North-South Generals Meet (May 2004) For the first time since the Korean War, general officers from the North and South Korean militaries met face to face on 26 May. Though the ROK played up the significance, they discussed relatively minor matters they hope will be expanded in future talks. (NOTE: In actuality, the generals from both sides have met before in 2002 and 2003, but the media hype touted it as something unique.)

The one-day discussions, at North Korea’s Diamond Mountain resort, focused mainly on avoiding accidental clashes in the waters off the peninsula’s west coast. The main goal of the meeting was simply to ensure the discussions would continue in the future. The next round of military-to-military talks were set for June 3 in South Korea.

In recent years, at least two pitched battles in 1999 and 2002 between navy vessels left sailors from both sides dead, ratcheting up tensions between nations still technically at war. The recent naval skirmishes have been caused mainly by armed ships protecting fishing boats in disputed, crab-rich waters near the border. The last clash, in June 2002, left six South Korean sailors dead; the North's casualties were believed to number more than 30 but never were confirmed. Such measures as a hot line, accepted flag signals for communication between vessels and assigning communication frequencies in case of emergencies were discussed.

Because South Korea is not a signatory to the Korean War armistice, direct military contacts usually happen between North Korean and U.S. or U.N. military personnel. The talks were scheduled to focus on the naval clashes but could deal with any “military tension-reducing and confidence- building measures” the North Koreans chose to broach. South Korea’s five-man delegation, led by Rear Adm. Park Jung-hwa, traveled to the summit by crossing the Demilitarized Zone in vehicles. The North’s five-member delegation was headed up by army Maj. Gen. An Ik San, South Korean officials said. In the North Korean military, a two-star general holds the equivalent rank of a one-star in the South Korean or U.S. militaries.

The reason the ROK has placed great significance on this meeting was that there were growing calls for South Korea to take its own diplomatic approach toward North Korea, instead of following U.S. demands that the North dismantle its nuclear-weapons program FIRST before any concessions be made.

JUNE 2004

Working Groups Prior to Summit (June 23 - 27) The problems associated with the summit remains as the ROK and China do not back the US proposal for economic rewards for freezing the DPRK nuclear programs as a "first-step" in the negotiation process. The New York Times said on 23 Jun that U.S. negotiators would offer the DPRK new but "highly conditional" incentives to give up its nuclear weapons at the talks, including a provisional guarantee not to invade. The newspaper quoted U.S. officials as saying President Bush had authorized negotiators to offer the incentives in what would be the first significant, detailed overture to the DPRK since he took office more than three years ago. Under the proposal, aid would begin flowing to the DPRK once its leader, Kim Jong-il, had made a commitment to dismantle his plutonium and uranium weapons programs, it said.

According to Reuters ("U.S. OFFERS CARROT, N.KOREA SAYS DROP THE STICK ", 2004-06-23) reported that the US offered a proposal to try to resolve the DPRK nuclear crisis at six-party talks in Beijing while an entrenched DPRK urged the US to soften its stance. Chief negotiators from the six parties opened discussions on the 20-month nuclear crisis at the exclusive Diaoyutai State Guesthouse as Japan warned that the credibility of the talks would be on the line if no progress was made.

Progress in two previous rounds has been glacial, and few expect major breakthroughs despite the U.S. proposal, which the New York Times said contained incentives for the North to abandon its nuclear weapons program. "We are prepared for serious discussion and we have a proposal to offer," U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly said in an opening statement. "A focus on the common objective, and practical and effective means to attain it, will lead in a very positive direction with new political, economic and diplomatic possibilities," he said. Kelly gave no details. "No positive results can be expected from the third round of the six-party talks if the U.S. again raises its old brigandish demand at the talks that will start today," the DPRK's Rodong Sinmun newspaper said in a commentary.

On the sidelines, top nuclear negotiators from the two Koreas met one-one-one on 23 Jun and exchanged views on how to ease tension over the DPRK's nuclear weapons program, ROK officials said. The ROK's chief delegate Lee Soo-hyuck and his DPRK counterpart, Kim Kye-kwan, discussed "nuclear dismantlement" and "freeze-for-compensation" during a 90-minute meeting at Beijing's Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, they said.

At the end, it proved to be inconclusive with the North issuing a threat to test a nuclear weapon if its demands for international aid was not met -- which the US took to be a bluff. The serious lack of mutual trust continued -- but there seemed to at least to be progress the North accepting proposals to a freeze if conditions of aid were met. The ROK held their own set of talks on the side line along with the US giving the appearance that the wedge between the two allies was complete. According to Chosun Ilbo,"North Korean Talks End with Some Progress, Promise of More Talks" (27 Jun 04) on 27 Jun: "While major differences remain between Pyongyang and Washington, officials say some progress has been made. The six nations have agreed to meet for a fourth round of talks in September. The third round ended Saturday with the host, China, saying serious differences remain between the United States and North Korea on a number of issues."

The participants, China, DPRK, US, Japan, South Korea and Russia, will study the proposals presented. All six sides agreed to hold working-level meetings as soon as possible to discuss the details of North Korea's first steps toward dismantling of its nuclear weapons, as well as Pyongyang's demands, which include a request for massive energy aid from the United States and other participants. According to documents made available by South Korean government officials, North Korea listed details on key elements of the nuclear freeze, saying the scope of the freeze would include only those facilities related to developing nuclear weapons such as the five-megawatt nuclear reactor in Yongbyeon, radio-chemical laboratories, and plutonium extracted from reprocessed fuel rods, but without any mention of enriched uranium arms development, a sensitive and contentious issue. In addition, North Korea said the method of verification would be through the six-party framework, and it objected to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

North Korean officials said they were willing not only to freeze their nuclear weapons development programs, but also to dismantle them, when their conditions are met. The United States presented a detailed proposal at the talks, addressing North Korea's energy and security needs, allowing other nations to provide the North with heavy fuel oil and provisional security assurances. In return for the freeze, Pyeongyang said it wanted to be compensated with 2 million kilowatts a year of electricity, the equivalent of 2.7 million tons of heavy fuel oil, elimination from the list of terrorism-sponsoring states and the easing of political and economic sanctions.

Washington would also begin the process of removing North Korea from its list of nations that sponsor terrorism. In exchange, Washington wants Pyongyang to provide a full listing of its nuclear facilities, allow international monitoring, and disable dangerous materials during a preliminary three-month period. (SITE NOTE: We wonder if the proven fact that the North openly plans to invade South Korea with its Special Forces to spread terror is now being placed in a separate category. The threats to Japan of spreading terrorism there in the recent past are now forgotten. This is a major turnaround for the Bush administration -- but we think that they believe the North will NEVER provide full accountability.)

Chinese delegation chief Wang Yi says one of the main remaining differences is the U.S. contention that North Korea is developing a uranium-enrichment program alongside its acknowledged plutonium program, an allegation Pyongyang has consistently denied in public.

The four-day meeting followed two earlier rounds that ended inconclusively. The dispute flared in October 2002, when Washington said North Korea admitted having a uranium-based weapons program, in violation of a 1994 agreement with the United States.

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Political and Pragmatic Links of Koreas According to the James Brooke, New York Times, "Both Koreas Sidestep U.S. to Forge Political and Pragmatic Links" (June 2004)

Both Koreas Sidestep U.S. to Forge Political and Pragmatic Links

Wielding wrenches on a rainy morning, South Korean marines methodically dismantled a wall of 48 olive-green loudspeakers that only days earlier had been blaring news and pop music to sentries and rice farmers working on the North Korean bank of the Han River.

On Saturday, the marines will start removing a 20-foot computer-controlled sign board that blinked news flashes across the demilitarized zone.

After half a century of cross-border propaganda, all is now quiet on South Korea's northern front. By Aug. 15, the hundreds of propaganda signs and loudspeakers are to be entirely removed from both sides of the inter-Korean border.

The Koreas are entering more than a summer of détente. Quietly ignoring Bush administration efforts to isolate North Korea, South Korea has become North Korea's largest source of aid, trade and tourism. It is also North Korea's most consistent diplomatic advocate.

Even though the two Koreas are still technically at war, their athletes will march again under one "Unification" flag at the Athens Olympics in August.

While older people and conservative politicians get nervous each time the United States announces a troop withdrawal, as it did earlier this month, younger South Koreans typically cheer. To them, and increasingly to the more liberal members of the South Korean government, North Korea is no longer seen as a military threat. The conciliatory stance causes uneasiness — and confusion — in Washington, where the White House tries to keep a united front with South Korea and Japan to induce North Korea to drop its nuclear weapons program. The latest round of talks, which also include China and Russia, are to end Saturday in Beijing.

"You could call it engagement, you could call it neutrality," said Victor D. Cha, a Washington-based Korea specialist visiting Seoul this week. "We don't know what South Korea's grand design is."

Outside the peninsula, North Korea is a pariah, a Stalinist dictatorship that runs a string of harsh labor camps, and that allowed one million people to starve to death in the 1990's rather than accept foreign aid. Its missiles and artillery have long threatened rapid annihilation of Seoul, a megalopolis that holds nearly half the nation's 48 million people.

Kim Dae-Jung and his wife pose with Kim Jong-Il when they visit Pyeongyang for the June 15 North-South Summit in 2000.

But in South Korea, where years of confrontation with North Korea have yielded little progress toward greater security, a hear-no-evil, see-no-evil policy took root five years ago under the previous president, Kim Dae Jung. Mr. Kim's "sunshine policy" was devoted both to avoiding a second Korean war and to diminishing the huge social and economic gap between the neighbors. Today, South Korea's central bank is the best source of statistics on North Korea's economy.

South Korea's Agriculture Ministry is drawing up plans to revive North Korea's failed farm sector. Other ministries are working to rehabilitate the North's electric power system and railroads. On the information front, South Korea's Unification Ministry is planning to start broadcasting North Korean news programs next month on the ministry's Web site. Backed by Seoul's new, liberal-controlled Parliament, Unification Minister Chung Se Hyun said Thursday that he might allow southerners to travel in July to the capital, Pyongyang, for the 10th anniversary of the death of Kim Il Sung, North Korea's founder.

"South Koreans have gone the full circle," said C. Kenneth Quinones, director of the Korea Peninsula Program at International Action, a Washington research group. "Ten years ago, anyone who went north was painted pink. Today, anyone who does not go north is not a real Korean."

For years, under a military dictatorship and the conservative government that succeeded it, contacts with the North were seen as virtually treasonous, despite the longing of many ordinary Koreans who had relatives and ties in the north. A new generation of South Koreans also came of age with no memories of the horrors of the Korean War.

To avoid offending North Korea, government officials rarely remind the public about the military threat from the North, so younger South Koreans come up with their own theories about the military alliance with the United States. Many believe the United States and Japan simply want to keep the Koreas divided.

In "The Third Scenario," a novel by Kim Jin Myung, the United States centralizes its Asian military command in Japan, concentrates troops on Guam, then provokes a full-scale war between the two Koreas. The goals are to keep Korea weak and to increase sales for American weapons manufacturers. In the three weeks since the book went on sale, it has sold 1.6 million copies.

"They have gotten themselves in a position where defending the alliance will offend the North Koreans," Mr. C Gha, aeorgetown University professor, said of Seoul's silence.

Whatever South Korea's designs, they do not include unification, at least not anytime soon. Instead, South Korea wants to nudge North Korea down the road toward a free market and economic development, postponing the day when a Germany-size reunification bill will come due. With efforts to destabilize the North completely out of fashion, relations are steadily improving. Bilateral trade, for instance, soared to $724 million last year, from $400 million in 2000.

Starting this summer, North and South Korean ships plan to trade directly for the first time, as each country opens seven ports to ships from the other. In the fall, a South Korean-run industrial park is to open with 15 factories in Kaesong, about 15 miles north of the border.

On the eastern side of Korea, day trips are to start July 3 across the demilitarized zone to Mount Kumgang, a North Korean tourists' enclave. Expecting a flood of tourists, Hyundai Asan, the tour operator, is devising "smart cards" to speed tourists through border controls.

Since Mount Kumgang opened to foreign visitors in 1999, nearly 700,000 South Koreans have made the tour. Critics call Mount Kumgang a Potemkin village, where North Korea collects $100 from each visitor and minimizes contacts between citizens of the two countries.

But even outside this enclave, 15,280 South Koreans visited North Korea last year, double the number in 2000. North Korea allowed only 1,023 citizens to visit South Korea last year, but that also doubled the level of 2000.

Mindful of the staggering cost of unifying the two Germanys, South Korea has made North Korea its primary recipient of foreign aid. "When a rich brother goes to visit a poorer brother, the rich brother should not go empty-handed," Mr. Kim, the former president, told The Financial Times last week when asked why Seoul surreptitiously paid $100 million to facilitate the summit meeting. "We wanted to provide $100 million of support. But there was no legal way to do it."

Most aid appears to be in the open.

Last week, for example, a South Korean charity group opened a 100-bed children's hospital in Pyongyang. The group, which brought 11 South Korean children to the opening, is also building a dairy plant in Pyongyang. This relaxed atmosphere reassures foreign investors and keeps South Korean flight capital at a low level. "There is no fear here — that is the striking change," Selig S. Harrison, an American academic who has been visiting the Koreas for decades, said in Seoul on Wednesday.

At the Jaejok Peak border post, it is hard to quantify the impact the loudspeakers and sign boards had on the northern side of the Han River. Over the last five years, the only known defector in this region was a North Korean Army officer who floated across the river in a raft made of empty plastic jugs.

As the soldiers unbolted the loudspeakers, a visitor peering through field binoculars could only imagine what impact the information effort had had on the minds of seven farmers who could be seen, dressed in black and toiling in a field, cut off from the world by more than coils of rusty barbed wire on the crest of a muddy riverbank.

The above article is from The New York Times

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F-117A Stealth Back in Kunsan, Korea Chosun Ilbo ("10 U.S. STEALTH FIGHTERS DEPLOYED TO KOREA FOR TRAINING", 2004-06-29) reported that the Defense Ministry announced Tuesday that ten U.S. F-117A stealth fighters would be deployed to a U.S. airbase in the southern part of the ROK to take part in military training that will last several months. An official with the Ministry said, "On Wednesday and Thursday, F-117A aircraft will move to Korea from Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico and will engage in military training in Korea for several months." Sources familiar with the situation said the move has symbolic implications that demonstrate that despite USFK force reductions, U.S. fighting power in the ROK would be strengthened.

The article stated that this would be the fourth time that stealth fighters have been deployed to Korea since 1993, 1996, and 2003, when those planes participated in U.S.-ROK joint military exercises such as the Foal Eagle (FE) exercise or the Team Spirit (TS) exercise. In that sense, it is quite rare for stealth fighters to be deployed to Korea when large training exercises are not in progress.

The 10 F-117As to be deployed in Korea represent about 20 percent of all stealth fighter-bombers (55 units) possessed by the U.S. and also the largest number the U.S. has ever deployed to Korea. On 30 Jun, the F-117As landed at Kunsan, however, Yonhap News reported that "though unfavorable weather conditions prevented some from doing so."

In Aug 2004, the F-117A Stealth fighters were still at Kunsan AB in what we believe was a precautionary move in case North Korea did something very stupid during this transition of the 2d Bde 2d ID out of the country. There are more changes that may take place so the F-117A fighters may remain for a few months more through Ulchi Focus Lens. In addition a squadron of U.S. F-15E Strike Eagles will arrive in South Korea in September for months-long deployment. These fighters normally are stationed at Kwangju. The two-seat fighters will fly to South Korea from the Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska to get accustomed to geographical features of the peninsula. The jets is equipped with a range of air-to-air and air-to-ground weaponry systems including Joint Direct Attack Munitions and GBU-27 laser-guided bombs.

Civil engineers benefit from F-117 deployment

by Master Sgt. Val Gempis Air Force Print News

8/17/2004 - KUNSAN AIR BASE, South Korea -- Civil engineers are reaping the benefits of an air and space expeditionary force deployment of F-117 Nighthawks here.

Building and maintaining a home for about 300 Airmen from the 49th Fighter Wing at Holloman Air Force Base, N.M., has been a great training opportunity for the civil engineers, said Chief Master Sgt. Mark Brejcha, chief enlisted manager of the 8th Civil Engineer Squadron here.

It allows the engineers to sharpen and acquire new skills, but more importantly gives them the experience on what it is like to be part of an AEF rotation, the chief said. Airmen do not deploy while they are here because they are serving a one-year unaccompanied remote tour.

“I’m really impressed how our people handled the onslaught of challenges they faced during the buildup of tent city. We were tasked heavily,” Chief Brejcha said.

The AEF deployment here stretched the already thin ranks of civil engineers. Aside from supporting the deployment, civil engineers also handled daily calls from base customers. To ensure their operations went smoothly, civil engineers worked around the clock for about a week during the initial startup of tent city. The group connected miles of cables, constructed a water storage and distribution station, and upgraded the hot water boiler system.

“The most difficult part of this operation is the planning stage,” said Senior Master Sgt. Manny Lapuz, 8th CES infrastructure chief. “Knowing what kind of equipment we need or which generators we want to use is very important.”

Although concrete pads were already poured at tent city, it still took some time for the Airmen to erect the tents. Some of the equipment was pulled from WRM kits from other bases.

“We’ve never used some of these tools before,” Sergeant Lapuz said. “But we learned how to operate them quickly.”

Civil engineers here said they are used to hard work. They are accustomed to being dirty, sweaty and hot. But when the boiler at tent city blew up and the power went out at the same time Sergeant Lapuz said everyone in the squadron lent a hand.

“We had people out there who have never worked outside of their building (swinging) sledgehammers and (getting) their boots muddy to ensure the deployed troops (had) all the comforts of home,” he said.

Although the pace of their work has slowed down considerably since the arrival of the deployed Airmen almost two months ago, the team still does some “tweaking” to make sure everything is operating properly at tent city. Once in awhile, they check to ensure that the shower temperature is just right; not too cold or too hot. They also have a regular shift of craftsman checking generator fluid levels, portable toilets cleanliness and water tank levels.

“It’s a great feeling to know that we play an important role when we see those planes take off every day,” Chief Brejcha said. “Healthy and well-rested pilots and maintainers will help maximize their training and ensure safe flying here at Kunsan.”

The 49th FW visitors said Kunsan Airmen have done an excellent job to make them feel at home. Being deployed and living in tents is not always easy.

“We’re very impressed with the hospitality we’ve received here,” said Master Sgt. Gerald Bies, a lead production superintendent from Holloman. “This is one of the best tent cities I’ve seen.”

Aside from having a place to sleep, civil engineers built an entertainment tent for television and movies. They also built a permanent laundry facility. To lift morale, the civil engineers constructed a communication tent with telephones and Internet access so the deployed Airmen could contact home.

“Our mission is to fight in place,” Chief Brejcha said. “This deployment has taught us new ways and skills. Without a doubt, supporting these Holloman Airmen has greatly improved our combat capability.”

Nice article in the Air Force Association Magazine in Sept 2004 about the F-117.

(NOTE: There may be more here than meets the eye about the F-117s coming to Korea. There was some pork-barrel politics involved in getting the F-117s a mission. In Feb 2004, the newspapers reported, "The Air Force is seeking to pare back a fifth of the New Mexico-based stealth fighter jets, one of the nation's highest profile weapons. Part of President Bush's $2.4 trillion 2005 budget proposal calls for removing 10 of the radar-evading F-117A Nighthawks from Holloman Air Force Base, according to a Monday news release from Sen. Pete Domenici, R-N.M." According to news reports, "Last year, the Air Force said stealths flew more than 80 missions and dropped more than 100 2,000-pound guided bombs in Iraq, including the opening strike against Iraqi leadership. Under Bush's $401.7 billion defense proposal, three jets will be retired from each of Holloman's two combat squadrons. Four more from the base's stealth training wing will be mothballed, according to Bingaman. The retirement will mean an estimated $75 million savings over the next five years, Bingaman said. The budget blueprint also calls for spending $24.4 million for new housing at Holloman, $95.3 million for laser and microwave research at Kirtland Air Force Base, and $33 million at White Sands Missile Range."

The F-117’s at Holloman AFB were in danger of being mothballed earlier in 2004, but through a strong regional collaboration the fighters have not only been saved, but have been strengthened. This spring OCEDC, the Alamogordo Chamber of Commerce Committee of Fifty and the Alliance for Regional Military Support was made aware of an effort by the U.S. Air Force, Air Combat Command to mothball 10 F-117’s in 2004 and 11 more in 2005. This would have represented a 40% decrease in the size of the Stealth presence at Holloman and a commensurate decrease in the economic impact of Holloman AFB. After researching the issue our federal delegation was able to determine that the proposed cost savings did not warrant the loss in low observable (stealth) strike capabilities. The Defense Appropriations Bill not only restored funding for the operation of the 10 jets, that had been earmarked for mothballing, but added an additional $9.8M for modifications to the aircraft that would improve their capabilities. A press release from Senator Domenici’s office stated that “The (Defense Appropriations) bill also contains language requested by Domenici and Senator Jeff Bingaman that prevents the Air Force from retiring any of the F-117 Stealth Fighters at Holloman Air Force Base. In addition, $9.8 million for the Stealth Fighters at Holloman was added to the bill by Representatives Steve Pearce and Heather Wilson. Domenici protected the funds during the Senate-House conference committee.)

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JULY 2004

South Demand Promised Hotline Reconnection In continuing with agreements made at the working-level inter-Korean military talks that North Korea would normalize the operation of the military hotline between the two navies. It however, has remained disconnected despite earlier agreement.

Laying a groundwork for the genuine peace and rapprochement on the divided peninsula, the two Koreas held their first general-level military talks in about 50 years since the 1950-53 Korean War at the North’s scenic Mt. Kumgang in May. The high-ranking soldiers from both sides met again in early June, this time at the South’s resort mountain, Sorak, where a package of measures were agreed to ease tensions along the heavily fortified border.

They, in particular, agreed to share a radio frequency and use joint signaling systems to avoid accidental armed clashes between the two navies in the poorly marked western sea border. Since the first successful test of the military hotline on June 14, however, the North has shown passive attitudes on the agreed measures, responding only three times to the 17 calls from the South Korean navy by the end of the month. Most recently, a North Korean fishing boat briefly crossed the Northern Limit Line (NLL) last on 30 Jun. But the North’s navy didn’t respond to the repeated calls from the South.

In a wierd twist, the MND announced that South Korean naval officers were to blame. "It's true that the North Korean navy vessel transmitted radio messages three times stating, 'a descending ship is not our ship but a Chinese fishing boat,'" Brig. Gen. Nam Dae-yeon, a spokesman with the Defense Ministry. The error is not the firing of the shots, but the officers failure to notify the joint chiefs of the transmission. The ROK cannot confirm if it really was a Chinese boat or North Korean -- and could have been a ruse. There is a distrust of the radio transmissions as the North in the past will respond sometimes and not at others. The shot was fired across the bow to warn the ship off as it was encroaching. The action seems to be reasonable, but the pressure needed to be taken off the North.

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Vietnam Donates 1,000 tons of Rice to North The Associated Press ("Vietnam to Donate 1,000 tons of Rice to North Korea", 2004-07-07) reported that Vietnam is shipping 1,000 tons of rice as food aid to the DPRK in the aftermath of a massive train accident in April that killed at least 161 people and injured more than 1,300, officials confirmed Wednesday. Prime Minister Phan Van Khai made the decision on June 23 to donate 1,000 tons of 20% broken rice to the DPRK, said a Foreign Ministry official under condition of anonymity. Vietnam is the world's second-largest rice exporter, behind Thailand. (NOTE: Rice exports for Vietnam have fallen by about 3 percent in recent months and it is assumed that the donation of "broken rice" is to relieve its storage problems -- in the same way that the South eliminated their ever growing rice storage surpluses as the ROK economy ate less and less rice. The fact that this comes on the heels of Vietnam and South Korea entering into a pact where no visas will be required between the countries might suggest that the ROK has a hand in brokering this deal. On July 22-25, Gen. Nam Jae-joon, ROK Joint Chief of Staff, met with Vietnam's top military leaders, including Defense Minister Pham Van Tra.)

The move comes on the heels of South Korea "loaning" 400 tons of rice to the North -- some of which it will have to buy on the open market. This action indicates that the South Korean warehouses that in the past were overflowing with rice are now at its 90-day stockpile levels. Declining consumption coupled with the ROK policy of buying high and selling low created a problem that the ROK finally said it would reduce its buying. It continues to ship rice to the north to rid itself of any surplus.

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North Korea Laying 80 New Tunnels Donga Ilbo ("North Korea Laying 80 New Tunnels", 2004-07-08) reported that the Ministry of National Defense said in its "Report on the business of national defense" presented to the Committee of State Security on July 7 that the DPRK has been laying 80 new tunnels and reinforcing the camouflage of its army bases after the Iraq war in March 2003. It analyzed that the increase in tunnels is a prepatory response to the precision bombing strikes launched about 800 times a day by stealth fighters of U.S. army during the Iraq war. (NOTE: There is also the use of new Apache Longbow helicopters equipped with deadly Hellfire missiles that were used effectively in Afghanistan that sucks all the oxygen from the tunnels -- killing all those within. Also in July 2004 the MND announced that ATACMS-P with surface penetrating capabilities will be deployed to attack these tunnels.)

The Ministry of National Defense also stated that the DPRK is focusing investment on conventional weapons and strategic weapons, despite its serious financial difficulties in the recent years. The DPRK is improving the precision and the targeting of about 400 artillery tubes of 240mm in the neighborhood of the truce line, targeting the metropolitan area of ROK and also making progress in quality reform on about 40 armored vehicles named "Chunmaho" (an imitation of Russia's T-62 armored vehicle) deployed in their front-line units. In addition, through missile engine tests, the DPRK is planning on producing medium-range ballistic missiles and making submarines.

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The following article summarizes what we have been preaching all along about the North's use of "blackmail" to obtain economic support from its friends and enemies since the regime was established. This dependence on outside aid has ended up with the North basically following policies intended simply for "regime survival." In turn the outside world of its "friends" have provided food aid that has been directed to the military thus bypassing programs of food aid directed towards the people. Likewise the use of oil by China to the North has been used to foster its own goals -- by turning off the oil to make its point about bringing the DPRK to the negotiating table. Other countries have chosen the multilateral approach that seems to be the best in dealing with the North, however, there are major lessons to be learned from KEDO -- which failed but whose multilateral approach is recommended for future aid programs. The fly in the ointment is the ROK rapproachment programs that has steadily increased and monetary aid is buttressing the North.

This special report by Bradley O. Babson, an Asian specialist and former World Bank official, was presented at the 2004 Workshop: “Towards a Peaceful Resolution with North Korea: Crafting a New International Engagement Framework” in Washington D.C. The workshop, which ran from February 12-13, 2004, was hosted by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) and the Korea Economic Institute (KEI), in cooperation with the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). In this presentation Babson gives an excellent summary of the methods of mobilizing capital for the DPRK. This presentation notes the intricacy of the relationship between political and economic issues in the DPRK. Babson also emphasizes the need for open dialogue between nations to support such an endeavor.

-“Designing Public Capital Mobilization Strategies for DPRK” by Bradley O. Babson

Lessons from the Past In general, the lessons of experience in mobilizing public resources for DPRK in the international community during the 1990’s point to the critical tension between political interests of donors and the DPRK leadership on the one hand, and the humanitarian and economic development needs of DPRK society on the other. The tendency to politicize provision of foreign aid is very high, with the consequence of reducing impact on the lives of the DPRK population and distorting incentives for reforms by the authorities.

Subsidized Socialism. It is worth remembering that DPRK built a socialist economic system in which all domestic resources were public and subsidies from the Soviet Union and China were major sources of international assistance for many years. The misallocation of resources and dependency on foreign support that resulted from DPRK’s economic management system and political relationships with its Communist backers, contributed greatly to the breakdown of the DPRK economy in the 1990’s and the humanitarian crisis that emerged. While espousing the “Juche” philosophy of self-reliance,

DPRK actually built a system that institutionalized economic dependence on foreign public financial assistance, even though this was largely disguised in the form of “friendship prices” and counter-trade practices that provided large subsidies, especially for energy. This dependence, plus the distorting effects of prices that did not reflect economic cost, led to energy-intensive investments in industry, transport, and agriculture that were inefficient and ultimately unsustainable. DPRK’s military-first policies and favoritism of the elite amplified these failures, which were not challenged by the suppliers of DPRK’s economic aid during this period. The important lessons from these experiences are that the economic policy context is critical for foreign aid to be effective in promoting economic development, and that aid provided primarily for political purposes -- in this case to ensure regime survival -- does not necessarily lead to economic viability and can foster aid dependence that acts as an inhibitor of needed economic reform. There is nothing surprising in this, and it reflects the consensus of international experience with economic development globally.

Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). The international response to both DPRK’s nuclear brinkmanship of the early 1990’s and the food crisis of the mid-1990’s, essentially resulted in mobilization of new forms of international public financial assistance for DPRK. The establishment of KEDO under the Agreed Framework negotiated in 1994 between the U.S. and DPRK, created a mechanism where public resources from KEDO members (primarily the U.S, Japan, ROK and the European Union) were mobilized to provide both 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil annually to DPRK and construction of two Light Water Reactor (LWR) nuclear power plants. While this agreement broke down following disclosure of a secret uranium enrichment program in October 2002, with suspension of oil shipments in December 2002 and suspension of the LWR project in November 2003, the resources provided by KEDO to DPRK between 1995 and 2003 did accomplish some positive results. On the political side, the KEDO program did contain DPRK’s plutonium nuclear program and allowed for direct contacts and negotiations between KEDO members and DPRK during a period of extreme difficulties for DPRK, both in leadership change following the death of Kim Il Sung and in coping with its economic and food crises. These stabilizing factors were important in maintaining peace and fostering an environment where DPRK could build trust with new foreign partners in cooperative activities. On the economic side, the fuel oil did help offset the trade shock that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992, and the LWR project did provide a means to develop practical working modalities for foreigners with DPRK authorities. The LWR project itself, however, was never seen by either side as a truly economic undertaking designed to overcome DPRK’s shortages of electric power. Many issues were left unattended as the project developed, including such elementary questions as how to finance transmission lines needed to connect the plants to the national electricity grid and how to stabilize the grid itself to be able to absorb power from the LWRs. With the suspension and likely cancellation of the LWR project now a reality, there is a growing realization (especially in ROK) that significant resources have been deployed without any tangible economic benefit. An important lesson of the KEDO experience is that when public resources are mobilized primarily to achieve political goals -- in this case containing DPRK’s nuclear program-- but are provided as economic assistance that does not meet a test of economic or commercial rationality, the political achievement may be unsustainable and the resources essentially wasted. While the demise of the KEDO LWR project may have been triggered by the discovery of the secret uranium enrichment program, it was destined in any case to face a crisis when the lack of economic justification and provision of needed complementary investments could no longer be ignored. A second lesson is that KEDO did succeed in demonstrating the value of multilateralism, both in mobilizing significant public resources from donors with very different interests and in coordinating policies relating to management of these resources and operational relations with DPRK authorities. For this reason, it may well be desirable to consider a future role for KEDO in mobilizing resources for DPRK under a New International Engagement Framework, if it is provided with a new mandate and is better able to integrate its economic and political functions.

Humanitarian Aid. The international response to the DPRK famine of the mid- 1990’s also holds valuable lessons for the future. The mobilization of significant humanitarian assistance was accomplished in a disciplined way under the leadership of the United Nations. The annual UN Appeal is based on detailed crop production and food availability assessments by the World Food Program (WFP) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), with health and educational humanitarian needs defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF. These objectively defined appeals have been supported by donors through contributions to UN-managed delivery programs, bilateral transfers, and support for NGO’s active in DPRK. The willingness of donors, particularly the U.S., ROK, Japan and European Union, to provide humanitarian assistance while at the same time challenging DPRK on its weapons programs, contributed importantly to a growing perception that it is possible to engage DPRK on multiple fronts at the same time, and that de-linking humanitarian assistance from other issues could create an atmosphere conducive for addressing other concerns of the international community. The fact that DPRK was willing to ask for international assistance and to set up administrative mechanisms to cooperate with foreign partners has contributed to the beginning of a more businesslike way of interacting. While there have been many issues of concern about monitoring delivery of food aid to intended beneficiaries, access to different areas of the country, and restrictions imposed by the government on foreigners working in DPRK, there has been steady improvement over the years, due in part to mutual trust building and in part to learning from experiences.

There are important limitations, however, on the humanitarian resource mobilization experience of recent years. First is aid fatigue. After seven years of appeals for food aid, the willingness of the international community to continue to meet the food deficit in DPRK is dwindling. This reflects both frustration that the more fundamental obstacles to improving food security in DPRK have not been overcome and emergence of new claimants on resources for humanitarian assistance that compete for attention with DPRK, notably in Africa, Afghanistan and Iraq. A second limitation is unwillingness of most donors to shift from humanitarian assistance to development assistance, pending resolution of major political security issues. An initiative by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1998 to convene a Roundtable for donors and DPRK authorities to discuss an Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Protection program (AREP) failed to mobilize resources needed to address DPRK’s underlying difficulties in expanding agricultural production. While the UN and NGOs have made limited progress on a small scale, most governments have not (with the exception of ROK). A third limitation is the recent willingness of some governments to link humanitarian assistance to other political objectives. Since the re-emergence of a nuclear crisis in late 2002, neither the U.S. nor Japan have made credible efforts to respond to the shortfall in the UN Appeal for 2003 and expected for 2004, although official policy is still to maintain a separation of humanitarian aid from other issues. The overall lesson from the humanitarian experience of recent years is that mobilization of significant public resources for DPRK depends critically on political will, and this will cannot be assumed to be stable, even for basic humanitarian needs.

Korean Reconciliation. Political will to mobilize resources for DPRK has been significantly affected by the appeal of inter-Korean reconciliation. The Sunshine policy adopted by President Kim Dae Jung in ROK, led to significant use of public funds to finance inter-Korean projects, including subsidies to private companies such as Hyundai Assan’s Mount Kumgang tourism project. The Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Fund administered by the Ministry of Unification grew from 40 billion Won in 1998 to 1037 billion won in 2002. In the first 11 months of 2003, ROK provided $125 million in direct economic and humanitarian aid to DPRK, while at the same time continuing efforts to resolve DPRK’s nuclear program peacefully through dialogue.

However, allegations of under-the-table payments to secure agreement for the June 2000 Summit meeting between Kim Jong Il and Kim Dae Jung, also underscore the risk that public funds can be used in non-transparent ways that ultimately undermine the objectives of reconciliation and distort incentives for DPRK to adopt businesslike practices in its dealing with foreigners. The lesson is that corruption is an issue that can infect the donor as well as recipient and that the risk of corruption playing a major role in use of public resources mobilized for DPRK is high. Strong efforts will need to be made to introduce transparency and safeguards in the mechanisms for both decision-making about the granting of funds and in the use of funds.

Chinese Aid. The experience of Chinese economic support for DPRK in the 1990’s also contains important lessons. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, China has been DPRK’s biggest trading partner and largest supplier of concessional assistance, both through subsidized trade and through direct transfers. Chinese agricultural and energy assistance have been vital to DPRK’s ability to avoid internal instability that could threaten survival of the regime. China has not chosen to channel resources through the UN Appeal mechanism, and relied on bilateral channels. This permits China to use its assistance to pursue its own political goals independently of the goals of other countries which channel their funds through the UN Appeal. It is widely believed, for example, that Chinese food aid is channeled to the military, which allows the WFP food aid to be targeted at the general population without risk that the military-first policy or regime stability would be undermined by foreign aid policies of other countries.

Cash versus In-Kind. It is noteworthy that most publicly-provided humanitarian aid to DPRK, inter-Korean economic assistance (for example in connecting cross-border road and rail links), subsidized trade with China and the former Soviet Union, and KEDO provision of oil and LWR construction, have not been in cash, but in kind. Cash payments have been made openly by the private sector, but not openly by the public sector, except in the case of protocols negotiated by KEDO under the LWR project, for example for wage payments for North Korean labor. (As mentioned above, allegations of cash payments by the Kim Dae Jung government are considered a scandal.) This preference for in-kind over cash illustrates the lack of trust by external providers of publicly-funded assistance that the DPRK authorities would use funds for purposes intended, and would divert them either to the military or consumption of the elite. Any future effort to address DPRK’s large scale infrastructure investment needs will need to involve very different modalities for channeling funds for contracts for civil works, equipments and technical services. The negotiation of protocols for procurement of goods and services as well as supervision of the use of funds will be needed for any future program of development assistance, and will be a major issue for both multilateral and bilateral donors. KEDO experience will be a valuable starting point in these discussions.

Transition to Market Economy. The failures of the DPRK economic system, combined with the limitations of foreign assistance in this environment, are the backdrop for the emergence of the informal market economy in DPRK, as people have sought new means to meet basic needs and responded to incentives to fend for themselves and not depend upon the state. Economic reforms introduced by the government since mid-2002 have accepted that market mechanisms are now playing an important role in the DPRK economy and social system and that market incentives are needed to increase both agricultural and industrial production. Lack of resources to finance needed infrastructure and intermediate inputs has constrained a supply response to those reforms. Thus mobilization of public resources, both domestically and internationally, is critically needed to reinforce the reform process and stimulate economic recovery. The dilemma faced by the international community and DPRK leadership if political developments permit a rationalization of the use of foreign aid for humanitarian and economic development purposes, is how to do this without undermining the positive features of the emerging market economy. Just when incentives are beginning to stimulate entrepreneurship and the taste of freedom in the DPRK population, there is a risk that foreign aid will be used to suit the political needs of donors and the DPRK authorities, and undercut the transformative processes now underway in DPRK. The challenge is to design policies and mechanisms that put publicly mobilized resources to best use in accelerating economic system change and putting the country on a path to prosperity for its citizens.

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North Korean diplomat wants South in Three-Way Peace Treaty According to the Joongang Ilbo, "North Korean diplomat wants South in treaty" (9 July 2004), "A high-ranking North Korean diplomat proposed a peace treaty signed by the two Koreas and the United States as a way to solve the deadlock over the North's suspected nuclear weapons programs. In the past, North Korea had called for a peace treaty between Pyeongyang and Washington only. The official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told the JoongAng Ilbo on Wednesday, "The peace treaty that we propose is, to be explicit, one that would involve equal participation by South Korea and two other nations [North Korea and the United States] and be signed by them." Pyeongyang had said recently that "unless all countries that have military based in the Korean Peninsula sign a permanent peace treaty, North Korea cannot help but to possess nuclear weapons." After the third round of six-party talks on the North's nuclear program, the official recounted that the United States said the North Korean proposal was "interesting," and was being "studied carefully in Washington." "There has been some progress in the United States' attitude, but it is regrettable that it has not abandoned its hostile policy towards the North," the official said. The talks were held in Beijing last month and included China, Russia and Japan."

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USFK to Deploy ATACMS-P The Yonhap News on 13 July quoted a US defense magazine as saying that the USFK plans to introduce newly-developed missiles capable of destroying deeply buried North Korean weapons as early as next year. Quoting Pentagon officials, the Defense News said the deployment of the Army Tactical Missile System-Penetrator (ATACMS-P) would provide strategic leverage over North Korea, believed to keep its nuclear weapons program far below the Earth's surface, the magazine said.

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AUGUST 2004

According to the Chosun Ilbo "N. Korea Developing Missiles to Hit U.S.: Jane's Defense Weekly" (4 Aug 2004) North Korea was said to be develop and ICBM and sub-launched missile based on the Russian SS-N-6.

N. Korea Developing Missiles to Hit U.S.: Jane's Defense Weekly

The British military journal Jane's Defense Weekly reported Tuesday that North Korea is developing and deploying two new kinds of missile systems that would give North Korea the ability to threaten the U.S. mainland for the first time.

The magazine reported that the missiles are based on the old Soviet R-27 sub-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), designated the SSN6 by NATO. It is developing both ground-launched and sea-launched versions, and the missiles have ranges of at least 2,500km.

In particular, the magazine said the missiles under development represent a completely new design from the Taepodong 1 and Taepodong-2 missile designs.

Jane's said the ground-launched model could have a range of between 2,500km and 4,000km, bringing into range all of East Asia, including U.S. bases in Hawaii and Guam, while the sea-launched version has a range of at least 2,500km.

The magazine said the ground-launched and sea-launched missiles magnifies the threat posed by North Korea's ballistic missiles, and indicated that sub-launched or ship-launched versions would represent the greatest threat.

It said the missiles fundamentally change the threat posed by North Korean missiles, while at the same time possibly giving the North Korean leadership the long sought-after ability to directly threaten the U.S. mainland.

U.S. officials had previously claimed last November that the North Koreans were developing missiles based on the Soviet SSN6 that could strike the United States.

Jane's said North Korea obtained 12 decommissioned Russian submarines from a Japanese scrap dealer in 1993, and the North may have obtained important elements for the development of these missiles from the R-21 missile launch systems that were aboard those subs.

The magazine said the Russian subs were sold with their missiles and launch systems removed, but important elements like the missile launch tubes and safety systems were left intact, and this technology was provided to the North along with designs for the R-27.

The magazine also said specialists from Russia's VP Makeyev Design Bureau in Miass, Chelyabinsk were arrested in 1992 as they were heading to North Korea. Makeyev Design Bureau developed the R-27. It added that other groups of missile experts had successfully made it to the North.

Meanwhile, Jane's said there has been no word of attempts by North Korea to sell this new missile system to other countries.

The magazine said the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and China possess sub-launched nuclear weapons, while Israel is presumed to possess similar capabilities.

(englishnews@chosun.com )

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Kaesong Project Cause of Concern for US According to the Korea Times, "ROK, US Discuss Kaesong Project" (6 Aug 2004) stated that the US and ROK were discussing the plans to send key facilities and materials for an industrial complex being built in the North Korean border town of Kaesong. The working-level bilateral talks, which have been underway in Seoul and Washington since last month, focused on a number of key facilities South Korean firms can take to the communist country to run their factories. The industrial complex is one of the most prominent symbols of inter-Korean reconciliation set in motion by the 2000 landmark summit of the leaders of the two Koreas. Seoul seeks to win the U.S’ understanding on the cross border project by South Korea’s Hyundai Asan and the state-run Korea Land Corp.

As a signatory to the U.S.-led international regime, South Korea is banned from sending strategic facilities and items to the communist country. The Wassenaar Arrangement, signed by 33 member countries, including South Korea, was intended to restrict the flow of commercial weapons, electronics and telecommunications products to countries supporting terrorism or causing regional disputes. South Korea reportedly stressed that the end user of the key facilities in the industrial park is South Korea, and that it can control and monitor them. But the U.S. is allegedly concerned that the facilities Seoul plans to send to the industrial complex may end up falling in the hands of the communist North. (See Wassenaar Arrangement for details on agreement.)

The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, is one of four multilateral export control regimes in which the United States participates. The Arrangement's purpose is to contribute to regional and international security and stability by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use (i.e. those having civil and military uses) goods and technologies to prevent destabilizing accumulations of those items. The Wassenaar Arrangement establishes lists of items for which member countries are to apply export controls. Member governments implement these controls to ensure that transfers of the controlled items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities that undermine the goals of the Arrangement, and are not diverted to support such capabilities. In addition, the Wassenaar Arrangement imposes some reporting requirements on its member governments.

The U.S. Government controls all items for export that are controlled multilaterally by the Wassenaar Arrangement. In general, export controls for dual-use goods and technologies controlled in the Wassenaar Arrangement are administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce and controlled for national security reasons on the Commerce Control List and the U.S. Department of State administers export controls on conventional arms.

The agreement establishing the Wassenaar Arrangement, called the initial elements, was approved by its 33 founding countries in July 1996. The Arrangement began operations in September of that year. Its headquarters are in Vienna, Austria although it is named after a suburb of The Hague, Netherlands where the agreement was reached. The Wassenaar Arrangement operates through a permanent secretariat in Vienna. In addition, its member countries send delegations to Austria for working groups and other meetings to develop organizational policy. A Plenary meeting is held annually to approve or reject the policies recommended by the working groups. Foreign ministry officials expressed concerns that Seoul’s plan to build the industrial park will be affected by the U.S. since Washington has regulations banning the shipment of sensitive facilities and materials to the North. Earlier this year, North Korea openly complained that South Korea was intentionally slowing the Kaesong project at the behest of the U.S., a charge South Korea denied.

The complex is to be used by hundreds of South Korean garment and other labor-intensive companies that want to relocate facilities there to use cheap, skilled North Korean labor. The industrial park will be partially opened later this year, with 15 South Korean companies scheduled to move in and begin producing goods by the end of the year. Development of the complex has been stalled partly because of tensions over Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program.

KBS, "Sale of Land of Gaesong Industrial Complex Delayed to Next Year" (4 Aug 2004) reported that the Korea Land Corporation has postponed the first-phase sale of land in the Gaesong Industrial Complex until the first half of next year. The decision was taken after taking into account the government's suggestions for a further review of the selection of South Korean business firms to set up shop at the industrial park in the North's border city of Gaesong.

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Ulchi Focus Lens 2004 (Aug 23-Sept 3) Combined Forces Command announced on 6 Aug that the Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) exercise would be conducted from August 23 to September 3. UFL is a joint exercise that prepares alliance forces for total war.

This year's exercise would be the 30th. UFL usually consists of mock training situations in various war situation generated by a computer. 13,000 U.S. soldiers, including 6,000 U.S. troops stationed abroad, and tens of thousands of Korean soldiers will be divided into friendly and enemy forces and train. The number of the U.S. participants is reduced from 14,000 to 13,000 because the 2nd Battalion of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division has been deployed from Korea to Iraq. CFC has reported the training schedule and aim of the program to North Korea through the United Nations Command, but as North Korea has sensitively responded to the exercise every year, Pyongyang is expected to object.

The computer simulation-driven exercises are part of a year-round training programme to “evaluate and improve combined and joint coordination” between the two forces, the US military has said. The annual exercises come ahead of an expected third round of six-nation talks aimed at resolving a standoff over North Korea’s nuclear weapons drive which has raised tension on the peninsula since October 2002.

As is usual every year, North Korea condemned US South Korea drills and accused Washington of provoking possible nuclear holocaust in Peninsula. Pyongyang routinely condemns Ulchi Focus Lens as a rehearsal for an invasion into the communist state. This is tied to the Japanese announcement that they will host a multinational exercise to intercept missiles of WMD from North Korea. US and South Korean forces will conduct the exercises, called Ulchi Focus Lens, for two weeks starting August 23.

In UFL 2003, the AH-64D Apache attack helicopters of the 1st Battalion, 2nd Aviation Regiment fired 80 Hellfire anti-tank missiles at an island off the coast of Kunsan, Aug. 10. The live-fire exercise was the first over water firing for the battalion since 1997. During this years exercise, the F-117As are still at Kunsan. In addition a squadron of U.S. F-15E Strike Eagles will arrive in South Korea in September for months-long deployment. These fighters normally are stationed at Kwangju. The two-seat fighters will fly to South Korea from the Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska to get accustomed to geographical features of the peninsula.

According to the Korea Times on Aug 6, North Korean officials will be in New York for informal talks on the week of August 10 or 11 on dismantling the country’s nuclear weapons program. The Korea Times said officials from the two Koreas, the United States, Japan and China would meet on the sidelines of a conference run by the nongovernmental National Committee on American Foreign Policy.

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SEPTEMBER 2004

South Korea admits to Nuclear Extraction The ROK was attempting attempting to pooh-pooh away an nuclear experiment done three times out of "scientific curiousity" in 2000 during the Kim Dae-jung administration. Quoting a source at the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Washington Post raised strong suspicions concerning the nuclear transparency of the Korean government, saying, "Diplomats at the IAEA in Vienna said the agency had begun to suspect that South Korea was conducting nuclear experiments more than six years ago and said South Korean officials had worked hard to hide the experiments from inspectors." The Washington Post also said that suspicions about plutonium experiments began in 1998, when an inspection team discovered traces of such an experiment at a government research center in Seoul, but while the inspections were taking place in another part of the country, the Koreans disassembled the relevant experiment site without reporting it. The paper also said the IAEA had collected irrefutable evidence of plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment in 2003 and presented it to the Korean government in December. The Korean government is denying that this took place, but the IAEA has confirmed six cases of nuclear violations that could be submitted to the U.N. Security Council.

Though the world was shocked, the ROK polls indicated that 75 percent of the ROK populace was NOT -- perhaps showing that they felt the need for nuclear weapons of their own.

The ROK government claimed it knew nothing of the experiment which yielded 2 miligrams of enriched uranium. Some diplomats stated that the uranium was enriched "near" the 80 percent mark which is weapons grade, but the ROK head of the unit states that it was near the 10 percent mark -- however, some sources stated it was "near 80 percent" which was the point of nuclear weapons grade material. The IAEA inspectors took a 1 miligram sample for inspection of the highly enriched uranium (HEU).

The point was that in 2000 there was a great uproar over the ROK having its own nuclear weapons -- despite the treaties against nuclear proliferation. To expect that the government did NOT know of this would be highly suspect. Its impacts are expected to be minimal, but there is increasing tension between the US and ROK even though impacts are minimal to the multilateral North Korean talks. However, that it occurred during the North Korean nuclear negotiations opens charges of South Korea -- and the US ally -- as hypocrites in dealing with the negotiations. The admission was made in the first-ever report to the IAEA by the ROK. South Korea acknowledged it should have reported to the U.N. nuclear watchdog four years ago that it used nuclear material in an experiment that led to the production of a small amount of enriched uranium. However, it is up to the watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to determine whether the failure to report constitutes a violation of the Safeguard Agreement. Later it admitted to extracting plutonium in 1982 -- then stated that some of it was "lost." The ROK claims that the material was "misidentified" in the report -- a technicality. Thus the ROK had experimented with both plutonium and HEU extractions.

A report (Napsnet, "South Korea's Nuclear Mis-Adventures", Jungmin Kang, Tatsujiro Suzuki, Peter Hayes (September 10, 2004)) stated:

Once gained, it's hard to lose technical capacity or scientific knowledge. In the early seventies, and reportedly in the late seventies and early eighties, South Korea tried to obtain nuclear weapons capability. This state-sanctioned effort included attempted acquisition of reprocessing plant from France, and the purchase of intermediate-range missile blueprints and an entire Lockheed jet engine factory from the United States. These early nuclear adventures were halted by American intervention."

Since then, many observers assumed that its enormous investment in nuclear reactors for power production and the admission of South Korea into the first tier OECD states, combined with continued extension of nuclear deterrence from the United States to its junior ally, had put paid to any residual pretensions to obtain nuclear weapons of its own. It was well-known that the elements of nuclear establishment in the South still want to reprocess plutonium from spent fuel to "close the fuel cycle" like in Japan. Indeed, insiders knew about the plutonium hanky-panky whereby the handling of spent fuel and related chemistry at KAERI in the early eighties transgressed the reprocessing boundary in scientific reality. And some mavericks in the South argued openly that it should obtain its own nuclear weapons.

But most analysts assumed that the gains flowing from being a certified, squeaky clean nuclear-powered state meant that the South Korean government would adhere stringently to all its nuclear safeguards obligations and rein in the pretensions of scientists such as those affiliated with the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), and would forego all nuclear weapons-related research and technological capacity. The standoff with North Korea only reinforced this perception that the South would play strictly by the international rules set by NPT-IAEA safeguards system, and enshrined in both the 1992 inter-Korean Denuclearization Declaration (in which both Koreas committed to not acquiring plutonium or enrichment facilities) and in various bilateral agreements such as the 1979 Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Korea concerning Cooperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and the Transfer of Nuclear Material whereby Australia agreed to provide uranium to South Korea.

The revelations that South Korean scientists not only enriched uranium in 2000 to 10 percent levels of uranium 235 but also suppressed knowledge of this activity from their own superiors until it became evident that it would come to light anyway in the course of International Atomic Energy Agency environmental sampling, are therefore doubly troubling for two reasons.

First, the fact that the responsible authorities for South Korean compliance with its multilateral nuclear safeguards obligations were kept in the dark for so long suggests that the nuclear establishment may be as poorly regulated as the financial sector in South Korea!

Second, the fact this secrecy was sustained at a time that South Korea was engaged in an attempt to end the North Korean nuclear program, and specifically, its alleged uranium enrichment program, lays the South and its allies, especially the United States, open to North Korean and other third party accusation of hypocrisy and double standards.

What else have South Korean scientists been up to out of the light of public oversight is therefore a fair question and demands a thorough and complete public review by the South Korean government as well as settling with the IAEA in accordance with its standards and rules.

What They Did

Four or five researchers of KAERI (Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute) conducted uranium enrichment experiments three times during January to February 2000. The equipment used was scraped and have been stored at KAERI afterward because they were "contaminated." The original purpose of the experiment was separation of Gadolinium Gd-157 (a neutron absorber) from other Gd isotopes using AVLIS (Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation) technology.

The amount and average enrichment of the separated uranium during the experiment was 0.2 gram and 10 percent, respectively. KAERI did not report the experiment to the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) until late June 2004. It seems that KAERI thought it could conceal the experiments because the amount of uranium enriched was very small.

As a result of its ignorance, MOST breached South Korea's obligations under its NPT/IAEA safeguards agreement by not reporting the experiment to the IAEA in 2000. So far, MOST and KAERI do not admit that they violated the safeguards agreement between the IAEA and South Korea. However, the safeguards agreement clearly requires such a report and it seems obvious that South Korea did violate it.1 This issue will be determined by the IAEA when it considers the ROK report in the near future.

Why Now?

Because the South Korean congress ratified the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) of the IAEA on February 19, 2004, MOST needed to submit a detailed report to the IAEA with increased information about the South Korean nuclear fuel cycle activities and sites within 180 days after the ratification. The Additional Protocol, if implemented, requires environmental sampling at places to which inspectors demand and are granted access. Such sampling at the KAERI site will likely reveal trails of nuclear materials at the site, just as occurred at Yongbyon in the North about a decade ago.

KAERI had been concerned about that it would be difficult to keep the experiments secret with the Additional Protocol in force. KAERI finally confessed its uranium experiments to MOST in late June 2004. MOST officials reported these activities finally to the IAEA on August 17, 2004 and to an astonished world on September 2, 2004. However, more than two thirds of South Koreans appear to have been not alarmed by the news-perhaps because it is seen as "balancing the books" with North Korea.

KAERI's uranium enrichment experiment should not be interpreted as an indicator that the South Korean government is intending to obtain nuclear weapons material. The uranium enrichment experiment has not been conducted with specific planning nor was it supported by the South Korean government or high-level policymakers. South Korea has complied closely with the IAEA safeguards, often in exemplary fashion. In contrast, North Korea expelled the IAEA inspectors and withdrew from the NPT.

Nucleonics Week reported that a US expert proposed to KAERI in 2002 to conduct molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS) experiment for zinc, but the proposal was rejected by the US Department of Energy on non-proliferation grounds. If accurate, this report means that KAERI scientists remained interested in laser enrichment technologies just two years ago. However, production of highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes would have required much larger equipment than that found at KAERI.2

Plutonium Separation

The enrichment revelations were underscored by the subsequent public admission that South Korea had conducted plutonium separation experiments during April to May in 1982. A small group of KAERI researchers separated tiny amount (milligram order) of plutonium from about 2.5 kilograms of spent fuel discharged from the TRIGA Mark III research reactor which has a capacity of 2MW thermal power. (The 5MWe Graphite reactor at Yongbyon in North Korea has thermal capacity is about 25MW.)

Like its enrichment activities in 2000, KAERI did not report the plutonium activity to MOST in 1982. Indeed, it seems that MOST did not know about the plutonium separation experiments until 2003 although rumors had circulated in American intelligence circles about this activity since the early eighties.

The IAEA took an environmental samples at a former KAERI site in Seoul in 1997 and 2003 and found physical evidence of separated plutonium. The 1997 and 2003 IAEA environmental sampling at ex-KAERI site in Seoul was permitted by KAERI even though it was not obliged to do so under the then safeguards agreement at that time. KAERI's plutonium separation experiment was discussed in a safeguards meeting between the IAEA and MOST in December 2003.

Conclusion

If the activities are fully documented by the IAEA and no further transgressions come to light, then South Korea's latest nuclear mis-adventure may have the following positive outcomes.

First, this episode may put paid to any further notions that South Korea should "close its nuclear fuel cycle" by reprocessing, or gain enrichment capacity in a counter-productive quest for energy security.

Second, it suggests that the new IAEA inspection agreement works. The effectiveness of environmental sampling and forensic radiochemistry forced the South Korean scientists to the surface in spite of evident attempts to destroy physical evidence and after three long years.

Third, South Korea's declaration may offer the North a face-saving way to explain its own enrichment activities as similarly a misguided and mistaken effort by scientists over-anxious to obtain new technology. This is not to suggest that the activities are somehow symmetrical or equivalent-but the way that the situation was resolved might be parallel. Arguably, such South Korea's declaration is more applicable to the North Korean situation than the Libyan model of complete nuclear capitulation.

Fourth, it offers South Korea a way to reassert its non-nuclear commitments in ways that are stabilizing in the region and dampen subterranean aspirations in some parts of Japan's leadership for their own nuclear capacity. Japan's media, for example, reported on news of South Korean enrichment and much older plutonium reprocessing with great concern and skepticism.

Fifth, if handled correctly, the events may end up accelerating rather than delaying the next round of six-party talks in Beijing over North Korea's nuclear activities and related issues. The fact that enough plutonium for a small arsenal of nuclear weapons is no longer safeguarded and may have been weaponized in the DPRK remains the most urgent nuclear proliferation issue in this region. South Korea's surprise detour from the straight and narrow path should not divert anyone from this primary task.

In late Sep it was in the press that the ROK nuclear misdeeds were leaked after the ROK attempted to pressure the IAEA President to NOT forward the issue to the IAEA board. The inspectors returned in Sep and took back 20 samples. A report to the IAEA board is expected in November. According to the Washington Post on 11 Oct, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency said that the ROK's recently disclosed work with uranium and plutonium did not appear to be part of a weapons program, describing it as "simply two scientific experiments on a small scale." "I don't think we have seen any intentions to develop nuclear weapons" by the ROK, the director general of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, told reporters in Tokyo after completing an official trip to the ROK capital, Seoul.

However, the revelations by South Korea that it had enriched nuclear material in atomic vapour laser isotope separation (AVLIS) experiments in 2000 in contravention of its international nuclear safeguard obligations cast further doubt on the next round of the Six-party Talks aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear problem. Mark Gorwitz, Special Contributor to the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) Online, writes: "Taken as a whole, the open literature shows the extent of South Korean research in the area of laser isotope separation. Technology learned in one enrichment program has been successfully transferred to another. The undeclared uranium enrichment experiments have been the main beneficiary of such a transfer and are a proliferation concern that deserves to be thoroughly examined by the IAEA."

Then it was reported that South Korea had produced anti-tank munitions in the 1980s using depleted uranium imported for non-military use and failed to make required disclosures by the NGO group Green Korea United. This should have been reported to the IAEA as well according to the NGO group and a DLP lawmaker. According to a government official, the use of depleted uranium in munitions did not involve conversion of uranium, but a simple reshaping of the material and that process carried no reporting requirement. The munitions-making at government laboratories between 1983 and 1987 was not aimed at producing nuclear weapons. A government official said depleted-uranium munitions were produced for five years and the government had told the IAEA in 1987 when the program was ended. It claimed US Embassy officials were present when the depleted uranium was destroyed. Depleted uranium is a by-product of nuclear fuel production. It can be used to strengthen ammunition and enable it to penetrate armour.

Concerned that the IAEA will condemn the ROK for conducting nuclear experiments barred by its obligations under international treaties, Deputy Foreign Minister Choi Young-jin went to the US in October to to present the ROK's view to US officials. The ROK and US are at odds over whether the UN Security Council should be called in to assess Seoul's nuclear program. The US considers it unavoidable, while Seoul opposes it. The IAEA will report in November on its findings on South Korea's admission to enriching uranium in 2000 and separating plutonium in 1982 after inspections in South Korea.

In November, Reuters ("S.KOREA LOBBIES HARD AT UN NUKE WATCHDOG-DIPLOMATS", 2004-11-03) reported that ROK diplomats are lobbying hard to prevent the United Nations nuclear watchdog reporting it to the UN Security Council for violating the global non-proliferation pact. Arms Control Today ("IAEA PROBES SEOUL'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM ", 2004-11-03) reported that inspectors from the IAEA have been investigating the ROK’s nuclear-related facilities after learning that its government secretly produced small quantities of nuclear material. One of several remaining questions about Seoul’s nuclear program is the precise concentration of U-235 that the enriched uranium contained. Chang In-soon, president of the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute, told The Washington Post Sept. 8 that none of the enriched uranium contained much more than the average level of U-235. In a Sept. 16 interview, however, a diplomatic source in Vienna close to the IAEA confirmed a Sept. 12 Washington Post report that the ROK had enriched uranium to 77 percent, a level theoretically sufficient for a nuclear weapon.

On 26 Nov, the Yonhap News reported that the IAEA said that its board of governors meeting decided not to refer South Korea to the U.N. Security Council over its undeclared nuclear material experiments. Instead, the agency's governing board adopted a "chairman's statement" to express concerns over Seoul's failure to report the experiments.

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Stealth Fighters to Remain in Korea till November??? Despite the announcement that the Kunsan AB runway would close for repairs, the F-117 stealth fighters deployed to South Korea will remain in the country until November according to the Ministry of Defense. The USFK countered that this was "inaccurate" and refused to discuss its specific deployment schedule for security reasons. The U.S. military said the F-117s in South Korea will be deployed to other locations before 4 Oct when Kunsan was closed for two months of scheduled maintenance on its runway. It did not say where exactly the planes will be sent. Most likely Kunsan's F-16s will deploy to Kwangju -- but may split and go to Osan. Because of the sensitivity of the F-117s, they most likely will go to Osan.

An official at the South Korean Defense Ministry said that the radar-evading combat aircraft, also known as "Nighthawks", and their crew would continue to conduct training aimed at familiarizing themselves with the geographical features of the Korean Peninsula until November, at the latest. The delay of the Nighthawks' re-deployment is seen as a strategic move by the United States to exert pressure on North Korea, which recently announced it had converted plutonium from 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods into weapons. A five-month deployment of a Nighthawk squadron to the country is an unusual move for Washington. The U.S. military dispatched the fighters to South Korea twice in 1993 and 1996, only to withdraw them after two to three months.

In August, the U.S. military also deployed a squadron of U.S. F-15E Strike Eagles from Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska to Kwangju for months of training. In early November AFKN had a news spot on the 3rd Aircraft Expeditionary Group at Kwangju on how they were maintaining their aircraft.

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OCTOBER 2004

Oplan 5026 has 900 Surgical Strike Capability while China may send 400,000 troops to aid the North The Yonhap News, "U.S. Capable of Surgically Striking 900 Targets in N. Korea" (5 Oct 2004) stated that the USFK "is capable of surgically striking more than 900 crucial targets in North Korea, including its main nuclear complex" according to Park Jin of the GNP. According to Jin, the U.S. capability is key to an operation plan by Washington, code-named OPLAN 5026, which specifies such an air strike on North Korea in the event of a war on the peninsula. "An argument that the United States can achieve its goal of neutralizing the North's nuclear program with surgical strikes using state-of-the-art weapons at the expense of few U.S. troops, is gaining strength within the Pentagon," Park said during a parliamentary audit of the Defense Ministry. The lawmaker based his claim on an article posted on globalsecurity.org.

According to the article, more than 50 U.S. F-15Es, B-1Bs, B-52Hs and F-117s were temporarily deployed to U.S. air bases in South Korea and Guam in 2003 for exercises. The report said the U.S. planes are capable of delivering about 750 precision guided munitions, specifically the Joint Direct Attack Munitions, on 612-756 aim points in North Korea, the report said. The inclusion of U.S. war planes in South Korea and missiles being launched by cruisers, destroyers and submarines will enable the U.S. forces to strike 800-944 aim points, it said.

The targets include North Korea's main nuclear complex in Yongbyon, weapons of mass destruction facilities, surface-to-air missile batteries, air defense radars and command and control locations, the article said. "One scenario for dealing with North Korea's nuclear program would consist of surgical strikes against facilities believed to be involved with the production, storage, or deployment of nuclear weapons," the article said. OPLAN 5026 was to compensate for a 1974 plan called OPLAN 5027 that called for the reinforcement of 690,000 U.S. troops in case of a war breaking out on the peninsula.

The South Korean Defense Ministry, meanwhile, said the OPLAN 5026 is just one military option which is defense-oriented. "Our position is that we will not allow for preemptive U.S. attacks on North Korea without the prior consent of South Korea under any circumstance," Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung said during the audit session.

According to another Yonhap News article, during the same audit session South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Kim Jong-hwan stated that China would send about 400,000 troops to fight alongside North Korea in the event of a war breaking out on the Korean Peninsula. In line with a 1961 defense treaty with North Korea, China is expected to dispatch a "limited" number of troops to help its communist ally fight a war. Kim's office later elaborated that China would send 18 army divisions, 800 air force planes and 150 navy ships to support the North's forces. The 18 Chinese divisions would total 400,000 combat soldiers, it said.

According to Gen. Kim, Russia was also expected to extend "assistance" to North Korea but did not elaborate on whether or how many troops Moscow will send. Russia and North Korea signed a revised defense treaty in 2000, in which the two nations agreed to consult each other if one of them engages in a war. The previous Pyongyang-Moscow defense treaty obliged each party to support the other if involved in a conflict.

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Buildup to Test Japanese Missile Defense System? A squadron of F-117s deployed to Kunsan in June for Foal Eagle and appears to be staying for Ulchi Focus Lens. In Sep 2004 a squadron from the 3rd FW in Elmendorf deployed to Kwangju for two months for the exercise. The F-117s departed for another base (most likely Kwangju) after the runway was closed at Kunsan.

Aegis destroyers were prepositioned in the Sea of Japan in Sep 2004 supposedly in reaction to the possible North Korea missile test. On 12 Oct it was reported that 70 percent of the activity in the missile test area had ceased and it appeared to have been a military training exercise. Kyodo ("U.S. Aegis Cruiser Lake Erie Makes Port Call at Nigata" 2004-10-11) reported that the US Aegis guided missile cruiser Lake Erie made a port call at Niigata port on Monday in an apparent effort to counter perceived DPRK ballistic missile threats. The US Navy says the port call is to give crew members a rest and to replenish supplies, but it is widely seen as part of its efforts to build a missile defense network against DPRK threats.

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Ammunition Stock Falls Short of Requirements According to the Choson Ilbo on 11 Oct 2004, a GNP lawmaker Park Jin (using his own calculations) alleged that ammunition reserves of the South Korean Armed Forces meet just 59 percent of the ammunition that will be needed if a war breaks out, even with support from U.S. Forces Korea. During the National Assembly's annual audit of state affairs, lawmaker Park Jin said that ammunition reserves of the Korean Army, Navy and Air Force meet just 18 percent of the required wartime amount.

The armed forces are supposed to have ammunition reserves to last at least 60 days under the nation's wartime plan. Another GNP lawmaker, Song Yung-son, said that the Navy's reserves would last only 50 days, the Air Force's only 18 days and the Army's only nine days. Even if U.S. military ammunition were made available, navy reserves would last just 50 days, the Air Force's 40 days and the Army's 20 days.

Supposedly the ammunition reserves for the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) will last only 0.4 day, stoking security concerns over whether Seoul can take up a self-sufficient defensive posture against an attacking North. Defense Ministrer Yoon Kwang-ung on Sept. 8 told the parliamentary Defense Committee that an enormous slice of the budget is needed to procure expensive ammunitions for new weapons systems and that, as for MLRS ammunition, the country would have to work out measures to use American ammunition in an emergency.

The ammunition reserves for K1A1 tanks will last just ten days, while those for K-9 self-propelled guns will last only five days. The Army's reserves are remarkably smaller than that of the Navy and Air Force, though Park added that the figures are based on his own calculations and may be different from those of the Defense Ministry.

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S. Korea Fails to Confirm U.S. Intelligence on N.K. Sub On 10 Oct, the South Korean military received intelligence from the United States that suspected North Korean submarines were operating in the South's waters, but the military was unable to locate them. U.S. intelligence authorities told the South Korean military that two suspected North Korean submarines appeared off the country's east coast on 10 Oct. The Joongang Ilbo stated that two 300-ton-class medium-sized submarines turned up about 2:30 a.m., Sunday in the East Sea, near the Northern Limit Line. About 5 a.m., one sub started crossing into the southern waters and arrived near a port located at the South Korea's northernmost point, while the other remained in its original position. The MND spokesman Nam Dae-yeon said upon receiving U.S. intelligence that suspected North Korean submarines were operating off the country's east coast, the Navy sent its P-3C patrol aircraft and anti-submarine LYNX helicopters to the area, spreading submarine detection "sonar buoys" and dropping depth charges.

Quoting its Washington military informants, the Asahi Shimbun reported on October 21 that two North Korean submarines repeatedly trespassed into South Korea’s territorial seas in the East Sea starting on October 10. They were small diesel powered "Shark" class submarines (300 tons) used to infiltrate enemy lines. Of the two submarines, it was reported that one returned to North Korea after a few days while the other was spotted sailing along the East Sea on October 19.

Some may shrug so what but this is the first confirmation that the new thermal satellite imagery technology is now at work over Korea. It was announced in the beginning of the year from military websites that this satellite technology was going to be deployed. Supposedly this technology can pinpoint submarines based on their thermal signatures -- making the North's subs very vulnerable.

However, if the ROK Navy can't catch them, the technology is worthless. The operation took place off the east coast of the peninsula, following intelligence reports that two objects appearing to be submarines had been spotted. After receiving the intelligence, the Navy undertook an intense search involving a P-3C surveillance airplane and Lynx anti-submarine helicopters. Depth charges were dropped, but the search proved unsuccessful. According to the Asahi Shimbun sources, the US has lost faith in the ROK ability to react to its information.

Later on 14 Oct the MND denied that the Navy had taken military action against two North Korean submarines which had intruded into southern waters on the nation's east coast The MND rejected the reported North Korean sub intrusions, saying, "Dropping bombs is part of customary anti-submarine operations." He accused the newspaper of causing undue panic by disseminating false information. He demanded that the newspaper publish a correction, saying that otherwise the ministry would ban the paper's two reporters from covering the ministry for the next three months indicating the MND was very sensitive about the impression that it cannot catch intrusions. Submarine incidents of 1996 and 1998 have caused the MND to have egg on its face when a taxi driver reported a disabled submarine -- not the military. The 1998 incident was another fiasco.

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China sends 10,000 troops to Border with N.K. China has dispatched 10,000 elite troops to beef up the Army presence on the border. China already has two divisions of troops guarding the border, but intelligence sources are wondering why the additional troops were required. Japan's Sankei Shimbun also reported that China had sent 10,000 troops earlier this month to three border areas along the Tumen River, running between China and North Korea. The newspaper reported that the reinforcement was deployed to stop North Korean soldiers from defecting to China. China denied this and said the troops were sent to the border to help with a "communication engineering project."

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President Bush signs North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 Tensions are increasing over the flow of defectors to the ROK. The dramatic opening of the doors was due to the US North Korean Human Rights Act that was signed into law in Oct 2004 by President Bush. Under this bill, the US would accept DPRK defectors and authorizes $24 million a year in humanitarian relief through 2008. However, this places the US in conflict with the ROK as the DPRK defectors supposedly have automatic South Korea citizenship. However, the measure says North Koreans should NOT be denied refugee status or asylum in the U.S. simply because South Korea automatically considers them citizens. The U.S. often denies such status to refugees who are welcome in other countries. But what this bill also does is give the US first dibs on defectors with intelligence value. Suddenly the ROK has revealed that its plans for the defectors are inadequate and they need more space and better educational programs. Most of the past defectors remain in poverty and many have resorted to crime. The program is swiftly becoming a nightmare as more and more defectors attempt to storm embassies and foreign schools in China to demand defection to Seoul. On one hand, the ROK officially mouthes support of the defectors, but in actuality is actually doing very little unless forced to by NGO groups because it fears it would disrupt the relations with the DPRK. China has been allowing defectors to "escape" to third countries for transit to Seoul, but this is on a case-by-case basis.

In spite of all the diplomatic charges over the alleged nuclear programs on each side of the DMZ, economic relations between the ROK and North Korea were steadily strengthening. The corridor is a practical example of the US's and ROK's divergent approaches to dealing with the DPRK. While President George W. Bush's administration has set high barriers to helping the DPRK insisting that it get rid of its weapons first, President Roh's government is seeking a reciprocal approach. The Roh government calls its human rights stance to DPRK its "silent diplomacy" meaning they don't talk about it.

Difference between 2003 Freedom Act and 2004 Human Rights Act The Human Rights Bill has been sent for the President's signature after Congressional approval. Yonhap ("N. KOREA CALLS U.S. BILL 'DECLARATION OF WAR'", 2004-10-07) reported that the DPRK Thursday stepped up its rhetoric against the US, calling the US bill aimed at improving the DPRK's human rights a "declaration of war."

An essay by Karin J. Lee, "The North Korean Human Rights Act and other Congressional Agendas," was published on Napsnet. It stated,

HR 4011, the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, passed the Senate on September 28, 2004, after a lengthy amendment process. The amended version of the bill passed the House on October 4 without further changes. It will now be sent to the president to be signed into law.

While the bill is still recognizable as kin to its predecessor, S. 1903, the North Korean Freedom Act of 2003, the Human Rights Act is a great improvement. The new bill focuses more effectively on human rights, the result of the dedicated work of staff on the House International Relations Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee. However, concerns for the safety of refugees persist. In addition, Congress has more work to do: it needs to strengthen efforts to improve dialogue on US-North Korean security issues. Doing so would not only advance the United States government's security agenda, it would also create a better chance of improving human rights.

Differences between the Freedom Act and Human Rights Act

Most of the changes between the earlier Freedom Act and the Human Rights Act involve deletions. For example, gone are many of the Freedom Act's provisions that would have needlessly endangered North Koreans hiding in China. One section in the Freedom Act would have granted special expanded "S Visas" to North Koreans with information on North Korea's WMD (Weapon's of Mass Destruction) programs – raising the North Korean government's suspicion that any North Korean in China was a potential traitor. Promises of special treatment to "informants" would have practically guaranteed that U.S. intelligence offices would be flooded with false information. Gone as well is the Freedom Act's heavy-handed and undiplomatic criticism of long-term ally South Korea and China, the new-found partner in negotiations with North Korea.

The Freedom Act would have prohibited bilateral humanitarian aid to North Korea until it had reached human rights standards that are unachievable in the near term. This would have eliminated potentially critical humanitarian assistance in violation of tenets captured in President Reagan's famous declaration that "a hungry child knows no politics." It also would have denied bilateral non-humanitarian aid, tying the President's hands in any attempt to negotiate a security agreement with North Korea. The Human Rights Act transformed those prohibitions into "sense of Congress" statements that convey Congress' opinion without establishing a legal barrier to the provision of aid.

Perhaps most importantly the Human Rights Act eschews the Freedom Act's association with the goal of regime change, an association that grew from congressional hearings that dangerously politicized the plight of refugees by linking the concept of refugee "exodus" with North Korea's collapse. In contrast, as stated in the House Committee Report on the Human Rights Act (Report 108-478), H.R. 4011 is motivated by a genuine desire for improvements in human rights, refugee protection, and humanitarian transparency. It is not a pretext for a hidden strategy to provoke regime collapse or to seek collateral advantage in ongoing strategic negotiations.While the legislation highlights numerous egregious abuses, the Committee remains willing to recognize progress in the future, and hopes for such an opportunity. Indeed, credible and substantial improvements in the human rights practices and openness of the Government of North Korea would help to build substantial goodwill with the United States.

North Korea Human Rights Act Highlights. . . .

With all that has been eliminated, what remains? The North Korean Human Rights Act focuses much more narrowly and successfully on raising North Korean human rights and humanitarian concerns. Reflecting the enduring concern the American people hold regarding human rights, the bill sends a message to North Korea that the United States Congress is deeply disturbed by reports of human rights abuses in North Korea. The bill requests that "[T]he human rights of North Koreans should remain a key element in future negotiations between the United States, North Korea, and other concerned parties in Northeast Asia." The legislation calls for greater transparency in the provision of food aid, but does not impede humanitarian assistance or activities in North Korea. It names actions that would improve North Korean human rights. It authorizes but does not appropriate a total of $24 million annually for the next four years for programs that promote human rights and democracy, freedom of information, and assistance to North Koreans outside of North Korea.1 It pressures the U.S. State Department to facilitate applications by North Korean citizens seeking protection as refugees.

The bill also encourages discussion of North Korean human rights within a regional framework. The U.S. approach on behalf of the North Korean people will be made more effective when it is done in concert with South Korean and European Union allies, as well as with other regional players such as China and Russia. It asks the president to appoint a special envoy on North Korean human rights, thereby ensuring that discussions of human rights and security can each proceed along separate tracks when such dialogue is impossible on a single track.

. . . And Cautions

Unfortunately, passage of a bill in the United States cannot guarantee improved humanitarian conditions for North Koreans. Over the summer the potential negative impact of publicity was demonstrated when two plane loads of North Korean refugees who had been hiding in a Southeast Asian country were brought to South Korea. The publicity jeopardized the underground railroads that had brought those refugees thousands of miles from Northeast China. One hundred refugees in transit were returned to China; it is rumored that they were forcibly returned to North Korea, where their fate is unknown.

Similarly, on September 28, 44 North Korean asylum seekers breached security at the Canadian Embassy in Beijing in an effort to win protection. If such publicized embassies entries in Beijing increase, it could trigger a fairly prompt backlash at the border, as took place in the 2002 embassy stormings.

Consideration of such risks must be a factor as the bill is implemented. The refugee provisions in the bill are fairly modest. However, according to reports from individuals working with refugees in China, some North Koreans in hiding mistakenly believe that passage of the bill means they will easily win entry to the United States. Unfortunately U.S. law cannot guarantee that China will allow North Koreans hiding in China to exit the country. The legislation may even temporarily make China less cooperative. In addition, the bill's passage also cannot guarantee that the overwhelmed Department of Homeland Security, functioning in a post-September 11, 2004 world, will be able to process a significant number of asylum or resettlement requests from North Korea in the near future. Furthermore, the refugee provisions are not intended to apply to North Koreans now legally resettled in South Korea, despite rumors to that effect.

Such misperceptions have the potential to be very harmful. For example, in some cases ill-informed smugglers might tempt North Koreans into dangerous situations that end in their deportation. Unfortunately, there is also the risk that the Chinese government could clamp down on the border, closing off a critical avenue to food and relative safety. While such outcomes are only a possibility, it is urgently important that the refugee grapevine and underground railroad transmit the message that passage of the bill does not mean that the U.S. has opened wide its doors to all North Koreans who apply to come to the United States.

Despite the drafters' sincere humanitarian intentions, the actual impact of the bill on refugee admissions is likely to be minor, especially in the next few years. The refugee provisions should be seen as a message from Congress to the State Department (re-enforcing several sense of Congress provisions addressing this topic in the past few years). While the bill effectively raises the issue as one of concern in the international arena, and will probably result in the acceptance of some refugees to the United States, South Korea will remain the primary and best destination for North Koreans in the years to come. Indeed, the bill acknowledges that the "[P]rincipal responsibility for North Korean refugee resettlement naturally falls to the Government of South Korea."

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Security Policy Initiative replaces FOTA The United States and Korea agreed to establish a Strategic Policy Initiative (SPI) to form a blueprint for the future of the U.S.-Korea alliance, during the annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM). The SPI will re-establish the military relationship over the next two years. Basically, the ROK will be considered in context of a much broader perspective that includes North Korea and China (with Taiwan) -- and the US, Japan and Korea. The ROK will be just one piece in the REGIONAL security picture.

The ROK and US military officials will meet in November to to launch a new consultation framework aimed at reshaping the ROK-US alliance. A U.S. military delegation will visit Seoul to participate in the Security Policy Initiative, which will replace the previous bilateral defense talks, called the Future of the Alliance (FOTA) forum. Since the major agenda of the FOTA talks concluded with the settlement of the transfer of the Yongsan Garrison and a reduction of U.S. troops in Korea, the two countries need a new framework for discussion. Our comment is that the agenda items has NOT changed -- there will still be quibbling over the costs of the Yongsan relocation and the pull-out of US troops is far from over. In 2005, IF JAPAN comes on board with constitutional changes, there may be a radical realignment of the ROK-US military relationship.

The Los Angeles Times reported that because of the DPRK's movement to launch missiles, Japan`s Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, a private advisory panel to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, is creating a great stir by claiming the possibility of taking the offensive posture. According to the paper, the Japanese government is rewriting its defense policy in consideration of the PRC's strengthening of its forces and the DPRK's attempt to develop nuclear weapons. This is all part of the Japanese movement to build a Missile Defense Shield (MDS) along with the US -- and the resultant question of the use of a preemptive strike if it was considered essential for the national defense. This in turn would create a change in Article 9 of the Peace Constitution. The US and Japan conservative forces have been quietly lobbying for a Constitutional Change because Koizumi does not yet have the political majority needed to affect such change. 2005 appears to be the projected date for any action in Japanese politics.

As part of the PSI, Seoul and Washington are discussing turning the USFK into a "regional force," meaning they would no longer focus solely on deterring the DPRK, and could be sent elsewhere in East Asia in times of crisis, Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung said on 23 Oct. Tied to this the US has agreed to hold strategic talks at the ministerial level with Japan to discuss the security situation in the Asia-Pacific region. The discussions will involve the presence of the US military in Japan and its transformation dealt with in terms of the "strategic needs" of Japan and the US. The impacts MIGHT be that the 3d Bde 2d ID (Stryker) may be considered for stationing in Korea after its tour in Iraq. Again this is simply a MIGHT scenario as a lot of things are planned and pending. Also the Roh government has a tendency to become unstable when it comes to agreements.

The latest naval interdiction exercise off Japan is considered the first PSI drill. The drill will focus on training to interdict ships carrying suspected WMD (nuclear or missile technology). Agence France Presse ("'Weapons Seized in Japanese Waters in 19-Nation Drill Enraging North Korea", 2004-10-26) reported that nineteen countries took to the waters near Tokyo Tuesday to practice how to capture smuggled weapons, in what the US called a signal to the DPRK and other alleged proliferators. Ships and a total of nearly 900 troops from the US, France, Australia and host Japan and observers from 15 other countries were taking part in the drill, the first of its kind held in Asia. The New York Times ("Theatrical Drill in Pacific Meant to Send Signal to North Korea", 2004-10-26) reported that part training exercise, part political theater, this international naval interdiction drill, code-named Team Samurai, had a clear audience: the DPRK. "We are sending a signal to everybody who wants to traffic weapons of mass destruction that we have zero tolerance for that, " John R. Bolton, US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.

According to the Associated Press, "S. Korea on high state of alert" (26 Oct 2004), "The "Team Samurai" drills, just outside Tokyo Bay, focused on a scenario of intercepting and boarding two ships believed to be transporting sarin, a deadly nerve gas. A Japanese coast guard frigate, one of two target ships, flew a skull-and-cross-bones flag. U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton and Rear Admiral James Kelly, battle group commander of U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk, were aboard the Japanese vessel Izu, the other target. Coast guard vessels from Japan, along with military ships from the United States, France and Australia, were to track the ships, board and search them. The exercises are part of a U.S. administration effort to block shipments of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, the material and equipment needed to make them and missiles that could be used to carry them. Officials have said the drills were not directed at any one nation."

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S.Korea Criticizes US on N.Korea Talks According to the Washington Post "S. Korea Joins China in Criticizing U.S. on N. Korea" (26 Oct 2004), South Korea joined China in expressing concern that the Bush administration had not been "sufficiently creative or willing to compromise in stalled negotiations" over ending North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

ROK Foreign minister, Ban Ki Moon, told reporters after meeting with Secretary of State Colin L. Powell that he suggested to Powell that the United States and its allies "must come up with a more creative and realistic proposal" to lure North Korea back to the talks "as soon as possible." He did not elaborate -- and there are confusing reports of portions of the translation being left out. Ban also expressed some irritation at a new U.S. law signed by President Bush last week that calls for human rights issues in North Korea to be addressed at the nuclear talks. Ban said that while South Korea supports standing up for human rights in the North, "the particular situations of that particular country have to be taken into account when we deal with these kinds of issues." He expressed hope that the legislation -- heavily criticized by the North Korean government -- would not harm the talks.

However, what is now apparent that the ROK is starting to again move away from the former "unified" stance of the US, Japan and ROK in dealing with the North. During a three-day swing through the region, Powell won support from Japan, China and South Korea for resuming the talks as soon as possible. But the conflicting statements on the U.S. position suggested a growing divide with key U.S. allies over how to structure an opening offer to North Korea. The ROK is basing its movement on the rapproachment stance -- and it also has a detrimental effect on the defector issue from the North in China. The ROK is trying to straddle the middle line, without taking sides. It needs the US but it desperately wants more open contact with the North. Though the US Ambassador said to not hold one's breath over the Kaesong Industrial Project being a success, the South has disputed this remark.

Chinese officials told Powell that the Bush administration should be more open to compromise in the six-nation talks by adopting a "flexible and practical attitude." The US continues to insist that it will give North Korea no rewards until the communist state fully discloses its nuclear programs and allows independent verification of its report. South Korea and Japan, by contrast, have proposed to immediately provide fuel oil if the North commits to freeze and ultimately dismantle its programs. South Korean officials have privately pressed the United States to make a symbolic contribution to the fuel oil deliveries, such as paying a few million dollars in administrative expenses. But the Bush administration has resisted the idea. Multilateral talks planned for September were scrapped after North Korea refused to attend, citing what it described as the Bush administration's "hostile policy." As of October, the North simply was awaiting the results of the US elections to see which adversary they will face at the negotiating table.

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NOVEMBER 2004

The F-117 Nighthawks are rumored to have left for home leaving only the 3rd Expeditionary Force F-115Es there at Kwangju...along with the newly arrived Patriots that are setting up shop there. However, there is no news of the F-117 returning home so we are not certain as to their location. As for the 8th FW, they were still deployed to Osan with their two squadrons. Up near the DMZ, the Marine engineers were practicing their bridge building skills, but otherwise the training seems to be drawing down. The focus is on the relocation of the forces into Camp Stanley and Red Cloud...and watching the problems develop as the 2d Bde 2d ID left a mess on the bases they evacuated in a hurry to leave for Iraq. Supposedly ten of the bases are to be returned by the end of the year -- but it does not look so good on the turnover. Latest furor over the 2d ID sending 100 tanks off the DMZ to Iraq -- but the USFK claims that they are the outdated versions. Then the question is why send them to Iraq?

According to the Yonhap News on 7 Nov 2004, the US conducted secret tests of dropping nuclear weapons on North Korea in Florida in 1998. At the same time it was revealed that a test was performed at Kunsan on 21 Oct 1991 -- and supposedly nuclear warheads were stored on the peninsula up until 1998. This would be startling news as the US President publicly avowed before Congress and the world that there were no nukes in Korea. Kim Young-sam also would be declared a liar as he stated to his nation that the nukes were NOT present. This report would have to be taken with a grain of salt.

U.S. Military Conducted Simulated Nuclear Strike on N.K.: Report

TOKYO, Nov. 7 (Yonhap) -- The United States military conducted secret training in 1998 which simulated the dropping of 30 nuclear weapons on North Korea, according to declassified documents of the Central Intelligence Agency and other U.S. government agencies obtained and reported by Japan's Kyodo News Agency Sunday.

The documents also showed the United States discovered North Korea built a new experimental nuclear plant in Yongbyon in 1982, three years before the North signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1985.

The United States Air Force had 24 F15-E bombers at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base in North Carolina fly missions to drop mock nuclear warheads on a firing range in Florida between January and June 1998, the documents said.

The mission was undertaken as part of the so-called "5027 scenario" involving a counterattack on North Korea if the North invaded South Korea.

AWACS and KC-135 mid-air refueling planes also participated in the drill to practice helping the U.S. bombers fly to North Korea from air bases in the United States.

The declassified documents said the United States maintained nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula for 33 years from 1958 and occasionally conducted drills on the use of nuclear weapons.

In one instance, the U.S. Air Force fired a mock nuclear weapon at Gunsan Air force Base along the southwestern coast of South Korea on Oct. 22, 1991, according to the documents.

The United States officially declared that it withdrew nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1991 but the declassified documents said the United States maintained nuclear warheads on the Korean Peninsula until at least 1998.

Regarding the nuclear capability of North Korea, a CIA report from September 1986 said North Korea had the ability to produce nuclear warhead detonation equipment within months if it could import the necessary raw materials from abroad.

North Korea's MiG-23 warplanes could deliver the nuclear weapons if they were modified slightly, the report said.

U.S. intelligence agencies also detected over 100 caves in mountainous areas in the northern part of North Korea in the early 1990s, concluding the caves were made by the experiments for nuclear warhead detonations.

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ROK General to Head UNC Military Armistice Commission On 15 Nov the MND announced that South Korean Maj. Gen. Cho Young- rae has been named a senior member of the U.N. Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC). The commission serves to monitor the ceasefire that ended the fighting of the Korean War. UNCMAC also mediates any cross-border disputes or negotiations along the Demilitarized Zone. In his role, Cho also will serve as Combined Forces Command deputy chief of staff.

If this sounds familiar, it should. It was tried before and the North refused to acknowledge him because the South is NOT a signatory to the Armistice. It in turn led to the heated debate about the CFC under the control of the US as head of the UNC. This in turn led to the decision for the ROK to lead its own troops in peacetime and only in war will the ROK fall under the UNC. But this really doesn't matter. The UNC Armistice Commission has not met since the last time a ROK General was appointed.

Our opinion is that this is a true bit of nonsense befitting the CFC as it stands today.

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Whose side is South Korea on??? The results of an opinion poll by the "Frontier Times," an internet newspaper, was published in the Donga Ilbo on 16 Nov 2004. It was very enlightening that a group in Korean society has been formed that is distinctly anti-US.

"Should We Join Ties With North Korea In Case of Armed Conflict Between N. Korea and the U.S.?"

NOVEMBER 16, 2004 23:04 by Yeon-Wook Jung (jyw11@donga.com)

A public-opinion poll result showed 20 percent of those polled answering that South Korea should join hands with North Korea in case the U.S. and North Korea go into armed conflict.

In the poll conducted on November 12 and 13 on 1,001 people over twenty years old on the first edition anniversary on November 15 of "Frontier Times," an internet newspaper with a tendency of conservatism and right-of-center democratic ideologies, which Lee Won-chang, the former congressman of the Grand National Party, made, the limit of sampling error was 95 percent and the confidence level was ±3.1 percent.

According to this poll, which asked in case of conflict between North Korea and the U.S., which subject nation they would choose a union with as South Koreans, 49.1 percent of the respondents chose the U.S, and 30.6 percent said that "they don't know," while 20 percent of the respondents chose North Korea.

The age range of the people who chose North Korea consisted mostly of those in their 30s (25.4 percent), 40s (21.9 percent), 20s (20.6 percent), and 50s (18 percent), respectively. There were more women than men, 17.1 percent and 23.5 percent, who answered in favor of union with North Korea.

Associates from "Frontier Times" said, "It shows that a group which is pro-North Korean and anti-American has unexpectedly formed in our society.``

On the other hand, 56 percent of respondents acknowledged that as a first consideration for the South and North Korea to normalize relations, South Korea should receive an apology from North Korea for incidents such as the Korean War, the Aungsan bombing incident, and the KAL 007 incident. On the other hand, 33 percent of respondents said, "There is no need to raise an issue about the past."

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ROK Ministry of Defense "Liberal" Leadership And "Main Enemy" Terminology The ROK Ministry of Defense with its "liberal civilian" leadership in place has made its move to remove North Korea as the "main enemy." This specific term is what drives the defense budget and other defense programs. In addition, if the ROK changes the term, there is an underlying question as to why is the USFK in Korea. If the North is NOT a main enemy, then what is the UNC and USFK defending against. Understandably, the governments come and go, but there is growing evidence that more and more of the ROK people are supporting this idea. If the President and National Assembly support this change -- which is possible -- there may be reprecussions down the road on the diplomatic level.

Defense Ministry: “Main Enemy is Contradictory Term”

NOVEMBER 16, 2004 22:58 by Ho-Won Choi ( bestiger@donga.com)

In a unprecedented move, Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung expressed his willingness to remove phrases defining North Korea as the main enemy from the 2004 White Paper on National Defense, due to be published in January of next year, Dong-A Ilbo learned on November 16.

“I don’t understand why the ministry has been using the concept of ‘main enemy,’” a source on November 16 quoted the minister as saying in a conference on defense innovation with the ministry’s senior officials on November 12. “Will tourism between the North and South be possible once the concept is applied?”

Minister Yoon said that he understands why the ministry uses the concept of “main military enemy,” but that it is preposterous to call a country the main enemy, the source told.

“Military policy is subordinate to diplomacy and security. The same is true of the concept of ‘main enemy,’ Yoon said. “The main enemy should be discussed by government organizations which are comprehensively responsible for diplomacy and security such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.”

Yoon’s remarks likely herald that “North Korea as the main enemy” will vanish from the 2004 White Paper. The 2000 White Paper, the latest volume, contains phrases defining the aim of national defense as the protection of the state against the real military threats posed by North Korea, the main enemy.

“Minister Yoon’s remarks were aimed at stressing the military aspects of North Korea -- its subversive ideology and weapons of mass destruction -- as the enemy over North Korea itself,” said Shin Hyon-don, the ministry’s spokesperson.

“He clarified that the Ministry of Defense does not make policies on security or diplomacy and that it just implements them,” said another ministry official. “Since the concept of ‘main enemy’ is related to the philosophy of security and diplomacy policies, it is out of the policy scope of the defense ministry and the military.”

Whether to keep or remove the main enemy phrases from the white paper will likely be decided by the National Security Council or the Presidential Office. The government and the Presidential Office are reportedly considering the use of “major threat,” “military threat,” and “security threat” to describe North Korea.

However, the Korea Herald reported on 18 Nov that lawmakers of the ruling and the opposition party clashed over the Defense Ministry's plan to drop the designation of the DPRK as the nation's No. 1 foe, in the National Assembly panel review of national defense. Members of the opposition Grand National Party strongly opposed dropping the designation, criticizing the Defense Minister for earlier remarks on erasing the term "main enemy" from the nation's defense white paper which again will be issued after being stopped a few years back supposedly because it antagonized the North when the ROK wanted to negotiate.

But Seoul is issuing contradictory signals. Joongang Ilbo reported on 18 Nov that the Ministry of Information and Communication had blocked access to 31 Internet sites operated by the DPRK, or sites containing what the ROK considers "pro-North Korea" propaganda. The action was based on the National Security Law, which bars the spread of materials praising the DPRK and its leaders. Unfortunately the move was bypassed as mirror sites from abroad opened up effectively bypassing the blocks.

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US Policy on North Korea Strengthened: Disarmament FIRST President Roh on his November visit to America responded with terms that US and ROK were not on the same page diplomatically in dealing with the North Korean problem. In a speech to applauding Korean-Americans in Los Angeles on 12 Nov, he urged Washington not to take a hard-line policy on the North. Roh favors direct dialogue, while the US favors the six-nation format. Addressing a lunch meeting hosted by the World Affairs Council, a research organization based in Los Angeles, Roh said that there are reasonable grounds to Pyongyang’s claims that it wants to secure nuclear weapons and long-range missiles in order to deter threats from the outside. He made it clear that he is opposed to any kind of sanctions against the North. His disputable statement is interpreted as a bid to block the nuclear standoff issue between Pyongyang and Washington from being referred to in the United Nations’ Security Council, which is certain to impose various restrictions on the North.

If this comes out as OFFICIAL ROK policy coupled -- along with any changes in the definitions as to the North NOT being considered the "main enemy" but merely a "threat" -- there can be dramatic shifts in OFFICIAL US policy towards the ROK. As a result, it appears to some that the Roh statement in LA set off some subtle moves to head off Seoul's initiative on the DPRK nuclear issue. Roh's aides tried to backpedal by stating that Roh expressed leniency to urge NK to join nuke talks.

Reuters reported on 17 Nov that the US president would hold separate meetings with President Roh, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiroa and PRC President Hu Jintao to ask for cooperation in settling the DPRK issue. According to the Chosun Ilbo President Roh Moo-hyun and US President George W. Bush will hold a summit in Chile on Nov. 20 and issue a joint statement that they will closely cooperate to resolve the DPRK nuclear issue. They will reaffirm that the dispute over North Korea's nuclear program should be resolved peacefully through an early resumption of six-party talks. The two leaders will also reaffirm that the Korean Peninsula must be free of nuclear weapons.

Supposedly President Roh Moo-hyun intended to tell his Bush that Seoul would take an "active and leading role" in resolving the dispute over North Korea's nuclear program. Roh's intention was seen as reflecting South Korea's concern that the nuclear standoff may deepen in the second-term Bush administration and Seoul needed to do more to broker a breakthrough before it is too late. This is an unbelievable stance -- as Seoul has been a "non-team player" in breaking the tri-party agreement (Japan-US-ROK) to handle the North Korean situation with one voice. Instead, the ROK under Roh has constantly undermined the US position. In addition, earlier attempts by Seoul to be an intermediary in the negotiation process resulted in the North rebuking Seoul's efforts stating the process was between the US and the North. Seoul can expect a "cold shoulder" on this "demand" -- whether made for domestic politics to show he can stand up to a super-power or if intends to again tweak the US nose. He can expect the same reception as Kim Dae-jung with his "sunshine policy" when he visited George Bush a few years back. Why he would chance a political black-eye is anyone's guess, but George Bush has only two options -- bend in public (a no-no as he heads into his second term as his own boss) or poke Roh in the eye.

The worrisome thing is that the US has now "drawn a line" indicating that if the North attempts to sell nuclear materials to terrorists or hostile nations, the US will take "stringent" measures. This is a strong warning that was repeated by Gen LaPorte on 19 Nov indicating the strong measures included possible military intervention. In this case, it will result in intercepting the materials on international seas or other unspecified military options.

According to President Roh on 16 Nov in a written interview with Portuguese-language newspaper Estado de Sao Paulo, South Korea believes North Korea will abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions if the North is given enough compensation. Roh said, "Our government does not agree with the theory by some hard-liners that North Korea is just winning time for development of nuclear weapons with no intention to join negotiations (for dismantlement of its nuclear weapons)." This is a strange statement as the ROK was stating a year ago that there was no proof that the North had nuclear weapons, but now it says that it has one or two.

The US is going to take a get tough attitude with NK -- starting with possible sanctions if it does not come up with substantive concessions. The Joongang Ilbo reported that a group of foreign affairs analysts on a tour of countries involved in the six-way talks on the DPRK nuclear issues has called on the governments involved in those talks to resume them as quickly as possible. The team also advised Seoul to prepare a list of sanctions it could invoke against the DPRK if it refuses a reasonable settlement, not simply promise rewards to the DPRK.

To complicate matters for the ROK, US Sec of State Colin Powell has resigned and it is expected that Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly are also likely to step down, showing signs of major personnel changes in the State Department. If the three major members of the State Department against the hawks in the cabinet resign, the North Korea policy of the second Bush administration will become tougher.

According to the Donga Ilbo, with the resignation of Colin Powell and the possible appointment of White House National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice to fill the position, people are starting to look at the Bush policy in his second term. During Rice's interview with Foreign Affairs Minister Ban Ki-moon, Rice said, "The time for North Korea to make a 'strategic decision' in the six-party talks has come. Pyongyang will be surprised by how much it will receive as compensation when it aborts its nuclear programs and truly dismantles them under international surveillance."

It was a remark which placed weight on the "dismantlement first" method of North Korea. She even said, "North Korea should look at Libya (which dismantled first)." In addition, concerning the "highly enriched uranium (HEU) nuclear programs," which caused the North's second nuclear crisis, she stressed, "It is important that Pyongyang acknowledges and makes it clear."

"However, this has a rift of perspective compared with President Roh's idea which urged the U.S. "to accept North Korea as a dialogue partner, guarantee the regime's security, and make the decision whether to give the chance to overcome the current impasse through reforms and opening up or not."

The Chosun Ilbo editorial on 17 Nov read, "Should the country claim to be an arbitrator to the North Korean nuclear problem, despite being an evident party to it, as it does now, Korea would not only fail to gain trust as a party from her allies, but it would also likely be neglected as an impotent arbitrator even by Pyongyang. If the president acts as if he were a spokesman for the North, calling it "reasonable" for Pyongyang to develop nuclear capabilities, and asserting "North Korea's nuclear capabilities are for defensive purposes," Korea could be alienated as an outsider devoid of the right to a voice at a final moment in which the fate of the country rests."

It seems that some delays to the promotion of the six-party talks schedule are inevitable with the unofficial appointment of Rice to Secretary of State. The ROK found it advantageous to play the spoiler in the six-party talks by being on the US "side" but at the same time extending monetary, food, humanitarian and fertilizer aid to the North. The UN stated that it has expended over $22 billion in aid to the North since 1996. The North and ROK found this game of blackmail worked very nicely. With the new Bush cabinet made up of neo-conservative hawks, the current ROK stance of "saying one thing and doing another" is going to be tested to the limit.

A mini-summit on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum in Chile brought about an "agreement" for a unified stance that allays some fears that the re-elected Bush would push for hardline policies toward the North. Presidents Roh and Bush agreed to strengthen joint efforts for the early resumption of six-party talks and substantive progress from the talks. However, concerns linger as the two sides have to iron out differences on detailed plans to tackle issues pertaining to the communist North. The bottomline is the summit was all "show" and there are major problems as the ROK will continue with its divisive tactics.

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Kim Jong-il Losing Grip? The order to remove the photos from official sites has people abuzz. The Associated Press reported that DPRK officials have removed portraits of leader Kim Jong Il from some public buildings, a dramatic change in a reclusive nation that has clung to totalitarian rule for more than half a century. Analysts speculated that Kim may have ordered the measure himself in 2003 to play down his state-sponsored personality cult, and that the change doesn't necessarily reflect an overhaul of the leadership.

There were also reports that Kim was dropping the title "Great Leader." DPRK analysts in Seoul and Tokyo said they did not believe there had been a coup d'etat, but rather that Kim might be trying to soften his dictatorial public image. Analysts say Kim may be attempting to portray himself as a more serious political leader to the outside world, where his deified status at home has earned him a reputation as one of the globe's more bizarre rulers. But he may also be succumbing to pressure on several fronts to overhaul his secretive country's peculiar form of leadership.

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ROK Panicking to Keep Nuclear Fiasco out of Security Council A high-level South Korean delegation along with another 10-man delegation went to the headquarters of the IAEA in Vienna in a last-ditch effort to prevent the country's referral to the U.N. Security Council over past undeclared nuclear material experiments. The dispatch comes days before the International Atomic Energy Agency convenes a board of governors meeting to decide whether to bring South Korea to the U.N.'s highest decision-making body for failing to report laboratory experiments involving nuclear material. Led by Vice Foreign Minister Choi Young-jin, the 12-member team plans to try to convince governing members of the nuclear watchdog that the controversial experiments had nothing to do with nuclear weapons and the country remains firmly committed to its nonproliferation obligations. The three-day IAEA meeting is scheduled to open on 25 Nov.

South Korea acknowledged in early September that its scientists extracted or enriched small amounts of plutonium and uranium, two key ingredients of nuclear weapons, in 1982 and 2000 without reporting to the government. Seoul officials said the experiments were isolated, one-off incidents and not part of any weapons program -- though it was found that the enrichment was higher than previously claimed. Earlier this month, the U.N. agency circulated a report among IAEA board members on its findings from three rounds of inspections of South Korea. The report acknowledged Seoul's explanation that the experiments had no relevance to nuclear weapons, but described the failure to report them as a "matter of serious concern." South Korean officials believe that even if the case is referred to the council, it will not lead to any punitive measures as the violation is considered to have been a mistake. Nonetheless, they are opposed to going to the council as this could be seen as giving the case equivalent seriousness to those involving Iran and North Korea.

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US Objections to Kaesong Complex The Chosun Ilbo reported that claims have been raised that the Kaesong Industrial Complex Project, which is currently in its initial stage, could serve as a “hostage” that could be sensitively affected by future DPRK-U.S. relations. This is because there is concern that the project can be adversely affected if U.S. President George W. Bush pushes for hawkish policies toward DPRK in the future. The project by ROK’s Hyundai Asan to build an industrial complex extending 26 square kilometers, if carried out smoothly, would generate employment for 700,000 North Koreans and 100,000 South Koreans and bring many benefits because the complex is close to Seoul and Incheon International Airport.

The US also has reservations that some dual-use technologies may be used in the industries selected for construction. The ROK claims that all will be low-tech industries -- but the scope indicates that this may not be true. The US-ROK held negotiations over this issue in Sept.

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Delegation to US On 26 Nov, the National Assembly announced it was sending a delegation of lawmakers from the two major parties to the United States next month to strengthen the Korea-U.S. alliance and seek a breakthrough on the North Korean nuclear standoff, but the team itself has differing views on the issue.

After visiting the United States as representatives of their parties last week, Rep. Chung Eui-yong of the ruling Uri Party and Rep. Park Jin of the opposition Grand National Party disclosed the plan to send the delegation, comprising 10 lawmakers from their parties. But their opinions after meeting U.S. politicians during their visit underscored the contrasts that remain in the two parties' understanding of the present situation on the Korean Peninsula.

"The U.S. Congress' tolerance (on the North Korean nuclear issue) is decreasing rapidly, with the majority of U.S. lawmakers believing that the North possesses enough materials to produce at least six nuclear weapons," said Park. "So if there is no progress on the nuclear problem, the U.S. Congress will inevitably come up with harsh measures against North Korea."

Many U.S. lawmakers regarded the South Korea-U.S. relationship as insecure and uncertain, Park added. "Until now, North Korea's threats on the national security had played a role in strengthening the South Korea-U.S. alliance. But the contrasting positions (between Seoul and Washington) toward the North have caused tensions in the alliance," he said.

T Political experts here attach much significance to the delegation's trip, noting changed circumstances such as U.S. President George W. Bush's re-election. But there are concerns that divided views presented by the two parties may work against producing positive results from the visit. The rival parties have frequently confronted with each other on issues of the North's nuclear issue, inter-Korean relations and the Seoul-Washington alliance. For example, both reacted differently to President Roh Moo-hyun's speech in Los Angeles on his way to South America, where he had a summit meeting with President Bush. The GNP strongly criticized Roh after he said, "There is some truth in North Korea asserting that nuclear weapons are for its own security." GNP floor leader Kim Deog-ryong said, "Siding with the North, while reproaching the United States, was very unwise of the president. The government's frigidity on the North Korea nuclear issue is endangering the national security."

The GNP remain critical of the Roh government, which they assert is neglecting the need of achieving a stronger alliance with the United States. Uri, however, criticizes the GNP for falsely leading the public to think there are dangers where none exist.

Views on how to solve the nuclear standoff also differ. The ruling party lawmakers favor bilateral talks between the United States and the North, while the opposition party emphasizes the importance of the current multilateral framework of the six-party talks.

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