Headquarters, Dunellen, NJ
To: News Media
For Immediate Release
AFTER 48 YEARS OF WAITING KOREA CEASE-FIRE SERVICE IS
FINALLY RECOGNIZED
After 48 years of service in the Republic of Korea, U.S.
Armed Forces will finally receive the service medal
recognition they earned and deserve for their historically
dangerous and hostile duty. Approximately 40,000 troops
have served on the peninsula each year since 1954. On 2 DEC
2002, President Bush signed the National Defense
Authorization for year 2003 that included the KOREA DEFENSE
SERVICE MEDAL to be awarded to all armed forces members who
served from 28 July 1954 to a date to be determined by the
Secretary of Defense. The House and Senate passed the bill
in November. This will affect many thousands of former and
current servicemen and women. Korea service is the only
U.S. military deployment standing the line face-to-face with
an enemy without a service medal award.
Representative Elton Gallegly (R-CA 23) was the first Member
of Congress to create legislation for the service medal on
May 22, 2001. His bill had 243 bipartisan cosponsors that
included a majority of members on the House Armed Services
Committee. A companion bill introduced in the Senate by
Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) on June 7, 2001 with 63
bipartisan cosponsors that also included a majority on the
Senate Armed Services Committee.
There has never been a surrender or formal truce agreement
officially ending the Korean War in spite of 48 years of
negotiation. Only a fragile cease-fire agreement is in
place and technically, the countries remain at a
state-of-war. Since cease-fire service began in 1954 there
have been over 40,400 breaches to the cease-fire agreement
by North Korean Forces. At least 1,200 U.S. personnel have
died, hundreds wounded, and 87 captured and held prisoner.
There are more than 2,300 Republic of Korea casualties.
In August 1999 the Korea Defense Veterans of America,
headquartered in Dunellen, NJ, initiated the project to
bring proper recognition to cease-fire veterans. The KDVA
is a national organization of current and former Armed
Forces members from all branches of service that have served
in Korea between 1945 and the present. The official web
site is at: http://kdvamerica.org
Thomas McLaughlin, National Public Relations Officer
(718) 634-4312
Norm Tredway, National Commander
(732) 752-8457

Korea Defense Service Medal (Proposed)
President Approves Gallegly-championed Korea Defense Service Medal
WASHINGTON, D.C.—President Bush today signed the National Defense Authorization Act, which among other things directs the Department of Defense to issue a Korea Defense Service Medal as championed by Congressman Elton Gallegly (R-Ventura County).
Last year, Congress approved language that only asked the DOD to consider a medal. But the DOD has consistently refused to issue the medal, leading Gallegly and his allies in the Senate to push for the stronger language this year.
The language signed by the President today comes from Gallegly’s Korea Defense Service Medal Act, which he introduced last year. The language specifically directs the DOD to award a Korea Defense Service Medal to members of the armed forces who served in Korea after July 1954, when the DOD stopped issuing the Korea Service Medal.
More than 40,000 members of the United States armed forces have served on the Korean Peninsula each year since the armistice was signed. Since then, an estimated 1,200 servicemen and women have died as a direct result of their Korean service.
Since the Korean armistice was signed, there have been more than 40,000 breaches of the cease-fire, making it among the more dangerous places to serve.
Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D-New Mexico) introduced the companion bill in the Senate.
In addition to inclusion of the Korean Defense Service Medal, the National Defense Authorization Act includes:
- A 4.1 percent military pay raise, with targeted increases up to 6.5 percent for mid-grade and senior noncommissioned officers and mid-grade officers.
- A reduction in out-of-pocket housing expenses paid by service members from 11.3 to 7.5 percent.
- The creation of a new payment for all military retirees who were wounded in combat and received the Purple Heart and those retirees who were severely disabled in combat-related incidents. Monthly payments would range from $103 to $2,100 each month, depending upon the level of disability, and would represent a partial to full offset of the reduction in retired pay required by current law on concurrent receipt.
- More than $15 billion for programs to combat terrorism and defend the homeland against weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles.
- Authorization of $10 billion for ongoing costs of the War Against Terrorism.
- Authorization of more than $10 billion to build new military housing and working facilities for military personnel and their families.
- Authorization of approximately $130 billion to develop, test and build new military weapons and equipment.
However, the KDVA still seeks recognition for COMBAT service of veterans who served on the DMZ. Many of the patrols were ambushed and firefights with North Korean infiltrators were not unknown. Shellings from the North were not unknown. When one looks at the new rules to qualify for a combat medal/pay and what the U.S. troops had to put up with till 1970 while patrolling the DMZ, there is no comparison. Current rules states that if you never fired a shot and were hiding behind a rock, but were in the vicinity, you qualify. On the other hand, in 1967 the "cold war" turned into a "shooting war" on the DMZ. Many soldiers were killed. (See Korean War Organization: DMZ War.) This is a recognition that is long over due.
The KDVA still seeks the reinstatement of the United Nations Korea Service Medal and Republic of Korea Service Medal (offered by Korea for service AFTER 27 July 1953 but rejected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.). (See Service Awards for other awards that the KDVA feels that the veterans are entitled to.)
Impacts after the 9-11 Tragedy?
The U.S. Changes in Face of Terrorist Threat:
"Everything has changed!'' is the phrase Americans use to describe their
world view since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.
The illusion of safety in the cocoon of America was shattered forever. People
had been preached this for years, but no one felt the threat. Now the
Americans have received a small taste of what the Koreans have lived under for
over 50 years -- threat of destruction and war waged on their homeland.
A Chinese commentator said: "9-11 may have changed everything for Americans,
but not for Asians. What has changed things for us is the way America responded
to 9-11.'' The following is from CBS News sources:
In July 2002, the Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra canceled a U.S. concert tour because no American company would take the risk and provide insurance. It's the first time the orchestra was forced to cancel a foreign tour because of fears of terrorist attacks.
According to the CIA, its recruitment of foreign spies who can provide intelligence on terrorists has increased by 50 percent since 9/11. The agency had faced criticism for not having an adequate network of foreign agents with ties to groups like al Qaeda.
Near San Francisco's airport are some great fishing spots. But sportsmen cannot fish there since 9/11. The same kind of security measure is in place throughout the U.S., especially near bridges and dams, as well as sources of drinking water.
Expanded police power under the Patriot Act, instituted in October 2001, makes it possible for authorities with the necessary court orders to track your paths on the Internet and even read your email, especially if you are suspected of having links to terrorism.
Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda: The first known videotape of Osama bin Laden referencing the Sept. 11 attacks surfaced on Oct. 7, 2001, the same day the U.S. and Britain started bombing Afghanistan. Following that the release of that tape, the U.S. government urged news organizations to be cautious when airing the terror mastermind's unedited statements, voicing concerns that he might use them to send coded messages to his fighters. Since then, portions of several new tapes have been released by the Arabic television network Al-Jazeera, American television networks or the Pentagon; others have been mentioned by governments and the press but not made public.
 Gary Markstein, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, WI (Nov 02)
On January 8, 2002, the U.S. stated that Osama bin Laden was not in the Tora Bora cave complex. The search continues. Most intelligence analysts think bin Laden is holed up in Pakistan's border zone by sympathizers among the 3 million residents of dusty Peshawar, the chief city of the Northwest Frontier.
In November a recorded message broadcast on Al-Jazeera, the Arab news service, was almost certainly the voice of Osama bin Laden with an 80 percent probability. On the audiotape, bin Laden ridiculed Bush as a "pharaoh" and foreshadowed catastrophic future attacks on the West. It predicted that al-Qaeda's enemies "will be killed just as you kill and will be bombed just as you bomb. And expect more that will further distress you." For nearly a year, the question loomed: had bin Laden been killed in the devastating U.S. bombing campaign, or had he somehow managed to escape and lie low, possibly in the lawless border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan? This tape answered the question. Though the tape is scratchy and cannot be positively identified, the tape mentions recent terrorist events (i.e. Bali) that could not have been pasted in.
Time Magazine stated, "With almost certain confirmation that bin Laden is alive, the discussion turns back to how serious a threat he is and why he can't be caught. In a Time/CNN poll, a sizable portion, 42%, of Americans surveyed said the tape made them more worried about impending terrorist attacks, although 56% remained at the same level of anxiety. The voice on the tape calmly and chillingly predicts that al-Qaeda's enemies "will be killed just as you kill and will be bombed just as you bomb. And expect more that will further distress you." While there's no real pattern in forewarnings from al-Qaeda, intelligence analysts take the words at face value. A recorded al-Jazeera broadcast from bin Laden deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri in early October was followed by the deadly bombing in Bali that killed more than 180. The voice's condemnation of key allies in the U.S. antiterrorism war—Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Canada and Australia—put foreign governments on alert for another major hit. Bin Laden also named Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld—he calls them "the White House gangsters"—and that has counterterrorism experts worried those officials might be personally targeted. "
Following the tape's release in November, a statement attributed to al Qaeda called on Americans to become Muslims and warned of new terror attacks in Washington and New York unless the United States stopped supporting Israel.
World Trade Center 2002
The Korean View: Washington's "either you're with us or against us'' approach has caused even
those who traditionally have not been very sympathetic toward the U.S. to
appear supportive -- or at least to maintain a lower profile. After President
Bush's branding of North Korea as part of the infamous ``axis of evil,''
tensions mounted in Korea. The North claimed it was tantamount to war -- but
never really increased movements except for rhetoric. In truth, September 11
provided an opportunity for Pyongyang to improve relations with Washington, but
Pyongyang choose not to seize the moment. Pyongyang continued to
steadfastly reject offers by Washington to hold talks ``any time, any place,
without preconditions.''
During President Bush's visit to Seoul in February 2001, he did a good job in
toning down his comments regarding North Korea and, more importantly, in
reaffirming his support for President Kim when the two met in Seoul. However,
any good relations disappeared in the wake of the Korean reaction to the Winter
Olympic's todo over a Korean speed skater.
The major strains in U.S.-ROK relations predated 9-11. They date back to ROK
President Kim Dae-jung's poorly-handled March 2001 visit to Washington. One of
the first acts that George Bush did when he came to power was hold a meeting in
Washington with Kim Dae-jung in which he said they would support the
"engagement policies" with North Korea -- but that basically his giveaway
"sunshine policy" was not realistic in the Republican conservative viewpoint.
The "axis'' comment underscored the problem, it didn't create it. The Korean
people should have seen the "confrontational" stance with North Korea coming.
As to preemptive strikes, this is something new. However, people have also
forgotten that Bill Clinton was ready to make a smoking hole of North Korea in
1991 with pre-emptive strikes when they were having the nuclear inspection and
WMD problems with Kim Il-Sung. This last comment was reported by former
President Kim Young-sam in an interview two years ago.
Axis of Evil and Preemptive strikes:
The lessons learned in
Afghanistan are still being assimilated. For the present, there won't be any
major changes in the force structure at Kunsan under the Bush-Rumsfield
"vision." However, there may be some changes in the future.
The game plan for Korea is tossing aside Clinton's full acceptance of the Kim
Dae-jung "Sunshine Policy" and taking a more adversarial stance -- keying in on
the North Korean missile threat and terrorism. In January 2002, the Koreans
newspaper editorials were sounding off about the statements of the U.S.
ambassador -- and the Bush envoys to North Korea -- dealing with North Korea's
continued "terrorist" activities. Currently, Bush called Iraq, Iran and North
Korea the "axis of evil", but Colin Powell tried to smooth peoples feathers
down that this was just rhetoric. However, Bush just asked for one billion
dollars to back up his "rhetoric." (NOTE: What strikes many Asian observers as
ironic is that China is pointedly missing from the list -- regardless that it
ships missiles to Iran and is the greatest distributor of weapons of Mass
Destruction.) This may change the mission of Kunsan.
Currently, Kunsan mission is based upon reacting to a North Korean attack.
Following the Bush line -- and actions in Afghanistan -- a first-strike
potential may be considered.
Following Bush's new line of thinking, pre-emptive strikes have become a
possibility. In the past, strikes have been mostly retaliatory. However, now
Bush wants to "take the war to the enemy." In the February 7, 2002 edition of
The Christian Science Monitor
it stated, "In a controversial expansion of the Bush doctrine - the
unilateralist "with us or with the terrorists" foreign policy that followed
Sept. 11 - the administration is making a stark argument for striking first."
It went on, "Defending against terrorism and other emerging 21st century
threats may well require that we take the war to the enemy," Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld said last week in a speech at the National Defense University."
Bush has somehow started to enmesh his "war on terrorism" with his agenda for
the halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Bush
combined the two when he targeted Iran, Iraq and North Korea as nations that
support terrorism with WMD. Bush's "axis of evil" remark in his State of the
Union address touched off a firestorm in Korea. Korea is worried -- and
justifiably so -- that the "sunshine policy" of Kim Dae-jung will be mired down
in any confrontation between the U.S. and North Korea.
A Los Angeles Times article on February 7, 2002 stated, "Now, South Korea is in
political turmoil over Bush's remarks and the suggestion that the war against
terrorism could spill over to the Korean peninsula. Newspaper editorials have
labeled the U.S. president a "cowboy" bent on war, while labor unions, church
groups and a Buddhist association are among those that have issued statements
this week accusing Bush of endangering world peace. The uproar has to do with
one simple sentence in the Jan. 29 speech, in which Bush said, "North Korea is
a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction while starving
its citizens."
The article went on, "Gen. Thomas Schwartz, commander of U.S. troops stationed
in South Korea, testified last March before Congress that the North has 1.2
million soldiers on active duty and that it commands the largest submarine
fleet in the world. Even after President Kim made a historic visit to Pyongyang
in June 2000, North Korea continued to mass forces near the demilitarized zone
between the two countries, becoming an ever more serious threat to South Korea
and to the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed here, Schwartz said. ... "The
perception of a peaceful peninsula differs from reality," Schwartz testified.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il "stubbornly adheres to his 'military first'
policy, pouring huge amounts of his budget resources into the military. . . .
As a result, his military forces are bigger, better, closer and deadlier." Two
declassified CIA reports released last month gave similarly dire assessments of
North Korea. The agency said in a report made public after Bush's speech that
North Korea is "capable of producing and delivering via missile warheads or
other munitions a wide variety of chemical agents and possibly some biological
agents." The report also said that, before the 1994 freeze on its nuclear
program, the Communist nation had accumulated enough plutonium for at least one
nuclear weapon."
No one refutes that North Korea has WMD. No one refutes that North Korea has
engaged in the past in terrorism. No one refutes that North Korea has continued
to engage in terrorism by continuing to insert agents into South Korea. It is
the change in the U.S. position that worries everyone. In addition, most US
Intelligence Community (IC) agencies believe the US could face intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) threats from North Korea and Iran, and possibly from
Iraq, before 2015. Thus no one is griping that the North Koreans are a threat.
It's the possibility of a pre-emptive strike policy and the "Take-it or
Leave-it" attitudes of the Bush administration that are frightening the
Koreans. The bottomline is that a preemptive strike -- regardless of who
launches it -- will cost both sides tens of thousands of civilians lives on
both sides in the best case scenario. The worst case scenario is the total
destruction of both North and South Korea economies and infrastructure with
death tolls in the millions.
Deputy Secretary of State Armitage stated in March 2002, that the possibility
of using nuclear weapon in case of war in the peninsula would be considered as
one of the possible OPTIONS when planning military strategy. However, he was
confident that the USFK and ROK forces would hold back an attack. He stated
also that if North Korea continued to export missiles, the Bush Administration
considers intercepting or destroying the arms shipment vessel as an option.
In March 2002, the option to use a "preemptive strike" was being aimed at Iraq -- and
the world was abuzz with nations taking sides. Though a coalition would be
preferred, the U.S. had stated openly that it will go it alone if it had to.
After Afghanistan, the world was taking this warning seriously.
In Korea, the cannon's sights could just as well be shifted to North Korea. Some
felt that North Korea's Kim Jong-Il had taken this very seriously as the gun
sights were aimed at his head after Bush pointedly remarked on the DPRK's
continued spread of weapons of mass destruction. At first there was no
immediate reaction from the DPRK besides the usual bluff-and-bluster of the
years past. Then suddenly there was a dramatic shift in its openess in admitting to past transgressions that diplomatically opened doors -- and at the same time slammed doors shut.
GO TO Sunshine Policy Saved at 11th Hour: FOR CONTINUATION OF STORY.
Sunshine Policy Saved: 11th Hour Negotiations Lead to Family Reunions and Start on the Railway/Road
links between North-South Korea
Kim Dae-Jung has had a hard time with his "Sunshine Policy" ever since George
Bush was elected. The chilling of relations became a political issue. The
opening of the North and starting the dialogue was to be Kim Dae-Jung's legacy
as he leaves office in December. However, with the scandals over his sons
corruption cases and other doldrums, it looked like there would be an
ignominous end to his Presidency.
 Kim Dae-jungThe Nobel Peace Prize winner's personal image was severely tarnished by two of his sons being convicted of influence peddling and bribery. Because of this he admitted that this was a low-point in his life. (NOTE: His second son Kim Hong-Up, 53, was sentenced to three and a half years in prison in October for accepting millions of dollars from businessmen through influence peddling with a million dollar fine. However, former President Kim Young-Sam's son was sentenced to prison for similar charges and was pardoned by Kim Dae-jung. A similar Presidential pardon is probably just an election away. His youngest son Kim Hong-Gul, 38, was convicted of accepting bribes and evading taxes in November and received a two-year suspended sentence with a $164,000 fine.)
Sunshine Policy Looks Doomed: The relations with the North was troubled by President Bush's stance that the North was part of the "Axis of Evil." Kim Dae-jung's Sunshine Policy looked to be doomed after a naval engagement occurred in June. A South Korean ship was sunk and there
appeared to be little chance that any negotiations would take place. The engagement seemed to
confirm that the 60-year-old leader of the world's most reclusive country was
not a man to be trusted if he approved the attack. The North did not apologize
-- though it did extend its condolences and sorrow over the loss of life.
The
South did not press the issue for fear of scuttling the negotiations forever.
But Kim Jong-Il had other cards up his sleeve as he shuttled off by train to
meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Then came an announcement that Kim
and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi would hold a summit in Pyongyang
in September.
 Kim Jong-Il visit to Russia
Situation Flip-flops: Suddenly things flip-flopped. At the 11th hour the North and
South agreed to sit down and again hold negotiations. There were all kinds of speculation as to why Kim Jong-Il chose this time to
again open negotiations. Some said it was to make an alliance with Japan to get
a "Japan Card" to enhance its negotiating position with the U.S. Others said it
was to draw away the gun barrel that George Bush had pointed at North Korea's head. Others said that Kim Jong-Il's country was on the verge of imploding
if he didn't get some outside economic help fast. For whatever reason, he extended an invitation for multi-national summit negotiations -- something Kim Jong-Il never did before.
As part of the process, a second group of families were allowed to hold
reunions at North Korea's Kumgang mountain resort. In September, the fifth
inter-Korean family reunions, with 455 silver-haired South Korean men and women
met with 100 of their North Korean relatives at Onjonggak in the morning, and
boarded the cruiser Solbong back to the South yesterday afternoon. Another 100
people, mostly in the 70s and 80s, went to Mt. Kumgang this morning for the
second part of the fifth mass reunions since August 2000.
In May, a South Korean presidential envoy succeeded in acquiring North Korean
leader Kim Jong-il's agreement to build another set of rail and road links
through the eastern sector of the border, largely aimed at revitalizing the
money-losing Mt. Kumgang tourism project.
They are expected to finish the construction of the Mt. Kumgang reunion center
by March 2003.
The center is expected to benefit a large number of those eagerly awaiting a
chance to meet their kin after half a century of separation. There are some
100,000 on South Korea's list alone. Due to limited time and space, the Koreas
have been able to send only a hundred people from each side for the five
reunions so far.
The North issued an official decree that declared the Geumgang mountain as special district on October 23. According to the new decree passed by the North's Presidium of Supreme People's Assembly, "the new zone will cover part of Seongbuk and Samilpo regions as well as that of Goseong and Tongcheon counties all the way to Haegeum River area." The article went on to say, "The decree specifies any rash development within the mountain region that could harm the natural environment there - trees, water falls, remains of old castle etc., - will be stopped at all cost. Investment from abroad is readily encouraged and the assets of investors will be protected along with exemption of tax, says the book of law. It marks, however the sovereignty of the region will continue to remain to the North. The organization for central tour district will continue to seek ways to expand the tourist zone while Cabinet and other related state agencies ponder on better ways to implement the new decree."
In September, the negotiations agreed to proceed with reconnecting a railway
and a parallel road between Seoul and Shinuiju through the western sector of
the 4 km-wide border. The negotiators agreed that the troops from both their
militaries would start on Sept 19 to tear down barbed wire to build
cross-border railways and parallel roads -- and clear mines in the area.
Military cooperation is vital to the inter-Korean transportation project
because the railways and roads will run through the mine-infested no man's land
that divides the peninsula. Hopefully, the link up was projected for completion by the end of 2002.
According to the
Korea Times
, "The agreement included the establishment of guard posts, each 250 meters
away from the military demarcation line, inside two transportation corridors _
the Seoul-Kyongui line _ 250 meters _ and the Tonghae (east coast) line _ 100
meters _ across the border. A code of conduct for the troops of the two
militaries, designed to prevent accidental military clashes, specified that no
construction of military installations should be allowed other than the guard
posts and rail and road links, according to the agreement."
The installation of a hotline, a major step forward in military confidence
building measures, has been agreed upon. A hotline was implemented following a
joint communique on July 4, 1974, but North Korea unilaterally severed it
shortly after the August 1976 ax murder incident, which left two American
soldiers dead at the Bridge of No Return inside the DMZ. After the nuclear
tensions during Kim Young-Sam's regime and the U.S. on the brink of
unilaterally making a smoking hole of the suspected mountain, it was proposed
to implement the hot line, but nothing came of it.
Washington Post
article stated on 23 September that North and South Korea agreed to set up a
military hotline to help liaison as they reconnect rails and roads through
their heavily mined DMZ area. It stated, "Previously, the only connection was a
rickety Soviet-era landline between the North Korean military and a United
Nations guard post in the truce village of Panmunjom in the heart of the
Demilitarized Zone bisecting the Korean peninsula." There will eventually be
four hotlines -- one for telephone and one for fax on both the east and west
coasts of the peninsula along the planned railway routes. The initial line
runs along the western routes with the hotlines for the more remote east coast
later.
To a casual observers of current Korean history though, these "negotiations"
seem rather ironic. Both sides agreed to implement the items they are
currently "discussing" as part of their agreements to enter the United Nations
as "equal" nations over a decade ago. So much for international treaties. The
Postal Service still isn't implemented, the families reunions have been used as
"carrots" for negotiations; and the railroads/road still remain unbuilt. To
the South's credit, they built the Peace Highway through Seoul to the border in
about 1992; and they opened Kumgang Mountain in North Korea as a tourist venue
-- though it turned out to be a money-loser.
Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine Policy" looked like it would be rescued at the 11th hour. Kim Jong-Il held a summit with Japan's Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in Sept 2002 to resume normalization talks between the two nations. All of this was seen as Kim
Jong-Il getting a "Japan Card" to play in its negotiations with the U.S. -- a
move that showed Kim Jong-Il took George Bush's "axis of evil" speech seriously.
Japanese Negotiations and Admission of Abductees: After the North Korean-Japan summit, Japan's Prime Minister Koizumi brought
home astonishing news that the North had agreed to an indefinite suspension of
its missile program and accepted nuclear inspections. Japan apologized for its
occupation of the Korean Peninsula in 1910-45, while North Korea dropped its
demand for war reparations. The joint declaration signed after the summit said North Korea would extend
its missile moratorium beyond 2003. However, the news that unsettled the Japan's public
was that for the first time the North confessed to abducting 11 Japanese
citizens to teach their spies how to speak and act like Japanese. The public
uproar from this news overshadowed the other achievements of the summit.
American Talks Begin: In light of this new tact of North Korea, the U.S. sent a senior American
diplomat, James A. Kelly, to North Korea to end 20 months of
internal debate on whether to open talks with a country that Mr. Bush lumped
with Iran and Iraq as part of an "axis of evil." This was a significant change
of strategy for the administration, which had ended similar negotiations
pursued with North Korea by President Clinton shortly before he left office. Everyone in South Korea was cautiously hopeful that the Sunshine Policy would bear fruit in a continued dialogue between the two nations.
 Colin Powell & Choe Sung-hong, South Korea Foreign Minister
The talks was seen as a quasi-victory for Colin Powell who had sought this discussion from
the start in what he felt were "low-risk" negotiations. When the discussions opened, it was far from clear
whether the U.S. administration was willing to compensate North Korea for giving up
missile exports. Nor was it clear whether the North would be willing to pull
back from the demilitarized zone. With its economy in shambles, the North's
ability to wipe out Seoul with a devastating attack is about the only card it
still has to play.
According to the White House in September 2002, they intended to have a wide-ranging
discussion with North Korea that would cover its missile production and
exports, its huge array of conventional weapons within reach of South Korea and
its history of repression. There would undoubtedly be revived talk about its
nuclear program, which has been frozen since 1994 under an agreement with the
United States.
In Sept 2002, James
Kelly, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs,
sat down together with North Korea's First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-ju
for the meeting. This was the first high-level bilateral talks since Bush came
into office in January 2001 and came at a time when Pyongyang was making a
series of overtures to open up to the outside world in a desperate bid to
rejuvenate its depressed economy. Kelly addressed U.S. concerns about the
North's missile production and sales, nuclear development program, conventional
weapons and human rights record and the U.S. might have raised the need for the
reclusive nation to accept international inspection of its nuclear activities.
In response, North Korea possibly demanded steps to guarantee the survival of
its current regime.
North Korean Admission of Nuclear Program: Then the bomb shell hit. In October 2002 the U.S. stated that the North had revealed that it had secretly pursued a nuclear program in violation of its 1994 nuclear accord to receive oil and food in exchange for stopping its nuclear development. According to the Mainichi Shimbun in November, the North's Deputy Foreign Minster Kang Sok-ju also told special envoy Kelly at the time that it would give up its nuclear ambitions if Washington accepted its demands for a non-aggression pact and peace treaty as well as lifting economic sanctions. Kelly was upset at the proposal, the paper said quoting the words of U.S. senior officials. He reportedly left the negotiating table saying "If North Korea thinks that the United States will agree to a new framework because it has broken the Agreed Framework then it is totally mistaken."
This revelation by North Korea could have scuttled everything, but the Seoul authorities viewed it as an opening in the dialogue with the U.S. whereby the North Koreans used a "nuclear trump card" to get a better bargaining position in a "comprehensive package" -- including the nuclear issue -- with the U.S. The progress with clearing of the mines and other inter-Korean agreements were not halted.
 Bruce Plante, Chattanooga Times Free Press, TN (Click on cartoon to enlarge)
Both Seoul and Washington emphasized a "peaceful" resolution but there was a critical, difference between the two allies on how and when work for the peaceful solution should get underway. The two nations' differing responses were due partly to their interpretation of the situation. The U.S. viewed the revelation as in effect negating the 1994 nuclear accord. The South viewed it as a positive sign of North Korea's opening up for a dialogue.
To the U.S., diplomacy and international agreements are based on trust -- and North Korea just showed that its "word" was worthless. The U.S. was gun-shy after being bitten and shied away from the 1994 accord, while the South still wanted its "Sunshine Policy" to work AT ALL COSTS. Japan and South Korea both believed the 1994 pact freezing North Korea's nuclear weapons program had been effective and argued that it should not be scrapped by the U.S. in haste. (See North Korean Strategy: The USFK View for the USFK strategy and positions in Korea.)
North Korea in October did a turn-about and stated that it never really admitted to the nuclear charges and that the U.S. should immediately enter into a non-aggression pact with it to show good faith. In other words, the U.S. should show that it will not make a smoking hole of the nuclear plant as Bill Clinton wanted to do in 1994. (See Kim Young-Sam's interview in May 2000.) Later in November, North Korea went on to further "clarify" its statement saying that it was using its statement as an "example" of how a nation would be justified in continuing the development of nuclear weapons if another nation did not live up to its part of an accord. It continued its denial that it had never admitted saying it had continued nuclear weapons program.
Lacking in generous friends at a time when the economy is crumbling, North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Il, was out on a limb where he was very vulnerable. A 21 October New York Times article stated, "He has already introduced major reforms aimed at opening the economy, but he appears increasingly unable to resist pressures for more far-reaching changes. Among those changes, some experts say, may be the recent trend toward diplomacy by confession. Faced with the urgent need to fend off economic collapse, Mr. Kim's confession of a uranium-based nuclear weapons program appears to many experts to have been a pragmatic, if ultimately misguided response to an insurmountable obstacle: a Bush Administration that had little interest in engagement."
At this point, Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine Policy" was in serious trouble. However, the Korean people wanted reunification of the peninsula so badly that they were willing to overlook this latest "confession" by North Korea and view it in a positive light. They accepted it as "diplomacy by confession" -- a rather strange way of looking at things.
Though the U.S.-North Korea dialogue ceased, negotiations with South Korea continued without a break. However, the negotiations were showing signs of strain as South Korea urged North Korea to renounce its nuclear program. As the world started to chime in on "urging" North Korea to give up its nuclear program, the North started to "sweeten the pot" for the South by agreeing to many areas. In October an agreement was reached for a "permanent" reunion location near Mt. Pakdu in North Korea for the highly emotional issue of the reunification of families. The North has already started clearing the village in preparation to construction of the facilities. The clearing of the mines in the DMZ by both Koreas continued as business-as-usual. However, the thing that the South wished to disregard at this point in time -- as it wants the Sunshine Policy to succeed so dearly -- was that whatever the North promises on paper, they can renege on at a later date -- just like the 1994 accord.
Japanese Negotiations Turn Sour: Japan continued its talks for normalization with the North. The North as a "sign of goodwill" allowed five Japanese who were kidnapped to return home -- but kept their families in North Korea to assure their return. When things started turning sour, the Japanese "extended" the visit of the kidnapped Japanese when they indicated that they did not want to return to North Korea. The five abductees, including two married couples, have publicly declared their intention to stay on here and wait for their loved ones to join them in Japan, even though the visit was initially intended to last about two weeks. One of the returnees, Hitomi Soga, has a husband, Charles Jenkins, who deserted from the U.S. Army along the DMZ in 1965. The two have two teenage daughters.
The North was incensed by this move and the Japanese stated that they would take it to the U.N. if pushed -- how could they "return" people who were kidnapped in the first place and did not want to return. Many Japanese doubted the stories of the circumstances of other abductees declared deceased by the North Koreans. The abductees had become political pawns.
Japan urged the North to renounce its nuclear program but was rebuffed. Tokyo said it was willing to consider giving Pyongyang economic aid, which could substitute for compensation for the 1910-1945 colonial rule of Korea by Japan, after solving the issues of the abduction and nuclear development by the North. At this point, the North strongly hinted that it was returning to its missile development programs causing Japan's leadership to reconsider joining in developing a missile shield. The North had voluntarily shut down its ICBM missile development in 1998. As a result, the Japanese negotiations for normalization broke down. However, the Japanese stepped lightly in its diplomatic language to keep the doors open for future dialogue.
North Korea Isolated: By mid-November, the chill on the "Sunshine Policy" was reaching sub-zero temperatures. North Korea accused South Korea of dangerous military provocation by sending warships into its territorial waters and moving tanks and guns along their border. KCNA said it was clear that the Southern "provocations" were aimed at raising tension between the rival states and warned Seoul it should "think twice" about the consequences.
Pyongyang's official daily, Rondon Sinmun, said the North
would continue to develop its military strength to defend itself from the United States. "The DPRK will continue to increase its military capacity for self-defense to cope with the US imperialists' escalated moves for aggression and their policy to stifle Pyongyang with nuclear weapons," the daily said.
U.S. Moves to Cut Off KEDO Oil and Food Aid: The fly-in-the-ointment was the U.S. who stirred up a hornet's nest internationally over North Korea's admittal of its nuclear capability. The U.S. stated that it no longer felt bound to send heating oil to North Korea, though the final decision rested with KEDO -- though all knew the consortium would follow the U.S. lead for solidarity sake. The United States disclosed at the last KEDO meeting that the North still holds about 50,000 metric tons of heavy fuel prompting both South Korea and Japan to agree on final decision to suspend heavy oil. With its KEDO supplied heavy oil cut off and then the food aid cut off or "delayed" by others, it was starting to feel the pinch. (See KEDO oil for U.S. position.)
To increase the economic pressure on North Korea, on November 28 the U.S. announced it would stop food aid to North Korea -- at least temporarily. The U.S., one of the North's major food donors, has provided 155,000 tons of food to the North this year, meeting its pledge. He said the halt to new donations was a result of a lack of funds to provide additional aid. In a separate issue, the U.S. Agency for International Development said North Korea has not yet responded to U.S. demands for better monitoring of food aid to prevent diversions to the military or to North Korea's elite. The United States also wants better access to food recipients to ensure that they are receiving the aid they need. The U.S. Embassy in Seoul stressed that the U.S. calls for better access are related to any additional aid above and beyond the pledged amounts. The basic donations were provided with no such strings attached, but any further aid will require U.S. monitoring. Though the U.S. claims that its donations to North Korea stem from humanitarian considerations and has nothing to do with issues such as the North's nuclear weapons program, no one really believes that.
The World Food Program, which feeds one-third of the North Korean population, called urgently for additional food aid last week to counter what it called a crisis that has already cut rations to 3 million North Koreans in the western part of the country for the last two months. The UN aid agency complained that major donors, including Japan, had delayed their shipments of promised aid. By early 2003, food rations would be ended for an additional 1.6 million people unless more help is forthcoming, the agency said. A World Food Program spokesman, Gerald Bourke, said improvements in the monitoring system to prevent food diversions are already in place.
GO TO North Korea Amassing Chemical Weapons, Continuing its Nuclear Weapons Program & Asks for Russian Military Aid FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE NORTH'S NUCLEAR ISOLATION STORY. South Korea continued contact with North Korea (see below) though U.S. and Japan talks stalled.
Problems with Mine Clearing Operations: The two Koreas agreed to reconstruct two sets of railways and roads across the DMZ. In an agreement reached in August, the two sides agreed to open one of the roads by the end of November and one of the railway
lines in December. The railway project is a core part of South Korean Nobel Peace
Prize-winning President Kim Dae-Jung's five-year-old peace drive.
In November, Seoul's Defense Ministry disclosed that the North unilaterally suspended its part of mine clearing project aimed to establish safe land for inter-Korean railway. It was expected that the delay would push back the timetable for completion of one road link. The North blamed "interference of UN Command" as the reason for the shutdown -- which observers said is a move to drive a wedge between the South and its allies. Those inspections became controversial when the UN command, which oversees the Korean War armistice agreement, said it wanted name lists of officials who were to cross the military demarcation line in the center of the DMZ to conduct the inspections. These officials were to cross-inspect the demining work in the southern DMZ.
The North refused stating it would only provide the list to the South. The United Nations Command gave the go-ahead to a "simplified procedure" on 23 November that would allow the South to act as intermediary in passing a list of North Koreans to participate in the inspection in the southern part of the DMZ. The UNC permitted the North and South Korean demining verification teams to cross the border. The South Korean Defense Ministry forwarded the permits to the North Koreans, who refused to acknowledge the information and abstained from the demining verification.
However, the North did not respond.
The North continued to refuse to provide a list insisting that the UNC should have no jurisdiction over the DMZ corridors which it said should come under the control of the two Koreas. Then at the last minute, the North responded positively to begin surveying at least one of the corridors in the Demilitarized Zone where the road extensions from the two sides will be joined. However, what this amounted to was that the mine clearing operations would proceed on BOTH sides of the DMZ WITHOUT cross-inspections. Both sides surveyed the roads on their sides of the DMZ without crossing to the other side.
The dispute delayed the demining work inside the DMZ corridors for three weeks, but was "resolved" when the two Koreas decided to remove mines WITHOUT cross-inspections. The South's military engineers backed by demining equipment and combat soldiers restarted the demining work, while the North Korean military troops were seen clearing bushes from the border as well. North Korea informed the South that it will resume mine-removal operations to expedite the reconnection of inter-Korean railways and roads. The mine removal work is to be completed by Dec. 10.
But the row remained unsettled. The UN Command viewed the North's tactics of cutting the UN out of the process as means for creating an exclusive zone -- a joint inter-Korean quarter -- within the DMZ free of the armistice accord so that heavily armed forces could be injected without UN intervention. The UNC stated that the North conceded to the jurisdiction rights of the UNC in November 2000 and signed the related agreement. Major General James Soligan, deputy chief of staff of the UNC, issued a warning that this open corridor could also provide an attack avenue for the North. Soligan reaffirmed UN Command's basic position that any passage through the Demarcation Line would require prior approval from the Command as stipulated under the armistice agreement.
Soligan stated the rail project would be in jeopardy if the North Koreans continued to refuse to apply for UNC approval before crossing the border -- including all personnel involved in construction of re-linking inter-Korean railways and roads as well as vehicles from either side. Though the UNC supports the inter-Korea efforts, Soligan also pointed out that there could be possible setbacks to major inter-Korean economic projects if the North refuses to seek consent to cross the Demarcation Line. The accord also applies for tourists bound for the special tour district of Geumgang. Soligan stated, "The reality is that both the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the UNC agreed that North Korea will have to comply with the armistice agreement in order to connect road and rails. In other words, transportation corridors are part of the DMZ and we will follow armistice agreement procedures in there."
On December 1, the National Defense Ministry and the UNC agreed to simplify the procedure of issuing approvals to travelers to cross the Military Demarcation Line between the two Koreas. The simplified procedure is targeted for tourists to the North's Mount Geumgang resort using the road link and will take only two steps. The Defense Ministry will have to send a list of Mount Geumgang tourists to the UN Command and then inform the North of the visitors. "The United Nations Command will issue immediate approval upon the National Defense Ministry's requests for the tourists to enter the Demilitarized Zone and to cross the Military Demarcation Line, and the ministry will inform North Korea about the cross-border travelers," Brigadier General Jang Gwang-il of the NDM. Two sets of tourists would use the road link on Dec. 11.
However, what is disturbing is the South Korean inference that "With the simplified procedure for border crossing, the UN Command practically handed over the primary right of approving Military Demarcation Line crossing to the South, and the South will take the lead in practicing the right from now on," a Defense Ministry official said. This South Korean blanket interpretation may cause a great deal of problems in the future as the UNC still retains the right to approve or disapprove the requests.
North Korea Remains Isolated with only South Korea as a "Friend": The controversy that flared up in the Demilitarized zone was not a good sign given that inter-Korean Geumgang tours needs overland route to be constructed as soon as possible to attract more tourists and break even with the business. Although cruise business was still in operation as of December 2002, its overwhelming cost and limited number of tourists the ship can carry makes it a far cry from inducing sufficient profit.
At the end of November, North Korea was trying maintain its links to the South with a "sprinkle of sugar." It announced the creation of a special zone for the Geumgang area. Unlike the Sinuju special administrative area, Pyongyang will retain control of the area. "The law provides for free travel by individuals and groups by foot and in "wheeled" vehicles, envisioning the planned link of roads across the border along the East Coast. "Convertible currencies" will be used in the district and, under the enabling act, will be permitted to move freely in and out of the district. The law also provided for validity of all agreements reached between the two Koreas related to the Geumgang project, perhaps a gesture intended to encourage continued involvement of the South's Hyundai Asan Corp. Hyun-dai hailed the announcement, expressing confidence that it would provide the opportunity for the struggling tourism and development projects to pick up."
The city of Gaeseong just north of the DMZ had been made into a special industrial zone to encourage industrial development. As of December, it looked like a South Korean would be named to administer the district. The following is an article that announced the forming of the Gaesong special industrial zone on November 27.
It's official: Capitalism comes to Gaeseong
North Korea announced yesterday that it has issued a new law to govern a special industrial zone to be developed in the city of Gaeseong, just north of the Korean Demilitarized Zone. The law will guarantee investments, forbid tariffs, do away with visa requirements for entry and put no controls on foreign exchange transactions.
North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency said yesterday that the North's legislature approved the new decree Nov. 13 and confirmed it on Nov. 20. The legislation designates the city, 170 kilometers south of Pyeongyang and 78 kilometers northwest of Seoul, as an "international industrial, trade, commercial, financial and tourist zone." The city, home to about 400,000 North Koreans, is connected to Pyeongyang by rail and an expressway; the two Koreas are attempting to restore severed rail and road links that would connect the new zone with South Korea.
Gaeseong had been the capital of Korea's Goryeo dynasty until the dynasty was overthrown and the capital moved to Seoul by the founder of the Joseon dynasty in 1395. The old district of the city will be part of the tourism zone, KCNA said.
In Seoul, a government official said a South Korean would probably be named to administer the zone; such an understanding has been reached with the North, he said.
The terms of the decree allow any foreign entity to set up shop in the zone, but officials here say South Korean firms will probably predominate. Investors will be given special treatment in employment, land leasing and taxes; most firms' profits will be taxed at 14 percent and technology, infrastructure and light industrial firms will pay 10 percent. "China and Vietnam levy up to 17 percent in income taxes on such industries," a South Korean government source said. "Pyeongyang seems interested in becoming more competitive in those fields."
North Korea hopes to benefit from wages paid to a workforce that could be as large as 160,000 persons. Wages for a common laborer would probably be set at less than $100 per month, a Unification Ministry official said, far lower than the $150 basic wage in China's Shenzhen special economic zone. By contrast, North Korea had demanded wages of $700 per month for workers it would have supplied to the troubled Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization at its nuclear power plant construction site in eastern North Korea.
Leases will be guaranteed for 50 years, and the North will guarantee transfer and inheritance rights.
No single official currency for the zone was mentioned. The North has reportedly banned the use of U.S. dollars in the country beginning Dec. 1, but it was not clear if that ban would apply to transactions within the zone. Profits would be freely remittable abroad, Pyeongyang said.
The decree was silent on access to other parts of North Korea from within the zone, but said corridors would be established to allow travel overland from South Korea.
The Gaeseong industrial zone project was first agreed between the Hyundai Group of South Korea and the North Korean government in August 2000; the two sides agreed to build a 66-square-kilometer industrial zone that was budgeted at $1 billion in construction costs alone. Hyundai and the Korea Land Corporation will develop an initial 3.3 square kilometers in the zone at a cost of 200 billion won ($163 million). (Site Note: On 6 Dec the Chosun Ilbo reported, "Officials from the Korea Land Corporation, who visited North Korea for consultations on the Kaesong Industrial Complex, said Friday that Pyongyang had notified them that the area of the site for development had been reduced from 66.6 million square meters to 48.5 million square meters. They said the reason for this was due to the presence of military facilities and unfavorable land conditions, and Hyundai Asan was requesting additional space at another site to compensate for the loss. The contract between the North and Hyundai, signed in August 2000, specified the site to be made up of a 24 million square meters for industrial development and the remaining 42.6 million to be used as residential and support facilities. The officials said North Korea changed phase one of the plan for developing 3.3 million square meters south of Bondong Station to the north of the facility, as more land was needed. They noted that a new development plan will have to be formulated over a substantial period of time, leading to a considerable delay." The South's state-run Korea Development Institute raised doubts about Kaesong's economic viability, without drastic steps to
develop it as an attractive zone. The Kaesong zone would fall behind rivals in China due to insufficent infrastructure outlays and uncertainties over the North's nuclear program, it
said. Regardless, South Korea announced they would start construction in December.)
Seoul welcomed the North's willingness to conduct another capitalist experiment.
"We anticipate that the Gaeseong industrial complex project will proceed smoothly and contribute to further inter-Korean economic cooperation," said Han Sang-il, a Unification Ministry spokesman. The two Koreas will hold working-level talks on the Gaeseong project in mid-December; the ground breaking ceremony is scheduled for late next month.
North Korea's second attempt at developing a capitalism zone at Sinuiju, a city bordering China, continued to flounder yesterday. Chinese authorities formally arrested Yang Bin, a Chinese-born businessman appointed to head the North's special administrative zone at Sinuiju, on charges of bribery and fraud. China's state-run Xinhua News Agency said yesterday that Mr. Yang had been arrested after more than a month of detention. The North's first free trade zone, Rajin-Sonbong, in the far northeast corner of the country, has long been moribund.
Following the above article, another article was released clarifying the differences between the Sinuju, Geumgang and Gaeseong special zones:
Brief comparison of special zones : Sinuiju, Geumgang and Gaeseong
North Korea by designating Sinuiju, Geumgang mountain and Gaeseong region a special economic district has in fact, completed its internal reform and stepped up its open door policy that took off with the price reform at the beginning of July this year.
The respective laws for the border city, tour site and industrial complex all guarantees; free economic activities; economic benefits to promote investment; participation of outsiders and 50-year long land lease. Still one could note slight differences on reach rules for the new zones given Sinuiju will be raised in Hong Kong-style, Geumgang tour zone as tourist attraction and Gaeseong complex aimed to become industrial site.
-Freedom of activities:
Sinuiju which was the first to be bestowed with its special status among the three guarantees voting and labor rights to its residents as well as freedom of media, publication, rally, religion and other kinds of gatherings.
Gaeseong complex the prospective industrial zone bans detention or arrest of the residents as well as unilateral investigation of body or residence unless based on agreed law. People there are free to use mail, telephones fax and other means of communications.
Geumgang tour zone given its particular nature aimed toward tourists above all, stipulated on convenient travel of cars for people coming in either as individual or group.
-Economic sanction
North Korea equipped its zones with various benefits for business planners that could bring them much-desired capital. First of all the authority allowed export of profits in line with capitalist operation and further pledged recognition and protection of investors' private properties by law.
Sinuiju was granted preferential duties and taxation, Geumgang with tax-free policy and Gaeseong with non-tariff making the three zones evermore attractive for business people.
- Participation of outsiders
Sinuiju, for one, named a foreigner and a Chines tycoon Yang Bin as its first chief of the administrative zone to lead the way to boost the border district. Other people could also win the citizenship with the authorization of the head of the zone. (Site Note: Yang Bin, 39, the tycoon who became point man for North Korea's foray into capitalism in Sinuiju, is in big trouble with China. Yang, a Dutch citizen who parlayed orchid cuttings and vegetables into a fortune upon returning to China, is imprisoned somewhere charged with investment scams, offering bribes, using fraudulent contracts and the vague "illegally occupying farmland." Yang and his company, Euro-Asia Agricultural Holdings Ltd problems began months earlier, but crested days after his appointment to lead North Korea's new Sinuiju special economic zone just across China's border. In short, everything suggests Yang Bin annoyed the wrong people in Beijing. Yang attracted attention because of his agreement, apparently without consulting Beijing, to head North Korea's experimental Sinuiju economic zone. It could also signal China's wariness about longtime ally North Korea and its skittishness about having competition in the admittedly narrow category of Asian communist nations experimenting with capitalism. Shenyang-based Euro-Asia is in tatters. It has been suspended from trading on Hong Kong's exchange and closed its office there. The fate of Holland Village, Yang's garish, uncompleted real-estate development in Shenyang, is unknown.)
Gaeseong complex and Geumgang tour zone allowed participation of South Korean officials to local administrative body. Some observers speculate South Koreans could be directly elected to take the rein in those bodies as well.
-Land lease
North Korea marked 50-year land lease for all three zones. The authority especially specified the land lease to Sinuiju administrative zone will last till December 31 of 2052. Gaeseong industrial zone too made it clear exactly 50-year lease of land starting from the day it issues certificate for land use to the investors and businessmen.
Geumgang mountain which also requires issuance of special certificate for land lease was not marked with particular date but it is safe to take the investors' era to last for about half a century given Hyundai Asan, the North's major South Korean partner to tourist project was warranted with 50-year-long land use.
"I believe they got the idea of 50-year land lease from watching the examples of China and several other countries," one North Korea expert said. "We might wait and see if the North plans to make it any longer."
-Environmental protection
Given serious pollution around the world it is likely the North vowed never to follow the suit of other advanced industrial nations that had to pay their wealth with threats from the environment though economic development is necessary.
No polluting of environment stipulated Sinuiju law while Geumgang went on to list standards for discharge of polluted materials; vibration, noise and others. Gaeseong specifically added it would prohibit any investment that could harm the surrounding nature.
Differences
While Sinuiju looks to Hong Kong as a model and centers on guaranteeing administrative, judicial and legal rights along with responsibility of the residents, Geumgang and Gaeseong which will purely serve as investment district is more fixed on regulating rights and activities of businessmen.
Defections from North Continues to Rise: The Unification Ministry stated that a total of 1,008 North Koreans had defected to South Korea up to December 2002. What is bothersome is that the number is expected to rise. The figure is sharply up from 2001, when 583 North Koreans defected. In 2000, 312 North Koreans defected and 148 fled the communist country in 1999. Most of the defectors came to South Korea via China, which shares a long land border with the impoverished, communist North. About 120 were allowed to fly to Seoul after taking refuge at foreign diplomatic missions and schools in China. Most defectors complained about hunger and repression in their homeland. Thousands more are believed to be living in hiding in China's northeast, seeking a chance to come to South Korea. Since 1995, North Korea has depended on outside aid to feed its 22 million people.
The defection problem is miniscule now, but if it turns into a flood, there will be innumerable difficulties for the Korean government. The defectors do not have the job skills to work in South Korea. They are technologically backward and remain a burden on the South Korean government. Recent "job fairs" for the defectors have been offered, but the individuals skills are only fit for the most menial of work.
North Korea Amassing Chemical Weapons, Continuing its Nuclear Weapons Program, & Asking for Russian Military Aid
Chemical Weapons:
Go to Is the South Korea Civilian Populace Prepared for a Chemical Attack? (2001) for this topic covered in greater detail.
8th Fighter Wing Exercises
SSgt Richard Ortiz checks M3 paper
for chemical contamination
(8FW Photo) (Click to Enlarge)
The following article is from the
Washington Times
article dated Sept 17, 2002 dealing with the South Korean White Paper which is
released annually. In a recent change, the white paper no longer calls North
Korea the "main enemy" for political reasons -- though everyone knows that it
is... This is the same story as in the past so the status remains unchanged.
But this is the reason that George Bush refuses to remove North Korea from his
"hit list" as one of the "axis of evil." Their use of chemical weapons is a solid part
of the North Korean strategy if they were to attack the South.
North Korea amasses chemical weapons
By Jong-Heon Lee
UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
SEOUL — North Korea has a stockpile of 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical weapons
and is believed to be capable of producing 1 ton of biological weapons
annually, South Korea's Defense Ministry said yesterday.
The communist state's stockpile of chemical weapons consists of 17 different
types that can be used to dispense nerve gases, the ministry said in a report
presented to the National Assembly. North Korea can produce about 4,500 tons of
chemical weapons every year, it said.
Pyongyang's army also has biological weapons involving 13 different lethal
germs and viruses, the ministry said.
Mike Moody, president of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute in
Washington, said the South Korean estimates represented "a significant amount"
of chemical weapons.
By comparison, Russia had 40,000 tons of chemical weapons when it was forced to
declare the numbers by the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty. The United
States had 30,000 tons before it began to dismantle its reserves.
Mr. Moody noted that the production of an agent does not always translate into
an effective chemical or biological weapon. Its effectiveness depends on
several factors, including the quality of production, means of dispersal and
intended target.
North Korea signed the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987 but has been
called a leading violator of the international treaty that bans germ warfare.
Under its ruling principle of "army-first politics," North Korea has produced
and deployed long-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United
States and has sold some missiles to Iran and Syria. Experts say the missiles
can be fitted with biochemical warheads.
To cope with attacks from the North, South Korean military authorities have
bought vaccines capable of inoculating 10,000 soldiers against anthrax,
officials said.
Last month, South Korea renounced the use of biological weapons "under any
circumstances," despite criticism that the decision was "premature" as long as
North Korea poses a military threat.
"The decision was aimed at putting pressure on North Korea to take a reciprocal
measure against biochemical weapons," a senior official said on the condition
of anonymity. But South Korea has retained the right to use chemical weapons as
a deterrent against the North, the official said.
John Bolton, the U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and
international security, echoed the concerns about North Korea's biological and
chemical warfare capabilities during a recent visit to Seoul.
"In regard to chemical weapons, there is little doubt that North Korea has an
active program," he said in a speech last month. "The U.S. government believes
that North Korea has one of the most robust offensive bioweapons programs on
Earth."
The United States believes North Korea has also diverted enough plutonium to
make one or two nuclear bombs before agreeing to freeze production in 1994.
Pyongyang has rejected international calls for inspectors to be allowed into
its nuclear facilities to verify that weapons development has halted.
South Korean Foreign Minister Choi Sung-hong urged North Korea last week to
allow inspections of its nuclear facilities, saying "the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction" was a key challenge in the peace process between
the two Koreas.
"It is now essential that the full cooperation with the International Atomic
Energy Agency begin without further delay for the implementation of safeguards
requirements" of the 1994 nuclear accord, he said in an address on Friday to
the U.N. General Assembly.
•Staff writer Maria Tsigas contributed to this report in Washington.
(See North Korean Strategy: The USFK View for the USFK strategy and positions in Korea.)
Bacteriological Weapons: A
Washington Times
article dated Sept 17, 2002 stated that the Koreans had
procured innoculations for anthrax for only 10,000 of their 650,000-strong
military force. This miniscule number is in the face of U.S. intelligence information that states that North Korea is among four nations that is believed to have unauthorized samples of smallpox; the others are Russia, Iraq and France. This was also stated in testimony before the Korean National Assembly by the Ministry of Defense.
This small number underlines how seriously the Koreans take the anthrax
threat -- as opposed to the USFK stance. Anthrax is a powerful weapon: It kills 30 percent of its victims, is highly contagious and has no known treatment. Why would the Korea treat this anthrax threat so lightly?
The first reason is that the a biological attack by the North can
easily backfire and decimate the North itself -- and North Korea knows this. Unlike firing the virus into another country via a missile, the use on the peninsula would soon spread to engulf all who are unprotected -- soldier and civilian on both sides of the DMZ. It would be a foolish weapon to use. The second reason is that any person using these types of weapons against their
"brother Koreans" would be branded throughout history as a "barbaric monster"
-- and what Korean leader wishes that for his posterity.
How low a priority
this threat was is shown by the Koreans opening a special agency for
bacteriological investigations in 2001 only AFTER the US anthrax scare. Thus it
is very easy for the South Koreans to issue a statement stating they would
NEVER use such weapons -- because they won't. For additional information on
biological/bacteriological weapons in Korea, see
Bio-terrorism Suddenly a Concern in Korea (2001)
.
Nuclear Weapons: As to a nuclear
weapon trump card by the North would used to threaten -- NOT South Korea -- but Japan. Japan knows this full well and views the nuclear weapon issue a "national defense" issue, rather that an international issue. As such Japan is very eager not to have this latest row over North Korea's admitting to having a nuclear program escalate further. North Korea even hinted that its voluntary halting of it ICBM program may again be resumed.
 Monty Wolverton. WolvertoonsFor years, there have been rumors of a secret uranium-enrichment facility, but the discovery that North Korea was trying to acquire the high-strength aluminum to be used in gas centrifuges was described as the first hard evidence that the country had an active nuclear program. Hard details, including where the aluminum originated or how much North Korea acquired was not revealed by the U.S. government. The location of the uranium-enrichment facility which had "significant construction activity" was not revealed. Speculation have centered on three locations, including a suspected underground facility in Changang province known as Hagap. Then a North Korean defector, Kim Duk-hong, said that Pyongyang had already developed nuclear weapons using uranium, instead of plutonium, in an interview with a Japanese weekly magazine in April 1999. Then in 1999, The ROK Defense Ministry learnt of North Korea's attempt to import uranium-enhancing equipment from abroad. Though the info was rudimentary, the pieces were starting to fall into place.
Chronology of Nuclear Events in North Korea:
Mid-1960s: North Korea sets up atomic energy research complex in Yongbyon
North of Pyongyang.
1965: Soviet IRT-2M research reactor assembled.
Mid-1970s: North Korea adds second nuclear reactor.
1985: United States says it has evidence North Korea is building a secret
nuclear reactor near Yongbyon.
1985: North signs the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but refuses to
sign safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
Dec 1991: North and South Korea adopt declaration on denuclearization of
Korean peninsula.
Jan 1992: North Korea signs nuclear safeguard agreement.
Feb 1993: North rejects IAEA request for special inspections of two
suspected nuclear fuel storage sites at Yongbyon
March 1993: North threatens to withdraw from NPT.
May 1993: North test-fires missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead
to targets within a 1,000-kilometer (600-mile) radius.
June 1993: North agrees to suspend its threatened NPT withdrawal during
high-level US-North Korean talks.
June 1993: US president Bill Clinton, visiting Seoul, warns that North
Korea will be annihilated if it uses nuclear weapons.
Dec 1993: North softens stand and agrees to talks with IAEA.
July 1994: North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung dies, prompting cancellation of
scheduled summit with South leader Kim Young-Sam.
Oct 1994: North Korea and the United States sign a deal in Geneva in which
Pyongyang agrees to freeze its suspect nuclear weapons programme in return for
the construction of two light-water nuclear reactors.
Jan 1995: US eases economic sanctions on North Korea.
Apr 1997: The United States says that by 1994 North Korea had produced
enough plutonium for "at least one nuclear device". This is the first time the
United States has said North Korea has plutonium.
Dec 1999: Deal signed between both Koreas and US-led international
consortium to build two "safe" nuclear reactors in North Korea.
July 2000: North Korea threatens to restart nuclear development program in
protest to delays in nuclear plant construction.
Apr 2001: IAEA says North Korea "probably has one or two nuclear bombs"
although it has been unable to carry out inspections since 1994.
Aug 2002: Concrete-pouring ceremony in North Korea to build two light-water
nuclear reactors.
Oct 2002: North Korea admits in meetings with US special envoy James Kelly
that it has a programme to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons.
On 17 October 2002, Washington made the announcement that North Korea had secretly been pursuing a nuclear weapons program despite signing a nuclear non-proliferation treaty during the Clinton Administration in 1994. North Korea supposedly made the "surprising" public admittance -- after it was confronted with the facts. During the U.S. press conference a senior official said that the admission came after Kelly and the team presented evidence to the North Koreans that they were in violation of the Agreed Framework, the 1994 deal to end its nuclear program. North Korea reacted negatively to the three-day visit to Pyongyang by Kelly in October. They accused Kelly of being arrogant and high handed. However, President Bush has made no attempt to conceal his distaste for North Korea and its leader Kim Jong-Il, but nevertheless offered to talk at ``any time, any place,'' about a host of US concerns -- including Pyongyang's missile and nuclear programs, its conventional military threat, and appalling human rights record.
N. Korea Admits Having Secret Nuclear Arms
Stunned U.S. Ponders Next Steps
By Peter Slevin and Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, October 17, 2002; Page A01
The North Korean government has acknowledged for the first time that it has been secretly developing nuclear weapons for years in violation of international agreements -- and that it possesses "more powerful" weapons, as well -- Bush administration officials said last night.
The North Koreans, who confirmed the project when challenged by visiting U.S. diplomats earlier this month, said the existence of the program nullifies a 1994 deal with the United States to halt their nuclear weapons program in return for foreign help. One senior U.S. official said the new weapons project is a "very serious material breach" of the accord.
The Bush administration, stunned by the admission, dispatched envoys to the region yesterday to consult with allies and called on North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to halt the weapons project. The administration also has begun consultations with Congress about what to do next.
"The United States is calling on North Korea to comply with all of its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to eliminate its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable manner," a U.S. official said. "What we seek is a peaceful resolution of this situation."
The revelation from the isolated Stalinist country presents the Bush administration with a serious, unanticipated foreign policy challenge as officials prepare to confront Iraqi President Saddam Hussein over his refusal to surrender weapons of mass destruction. Meanwhile, thousands of U.S. troops remain deployed in an unstable Afghanistan and terrorist attacks have spiked in recent weeks from Yemen to Indonesia.
U.S. officials and commentators offered differing assessments last night of the implications of North Korea's announcement, with some considering it a belligerent act deserving of a strong response, and others saying it could be a bid by North Korea to create an opening to the United States.
"This is going to require a reassessment of our commitments to North Korea," said Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fla.), chairman of the Senate intelligence committee. "It's a very serious development if a country we had thought had entered into a serious and credible negotiation to retreat from a nuclear program in exchange for generous assistance" has violated that agreement.
President Bush counts North Korea as a member of an "axis of evil," along with Iraq and Iran. Yet the revelation of the nuclear program comes amid a string of surprisingly conciliatory moves by Kim, long criticized for peddling dangerous weapons and oppressing an impoverished population. In recent weeks, the Pyongyang government apologized for a naval battle with South Korea in the Yellow Sea and for the abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s.
A U.S. delegation headed by Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly presented detailed evidence of a covert nuclear weapons program during an Oct. 3-5 trip, U.S. officials said. The North Koreans called the allegations "fabrications," but then a day later, a more senior official, Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Joo, confirmed Kelly's charges. He said the North Koreans met through the night before deciding to reveal that the project had been underway for several years. He also said his government had developed other, more powerful weapons.
Kang offered no apologies. He was "assertive, aggressive about it," a U.S. official said.
The administration says it does not know the full extent of North Korea's nuclear capabilities, and experts are uncertain what Kang meant when he referred to more powerful weapons. Last night, they said they assume he meant weapons of mass destruction, which typically include biological and chemical weapons.
North Korea's new nuclear project relies on highly enriched uranium, a switch from an earlier plutonium-based program that Pyongyang agreed to halt in the groundbreaking 1994 Agreed Framework. U.S. officials would not answer when asked whether the highly enriched uranium had yet been turned into a weapon.
The CIA's National Intelligence Estimate, released in December, reported that North Korea had likely produced one or two plutonium-based nuclear weapons by the mid-1990s.
Administration officials have struggled with the North Korean policy since Bush took office, with some officials advocating a much more demanding approach than the engagement policy of the Clinton administration and others urging continued diplomatic flexibility.
The disclosure has not ended that debate, said one high-ranking official, who reported that some administration leaders believe "we should go to war tomorrow." He added, however, that Bush has been "very calm, cool and collected. He doesn't need another crisis."
The North Korean disclosure was "a jaw-dropper," said the official. It revealed a worrisome determination to build a nuclear device, but it also left open the possibility that Kim, who has been repairing relations with foreign rivals, unveiled the project as a way of coming clean.
The admission "represented a candor on the part of North Korean officials that we are unaccustomed to," the official said. "It has promise. It has opportunity. It has dangers."
Immediately, the U.S.suspended its offer to engage North Korea -- a pledge of an economic and political opening in return for reductions in North Korea's military posture and policies of weapons proliferation, along with an improvement in humanitarian conditions.
"In light of our concerns about the nuclear weapons program, we could not pursue that approach," a U.S. official said during the conference call. "Everyone in the region has a stake in this issue, and no peaceful nation wants to see a nuclear-armed North Korea."
Joseph Cirincione, director of the non-proliferation project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said the administration faces two very distinct choices. "They either play 'gotcha' " and cut off relations, he said, "or they can justifiably claim that their tough approach produced exactly the change in North Korean behavior we had been seeking."
Cirincione noted that as the United States has begun its campaign against Iraq, "North Korea has taken some surprising steps just in the last three months. They are not changing regimes but they are making change in their regime."
In Japan, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's spokeswoman, Misako Kaji, said, "Japan is gravely concerned about the U.S. announcement North Korea is developing nuclear weapons.
The parallels between North Korea and Iraq are worth noting, said Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Non-Proliferation Education Center. He pointed to the administration's repeated assertions that Iraq will not be secure until Hussein is removed from power.
"If we're serious about Iraq, as we are and should be, we need to be twice as serious as we currently are about North Korea," said Sokolski, who believes the administration should be tough on Kim. "If you've got a nuclear cheater, do you give them the benefit of the doubt and coddle him? Or do you say the burden's on you to come clean?"
Staff writer Glenn Kessler contributed to this report.
© 2002 The Washington Post Company
In 1994, Pyongyang agreed to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons in exchange for civilian nuclear reactors financed and built by an international consortium. The apparent decision to pursue uranium-based weapons suggests that North Korea believed it could preserve and even expand its nuclear options, while revealing nothing of its intentions to the outside world, weapons experts said.
 Rex Babin, Sacramento Bee, CA Click on cartoon to enlarge
In an October 18, 2002 article in the Washington Post entitled "U.S. Followed the Aluminum
Pyongyang's Effort to Buy Metal Was Tip to Plans":
Gas-centrifuge facilities, which is what the aluminum would be used in, "are not all that large, and conceivably you can build them above ground without being detected," said Jon Wolfsthal, deputy director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's nonproliferation project. "There's nothing unique about them from the outside. And unlike nuclear reactors, they don't have large heat signatures."
Gas-centrifuge technology is one of several methods for producing enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. A typical enrichment plant consists of thousands of fast-spinning centrifuges, which extract fissile material from natural uranium. The centrifuges are built of specialized metals with a high tolerance for heat and pressure.
Despite more than four decades of experience with advanced weapons and nuclear engineering, North Korea lacks the specialized manufacturing capability and know-how to build a gas-centrifuge facility on its own, weapons experts agreed. Many analysts pointed to Pakistan as a possible source of supplies and expertise.
"Pakistan would be a possibility because it used gas centrifuges, and its own nuclear weapons initially used enriched uranium," said Robert Einhorn, former assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation and now a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
"Also, North Korea and Pakistan have been known to engage in sensitive trade, including Pakistan's purchase of Nodong missiles from North Korea," Einhorn said. "U.S. officials were concerned at the time about what the quid pro quo might be."
US officials said that they believed Pakistan, China and Russia may have all assisted North Korea in developing an enriched uranium program need for building nuclear weapons. All countries flatly denied their involvement. In fact, the head of Russia's atomic energy ministry expressed doubt that North Korea was developing a nuclear weapons program at all.
However, Washington Post article on November 13 stated that the Bush administration had evidence that suggested that Pakistan assisted North Korea's covert nuclear weapons program as recently as August, much later than previously disclosed. The administration believed Pakistan continued to trade nuclear technical knowledge, designs and possibly material in exchange for missile parts up until this summer, when the administration concluded North Korea was secretly trying to construct a facility to enrich uranium for a bomb. Administration officials would not discuss the extent of the evidence, but they said it involved highly suspicious shipping trade.
The article continued, "Pakistan's involvement in North Korea's program has put the administration in an extremely delicate position. Under U.S. law, if the president determines that a country has delivered nuclear enrichment equipment, material or technology without international safeguards, the United States must suspend economic and military aid. Such sanctions were imposed against Pakistan in 1979, but last year President Bush waived them and other nuclear-related sanctions after the Pakistani government agreed to help in the fight against al Qaeda and Afghanistan's Taliban militia after the Sept. 11 attacks." Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has personally guaranteed that questionable transactions with North Korea would cease, but the U.S. officials question whether Musharraf has full control of all entities that could be doing business with North Korea.
According to the Korea Times, there was going to be a "joint" release from both the U.S.-Seoul, but from the start there was a divergence of strategies on how to approach this problem. Seoul had invested heavily in North Korea and again the "Sunshine Policy" was on the verge of being sunk. "Officially" Seoul came out "urging" Pyongyang to respect the Nuclear Accord. The Seoul government was opposed to any North Korean nuclear weapon development program and urged Pyongyang to respect all responsibilities under the 1994 Agreed Framework, Non-proliferation agreement and the declaration of non-nuclearization of Korean Peninsular. However, it stopped short of economic sanctions. It stated that this crisis should be worked out through a "dialogue." The US, Japan and South Korea had agreed in 1999 to fuse their policy towards North Korea, but both South Korea and Japan were cool to the idea of economic sanctions.
However, the Bush administration found this situation a perfect opportunity get out of the agreement which has a lot of hassles over the years. The power plant construction was delayed by about five years due to the downturn in Washington-Pyongyang relations -- not counting North Korea constantly trying to blow South Korean ships out of the water. The State Department official said that the North Korean admission nullified the deal, under which North Korea was due to get help in building two light water reactors deemed less suitable for making nuclear bombs. The U.S. stated that it no longer felt bound to send heating oil to North Korea, though the final decision rested with KEDO.
But others have found this "deal" irksome as well. South Korea has constantly tried to "renegotiate" its pledges when the deal turned out to be NOT economically advantageous. They initially thought that they would build the nuclear reactors -- to the exclusion of foreign competition with the Korea Standard reactor construction -- while the U.S. and Japan paid the oil and nuclear reactor construction bills. That's not the way it worked out as there was no free ride. American said it would only pay for the oil and the financing of the reactors had to come from elsewhere. Japan's economic doldrums make it an unstable bankroller. In addition, the European Union who also contributes to the consortium feels that it is a deep hole they are throwing money into. It stated that it would reevaluate its position on KEDO financing in light of North Korea's announcement. However, construction restarted in Aug 2002 still continues on the project. After nine years, there has been so little progress that it is not worth mentioning.
KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization), an
international, non-profit organization was established to carry out two key
provisions of the Agreed Framework negotiated in 1994 by the US and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Specifically, in exchange for the DPRK freezing and eventually dismantling its nuclear program KEDO is: a) Supplying the DPRK with two proliferation-resistant light-water reactor (LWR) units and b) Heavy fuel oil (HFO) for heating and electricity.
A KEDO official said if North Korea and the United States fail to reach an early resolution regarding the nuclear issue, the construction of two light-water reactors may be halted. The power plant construction, which had been delayed by about five years due to ups and downs in Washington-Pyongyang relations, got under way in earnest in August, when KEDO officials held a ceremony and first poured concrete into the foundation. The construction is now 24 percent completed. The 1994 deal requires that North Korea come into full compliance with its safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify its past nuclear activities before key nuclear components are delivered. IAEA has insisted that inspections of the North's nuclear facilities must start in 2003 at the latest, saying such inspections usually take three to four years. North Korea has opposed the idea, citing construction delays of the promised reactors. (See 1995: KEDO.)
No one was quite sure how to react to the news. The revelation caused diplomatic meetings amongst all the North Asia players -- Japan, South Korea and China. All recommended the resolution of this tension through a "dialogue" process. Though there were basic differences in the viewpoints between Seoul and Washington, the U.S. opted to resolve the revelation through diplomacy. However, the U.S. stated that the revelation brought all previous accords -- such as the KEDO reactors for food program -- into question. However, what made the initial news interesting was a BBC report that North Korea made this revelation because it no longer felt bound by the 1994 accord in order to gain food or economic aid.
Initially, South Korea sided with the North's version of the events at the discussions. South Korea's Unification Minister Jeong Se-Hyun questioned the accuracy of the US version of events. "It seems that something was omitted from the remarks by (North Korea's) First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok-Ju concerning the (abolishment) of the Geneva agreement," he said. "It is hard to say whether what was reported by the United States was accurate or not." Some analysts in Seoul suspect that Washington might have exaggerated what Pyongyang officials said during James Kelly's trip. Yim Sung-Joon, a senior presidential secretary for foreign affairs and security, said the North's frank acknowledgement may mean it is willing to address the issue through dialogue.
 Tim Menees, Pittsburgh, PA Click on cartoon to enlarge
A 21 October article in the New York Times article stated: "North Korea desperately needs better relations with the Japan and the United States because the former has long promised to provide heavy development assistance once relations are normalized, while the latter controls many of the international financial institutions, whose cooperation is indispensable to North Korea's re-entry into the global economy." It went on, "Looking at his confessions, Mr. Kim appears to have focused on the issues most important to each of those two nations: the emotive question of the fate of its citizens for Japan, and weapons of mass destruction for the United States." In the article, Mr. Harrison, author of "Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement," said Pyongyang's position was spelled out to him by the country's representative to the United Nations. "North Korea has always wanted to pursue normalization with the United States, and however awkwardly, now they are bargaining," said Selig S. Harrison, director of the National Security Program at the Center for International Policy in Washington. "What they are saying is that they are prepared to negotiate an end to all nuclear activity and allow inspections, if we agree to two things: not to threaten them militarily and to pursue normalized relations."
North Korea took the view -- that may seem strange to Americans -- that the U.S. caused this confrontation by refusing to negotiate and blocking the construction of the KEDO nuclear plants. Perhaps there is some truth in this, but not because of American directed stoppages. The construction was supposed to be complete in 2003, but it is still six years away from completion. The South Korean's are trying to "spin-doctor" the construction aspect by saying it is now "24 percent" complete -- but "24 percent" of what? Actually, the project restarted in August 2002 from the point so the 24 percent would be the foundation and building. The South Korean newspapers fail to mention that the South Korean stoppages on construction had to do with North Korean saboteurs and spies, heated naval battles, and such miscellany. South Korea has decided not to mention any of this at this time. However, KEDO officials point out that the construction may come to a halt again soon if the crisis is not resolved by the U.S. and North Korea.
But now new questions are cropping up. How did the cash strapped North Koreans finance this project that would cost about $1 billion? The GNP party Chairman Suh Chung-won accused companies of providing the funds that were funneled into this project. He stated, "The $400 million that Hyundai paid the North in connection with the Mt. Geumgang tourism business and another $400 million the government offered the North secretly through Hyundai Merchant Marine may have been funneled into the North Korean project." Unrealistically he proposed that these projects be stopped. Kim Dae-jung and others simply disregarded this challenge as to where the funding came from.
 Kirk Walters. Toledo Blade, OH Click on cartoon to enlarge
All negotiations with North Korea started to grind to a halt as the North has refused to pledge to honor its pledges under the accord. As a result, the European Union, a member of the KEDO consortium, is now rethinking its positions. "The EU has been keen on expanding its relations with North Korea over the past two years. Of the 15 member states, only France and Ireland still have no diplomatic ties with Kim Jong-Il's regime. But after the US allegations were made public, the European bloc said it would review the diplomatic relations and humanitarian aid to the famine-stricken communist country."
Japan stated that talks on normalizing relations with North Korea would only go ahead if the North bowed to international demands to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. After the announcement the normalization talks between Japan and North Korea turned sour. The North Koreans had permitted five Japanese who were kidnapped to return to Japan as a "gesture of goodwill" -- but then extended the kidnapped Japanese stay in Japan indefinitely. This caused North Korea cry foul and to raise the prospect of resuming its missile program. A Japanese official stated, "Security problems over North Korea are not only a matter of grave international concern, but also Japan's national concern." Japan realizes that North Korea would train the nuclear weapons on Japan in the event of a crisis -- NOT South Korea -- for use as a nuclear trump card. Even a relatively small nuclear weapon could kill tens of thousands if it hits a large metropolis like Tokyo, and North Korea proved its ability to deliver such an ordnance back in 1998 by lobbing a missile over Japan.
In an attempt to find a way out, on 26 October North Korea proposed a non-aggression pact with the United States along with other conditions. The North said it was ready to seek a negotiated settlement of the crisis if Washington agreed to the non-aggression pact and two other conditions. First, Washington must recognize North Korean sovereignty and second, agree not to interfere in the country's economic development, taken as a reference to a lifting of US economic sanctions imposed on the North. Though the U.S. stated that North Korean officials made the admission after confronted with evidence of their nuclear program, North Korea denied that the US envoy produced any "evidence." Though the North did not directly confirm that it was running a nuclear weapons program, it defended its right to do so as U.S. was responsible for violating every article of the 1994 Accord. It further stated it considered the "axis of evil" comments of President Bush tantamount to a "clear declaration of war." In its self-defense, it felt it was entitled to possess not only nuclear weapon but any type of weapon more powerful than that so as to defend its sovereignty and right to existence from the ever-growing nuclear threat by the US.
In response, a joint communique from the U.S., Japan and South Korea on 27 October stated that North Korea must scrap its nuclear arms program "in a prompt and verifiable manner. "North Korea's relations with the international community now rest on North Korea's prompt and visible actions to dismantle its program to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons." The statement gave no specific indication of what consequences North Korea would face if it refused. There was a lot of leeway in this in that South Korea's Kim Dae-jung has stated that sanctions should have not been used to resolve the situation, while U.S. officials did not rule out the use of economic or other sanctions. Seoul called for a softer stance, expressing hope the shipments of oil would continue at least during the tenure of President Kim Dae-jung, who initiated the ``Sunshine Policy’’ of comprehensive engagement with North Korea. Kim’s term expired in February 2003. South Korea wished to keep alive the "sunshine policy" gains made in recent months.
In November, the U.S. announced that it was taking the position to stop continued oil shipments to the North. However, the U.S. did support the use of dialogue to resolve the situation. A rift was developing between South Korea's desire to engage the North and U.S. opposition to dialogue with the Stalinist regime until the nuclear program was shut down.
It was reported on November 8 the U.S., South Korea and Japan officials were wrestling with how to come out with a unified stance on North Korean nuclear issue. The three allies agreed in 1999 to fuse policy towards North Korea. Japan and South Korea have been cool to the idea of economic sanctions, which the United States had yet to rule out. The US did not believe that diplomatic pressure and the threat of isolation could be enough to force Pyongyang to halt its nuclear program. Japan and South Korea thought it was sufficient. In addition, the officials of the U.S. State Department said that there was not much possibility of the U.S. Congress approve any funding for further fuel oil shipments due to the latest nuclear revelations.
The South Korea and Japan maintained that the shipments of 42,500 tons of heavy fuel oil should proceed uninterrupted. The US objected to this stance, but said the decision was up to KEDO. KEDO -- made up of the U.S., EU, Japan and South Korea -- went ahead with the delivery for November, but shipments for December have been stopped. KEDO said future shipments of heavy oil depended on North Korea’s "concrete and credible actions" to dismantle completely its enriched-uranium program. Experts said the stoppage would deal a serious blow to the impoverished communist state in which the annual shipment of 500,000 tons of fuel from KEDO accounts for up to 15 percent of its electricty generating capacity. Homes, schools and hospitals are already short of power and entire cities in the North are in total darkness at night.
KEDO also announced that the entire project was in jeopardy of being scrapped unless North Korea stopped its nuclear program. As of Nov 17, no decision had been made about quitting or postponing the project. After the announcement that the shipments had been stopped, it was announced that the KEDO decision was supported by President Kim Dae-Jung and showed that North Korea had failed to drive a wedge between Seoul and its main ally the United States. A statement from the presidential Blue House described the KEDO move as "the best step" in response to North Korea's stubborn refusal to dismantle its nuclear program.
No one was sure in November how North Korea would react. It will attempt to widen the schism between the U.S. and Seoul over this situation, but most see this ploy as ineffective since it will not change the U.S. stance which is at the heart of the problem. In the worst case scenario North Korea could respond angrily leading to the brink of war as it did in 1994. If the situation worsened, the U.S. would impose economic sanctions and the North's ongoing economic reform would receive a fatal blow. Many analysts said they believe that the North had no other options except to resolve security concerns over its weapons program. At this point in time with no supporters in Russia or China, brinksmanship will not work.
 Protest against North Korea and the Sunshine Policy (Nov 02)
(From
Tongil News
)
In the interim, the South Korean government has attempted to go forward with all other agreements. It has agreed to establishment of a permanent reunion center near Pakdu Mountain in North Korea. The clearing of mines for the railroad link between the two countries continues -- though there was a delay when North Korea refused to deliver a list of inspectors of the de-mining operations to the U.N. forces on 13 November. The North wishes only to deal with the South directly bypassing the U.N. command which the South can not accept. South Korea continues to urge the European Community to not overact to the nuclear pronouncement -- and instead recommended investment in North Korea to assist the North's economy. South Korea, Japan, and the EU are urging the North to end this crisis through dialogue. However, the actions of KEDO to cut off its oil and possibly scrap the 1994 accord has placed the ball firmly in North Korea's court.
Neither North Korea nor the U.S. wanted to be the one who abrogated the 1994 accord. The North issued many notices blaming the north, but stopped short of threatening military action. In late November the North issued an announcement -- though not officially confirmed -- that it was converting its foreign denomination for trade from U.S. dollars to euros. Most felt this was in response to the U.S. potentially taking economic sanctions against the North. Pyongyang has said it will only resolve the issue if the United States offers a nonaggression pact. Washington has rejected any talks with Pyongyang unless it gives up the nuclear weapons program. In late November, the U.S. issued a statement that emphasized again it had no intention of invading the North -- that satisfied the North Korean demand "in principle." But an article by an Australian daily stated that the U.S. special forces were given orders from President George W. Bush to destroy freighters, likely to carry deadly weapons to North Korea, Iran, Iraq or Al-Quaeda group The order was confirmed by the U.S. Department of Defense. The special task force will focus on suspicious cargo ships headed toward the North, Iran, Iraq or to other places suspected to belong to terror groups. They will directly aim toward weapons or scientific equipment seemingly to have "double use."
Positive notes to White House written statement
The written statement released by the White House on Friday in the wake of KEDO decision to suspend oil supply to North Korea contained some positive aspects for strained ties between Pyeongyang and Washington. The declaration that came right after KEDO's suspension of oil supply to the North empathized it would not launch armed attack against the North. The measures comes in return of the North's earlier admission that it violated 1994 Agreed Framework that pledged freezing of nuclear program.
"We are united in our desire for a peaceful resolution of this situation," President George W. Bush himself made the speech while as he made clear the only real option left for the North is to "completely and visibly eliminate its nuclear weapons program."
Though he didn't hint to any immediate dialogue with the North he went on to express hopes for "different future" to "improve the lives of Korean people" nor did he rule out revising a U.S. initiative if the North comes to comply to the given terms.
The United States, although responsible for several diplomatic attacks toward the North from branding the counterpart as an "axis of evil" to hinting chances of preemptive attacks has never posed actual sanction toward the isolated regime up until now.
"The most important part of the latest statement released after close consultation with South Korea is that we have no U.S. has no intention to invade the North," said a high-level diplomatic source in Washington.
"This statement in fact, is to soothe the North," he explained, adding that the United States is gravely worried about the North's trying another extraction of its plutonium to create nuclear warhead.
Observers also note this is President Bush's third official statement to the North since its first statement in June last year and second in last September related to dispatching U.S. special envoy. While the earlier two statements went for engaging the North into dialogue this recent statement marks it clear that there's a solid reason to suspension of oil aid and what the North should do. Observers also note the prompt timing of the release of the statement that came out just after the KEDO declaration somewhat has to do with the U.S. efforts to make the North stay put while Washington remains preoccupied with Iraq. If the North does create a scene during the Iraqi attacks it would not only weaken the U.S. resolve to uproot the ruling administration there but would also create problem to channel the world's interest to the new war, watchers say.
Other experts note although the U.S. resolve not to invade the North was already made more than clear during President Bush's speech in Seoul last February, the reiteration of recent statement gives new meaning as its meets the North' latest call not to attack them through demands of nonagression pact. The North wanted assurance and the U.S. has given them one, at least in principle.
In relations South Korean government welcomed Mr. Bush's statement, interpreting it as a balanced message with consideration to Pyeongyang's own position to give up nuclear program without losing its face completely.
Kim Jin/Oh Young-hwan November 18, 2002
To increase the economic pressure on North Korea, on November 28 the U.S. announced it would stop food aid to North Korea -- at least temporarily. Though the U.S. claimed that its donations to North Korea stem from humanitarian considerations and has nothing to do with issues such as the North's nuclear weapons program, no one really believed it. The U.S., one of the North's major food donors, has provided 155,000 tons of food to the North this year, meeting its pledge. He said the halt to new donations was a result of a lack of funds to provide additional aid. In a separate issue, the U.S. Agency for International Development said North Korea has not yet responded to U.S. demands for better monitoring of food aid to prevent diversions to the military or to North Korea's elite. The United States also wants better access to food recipients to ensure that they are receiving the aid they need. The U.S. Embassy in Seoul stressed that the U.S. calls for better access are related to any additional aid above and beyond the pledged amounts. The basic donations were provided with no such strings attached, but any further aid will require U.S. monitoring.
The World Food Program, which feeds one-third of the North Korean population, called urgently for additional food aid last week to counter what it called a crisis that has already cut rations to 3 million North Koreans in the western part of the country for the last two months. The UN aid agency complained that major donors, including Japan, had delayed their shipments of promised aid. By early 2003, food rations would be ended for an additional 1.6 million people unless more help is forthcoming, the agency said. A World Food Program spokesman, Gerald Bourke, said improvements in the monitoring system to prevent food diversions are already in place.
Japan has sought to reopen the normalization talks by going through China, but the negotiations are stalled. The abductee issue is still a sore point. Japan is preparing to offer permanent resettlement of the abductees in Japan and wish their families in North Korea to join them. A former North Korean agent whose Japanese name is Kenki Aoyama, testified on various issues concerning the communist state before Japan's House of Representatives -- specifically on details of the North's abductions of Japanese citizens and the development of nuclear weapons and missile technology. Aoyama a Korean who was born in Japan left for his motherland in the North in 1960. He managed to escape to China in 1998 and sought asylum in Japan which accepted him the following year. Japan and the U.S. will hold bilateral talks in December to come to a united approach on the North Korean issue.
However, other disturbing news was brought to light about the testing that may already have taken place.
North Korea already conducted nuclear tests, says FEER
North Korea has already conducted nuclear test, reported Hong Kong's weekly magazine on Sunday. This week's edition of Eastern Economic Review revealed the actual test took place deep inside the two mine shafts o the underground facility of small city called Kusong located in the mountain north of Pyeongyang and the information was directly from the Stalinist nation. According to the article the covert site located 30 kilometers northwest of Yeongbyeon, is guarded by 2,500 solider some of whom are deployed as spy-hunting in nearby mountain in the accounts of people who witness the place with their own eyes. Yeongbyeon is where the Soviet-ear nuclear site shut down since the Agreed Framework between the North and the United States in 1994.
The news added South Korea's intelligence source knew of the North's tests as early as in late-1997 when its intelligence agent disguised as South Korean businessman acquired a top soil around the area from North Korean soldier. The soil proved to contain radioactive particles typical of residue from full-scale high explosive test using fissile material, the news said. It continued the parts needed for the tests are manufactured at factories located just south of the test site.
The news pointed out from a North Korean perspective, retaining nuclear capability may be a win-win situation in both ways quoting the words of Scott Snyder of Asia Society. "If they don't get caught they have nuclear capability. And if they do get caught they can bargain it away."
staff reporter November 18, 2002
With the latest revelations, all of its neighbors -- Russia, China, and Japan -- have come out to "urge" North Korea to cease its nuclear programs. Russia and China, issued a strong statement urging North Korea to end its nuclear weapons program and also urged the United States to "normalize relations" North Korea. The International Atomic Energy Agency has strongly urged that North Korea cease any development programs. On December 2, a USA TODAY story was released that the U.S. quietly was preparing to negotiate with North Korea.
U.S. quietly prepares to negotiate with N. Korea
By Barbara Slavin, USA TODAY
WASHINGTON — Despite North Korea's open breach of its promise to stop pursuing nuclear weapons, the Bush administration is quietly paving the way for negotiations that might give the reclusive country oil, food or other aid in exchange for verifiable shutdown of its bomb facilities.
Publicly, both countries have adopted hard-line positions since North Korea admitted to U.S. diplomats in October that it was building a uranium enrichment facility in defiance of a 1994 agreement with the United States. U.S. officials have refused negotiations and ordered a cutoff in oil aid. North Korea has refused any talks until the United States guarantees it won't use military force against it.
But behind the scenes, the Bush administration is preparing proposals for the complex means to verify any new North Korean promise to end its nuclear program, U.S. officials say. That is a signal that despite the bellicose rhetoric, both sides seem to be headed to the bargaining table.
"We can easily put together a regime of inspection and verification should one be needed, if they really are determined to come forward and tell us what they are doing and that they are going to stop," Secretary of State Colin Powell said in a recent interview.
Other State Department officials said verification schemes are already being prepared by the Verification and Compliance Bureau in the office of John Bolton, the undersecretary for arms control.
Powell said officials from the Department of Energy and the International Atomic Energy Agency are already monitoring a North Korean nuclear facility that had produced plutonium.
U.S. planning is based on confidence that North Korea will eventually succumb to economic pressure from its neighbors and a united international community.
On Monday, after a summit meeting in Beijing, the leaders of North Korea's old socialist allies, Russia and China, issued a strong statement urging North Korea to end its nuclear weapons program for the sake of "the destiny of the world and security in Northeast Asia." The statement also urged the United States to "normalize relations" North Korea.
If there are talks, it would be an admission by both sides that there is no other realistic option. The North is already believed to have one or two nuclear weapons, as well as a conventional army that could inflict terrible damage on South Korea and the 37,000 U.S. troops based there.
According to a recent CIA estimate, North Korea began a uranium enrichment program "about two years ago" that could produce "two or more nuclear weapons per year" by the middle of this decade.
A senior administration official says a gas centrifuge plant to enrich uranium could be ready as early as next year. The facility is being built with equipment acquired from Pakistan, Russia and other sources, but U.S. intelligence does not know where the plant — most likely underground — is located.
Meanwhile, the 1994 U.S. agreement with North Korea is on life support. The United States and a consortium that includes South Korea, Japan and the European Union allowed one more delivery of fuel oil to North Korea last month but suspended future shipments until the crisis is resolved.
Under a separate humanitarian program begun in 1995, the United States is still supplying food to North Korea. And some aspects of the 1994 agreement continue to be implemented. South Korea is still preparing the site for the two civilian nuclear reactors, and the North Koreans have not tampered with the plutonium at their declared nuclear site at Yongbyon.
"We have lots more economic levers" now, says Scott Snyder, South Korea representative of the Asia Foundation. "But it may take a little while for this to play out."
In early December, the U.S. stopped food aid to North Korea. It stated that it would only donate food with a monitoring program to ensure the food was not being diverted to military uses. North Korea refused to allow monitoring despite pleas from internation food agencies for humanitarian reasons. South Korea has continued to ship such items as cold weather underwear amd garments to the North as humanitarian aid.
North Korea decided to throw the gauntlet down in front of the U.S. and play its nuclear trump card. The nuclear trump card is aimed at Japan to bring it to the negotiating table to provide economic aid. The combination of the resumption of the North's missile program and nuclear WMD program is enough to panic even the staunchest of Japanese. Their anti-nuclear phobia makes the Japanese populace extremely susceptible to this type of blackmail. After the U.S. cut off the KEDO oil to the North over its violations of the nuclear program, the Pyongyang government has steadily ratcheted up the stakes in the confrontation, apparently in an effort to win economic concessions.
On Dec 12, the tension escalated when Pyongyang said it was reactivating a plutonium-based nuclear plant suspended under the 1994 accord after Washington cut regular fuel shipments mandated by the same pact. The decision to cut fuel shipments came after Pyongyang admitted to a US envoy in October that it had undertaken a separate nuclear program, using
enriched uranium. In quick succession, North Korea unilaterally stated it would shut down the cameras and open the seals on the facilities for spent rods and planned to unilaterally withdraw from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.
On Dec 17, North Korea launched a two-pronged attack on the U.S. and Japan as the two allies stepped up diplomatic pressure on the North to give up its nuclear program. Japan, however, said it would continue its dialogue with North Korea which would enable it to pressure the Stalinist state to renounce its nuclear weapons drive. Tokyo has signalled it will press ahead with normalization talks with North Korea -- even though Washington refuses to enter dialogue until Pyongyang ditches its nuclear program.
Secretary of State Colin Powell reassured all, "The United States has no plans to attack North Korea, and I see no indication that North Korea, however concerned it might be, is taking any action that would suggest we are on the verge of war from them attacking south."
North Korea started to reopen a sealed plutonium reprocessing plant on 23 Dec. Experts said North Korea could produce weapons within months. The International Atomic Energy Agency said North Korean officials had disabled surveillance cameras and broken through seals barring entry to a building housing the equipment needed to turn spent fuel rods from a nearby reactor into weapons-grade material. North Korean officials disabled cameras and broke seals around a pool holding 8,000 of the spent fuel rods at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, 55 miles north of Pyongyang. Prior to this the North Koreans began dismantling monitoring equipment at the reactor itself.
The Bush administration emphasized that it would continue to deal with the issue diplomatically. But even as he endorsed diplomacy as the right course for now, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld warned North Korea not to assume that the United States was incapable of confronting it militarily, even as Washington prepares for possible war with Iraq. Rumsfield on Dec 22 stated that "We are capable of fighting two major regional foreign conflicts" and added, "We are capable of winning decisively in one and swiftly defeating in the ... other. Let there be no doubt about it.". Some could argue that this flies in the face of the U.S. 2001 admittal that U.S. forces could win on one front only and the second front would be a holding action. (See Win on One Front.)
New bipartisan pressure from Congress has started to appear for the White House to rethink its policy of not negotiating until North Korea drops its nuclear program. The administration refused and stated that it would stick to its demand that North Korea drop its nuclear program as a condition for negotiations.
Secretary of State Powell continued the American efforts to maintain a united international front on the Korean issue. Speaking with his counterparts in Russia, France, Britain, South Korea, Japan, China and Russia to emphasize the need for "a peaceful resolution." However, Russia continued to refuse to put pressure on the North saying it was counter-productive.
On Dec 19 the Korean populace elected Roh Moon-Hyun as its new President. He is pledged to engagement with the North, and is operating in an atmosphere of notably strong anti-American sentiment. Korea has continued with its "sunshine policies" in opening the corridor between the Koreas and starting work on the Kaesong Special Economic Zone in December. By doing this, Kim Dae-Jung has caused a rift in the tri-nation "unified policy strategy" to handle the North. Even now, Japanese diplomats have been privately concerned that isolating North Korea would backfire. Russian leaders have been openly critical of the Bush administration's handling of the nuclear problem stating that it was to blame for the escalating tensions.
U.S. Gets Warning From North Korea
By HOWARD W. FRENCH
SEOUL, South Korea, Dec. 24 — North Korea warned today of an "uncontrollable catastrophe" unless the United States agrees to a negotiated solution to a tense standoff over its nuclear energy and weapons programs.
The statement, made amid mounting tensions with the United States, came as a stiff pre-emptive rebuff to a conciliation-minded newly elected president in South Korea, and a warning to other countries that their efforts to mediate the crisis will be futile.
"There is no need for any third party to meddle in the nuclear issue on the peninsula," said North Korea's ruling-party newspaper, the Rodong Sinmun. Referring to the North Korean government by its Korean initials, the paper said: "The issue should be settled between the DPRK and the U.S., the parties responsible for it. If the U.S. persistently tries to internationalize the pending issue between the DPRK and the U.S. in a bid to flee from its responsibility, it will push the situation to an uncontrollable catastrophe."
The North Korean defense minister, Kim Il Chol, went further, warning of "merciless punishment" to the United States if it pursued a confrontational approach to the emerging nuclear crisis.
"The U.S. hawks are arrogant enough to groundlessly claim that North Korea has pushed ahead with a `nuclear program,' bringing its hostile policy toward the DPRK to an extremely dangerous phase," the state-run Korean Central News Agency quoted Mr. Kim as saying.
Some analysts here saw the defense minister's statement as a defiant response to comments by his American counterpart, Donald H. Rumsfeld, who said on Monday that the United States had enough military power to prevail over North Korea even if such a conflict occurred during a war with Iraq.
The North's incendiary comments came as Pyongyang accelerated its takeover of nuclear fuel and reactors placed under international surveillance under a 1994 agreement with the United States. That pact, known as the Agreed Framework, was forged after a standoff remarkably similar to the current one.
Today, South Korean officials said North Korea had begun taking steps to reactivate a five-megawatt nuclear reactor that had been mothballed under the agreement. North Korea completed the removal of the last International Atomic Energy Agency seals and disabling surveillance cameras at a fuel fabrication plant in Yongbyon, South Korean officials said on Tuesday.
The facility is known technically as a "research reactor," but Western arms control experts say its true purpose is to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons.
"There are varying estimates on how long it would take them to reprocess the spent fuel, but they probably have plans to do it a lot faster than outsiders imagine — and will do so if their equipment works," said an American official who has studied North Korea's nuclear programs for years.
"Here are a few of the ugly signposts we might whiz past: asking the inspectors to leave, starting up the reprocessing line, finalizing their withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty and declaring themselves a nuclear power with a `Korean bomb' intended to protect the whole of the Korean people by keeping the Americans from starting a war."
Reflecting the sharp increase in distrust between the United States and South Korea amid a series of major demonstrations against the presence of 37,000 American troops in the country, the official added, "This will cause some secret shivers of pride amongst some in the South."
Both South Korea's outgoing president, Kim Dae Jung, and the man who will succeed him in February, Roh Moo Hyun, spent most of the day struggling to contain the crisis, which threatens to nullify the engagement policies they embrace.
"South Korea, the United States, Japan, China, Russia and the European Union are all strongly calling on North Korea to abandon the nuclear program, but the North is not listening now," Mr. Kim said during a cabinet meeting.
Amid concerns over tensions between Washington and Seoul, Mr. Kim appeared to draw closer to the American position on the North, saying there could be no major cooperation between the two countries unless Pyongyang agreed to international controls on its weapons of mass destruction. "We can never join hands in the development of nuclear weapons, missiles and other weapons," Mr. Kim said.
The new president, Mr. Roh, meanwhile, spent much of the day meeting with ambassadors of countries that have been involved in the region's crisis. "The president-elect requested cooperation from those concerned countries to help resolve the North's nuclear issue peacefully," said Mr. Roh's spokesman, Lee Nak Hyun.
Mr. Roh also spoke by telephone to the Japanese prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi. The two leaders "agreed to continue close cooperation among Japan, the United States and South Korea to bring about a peaceful solution to nuclear and other security issues regarding North Korea," a ministry statement said.
In Washington, the State Department said it was following developments closely. "Again, we urge North Korea not to restart any of its frozen nuclear facilities," said Tara Rigler, a department spokeswoman. Ms. Rigler said the State Department's stance was unchanged since Monday, when the department's spokesman, Philip Reeker, said that there could be no negotiations while North Korea is pursuing its nuclear program, and that the United States "will not give in to blackmail."
President Bush was said to be monitoring developments from the presidential retreat at Camp David, Md., where he is spending the Christmas holiday with his family.
Ms. Rigler reiterated the administration's position that the spent fuel rods are "of particular concern because they could be processed to recover plutonium for nuclear weapons."
"They have no relevance for the generation of electricity," she said.
Recently, China, which has been North Korea's closest ally since the two countries fought the United States during the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, also expressed concern over the reported pursuit of nuclear weapons. Today, Beijing urged Washington and Pyongyang to negotiate a solution of the crisis that would leave the Korean peninsula free from nuclear weapons.
"We hope relevant sides can proceed in the overall interest of safeguarding peace and stability on the peninsula and reach a resolution to the issue through dialogue," the Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a statement.
(See North Korean Strategy: The USFK View for the USFK strategy and positions in Korea.)
North Korea seeks Military Aid from Russia: Now that the North Koreans are on-the-ropes economically, no one wants to
extend them credit. Eight years ago, their oldest friend China demanded all
trade in hard currency -- no more barter trade. This problem is not getting
critical as a nation with one of the largest standing armies can no longer
maintain their aircraft and other military equipment -- simply because they
have no cash. The following article highlights this North Korean military
hardware problem:
North Korean Air Force looks to Moscow
By David Isenberg
In late August Russian and North Korean experts held talks that could lead to a
boost in Russian arms sales to Pyongyang. While North Korea cannot afford to
buy large numbers of modern weapons systems it does need to update its obsolete
equipment. This is good news for Russia, because North Korean weapons are
largely of Soviet origin. North Korea produces no aircraft itself, although it
does produce some spare parts for its aircraft.
As Asia Times Online reported (North Korean, Russian ties firmly on
track, August 27), currently Russian arms sales to North Korea are estimated at
about US$10 million a year, presumably a minimum level to supply the North
Korean army with most needed spare parts. North Korea reportedly sought some
$100 million of Russian arms supplies per annum, but Moscow has been reluctant
to extend new loans to cash-strapped Pyongyang.
Russian specialists say the North Korean Air Force is most in need of updating,
according to a report by Agence France Presse. It has 500 aircraft but only 30
MiG-29 fighters and 35 Su-25 fighters can be classed as being up to date.
More than half of the air force is grounded and needs repair and modernization.
About two-thirds of the North Korean Air Force is older-generation Soviet- or
Chinese-made designs incorporating 1950s and 1960s technology, with rudimentary
avionics and limited weapons systems capability. Older fighter aircraft include
160 MiG-21/Fishbeds, 20 Su-7/Fitters, 160 MiG-19/Farmers, 120 MiG-17/Frescos,
and 190 MiG-15/Fagots. Most of these aircraft are daylight,
clear-weather-capable only, and carry limited weapon loads. Three regiments
totaling 80 medium-range Il-28/BEAGLEs are the only bombers in the air force
inventory.
In the mid-to-late 1980s, the Soviet Union supplied a variety of a limited
number of more modern all-weather air-defense and ground-attack aircraft. In
1985, North Korea acquired 45 MiG-23/Floggers, with increased range and payload
over other older, less capable North Korean fighters. This aircraft can carry
the older AA-2/Atoll and the more sophisticated AA-7/Apex air-to-air missiles
in an air-intercept role. It can also be armed with general-purpose bombs and
rockets for ground-attack missions.
In 1985, North Korea also acquired 15 Soviet MiG-29/Fulcrum fighters. The
MiG-29 carries the AA-10/Alamo beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile. These
Fulcrums provide Pyongyang with a limited but much improved air-defense
capability.
In the late 1980s, the air force improved its ground-attack capabilities when
it acquired 35 Su-25/Frogfoot aircraft from the Soviet Union.
All-weather-capable and well armored, the Frogfoot has a combat radius of 300
nautical miles and carries up to 5,000 kilograms of bombs and rockets.
While Russia provides North Korea with spare parts for its Soviet-built fighter
jets and armor, it has no intention of giving it any offensive weapons, Russian
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said on August 26. "We are supplying some
equipment that cannot be called modern, let alone offensive, to North Korea."
He said Russia is supplying North Korea with defense systems and spare parts
for tanks and fighter planes.
In recent years, Russia, unlike other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
countries - Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan - has delivered practically no
weapons to the Northern part of the Korean Peninsula. According to information
in the United Nations Register, over the past 10 years Russia has sold about
260 "Igla-1" surface-to-air complexes to North Korea, though it also gave
Pyongyang a license to manufacture them, as well as several missiles for combat
cutters.
Meanwhile, Russia has delivered to South Korea 10 Mi-17 helicopters, 80 BMP-3
combat vehicles, 20 BTR-80 armored transporters, and 80 T-80U tanks.
Rosoboroneksport, Russia’s main arms-trading company, is conducting
negotiations on the sale to Seoul of S-300PMU and S-300V surface-to-air missile
systems, as well as Ka-50 helicopters - the "Chernaya Akula" ("Black Shark").
Yet North Korean leader Kim Jong-il visited Russia in late August for the
second consecutive summer. He brought with him members of his State Defense
Council, a secretary of the Central Committee of the Labor Party of Korea,
government ministers and other officials. Last year he traveled 13,000
kilometers from the North Korean capital to Moscow and back along the
Trans-Siberian railroad.
During his trip he visited Komsomolsk-on-Amur, where he took in an aviation
production association of the Sukhoi Corp and a shipyard. Reportedly he spent
two-and-a-half hours on the Sukhoi plant shop floors. He watched the process of
manufacturing an Su-27 jet fighter and a super-heavy press that die-stamped a
variety of aircraft parts in his presence.
Sukhoi Corp director-general Mikhail Pogosyan said the North Korean government
delegation had shown clear interest in the achievements of the Russian aviation
industry.
Earlier, ahead of the visit, Pogosyan had said the North Korean leader and
delegation would be familiarized with the Su-30MKK fighter planes manufactured
for China, the upgraded Su-30 planes for service with the Russian Air Force and
the program of development and production of a new multi-mission plane, the
Su-80, and two amphibian planes, the Be-20 and the Be-103.
(©2002 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact
content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
(See North Korean Strategy: The USFK View for the USFK strategy and positions in Korea.)
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