NOTICE/DISCLAIMER: The content of this page is UNOFFICIAL and the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of anyone associated with this page or any of those linked from this site. All opinions are those of the writer and are intended for entertainment purposes only. Links to other web pages are provided for convenience and do not, in any way, constitute an endorsement of the linked pages or any commercial or private issues or products presented there. Neither the DOD, the Air Force, the 8th Fighter Wing nor Mickey Mouse has endorsed any of this site. All Air Force links are publicly accessible through the worldwide web. If there is any discrepancy between eye-witness accounts and OFFICIAL DOD records, this site opts to lend credence to the eye-witness views.

USFK: MILITARY EVENTS (2004) OPINIONS

Korean Bases/Camps

This year is a unique opportunity to significantly improve readiness and overall quality of life in Korea. We are committed to consolidating our dispersed and inefficient legacy installations into hubs of enduring installations that position units where they can best accomplish their assigned missions. Moreover, this effort is a crucial step toward solving systemic issues related to encroachment; decaying infrastructure; overcrowded and inadequate housing; and deficient force protection design. Momentum in three major programs facilitate this consolidation effort: Yongsan relocation; Land Partnership Plan; and the Future of the Republic of Korea—United States Alliance Policy Initiative. Yongsan relocation has received renewed attention this year. Under the original 1990 Yongsan relocation agreement, the Republic of Korea committed to fully fund the movement of United States Forces Korea units out of central Seoul. For a variety of reasons, relocation of Yongsan languished until the current Korean government placed heavy emphasis on moving national government functions out of Seoul. Party as a result of the Roh administration’s emphasis, we now have agreement-in-principle to accelerate Yongsan relocation. Next month we expect to complete the Yongsan relocation facilities master plan. The Republic of Korea will pay all costs associated with Yongsan relocation. We are aggressively working with the Republic of Korea government to decide the details of timing and final facilities for Yongsan relocation under the terms of the original agreements. Land Partnership Plan, in its first year of execution, is the principle instrument for consolidating our 41 major installations. Approved by the Ministry of National Defense in March 2002 and ratified by the National Assembly in November 2002, Land Partnership Plan has the full support of the Korean government and will ensure stable stationing for United States Forces Korea. Land Partnership Plan depends heavily on predictable military construction funding because the needed facilities are funded by a combination of United States military construction and host nation funded construction. Land Partnership Plan is a comprehensive, durable framework for United States Forces Korea stationing. It returns half of the land (32,000 acres) granted to United States Forces Korea under the Status of Forces agreement. In exchange, the Republic of Korea government must procure the land needed to expand our enduring installations. These land parcels accommodate new facilities construction and provide easements that reduce encroachment and improve force protection. Moreover, Land Partnership Plan has the flexibility needed to accommodate refinements in force structure or stationing to achieve efficiencies identified through the Future of the Republic of Korea—United States Alliance Policy Initiative. The Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative is a series of high-level consultations designed to strengthen the Alliance, enhance deterrence, shape future roles, missions, and functions for the combined military forces, and establish a stable stationing plan for United States Forces Korea. During these talks, the Republic of Korea confirmed the agreement to consolidate United States Forces Korea into hubs of enduring installations and to refine the Land Partnership Plan to implement a stable stationing plan. The details of the consolidation will be developed in subsequent meetings between the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in conjunction with the United States Office of the Secretary of Defense and State Department. With these three innovative programs, I am confident that we can implement our military construction plan to enhance readiness; achieve efficiencies; guarantee force protection; and improve overall quality of life. Your support to stable military construction budgets for projects in the Future Year’s Defense Plan is essential to bringing this plan to fruition.

• North Korea: North Korea spends 33.9 percent of its GDP on defense, which is the highest in the world. However, it is only ranked #21 in terms of defense spending. In real dollars, this equates to only US$ 1.4 billion. At the same time, it has the highest per capita defense spending at $234.38 per person. Under the Kim Jong-il policy of "Army First" the high per capita spending rate is understandable.
  
  Its standing army is thought to be 1.2 million strong but many soldiers at outposts subsist by growing their own food. The problems of inadequate monies translates directly to ill-equipped and ill-trained troops.
  
  

  Military expenditure (#21): $5.217 billion (FY02). 33.9% of GDP (FY02). There is no verifiable information from North Korea and only estimates are available. Total GDP for 2002 (est): $22.26 billion. Number One in world with highest per capita defense share at $234.38 per person. (GDP Per Capita: $990.80 per person)

• South Korea: South Korea spends 2.9 percent of GDP, but is ranked #10 in terms of defense spending with $18.5 billion committed. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea is the most heavily armed border in the world. The ROK military has about 650,000 men. Koreans' per capita defense spending is ranked around 30th in the world with $13.90 as of 2001. Its military expenditures are only $13.094 billion (FY02) -- three times less than Japan and four times less than China. At the same time, South Korea maintains the world's eleventh largest economy with a GDP of US$ 677.9 billion, but the ROK claims it has no money to raise its defense spending to 3.2 percent of GDP -- an increase of $4 billion.
  
  This means that though the economy was able to sustain higher defense spending, the ROK government opted for lower defense spending in order to increase social welfare programs. The ROK is walking a tightrope of increasing its capabilities, while at the same time not making any major improvements that might threaten North Korea. For example, it is better to allow the USFK to have Patriot missiles, while the ROK refuses to fund the procurement. The reason is that it has its North Korean reapproachment programs to consider as well. At the same time, there was a 14 percent growth rate in its armed forces indicating a restructuring was on-going as it added new equipment.
  
  The US objects to Korea NOT footing its fair share of its defense costs. Under the Kim Young-sam administration, the 1994 defense budget grew from $14.0 billion to $17 billion in 1996 --about 3.3% of GDP. However, under the Kim Dae-jung administration, the defense budget decreased to $12.8 billion in 2001. For five successive years, Kim Dae-jung cut military spending -- shelving or delaying the proposed military upgrades. The proposed 2005 budget will be about $18.5 billion. The ROK has now reached its 1996 levels for defense. President Roh has also continued the shelving of projects such as the SAM-X that might offend the North for the sake of reapproachment.
  
  

  Military expenditure (#10): $13.094 billion (FY02) 2.7 percent of GDP (FY03); 2.8 percent of GDP (FY04); and 2.9 percent proposed (FY05). Number 48 in world capita defense share at $13.90 per person. (GDP Per Capita: $19497.17 per person) With recent increases in budget, the South Korea claims it has risen to #30 spot.

• United States: The U.S. is #1 in expenditures with 4.8 percent of GDP. Number 26 in world with per capita defense share at $26.47 per person. The conclusion is obvious that the US is a superpower which commits a great deal to its military might in order to project its influence world-wide. This is also a problem as the other nations of the world don't necessarily agree with how the US is using its powers -- and this is also the case of Korea. Unfortunately, Korea relies on the US for a major portion of its defense so the criticisms of its citizenry strongly influences decisions dealing with troop positioning. President Bush has stated publicly, "we will stay as long as we are wanted." Note that it was not "as long as we are needed" indicating the Bush Administration blames the ROK government for allowing such anti-Americanism to become pervasive.
  
  Ten years ago, America's defense burden was 4.8% of GDP -- and the Clinton administration was balancing the budget at the expense of the military. Although the decline in defense spending has been halted from the Clinton years, not nearly enough has been done to make up for the decade of neglect. The modest increase for 2004 pegged Pentagon spending at about 3.4 % of GDP. The Congressional Budget Office projections are that the proportion will decline to approximately 3% by 2007. In real terms, though, the US defense budget is $407 billion making it the largest in the world.
  
  

  Military expenditure (#1): $276.7 billion (FY99 est.) The 2005 proposal represents 3.6 percent of the GDP. US Defense spending is up from 2.9 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2000, but down from 8.9 percent during 1968, at the height of the Vietnam War. Spending is also down from 6 percent of GDP during the military buildup of the Reagan administration, according to Pentagon figures. Number 26 in world with per capita defense share at $26.47 per person. (GDP Per Capita: $35991.96 per person)
  
  

• China: China is #2 in expenditures, but with 1.7 percent of GDP mainly because many expenditures are hidden. It is generally believed that China's actual defense spending is two to three times the official budget. Some of it is hidden in the budgets of non-defense ministries, while some is simply not listed in any official budget. The increase in defense spending appears ironic in the face of Beijing's repeated emphasis on peace and development. Number 75 in world with per capita defense share at $9.33 per person reflecting the governments interest to turn China into a free market economy. Another indicator was that its armed forces underwent a -28 percent growth indicating the changeover to a market economy is taking hold. Still its military expenditure of $55.91 billion (FY02) were more than four times that of Korea.
  
  

  Military expenditure (#2): $55.91 billion (FY02). 1.7 percent of GDP (2004). China's defense spending was 21.83 billion yuan (about 2.6 billion US dollars) in 2004. China's budgetary military spending for 2003 was 185.3 billion yuan (about 22.3 billion dollars). China's military expenditure only makes up 8 percent of the country's total financial expenditure, still lower than the world's average level of 15 percent. FY 2001 budget was 141 billion yuan (US$17 billion) and the budget for defense expenditure in 2002 is 169.444 billion yuan (20.47 billion US dollars) showed an increase. However, it is less than six percent of that of the United States and about half of that of Japan. Number 75 in world with per capita defense share at $9.33 per person. (GDP per capita: $4653.54 per person)

• Japan: Japan is #4 in expenditures, after France at #3, with only 1 percent of GDP. Number 62 in world with per capita defense share at $10.82 per person. With only 237,000 military, it has sunk most of its expenditures into high-tech upgrades. The military expenditures of $39.52 billion (FY02) is more than three times that of South Korea. At the same time, the SDF actually had a -3 percent growth rate indicating Japan had opted to follow the US lead in providing long-range deterence through the use of high-tech weaponry. As such, it is now has a world-class SDF military force.
  
  Japan has the world's second largest economy with a GDP of US$ 5.5 trillion. It contributes on only one percent of GDP for defense, but in real terms, Japan has the fourth largest defense budget in the world of US$ 39.5 billion. Though its military is only about 250,000 men, its high-tech hardware far out-classes the current ROK military. All it needs is a carrier to form a carrier battle group -- as it is already equipped with four of the latest cruise-missile armed Aegis destroyers. Japan has been a "blue water" navy since the 1960s after it started to rearm the SDF after WWII. It has four AWACS aircraft integrated with the U.S. intelligence/surveillance systems. It has PAC-2/PAC-3 missile defense shield capabilities. It has its own spy satellites above North Korea. It developing an integrated Ground Radar Intercept system. Instead of simply assembling aircraft under contract, the Japanese have the capability to enter the fighter market. It took the basic JF-16 and added the Mitsubishi composite-carbon wing that made it better than the original F-16 design. The list goes on.
  
  Japan's 1947 constitution renounces the right to use force or the threat of force as a means of settling international disputes; and sets important limits on Japanese security policy. Japan does not have any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, although it has the technical capability to produce basic nuclear weapons and missiles in a relatively short time. Though it does not have a ballistic missile development program, but its space program includes a number of technologies that could potentially be adapted to long-range missiles. The solid-fueled M-5 rocket system, first launched in 1995, includes technologies that could be adapted to develop intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities roughly similar to those of the U.S. MX Peacekeeper missile.
  
  

  Military expenditure (#4): $39.52 billion (FY02) Number 62 in world with per capita defense share at $10.82 per person. (GDP Per Capita: $28699.55 per person)

• Taiwan: Taiwan is #18 in expenditures with 3.7 percent of GDP. With military expenditures at $7.574 billion (FY02) and standings at Number 37 in world with per capita defense share at $18.65 per person, the conclusion is that the nation was striking a balance between economic growth and military defense. In this it seemed to be an equal of South Korea in viewpoint. Latest moves towards independence from the "One-China -- Two Systems" idea has brought about increased defense spending as China threatens to move with force.
  
  

  Military expenditure (#18): $7.574 billion (FY02). 3.7 percent of GDP (2003). Defense spending' as a percentage of GDP steadily decreased over the past several years, but showed a marked increase due to the purchase of "standoff" weaponry from the US. The national defense budget for FY 1996 represented 3.6 percent of GDP; FY 1998 at 3.26 percent of GDP; until FY 2002 at 2.7% of GDP; and then a rise in FY 2003 to 3.7 percent of GDP. Taiwan's defense budget amounted to New Taiwan NTD 274.78 billion (USD 9.46 billion) for fiscal year 1998 or 22.43 percent of the total budget. The National Defense Budget for FY 1998 represented 3.26 percent of Taiwan's overall GDP. Number 37 in world with per capita defense share at $18.65 per person. (GDP per capita: $17962.21 per person)
  
  

• Israel: Military expenditure (#14): $8.97 billion (FY02). 9.5 percent of GDP (2003). Defense spending totaled some 8.2% of GDP in 2000, jumping to an average of 11.8% in the last three years. The Oslo Agreement with the Palestinians had produced a substantial peace dividend by allowing Israel to reduce its defense spending to an average of 8.5% of GDP in the second half of the 1990s, from 22% in the two previous decades. However, the Palestinian uprising in recent years has led Israel to increase its military spending. Defense spending spiked at 10 percent of the budget in 2003, double the American ratio and triple the military outlays of the typical EU member. Number 3 in world with per capita defense share at $76.40 per person. (GDP per capita: $19193.87 per person)
  
  

The following is from Sim Sung-tae, Korea Herald, "Budget request for 2005 rises 5% to W195 tril." (14 Jun 2004).

Budget request for 2005 rises 5% to W195 tril.

The nation's 53 ministries and agencies have requested a total of 195.3 trillion won for fiscal 2005, up 5 percent from this year's 186 trillion won, the Ministry of Planning and Budget said yesterday.

The request is far lower than the average annual increase rate of 25 percent for the past few years. The figure stood at 28.6 percent in 2003, 24.5 percent in 2002 and 25.3 in 2001.

The ministry said the 2005 budget request rose slightly on-year as it adopted a "top-down" budget-making system, which allows government agencies to draw up their budgets within a ministry-set limit.

The general account budget request for 2005 reached 132.2 trillion won, up 11.7 percent from 2004, while the special account figure was 63.1 trillion won, down 6.8 percent.

The 2005 budget requests, under the left-of-center Roh Moo-hyun administration, are focused on assisting low-income families, strengthening national defense and developing future industries.

If the budget is approved, defense spending will rise 12.9 percent on-year to 19.52 trillion won, while the budget for welfare is to climb 10.4 percent to 16.44 trillion won. (SITE NOTE: This source states 19.52 trillion won ($17.75 billion). However, other sources state the ROK defense ministry called for 21.4 trillion won ($19.45 billion) for the 2005 defense budget, up 13.4 percent from 2004. This makes one wonder what kind of smoke screen game is going on.)

Government spending on environment will increase 11.9 percent to 3.35 trillion won, and 844.5 billion won is to be used for the diplomacy and unification sectors. (SITE NOTE: The government continuing support to the North in the form of food/fertilizer aid and monetary grants is not listed here.)

The largest expenditure, 26.01 trillion won, is earmarked for education and human resource development, up 6.3 percent from 2004.

In contrast, spending on social overhead capital projects will decline 1 percent from 2004 to 16.58 trillion won in 2005.

After reviewing the budget requests, the budget ministry plans to submit its final budget plan for 2005 to the National Assembly for approval by early October. (SITE NOTE: This is what the FOTA warning from Richard Lawless after the FOTA in June was about. The ROK cannot drag its feet on the resolution of the Yongsan Garrison move. It MUST fund it -- or else. However, indications are the the ROK will turn the MILITARY issue of the FOTA into a POLITICAL issue. Kim Sook director for North American Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has headed the recent SOFA meeting and somehow took over the FOTA delegation head position, though the MND was to head the FOTA and MOFA was to handle the side issue of troop reductions.)

Budget Minister Kim Byung-il has said the 2005 budget would focus on priority national projects, expand growth-engine industry projects, and provide support for balanced national development as well as enhance the quality of life for ordinary citizens.

Harbor and railroad construction projects, modernization programs for provincial colleges and universities, e-government projects, welfare programs for underprivileged citizens, loan programs for the farming industry, and strategic national defense programs are among the priority projects under the 2005 budget guidelines, the ministry said.

To ensure professionalism over the R&D budget planning, the ministry plans to have all its budget proposals thoroughly reviewed by its National Science and Technology Committee before finalizing related budgets.

(saintsim@heraldm.com) By Sim Sung-tae

++++++++++++++++++++++++

Yonhap News stated, "The Ministry of Planning and Budget said state ministries and agencies requested 195.3 trillion won (US$167.6 billion) for fiscal 2005, compared with 186 trillion won for this year."

++++++++++++++++++++++++

The Bloomberg.com on 13 Jun stated, the Ministry of Planning and Budget released the figures showing, "South Korea's government is seeking to raise next year's budget by 12 percent from this year, as it spends more on national defense and welfare, Yonhap said, citing the Ministry of Planning and Budget. South Korea's ministries and organizations are asking for a budget, based on general accounts that exclude government funds and special projects, of 132.2 trillion won ($113.6 billion), up from this year's 118.4 trillion won, the report said. The plan has to be approved by the National Assembly. The unification and foreign affairs ministries asked for the largest increase, with a combined 17 percent rise in its budget, it didn't specify the amount. The Ministry of National Defense said on Friday it asked for a 13 percent increase to its budget to 21.5 trillion won ($18.5 billion) from 18.9 trillion won this year, to strengthen the nation's armed forces, days after a U.S. proposal to reduce by a third its troops stationed there."

++++++++++++++++++++++++

The following is from the Korea Times on 14 Jun 2004.

Budget Request for 2005 Increased Spending Requires Greater Fiscal Efficiency

Fifty-three government agencies have requested a total of 195.3 trillion won for their budgets next year, up only 5 percent from 2004. The increase rate, as Minister of Planning and Budget Kim Byung-il put it, was the ``lowest since the foundation of the Republic of Korea.'' This should be considered a positive result of the ``top-down'' budget formulation introduced for the first time for fiscal year 2005. As the government agencies drew up spending plans at their own discretion within limits set by the budget ministry, the time-honored practice of over-requesting has disappeared.

Still, ministry officials are likely to experience not a little difficulty in drafting next year's budget bill. While state financial resources are limited and any sharp increase in tax revenue is unlikely due to the protracted recession, defense spending is to jump 13.4 percent, almost three times as much as the average rate of increase, to 21.4 trillion won. The defense budget rise is the steepest since 1988, reflecting the heavy fiscal burden resulting from the Roh Moo-hyun administration seeking greater self-defense capability.

Morerover, defense expenditure will have to continue its sharp increase, as the requests by the Defense Ministry did not reflect the expenses accompanying the scheduled gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops. However, Korea's defense outlay burden against its gross domestic product remains at only 2.8 percent, well below the global average of 3.5 percent, not to mention those of Israel (9.5 percent) and Taiwan (3.7 percent). Koreans' per capita defense spending is ranked around 30th in the world with $252 as of 2001.

Although the rise in defense spending seems somewhat inevitable, those drawing up the budget should put at least equal emphasis on guaranteeing the minimum welfare of people in the low-income bracket who are suffering the most from the prolonged business slump. The deeper the recession becomes, the harder the government ought to try to help the economically weak by investing more in a widening of the social safety net. But the general lack of funds for investment in improving the social infrastructure will have to be filled by attracting private capital, particularly from abroad.

One thing budget officials should never forget is allocating sufficient funds to developing new growth engines for long-term prosperity. To meet increasing fiscal demand, the government needs far greater tax revenues. Overall, swelling budget demand will require far greater efficiency in fiscal management. In this vein, it is very important for budget officials to wisely consider the priority of different government projects and boldly curtail outlays for non-essential requests.

BACKGROUND ON DEFENSE SPENDING: In 1980 under Chun Doo-hwan (1980-1987) administration, the defense expenditures according to the MND was 8.0 percent of GDP. However, according to Global Security.com: ROK Budget, "The costs involved in initiating weapons production and the loss of military grant aid from the United States were the major reasons for the gradual increase of defense spending from 5.2 percent of GNP in 1979 to 6.2 percent of GNP in 1982." Remember that the 1970s the US aid was pumped into Korea in exchange for ROK military support in Vietnam. After the Vietnam War ended, the aid was withdrawn. By 1978, Jimmy Carter's campaign promise was to remove all the troops from Korea.


Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo

By the Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993) administration in 1990, defense spending had increased to almost US$10 billion a year, but because of the dramatic growth in the country's economy, this figure was below 30 percent of the government's budget and less than 5 percent of GNP for the first time since 1975. In other words, the country was earning more money, but still spending about the same amount.

After the fall of the USSR, Washington redefined its strategic relations with Japan, urging Tokyo to take a greater role in its own security. Japan did this with gusto, expanding the roles and interoperability of its forces, launching regional initiatives for joint maritime patrols from the Andaman Sea to the Sea of Japan. At the same time, Washington also attempted to have Korea take on a greater portion of its own defense. It was during the Roh administration that the ROK finally started to upgrade their military -- 12 years after the North had started their upgrade programs.

The idea of the ROK picking up its fair share of the defense costs actually came about in 1991 with the threat of the Nunn-Warner Initiative that sought to reduce the forces in Korea. The ROK had been getting a "free ride" from the US for a long time. In the 1970s when the US yanked out one Army division under the Nixon Doctrine -- it also started massive amounts of money into the ROK military to upgrade its forces. Then the Miracle of the Han came about partially by Korea following the Japanese "Keiretsu" system when Japan skimped on its defense while under the US nuclear umbrella and invested the savings into its industries. Park Chung-hee did this by identifying favored family groups to form the "chaebol" (conglomerate) system. In the 1980s, Korea became one of the four dragons of Asia and the Miracle of the Han had arrived.

Following the collapse of the USSR, the US started to reevaluate its presence in Korea. At the same time, the ROK populace started clamoring for more say in controlling the USFK -- primarily over legal jurisdiction of soldiers accused of committing crimes. But when the SOFA was renegotiated -- for the first time since 1966, it opened a Pandora's Box up for Korea. The "free ride" was over. (See SOFA Agreement for problems associated with ROK increasing its cost share in 2001.)

According to the MND: ROK-US Alliance and Our Security, Chapter 2, C. Sharing USFK Stationing Costs:

In 1991, Korea agreed to share USFK costs after comprehensively considering the defense cost-sharing level of other US allies, USFK's contribution to ROK defense, and the need to develop the ROK-US military alliance into that of a "cooperative security partnership" status. It went on to state, "During the first SOFA Special Measures Agreement for defense cost-sharing in 1991, the ROK agreed to pay one-third of the total USFK costs associated with maintaining USFK, excluding wages given to US forces and US civilian employees. The two states concluded a follow-up SOFA Special Measures Agreement for defense cost-sharing during the 1996-1998 term, which increased the amount of annual ROK burdensharing by 10% compared with the previous year based on the US$300 million which was paid by the ROK in 1995. As a result of this arrangement, ROK share of these defense costs reached US$399 million. However, taking into account the financial difficulties during late 1997, it was readjusted to US$310 million. On February 25, 1999, the ROK and the US concluded another follow-up defense cost-sharing agreement for the future after 1999. According to this agreement, the ROK would provide 257.5 billion won plus US$141.2 million in 1999, which adds up to approximately US$333 million. ROK defense cost sharing in 2000 and 2001 would be increased in connection with the nominal GDP growth rate of the previous year. Therefore, defense cost sharing in 2000 will increase by 9.78% compared to the agreed amount in 1999, and the defense costs for 2001 is currently under review."

Kim Young-sam Campaigning in Jeep

By the Kim Young-sam (1993-1998) administration, defense expenditures had fallen to below 5 percent of GDP -- though the amount expended did increase because of the Miracle of the Han. Annual growth for defense spending was 9.4% in 1994; 9.9% in 1995; and 10.7% in 1996. In 1994, the defense budget was $14.0 billion; and by 1996, the defense budget was $17 billion, about 3.3% of nominal GDP and 23.3% of government budget (prior to capital expenditures); about 650,000 troops.

According to Aviation Week & Space Technology: (June 17, 1995), "Since most of South Korea's modernization plans are multiyear projects, "appropriate measures must be taken to secure enough financial resources for these force improvements," according to the report. Furthermore, it says, "to this end, the proportion of the defense budget to GDP will have to be maintained at a minimum of 3%."

Modernization funding was set at $4.3 billion, representing about 37% of the defense budget. In past plans that level was only about 32%. The rate will increase further to average 39% over the next five years. Most of the modernization funds will go to the navy and air force, with the express purpose of "building up of core force capabilities essential to future information and high-tech warfare," according to the Defense Ministry's 1995 white paper.

Defense spending in 1997 was to be increased by 12% to 14.27 trillion won from 1996 budget of 12.74 trillion won, the highest since 1993. Unfortunately, Kim Young-sam's tenure was one crisis after another -- North Korean spies invading, the Robert Kim spy fiasco, Sampong building collapse, bridge collapse, ferry sinking, airliner crash. Finally, the IMF Crisis appeared in 1997 and military upgrades were forced to be cut back.

Under the Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) administration, the defense budget fell for five successive years. The South was supporting a 683,000-troop army with a defense budget of $12.8 billion annually, but Seoul's defense budget accounted for only 2.6 percent of GDP. Initially, it was understandable because of the IMF crisis, but the ROK climbed out of the hole within 2 years -- but the decreases in the military investment continued. On Jun 15, 2000 the historic North-South summit took place with Kim Dae-jung meeting face-to-face with Kim Jong-il. Based on this reapproachment, military budget increases were not in the cards. (NOTE: Kim Dae-jung received the Nobel Peace Prize for this, but unfortunately, later on the "Pay-for-Summit" scandal hit over the ROK secretly delivering money to the North PRIOR TO the summit.)

SITE NOTE: An editorial in the Korea Times on March 3, 2001 stated, "The South Korean government, obviously, was not too happy with the outcome of the presidential elections in the United States. The main reason for the lack of enthusiasm with the Bush-camp has been the very cordial relationship Kim Dae-jung had developed over the years with President Clinton. Seoul's reservations regarding the Republicans have an additional explanation: Many a comment coming from people close to the Republican front-runner were all but supportive of the South Korean policies. One of the more senior advisers of the Republican President, who may be called the master-mind of an alternative strategy vis-vis the communist regime in the North, even suggested, the use of the term "Sunshine Policy" be discontinued. Contrary to this, Kim Dae-jung and Bill Clinton were in full harmony in regards to North Korea: there was a fundamental consensus that engagement was the most effective strategy to deal with Pyongyang."

Kim Jong-Il and Kim Dae-jung
Happy with Sunshine Policy

Tensions seemed to be escalating between Korea and the U.S. on the reapproachment stance of both countries to North Korea. One of the first acts of the Bush Presidency was having a high-level visit from Kim Dae-jung. Prior to Kim Dae-jung's visit to the U.S. in March 2001, President Kim stated that the U.S. and Korea were "in agreement" over the North Korean peace process. Unfortunately, that was left-over from when Clinton was in office. A new President was in place.

Kim Dae-Jung and George Bush
(Korea Herald photo)

In March 2001, Colin Powell, U.S. Secretary of State, told a Senate hearing, "The US has no illusions about North Korea that is despotic and a rogue nation, and the authoritarian regime in the North will collapse whether it adopts an open-door policy or not." DJ Kim's tour for selling Sunshine policy to the new US Administration was doomed to failure. No matter how much South Korean media hype, the Sunshine Policy was in danger. Though the US-Korean alliance was never in danger, the opening of the dialogue between the North and the U.S. had some new game rules.

Starting in 2001, the ROK mid-term defense modernization programs started. In 2001 Korea started to expand its vision dealing with air space beyond its boundaries. In expanding its areas of concern, South Korea was joining Japan and China in redefining security interests and operational strategies in post-Cold War Northeast Asia. Increasingly some of their operations overlapped. Unfortunately, the ROK has been playing a game with its defense to appease the North -- while remaining under the US security umbrella. Beyond the Sea of Japan (East Sea) and the Yellow Sea, however, the three nations (ROK, Japan and China) had competing strategic and economic interests in developing and maintaining security in the shipping lanes through the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean. Because of this all three increased their budgets for the military.

South Korea's 2001 defense budget included several new pieces of equipment to extend its capabilities as well. Seoul intended to add three Aegis-class destroyers by 2011; AWACS, aerial refueling aircraft by 2006; and new submarines, fighter aircraft, helicopters, surface-to-air missiles and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. Unfortunately, politics entered the fray and the SAM-X program along with the Missile Defense Shield (MDS) idea was trashed. The naval programs progressed well with destroyers and submarines being built -- to the great relief of the under-utilized shipyards where the contracts were spread out based on employment needs -- not on low-cost bids.

In 2002 at the end of the Kim Dae-jung tenure, there was a slight increase, but the defense budget still stood at 2.7 percent of GDP. When Roh Moo-hyun (2003-?) administration took over, it was expected to be even less. Nations with "hot spots" (i.e., Isreal, Pakistan, India) commit 6 percent or more of GDP. Koreans' per capita defense spending is ranked around 30th in the world with $252 as of 2001.

Roh Moo-hyun and George Bush Summit (15 May 03)

However, the confrontation between the US and the ROK in June 2003 over "cost sharing" forced the ROK to promise to increase their "share" of the defense costs. The US forced the ROK to promise to increase its share to 3.2 percent in 2004. The US promised in return to invest $11 billion in the ROK to assure its defense capabilities.

In June 2003, Gen LaPorte glossed over the spending issue when he stated the U.S. military currently spends about $3 billion per year to maintain troops in South Korea, but this does not include the other costs which run up to $20 billion annually. This was on top of the $11 billion commitment to the ROK's defense. At that time we believed this action was to defuse NGO activist complaints of the USFK being paid for fully by the ROK. Simultaneously, it was a jibe at the ROK to increase its defense budget which is lower than expected for a nation facing an enemy across its border.

(SITE NOTE: We believe the $11 billion amount was slight of hand trick with numbers as it included programs already in the works such as the Apache Longbow and the Abrams MA1A upgrades -- as well as the $250 million the US Congress committed for construction along with the ROK promise for procurement of Pyongtaek lands and the additional PAC-3 batteries. (See Bolstered Forces Proposed for details of 2003 actions.)

Roh Moo-hyun Election Victory (2002)

In June 2003, the percentage spent on defense stood at 2.7 percent of the Korean GDP. Prime Minister Goh Kun said on 3 Jun 2003 that Korea should increase its defense budget in stages from next year till it is at least 3 percent of the GDP. "Defense expenditure has been cut back every year during the five years of the previous administration. It now stands at just about 2.7 percent of the GDP," Goh said in a meeting with reporters in June 2003. "In the future, the defense budget should rise to over 3 percent and increases should be implemented gradually from next year." The MND submitted a budget increase to 3.2 percent of GDP, but the National Assembly decreased the amount to 2.8 percent of GDP claiming a "lack of money."

The USFK in April 2003 -- after assurances by the ROK -- went to Congress to ask for supplemental funding of $250 million for USFK projects. The USFK wanted to pursue "Build to Lease" options -- with Congressional approval -- to extend maximum family housing lease period from 10 to 15 years and extend maximum family lease duration for support facilities from 5 to 15 years. The "Build-to-Lease" option was considered a cost option to rectify the problem of "government owned and leased housing for less than 10 percent of our married service members (1,862 families) compared to more than 70 percent in Europe and Japan." The goal was to provide quality command-sponsored housing for at least 25 percent of our accompanied service members and their families by 2010. (See Senate Appropriations Subcommittee (23 Apr 2003))

In 2004, the upgrades to the Apache Longbow and Abrams MA1A tanks are complete and the construction underway for 111 accompanied family apartment towers at Osan AB ($45 million); 1792 unaccompanied housing units, a new family housing development at Osan AB ($131.5 million); the underground command post at Osan (Theater Command Post Tango complete 2003), a multi-purpose center at Camp Castle, but the land STILL hasn't been procured in Pyongtaek. The US thought they had backed the ROK into a corner and forced it to promise to increase its share of its defense -- as well as obtain a PUBLIC commitment for procurement of lands in Pyongtaek.

According to the Ministry of Defense (MND) the 2005 budget for military augmentation projects may increase sharply to achieve a "cooperative self-defense," that focuses on filling the security vacuum on the Korean peninsula that may result from a planned reduction of U.S. forces in Korea. The Ministry of Defense submitted to the Ministry of Budget and Planning on Jun 11, 2004 for its "2005 Defense Budget Proposal," which includes the introduction of an airborne reconnaissance system and an anti-missile-guided Patriot (SAM-X) system to ensure defense against missiles.

Has the ROK Reneged on 3.2 percent Promise? In June 2003, the ROK promised to earmark 3.2 percent of GDP for defense -- but the National Assembly downgraded it to 2.8 percent of GDP. In June 2004 we now see that the ROK only had 2.9 percent of GDP defense commitment -- .1 percent increase from 2.8 percent. What's the difference of a measley .4 percent increase in spending? Only a measley $4 billion.

The key question is has the Roh administration reneged on their promised 3.2 percent increase. The answer is "no" as they are apparently increasing their defense expenditures at the rate of .1 percent of GDP per year. Another way of looking at this is that the MND did submit a 3.2 percent of GDP increase to the National Assembly in 2003 -- but the National Assembly downgraded it to a 2.8 percent of GDP for FY2004 claiming a "lack of money."

However, what was irksome was the ROK announcement as though the 2.9 percent of GDP increase was some great accomplishment. To have just surpassed the 1996 levels of defense spending is not much to be bragging about. To the U.S., the ROK has failed to demonstrate its willingness to upgrade its forces in any meaningful manner. With the realignment of the USFK, the US viewpoint is that the ROK should shoulder more defense responsibility. The MND aims to increase military spending to a level that accounts for 3.2 percent of the GDP. Unfortunately the time-table is the rub. The US felt that the ROK had gutted the military after 5 consecutive years under President Kim Dae-jung...and wanted it returned previous levels.

MND: ROK-US Alliance and Our Security, Chapter 3, C. Sharing USFK Stationing Costs in 2000 stated, "The size of the available defense-related financial resources for the 2001-2005 period is in line with the ROK government's "Mid-Term Fiscal Plan for 2000-2004," which means that the 6% annual growth rate of the government expenditure was used as the basis for determining the growth rate of defense-related expenditures. As a result, the total available financial resources for defense in the next five years is projected to be 87,493.8 billion won, equivalent to 2.6% of GDP and 16.7% of government expenditure." This was the Kim Dae-jung administration which had reduced the military defense budget for five consecutive years due to his rapproachment efforts with the North.

When Roh Moo-hyun took power, the US resurfaced the issue as part of the Future of the ROK-US Alliance (FOTA). As Korea had successively decreased its investment in its defense, it was expecting the US to pick up more and more of the defense "share." Thus in June 2003, the US as part of the FOTA "demanded" the ROK pick up more of its share -- especially as the US had told the ROK in April 2003 that it was contemplating a reduction in US forces in Korea.

The following is from USFK: US Department of Defense News Transcript, "Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz visits Korea" (June 2, 2003) dealing with Paul Wolfowitz comments at Press Conference at the Lotte Hotel - Seoul, Korea, following KCCI speech.

Q: SBS. We heard reports that this morning you met with the Defense Committee members of the National Assembly and that in this meeting you requested an increase in South Korea's defense budget. Is this true? What's the relation between this and the U.S.'s enhancement plan?

Wolfowitz: We did talk about the need for more investment in defense by South Korea. I believe now the defense burden is 2.7% of GNP. I think South Korea can certainly do more. My country does more. Doing more, even in relatively moderate increases, could make a huge difference. Let me give you one example, which made a big impression on me while I was here. The commander of our Special Forces here in Korea said that Korean Special Forces are as good as any he's seen anywhere in the world. But they still work with paper and pencil, instead of with the modern communications gear that our Special Forces took with them to Afghanistan, that demonstrated a really revolutionary capability. That's the kind of enhancement that South Korea could make to its existing Special Forces with relatively modest investments that would multiply many, many times the effectiveness of those forces to defend this country. We're talking about measures that will save both Korean and American lives in the event that there's a war. Even more important, they'd contribute to deterrence, reducing the likelihood that a war will take place. So I think it's a wise investment. I think Korea can afford it. You might ask why I have any business commenting on it. The answer is that we're in this together. We are allies together. We're investing a great deal to enhance our capabilities. I think it's appropriate for South Korea to do the same.

To assuage concerns, the US announced it was investing $11 billion in Korea's defense. The ROK was forced to agree to a 3.2 percent increase in the military budget. It is obvious now that the ROK "reneged" on its "promise" -- and is stretching out the increase until 2007. The MND did propose to the National Assembly an increase to 3.2 percent of GDP, but the National Assembly decreased the amount to 2.8 percent of GDP claiming there was no money.

However, the ROK has continued its upgrade program. The ROK is continuing in its own Mid-term Defense Program formulated under Kim Dae-jung and modified under the Roh Moo-hyun administration. One area of concern though is the lack of progress on ensuring the relocation from Yongsan is funded. With the ROK's latest moves, it is evident they wish to stretch it out the 3.2 increase till 2011.

To counter this immediate increase in 2003, the ROK has adopted a ten-year "self-defense" building plan when Roh Moo-hyun took the office. However, this approach is even more costly than an immediate increase in the defense budget to 3.2 percent of GDP. Basically the current formula calls for continued stalling of funding for shortfalls for the military, while proclaiming that the ROK is heading towards an self-reliant military.

The continuing saga of mixed signals from the Roh administration continues into June 2004 -- Roh speaking of "military alliance" on 6 Jun 2004 and then the MND talking of "self-reliant defense" on 11 Jun 2004. According to the report: "Following the relocation of US troops in South Korea, the Defense Ministry presented a vision for self-reliant defense," Major General Won Jang-Hwan, a top procurement officer, told Yonhap news agency. South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun has advocated building up an independent defense capability without reliance on the US.

The Washington Times, "Analysis: S. Korea balks at defense cost" (3 Jun 2004) stated,

Analysis: S. Korea balks at defense costs

By Jong-Heon Lee
UPI Correspondent

Seoul, South Korea, Jun. 3 (UPI) -- For more than half a century, South Korea has relied on U.S protection for its national security, while focusing its resources on building its economy torn by the 1950-1953 war.

The Asian country, which now has the world's 12th-largest economy, is set to emerge from the decades-long U.S. security umbrella as Washington plans to cut the number of its troops stationed in South Korea to deter communist North Korea. In his first reaction to the U.S. troop realignment plan late last month, President Roh Moo-hyun came up with a "cooperative self-defense" policy, which envisions less dependence on U.S. forces but espouses a military alliance with the United States. Roh, who took office in February 2003, has already vowed to develop his country's defenses independent of the United States within 10 years, pledging to lay the groundwork for it during his five-year term that ends in 2008.

In theory, the establishment of its own indigenous, independent defense is no doubt the best way to guard the country against rival North Korea and far larger and more powerful surrounding powers -- China, Russia and Japan.

In reality, however, the question is how to finance the costly military buildup. Government officials express confidence that the country can afford an independent defense posture by increasing military spending for the next 10 years.

South Korea is now a rich nation with more than $160 billion at its disposal. It holds the world's fourth-largest foreign currency reserves after Japan, China and Taiwan. The dollar is still adding in its coffers as trade surplus is expected to reach $20 billion this year on the back of strong exports.

The country, which hosted the 1988 Olympic Games and 2002 the soccer World Cup finals, joined an elite high-speed rail club last April. More than three-quarters of South Korea's 48 million population have at least one mobile phone. More than two-thirds of all homes are connected to high-speed Internet services and cable TV operators. Streets are flooded with 14.6 million vehicles.

But many analysts say South Korea has a long way to go for defense self-sufficiency because the nation's elected officials and taxpayers are expected to balk at the political and economic costs of defending their country on their own. It will not be an easy job to build a public consensus for the costly project that would eats up resources needed for investment and civilian consumption, they say.

The government has unveiled plans to spend a total of 24 trillion won ($20.6 billion) in an extra defense budget for the next 10 years, or using 3.2 percent of its gross domestic product for the military.

The country's defense budget for this year stands at 19.1 trillion won ($16.4 billion), or 2.8 percent of the country's GDP, which posted 721.3 trillion won ($619.7 billion) in 2003. The GDP is the total value of goods and services produced by a country in a year.

"The additional expenditure will amount to about $2 billion annually for building independent defense," said an official at the presidential National Security Council.

But defense officials say they need at least 137 trillion won ($118 billion) for the coming five years to pave the way for building self-defense capabilities. The figure is much higher than the NSC's estimate of 118.5 trillion ($101.8 billion) for the 2004-2008 period.

"At least 55 trillion won ($47.2 billion) is needed to buy high-tech war materials and boost surveillance for the next five years," an official at the Defense Ministry said, who also requested anonymity.

The state-run Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA) argues the nation will have to allocate a total of 64 trillion won ($55 billion) in an extra defense budget by 2010 for purchasing new weapons and equipment for independent defense.

"AWACS (Airborne Warning and System Control System) aircraft, Aegis destroyers and next-generation fighters are necessary to boost surveillance and command as well as control functions for tactical and air defense forces," said Park Joo-hyun, a KIDA analyst.

In a recent report, the defense think tank said the country should spend at least 209 trillion won ($179.6 billion) to improve the country's weapons system to achieve a self-defense posture within 20 years.

The figure is huge given that the country used only 5.5 trillion won ($4.7 billion) for military buildup last year out of the 17.4 trillion won ($14.9 billion) defense budget, because only 25 percent of the country's defense budget has been earmarked for weapons development. Whereas a greater bulk of 75 percent has been used up as fixed expenditure, such as wages for the 690,000-member military.

Han Tae-joon, who teaches economics at the Graduate School of International Studies, Chung-Ang University in Seoul, says the government should sharply increase its military budget, while spending more to improve weapons systems, if it wants to build an independent defense.

"South Korea currently spends only 2.7 percent of its GDP for the military, which falls short of the world's average of 3.5 percent," he said. "The level is also far short of 6.3 percent, the average of countries in military tensions," Han said. "Even if the country's economy grows 6 percent annually and the military spends 3.7 percent of the GDP, its defense budget amounts to just 65 trillion won ($55.8 billion) in 2021," he said.

The country's economic growth rate, which tumbled to 2.9 percent last year from a 6.3 percent surge in 2002, is forecast to reach about 5 percent this year, with concerns growing that strong oil prices would damage the energy-deficient country. The South Korean public seems not ready to shoulder the huge financial burden for a rapid military buildup. "Why does South Korea need an independent defense that requires hefty financial costs?" asked Kim Jong-shik, a 38-year-old computer engineer in Seoul. "We should remain longer under the U.S. security umbrella to continue to focus our efforts for economy," he said. Cho Dong-Keun, an economics professor at Myongji University, said increased military spending to make up for absence of the U.S. troops will hinder the country's economic growth by 1.2 percent every year for the following eight years.

Budget and Roh's Self-Reliant Defense Stars and Stripes stated on 13 Jun, "South Korean officials also announced Friday they were taking major steps to deliver on President Roh Moo-hyun's promise to build up the country's own defense capability over the next decade. That move takes on greater importance with the U.S. drawdown plans. The Ministry of National Defense said Friday it was seeking a 14 percent budget hike next year to fund such programs as an airborne-reconnaissance system and newer versions of the Patriot missile defense system. Other funds would go toward new equipment like the F-15K and KF-16 fighter jets; the K1A1 armored vehicle, navy vessels and command and control improvements, the MND said in a statement. U.S. officials have repeatedly touted a program to invest $11 billion over the next four years in military improvements. Currently, South Korea spends $13.9 billion a year in defense funds; at $417 billion this year, the United States spends by far the most in the world."

The Agence France-Presse, "South Korean military wants bigger budget to deter North Korea ", (June 11, 2004), stated that the MND was seeking a 21.4 trillion won, a 13.4 percent increase in defense spending or 2.9 percent of GDP, that followed "growing security jitters caused by a US plan to slash its 37,000-strong military contingent here by one third." "Following the relocation of US troops in South Korea, the Defense Ministry presented a vision for self-reliant defense," Major General Won Jang-Hwan, a top procurement officer, told Yonhap news agency. South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun has advocated building up an independent defence capability without reliance on the United States.

However, since Roh first announced his stance, there has been concern -- especially over the copious amounts of money that the ROK would have to commit -- and which the Roh administration is unwilling to commit because of other problems that have surfaced with the economy. The same concerns in 2003 are still sounded in 2004 because of the pending relocation costs -- coupled with Roh's intent to move the ROK Administrative Capital out of Seoul. A Chosun Ilbo, "The Costs of Self-Reliance" (Sept. 3, 2003) editorial stated,

The fundamental reason for the situation is the calls for "sovereign national defense" that have been getting main-stage attention since the beginning of the current government. President Roh Moo-hyun has consistently talked about sovereign defense since his inauguration, and has repeatedly said that he's going to increase spending in the area to 3 percent of the GDP. At his Liberation Day address, he announced an ambitious desire to "create the basis for our military to have the capabilities of sovereign defense within the next 10 years." The Ministry of National Defense, however, says it can't even dream about the idea with this kind of increase.

Our security environment is such that we have little choice but to spend a given amount to increase defense spending, no matter how difficult the economy may be. The problem is just how fully the country agrees with the increases. And it's all the more shocking when the money isn't being spent on things that would revive the economy, but that the increase itself won't even make up for the differences when the United States Forces Korea relocates farther from the front lines.

According to the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, the cost of making the country able to defend itself by itself would be W209 trillion over 20 years. It wouldn't be too much to say that figure is reason enough to tie up the economy and cause it to lose its vitality.

In Sep 2003 an article by Heo Yong-beom, Chosun Ilbo, "Counting Cost of USFK Relocation" (22 Sep 2003), it stated, "If the U.S. Army's 2nd Infantry Division is withdrawn from its positions near the North-South border, the costs to replace its equipment will total W5.5 trillion ($4.6 billion), if the South is to maintain the war-fighting potential there. The figure is about 31.5 percent of this year's defense budget of W17.4 trillion."

It went on to quote a GNP lawmaker, Park Se-hwan, who stated that the equipment of U.S. forces that would need to be replaced included $2.6 billion in ground equipment, $1.8 billion in air equipment and $51.9 million in anti-air weapons such as missiles. This includes M1A1 tanks, M2 armored vehicles, 155 self-propelled guns, MLRS/ATCMS (multi-engine rockets), AH-64 Apache helicopters, OH-58D scout helicopters, UH-60 helicopters, stinger missiles and avenger missiles. If one included emergency ammunition, entrainment equipment, support brigades and engineering brigades, it would take at least minimum of $5 billion.

The reason the ROK is dragging its feet in its classic "stall-and-conquer" negotiation style is made evident by Representative Park's statement that postpone the repositioning "as long as possible" because of the sky-high procurement costs. He pointed out that the MND had estimated that it would cost $3-5 billion if the 2d ID moves south of the Han River. However, he stated that the amount represented "only pure transition costs," not costs for replacing the military capability. Taking into consideration the tremendous costs for substitute equipment, he felt the ROK should consider postponing the repositioning of the 2nd Division for as long as possible.

Can the ROK Stand Alone? Despite the Roh administration's delusional "self-reliant" military arguments, the ROK needs the USFK's high-tech armament and intelligence gathering capabilities to survive. Without the USFK, the ROK is numerically inferior because the USFK has promised to bring in follow-on forces. These forces on paper bring parity to the military face off between North and South.

The bottomline is that the ROK cannot afford the high-tech hardware the US forces adds to the mix. Roh's talk of self-reliance sounds good politically, but it is delusional. Roh's own accounting experts come to the same conclusion. However, Roh has persisted in espousing these ideas when addressing Korean supporters -- as though American news reporters were so stupid as to miss these reports. Perhaps there is some truth as the American news services consider this trivially boring stuff.

In a report, weapons systems and military hardware owned by U.S. forces in South Korea in 2000 were valued at 132 trillion won (US$111.2 billion), an amount seven times larger than South Korea's annual defense budget. The finding indicated South Korea may need to greatly boost its military spending if Washington implements a plan to cut its troop level here by a third. In June 2003, the South admitted that without the U.S., it would be faced with a $20 billion annual defense bill. It also admitted that 60 percent of the wartime ammunition stores for their ROK forces was provided by the U.S. The list goes on and on. Suddenly the Koreans are being faced with a new reality with the U.S. DEMANDING they increase their cost share. The ROKs failure to do so is being used as a ROK excuse to delay the USFK reductions or relocations off the DMZ and the US is not going to tolerate it any longer.

The ROK Upgrade Programs (2001-2005 Mid-Term Defense Program) A massive infusion of high-technology equipment via an accelerated procurement schedule is envisioned during the transitional phase of planned US redeployments, with South Korean forces acquiring major new capabilities in ground- and air-defence, counter-battery fire and airborne early warning. (See International Institute for Strategic Studies.)

American military planners hope to limit South Korea's envisioned plans for enhanced naval capabilities (especially submarines) that the US believes distract its ally from addressing more immediate defence needs. But it seems unlikely that Seoul will be dissuaded from such courses of action.

The MND focused on large increases devoted to force improvement and hardware acquisitions. The Roh government seems intent on adapting as fully as possible to the impending changes in the alliance. The ROK continued its expansion programs -- such as its Aegis "stealth" destroyers and submarines tied to local industry -- without truely committing additional funds to upgrade its defense. Though the US won the F-15K contract for Korea's next-generation fighter, it was in the end downgraded from 120 fighters to 40.

The ROK still primarily invests in its own home-grown defense industries for defense procurement spending -- most notably in naval vessels. In the past, the ROK has tried to "go cheap" and ended up with subsystems that were incompatible with their designs -- such as the French electronics for their naval gun systems. The ROK has since learned from its costly errors of the past.

(SITE NOTE: The US hands are not clean in this affair. In the controversial selection of the F-15K, the ROK, in our opinion, stacked the deck against the superior Rafael which won the competition. It was evident a lot of behind the scene deals were made with the US. Dassault’s Rafale barely edged out Boeing’s F-15K by a margin of 1.1 percent in the first round of competition (first-stage evaluation of costs, operational capabilities, technology transfer and compatibilities with existing weapons systems). Boeing won because at the last minute, the ROK input the US being an old ally as a weighted criteria.)

According to the MND: ROK-US Alliance and Our Security, Chapter 3, B. 2001-2005 Mid-Term Defense Program of 2000 under the Kim Dae-jung administration, "the Mid-Term Defense Program provides a blueprint that helps solidify the proposed military capability build-up and maintenance requirements for the five-year term into an executable multi-year programs within the limits of the estimated defense budget.

It continued, "This is a "rolling plan" that is revised and supplemented every year, based on a comprehensive assessment of various factors, including the mid- and long-term security environment, defense policy objectives, force build-up requirements, and the available defense resources. It provides the basis for compiling a yearly defense budget as well as establishing annual unit programs such as creating, reorganizing, or disbanding units and drawing up annual military quotas and manpower management programs."

It went on, "The 2001-2005 Mid-Term Defense Program was drafted with the primary objective of maximizing the efficient execution of defense expenditure by re-examining the practicality and priority of each project in light of a Zero-Base perspective in order to implement essential investment as well as operational programs within the bounds of limited available resources."

According to Roxana Tiron, National Defense, "ROK Fears North Korean AbilityTo Wage Asymmetric Warfare" (January 2003),

"The high-priority programs are the Multiple Launch Rocket System, unmanned aerial vehicles for ground forces, the Korea Destroyer project, the SSX (submarine project for the Navy), a new fighter program for the Air Force, as well as a surface-to-air missile program, dubbed the SAM-X, according to Moon. However, he said, South Korea’s anti-missile program will be delayed, in order to fund more pressing Army programs.

According to the naval attaché, Cmdr. Jim Hyung Kim, South Korea plans to introduce major upgrades into its navy. In July, the government awarded Lockheed Martin a $1.2 billion contract for three Aegis combat systems for the ROK Navy’s three new 7,000-ton KDX-III destroyers. The Aegis air-defense technology can track up to 100 targets, at ranges out to 500 km. Kim said the KDX III will be commissioned in 2008.

In addition to the Aegis system, the ROK Navy is seeking new surface-to-air missiles (SAM-X). Among the options being considered is a new series of Raytheon Standard Missile II Block 4 missiles.

The F-X fighter is one of four major weapons procurement projects started in 1999. Others include a next-generation attack helicopter (AH-X) and an airborne surveillance system (E-X).

The F-X program originally was planned for 120 aircraft, but subsequently was cut down to 40, said Col. Hyung Chul Kim, South Korea’s air attaché.

In a highly contested competition, the Boeing F-15K beat France’s Rafale, the Eurofighter-2000 and Russia’s Su-35. John Pike, a military weapons expert, wrote on his Web site www.globalsecurity.org, that Dassault’s Rafale barely edged out Boeing’s F-15K by a margin of 1.1 percent in the first round of competition. “The U.S. model and the French-built Rafale were very close in the first-stage evaluation of costs, operational capabilities, technology transfer and compatibilities with existing weapons systems,” said Pike.

The South Korean Air Force selected General Electric engines for the fighter jets, said Kim.

The 40 fighter-jet deal is valued at more than $4 billion and now has entered a second phase of evaluation, which would focus heavily on the fighter’s interoperability with allied U.S. forces.

“The F-15K will reinforce the combined operational capability between [South] Korea and the U.S. Air Force, and these aircraft must be the key assets to obtain and maintain air superiority over the Korean Peninsula in case of conflict,” Kim said.

Additionally, he noted, the F-X program is expected to help boost the South Korea’s aerospace industry and “obtain the technology necessary to develop her own fighter aircraft in the near future.”

The South Koreans plan to roll out the T-50 Golden Eagle, a supersonic advanced jet trainer by 2005. The trainer is being developed by KAI (Korea Aerospace Industries, Ltd.) and Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, as the principle subcontractor. The U.S. firm developed the T-50 avionics system, flight control system and wings.

The first flight took place in October 2002. The T-50 will replace the aging fleets of F-4s and F-5s.

Does Increased Defense Budget Equate to Increased Defense Capability?

According to MND: ROK-US Alliance and Our Security, Chapter 3, A. Expanding Support for R&D of High-Tech Weapons Suited for the Korean Military , the primary focus is on the domestic production of conventional weapons and the ROK military is still dependent on the developed nations for their supply of cutting-edge core technologies. As a result, in order to secure cutting-edge weapons development capabilities which would allow for responsiveness to future security environments, the ROK military has set a goal of "acquiring the ability to develop defense science technology on a par with that of advanced nations by 2015."

What also must be considered when talking about defense budget expenditures toward new systems is the actual value to ROK defense or the overall goal to increase the ROK presence as a regional power able to protect its airspace and naval waterways. Defense monies have been spent to increase Korea's industrial base or export capabilities -- with ROK defense as a secondary motive. For example, the Samsung/Lockheed Martin A-50/T-50 Golden Eagle was an outstanding joint-venture success for Korea in the development of an indigenous advanced jet trainer in 2002. The first flight took place in October 2002. However, when viewed in the scope of national defense or as an extension ROK regional power, the A-50 is not really in the league of fighters in the countries surrounding it. The T-50 will replace the aging fleets of F-4s and F-5s. Its use in ROK defense as a trainer is possible, but as an attack aircraft, it is best suited for third-world countries. The end goal is the potential $30 billion market for exporting these aircraft to these countries -- not in ROK defense. The same holds true of unmanned aircraft vehicles (UAV) currently being test-flown in Korea.

There are a whole group of projects on the table for the ROK. These include the Korean Multi-purpose Helicopter (KMH; est. $12 billion); the Attack Helicopter Project (AH-X); the Early-Warning Project (E-X/AWACS; est. $1.7 billion); the Electro-Optics Project (EO-X; est. $68 million); the Electronic Warfare Project (EW-X; est. $116 million); the Master Combat Reporting Center (MCRC) Upgrade Project (est. $108 million); the Next Generation Fighter Project (F-X; est. $5 billion); the Air Refueler Project (KC-X; est. $1 billion); Additional Production of KF-16K; est. $733 million; the T-50 Golden Eagle Aircraft (Advanced Trainer/Attack Aircraft); the P-3 Lot II Maritime Patrol Aircraft; est. $565 million; the VIP Helicopter Project (VH-X, est. $108 million; the Mine Hunting Helicopter Project (MH-X); the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Project; the LYNX Refurbishing (upgrade) Project; (est. $37 million). Take your pick, but it is evident that there is not enough money in the pot for everything.

(SITE NOTE: Remember that the ROK started its military upgrade 12 years -- yes, 12 years -- after the North Korean military upgrades in the mid-1990s. It had funneled its resources into the chaebols (conglomerates). When it did enter the military upgrade programs, it was only because their domestic shipyards needed work and they put them to work on destroyers and submarines. Its aerospace efforts were determined by the issue of "technology transfer" (single engine F-16) -- not what was best suited for the mountainous/sea bound Korean environment (dual engine aircraft). It turns out under license the K1A1 main battle tank. However, it is far behind Japan in its military hardware. Its decision to constantly go "cheap" has caused many setbacks in its hardware upgrade programs. In the area of C4ISR, it is handicapped by incompatible systems between its military services. Its intelligence is almost entirely provided by the U.S.

The ROK has used the US for its defense shield while it funneled its funds to the benefit of the conglomerates. This is the reason the ROK, by its own admission, started its military upgrades 12 years after the North in 1990. It could afford to do so as the USFK was in Korea.)

Does Increased Defense Budget Request Equate to Increased Spending? It all depends on the National Assembly approving the budget request. Many of the items requested will end up on the cutting room floor because of the politics associated with the US relocation plans.

In 2003, South Korea was been bolstering its weapon acquisition programs, spending 33 percent of its defense budget on modernization efforts. The total budget for the ROK government for fiscal year 2003 was approximately $90 billion, said Moon. Of that, $14 billion is allocated to national defense. In 2003, the E-X Program (AWACS) was moved up the priority list, while the SAM-X Program (PAC-3 Missile) were moved down the list.

We have some misgivings over these two programs. Though they were announced as the partial reasons for the rise in MND 2005 budget, they are "wish list" items. They look good in print -- but they really are UNFUNDED requests. The E-X Program is a FUTURE program and the SAM-X is one that will NEVER get off the ground as long as Roh is in power.

• (1). The AWACS (E-X Program) is a very expensive proposal and the ROK has been simply "eye-shopping" -- looking and not buying. In 4 February 2004, the Hankook Times stated that the ROK was going to buy 4 AEW&C (Airborne Early Warning & Control) aircraft by 2011 at the expense of the SAM-X project.
  
  The move to bolster the ROK intelligence-gathering capabilities. South Korea has relied on American AWACs planes flown from U.S. bases in Japan for crucial air surveillance on the North. If all goes as planned, the four AWACs (or AEW&C) planes costing 1.8 trillion won ($1.5 billion) in total will start flying above the peninsula in 2011. The US will not get favored status in this deal.
  
  The Defense Ministry unveiled its master plan to acquire four planes, spending 2 trillion won ($1.7 billion) by 2011. In Feb 2003, the ROK put off the SAM-X project in order to procure 4 planes by 2005. According to the plan, the MND will distribute application forms in March and will begin a three-month evaluation process in August. The winning model will be decided in November 2004.
  
  According to Korea Times, "S. Korea to Buy 4 Early Warning Aircraft by 2011" (2 Feb 2004), The ministry wants a model with a maximum speed that exceeds 300 knots per hour and could operate at the height of 26,500 feet and stay in the air for at least six hours. It should also be equipped with an electronic 360-degree radar system, which can detect objects within a 370 km radius. Five models have been selected as potential winners: the "A320-200" of France's Thales, the "IL-76" and "G-550" from Israel's IAI/Elta and American models "A321-200" from L3-Com and "B737-700" from Boeing. Among the most popular AEW&C systems is arguably the U.S. Air Force's AWACS, which also can monitor, command and control electronic signals and manage air traffic. The brand name AWACS has become a dominant name among early warning aircraft.
  
  The E-767 probably has the edge simply because the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) fly E-767 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. The SDF currently has four AWACS planes that can share information with U.S. military aircraft and vessels.
  
  
• (2). The Patriot Missile Program (SAM-X) has been an an on-going UNFUNDED item. The USFK will have the Patriots so the ROK is sitting under its umbrella. The 44th Air Defense Artillery (ADA) are currently stationed at Suwon, Osan and Kunsan ABs. The 35th ADA is projected to deploy to Korea to beef up Osan AB and Kwangju AB (contingency base).
  
  The ROK continues to talk about beefing up its SAM-X, but there has been no concrete steps to improve their missile defense. The ROK appears to have 8 batteries (6 missiles each) on order, but negotiations on payments broke down in April 2002 over how the ROK would pay. The Raytheon Co. wanted the bulk of the payments "up-front" while the ROK wanted its payment stretched out till 2010. The ROK suspended the 1.9-trillion won plan to buy new US Patriot missiles in February 2003 when President Roh Moo-Hyun took office, vowing to step up inter-Korean rapprochement. The radical NGO activist group stated in People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy/Special News, "Recommendations for Peace on the Korean Peninsula By the National Council for Peace on the Korean Peninsula" (June 26, 2003), "The Missile Defense (MD) system that the Bush administration is pushing for is likely to be a factor in hindering peace and prosperity not only for the U.S. and Korea but also the region and the world and therefore should not be advocated."
  
  The bottom line is the ROK will NEVER buy a PAC-3 system as long as Roh is in power -- it will only talk!!! It prefers to live for free under the US missile umbrella and overruled the ROKAF request to place in on the priority list in 2003. Instead, the E-X program was moved up in its place.
  
  In July 2003, the USFK upgraded its PAC-2 to PAC-3 Patriots. In 2004, the US will send the elements of the 35th ADA to Osan and Kwangu to beef up the ROK air defense from SCUD attack. The ROK is still using the US to pay for its missile shield. However, now the US is claiming a $13 billion dollar investment in Korea's defense with the new PAC-3 brigade.

---

(OPINION) The ROK Engaged in Dangerous Game

The ROK is involved in a very dangerous game that is going to backfire if it is not careful. In 2003, the future of the USFK forces started to take shape...though a comprehensive rationale for plans still are in the formative stages. Senior ROK officials are expressing open disquiet over impending changes and have openly expressed opinions to delay major moves as long as possible. Three points have remained clear. (See International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol 9 Issue 5, "American Forces in Korea".)

• (1). The US insists that the time is long overdue for Korean forces to assume increased responsibility for their country's defense, even as South Korean officials insist that any redeployments in the midst of the renewed nuclear crisis with North Korea send the wrong signal to Pyongyang. South Korean pleas to the US fell largely on deaf ears.
  
  
• (2). The Bush administration asserts that US forces on the peninsula remain wedded to a 'tripwire' concept increasingly irrelevant to military realities on the peninsula.The USFK believes the scenario for a future engagement will be much different than that of the Korean War. The US contends that North Korea would employ its missiles, long-range artillery and special forces to bypass traditional invasion corridors and directly target major cities and military facilities throughout the southern half of the peninsula. The redeployment of US forces is therefore designed to limit potential American vulnerabilities in a future conflict, and – in conjunction with vastly strengthened South Korean forces – to exploit US technologies and operational concepts to degrade North Korean capabilities.
  
  The USFK envisions Phase One will be a major push to capture Seoul after overrunning Camp Casey and Camp Red Cloud -- and then consolidate forces to attack Osan AB and Pyongtaek where the US forces will be clustered. In Phase Two, the US forces may fall back to Taegu and then Pusan in a holding action until US forces arrive on the peninsula from Okinawa. Follow-on forces are expected to arrive within 30 days.
  
  
• (3). US planners believe that American forces are more critically required elsewhere, especially given the expectation of open-ended demands on US forces in Central Asia and the Persian Gulf. In this view, American forces must become much more flexible, to facilitate deployments on very short notice to distant theatres where military operations are deemed more likely. Under prevailing conditions, the 2nd Infantry Division is a fixed asset, committed exclusively to deterrence and defence on the peninsula. But the redeployment and reconfiguration of US forces would enable US Forces Korea (USFK) to ultimately become a far more mobile combat unit geared to future regional contingencies, not just to peninsular missions. US calculations therefore posit a less singular US security role on the peninsula, and (more than likely) appreciable reductions in the American military presence in South Korea in the long run. Such possibilities trigger understandable anxieties in the minds of Korean security planners, who fear that they will be left exposed and surrounded by much more powerful neighboring states.
  

The USFK's new strategy revolves around the relocation of forces to Pyongtaek to operate around "hubs" south of the Han River. The secondary issue was the relocation of the CFC. At first the CFC was to remain in Yongsan, but the ROK refused to consider authorizing more land on Yongsan for USFK dependents to promote "force protection." As a result, the CFC was to move to Osan AB in 2005. The USFK has been adamant that the move out of Yongsan will take place before Dec 2004 -- come hell-or-high-water. In conjunction with this move, the LPP phases have been accelerated. Bases on the DMZ which were to be returned in 2011 are now being vacated with the first returned in Jan 2004. With the removal of the 2d Bde 2d ID off the DMZ -- 3,600 personnel with their equipment -- it is evident that the relocation process will be accelerated even more. The turnover of the Joint Security Area (JSA) to the ROK will be complete in 2004.

To facilitate the 2d ID move to Pyongtaek, the USFK has started construction in Osan for family units -- mainly to accomodate the dependent families of the CFC function moving to Osan AB. The USFK is alos pursuing "build to lease" options in Pyongtaek to increase family housing for Camp Humphreys. All construction projects funding north of the Han River has been curtailed -- though projects previously funded will continue. The funds from curtailed projects will be focused on new construction in the Pyongtaek area. In April 2003, Gen LaPorte testified before Congress requesting supplementary military construction funding for FY2004. Prior to Gen LaPorte going to Congress, the ROK government and National Assembly agreed to additional funding for the movement to Pyongtaek. Based upon the ROK support, the Senate subcommittee approved $250 million in supplemental construction funding for the USFK. He stated US Senate Committee on Appropriations, "Military Construction Subcommittee Hearing: Statement of General Leon LaPorte" (April 23, 2003),

This year is a unique opportunity to significantly improve readiness and overall quality of life in Korea. We are committed to consolidating our dispersed and inefficient legacy installations into hubs of enduring installations that position units where they can best accomplish their assigned missions. Moreover, this effort is a crucial step toward solving systemic issues related to encroachment; decaying infrastructure; overcrowded and inadequate housing; and deficient force protection design. Momentum in three major programs facilitate this consolidation effort: Yongsan relocation; Land Partnership Plan; and the Future of the Republic of Korea—United States Alliance Policy Initiative. Yongsan relocation has received renewed attention this year. Under the original 1990 Yongsan relocation agreement, the Republic of Korea committed to fully fund the movement of United States Forces Korea units out of central Seoul. For a variety of reasons, relocation of Yongsan languished until the current Korean government placed heavy emphasis on moving national government functions out of Seoul. Party as a result of the Roh administration's emphasis, we now have agreement-in-principle to accelerate Yongsan relocation. Next month we expect to complete the Yongsan relocation facilities master plan. The Republic of Korea will pay all costs associated with Yongsan relocation. We are aggressively working with the Republic of Korea government to decide the details of timing and final facilities for Yongsan relocation under the terms of the original agreements. Land Partnership Plan, in its first year of execution, is the principle instrument for consolidating our 41 major installations. Approved by the Ministry of National Defense in March 2002 and ratified by the National Assembly in November 2002, Land Partnership Plan has the full support of the Korean government and will ensure stable stationing for United States Forces Korea. Land Partnership Plan depends heavily on predictable military construction funding because the needed facilities are funded by a combination of United States military construction and host nation funded construction. Land Partnership Plan is a comprehensive, durable framework for United States Forces Korea stationing. It returns half of the land (32,000 acres) granted to United States Forces Korea under the Status of Forces agreement. In exchange, the Republic of Korea government must procure the land needed to expand our enduring installations. These land parcels accommodate new facilities construction and provide easements that reduce encroachment and improve force protection. Moreover, Land Partnership Plan has the flexibility needed to accommodate refinements in force structure or stationing to achieve efficiencies identified through the Future of the Republic of Korea—United States Alliance Policy Initiative. The Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative is a series of high-level consultations designed to strengthen the Alliance, enhance deterrence, shape future roles, missions, and functions for the combined military forces, and establish a stable stationing plan for United States Forces Korea. During these talks, the Republic of Korea confirmed the agreement to consolidate United States Forces Korea into hubs of enduring installations and to refine the Land Partnership Plan to implement a stable stationing plan. The details of the consolidation will be developed in subsequent meetings between the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in conjunction with the United States Office of the Secretary of Defense and State Department. With these three innovative programs, I am confident that we can implement our military construction plan to enhance readiness; achieve efficiencies; guarantee force protection; and improve overall quality of life. Your support to stable military construction budgets for projects in the Future Year's Defense Plan is essential to bringing this plan to fruition.

In 2003, over $1 billion of ongoing and planned construction associated with improving military infrastructure at Yongsan Army Garrison and U.S. installations located north of Seoul--areas where there is uncertainty about future U.S. presence--was put on hold, canceled, or redirected to Pyongtaek (Camp Humphreys or Osan AB).

In Feb 2004, the 7th Round of the Future of the ROK-US Alliance (FOTA) ended without agreement on funding details that would finalize the move of Yongsan Garrison out of Seoul. U.S. officials have repeatedly said any shuffling of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula is being paired with an $11 billion program to upgrade military technology. This spans 150 capabilities, including upgrades to intelligence collection systems (SIGNIT), increased numbers of improved precision munitions (JDAMS), missile defense units (Patriot PAC-3), and attack helicopters (Apache Longbow upgrade), and additions to U.S. pre-positioned stocks. The U.S. also emphasized its plans to sustain a U.S. military rotational training process north of the Han River even after the redeployment of U.S. troops south of the Han has been completed. (NOTE: Problem is getting the ROK to build a exclusive rail line to the Korean Training Center (KTC) above Camp Casey. The FOTA talks have been ongoing since December 2002.

In the 9th Round of the FOTA in Jun 2004, the US again reiterated the move to be completed by Dec 2004. Yet there has not been any funding nor land procured as promised by the National Assembly in a 2003. Deputy Assistant U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Lawless, agreed to a "comprehensive Yongsan Garrison relocation agreement and implementation plans" in Jan 2004. The move is to be accomplished not later than Dec 2004. At this point in time, it appears that Korea is simply dragging its feet in hopes that this all goes away. Historically this is exactly what they did in the 1990 MOA for the move out of Yongsan. They provided no land until in 1992, the US gave up and returned to the status quo, remaining in Yongsan.

The current Ministry of Defense (MND) brainstorm is to sell the Yongsan land to developers to use for high-rise apartments to pay for the move. However, there are a lot of other people who are licking their chops to get control of the land -- the most vocal being the Seoul City government who has already drawn up plans for its use. Former Premier Goh Kun -- also a former Seoul Mayor -- favored turning it into a "national park." When somebody will allocate the funds is anyone's guess. However, it must be approved by the National Assembly -- and it has not been done yet.

It certainly appears that the ROK strategy is to employ the technique of "stall-and-conquer." Though a Kim Sook, director of North American affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is taking charge of settling issues with the US, even this is at a standstill as Korea is unable to react to the U.S. demand for additional 300,000 pyong of land at Pyongtaek. It appears the strictly military FOTA became political -- much to the consternation of the US as this means things will get dragged out. However, if the opponent makes concessions to further the negotiations, the ROK accepts the concessions, a promises everything, delivers nothing -- and when pushed to the wall, renegotiates -- but the ROK keeps the concession and starts anew. It is at this last point that the US-ROK negotiations on the move from Yongsan sits.

The US is at a juncture of a decision. All of the choices are bad.

• (1) It can continue negotiations and slip the movement date. The US will make this choice knowing full-well that the outcome will be the stalling of the move indefinitely. The ROK did this with the 1990 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) until the US gave up in 1992. And now is doing it again in 2004 still trying to implement that same 1990 MOA.
  
  
• (2) It can relocate its forces to Pyongtaek without any monies from the ROK and foot the bill with a special appropriations from the U.S. Congress for the $2.9-4 billion bill. If the US moves their forces at their own expense, the ROK will NOT reimburse the US for the move. The move's funding must be approved by the National Assembly. Getting such a special appropriation bill through the US Congress will be unpleasant at best. The USFK must admit the ROK has acted in bad faith on an international agreement (1990 MOA). It will raise an anti-Korean backlash as the US Congress will suddenly be faced with accusing the "ungrateful" Koreans of acting in bad faith for their own defense. The accusations will be that the Koreans have failed to provide for their "fair share" of defense -- while pursuing its own path of reapproachment with the North. Such an action in Congwere would open the door to anti-ROK supporters who wish the USFK removed from Korea completely. A firestorm of anti-Korean fervor would probably erupt from the grassroots level.
  
  
• (3) Relocate the USFK forces currently stationed in Yongsan out of the country at US expense, while retaining the CFC function temporarily at Osan AB. 7,000 troops would be assigned outside of Korea immediately. Equipment at Yongsan would be redistributed to units within Korea or added to the follow-on equipment depot at Kim-hae. The CFC function would be relocated to Osan AB at its own expense. The dependent facilities are currently under construction. There are 1,000 troops affiliated with the CFC function. The Signal Brigades and Intelligence units will remain in Korea, but all other functions may be declared excess. The CFC function would be downgraded (pending a move to consolidate it into a reorganization of the force structure at Camp Zama, Japan). The size of the CFC staff could be reduced at this time and the CFC function collocated at the newly completed underground facilities at Osan.

The US will be faced with choosing the least painful of the alternatives. To us, simply cutting one's losses and leaving will send the message to the ROK that the US is serious about relocating its troops. The ROK will be addressed forcefully that it will NOT have pre-consultation rights in the use of US troops in its global operations. It will not dictate US policy. The US is moving towards a more expeditionary global defense posture, with a particular emphasis on the Middle East and both South and Southeast Asia. It will increase its emphasis more on forward operating bases (FOBs), forward operating locations (FOLs), and other temporary basing solutions, rather than on large fixed bases. The prepositioning of B-52s in Guam under a "satellite" system and rotating them at three-month intervals is an example.

The cold reality -- despite all the talk of 50 years of alliance -- is that the US has been attempting to leave Korea permanently since the end of the Korea War. It cut it troops by one division in 1970s under the Nixon doctrine; Jimmy Carter would have pulled out completely in 1978 if he hadn't been forced to back down because of the North's massive upgrades at the time; and the Nunn-Warner Initiative in 1990 that stopped at Phase I because of the nuclear crisis that is still with us.

However, the move will also send a message to the North that the US believes it is a "paper tiger" which uses blackmail to achieve its goals of regime survival. The North is deathly afraid that if the US pull off of the DMZ as it will reduce its ability to extort money and aid by threatening war. The unthinkable threat of the annihilation of Seoul will be directed only at South Koreans -- not Americans troops any longer. The North has labeled the US pulling off the DMZ as an excuse by the US to start a war with preemptive strikes. The idea is that with the US no longer being a tripwire, it can act independently of the ROK defense strategy. In truth, if the US is off the DMZ, the North's excuse for making the threat to drive out the US will be removed and South Koreans will be forced to deal realistically with their "brothers" to the North.

Even if this move from Yongsan is settled, the larger picture of funding for the relocation of the 2d ID from the North is still unsettled.

In contrast to the growing anti-Americanism in Korea, there is also a growing grass-roots movement in America that is starting to look at Korea very negatively. The Americans are starting to hear about long-standing problems of inadequate housing; constant demands from NGO activist groups for changes in the SOFA; and ROK plan to reduce the length of service of its servicemen and claims of underfunding of its defense improvement programs. According to the Rand Corporation Air Force Report, "On the U.S. side, many Americans are increasingly incredulous at South Korean characterizations of the North Korean threat and what they perceive as the ROK’s “head in the sand” orientation. Moreover, some suspect that South Korea is using low threat appraisals as a rationalization for purposefully underfunding defense, expecting that the U.S. will pick up the shortfall and in effect subsidize the South Korean economy. This suspicion is feeding a “fine, if South Koreans want a more equal relationship let them pay for it” mentality in key U.S. constituencies."

Many Americans have been surprised, even astounded, at the ROK's willingness to continue to send tourists, encourage private sector investment, and provide economic assistance to the North in the face of Pyongyang's active nuclear program. Some, recoiling at the South Korean government's repeated willingness to "turn the other cheek" at North Korea's verbal abuse and other disdainful treatment, have simply stopped taking it seriously as a partner in efforts to deal with the North Korean challenge. The biggest effect of the perceptual and policy differences, however, has been to diminish the perceived importance of South Korea to the United States. If the U.S.-ROK alliance is predicated on a threat from North Korea and if South Korea continues to insist in both words and actions that North Korea is no longer a threat, then it is hard for many to conclude that the alliance remains very important.

Another reason for the changing attitudes toward South Korea has to do with the actions of the South Korean government inside South Korea itself. Here the issue is not the recent upsurge in "anti- American" sentiment per se. Rather it is the perceived indifference of South Korean leaders to this upsurge—and at times what appears to be at least tacit encouragement of it. The striking disinclination of the Korean leadership to defend the alliance over the past year or so in the face of massive demonstrations and the minimal efforts to try to dampen heated public sentiment when major incidents arose had a particularly big effect. Although the exigencies of domestic politics undoubtedly played a part, this disinclination raised serious doubts in the United States about Korea's commitment to the alliance—and even about its trustworthiness as a security partner. Few Americans believe an alliance can be sustained if the ally itself will not defend it. Even fewer are willing to keep U.S. troops where they are not wanted. Recent calls by a number of prominent Americans for a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea are one fully expectable byproduct.

"Stall and Conquer" Technique of Negotiating Because the ROK does NOT want the USFK to depart the DMZ, the ROK started the tactic of foot-dragging -- seeking to keep the USFK on the DMZ as long as possible. This is the classic Korean tactic of "stall-and-conquer" that the ROK business have used so successfully overseas when dealing with companies. Basically the tactic is to promise everything, deliver nothing and extract concessions. When the concessions are extracted, go back and start renegotiations again -- but keep the concessions.

(SITE NOTE: This Korean technique of promising something in exchange for something else and then reneging on the deal is very common Korean business technique. This technique appeared in 1970s college business textbooks, so it has been around for a while. It bears a striking resemblence to the Yongsan relocation "re-renegotiations." The 1990 MOA for the movement of Yongsan was approved by the National Assembly, but an orchestrated campaign whereby cities refused the USFK in their towns sealed the fate of the document. The USFK remained in Yongsan. When the anti-Americanism of 2002 started, it was again resurfaced, but suddenly the ROK has to renegotiate all the terms of the move. The cost has always been stated to be between $2.9 - $4 billion, but the ROK wanted to renegotiate the price. The USFK bent over backwards and made many concessions. Then the USFK asked for 280 acres on South Post for family housing for the CFC function that was to remain in Seoul. The ROK balked. Finally in Jan 2004, Donald Rumsfield simply said that enough was enough. The Yongsan Garrison and the CFC was moving to Osan and Pyongtaek. The ROK is now selling off portions of Yongsan for luxury apartments -- and the U.S. has not even left yet.

Another example of this technique is the US Embassy Chancelory relocation. Everything looked good until the plans were finalized and suddenly the activists rushed in to claim that historical properties were located under the land. The $240 million chancery project has been in limbo since 1966 when the ROK started haggling over the value of the site. The issue of historical value surfaced in the 1990s as the site was formerly occupied by royal family buildings in the late 19th century. Note that none of these concerns were surfaced when a ROK girls high school occupied the site. Because of the alleged antiquities and artifacts on the site, the Embassy construction could not proceed. Then when they tried to assemble a panel of artifacts to verify the site as a historic site, the ROK claimed it was too difficult to assemble the experts. Then they offered Camp Coiner that was to be vacated with the relocation to Pyongtaek. This is how the ROK operates.)

The ROK's Dangerous Game This is a very dangerous game that the ROK is playing. The U.S first proposed in November 2002 that the two sides establish a joint committee to discuss a possible U.S. troop reduction in Korea. The proposal was made immediately after the Bush administration officially announced the GPR to establish U.S. troops abroad as rapid deployment forces relying more on state-of-the-art equipment than manpower, to keep up with the changing security environment since the end of the Cold War. The ROK response was an immediate rejection of the idea and later stated that the process would be "negotiated." The ROK tactic was evident. Without funds or lands at Pyongtaek, the USFK personnel cannot move and this is what the ROK wants. The primary objective of the ROK is to retain the USFK on the DMZ as a "tripwire" -- regardless of what it says publicly.

It is dragging its feet in its typical "stall and conquer" technique. For over a year, the FOTA has stumbled as the ROK continues to negotiate over trivialities. Both the ROK and US concur that the priority is not to undermine the South Korea-U.S. joint deterrent against a possible attack from North Korea. However, the problem is that they both view the subject differently.

(1). Prior Consultation: Should the ROK be consulted if the USFK forces are required for regional deployments?

ROK position: Security of the Korean Peninsula must take precedence. Prior consultation must be held before any troops are withdrawn for deployment.

USFK position: Prior consultation would impact the flexibility of the global forces. The USFK points to its standing policy of "back-fill" -- meaning that if forces are removed from Korea -- other forces are moved to "fill in" for those units.

(2). Reductions: Will the reductions impact the security of Korea?

ROK position: Reduction in forces will impact security.

USFK position: Troop withdrawals will NOT impact the stability. $11 billion investment to upgrade systems in the ROK will offset any quantitative loss by qualitative increase. It points to the additional Patriots.

CFC at Risk if ROK Fails to Provide Funds and Land However, from the US perspective, without the funds or lands, the USFK forces can be cut by 7,000 immediately with only the CFC function moving to Osan. If the CFC "administrative" function is combined at Camp Zama in Kanagawa, Japan under the I Corps proposal, then the 1000 personnel are not required in Osan AB.

0n 19 Feb 2004 SBS News reported the 2nd ID was to be split into two brigades, one of which will be sent to an area near Osan and the other to an area near Pusan. The US Defense Department denied the report, saying that the US and Korea was in negotiations on the redeployment issue. Though the split didn't occur, it did appear in hindsight the US was preparing for only one brigade to remain on the DMZ as a backup plan. The ROK was stalling on their deployment which was to supposedly depart on Apr 2004.

The article also said that the US Defense Department will greatly reduce the number of US troops in Korea. This portion did come true with the OFFICIAL announcement of the 12,000 troop reduction (including the 3,600 from the 2d Bde 2d ID).

An article by Richard Halloran, Washington Times, "US Pacific Command Faces Sweeping Changes" (Feb 2004) was renounced at the time as an "opinion." The article provides some insights in that the changes proposed were "to eliminate crisscrossing chains of command that are legacies of World War II, the occupation of Japan, the Korean War, the war in Vietnam, and the Cold War, which ended in 1989 when the Soviet Union collapsed." By removing layers of the current cumbersome military bureaucracy, troops and ships and aircraft would be able to respond more quickly to any crisis on orders from the president and secretary of defense. In addition, the revisions are intended to appeal to South Korean nationalism and to tamp down rising anti-Americanism.

According to Halloran's article, disbanding the CFC is intended to lessen South Korean complaints that it diminishes Korean sovereignty. In Nov 1978 the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) was created. The Commander of the 8th Army was the commander of the CFC. The intent was to bring the ROK forces under the direct control of the UN command structure. Later on December 12, 1979 the unilateral use of CFC dedicated ROK troops by Chun Doo-Hwan to back his coup would cause some great consternation. He used his forces without approval of the CFC commander (US forces commander) and the lack of response by the US is pointed to as "support" of Chun Doo-Hwan's actions.

As part of the CFC, in March 1980, the ROK-US 1st corps was reorganized into the Combined Field Army (CFA). The Deputy Commander for the CFC became a ROK 4-star general -- and as such was appointed to deal in direct negotiations with the North at Panmunjeon on the Armistice Committee. The ROK general -- as deputy commander of the CFC -- was appointed as the senior representative of the United States Forces to the Military Armistice Committee. He was immediately rebuffed by the North as ROK was not a signatory to the Armistice. (As a note, the official meetings have not been held since 1992.) The Koreans pulled out of the Combined Field Army (CFA) in 1992 when it became clear that they could not command their own forces during peacetime.

The Koreans still fall under the Combined Field Command (CFC) in time of war along with all allied forces. This was related as part of the USFK plan to transfer more responsibility to the ROK. The combined ground component commander is now a South Korean four-star general rather than an American, and the transfer of peacetime operational control of ROK forces to South Korea took place in December 1994.

The article also stated that the commander of US Forces Korea will be changed from a general rank to a lieutenant general. Gen LaPorte has remained on past his rotation date and the Lt. Gen. slot. A four-star position would be created at Camp Smith, Hawaii for the commander of all Army forces in the Pacific.

Later on stories started appearing that the I Corps from Fort Lewis, WA might be shifted to Camp Zama. According to the Chosun Ilbo (quoting the Kyodo News of Japan of 2 March), the U.S. informed the Japanese government of its desire to move the First Army corps headquarters located in Fort Lewis, Washington to the U.S. military installation at Camp Zama, located in Kanagawa, Japan. The First Army corps is in charge of Asia-Pacific region and consists of 40,000 military personnel including an infantry division. It is commanded by a lieutenant general.

GlobalSecurity.org describes I Corps as "an early deploying corps for military contingencies in the Pacific … able to deploy on short notice. … War plans for I Corps include the defense of Korea or the defense of Japan. … I Corps base units include approximately 20,000 active-duty soldiers at Fort Lewis, Washington, and an equal number of U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard soldiers based in many of the fifty states." (See Camp Zama Move for Feb 2004 details.)

Kyodo News reported that the U.S. administration planned to restructure the U.S. Army's command in Korea and Japan, unifying its headquarters. If the headquarters is moved to Japan, the U.S. military command in Korea will be unified with the command in Japan in order to be absorbed into the headquarters of First Army corps. The news report speculated that the 2d ID could be moved to Zama should the command in Fort Lewis be relocated there.

In February 2004 we voiced our opinion that IF the ROK does not resolve the Yongsan fiscal and land-procurement issues, there is a possibility that part of the USFK command functions may move to Japan -- though the CFC functions would remain in Korea. However, the US portions of the command structure could be incorporated in Japan combining both the Japanese and ROK mutual defense pact requirements with a 4-star general position created at Camp Smith in Hawaii as the head of all Army forces in the Pacific.

(SITE NOTE: The JSDF has Aegis destroyers and AWACS aircraft that have been incorporated into the US 4CISR structure in operations in surveillance of North Korea. JSDF navy, as a true "blue water" navy, has been involved in RIMPAC exercises since the 1960s. JSDF JF-16s have participated in Cope Thunder in Alaska in 2003-2004 to integrate their tactics. The SOFA agreement was recently updated in May 2004. Host-tenant agreements for joint-security of Camp Zama concluded in May 2004. Japan has expanded its interpretations over the use of JSDF forces into peace-keeping missions and for reconstruction in Iraq. All that remains is the constitutional questions of allowing the function for the defense of Korea to be stationed in Japan. Some feel this is in violation of the Peace Constitution, but the trend is towards a much broader interpretation of the defense role of Japan -- up to some stating that Japan has the "right" to perform a preemptive strike if threatened.)

Magic Number of "12,000" = WARNING!!! Figure it out yourself. In Jun 2004, the US announced a 12,000 man reduction from the ROK in accordance with the Global Positioning Review (GPR). 3,600 leaving and not returning from 2d Bde 2d ID because the ROK stalled on sending its "promised" troops -- first by refusing to send combat troops and politicizing the deployment -- and then "renegotiating" the location when it looked as though it was going to be too dangerous. Message: Your old tactics of "stall and conquer" will NOT work. The US is playing hardball.

The US announced that 12,000 troops will be withdrawn. Hmmm .... ROK still has not procured land though they "promised" to do so PRIOR to the US committing an additional $250 million for Pyongtaek construction. If ROK does NOT provide funding or land, that would total about 12,000. Hmmm ... 8,000 + 3,600 = 11,600. If the CFC is eliminated and the function moves to Camp Zama in Japan, that's another portion gone and ... VOILA ... 12,000.

According to the Washington Times on 22 Jun, "An additional 8,900 combat troops will be pulled out by December 2005. South Korea has been pressing for a slower withdrawal, stretched out until 2006. No further troop cuts are planned, one official said." The Washington Times uses the number of 12,500. It figures, 3,600 + 8,900 = 12,500.

Then they talk about moving off the DMZ and without land at Pyongtaek, the ROK will understand fully that the US is NOT playing games. If they leave, their high-tech armaments go too. As was mentioned, this is a very high risk game the ROK is playing -- and one in which the US is fed up with.

In Jun 2004, Secretary Lawless gave a press conference exclaiming his "frustration" with the process -- and stating that it must be resolved in the next few months. We interpret this as a veiled threat to the ROK and the Korean people -- if you want the US to supplement your defense, pay for it.)

BOTTOMLINE: TROUBLE AHEAD The US wants the ROK to take on its fair share of the defense burden and the ROK has balked -- in fact, done nothing. Instead of treating the funding matter and troop relocations as a military matter, it is currently seeking to make it a political issue. The ROK cannot afford to upgrade its military so that it can stand alone. Its analysts and even a school child can figure out the arithmetic -- the ROK doesn't have the money.

However, it has built up this mystic of being "independent" of the US. So how can it keep the US hardware, but not the US control? ANSWER: Keep the US in Korea by dragging out negotiations and making it appear that the US is the one at fault for all the troubles. To ensure the entanglement, turn it into a POLITICAL issue instead of a military relocation issue.

TROUBLE: The US negotiators are fed up with these childish tactics. The US has bent over backwards to make concessions, providing funds and even providing funds that were in actuality in the ROK area of responsibility. The US is NOT going to play any longer. The ROK is engaged in a very dangerous game that may backfire in July FOTA negotiations.

Without the hardware of the US, the ROK is destined to be a large, cumbersome conventional force stuck in a man-to-man face off with the North. Unlike the Japanese who have now advanced to a world-class military power (though its Peace Constitution supposedly prevents it from being so), the ROK has remained basically a land-bound military with only dreams of becoming a "blue water navy" and regional air power. The Japanese far outstrip it with operational Aegis destroyers, PAC-2/PAC-3 missile defenses, AWACS aircraft integrated into the U.S. defense system, ground radar surveillance, their own spy satellites with launch systems, etc. The ROK is destined to be a third-rate nation militarily whose dreams of a "self-reliant" defense is only hindered by their inability to spend the money to achieve it.

The hard choices of supporting the chaebols (Conglomerates) or supporting military upgrades has ALWAYS fallen on the side of the chaebols. During the Park Chung-hee era, military spending steadily increased. According to Global Security.com: ROK Budget, "Between 1971 and 1975, defense spending increased from US$411 million to US$719 million. Defense expenditures averaged about 4.5 percent of the country's gross national product. In 1976, the first year that the government included proceeds from the defense tax in published figures for military expenditures, the budget for the armed forces and defense industries increased 100 percent over the 1975 figure to US$1.5 billion."

We remind one that in 1995 -- ten years ago -- the Kim Young-sam adminstration stated that the "proportion of the defense budget to GDP will have to be maintained at a minimum of 3%." Under the Kim Young-sam administration the 1994 defense budget grew from $14.0 billion to $17 billion in 1996 --about 3.3% of GDP. However, under the Kim Dae-jung administration, the defense budget decreased to $12.8 in 2001. For five successive years, Kim Dae-jung cut military spending -- shelving or delaying the proposed military upgrades -- except for the those projects that were beneficial to the ROK shipyards (submarines and destroyers) or increasing technology transfer. The proposed 2005 budget will be about $18.5 billion (between $17.45 billion - $19.45 billion depending on what news report you read).

Gadzooks!!! It has taken ten years to get the ROK defense spending back to 1996 levels -- and only after the U.S. promised $11 billion of its own funds. But back then in 1996, it was 3.3 percent of GDP while now it is still 2.8 percent of GDP -- meaning in basic English, "the ROK is reluctantly spending the same amount as ten years ago though it can afford more."

In essence, this means the ROK will NEVER be prepared to assume the security void created by the US withdrawal from the DMZ -- and Korea itself if it comes to that. Korea prefers to have the US security shield as it is the most cost-effective means of defending Korea. Without the US, the cost would be approximately 6 percent of GDP -- PER YEAR AT CURRENT RATES. Though the ROK talks a good story of "self-reliant" defense -- it is a pipe-dream. But the problem is that the US is starting to look upon Korea as millstone around its neck. It would be advantageous to maintain the alliance for the future -- the costs of the present may outweigh this consideration. The ROK is playing a dangerous game.

According to the Washington Times "S.Korea military calls for bigger budget" (Jun 11, 2004), "South Korea's military Friday requested $18.4 billion for next year's budget, up 13.4 percent from this year, to bolster its deterrent against North Korea. The request for greater military spending came after the United States unveiled its plans to slash one-third of its 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea by next year, sparking security concerns for its Asian ally. To make up for the U.S. troop reduction, the Defense Ministry requested the Ministry of Budget and Planning to increase the military budget to 21.4 trillion won ($18.4 billion) for next year. The expanded budget is necessary for a series of arms buildup projects, such as the deployment of an airborne reconnaissance system and an advanced version of the Patriot missile, the ministry said in a statement. The proposed budget represents 2.8 percent of the nation's gross domestic product, the ministry said. Defense analysts call for the government to use 3.2 percent of its GDP for the military to build a self-reliant defense force."

However, there still is the issue of the funding of the Yongsan relocation. According to KBS, "Defense wants 13% budget increase" on 11 June 2004 talking about the 2.9 percent of GDP increase. "But because the next-year budget was formulated at the end of May, it does not include expenses associated with the relocation of the Yongsan base and USFK troop reduction. After the scale and timing of the USFK reduction is decided in late August, the MND will likely increase the scale of its next-year budget to account for 3 percent of the GDP. That is required in order to bolster cooperative and self-reliant defense capabilities earlier than was previously scheduled. As such, the scale of the defense budget is expected to return to its pre-financial crisis level." Unfortunately, the ROK idea of addressing this issue AFTER August is NOT going to fly with the US.

Maj. Gen. Won of the Ministry of Defense said the old budget plan did not consider the effects of the U.S. withdrawing from the South, as the ministry's request was made in late May before the Pentagon's official proposal for the reduction went public early in June 2004. "The ministry believes the government will readjust military spending to 3 percent of the GDP by August," Won said. The state-run Korea Institute of Defense Analysis said South Korea needed to raise its spending to a level of 3.2 percent of the GDP, as an additional 209 trillion won would be needed by 2020 to buy the equipment it needs. The 2005 budget breaks down into 7.3 trillion won allocated for arms build-up projects and 14.1 trillion won for current outlay, up 16 and 12.1 percent from this year's spending, the ministry said. For combat and readiness, it earmarked 5.6 trillion won for the ongoing 181 projects.

According to Yonhap News on 1 July 2004, the ROK government was CONSIDERING allocating 95.4 trillion won ($82.5 billion) to national defense over a three year period. According to the Ministry of Planning and Budget, the government planned to boost its defense budget by 10 percent every year from 2005 through 2008 in a bid to meet national defense needs. This was a step in the right direction.

---

RETURN TO MAIN TABLE OF CONTENTS

Return to Top

---

For comments or inputs, contact Kalani O'Sullivan .

---

NOTICE/DISCLAIMER: The content of this page is unofficial and the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of anyone associated with this page or any of those linked from this site. All opinions are those of the writer and are intended for entertainment purposes only. Links to other web pages are provided for convenience and do not, in any way, constitute an endorsement of the linked pages or any commercial or private issues or products presented there. Neither the DOD, the Air Force, the 8th Fighter Wing nor Mickey Mouse has endorsed any of this site. All Air Force links are publicly accessible through the worldwide web. If there is any discrepancy between eye-witness accounts and OFFICIAL DOD records, this site opts to lend credence to the eye-witness views.

---

Return to Top

19 June 2001 Links Purged: June 5, 2000 HTML Toolbox

---