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USFK RELOCATION OF USFK FORCES (2004)

Korean Bases/Camps

RELOCATION AND SOFA BACKGROUND MATERIAL:

Planned US Reduction of Forces (1990): The following is under the "1990" section of this site. In 1990, America started to make plans to disassemble its forces. At first, the American forces were slated for a 25% reduction, but the South Korean government still feared North Korean intentions. Korea wished the American forces to stay.

Talks between the ROK Minister of National Defense and US Secretary of Defense were conducted. The treaty on creating JUSMAG-K was concluded.

In January 1990, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney announced the closing of three of the five United States air bases in South Korea and schedule the withdrawal of about two thousand air force personnel. One month later, Seoul accepted Washington's intention to withdraw about five thousand noncombatant troops from the American force of more than forty-three thousand soldiers in South Korea. At the end of 1990, 39,317 American military remained in Korea.

The following is from the conditions faced in 2002 -- and reflect the changes in activist thinking from the 1990 SOFA period. (Go to 2002: Protests for 2002 activists perspective of the plan)

In 1990, America started to make plans to disassemble its forces. In April 1990, the senior Bush administration sent a troop reduction plan, based on the Nunn-Warner East Asia Strategy Evaluation Report, to the US Congress. At first, the American forces were slated for a 25% reduction, but the South Korean government still feared North Korean intentions and was opposed to the 'high' rate of reduction. It preferred instead a more gradual rate of reduction. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was renegotiated in 1990 with a significant increase in the Korean portion of the defense expenditures. Seoul accepted Washington's intention to withdraw about 5,000 noncombatant troops from the American force of more than 43,000 soldiers in South Korea as part of Phase One of its plan. At the end of 1990, 39,317 American military remained in Korea. The original plan called for 2,000 Air Force and 5,000 non-combat ground troops would be withdrawn from Korea starting in 1991 and completed by 1993. Since 1993, the troop strength has remained at about 37,000 without further talks of troop withdrawals.

The cancellation of the orginal plan was due in part to the Korean government's opposition, but also because there was a change in the US policy in East Asia. The US policy makers had decided to maintain a minimum force level of 100,000 troops in East Asia. Thus the orginal plan stopped implementation after Phase One.

Phase Two of the original plan planned to reduce the troop strength in Korean to about 30,000 between 1994-1995. Unfortunately, the North Korean nuclear crisis that pushed the peninsula to the brink of war stopped the implementation. This crisis shelved any further troop reduction plans and since that time there have been no changes to the manning in Korea.

To many activists, this is looked upon as a lost opportunity to rid the peninsula of the Americans. (See The 'Crisis' on the Korean Peninsula and the US Troops in Korea .) Under the original plan, upon completion of Phase One and Phase Two, Phase Three would be implemented to turn over the defense of Korea to the Korean military. They envisioned the withdrawal of troops from Korea starting in 1996 and completing in 2000. The dream of being rid of the Americans evaporated when Kim Il-Sung practiced his brand of brinksmanship and brought the peninsula to the brink of war. Phase Two never materialized -- and with it no Phase Three.

A growing number of Americans legislators have come to believe that America has been footing the defense bill for Korea for too long. More and more pressure was brought to bear as Korea progressed up the ladder to a G-12 nation. Feeling the pressure, Korea started on an ambitious military upgrade program in the 1990s and continues to progress towards weening itself away from America. (NOTE: Unfortunately it was not the total picture. To ween itself completely away, some experts felt that $65 billion was required -- which the ROK could not afford. In addition, the ROK was forced to see that its spending of 2.8 percent of its GDP was NOT reality. Other nations that are "hot spots" spend a minimum of 6 percent of their GDP. The ROK had been cheating by shifting its "protectionist" funding to the chaebols at the expense of the military funding. In 1980 the percentage was 8 percent of GDP, but by 2002 the funding was down to 2.8 percent. In 2003, the funding increased to 3.4 percent of GDP -- only after the U.S. jabbed the ROK with a stick over its "fair share" in funding the defense of their country. (See Korea Continues to March to Its Own Drummer for ROK military hardware programs.)

As of 2002, the disparity between the two Koreas has begun to embarrass even some ROK analysts. Privately, many acknowledge that the American presence no longer is needed to deter the North.

Some activists state that the belief that US troop withdrawals from Korea will destabilize the region is a myth. The activists believe that the North is too weak to pose a danger to the military might of the South and the Americans are just scaring up boogie-men to justify their presence in Korea. The USFK view agrees with them somewhat, but points out that North Korea is really not interested in conquest -- it is interested in staying in power, even if it must sacrifice its people. (See Mythical North Korean Threat for details.)

The activists feel that entrenched military and industrial interests in Washington wish the military levels to remain the same -- and there is some truth in this as military hardware sales is a very profitable business. You can't sell fighters without a spectre of war around the corner -- and the Koreans understand this point very well as they anticipate a booming export business with their new Golden Eagle advanced trainer/fighter. However, all the key political figures -- both Korean and American -- keep mouthing the appropriate phrases of "mutual defense," "shared security concerns," and "provide stability in the region" to maintain the U.S. forces in Korea.

Activists proudly point to a 2002 MBC Poll that shows only 27.5% of Koreans want the Americans to stay while 16.8% say "leave now" and 55.6% say "start packing up." (NOTE: In the 1995 Sejong Poll, 41.5% wanted the Americans to stay.) Activists seem blithely unaware that there is a growing grassroots movement to disengage from Korea -- that has been slowly increasing momentum since 1978 when Jimmy Carter was elected President based upon that promise. The activists may not be watching the U.S. polls on CNN that showed 65 percent of the Americans favored disengagement from Korea. Less than one-third of Americans support the current Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and Korea. The American movement for disengagement proposes that Seoul and Washington should negotiate a phased withdrawal of American forces and termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty, replacing them with a cooperative military and political relationship among equals. In other words, the Americans want out!!!

The activists say, "If Korea is reunited and the Cold War ends in the Korean peninsula, the public opinion in the US would shift toward US disengagement from Korea and Korea will soon be forgotten. The American people would demand their troops out of Korea." The answer to is YES!!! Given the opportunity, the U.S. would be out of the door in no time flat -- without one shed tear and no looking back. More and more Americans are now seeing the Korean situation as simply that a KOREAN situation -- without any national security interests for America involved. For most Americans, a war between North and South Korea would be just that--a war between North and South Korea. The obvious humanitarian tragedy would generate few security concerns for the U.S. Presumably, it is for this reason that a majority of Americans oppose the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea; less than one-third support the current defense guarantee. Indeed, the U.S. ultimately will be more secure if its allies take the lead in dealing with potential conflicts that have minimal relevance to America.

In the foreseeable future, America will remain the largest trading partner with the region; retain significant cultural, historical, and political ties; and will cooperate militarily with allied states. The U.S. even could intervene militarily if it believed American vital interests were threatened--say by a potential hegemon that could not be contained by allied powers. To do so, Washington need NOT maintain an alliance and force structure created in a different era to achieve different ends. Nor need it intervene promiscuously in response to every instance of instability in a world in which some instability is inevitable. In other words, the U.S. will continue to exert influence throughout Asia, but as the only super-power left in the world, it need not stay in Korea to protect its interests. If you look closely at George Bush's vision for a 21st Century fighting force, having a stationary target on Korean soil (2d ID) is really not part of the stripped down mobile force that he envisions.

However, the activists may be right on one point. Though some analysts contend that America's presence in Korea offers an important base to promoting regional stability, others feel the ROK has just MODEST strategic value for the U.S. To many analysts it is felt that Washington could maintain whatever air and naval forces it desired in the region without bases in Korea, as well as a cooperative relationship with South Korea even in the absence of a defense guarantee and units based on Korean soil. (See Korea Marches to Its Own Drummer for details.)

Unfortunately, despite all assurances to the contrary, the activists feel that the U.S. wants to remain in Korea forever -- and has done everything to ruin the North-South reconciliation in order to retain its foothold in Korea. The logic here does not seem reasonable. Simple weight of numbers of the North could lead to the destruction of Seoul even if North Korea ultimately (and quickly) lost the war. There are a lot of safer ways to maintain your influence in the region than to risk the lives of tens of thousands of Seoul civilians -- as well as the bulk of your military force.

SOFA The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was renegotiated in 1990 to increase the Korean portion of the defense expenditures. As Korea had a favorable balance-of-payments ratio in foreign trade starting in 1986 that was rapidly increasing, it was certain that Korea could afford the cost.

This FIRST renegotiation of the SOFA created a storm of protests as it was the first to recognize Korea as being able to afford its share. Up to this time, the Koreans had been under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and used the U.S. as their defense shield. The money saved was pumped into the Korean "chaebol" conglomerate protectionist system. This economic aid was what made possible the Miracle of the Han and transformed Korea into one of the Four Dragons of Asia. Korea did not start its modernization programs in the 1990s until almost 12 years after North Korea started its upgrade programs.

This renegotiation put Korea on notice that America was serious about leaving. It made the point that though all the folks could mouthe words like "regional stability" and "mutual defense," the truth was that any war between the Koreas had very little to do with the U.S. security risks in the region. Only North Korea with its nuclear capability was a concern for the US -- NOT the potential war between the Koreas.

Initially, the Koreans ran around crying "Why is my BIG BROTHER doing this to me?" and "We are a POOR country. Why are you doing this to me?" After many months, these cries diminished and soon the Koreans started to get a different world view. They started to reconsider their place in the world -- and never looked back. After 1990, when the costs of a military program was discussed, you would never hear a Korean saying "We are a poor country. We can't afford it. " Instead, they would comment on programs with "It costs too much!"

After this time, Korea started on an ambitious hardware upgrade program to gain technology and build up its own home-grown defense. Though it had entered many high-tech high value added industries such as microchip production, it had not geared up for military buildup. Its shipyards were still cranking out tankers, but it lacked the technology to start a buildup of its military hardware. It looked to Germany, France, Russia, Japan and the U.S. for its technology transfers. In 1900, the plant at Sochon started up the production lines for the KF-16s. The Germans were approached for submarine designs. By 2002, it was building its own destroyers, cruisers, submarines, KMA-1 Main Battle Tanks, launched its KR-III sub-orbital "research" rocket, possessed OFFENSIVE missile capabilities with the ATACMS, and so forth. The 1990 renegotiation forced Korea to march to its own drummer.

The SOFA's legal provisions of allowing the Korean police for the first time to demand jurisdiction over crimes that were committed off-base was the first opening of a highly bothersome issue. Prior to this negotiation, the USFK basically had all the control. Minor crimes occurring on-base or were line-of-duty accidents remained under the jurisdiction of the USFK. For major crimes, the wording was that the ROK COULD demand the jurisdiction rights over cases involving serious crimes (murder, rape, arson), but the US at this time still retained custody of the suspect until tried. Though the ROK police COULD demand jurisdiction for minor crimes, they never did. This is a key difference as the Korean system allowed questioning of the suspect without charges or presence of a lawyer -- and without this provision, the prosecutor's office's found it hard to conduct their style of investigation.

The activists despised this SOFA calling it "unjust" but at this time the majority of Koreans believed the U.S. forces were essential to the defense of Korea. Only years later would the Koreans start to feel that they did not need the U.S. for their defense -- and in fact started to feel the U.S. was blocking their unification efforts.

The following is from the conditions faced in 2002 -- and reflect the changes in activist thinking from the 1990 SOFA period. (Go to 2002: Protests for 2002 activists perspective of the plan)

Many activists view the increased cost-sharing for Korea as some sort of insult and any increases are labeled "protection money" as though the U.S. were a thug. To the activists, the US is "demanding more money from Seoul so that the doves who oppose US presence in Korea for economic reasons may be silenced. In 1989, Seoul paid the US 45 million dollars for its presence in Korea. This was the first time Seoul had to pay the US for protection. This protection money increased to 70 million dollars in 1990, 150 million dollars in 1991, 180 million in 1992, 220 million in 1993, 260 million in 1994, and 300 million in 1995. The protection money stayed at the 1995 level for awhile because of the economic meltdown in the late 1990's."

The activists fail to mention that the "Miracle of the Han" was made possible when Korea followed the Japanese "kiretsu" conglomerate model and built up their "chaebol" conglomerates while living under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The ROK Ministry of National Defense acknowledges that Seoul did not begin its "force improvement program" until "12 years later than North Korea." Instead, South Korea "concentrated on its economic and social development" despite the dire military threat from the North. Instead of funneling its monies into military buildup, it funneled it into its designated "chaebols." This protectionist economic strategy worked. The ROK has about 24 times the GDP of North Korea.

However, there was growing resentment from the American taxpayers after Korea became one of the "four dragons of Asia" and STILL would not pay what America considered its fair share for its defense. As late as 1986, Washington still was providing significant amounts of security-oriented aid. On top of this was the direct American military subsidy in the form of the defense commitment and troop deployments. All the while, the ROK invested the cash that it saved into the South Korean economy. In 1990, the U.S. demanded the Korea start paying its way as their economy could easily afford it. The SOFA was renegotiated and their share significantly increased. When the "IMF Crisis" hit in 1995, the Koreans immediately started to "poor mouth" and the costs remained static at 1995 years until 2001. After the IMF had given Korea a clean bill of health, the U.S. again readdressed the cost-sharing formula.

The activists complain that the US "demanded" 440 million dollars in 2001 and wants to increase the share by 10% per year to 600 million by 2004. To Americans, the activists are using a different accountant than the U.S. side. The activists claim that "Seoul's share of the US expenses in Korea was less than a third of the total direct costs in 1990 but it will shoot up to more than 50% by 2004-2005. Here we are addressing direct costs only. When indirect costs - such as land use and subsidized utilities - are added on, Seoul's share of the costs amounts to more than three billion dollars a year."

Unfortunately their viewpoint is a bit skewed. (See Korea Should Start Paying Their Own Way for an enlightening 1999 article that covers the inequity of the ROK cost sharing.) The U.S. pays about $15 billion dollars annually to maintain their troops in Korea -- with Korea reaping the benefits. The article states, "All told, Americans spend as much to defend the ROK--about $15,000,000,000 annually--as the South Koreans do." When you talk about percentage of GNP for defense from a developed nation, you will see that Korea is getting better, but is STILL SIGNIFICANTLY behind such countries as Finland who have no enemies now that Russia is gone.

However, when we start comparing Japan and Korea dealing with the SOFA costs, we see a facet of the Koreans that is very irksome. The activists complain that in the 1990s, "the U.S. troops in Japan and Korea cost about 30 billion dollars a year. Korea and Japan paid the U.S. about 2 billion dollars and 20 billion dollars, respectively." Though we may quibble with the figures here, the point is the disparity in the payments between Korea ($2 billion) and Japanese ($20 billion). The Koreans constantly complain about the inequity of the Korean SOFA when compared to Japanese SOFA, but they REFUSE to pay the same percentage as the Japanese. The activists when confronted with the question as to why they shouldn't increase their share, one usually hears a cop-out response like "Americans are here to further their national interests in Asia, so why should we pay for them." The topic is always closed at that point.

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Relocation of USFK Forces in Future:

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JANUARY 2004

First Land Returned under LPP (30 Dec 2003) In its first move to consolidate its bases in South Korea, the U.S. military closed an installation in Seoul on 30 Dec and returned its granted land to South Korean authorities. The return of the Arirang Taxi Compound in Seoul, a taxi service annex for U.S. personnel and their family members, is the first consolidation of American installations under a 2002 land partnership plan (LPP) ratified by the National Assembly on October 30, 2002.

On 30 Dec the USFK Website had an article on the Environmental Survey being completed on Yongsan Garrison's "Taxi Annex" near Itaewon. It stated "a three step environmental survey was performed on the Yongsan Taxi Compound in preparation for USFK's return of the property to ROK MND. This environmental survey involved the following steps.

• On January 28, 2003, USFK provided basic information relevant to the environmental condition of the Arirang Taxi Compound. This included items such as a list of facilities, history of the site, location of utilities, and a map of the site. It also addressed actions taken in preparation for release such as removal of heating fuel, disconnecting utilities, and removal of equipment and materials related to facilities.
• An initial joint site visit was conducted on February 18, 2003 to familiarize experts with the site prior to detailed survey.
• Technical experts from ROK Environmental Management Corporation conducted the ROK portion of the detailed environmental for ROK Ministry of National Defense from April 3, 2003 through May 28, 2003. The survey pointed out small areas of surface contamination where petroleum products had been spilled, but not detected prior to the survey. USFK used a Korean contractor to remove 78 cubic meters of soil for treatment by incineration and disposal. Concentration of petroleum after cleanup was reduced to approximately 1000 parts per million which is half the ROK standard requiring action.
• After the joint environmental survey and the actions above, ROK and US agreed that there were no other environmental conditions that required corrective action.

The procedures listed here can be expected to be followed in upcoming property transfers under the LPP and following the Environmental Impact/Clean up procedures agreed upon in mid-2003.

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Sixth Round of Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative in Jan 15-16 South Korean and U.S. military officials were scheduled to meet in Hawaii on Jan. 15-16 to discuss a range of issues which will likely include a plan to realign American troops stationed in South Korea. These meetings were to resolve these issues BEFORE the annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in November, but the failure to reach agreements on many key issues have led to these meetings.

Originally, Seoul offered 170,000 pyeong of the 810,000-pyeong (320 hectares) Yongsan base to be used by the UNC and CFC. One pyeong equals 3.3 square meters. On the other hand, the U.S. side reportedly sought to keep 280,000 pyeong or some 30 percent of the total Yongsan plot, to build large-scale lodging facilities, hospitals and schools to support 1,000 personnel affiliated with the CFC and UNC, as well as their family members whose number could rise as high as 6,000. Koreans offered some 17 million pyong, while Americans want more than 28 million. The U.S. response was simply that if the land was not granted ALL of the functions will move to Pyongtaek.

Going into Seoul reportedly was going to offer 200,000 pyong versus the 280,000 that the USFK demands. The ROK is still trying to negotiate everything in its reluctance to have the USFK move. Unfortunately, the ROK has very little leeway. The U.S. has made some major concessions, but the ROK has delivered nothing.

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U.S. Prefers Relocation of Seoul Facilities to Pyeongtaek (13 Jan) The U.S. wants all of its facilities in the Yongsan Garrison in Seoul to be relocated to Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province, 70 kilometers south of Seoul, to prevent "problems and inconveniences for Koreans in the center of the nation's capital," according to U.S. Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on 13 Jan.

Within this utterance, we also see a veiled threat over the recent protests over the lands where the Embassy seeks to construct their new housing units and administrative center. The protests from activists have been very unsettling as accusations fly over the historical significance of the proposed site.

The Ministry of Defense entering the Jan 15-16 meeting of the Future of the ROK-US Alliance Meeting in Honolulu was set to "increase" the offer of lands at Yongsan to 200,000 pyong. However, it was wishful thinking that they would succeed in keeping the USFK in Seoul. Though the ROK was putting on "smiley faces" on the upcoming meetings in January, the Ambassador's word give a foretaste that the meeting would NOT be a happy one. It will most certainly be contentious with the U.S. making demands -- and the still ROK attempting to negotiate. The ROK couldn't seem to understand that their broken promises on the USFK movement -- starting with their 1990 MOA -- did not make them a reliable ally.

Under terms agreed to in 2003, the two allies signed a plan to eventually close about half of the U.S. bases in South Korea, moving most troops to new military hubs near Osan Air Base and Camp Humphreys under the Land Partnership Plan (LPP). Many of the 2nd Infantry Division units would consolidate at Camp Red Cloud and Camp Casey before moving further south from the DMZ and out of North Korea's long-distance artillery range.

U.S. officials in 2003 touted some $11 billion in upgrades to military hardware as a way to keep a strong deterrent force while moving forces to different locations. However, many of the $11 billion upgrades were already in the works such as the Apache Longbow upgrades so it might be a little deceptive. The bottomline is that the high-tech hardware improvements are things that the ROK does NOT possess.

However, there is a lot of dissention over the Roh administration's policy to be "independent of the U.S." The Foreign Minister resigned and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) announced yesterday that Cho Hyeon-dong, director of the North America Division III who had been investigated by Cheong Wa Dae for his "infelicitous words," will not attend the sixth ROK-US alliance meeting held during January 15-16 in Hawaii. A MOFAT authority said, “We judged it difficult for Director Cho to leave for overseas business since Cheong Wa Dae’s investigation is in progress.”

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Yongsan Garrison Aerial View

Yongsan Garrison to Relocate (19 Jan) The USFK and CFC will relocate completely to Pyongtaek by "mutual agreement" following the 6th Round of the Future of the ROK-US Alliance in Hawaii. However, the ROK continues to attempt to "control" the situation by claiming the the USFK cost estimate of $9.5 billion would be as low as $3 billion. The Munhwa Ilbo reported that it seems the costs of the move, originally calculated to be around US$9.5 billion according to American estimates, "will be directly regulated by the Korean government and may fall as low as the US$3 billion level." The USFK has assumed the burden of contractor losses and will invest in Camp Humpherys infrastructure BUT it had also a promise from the ROK National Assembly on land availability and monetary support for the move in 2003. If the ROK attempts to "renegotiate" it will be in for more nasty surprises. The mood within the Department of Defense towards Korea is definitely reaching below-zero temperatures.

The 18 Jan Chosun Ilbo stated "The Yongsan Garrison will be moved completely to the Osan-Pyongtaek area. During the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative talks held in Hawaii on Saturday, the two negotiating teams, headed on the Korean side by Assistant Defense Minister Cha Young-koo and the American side by Deputy Assistant U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Lawless, agreed to a comprehensive Yongsan Garrison relocation agreement and implementation plans."

The article continued, "The Americans, however, insisted on moving the Yongsan Garrison completely out of the city. It is known that the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, taking into account anti-American feelings in South Korea, order the move to be carried out regardless of land offers from the Korean side. He asked whether Americans would accept a foreign army camped out in New York's Central Park.

Stars and Stripes Pacific Edition on 20 Jan stated, "The announcement was made at a joint press conference with South Korean Lt. Gen. Cha Young-koo and U.S. Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Lawless, the chief negotiators for each side. "We shared the view that the relocation of the CFC and UNC will further strengthen the bilateral alliance and pave the way for creating a stable environment for the U.S. military presence in South Korea for the long term," Cha said. Cha and Lawless said Saturday there had been no discussions about reducing the overall number of U.S. troops in South Korea."

The article continued, "Both sides said talks will continue throughout this year to hammer out unresolved issues, including how to pay for the move. Under previous agreements, South Korea would bear all of the estimated $3 billion cost of moving troops from Seoul to Pyongtaek. The decision came as a result of larger negotiations to reshuffle the 37,000 U.S. troops in the country, including the eventual move of forces away from the Demilitarized Zone." The damages to the concessions lost business will be compensated by the USFK, but it probably will be minimal as the USFK will offer the concessions at Pyongtaek and Osan to offset any losses.

The following is from the Chosun Ilbo on 18 Jan 2004:

All US Military Facilities to Go South of the Han River

by Yu Yong-weon (kysu@chosun.com)

All U.S. military facilities located at the Yongsan Garrison, including the Combined Forces Command and the UN Command, are to be moved to locations south of the Han River by the end of 2007. The move would bring an end to the 122-year history of having a foreign military based in Seoul, a history that began with the occupation of Yongsan by troops from Qing Dynasty China during the Military Revolt of 1882. The government aims to turn Yongsan into a park.

During the sixth round of the "Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative" talks held in Honolulu, Hawaii, the Korean and U.S. negotiating teams, led by Assistant Defense Minister Cha Young-koo and Deputy Assistant U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Lawless, respectively, agreed Saturday afternoon to move all the men and facilities from the Yongsan Garrison to the Osan-Pyeongtaek area.

Taking into account feelings of insecurity within Korea and practical issues like securing base sites and building facilities, the two side agreed to start moving the Combined Forces Command and UN Command in the beginning of 2007, after a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue has been reached and essentially linked to the second stage of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division's redeployment to positions south of the Han River. The two sides also agreed to leave behind the Dragon Hill Lodge (which sits on roughly 25,000 pyeong of land), a liaison office of about 50 men, and communications offices for the Commander in Chief of Combined Forces Command (a four-star U.S. general) and the Deputy Commander in Chief (a four-star Korean general). (SITE NOTE: We question the wording in this article that states "after a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue has been reached" as it is something the USFK has repeatedly refused to link the future reductions/relocations to.)

Meanwhile, Seoul city officials said Sunday that they would recommend to the government plans to designate the Yongsan Garrison area a national park and woodlands. (SITE NOTE: The Ministry of Defense is planning to retain some of the acreage and sell off the remainder to pay for the move to Pyongtaek. The two sides -- the Seoul City administration and the Ministry of Defense -- are NOT on the same wavelength.)

According to Korea Herald on 20 Jan, Korea was already starting to waffle on repositioning costs. The controversy centered on how South Korea will finance the cost of relocating all American troops out of metropolitan Seoul over the next three years. To raise the money for the relocation, the Defense Ministry wants to sell the land used for the U.S. army to build commercial buildings. But the Seoul Metropolitan Government plans to acquire the army base site at no cost to turn it to a national park. Under the agreement, South Korea will have to shoulder all relocation costs, estimated at 3.6 trillion to 6 trillion won ($3 billion to $5 billion) by Korean estimates, but $9.5 billion by USFK estimates. Analysts, however, say it would be virtually impossible for Seoul to cover all the costs alone, considering that its national budget for this year increased by only 6.9 trillion won with the defense budget standing at almost 19 trillion won.

According to sources in the National Security Council, "About 90 percent has been agreed at working-level negotiations between South Korea and the U.S." The South Korean side will supply manpower to help with the move. Part of the costs will be paid for in services. However, negotiations were still underway to determine the details in January.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Goh Kun instructed government officials Monday to form a task force on the establishment of a national park in central Seoul where the headquarters of U.S. military forces in South Korea is currently located. Goh ordered his office to set up a pan-national panel including civilian experts to map out a "master plan" for the Yongsan relocation. Seoul City Mayor Lee Myung-bak said he would officially request the central government establish a public park in the Yongsan area. "The sites composing Yongsan garrison should be returned to the people to revive national identity," Lee said, touching upon a fact that foreign troops, including Chinese Ching Dynasty soldiers and Japan's Imperial army, have been stationed in the area for about 120 years.

The following is an editorial from the Chosun Ilbo on 18 Jan 2004:

Preparing for USFK to be South of the Han

Korea and the United States have agreed to move all United States Forces Korea (USFK) facilities from the installation in Yongsan to Pyeongtaek, Gyeonggi Province. The U.S. 2nd Infantry is set to move south of the Han River in the near future. The end of all this winds up being a situation where the only USFK business north of the Han will be around 50 liaison officers on what will be the "former" base at Yongsan.

To begin with, you have to ask whether the government has plans supplement the difference in fighting power and equipment that will come with the era in which the USFK will be south of the Han. This is not something that needs repetitions of slogans about "independent diplomacy." The experts calculate that the cost of making up for the difference will be many times more than the US$3 billion it will cost to make the move.

The next question one worries about is whether the current government has formulated measures for dealing with the change in the character of the USFK and the subsequent increase in the fluidity and uncertainty of Korea's security. Even in the process of reorganizing its foreign deployed military after the end of the Cold War, the United States has maintained that the USFK would not be used for military purposes outside the Korean Peninsula, and stance has served to maintain control on the Cold War situation that remains on the peninsula and on North Korea's conventional capabilities.

The "era in which the USFK is south of the Han River" means U.S. forces will be free from this restricted role, and that its military strength could at any time be made to meet demands in Northeast Asia and the whole of Asia, not just those presented by North Korea. This means there has to be a complete re-thinking of our defense strategy, since we have automatically and habitually thought of our deterrent towards the North as the sum of the Korean military and the strength of the USFK.

Finally, one asks how the government will make up for the changed image, foreign and domestic, of Korea's security situation, which has until now been the result of a combination of having the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division at the DMZ and the Combined Forces Command and United Nations Command in Seoul. The resulting anxieties mean more than an increase in military uncertainties. The more fundamental anxiety is the question of whether this situation, which runs contrary to the people's judgment about security, isn't the result of an unreasonable conclusion to this agreement, one arrived at because of an obstinate attachment to the hollow concept of "independence" that exists within the current government.

Reaction in political circles to the Korea-U.S. agreement on the relocation of the entire U.S. forces in Korea to areas south of Seoul is divided along party lines. The majority opposition Grand National Party threatened not to ratify the bilateral accord, which it claims seriously jeopardizes the defense of the republic and wished the "tripwire" to remain in place. They viewed it as the precursor to the withdrawal of the USFK. The Millennium Democratic Party were concerned about the defense structure for the nation and the ultimate monetary costs to the ROK in order to fill the vacuum left by the USFK. The pro-government Uri Party of Roh Moo-hyun welcomed the move in order to put a happy face on their negotiations. The Seoul government, the political opposition and the U.S. authorities all have different thoughts on the matter of how the relocation will affect the defense of Korea. The USFK stated that there will be no impact and assured that ROK that it would not weaken the defense pact. The following is an editorial from the Korea Herald on 20 Jan 2004:

Politics of USFK relocation

Reaction in political circles to the Korea-U.S. agreement on the relocation of the entire U.S. forces in Korea to areas south of Seoul is divided along party lines. The majority opposition Grand National Party threatens not to ratify the bilateral accord, which it claims seriously jeopardizes the defense of the republic, while the pro-government Uri Party welcomes it. The Millennium Democratic Party called for supplementary steps not to weaken the security of the nation.

Many are concerned about the financial burden, which will be significant, but this is a secondary problem. The basic and the most important question is how the relocation will affect the defense of South Korea against a possible North Korean invasion. One disturbing fact is that the Seoul government, the political opposition and the U.S. authorities all have different thoughts on the matter.

First, U.S. officials insist that the USFK relocation, including the move of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command and the U.N. Command, will allow greater efficiency and economy of scale and thereby improve their combined defense posture. They believe it is also needed to shift the USFK mission from a posture of deterrence against aggression from the North to one of a strategic mobile force in the region.

The giant opposition party argues that the absence of the U.S. command in Seoul and pulling back the U.S. ground combat forces to the south of the capital mean the removal of the "tripwire" checks against a North Korean invasion and they also expose the populated areas to long-range artillery attack from the North. The GNP accused the Roh Moo-hyun administration of helping Kim Jong-il, claiming that the relocation is a precursor to the withdrawal of the USFK.

The position of the Roh government is more complicated. Seoul's representative to last week's talks in Hawaii said Korea accepted the U.S. proposal "in consideration of the Korean people's desire to end the stationing of foreign forces in the capital city," as well as the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and the overall U.S. forces realignment plan.

Korean authorities had initially opposed the departure of the dual command from Seoul but offered only 140 acres as compensation in Yongsan against the 230 acres demanded by the USFK. The Americans were somehow convinced that the Seoul government did not really want to keep the U.S. forces headquarters in the capital city, the target of anti-Americanism here, and stuck to their position.

At this point we wonder if the manner in which the Yongsan U.S. command relocation question was settled reflected in any way the newly re-emerged concept of an "independent diplomacy" stressed by the present administration, as against the traditional emphasis on a strong alliance with the United States. Whatever Seoul's basic philosophy, we see that non-military considerations have significantly interfered in the negotiations over the USFK relocation question.

The two allies should now closely cooperate so as not to create any vulnerability, both while the relocation is underway and thereafter. Seoul will have to monitor the progress of Washington's $11 billion program to reinforce the USFK over the next few years closely and adjust its own forces improvement programs accordingly.

Military officials assert that advanced technologies will ensure that the move of the 2nd Division to the south will create no defense vacuum. Yet, it requires that some well-equipped Korean ground forces replace the U.S. division in the Dongducheon area. It would mean an extensive realignment of the forward units of the Korean Army, as the addition of a new ROK Army division seems impractical.

The Grand National Party, meanwhile, is advised to be more prudent in dealing with the USFK realignment even if its concerns appear legitimate. The opposition party's threatened refusal to ratify the Korea-U.S. agreement will only complicate the matter as long as it cannot produce any viable alternative.

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Future Closure of Camp Graves and Giant (Jan 2004) Camp Greaves and Giant will close by 1 Nov 2004 -- instead of 2011 under the original LPP -- and the USFK will scale down operations at Camp Bonifas and Camp Liberty Bell. On 12 Jan Brig. Gen. John A. Macdonald, the director of the Installation Management Agency-Korea Region, provided remarks to give as much early planning as possible to Korean civilian employees' future as it applies to the status of Camps Greaves and Giant. It appears that there is no contingency plan for civilian and Korean workers -- meaning they will be out of a job. As part of the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) there have been discussions concerning the possible acceleration of some facilities actions, but both the ROK and U.S. have confirmed no final decisions or timelines are in place.

Under the LPP, U.S. bases will be reduced from 41 to 23 by 2011. Base closures will come “on a timeline agreed to by both parties,” the release stated. Camps Greaves and Giant were originally scheduled for closure in 2011. “Finalized information will be released as decisions are agreed to by both the ROK and U.S. partners,” the USFK release read. Greaves and Giant are home to 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment. Soldiers at Camps Bonifas and Liberty Bell are part of the Joint Security Battalion, a U.N. Command unit headed by a U.S lieutenant colonel responsible for security at Panmunjom. U.S. and South Korean officials discussed reducing the U.S. presence at Camp Bonifas during the Future of the Alliance initiative meetings.

Camps Greaves, Giant to close by Nov. 1

By Joseph Giordono, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Saturday, January 17, 2004

YONGSAN GARRISON, South Korea — The Army will close Camp Greaves and Camp Giant by Nov. 1 and will drastically scale down operations at Camp Bonifas and Camp Liberty Bell, officials said Thursday. Brig. Gen. John A. Macdonald, director of the Installation Management Agency-Korea Region, made the surprise announcement at a town hall meeting with Camp Casey soldiers earlier this week. Official word, however, was not spread until a Thursday afternoon news release. "Camp Greaves will close. We plan to have the move completed by Nov. 1. Then we'll lock the gate and turn it over to the Republic of Korea," Macdonald said, according to the release. A spokesman for IMA-KORO said Thursday the closures were part of a revision to the Land Partnership Plan that South Korea and the United States signed in March 2002. Under the original plan, Greaves and Giant were to close in 2011, said the spokesman, Steve Oertwig. Officials could not immediately explain why the time line was moved up, or why the bases named were the ones to be closed or downsized. More details would be available Friday, Oertwig said. Greaves and Giant are home to the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, a major part of the 2nd Infantry Division. It was unclear Thursday where those soldiers would move, but military officials previously have said smaller bases in the 2nd ID area would be consolidated onto hubs at Camp Casey and Camp Red Cloud. "We own the bases but we don't own the soldiers," Oertwig said, when asked what would happen to troops stationed there. A 2nd Infantry Division spokeswoman said Thursday it was not "in her purview" to discuss the announcement at this time. Greaves, at 58 acres, and Giant, at 24 acres, offer fewer services than other area bases; soldiers stationed at the two bases routinely travel to the larger facilities in the area. Camp Giant also houses a Directorate of Public Works office, which likely will be shifted to Rodriguez Range and other bases in the Western Corridor area, officials said. Macdonald also announced that the number of U.S. soldiers at Camps Bonifas and Liberty Bell — which sit on the Demilitarized Zone's southern boundary and house soldiers who serve in the Joint Security Battalion — will be reduced from 200 to 43.

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US PR active to put Smiley Faces on Relocation With the latest news of the pullout from Seoul, the "smiley face" articles are starting to appear to try to show that the US-ROK relationship is solid. The Stars and Stripes Pacific Edition on 20 Jan stated that the South Korean government has increased its spending to help support the stationing of American military bases here in recent years. For fiscal 2003, which ended Sept. 30, South Korea spent US$539.5 million in direct support of the 37,000 American troops stationed here, an increase from $49.5 million in 2002 and $114.5 million in 2001.

However, at the same time on 19 Jan, South Korean civic activists were rallying against the ROK-US agreement to relocate American troops from Seoul to Pyongtaek. These NGO activist groups vehemently oppose the relocation to Pyongtaek -- and instead would rather see ALL troops withdrawn from Korea.

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Pyongtaek Farmers Rally Against Relocation The relocation of the military to Pyongtaek have ALWAYS been opposed by the residents, mayor and city councilmen. Despite all the "smiley faces" the ROK government and USFK want to paint on the issue, this is a fact. In the 1990s when the Yongsan relocation was surfaced, the then mayor and city councilmen flatly refused to have an increase in military within their city.

When the latest move to move the military south of the Han, the Pyongtaek hierarchy again protested the move but were steamrollered by the ROK government. At this point, the views of the residents were methodically suppressed in the foreign English speaking press, though periodically news clips would appear in the Yonhap news of the Pyongtaek residents unhappiness with the situation. News of the protest were always from Tongil News and OhMy News. In 2003, the demonstrations were mostly from student agitators from OUTSIDE the area who protested at the gates of Camp Humpherys. (SEE Relocation: 2003).

The following is a translation of the OhMy News article dealing with the relocation from the Pyongtaek Farmers perspective. The translation appeared in the Korea Herald on 30 Jan 2004.

Last November, when it was announced that 240,000 p'yeong of farming land was to be expropriated from part of P'aengseong-eup [in P'yeongt'aek City], the heads of 71 villages got together and formed the P'aengseong Response Committee. Since last Dec. 26, they have been on a sit-down strike in a tent on a farm road. The villagers take 24-hour shifts watching out for and impeding moves from the Ministry of Defense to expropriate their land.

We entered the sit-down strike tent, and there the married women's club members unburdened their hearts of their losses suffered from the U.S. military. Lee Ok-ja (59, P'yeongt'aek City, P'aengseong-uep, Daech'u-ri) said, "We've had land taken from us for the U.S. base, and rather than compensation, we've been forced from our homes naked or had to build and live in mud huts… we've had to cry tears of blood."

Lee Kyeong-bun (50, Daech'u-ri, president of the club) said, "Because of the ear-splitting sound from the American warplanes, our children go into convulsions, and because the American soldiers carelessly burn waste fuel, we couldn't hang up our laundry," and "I have nothing to ask the American military. The only thing I wish is that they would just go back to their own country quietly."

The married-women's club members shuddered as they recalled instances of rape and sexual harassment suffered at the hands of the American military. "Since we were frightened of the American military, we couldn't go out at night, and because we never knew what misfortune might befall us, we couldn't adorn ourselves as we would have liked," they said. Their voices rose, saying, "Since we have lived suffering as much as we could suffer, and enduring as much as we could endure, they mustn't do any more damage to us."

Lee Su-yong (36, P'aengseong-eup, secretary general of the Response Committee) protested that the government and the U.S. military were turning the villagers, who have lived their lives being sacrificed for national security, into believers in anti-Americanism. He said, "The land of Daech'u-ri is the villagers' land, not the nation's land, and the villagers will put everything on the line and defend their land to the end." Conveying the urgency of the situation, he said "The villagers oppose the turning over of land to the U.S. military with such a do-or-die spirit that they joke among themselves that they'd rather kick out the U.S. military and accept a nuclear waste dump." (SITE NOTE: This is in reference to the bloody riots when the government heavy-handily selected Puan and the future nuclear dump site without consultation with the residents. In December 2003, the government backed off and was seeking a new site.)

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Construction Projects at Yongsan halted Because of the relocation notice for the units at Yongsan, the construction contracts for Yongsan and Camp Stanley have been put on a hold. The monies intended to improve Camp Stanley have been shifted to Camp Humphreys. The following article is from the Stars and Stripes on 27 Jan 2004.

S. Korea transformation complicates construction

By Jeremy Kirk, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Tuesday, January 27, 2004

YONGSAN GARRISON, South Korea — The U.S. Army has halted construction projects at Yongsan Garrison and in the 2nd Infantry Division area, focusing now on “enduring installations” the U.S. military plans to occupy long term in South Korea, said U.S. Forces Korea’s top engineer.

“We have been talking with the Koreans for some time now about reshaping the force here,” said Col. Dan Wilson.

Those talks have led to a USFK shift in construction plans, toward moving forces at Yongsan Garrison and consolidating the 2nd Infantry Division. Eventually, USFK officials have said, U.S. forces will relocate to two major hubs at Camp Humphreys in Pyongtaek and Osan Air Base.

But the continuing negotiations pose a logistics problem: Securing military construction funding requires congressional blessing and usually takes years. A year ago, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld ordered commanders to ensure their military construction requests made sense given the ongoing discussions, Wilson said.

USFK commander Gen. Leon J. LaPorte analyzed every planned construction project to see if it should be kept, the engineer said. LaPorte’s “commitment to the Congress has always been that he’s only going to invest in enduring installations … we were redefining what those enduring installations were.”

Because of potential changes in where the Korean government wanted U.S. troops to relocate, in spring 2003 the Defense Department recommended canceling and relocating some projects, Wilson said, and cutting the military construction budget accordingly. Affected were fiscal 2003 construction projects that hadn’t been awarded to builders and fiscal 2004 projects submitted to Congress, Wilson said.

For example, money planned to improve Camp Stanley — a 2nd Infantry Division camp in Uijongbu — was shifted to Camp Humphreys, he said. “That’s the future for Korea,” said USFK’s top engineer. “That’s the enduring installation. That’s where we are focusing all our resources.”

The result: The U.S. Army will spend $65 million on two Camp Humphreys construction projects during fiscal 2004 — the start of a hefty expansion planned for the base, which is in a relatively rural area surrounded by rice paddies 40 miles south of Seoul.

Plans call for spending $40 million to build a 464-person barracks, a 96-person unaccompanied officer quarters, one brigade headquarters and two company operations buildings, and spending $25 million to build a 232-person barracks, battalion headquarters and three company operations buildings.

But the two barracks projects can’t be awarded to a contractor, Wilson said, until USFK shows congressional military construction subcommittees a Camp Humphreys master plan accommodating the anticipated relocations.

The congressional committees also want to see relocation cost-sharing arrangements with Korea’s government, “which we are in the final stages of negotiating,” the engineer said.

An architectural engineering firm is drafting that master plan; the intent is to finish it before LaPorte gives his annual testimony to Congress, usually in March or April, Wilson said.

“We have a very good idea of everything we need to build at Camp Humphreys,” he said. “Everyone who is moving is going to get new facilities. So … it will be a big quality-of-life difference for everyone.”

LaPorte also made a project-by-project decision on construction funded by South Korea’s government and by U.S. military agencies whose budgets come from non-appropriated funds, outside the regular military budgets, Wilson said. “Our challenge is to work all of those different funding sources together and apply them against the appropriate projects.”

The Air Force got exactly what it wanted for fiscal 2004: $68.5 million in military construction and family housing construction dollars: $45 million for family housing projects, $16.5 for a barracks and $7 million for upgraded aircraft shelters at Kunsan Air Base, Wilson said.

The command is pursuing a build-to-lease project at Camp Humphreys similar to the U.S. Navy’s in Naples, Italy, he said: The military would rent housing, schools and other facilities from a Korean developer for a certain term, thereby avoiding construction and maintenance costs.

Developers will be asked to submit proposals this spring, Wilson said. While plans aren’t firm, the military tentatively seeks a community-style neighborhood including 1,500 family housing units, schools and shops. “The Koreans go out and build whole new cities all the time,” the engineer said. “Let’s leverage their expertise.” He attended the last round of relocation talks with South Korea’s government in Hawaii Jan. 15-16. After years of complaints about the amount of space U.S. troops occupy in downtown Seoul, officials agreed to vacate Yongsan Garrison by 2007. Under an existing agreement, South Korea must pay for such a move. No plans have been released yet on how South Korea will meet the estimated multibillion-dollar bill.

Those will come after South Korea’s National Assembly, its legislature, approves a final agreement, Wilson contended.

Despite press reports indicating tension during negotiations, Wilson described the atmosphere at all talks he’s attended as “very cooperative. It’s very open and honest. We don’t immediately agree on everything but that shouldn’t surprise anyone. We have agreed in principle on all the important points.”

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FEBRUARY 2004

USFK Continues Denial of Restructuring On 2 Feb, the military commentator Richard Halloran reported in the Washington Times that the forces in Korea were being considered for realignment in conjunction with the global situation. The Washington Times reported that the Pentagon was pressing ahead with massive restructuring of the U.S. Pacific Command, including the disbanding of the U.S. Forces Korea, the United Nations Command and the South Korea-U.S Combined Forces Command. (SITE NOTE: Richard Halloran formerly was a writer for the New York Times, but currently reports out of Honolulu, Hawaii. His reports in the past have proven to right on target. For example, while the rest of the U.S. press was distracted by the North Korean nuclear crisis. the Korean anti-Americanism raged against the USFK. Long before the rest of the U.S. press woke up, he wrote an article in July 2002 revealing this disasterous situation. In other military areas, he has been a credible source of information.)

US Pacific Command Faces Sweeping Changes

By Richard Halloran
Times Staff Writer

HONOLULU, Hawaii -- Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld is planning a sweeping revision of the command apparatus through which U.S. military forces are controlled in Asia, in an effort to make them more responsive to contingencies from the Koreas to Australia.

Military officers said the revision would take place primarily in South Korea and Japan, but would affect deployments throughout the Pacific Command's area of responsibility, which runs from the West Coast across the Pacific and Indian Oceans to East Africa.

From its headquarters overlooking Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, it controls 300,000 military people and is the largest combatant command of the U.S. armed forces.

Among the command elements that will most likely be dismantled in South Korea are the U.N. Command (UNC), U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), the Combined Forces Command (CFC), and the Eighth U.S. Army. In Japan, United States Forces Japan (USFJ) will disappear, but a new operational corps headquarters led by a lieutenant general will be set up.

In addition, the position of the four-star general who commands the UNC, USFK and CFC will be abolished. At the same time, plans call for establishing a new billet for an Army four-star general at the headquarters of the U.S. Army Pacific at Fort Shafter in Hawaii. He will take control of Army forces in the Pacific region now under the command of a three-star general.

In response to a query, the spokesman for the Pacific Command, Navy Capt. John Singley said: "The Pacific Command is currently reviewing plans to strengthen our defense posture as part of a larger U.S. government global effort in that regard. We are currently consulting with our allies and partners in the region and will continue to do so before any decisions are made."

"Some of these plans are near-term," Capt. Singley said. "Others are further in the future. The aim of the global-posture review is to strengthen our defense relationships with key allies and partners, improve flexibility, enable action regionally and globally, exploit advantages in rapid power projection, and focus on overall capabilities instead of numbers."

Officers informed of the shakeup pointed to Mr. Rumsfeld's wider plan to "transform" the Pentagon and the armed forces.

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith told an audience in Washington in December: "A key facet of transformation is realigning our global defense posture. That is, updating the types, locations, numbers and capabilities of our military forces and the nature of our alliances."

In Asia, the officers said, the intent was to eliminate crisscrossing chains of command that are legacies of World War II, the occupation of Japan, the Korean War, the war in Vietnam, and the Cold War, which ended in 1989 when the Soviet Union collapsed.

These officers asked not to be identified because the review is still in process and no decisions have been made. "When we get through," said one officer, "it will be seamless."

By removing layers of the current cumbersome military bureaucracy, they suggested, troops and ships and aircraft would be able to respond more quickly to any crisis on orders from the president and secretary of defense.

In addition, the revisions are intended to appeal to South Korean nationalism and to tamp down rising anti-Americanism. The United States and South Korea have already announced that the U.S. headquarters will move from a congested area in Seoul to a new site about 75 miles to the south. The 2nd Infantry Division will move from the heavily populated area north of Seoul to new bases farther south.

Disbanding the CFC is intended to lessen South Korean complaints that it diminishes Korean sovereignty, said officers with experience there.

The CFC controls both South Korean and U.S. forces, but is led by a U.S. general with a Korean general as second in command. Many Koreans have argued that it is their country and they furnish the bulk of the forces, and therefore, a Korean should command.

"This would reduce the misperception that the U.S. controls the Korean military," said an officer. It might also take away a North Korean charge that South Korean forces are lackeys of the Americans.

Disbanding the UNC, Mr. Feith said, "will undoubtedly be part of the whole discussion that we have regarding the realignment of our posture in Korea."

On 4 Feb, the U.S. Department of Defense denied this news report that the American military has been pushing to dismantle its Combined Forces Command in South Korea as part of a massive restructuring of its Pacific Command. In response to the commentary written by Richard Halloran that appeared both in the Korea Herald on Jan. 30, 2004 and the Washington Times on Feb. 2, 2004, the U.S. Department of Defense issued the following statement: "It's important to note that this piece represents an opinion, and should not be viewed as authoritative fact. This speculation reported as fact does not help efforts to make decisions in consultations with our allies." Said LCDR Flex Plexico, Defense Department Press Officer.

In response to the same articles, U.S. Forces Korea website stated: "There is no plan to dismantle the Command elements of the United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, U.S. Forces Korea and 8th U.S. Army Headquarters. Any change to the command structure of UNC, CFC, USFK or EUSA will be coordinated directly with the Republic of Korea government. Any media reports concerning the future of UNC, CFC, USFK and EUSA are speculation," said Lt. Col. MaryAnn B. Cummings, USFK Public Affairs Officer.

After the 7th round of the Future of the Alliance fell through because of monetary differences, on 19 Feb Gen. Leon J. LaPorte publicly dismissed speculation that a U.S. realignment plan of its soldiers in South Korea will eventually lead to a troop reduction. He stated that the U.S. will not COMPLETELY withdraw its troops stationed on the Korean Peninsula, even after the two Koreas are reunified in the future.

Despite the DoD and USFK denials, according to SBS News on 19 Feb, the 2nd Infantry Division will be split into two brigades, one of which will be sent to an area near Osan and the other to an area near Pusan. The two brigades will be responsible not only for defending against a North Korean invasion, but will also play a pivotal role in US military strategy in East Asia. According to the SBS report, the Korean military will begin taking over US military duties in the forward areas of South Korea beginning this fall, with plans to take over all such duties by 2006.

The article also says that the US Defense Department will greatly reduce the number of US troops in Korea, and that the commander of US Forces Korea will be changed from a general rank to a lieutenant general. The US Defense Department has denied the report, saying that the US and Korea are currently in negotiations on the redeployment issue.

What is interesting about the SBS article is the first mention of a unit at "Pusan." This was mentioned long ago under the LPP negotiations in 2000. Actually the area was in Pohang in the locale that the USFK has joint exercises with the RoK for amphibious landings. The RoK STILL has not procured any land in the area per the provisions of the LPP.

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President Roh Supports USFK Move out of Yongsan AND NGO Anti-War Group in Sync On 12 Feb 2004, President Roh Moo-hyun Thursday defended the agreement between South Korea and the United States to relocate the U.S. troops and facilities in Yongsan Garrison out of Seoul. Speaking at a luncheon meeting with representatives of the Korea Freedom League, a major conservative organization, Roh said, "It is the right decision to move the Yongsan Garrison, although there exist those who either support or oppose the relocation." Roh said the decision by the U.S. to move the Yongsan Garrison to Pyeongtaek, is part of the U.S. global strategy for troop redeployment.

The Chosun Ilbo stated, "From the armies of the Qing Dynasty and Japan in the past to the American troops of the present, foreign armies have been continually stationed to the Yongsan area, said President Roh Moo-hyun as he was commenting on the move of the U.S. garrison at Yongsan. "Now is the time for the area to release itself from its historic symbolism," he said. .. Korea has moved on from an era where foreign armies were garrisoned in the heart of Seoul to a new era of freedom, independence, harmony, cooperation, and peace." In other words, rejoice that the foreign invaders have been removed. Not pretty words.

The Anti-War Movement lead by the Rev. Mun Chon-Hyun, a Catholic priest whose operates out of Kunsan. (See photos below: The man with the short white beard using a cane is the Rev. Mun.) However, for the past year, his operations have been centered in Seoul where he has led the anti-American demonstrations near the embassy. On the latest move of the USFK forces out of Yongsan, Rev. Mun staged a protest in Seoul stating that the move from Yongsan was part of the U.S. Global Strategy and therefore the U.S. should pay for ALL of the move's costs.

Protest in Seoul (10 Feb 2004)

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7th Meeting of the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative (20-21 Feb) On 20 Feb, the US and ROK will conduct the 7th round of meetings on the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA). There are areas that in conflict primarily the cost-sharing for the move to Pyongtaek. The ROK have balked at every turn on paying for the move -- which they signed off on starting in 1990 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), but later in 2003 "renegotiated." The ROK side makes it appear that the "Umbrella Agreement" is still being worked on, but the fact is that it was ratified under the 1990 MOA approved by the National Assembly. The U.S. is pressing Korea to pick up the tab for relocation costs per its agreement, but the ROK has taken the tact that the costs are inflated. The ROK position is that the MOA is invalid and must be renegotiated, while the US states that the MOA remains in effect with the ROK picking up ALL costs for relocation.

7th Round of ROK-US Future of Alliance Initiative (12 Feb 2004)

In 2003, Korea said that the U.S. had "padded" the figures. After a year of anti-Americanism pointed at the USFK in 2002, the U.S. was in no mood to banter over this point with a G-12 nation -- or in the U.S. words, "a prosperous democracy." When the topic was resurfaced again, the Korean government announced the relocation cost for Yongsan at $1.3 billion -- but this was NOT confirmed by the USFK. This was the starting volley of the Korean government wanting to negotiate the price down.

In 2004, the ROK wishfully thinks it can get the cost down to the $3.2 billion range, though the USFK has stated in the past -- and continues to state that it would be in the $9.5 billion range for the total relocation of forces south of the Han. The ROK has used every tact from poor-mouthing (not enough money in budget) to using pressure of declaring sales of military equipment to Korea may be in jeapordy. Even now there is a contentious move by the MND to attempt to pay for the move by selling the prime real estate Yongsan land -- while the Prime Minister calls for the creation of a national park.

The ROK is caught in a trap of its own making. For over 20 years Korea has slowly reduced its share of GDP for defense from 8% in 1980 under Chun Doo-hwan to 2.8 percent under Kim Dae-jung. Now it was being called upon to pay the piper. In 2004, the budget increased to 3.2 percent of GDP AFTER the US forced the ROK to do so. Up until that time the amount had slowly decreased until it was at 2.8% of GDP -- but far below the average 6 percent of GDP of other nations with a hostile frontier.

There was a great concern over what was at stake in the 7th round of talks. The Chosun Ilbo editorial stated, "United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said the other day that the U.S. did not want to station troops where they are not wanted or in places that are unfriendly. He said the current reorganization of overseas U.S. forces would be the largest since the end of World War II. Given the context of Rumsfeld's usual statements, these latest comments leave ample room to be interpreted as indicating there will be a reduction of the United States Forces Korea (USFK). When he visited Seoul in November of last year, he did not completely deny the possibility, saying that military strength is not measured in "numbers."

Troop Relocation from Yongsan (13 Feb 2004)

US, Korea to Discuss Yongsan Move during Talks

by Koo Sung-jae (sjkoo@chosun.com)

South Korea and the United States will conduct the seventh round of the “Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative” talks in the conference room in the National Defense Ministry for two days starting Friday, and will have final negotiations on the Umbrella Agreement (UA), the legal basis for the move of the Yongsan Garrison, and the Implementation Agreement (IA).

Nam Dae-yeon, the spokesman of the National Defense Ministry said Thursday that “both sides will negotiate on the cost, execution procedures and others matters, and will possibly reach an agreement and announce a preliminary statement during the morning conference on Saturday.” Assistant Defense Minister Cha Young-koo from South Korea, and Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Lawless from the U.S. will participate as delegation heads.

The UA will regulate the principles of the move of the Yongsan Garrison and the procedures, objective units, execution principles, designing and constructing procedures, cost management, and others issues, while the IA will include supplementary facilities, charges on the estate, cost procedures, general development plans of the facilities, the offer and return schedule of the land, and location of main bases.

It is known that both sides hold differing views on South Korea’s verification of the move's budget, which reaches US$ 4 billion, and turn-key construction methods, among other things.

Both sides agreed on Jan. 15 and 16 in Honolulu, Hawaii to move all U.S. military facilities located at the Yongsan Garrison, including the Combined Forces Command and the UN Command, to locations south of the Han River and negotiated on setting the UA, and IA, but could not reach an agreement because of their differing views on some issues.

If the UA and IA are agreed upon during this conference, they will go through preliminary announcement procedures and after being officially signed by Defense Minister Cho Yung-kil, North American Affairs Director-General Kim Sook, Commander of the United States Forces Korea (USFK) General Leon LaPorte, and Deputy Commander of USFK and Commander of the Pacific Air Forces' 7th Air Force, Lieutenant General Garry R. Trexler, they will be officially laid before the National Assembly for ratification.

Troop Relocation from Yongsan (12 Feb 2004)

Troop Relocation from Yongsan (13 Feb 2004)

In mid-Feb 2004, it was becoming apparent that ROK would try a new strategy in attempting to reduce its share of costs for the USFK move to Pyongtaek. It was going to attempt to illustrate how the USFK move off the DMZ was part of the U.S. GLOBAL STRATEGY and therefore, the U.S. should pick up a greater share of the moving costs. The anti-war NGO activist groups were espousing this strategy prior to the 7th round of talks on the Future of the ROK-US Alliance. This was NOT going to fly. The following is from 14 Feb 2004 Yonhap News:

S. Korea, U.S. Fail to Sign Yongsan Base Relocation Plan

South Korea and the United States failed to sign an accord Saturday to relocate the U.S. military command out of Seoul due to "language and other technical problems," a joint statement said.

The allies had planned to sign the deal at the end of a two-day meeting in Seoul but they found that there still were minor details that should be addressed, it said.

"The two sides agreed that they have moved measurably closer to concluding the necessary agreement and shared the strong desire to resolve remaining technical details as quickly as possible," said the statement.

Lt. Gen. Cha Young-koo, the chief South Korean negotiator, said both sides differed over details of the relocation cost, estimated at around US$3-$4 billion. Under a 1990 accord, South Korea was to bear all the expenses, a part which local activists argue is unfair.

"The respective countries need to check more completely whether some sentences and words are unclear in the documented agreement over the expense," Cha said at a press conference.

The sides, Cha said, will try to resolve the differences at a next round of talks, scheduled for March in the United States.

If the accord is concluded, it will be referred to the National Assembly in July for approval, he said.

During this week's consultations, the countries also reaffirmed their previous agreement to expand South Korea's role in defending itself from North Korean threats.

"They agreed to continue close consultations on further expanding Korea's role in its defense and on the continued U.S. contribution to stability on and around the Korean Peninsula," the joint statement said.

About 37,000 U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea to deter North Korea's 1.1 million-member armed forces, the world's fifth largest. South Korea has 690,000 troops.

U.S. negotiators, led by Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless, also thanked South Korea's parliament for approving a government proposal to deploy 3,000 fresh troops, including combatants, to Iraq in late April.

Parliament's voting on the dispatch had been delayed for several weeks in the face of anti-war protests.

"The U.S. delegation recognized the significance of the Korean National Assembly's vote to authorize dispatch of additional forces to Iraq, and expressed appreciation for Alliance contributions to the war on terrorism," according to the statement.

It will be South Korea's largest overseas military deployment since the Vietnam War. Over 300,000 South Koreans fought alongside the United States in the Vietnam War, of whom about 5,000 were killed.

The fresh Korean troops are to join hundreds of military engineers and medics already operating in the war-torn state, bringing the total to 3,600.

This week's negotiations are a continuation of the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative talks that began in December 2002. The allies' ties have undergone strains in recent years because of anti-American protests here.

The base transfer is a key part of the planned U.S. reorganization of its 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea. The U.S. military already has said it will pull back its major combat 2nd U.S. Infantry Division away from the tense border with North Korea.

The U.S. reconsolidation plans prompted security concerns among South Koreans because they would leave no U.S. military units between the border and Seoul, 50 kilometers away.

Stars and Stripes on 16 Feb 2004 stated: "The seventh round of the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative talks was meant to codify an agreement reached last month to move all 7,000 U.S. troops — including the Combined Forces Command, U.S. Forces Korea and the United Nations Command — to a new military hub in Pyongtaek by 2007. But the two sides still have “technical problems” over the cost of relocation, according to a joint statement issued Saturday. That cost is estimated between $3 billion and $4 billion. Under previous agreements, South Korea must bear the full relocation cost. Both sides agreed they moved “measurably closer” to an agreement and “stressed that the relocation should be completed in a timely manner without any unnecessary delays,” the joint statement read. At a press conference after the meetings, Lt. Gen. Cha Young- koo, the lead South Korean negotiator, said money was the main stumbling block."

According to the Joongang Ilbo on 16 Feb 2004, "The two countries had diverging views regarding the provision on applying U.S. standards in the construction and the degree to which Korean materials are used." The eighth round of FOTA talks, is tentatively scheduled for March or April in the U.S. The FOTA talks have been ongoing since December 2002.

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Yongsan's Hospital Renovation Proceeds Despite Planned Move Military officials annaunced that they were going ahead with the final phase of a $70.2 million renovation to the 121st General Hospital despite an agreement to move all forces off Yongsan by 2007. This move doesn't make sense as Camp Humphreys where the bulk of the troops are to be relocated has only a troop clinic. The construction is totally U.S. funded but this would be questioned as all future construction contracts along the DMZ has been halted. However, the construction may have been approved because the contracts were previously let and cannot be retracted without severe penalties. Usually a contract has a five-year lead time and may have been let BEFORE the decision to leave Yongsan completely this year. This would be the most logical reason for proceeding with this multi-million dollar upgrade.

Yongsan's hospital renovation proceeds despite planned move

By Jeremy Kirk, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Sunday, February 22, 2004

YONGSAN GARRISON, South Korea — U.S. Forces Korea is forging ahead with a $70.2 million, three-phase renovation of the 121st Hospital despite pledges to South Korea’s government to move all U.S. forces from the base by 2007.

A $24.5 million contract is expected to be awarded in the next few weeks for the renovation’s second phase, said Lt. Col. Steve Boylan, 8th Army public affairs officer. Unlike some base construction projects, this one would be funded entirely by the United States, officials said.

“This critical project continues to enhance our readiness, our quality of life and moves us another step closer to ensuring that we are making Korea an assignment of choice,” Boylan said in a statement. He declined to address whether the hospital could be kept and used by the U.S. military even if forces moved from Yongsan Garrison.

Leaving some forces behind at the post had been discussed earlier with South Korea’s government. Financial details have to be agreed upon before the latest proposal is made final but it would have all U.S. forces leaving except a few military liaisons working close to South Korea’s Defense Ministry.

The first $35.4 million phase of the hospital renovation will be completed this year, Boylan said. The last estimated $10.3 million phase is scheduled for completion in 2007, the target year Yongsan’s 7,000 soldiers are to move to a hub at Osan or Pyongtaek.

In the seventh round of talks earlier this month, U.S. and South Korea officials were unable to agree how to finance the move, an issue that halted move plans dating back to the early 1990s. Yongsan Garrison is the largest U.S. military base in South Korea; its 800 acres host four major military commands.

In light of the moving plans, USFK has halted new construction at Yongsan Garrison and bases housing the 2nd Infantry Division, which is pegged to consolidate into two hubs at camps Red Cloud and Casey, then move south of the Han River. No timetable has been set for that move.

During Friday’s radio town hall meeting, Area II commander Col. Timothy McNulty said people won’t see many new building projects approved until moving plans are firm. Because military construction projects take from six to nine years to plan, projects planned long ago are continuing, he said, such as the mid-rise apartments on south post and barracks projects on Camp Coiner.

About moving Yongsan Garrison, “Desires are known,” McNulty said. “The final outcome is not.”

Built about 1961, the 121st Hospital is a critical but aging component of the U.S. military in South Korea. Although more than a dozen troop medical clinics are on U.S. installations on the peninsula, the seriously injured or ill usually are taken by helicopter to the 121st.

Camp Humphreys — the base where most U.S. troops from Yongsan are expected to move — has only a troop medical clinic.

Among the dozens of improvements scheduled for the 121st are modern operating rooms, outpatient clinics and four labor and delivery suites, Boylan said.

Plans to build a new major U.S. medical facility have been started and stopped at least twice over the last 20 years.

Yonhap News reported on 24 Feb 2004 that the USFK in in Seoul dismissed as "incomplete" a news report indicating the command's planned relocation could be protracted due to on-base construction work. The construction will include the first two stages ($60 million) which the USFK calls essential for the safe operation of the hospital and future accreditation. The third phase ($10.5 million) is not considered essential but no final decision has been made. The following is a Stars and Stripes article on 26 Feb 2004.

South Korea will take control of Yongsan hospital after 2007 relocation

By Jeremy Kirk, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Thursday, February 26, 2004

YONGSAN GARRISON, South Korea — South Korea will take control of the U.S. military’s largest hospital in Seoul after Yongsan Garrison relocates in 2007, U.S. officials announced Tuesday. When the hospital is turned over, South Korea will “receive a first-class medical hospital at no cost,” Col. Daniel Wilson, USFK engineer, stated in a news release. The U.S. government is funding extensive pre-turnover renovations and plans to spend about $60 million on the first two phases.

Officials maintain that despite plans to move forces at Yongsan Garrison south to Pyongtaek, the fixes are an investment in the alliance. Who would own the 121st Hospital was included in detailed U.S.-South Korean discussions on how to reorganize forces around the peninsula, said Lt. Col. MaryAnn B. Cummings, USFK public affairs officer.

Tuesday’s announcement came after widespread coverage in the Korean media about a recent Stripes report on plans to renovate the 121st. An Army public affairs officer in a subordinate unit had released “incomplete information” about the renovations. A “broader perspective” provides a better understanding of the project, Cummings said in the news release.

The Army had announced the renovations but not that the hospital then would be given to South Korea. Both militaries would use the 121st in the case of hostilities, officials said.

“The upgrades were needed to keep the hospital safe and functional and in order to meet requirements to maintain hospital accreditation and certification,” Wilson said in the USFK statement.

The 121st, built in 1961, is the U.S. military’s only major medical facility in South Korea. Smaller facilities, called troop medical clinics, are sprinkled throughout the country. Most severely injured or seriously ill patients are taken by helicopter to the 121st.

Cummings said she would not speculate how the U.S. military will compensate for the 121st Hospital when it is turned over to South Korea.

“We are going to have the capabilities we need,” she said.

The three-phase renovation was approved in 1998, and the first $35.4 million phase began in 2001. It is scheduled for completion in spring 2005, officials said. USFK Gen. Leon J. LaPorte and Army Surgeon General Lt. Gen. James Peake recently approved a $24.5 million second phase, officials said.

If the phase two construction stopped, the hospital would be “left in an unsafe and nonfunctional condition,” according to the news release.

Phase two is a repair and renovation project financed by operational health-care funds to fix major building code deficiencies, said Col. Philip Volpe, 18th Medical Command commander.

“If we were to wait any longer by delaying or canceling these repairs, we would run the risk of being encumbered with a facility that is rapidly becoming too dangerous for patients,” Volpe said in a release. “That is … unacceptable.”

A minimum $16 million phase two investment would be needed to continue to use the hospital, officials said. The final, third phase — pegged at an estimated $10.3 million — isn’t considered essential construction, they said Tuesday; no decision has been made whether to move ahead.

“A major part of my mission is to ensure quality, uninterrupted health care under all circumstances,” Volpe said. “We cannot compromise providing the best quality and safest care possible.”

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Foreign companies won't leave ROK after US Army relocation According to The Korea Post, "The foreign business companies in Korea will not leave Korea after the United Forces are relocated from Seoul to the rear area. This was learned as a result of a survey conducted by The Korea Post on 84 resident foreign embassies in Seoul and a total of 200 foreign business companies located in Korea on Jan. 15-31. There was not a single foreign business company in Korea who replied it would move out of Korea after the US Forces are relocated from Yongsan area to Osan-Pyeongtaek area. Some of the respondents said that they felt that way because the US Forces in Pyeongtaek will continue to have the effect of a war deterrent as long as they stayed in the Republic of Korea. (See related stories and photos in the current [February 2004) issue of The Korea Post.)"

BUT this only deals with RELOCATION. If the USFK starts to talk of REDUCING their forces, there may be a mass exodus. The name of the game in investment is the security of the investment. Companies know that without the US commitment, their security is at risk.

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Roh Calls Yongsan Symbol of Foreign Intervention, Invasion and Dependence" According to the Associated Press on 1 Mar, ROK President Roh Moo-hyun called for a foreign policy more independent of the US and criticized Japan for its militaristic past, targeting his country's two biggest allies in the DPRK nuclear crisis. Giving a nationally televised address marking Korea's March 1, 1919, uprising against Japanese colonial rule, Roh dismissed criticism that his foreign policy has fueled anti-Americanism among young South Koreans.

Japan offered another apology for its colonial period actions against Korea to offset this criticism.

"Let's not talk about whether we are pro-American or anti-American," Roh said to rousing applause. "Whether we are pro-US or anti-US cannot be the yardstick to assess ourselves." "Step by step, we should strengthen our independence and build our strength as an independent nation." Roh hailed a recent US-ROK agreement to pull US troops out of the Yongsan district of central Seoul, reminding people that Yongsan has been occupied by foreign forces for more than a century and calling the area "a symbol of foreign intervention, invasion and dependence."

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MARCH 2004

Realignment of LPP Plans: The Yonhap News reported on 2 Mar 2004:

S. Korea, U.S. Military Agree to Change in Land Swap Plan

SEOUL, March 2 (Yonhap) -- South Korea withdrew a plan to provide a large tract of land in two suburban areas of Seoul to realign U.S. military installations, Seoul officials said Tuesday.

The decision is the first major revision to a key part of the 2002 Land Partnership Plan (LPP), in which South Korea was to provide the U.S. forces with 300,000 pyeong of land in Uijeongbu and 200,000 pyeong of land in Icheon. One pyeong equals 3.3 square meters.

"The assistant defense minister for policy has said there will be some changes to the LPP, and those include matters on Uijeongbu and Icheon," Brig. Gen. Nam Dae-yeon, spokesman for the South Korean Defense Ministry, said.

Nam refused to say whether the United States first proposed such an idea, or for what reasons, sparking speculation that the decision reflects a U.S. plan to reduce its troop levels in South Korea.

In a separate program from the land partnership plan, South Korea and the United States agreed to a sweeping reorganization of 37,000 American troops here, including the southward redeployment of the U.S. command in Seoul and the combat force of the 2nd Infantry Division near the tense inter-Korean border.

Despite repeated U.S. denials, analysts say the relocation plans are a preliminary step for eventual American troop reduction in South Korea.

The LPP is aimed at efficiently using land in South Korea, improving the conditions for American troops stationed here and bolstering the combined Korea-U.S. deterrence against North Korea.

South Korea is to grant 1.5 million pyeong of land for the relocation of U.S. troops in the land swap plan, and the U.S. military, in return, is to close 28 of its 41 major military camps scattered across the country and return more than half of land granted to it, 41 million pyeong, to the host country.

In December last year the U.S. military closed the Arirang Taxi Compound in Seoul, a taxi service annex for U.S. personnel and their family members, in its first reconsolidation of forces in South Korea.

The high-profile U.S. military presence, a fixture dating back to the 1950-53 Korean War, has been a constant source of anti-U.S. sentiment among some locals.

The following is from the Stars and Stripes on 4 Mar:

S. Korea cancels land buy for bases

By Jeremy Kirk and Choe Song-won, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Thursday, March 4, 2004

YONGSAN GARRISON, South Korea — In a change to a decade-long plan to reorganize U.S. forces on the peninsula, South Korea will not purchase land to relocate two bases near the Demilitarized Zone, officials said Tuesday.

The U.S. military wants to reorganize its bases in South Korea to become more efficient, reduce the impact on civilian populations, and raise the quality of life for its 38,000 servicemembers here. The two governments agreed in broad strokes on how to reorganize, but timetables for moving forces have not been set.

The United States and South Korea agreed to the Land Partnership Plan in March 2002. Under the plan, the U.S. agreed to cut its number of installations and return around 30,000 acres of land. In exchange, South Korea agreed to purchase and provide about 600 acres.

The canceled land purchases include 244 acres near Camp Stanley, a camp on the fringe of Uijongbu bounded by rice paddies and a prison, said Lt. Col. Lee Bung-woo, South Korean Defense Ministry spokesman. Also scrapped was the purchase of 163 acres in Ichon, an area southeast of Seoul, that would be used to replace Camp Page in Chunchon, Lee said.

According to written response from U.S. Forces Korea on Tuesday, “The U.S. and ROK are currently negotiating an amendment to the LPP. Among the provisions of that amendment, the land grants planned for Uijongbu and Ichon will be cancelled, and a larger grant of land at Camp Humphreys provided instead.”

The actual wording of the amendment is still under negotiation, USFK said, but “both the U.S. and ROK have agreed to this change in the plan for land grants,” read the statement, attributed to USFK head engineer Col. Dan Wilson.

“We did not want [the Korean Ministry of National Defense] to buy land the U.S. would probably not need, and certainly did not want to unnecessarily displace Korean people or businesses,” Wilson said in the statement.

“We do still plan to consolidate 2ID forces onto existing bases north of Seoul as much as possible, as an interim step, but we plan to do this without new land or major construction,” said Wilson.

“Some units may in fact move directly to Camp Humphreys during this initial phase. That is not yet decided. Also during this phase, the ROK government will purchase land in Pyongtaek (near Osan Air Base and Camp Humphreys), instead of Uijongbu and Ichon.”

To finance moving U.S. forces as required under the status of forces agreement, the Defense Ministry will sell the land vacated by U.S. forces. A tract of land at Osan Air Base and the former Arirang taxi area near Itaewon in Seoul already have been returned to the South Korean government. The Land Partnership Plan runs through 2011.

South Korean media speculated the canceled purchase may foreshadow troop cuts, which USFK denied.Talks between the governments “have not included any discussions about troop reductions nor have they included any discussions about the changes to the combined command relationship,” according to a Tuesday USFK news release. “Any future realignment or reduction in U.S. forces in South Korea will necessarily involve close consultations with the government of the Republic of Korea.”

South Korea’s Defense Minister, Yu Bo-sun, echoed that statement. “We’ve never discussed that,” he said. U.S. officials have said the LPP could change amid ongoing discussions to move U.S. forces. So far, the two governments have agreed to move forces at Yongsan Garrison to the Osan and Pyongtaek areas by 2007 — though they have not reached an agreement on covering the $3 billion price tag — and to consolidate the 2nd Infantry Division onto camps Red Cloud and Casey.

Eventually, the division will be moved south of the Han River, but no firm timetable has been set. Lee said he couldn’t confirm if the canceled purchase meant U.S. troops could move directly south rather than consolidating first.

Last month, a seventh round of Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative talks ended without an agreement on how to finance moving Yongsan Garrison. Officials plan for more talks this month in the United States.

U.S. officials have said that long-range weapons systems mean troops do not need to be stationed so close to the Demilitarized Zone. “Any changes in the U.S. presence will ensure that the forces are more capable and credible,” USFK said Tuesday.

U.S. Seeks Transfer Part of I Corps to Camp Zama There is a lot of suspicion in Korea that the USFK is planning to reduce its forces. According to the Chosun Ilbo (quoting the Kyodo News of Japan of 2 March), the U.S. informed the Japanese government of its desire to move the First Army corps headquarters located in Fort Lewis, Washington to the U.S. military installation at Camp Zama, located in Kanagawa, Japan. The First Army corps is in charge of Asia-Pacific region and consists of 40,000 military personnel including an infantry division. It is commanded by a lieutenant general. GlobalSecurity.org describes I Corps as "an early deploying corps for military contingencies in the Pacific … able to deploy on short notice. … War plans for I Corps include the defense of Korea or the defense of Japan. … I Corps base units include approximately 20,000 active-duty soldiers at Fort Lewis, Washington, and an equal number of U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard soldiers based in many of the fifty states."

Kyodo News reported that the U.S. administration planned to restructure the U.S. Army's command in Korea and Japan, unifying its headquarters. If the headquarters is moved to Japan, the U.S. military command in Korea will be unified with the command in Japan in order to be absorbed into the headquarters of First Army corps, reported this newspaper.

The move is apparently part of the U.S. military's global reorganization plans. The news report speculated that the 2d ID could be moved to Zama should the command in Fort Lewis be relocated there. This is a big "IF" for the USFK command to be dissolved as part of global U.S. strategy -- which is not likely. However, this announced relocation does create pressure in the ROK press over speculations that IF the ROK does not resolve the Yongsan fiscal and land-procurement issues, there is a possibility that part of the USFK command functions may move to Japan -- though the CFC functions would remain in Korea.

Recently during last November's working-group security talks held in Hawaii, U.S. officials also told Japanese authorities of the possibility it might want to dissolve the United States Forces Japan (USFJ) command located in Yokota, Tokyo. Kyodo reported that moving the command from Fort Lewis to Zama could violate the defense treaty shared by the U.S. and Japan. Japanese officials have reportedly told the U.S. that it would be difficult to get approval for such a move from the governments of the cities where Camp Zama is located.

The USFK, however, announced that "foreign news reports [about dissolving the USFK command] are not fact, and there are no such plans." "Nothing has been decided about any changes in the USFK command system," a U.S. military official said. However, despite disapproval from Japan, the U.S. continues to negotiate with working groups, considering the reorganization of the First Army corps as critical, reported Tokyo Shimbun.

The following is from the 4 Mar 2004 Stars and Stripes:

Part of I Corps HQ may leave Ft. Lewis for Zama

By Juliana Gittler, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Thursday, March 4, 2004

TOKYO — Talks are under way about possibly relocating part of the Army’s I Corps headquarters from Fort Lewis, Wash., to Camp Zama, Japan, U.S. officials confirmed Tuesday.

“Talks are in progress on changes that could affect the Pacific region,” said U.S. Army Japan spokesman Maj. Randy Cephus. “There are talks; however, it is in the planning phases.”

The development follows reports early this year that the Army plans to restructure its major commands in the region, moving general officers and possibly dismantling the 8th Army and the U.N. command in South Korea and USARJ in Japan.

“I am not able to discuss specifics, but among them is the possibility of moving a portion of the [I Corps] headquarters here,” Cephus said.

GlobalSecurity.org describes I Corps as “an early deploying corps for military contingencies in the Pacific … able to deploy on short notice. … War plans for I Corps include the defense of Korea or the defense of Japan. … I Corps base units include approximately 20,000 active-duty soldiers at Fort Lewis, Washington, and an equal number of U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard soldiers based in many of the fifty states.”

Other possibilities are being considered, Cephus added. The Army is streamlining major commands in all theaters as part of a Department of Defense transformation effort.

Japan’s Kyodo News Service reported the ongoing talks Tuesday. U.S. Pacific Command officials would not comment on the Kyodo report, but officials said the United States is consulting with many allies including Japan on ways to realign and strengthen the U.S. military in Asia.

Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied that specific plans have been proposed.

Move Costs for Yongsan Brewing Controversy According to the Hankyoreh, a Hangul language newspaper and supporter of President Roh's policies, on 23 March 2004, the U.S. was stirring up a controversy by requesting Seoul build 1,200 housing units for USFK troops in "new bases." Following the Roh strategy dealing with the Yongsan relocation that the relocation is part of the AMERICAN global military restructuring and therefore, NOT a ROK initiative. If you can follow this convoluted logic, then the building of new buildings as stipulated in the SOFA should be a USFK responsibility.

The problem with this logic claiming that the USFK is justifying it by what occurs in Germany and Japan. The fact is that in 70 percent of military personnel are accompanied by families, while in Korea less than 10 percent are accompanied. Those that are accompanied have inadequate facilities and living quarters.

The controversy deals with the cost of moving out of Yongsan and ultimately relocating the troops off the DMZ down to Pyongtaek, Osan, or other locations that the ROK government must foot the cost for. No followup stories were seen in any of the English-language newspapers. The only reason this editorial was published was to start creating the ground swell for the Spring Offensive when the weather warms and more students/activists hit the streets.

Pyongtaek Protest on 27 Mar 04

Pyongtaek Protest on 27 Mar 04

15,000 Troops Removed from Asia??? The Washington Post ran an article that the forces in Germany may be halved. In the article it presented the Global Repositioning that has been discussed, but there are a few details in the article that is GLARING. The article stated, "The administration still intends to retain a ring of permanent military hubs in closely allied countries, including Germany, Britain, Italy and Japan. But many other bases that the United States has relied on would be supplanted by a number of spare "forward operating sites" such as those planned for Eastern Europe. They would be maintained by small support staffs." Note that Korea is not mentioned as a military hub -- perhaps because of the permanent nature of the forces. However, at the same time the US is supposed to be in negotiations with Japan to bring the I Corps to Camp Zama to be the overall center for operations -- thereby eliminating the need for the CFC.

The following is the Mar 25 article from the Washington Post :

U.S. May Halve Forces in Germany

Shift in Europe, Asia Is Aimed at Faster Deployment
By Bradley Graham
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, March 25, 2004; Page A01

The Pentagon has drafted plans to withdraw as many as half of the 71,000 troops based in Germany as part of an extensive realignment of American military forces that moves away from large concentrations in Europe and Asia, according to U.S. officials.

Under the plan, which is nearing approval, smaller, relatively spartan bases would be established in Romania and possibly Bulgaria, and designed for the rapid projection of U.S. military power against terrorists, hostile states and other potential adversaries.

Farther east, in Central Asia, bases in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan that were established in 2001 to support the war in Afghanistan would be preserved as training sites and as staging areas that U.S. forces could use in emergencies.

In Asia, about 15,000 troops out of a total presence of about 100,000 would be withdrawn, mostly by streamlining administrative staffs of the U.S. military commands in South Korea and Japan, the officials said. But much of that reduction could be offset by a buildup of personnel and aircraft in Guam and the possible stationing of another aircraft carrier battle group in either Guam or Hawaii, the officials said. The Pentagon plan also calls for new training and staging areas in Australia and expansion of military ties with Singapore and Thailand.

U.S. officials have said before that they intended to eliminate a number of large, full-service Cold War bases abroad and construct a network of more skeletal outposts closer to potential trouble spots in the Middle East and along the Pacific Rim. But neither the proposed size of the reductions in Europe and Asia nor details about locations of the new sites were previously disclosed.

The realignment would amount to a dramatic change in how U.S. forces are positioned around the globe. Some of the troops now overseas would be brought home, while vital equipment would be dispersed more widely to enable more nimble dispatch of forces. Another major objective, officials added, is to deepen military ties and joint training with a greater number of allies in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Africa and Southeast Asia. Several senior administration officials involved in the planning said in interviews that President Bush and his national security advisers are still a month or two away from approving the changes. Some key details have yet to be resolved, officials said, and more consultations with allies will be held.

But many aspects of the initiative have been well defined by Pentagon authorities. Defense officials, some of whom spoke on the condition that they not be named, agreed to discuss the plan after The Washington Post learned some details.

The planning reflects a recognition that potential threats have changed since the Cold War ended, said Douglas J. Feith, Pentagon undersecretary for policy and an architect of the global realignment plan.

"One of the main arguments for forward deployment in the old days was, you had a sense that you knew where you were going to fight and so you positioned your forces where you thought you were going to fight," Feith said. "Our view now is you have to move to the fight."

The administration still intends to retain a ring of permanent military hubs in closely allied countries, including Germany, Britain, Italy and Japan. But many other bases that the United States has relied on would be supplanted by a number of spare "forward operating sites" such as those planned for Eastern Europe. They would be maintained by small support staffs.

Other countries would be designated as "cooperative security locations," providing staging areas that U.S. forces could occupy quickly in a conflict. These locations would have no permanent U.S. military presence but could be used periodically for training exercises.

In Western Europe, which hosts about 102,000 U.S. military service personnel, most of the expected reduction would come in Army forces in Germany.

The Army would withdraw more than 60 percent of its 56,000 troops in Germany, home to the 1st Armored and 1st Infantry divisions, officials said, and several overlapping high-level commands would be consolidated.

The nature of the remaining force would change as well. Armored units there now would leave and be replaced in part by lighter, easier-to-deploy forces, possibly including a brigade of Stryker infantry combat vehicles -- lightly armored wheeled vehicles central to the Army's shift toward more agile, mobile units. Additionally, some troops sent to Europe would go for short rotations without families, instead of more traditional three-year tours with families.

Some substantial U.S. military operations would remain in Germany, including Ramstein Air Base, which defense officials view as a critical hub facility for supporting deployments to more distant places. But some U.S. fighter aircraft may be shifted to the Middle East.

Officials said the specific level of personnel reductions in Germany will depend on decisions involving relocation of the aircraft and stationing of a Stryker brigade in Germany, among other factors.

"The one thing I would strongly refute, because it comes up all the time, is the notion that we're withdrawing forces to punish the Germans somehow" for their lack of support for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Feith said. "What we're doing is not at all tied to current events. We're looking at this in terms of changes that will last decades."

Feith said German authorities had been kept informed of U.S. plans. But the German military attaché here, Col. Carsten Jacobson, expressed surprise when told the force reduction could end up in the range of 50 percent. "It's definitely higher than what we've heard so far," he said, adding that his understanding was the proposed cuts were in the range of 20 to 30 percent.

Officials stressed that the entire realignment plan has many parts, involving not just the repositioning of U.S. forces but also a greater reliance on pre-positioning of combat equipment at staging areas in strategic locations and aboard ships.

Some defense specialists have questioned whether the administration may be planning too much retrenchment, upsetting relations with old allies and giving up valuable real estate in Germany and elsewhere to bring troops home where they would be farther from potential war zones.

"This set of proposals doesn't seem to be thought out very carefully," said Ashton Carter, who was an assistant secretary of defense under President Bill Clinton and is now co-director of the Preventive Defense Project at Harvard University. "Neither the strategic rationale nor the cost to the taxpayer nor the impact on our allies seems to have been thought through."

But Feith said that plans are being closely coordinated with affected countries, and that it was outdated to think large numbers of forward-based forces would save deployment time. "In fact, some forward deployments will cost you time, because you have to get permission or you have to work things out" with host governments, he said.

U.S. Defense Department Mulls Troop Reductions in Asia

The U.S. Defense Department has prepared a draft plan on the re-deployment of American troops around the world, including the pullout of 15,000 soldiers from Asia, the Washington Post said on Thursday. Currently, there are 100,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea and Japan.

According to the draft plan, the pullout will take place as a way of reducing administrative workers at U.S. military commands in South Korea and Japan, and the resulting military power vacuum will be offset by the reinforcement of military forces and aircraft in Guam.

After consulting with allied countries, President Bush and his national security advisers are expected to approve the plan within the next few months at the earliest, the Post reported.

In addition, the plan calls for the withdrawal of as many as half of the 71,000 American troops stationed in Germany and then establishing smaller bases in Romania and possibly Bulgaria, in order to quickly deploy U.S. troops against terrorists, hostile states and other potential adversaries.

U.S. officials said that the plan is mainly aimed at beefing up the rapid deployment capacity of U.S. troops to trouble areas by posting key military equipment instead of bringing home part of its overseas troops. At the same time, it seeks to strengthen the military partnership with its allies in East Europe, Central Asia, Africa and Southeast Asia.

TESTIMONY OF
BRIGADIER GENERAL JEROME JOHNSON
DIRECTOR FOR PLANS, OPERATIONS AND READINESS
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G4
UNITED STATES ARMY
AND
BRIGADIER GENERAL KEVIN T. RYAN
DIRECTOR OF STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G3
UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REGARDING
ARMY PROPOSITIONED STOCKS SUPPORTING
THE UNITED STATES ARMY
March 24, 2004

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to report to you today on Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS). APS is a very important program both for the Army and our nation. APS has been used extensively to support combat operations in Southwest Asia (SWA) where a major portion of it remains committed today. As the Army resets, the need to modernize and improve the APS program becomes increasingly important if we are to stay strategically responsive.

Why do we have Army Prepositioned Stocks?

Through the support of Congress, APS has been a very successful program. APS equipment and supplies drawn by units were major contributors to the success the Army experienced in recent combat operations. APS also reduced strategic lift requirements enabling the Joint Force Commander in Kuwait to rapidly build combat power. The Army learned many lessons during Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF), which are now being incorporated into the Army’s future APS strategy. The Army faces significant funding challenges as it resets and converts to modular units but recognizes that APS must also be reset and repositioned to be ready for tomorrow’s challenges.

The APS program exists to support the National Military Strategy by prepositioning critical warfighting stocks in strategic locations worldwide. Prepositioning of materiel reduces the deployment response time required for an expeditionary Army. The APS program is evolving from its Cold War mission of large amounts of equipment and supplies stored in Central Europe to tailored sets deployed ashore and afloat in three regions to better support all regional Combatant Commanders. APS remains a cornerstone of Army power projection.

What are Army Prepositioned Stocks?

APS consists of prepositioned unit sets of equipment, operational projects (OPROJ) and sustainment stocks. It also includes War Reserve Stocks for our allies in Korea and Israel. Prior to OIF, the core of the program was five brigade sets -- one afloat on ships stationed at Diego Garcia (designated as APS-3) and one set ashore in Europe (APS-2), one set in Korea (APS-4) and two sets in SWA (APS-5). Currently, there are six brigade sets in APS. Five are on land (one in Europe, three in SWA, and one in Korea) and the sixth is afloat at Guam/Saipan.

Fourteen APS Operational Projects (APS-1) provide specialized capabilities over and above normal unit authorizations, such as petroleum distribution, Force Provider housing modules and mortuary affairs. These are located across the globe to support regional Combatant Commander requirements. Sustainment stocks support APS unit sets and deploying units in SWA and Korea until re-supply is initiated from the industrial and sustaining base in the Continental United States (CONUS).

New APS Strategy

Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Army leadership recognized that an APS policy based on Cold War threats must change to meet Army transformation goals, and directed development of a new APS strategy to address the current and future threat environment. In June 2003, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army approved a new APS strategy to comply with the current Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG). This strategy emphasizes rapid force closure, enhances strategic responsiveness, offers flexible deterrent options to the regional Combatant Commanders, and provides capabilities to meet the demands across the full spectrum of operations. The new APS strategy focuses on forward positioning critical enablers to influence the SPG imperative “Swiftly Defeat the Effort” Phase One (seize the initiative) and Phase Two (decisive operations), while transitioning to “Win Decisively”. The major differences in this new strategy are the development of the Army Regional Flotilla (ARF) concept and a significant reduction in combat units within APS.

The concept of APS-3 afloat in a single location will give way to three Army Regional Flotillas (ARF) positioned in the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea.

Land-based APS enhances Army deployment response by allowing ground units to deploy personnel by airlift and act as an immediate response force while also mitigating enemy anti-access efforts. Additionally, land-based APS reduces the requirements for limited strategic air/sealift early in operations. Land-based APS in Europe will shift from Central Europe to a 1x1 brigade set in Italy. This is short-hand for the equipment for one armored battalion and one mechanized infantry battalion. A 2x2 brigade set will be located in both SWA and Korea. These optimal locations were determined from numerous studies such as the Defense Mobility Requirements Study 2005 and the Center for Army Analysis study “Arcs of Instability”.

Army Regional Flotillas (ARF)

The new APS strategy has afloat capabilities dispersed geographically in three critical regions providing a new set of modular capabilities designed to provide regional Combatant Commanders with flexible response options. APS afloat influences early decisive operations by providing capabilities for a rapid response force.

At the core of each of the three ARFs are two Large Medium-Speed Roll On/Roll Off (LMSR) vessels. One LMSR contains a 1x1 brigade set consisting of equipment for one armored and one mechanized infantry battalion, a round-out assortment of brigade combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units, and 15 days of supply of unit basic loads. The second LMSR will contain equipment for units at Echelons Above Division (EAD) and Echelons Above Corps (EAC). These units provide theater opening and sustainment support for the deployed force.

Much of the equipment scheduled for upload on the second LMSR will support not only the present 1x1 brigade set construct but will also support future deployment of STRYKER brigade combat teams. This includes equipment such as 900-series trucks, the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV), Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTT) and Palletized Load System (PLS) trucks that will be part of the STRYKER Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) and Combat Service Support Company (CSSC). Initial indications are that 70% of the equipment aboard this ship can support both the 1x1 brigade set and STRYKER brigade. Using CS/CSS assets from an ARF will give the STRYKER brigade an initial sustainment capability without further straining limited strategic airlift assets. There is no Army plan today to place STRYKER vehicles in prepositioned stocks.

A third vessel, a 26-foot shallow draft Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) ship, will hold humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) functional units and capabilities. The smaller draft of the RO/RO ship affords it wider global port access than the LMSR. Each ARF will also include a ship with sustainment stocks and another loaded with ammunition containers, sufficient to provide 30 days of supply to 2.5 divisions. This requirement is under review and may change, but the number of ammunition and container ships will not. While these ships can support the 1x1 brigade set, they are primarily intended to support the augmentation forces in a “Win Decisively” scenario.

In addition, each flotilla will incorporate a specific set of port opening and in-stream discharge enablers, such as cargo-handling equipment. These sets will include Army watercraft stationed in Japan and Kuwait, plus theater and logistics support vessels (TSV/LSV), which will support daily operations within assigned theaters.

In its entirety, an Army Regional Flotilla provides a powerful combat capability across the full spectrum of operations to the regional Combatant Commander. Lessons learned from the download of APS equipment and supplies for OIF are being incorporated into the design of the ARFs and their ships. Some of the technology enhancements needed aboard the ships are still being developed, but we are confident that, given time and resources, we will arrive at optimum solutions.

APS Performance during Operation Iraqi Freedom

APS equipment proved instrumental in supporting combat operations during OIF. Our general sense is that, in most instances, the equipment and supplies matched fairly well with unit requirements, and the equipment was well maintained. There were some unit sets in APS that unit commanders neither wanted nor required. These have been removed from APS and will be replaced by other units not previously prepositioned.

Most of the APS-5 (SWA) and the APS-3 (Afloat) was issued in support of OIF, including three 2x2 brigade sets. In total, 218 unit sets including approximately 17,665 pieces of rolling stock, 124,400 sets, kits and outfits, and 119,194 Class VIII medical supply packages were issued from APS to deployed units.

The 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID) was the largest consumer of APS equipment. They received 121 unit sets, approximately 7,525 pieces of rolling stock including 252 Abrams tanks, 325 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, 18 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems and 59 Paladin Howitzers. The Division’s signal and air defense artillery units both drew APS and deployed equipment from home station. The only units that were not sourced from APS were those assigned to the 3ID aviation brigade, since aviation assets are not stocked in APS.

Prior to OIF, Army Materiel Command (AMC) did a tremendous job of maintaining the equipment within the APS program as evidenced by the high readiness rates of the equipment drawn by the units. During OIF, the equipment, in particular the Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles and wheeled vehicles, were subjected to the equivalent of three years of high-intensity training in the harshest of conditions. Listed below are a few selected comments from After Action Reviews on APS:

• Company Commander: “When we went into the fight, they [tanks] were the best we were ever on!”
  
  
• Battalion Motor Officer: “Lowest combat power [for tanks] for any fight was 95% - that was one fight - for all the others it was 100%.”
  
  
• Battalion Motor Officer: “We used more parts at NTC [National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California] and on home station equipment than on the [APS] M1s [tanks].”
  
  
• Soldier: “14 of 14 started [Bradley’s]. 14 of 14 finished.”
  
  
• Soldier: “The equipment [Paladins] was good – Saw the guns and said ‘yeah!’”

The Army employed significant quantities of Operational Project stocks in support of both OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. For example, all the Army’s available Force Provider bare base housing modules have been deployed to provide bed-down facilities for soldiers and airmen in Central and Southwest Asia and in other parts of the world in support of the Global War on Terrorism. Other operational project stocks used included the Inland Petroleum Distribution System pipeline sets, Special Operations Forces equipment, mortuary affairs materiel, bridging, aircraft landing mats and materiel for handling enemy prisoners of war.

War Reserve Secondary Items (WRSI) were another success story and continue to support current operations. At the onset of OIF, total WRSI assets on hand were valued at $2.2 billion. The Army Materiel Command released $900 million worth of WRSI in support of OEF/OIF requirements, much of which was not readily available in the Army supply system. WRSI also served as a buffer for the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) as it ramped up its supply base to support service requirements. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4 and the Commander of Army Materiel Command are revalidating WRSI requirements to support future contingencies.

Resetting APS

APS equipment in SWA continues to be used to a great extent to support current operations. As an example, since March 2003, over 3100 individual vehicles from APS have been issued in support of theater requirements, greatly reducing the need for strategic shipping from the United States. APS equipment will also be used to support future OEF rotations. Both of these cases prove the value of APS to Army operations but at the same time limit our ability to complete APS reset.

Several major lessons have emerged from our OIF experience and are being incorporated into future APS strategy. We need to modernize APS to the level of the equipment used at home station by the deploying force. Our Soldiers should have the opportunity to thoroughly train and exercise with APS equipment to master any differences in capability. The APS sets must be complete and the sustainment stocks should be theater-centric.

As of March 15, 2004, reset actions have been accomplished on APS-4 (Korea), two ammunition ships, the 1x1 brigade set for ARF Guam/Saipan, and the 1x1 brigade set for ARF Diego Garcia is being prepared. Almost half of the equipment for the second LMSR in ARF Guam/Saipan (the combat support/combat service support sets) has been redeployed from SWA and is undergoing repair and refurbishment at Charleston, South Carolina. The Army will attempt to completely load this ship; however, continued use of APS equipment for current operations is hindering this effort. None of the ARF 1x1 brigade sets have been completely filled with all authorized equipment. The shortages are primarily caused by APS equipment remaining in theater.

Despite the recent success of the APS program, we do face some significant challenges. In November 1998, the General Accounting Office (GAO) completed an audit, commissioned by the Senate Armed Services Committee, of Department of Defense prepositioning programs. Their report specifically criticized the Army for poor definition of requirements and incomplete visibility of operational projects, inappropriate APS structure in Europe, and lack of war reserve secondary item (WRSI) funding for sustainment.

Since the audit, a review of APS operations in Europe has resulted in the closure of three sites, significantly reducing APS operations in Central Europe. In fiscal years (FY) 04-06, the Army is investing $53.4 million in military construction funding to modernize key APS maintenance, storage, and ammunition facilities at Livorno, Italy, as the enduring site for the APS-2 1x1 brigade set.

The U.S. Army Audit Agency (AAA) just completed an audit of operational project stocks held in Korea and recommended potential savings of $114.6 million by reducing unsupported Army requirements. The AAA also discovered that the Army had overstated requirements by $125.6 million. The Army had already eliminated the need for aircraft matting in Korea and is in the process of disposing of some outdated bridging equipment there. A key finding highlighted by AAA is that “none of the Operational Projects within APS-4 had enough materiel on hand to satisfy their intended purposes.” Audits are also ongoing within APS-2 (Europe).

Asset visibility once Operational Project stocks have been released suffers from the same disjointed, unconnected 20th-century supply system that plagued the Army in its race to Baghdad. No one system offers seamless, real-time, end-to-end visibility of items issued from Operational Projects. Implementation of an interim solution is underway to facilitate the transfer of these items from the legacy depot-level accounting system aboard the ships to the retail-level property book and maintenance systems in the using units.

Funding for procurement of War Reserve Secondary Items (WRSI) remains a significant problem; it competes against many other higher-priority Army programs. $92.2 million of obligation authority was provided in FY 2004 and the Army has programmed $900 million across FY 2005-2009 against total WRSI requirements. This was done specifically to increase the readiness of all prepositioned sets and to provide sustainment stocks to the initial corps allocated against the planning scenario of two simultaneous major combat operations. Funding for WRSI has become critical because war reserve spares are at a 28% fill rate after their heavy usage during OIF. WRSI requirements for program years 2006-2011 have been validated but actual funding is still to be determined, leaving future Army operations at high risk.

Modernization of APS remains a contentious issue. Generally, APS unit set equipment is one or two generations older than equipment in first line units, e.g., M1A1 Abrams tanks instead of M1A2s; older models of Bradleys; and M-35A2 and 800-series trucks instead of the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) or even the FMTV predecessors, the 900-series trucks. The presence of this older equipment presents maintenance and training challenges. Using less modern APS equipment during OIF required time for soldiers to become fully accustomed to it, such as learning how to drive with a manual transmission; however, the ability to accomplish assigned missions was not severely impacted.

Modern equipment generally has come into APS as a result of “cascading” from units receiving new equipment, but the Army Staff has been working to effect at least limited modernization of APS equipment as part of the Army reset initiative. Specifically, APS-4 (Korea) and the Army Regional Flotilla in Guam/Saipan have been targeted for modernization. Funding is also a major issue for the reset of APS. Limited funding for FY 2004 Army APS reset actions has come from FY 2004 supplemental appropriations in the amount of 28% of Other Procurement, Army (OPA) and 5% of Operation & Maintenance, Army (OMA) requirements. This does not include depot funding received.

FY 2004 APS operational funding (less WRSI) totaled $483.6 million. In particular, validated requirements to store and maintain critical warfighting equipment in APS Afloat, in Korea, and SWA are fully funded. The Army also has been able to program funds for key initiatives like prepositioning Army watercraft unit sets in the Pacific and SWA to enhance strategic responsiveness. We anticipate that the overall funding position for APS operations will remain very good (over 90% of requirements) across the new FY 2005-2009 program, but funding for equipment modernization and to fill APS shortages, including WRSI, will remain a challenge.

The Future

Army Prepositioned Stocks remain an integral part of the Army’s mobility triad, the other two legs being sealift and airlift. To support force projection and operational requirements, the Army continues to refine its deployment goals. In the Secretary of Defense’s memorandum titled “Operational Availability Action Items”, dated August 18, 2003, he provided the Services with what have become known as the DoD Joint Swiftness Goals. The Army is currently reassessing its deployment metrics of “one brigade in 96 hours / one division in 120 hours / five divisions in 30 days”. A recommendation is currently undergoing review by senior Army leadership.

The awesome force projection capabilities we leveraged in recent operations are a testament to congressional support in the aftermath of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. However, the Secretary of Defense’s conflict separation objectives, and the Joint Operations Concept enabling rapid, global and credible military response options in future crises, underscore the need for a quantum leap forward in our force projection capability. The Army is adopting a joint and expeditionary mindset in support of the defense strategy. In coordination with the Defense and Joint Staffs, our sister Services and the regional Combatant Commanders, we will aggressively pursue advances in force projection capabilities.

While there is a strategy for APS end-state through 2006, we continually reexamine that strategy to incorporate developing Army initiatives such as modularity for the Unit of Employment concept.

Our vision for the future includes modular Army units, deploying into austere locations if necessary, and arriving intact and immediately employable. The Army’s global force projection strategy and its move to develop robust joint and expeditionary capabilities will be characterized by continued implementation of the Army Power Projection Program (AP3), force design changes, positioning and training of units, and logistics transformation. These components are our implementing mechanisms to develop and field Army capabilities nested within an overarching Joint force projection strategy.

Full implementation of the Army vision requires improvements in several Defense power projection and counter anti-access capabilities. Defense programs, concepts, and processes that must evolve to attain these capabilities will be further refined this year within the Defense Mobility Capabilities Study. While some of these capabilities may not be realized until next decade, some are achievable now with sufficient resources.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank you for your support and for taking the time to review our APS program today. It is an important program for the Army and will remain so for the foreseeable future. We are an Army serving a nation at war, and APS has played a large role in our successes so far.

APRIL 2004

Ground is broken for major housing project at Osan

By Franklin Fisher, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Thursday, April 1, 2004

OSAN AIR BASE, South Korea — Air Force dignitaries broke ground Tuesday on a new nine-story, off-base housing tower, marking a key early step in the gradual expansion of the Pyongtaek region into the U.S. military’s central troop hub in South Korea.

The project is the first construction to go forward under the Land Partnership Plan, signed in March 2002 between the South Korean and U.S. governments, officials said.

Under the plan, the U.S. military will gradually close many of its installations, shift many of its forces south of Seoul, and enlarge some of its key remaining installations. Among those slated to grow are Osan Air Base and Camp Humphreys, both in the Pyongtaek area.

“This is the first … construction we’re doing for the Land Partnership Plan in all of Korea,” said Capt. Jeff Lin, chief of construction management at the 51st Civil Engineering Squadron at Osan.

Construction on the new $30 million tower project has been under way since November on the first building, which will have 112 apartments and is set to open in February 2006.

And the Air Force will begin construction on two more such buildings — one this fall, the other in fall 2005. The first building is going up on a 7.2-acre site next to Mustang Valley Village, an existing Air Force family housing complex that houses 199 families in three-story townhouse-style apartment buildings, about a five minute drive southeast of the air base perimeter.

Though the site of the new tower currently lies outside the base perimeter, it is on land owned by the Air Force and will eventually be enclosed behind a wall or other perimeter barrier. The other two buildings will be on the current site of the 1000 series officer dorms, not far from the base officers’ club.

The new tower will house command-sponsored families of commanders or personnel deemed “essential,” said Lin.

“And if there’s still space in there, other folks can fit in there,” Lin said. “They have to be command-sponsored, though.”

When Air Force families eventually move into the nine-story building, awaiting them will be elevators, carpeting, dishwashers and other state-of-the-art features installed to meet Air Force housing standards, officials said. The building will have 48 two-bedroom apartments, 48 three-bedroom apartments and 16 four-bedroom apartments, Lin said.

The project also calls for 109 parking spaces, landscaping, outdoor barbecue, picnic pavilions and outdoor play areas for children.

U.S. military officials Tuesday morning attended a brief groundbreaking ceremony hosted by Hyundae Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd., the South Korean firm performing the construction under contract with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

This project “will bring a new standard of family living for military members stationed here at Osan,” Brig. Gen. Maury Forsyth, commander of Osan’s 51st Fighter Wing, said in brief remarks at the groundbreaking. “It will give our families, on average, 50 percent more living space than they currently have,” Forsyth said. Military readiness, he said, “has many aspects. Sorties and fuel are easy to quantify but job satisfaction, efficiency, and family readiness are harder to measure. We’ve come a long way improving these immeasurable quality-of-life factors across the board at Osan and this will be the most visible example of our efforts.”

Last Outpost on DMZ Turned Over to ROK The plan for Korea to single-handedly guard the Joint Security Area from 2005 was agreed upon in the Third Round of the Future of the ROK-US Alliance. However, it was discarded in favor of "reducing the U.S. military presence" by reducing the numbers of US guards at the Joint Security Area, an 800 meter (1/2 mile)-wide enclave. On the part of the U.S., the decision to reverse itself and remain in the Joint Security Area is NOT a major move. The positions are more "symbolic" that anything else as the UNC Security Battalion is only a 550 man unit of which 60 percent is ROK Army. Actually it is to the U.S. advantage to have members in the symbolic unit to retrieve the remains of U.S. soldiers in the on-going search in North Korea for Korean War dead. They postponed the schedule that would have ROK soldiers defending the southern half of the JSA alone.

On 30 April 2003 the U.S. suggested that South Korean troops take over responsibility for guarding the Joint Security Area (JSA) of Panmunjeom from the United Nations Command (UNC). (See Relocation of USFK Forces (2003).) In the Chosun Ilbo (Yoo Yong-won, "SOUTH MAY TAKE FULL CHARGE OF JSA," Seoul, 05/01/03) it was reported that ROK and US governments were discussing a plan that would make ROK military fully responsible for the Joint Security Area in Panmunjeom as soon as early next year. The MND official said the U.S. raised the issue during the first session of the "Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative" held in Seoul from April 8-9, adding, " But it was just an idea and the two sides never discussed about it officially." During the session, the two countries agreed in principle on the Korean army's takeover of some specific missions in accordance with its enhanced military abilities, and guarding of the JSA was one of them. A high-ranking ROK government official said that US government had proposed that the change be implemented in the first half of next year, and that ROK was considering it in a positive way, as a symbol of its self-defense capabilities.

The MND stated that the matter will be discussed by South Korea and the U.S. in the future. The MND official pointed out that the change was independent of the plan to relocate the 2nd ID south of the Han River, a plan ROK opposes. That issue will be taken up at the summit talks in Washington in mid-May.

The JSA is the only location guarded by UNC troops, composed of 350 Koreans and 250 Americans, along the 155-mile-long truce line. In 1991, ROK Armed Forces took full responsibility for guarding the entire 155-mile truce line. In truth, the ROK Armed Forces had already taken responsibility in 1970 for the guarding of the entire frontline of the DMZ -- with the exception of the Panmunjon Peace Village. If the duty of protecting the JSA is transferred to the Korean army, it will have significant meaning because the army will be guarding the entire demilitarized zone (DMZ), analysts said. In early 1990s, the U.S. suggested South Korea assume responsibility for the task, but discussions were not held on the matter because South Korea objected to it, considering the symbolic meaning of the UNC and the JSA.

On 13 Apr it was announced that the USFK would pull off of the DMZ at its last outpost where shared ROK-USFK patrols existed. The manning at the JSA would be reduced to 40 Americans who would perform mostly ceremonial duties. However, the southern portion of the Panmujon Peace Village would still remain under USFK control. The following article appeared on Yonhap News on 13 Apr.

U.S. Troops to Stop Patrolling DMZ, Ending 50-Year Mission

By Kim Hyung-jin

SEOUL, April 13 (Yonhap) -- The United States will relinquish its only military outpost along the inter-Korean border as it plans to let South Korea play a greater role in its defense, U.S. military officials said Tuesday.

The turnover of Outpost Ouellette to South Korea's military later this year means there would be no American soldiers manning the 248-kilometer Korean border except for in the truce village of Panmunjom, known as the joint security area (JSA).

Ouellette is the only guard post inside the 4-kilometer-wide Demilitarized Zone that has been manned by American soldiers. It is only 25 meters from the military demarcation line and a few hundred meters away from Panmunjom.

The change will also allow U.S. soldiers to stop patrolling a section of the DMZ near the outpost, turning over the duty to the South Korean military, U.S. officials said.

"Platoon-sized U.S. forces from Outpost Ouellette have been patrolling the DMZ with South Korean troops," said the U.S. official, confirming a similar report carried by the U.S. military newspaper Stars & Stripes.

The official said the U.S. military will continue its guard duties at Panmunjom with South Korean soldiers. The American-led U.N. Command maintains some 600 troops at the border village, including 180 American troops.

South Korean and U.S. officials have already agreed to slash the number of American soldiers at Panmunjom to less than 40 by this October, a move that they said would give the South Korean military more leverage over its self defense.

In February, the sides also agreed that the U.S.-led U.N. Command will continue to be in charge of the southern section of Panmunjom, despite an initial U.S. demand that the South take over the full command of the area, said Maj. Gen. Chung Byung-chil, head of the strategy bureau at the Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"We went to talks with U.S. officials with an idea of the JSA's symbolic (deterrence) and public security concerns" over possible withdrawal of American troops from Panmunjom, Chung said.

About 37,000 American troops are stationed in South Korea to deter aggression from North Korea, a legacy of the 1950-53 Korean War.

Under agreements with South Korea, the U.S. military will relocate the 2nd Infantry Division away from the inter-Korean border and the Yongsan Garrison in Seoul to south of the capital.

hyungjin@yna.co.kr

S. Korea, U.S. to Hold Alliance Talks May 6-7 On 13 Apr it was announced that the ROK and US officials will meet on May 6-7 to finalize plans for the relocation of the American military command in Seoul. The allies have agreed to redeploy the U.S. Yongsan Garrison in Seoul to Pyeongtaek, some 70 kilometers south of the Korean capital, by 2007. But the sides have yet to sign an accord on the relocation due to some "language and other technical problems." The planned meeting, the eighth round of the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative, is to be held from May 6-7 in Washington. The allies began the talks in late 2002.

(SITE NOTE: Soon after the talks, Lt. Gen. Cha Young-koo, the Chief Negotiator and assistant defense minister for policy, suddenly "retired." No report was issued and the only comment was that the discussions were dealing with the Yongsan relocation. NO OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE WAS RELEASED. On 28 May, the MND announced that they planned to name a retired two-star Army general as chief South Korean negotiator to military talks with the United States. Defense Minister Cho Young-kil is reviewing the application of Ahn Kwang-chan, former deputy chief of the Korea-U.S. joint military command in Seoul to take the post of assistant defense minister for policy.)

MAY 2004

USFK to be Sent to Iraq?

U.S. National Public Radio (NPR) reported Thursday that U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld hasn't excluded possibly taking U.S. troops stationed in Korea and other strategic hot spots around the world and placing them in Iraq in order to maintain troop levels in that country.

In an interview with NPR, Rumsfeld was asked if the U.S. had plans to remove troops from Korea or other hot spots in order to put additional forces in Iraq. The defense secretary answered that the U.S. would look for the troops to send to Iraq in the most appropriate places. He also made it clear that deterrence wouldn't be weakened in any part of the world.

Rumsfeld was then asked if the additional men would come specifically from Korea, to which he answered that he hadn't said where those troops would come from. If the U.S. takes troops from one region in the world, he said, some people would be taken back, believing that deterrence has been weakened. The U.S., however, would take other measures to ensure that deterrence in the particular region was not weakened, he said.

About this, Ban Ki-moon said during a regular briefing Thursday that, "The issue of deploying USFK abroad is a matter, naturally, to be discussed between the U.S. and Korea. Up till now, there have yet to be any discussions on this issue." He said, "The U.S. defense department said it has plans to ship additional troops to Iraq in order to keep troops levels there at 138,000... In his interview with NPR, Secretary Rumsfeld, concerning whether he would redeploy troops from other regions abroad to Iraq, answered that the aim is not to harm deterrence in any relevant region."

(Lee Ha-won, may2@chosun.com )

U.S. to Send One USFK Brigade to Iraq According to the Chosun Ilbo on 17 May 2004, the U.S. government informed the Korean government on its intentions to send one brigade (about 3,000 men) from the 2nd Infantry Division to Iraq. Supposedly the 2nd ID deployed along the DMZ will be the major component of the redeployment to Iraq, but some from the support units stationed south of the Han River may be included. As of 17 May, the U.S. government had not decided whether to ship one of the two infantry brigades in the division intact or mix units from the two to form a new unit. On 19 May the USFK Gen. LaPorte announced that the USFK was expecting the movement to be by Aug 15th at the latest.

(SITE NOTE: We suspect the move will be to remove the much of the M1A1 Abrams and Bradley Fighting vehicles from Korea which Rumsfield wanted positioned on ships off-shore back in 2003, but was put off because of ROK objections. Then the ROK started mumbling about a railway link to the DMZ by 2011 for training at the Rodriquez range instead of delivering on the promised lands in the Pohang area stipulated in the Land Partnership Plan. No action on procurement of land for the dedicated railway OR at Pohang has been started -- just talk. The ROK has been shooting itself in the foot with its constant ploys and delays.)

Supposedly it came as a surprise to the Koreans -- though Donald Rumsfield "hinted" at it on March 25th. Donald Rumsfeld said on 25 Mar that the U.S. will honor its defense commitment to South Korea even if it curtails its military presence on the Korean peninsula. With that statement it left all kinds of doors open. Rumsfield said, "We will not do anything with respect to South Korea that will not assure that the deterrent and the defensive capability will be healthy, strong and, I would add, stronger than it is today, even though the numbers are going to change."

On May 6th Rumfield said as much on National Public Radio during an interview. (SITE NOTE: We believe the ROK was told this info on the May 6-7 Future of the ROK-US Alliance Meeting in Washington. No press release was ever seen from the meeting -- at least not that we have seen. There were unsubstantiated reports that ROK chief negotiator Lt. Gen. Cha Young-koo, Assistant Defense Minister for Policy, "retired" soon after the meeting. We believe that because the ROK situation was still unsettled because the Roh impeachment was still before the Constitutional Court, the announcement of the USFK deployment was delayed. Roh was restored to power on May 14th (Friday) and the announcement came shortly thereafter on May 17th (Monday). This decision should NOT be a surprise as the U.S. is basically "fed up" with the ROK foot-dragging on the relocation of the USFK off the DMZ and its incessant delays on the deployment to Iraq. As a "staunch ally" of the U.S., it has been instead an embarrassment to the U.S. The U.S. had been lobbying the ROK for combat troops, but it only received a promise of a reconstruction battalion instead -- and one that did NOT want to be associated with the U.S. forces in Iraq at that.)

The Associated Press, quoting a U.S. government official, reported Sunday that, "the shift was not imminent but would be part of the next rotation of American troops in Iraq, which is scheduled to begin this summer." (NOTE: This means June 2004.) The New York Times reported on its website that, "Any final decision to decrease the number of American troops in South Korea is likely to set off a debate there about whether the United States is undermining an Asian ally -- especially as new revelations emerge about North Korea's program to build nuclear weapons." CNN also quoted wire services from Seoul that, "The move to tap its forces there would be a historic one by the Pentagon... A troop move underscores how much the U.S. military is stretched to provide enough forces for Iraq while also meeting its other commitments."

The Korean government was faced with some uncomfortable realities that (1) the re-deployment might lead to a new adjustment of roles for USFK and (2) that it may lead to a permanent reduction in the USFK. President Roh Moo-hyun received reports on the current situation from Foreign Affairs Minister Ban Ki-moon on 17 May and requested that Ban make sure that there are no gaps in national defense resulting from the U.S. redeployment. On 21 May, the U.S. stated that it does not plan to send replacements to South Korea after moving thousands of troops to Iraq. Air Force Gen. Richard Myers, the chairman of the Joint chiefs of staff, and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker revealed the U.S. decision in testimony to a House Armed Services Committee hearing.

The ROK is jumping through the hoops trying to make "happy faces" out of this turn of events claiming this move has nothing to do with the pending ROK troop deplolyment going to Iraq. In essence, the ROK keeps finding obstacles to its sending of troops. The pulling of 4,000 USFK troops may be a signal that the U.S. is letting the ROK off the hook -- more or less in disgust. In this way, the ROK can keep its troops at home because of the U.S. redeployment -- which surprisingly comes in the summer at the same time the latest ROK deployment (after delays) is to take place. Just speculation... South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, stung by accusations the decision was made without input from the South Korean government, has called on the public to view the dispatch “calmly,” saying it had long been anticipated and was done only after consultations between both governments.

The ROK also is stating that this does NOT impact on the security of the ROK as a massive pullout in investment WILL occur if the investors feel their money is at risk. Even with the movement to Pyongtaek, the investors felt safe -- but any talk of a reduction in forces can have a negative impact on the market dependent on the spin analysts put on it. (NOTE: On 17 May the South Korean stock prices took a beating from the lack of buying interest and falls in overseas markets, with a benchmark price index tumbling below the 730-point mark.) Roh states that he "understands" this move. Despite all his talk of "self-reliance" in defense, the ROK at present can NOT stand alone.

In turn, the drawdown of Yongsan in 2005 is slated for a transfer of 7,000 troops to Pyongtaek. It might be that the numbers could be subtracted from this move -- and just simply disappear from the USFK manning documents. The decrease in numbers could be immediate and aid in the pending housing shortage forecasts for Pyongtaek -- because of the ROK delays on getting the moneys to purchase lands. The Ministry of National Defense is planning to sell portions of Yongsan to fund the move -- though the ROK signed a Memorandum of Agreement over a decade ago on this move. The ROK has been attempting to "renegotiate" the MOA ever since the U.S. announced it was serious about the move.

After Rumsfield stated he was pulling out of Yongsan in January 2004, the threat has been that if the ROK does not deliver on its promise of land to support the move to Pyongtaek, it might lose troops. The ROK is stating that the move will be in 2007 so it has not reacted -- while the USFK has already started building the new apartments at Osan. The move has been accelerated, but the ROK is dragging its feet.

Some of the side note hysterics was when the Yonhap News printed a blurp that stated, "U.S. Sent 5,700 Troops for S. Korea to Iraq" This was to hype up the news. "The United States sent thousands of troops to Iraq at the end of last year, instead of their originally planned posting in South Korea, diplomatic sources said Sunday. "The U.S. Department of Defense dispatched 5,700 troops to the northern Iraqi city of Mosul last December," a source here said. "Initially, they were supposed to replace existing troops in South Korea." This wasn't any secret. This is the 3rd Brigade, 2d ID, the Stryker Brigade, which was sent to Iraq in Dec 2003. It was NOT scheduled for the ROK. It was proposed and there was a lot of talk. One platoon of the Brigade did come to the ROK in Aug 2003, but the decision to deploy to Iraq had already been made. One can expect more such nonsense in the future...from the media on both sides of the pond.

Immediately there was shocked silence on the Korean newsgroups. Suddenly the berating of "America Go Home" stopped -- except for the American side which commented -- "It's about time!" This was the first pull-out (reduction in forces) since the Nunn-Warner initiative in the 1990s. The ROK government moved to calm security fears as the US confirmed plans to redeploy some 3,600 US troops from the DMZ to Iraq. US and ROK officials said the reduction in troop numbers would not weaken the ability of US forces based in the ROK for more than 50 years to deter the DPRK. Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon said, "I am convinced that there will be no security vacuum and the troop withdrawal will not lead to a weakening alliance between South Korea and the US."

It was announced that the U.S. was going to deploy more PAC-3 Patriots to the area. However, what is not said was this was part of the plan to beef up the JAPANESE Missile Defense Shield. The positioning of the PAC-3 Patriots will be at Kwangju AB which will support CONTINGENCY missions. There is something unsettling about this positioning -- something that may become clearer as plans for the relocation are solidified. The talk of more long-range US bombers being deployed indicated that the deployments of bombers to Guam will be increased. This was already in existence.

The U.S. current policy is to move like forces into to the area to make up for any short fall in forces. For example, if a 8th FW squadron of F-16s went to Alaska for an exercise, the Marine aircraft from Japan would come to Korea as a backfill. As for Army units, like Reserve forces would have been moved in. Unfortunately at this time there are no reserve forces left -- they are all in Iraq. Thus the speculation that this may be permanent may be true as there is no provisions for a backfill.

The following is from the Associated Press on 17 May 2004:

Troops In S. Korea May Go To Iraq

Associated Press
May 17, 2004

WASHINGTON - In a sign of the Iraq war's increasing strain on the U.S. Army, the Pentagon is considering an extraordinary shift of troops to Iraq from their garrisons in South Korea, where they have stood guard for decades against a feared invasion by forces of communist North Korea, officials say.

The move reflects not only the Army's difficulty in finding enough soldiers for the next rotation of forces into Iraq later this year but also Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's push for greater flexibility in deploying troops based anywhere in the world, including the Korean peninsula.

The U.S. commitment to defending South Korea is the most enduring of its kind, after the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact that threatened Europe until it dissolved in 1991. U.S. forces saved South Korea after the North invaded without warning in June 1950.

South Korean officials offered the first word Sunday that the United States wanted to move some of the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed there to Iraq, and Pentagon officials confirmed that talks were under way. The issue is politically sensitive because of the concern about a potential North Korean attack across the Demilitarized Zone that has separated the North and South since the Korean War ended in a truce in July 1953. U.S. and South Korean forces remain on a war footing because the truce has never been converted to a peace treaty, and the two Koreas are technically still at war.

"The U.S. government has told us that it needs to select some U.S. troops in South Korea and send them to Iraq to cope with the worsening situation in Iraq," said Kim Sook, head of the South Korean Foreign Ministry's North American Bureau.

Tapping into the U.S. force on the Korean peninsula, the Cold War's last remaining flash point, would be a historic move by the Pentagon. It underscores the degree to which the military is stretched to provide enough forces for Iraq while also meeting its other commitments.

The Pentagon had planned to reduce the number of troops in Iraq to about 115,000 this spring, but an increasingly bloody insurgency forced a change in plans. The Pentagon announced this month that it now plans to keep about 135,000 troops in Iraq for at least the next year and a half.

Kim said the two allies are working out details, including the size and timing of the redeployment of U.S. troops from South Korea. The forces have traditionally served as a deterrent against North Korea's 1.1-million-member military, which is the world's fifth largest although severely hampered in its equipping and training by the communist nation's chronic economic problems.

In Washington, a senior defense official confirmed that the Pentagon is in discussions with the South Korean government about using some Korea-based U.S. forces in Iraq. The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the shift was not imminent but would be part of the next rotation of American troops in Iraq, which is scheduled to begin this summer. He offered no other details.

South Korea's mass-circulation JoongAng Ilbo newspaper, quoting unnamed government sources, reported that a brigade of 4,000 U.S. troops belonging to the 2nd Infantry Division will move to Iraq "within several weeks."

The division, based at Camp Red Cloud, is deployed along the tense border with North Korea, the world's most heavily armed. It has a formidable array of combat power, including two combat maneuver brigades, an aviation brigade, a combat engineer brigade, an air defense artillery regiment and a military police company. It has been stationed in South Korea since 1965.

The division's 3rd Brigade, known as the Arrowhead Brigade, is based at Fort Lewis, Wash., as a reserve force for Korea. That brigade, which was the first in the Army to transition from tanks to the new Stryker wheeled vehicle, has been operating in northern Iraq since late last fall.

Kim, the South Korean official, said it was too early to speculate on whether the troops will return to South Korea after their Iraq mission. The Bush administration wants to reduce the number of troops stationed permanently in South Korea, but no decisions have been made.

South Korea has feared that a cut in U.S. military presence might weaken the two allies' combined defense readiness against North Korea amid tension over the communist state's nuclear weapons program. At the administration's urging, South Korea has agreed to send more than 3,000 of its troops to Iraq to help stabilize and rebuild the country. They are expected to arrive in August.

The Bush administration attempted to put "happy faces" on the deployment saying that the planned redeployment of forces to Iraq is not an outcome of the United States losing its confidence in South Korea. GNP lawmaker Park Jin quoted a White House official as saying, "The deteriorating situation in Iraq was the main reason for the decision to relocate some of the U.S. forces in South Korea, and it does not mean a no-confidence vote for South Korea." Park was sent as a special envoy of his party to meet with Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly and Richard Lawless, deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia and White House officials.

4,000 U.S. troops here said Iraq-bound

Long-rumored but often denied, plans to send U.S. troops here to Iraq have been confirmed by military and civilian government sources.

A government official said yesterday that a brigade, about 4,000 soldiers, from the U.S. 2d Infantry Division would be sent to the Middle East within the next few weeks. Other officials here confirmed the U.S. plans.

"The U.S. government recently notified our government through diplomatic channels that it has decided to send a brigade to Iraq," the official said. "The two sides are expected to discuss this matter in the near future."

He added that it was not clear whether the brigade would return to Korea after its duty in Iraq or leave Korea permanently. "But with U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and other senior officials continuously mentioning reductions of U.S. troops on the peninsula, it is quite possible that the unit might leave Korea for good," he added.

Washington did not give an exact date for the dispatch; this official said he expected it to happen in June.

Neither, he said, has the U.S. government decided whether to ship one of the two infantry brigades in the division intact or mix units from the two to form a new unit. A diplomatic source commented that President George W. Bush was expected to raise the subject when he calls Korea's President Roh Moo-hyun to congratulate him on his return to office after a two-month impeachment hiatus. That diplomat also said the U.S. decision was not meant to increase the pressure on Korea to dispatch troops to Iraq, but rather to strengthen U.S. forces in the region before the handover of sovereignty to an interim government there on June 30.

The U.S. Embassy's public affairs officer, Maureen Cormack, said she had no information on the subject.

by Lee Chul-hee enational@joongang.co.kr

So We Have USFK Reductions After All?

The U.S. government has informed the Korean government that is has decided to deploy a U.S. military brigade in Korea to Iraq.

For some time, the press and experts repeatedly forecasted that there would be some changes happening for U.S. military troops stationed in Korea with the Iraq War in process. The Korean government, however, would only respond to this analysis by saying that there is no problem between the two countries, avoiding to directly comment on the issue. Since the beginning of the Bush administration, the Korean government has dodged the issue of relocating U.S. troops and alluding to matters relating to the size and role of the U.S. troops in Korea. Nevertheless, because things have led to the current situation, the Korean government must give direct answers to ease the people’s minds from doubts, uncertainties, and suspicions that have arised in relation to the present and future of Korean-U.S. relations and U.S. troops in Korea.

U.S. ground forces in Korea are the 28,000 men of the 2nd Infantry Division. According to press reports, among the three brigades of the 2nd Division, one of the three, which is now on stand-by waiting for its replacement from the main land, is to be dispatch to Iraq, while another brigade is to be withdrawn to the United States. This leaves only one infantry brigade in Korea. This could also mean that the size and character of the USFK in Korea has entered a critical new phase, the first since the 1970s when a division was withdrawn from Korea in accordance with President Nixon's “Guam doctrine.”

First of all, a practical question on the table is whether or not the brigade sent to Iraq would come back to Korea once the war in Iraq ends. If it does not return to Korea, we can say that an actual reduction and withdrawal of U.S. troops in Korea is happening right at this moment. It is a matter of primary concern as to how the role of the one brigade left in Korea would change and how the Korean military would fill the vacuum.

When U.S. troops leave the duty of securing the Korean national boundaries but instead takes a new role as an air power-centered task force, a fundamental issue would be whether the Korean government has fully considered and prepared for the possible problems that might arise in the process. The most critical factor, however, is whether this reduction of U.S. troops in Korea would lead to the total withdrawal of U.S. troops in the future. The government must provide a precise answer to these questions.

Another concern is whether the Korean government went into a thorough discussion with the U.S. government concerning military reinforcements that are to take the position of the one brigade leaving for Iraq. Such a common-sense question seemed necessary as strange signs have appeared through various channels and on several levels. Some raised questions as to whether the whole process has been directed solely by the United States without making any sufficient preliminary announcements or agreements with the Korean government because of this atmosphere.

One thing that weighs on our minds is whether the forces that have been asserting “Anti-Americanism” and “Withdrawal of U.S. Troops” through the candlelight vigils and opposing the construction of a new U.S. Embassy, the moving of U.S. bases and shaking the basis of the relationship between Korea and the U.S. every time there is a pending bilateral issue have grown to be the core political base of this government. Another worry is whether this situation is related to the core government personalities that forecasted “qualitative changes in the relation between Korea and the U.S.”

If these changes in the U.S. military are included among the qualitative changes of the alliance between Korea and the U.S., we must ask what security and alliance alternatives to substitute for and suppliment these“qualitative changes" has the government prepared, adn what direction will it take from there.

Can an anxious nation trust that this government’s policy toward the U.S. and its alliances is the result of deep consideration concerning Korea’s path and strategies for defense?

Eventually all these issues come down to the question of how this government evaluates the meaning of the alliance between Korea and the United States. The alliance with the U.S. is the only alliance we have. Accordingly, changes in the Korea-U.S. alliance or amendments in the track will directly influence, of course, the “axis of diplomacy” and the “axis of national defense” that has been supporting independence and prosperity of Korea since our independence in 1945. It is evident that it will also influence the future path of the country.

Such suspicions and anxiety of the nation cannot be comforted with rhetoric like “independent crack military forces” or “cooperative autonomous national defense,” nor can the security gap resulting from qualitative changes in the alliance be hidden with empty rhetoric saying “alliance defensive abilities will be strengthened with close cooperation between Korea and the U.S.” by the ones who are in charge.

This government should boldly state its diplomatic paths and security direction and truthfully respond to the nation’s doubts. One thing to be emphasized at this point is that those in charge of this government should not think that a five-years term in office grants them the right to change and shift the diplomatic, defensive, and economic bases that were the pivots of Korea for the past 50 years for political reasons without the agreement of the people. What the people truly wish to hear is the government’s position about these criticisms.

SITE NOTE: The Korean Press are focused on Korea only. However, there are other factors involved. The New York Times supported a plan to rearrange U.S. forces in the Korean peninsula and Europe that will take concrete shape soon, by reporting on its web site on June 4 that the U.S. plans to withdraw two divisions of the US army in Germany as a part of the US Global Defense Posture Review (GRP) The plan for relocation of the U.S. forces in Germany that the New York Times reported includes the redeployment of the 1st Armored Division and the 1st Infantry Division back to the U.S. A brigade of lightly armed strikers will be stationed in Germany, and a wing of F-16s flying will be shifted to Turkey.

In addition, the Philippines has broached the issue of asking the U.S. to return to the Philippines. The impacts of the loss of the U.S. may have salved the Philippine pride for a short time under President Aquino, but now the realities of a prolonged down turn in the economy -- upsurge in Muslim insurgency in the South of the PI -- has caused the PI to face a new reality. It needs the U.S. military for monetary benefits as well as security needs. The two governments are currently negotiating an agreement that will give US forces easier access to Philippines bases. However, throughout the region, the US is viewed with a mixture of admiration and fear: A source of investment in good times that can instantly turn into a bully when times go bad. The protests against the US presence have remained small. Eighty-four percent of Filipinos are supportive of the US assistance, according to local pollsters. However, the Americans staying is another matter. Some 2,000 students at the University of the Philippines burned an American flag during a protest in February.

John Roberts, "US military plans for a long-term presence in the Philippines" (16 April 2002) stated, "The country’s constitution bans the presence of foreign troops on Philippine soil. Moreover, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo expected a political backlash over the return of troops of the former colonial power just a decade after shutting the last US bases—the Subic Bay naval base and Clark Airfield. A constitutional challenge has already been mounted in the Supreme Court and a number of anti-US protests have taken place." Three decades after the US defeat in Vietnam and a decade after its withdrawal from Subic Bay and Clark Airfield, the Bush administration and the Pentagon are pushing for the Philippines to again become a major US base of operations in South East Asia.

The US treads carefully in the Philippines, balancing the desire to act toward perceived terrorist threats against the political damage that could be done to President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Ms. Arroyo's Senate opponents are already lining up to use her cooperation with the US against her.

Christian Science Monitor (Feb 8, 2004) stated that populace was still divided on the Bush opening a new front on the War on Terror in the PI. In Angeles City (former home of Clark AB) bars are sprucing up betting on the US return. Nowhere are there as many mixed emotions as in the Philippines, which has closer cultural ties to the US than any other Asian nation. English is the language of commerce, the favorite sport is basketball, and many senior military officers graduated from US service academies such as West Point. Yet the two US bases here were closed in 1992 because of nationalist opposition in the Senate and complaints from citizens' groups about the raunchy neighborhoods that sprang up around them.

2d ID Troops Warned About Leaking Details The 2d Infantry Division will deploy approximately 3,600 Soldiers to Iraq in the late-summer timeframe. On May 19, the division received the official order to send 2d Brigade along with supporting units comprising the 2d Brigade Combat Team (2BCT) to support Operation Iraqi Freedom. The 2d ID Magazine stated the following advice to all GIs about the upcoming deployment of the 3600 man combat team which will rotate to maintain the U.S. Army’s wartime criteria of 12-month rotations for deployed units. This unit is part of the additional 20,000 that has been authorized to deploy to Iraq.

You can expect high media interest in the deployment, and media may approach you while you are off-post. No discussion of operational details is authorized. It is not appropriate to comment on matters of policy. You are reminded not to speak beyond your pay grade. Personnel should limit their comments to information within the purview of their own personal experience and responsibilities. Remember that anything you say may be quoted. You are not required to speak to the media. If you have any doubt on what you should say, you may simply direct the reporter to the division public affairs office.

Maintain operational security (OPSEC). Beware of discussing details of the deployment in areas where people not authorized to know the information are present and can hear your conversation. Do not discuss the timeline, deployment location, and operational details with anyone other than your Soldiers and your chain of command. This includes phone calls and e-mail to friends and family. Operational details are classified information.

Negotiations for Troop Withdrawal Begin in June Chosun Ilbo on 28 May, negotiation concerning USFK reduction in line with the U.S. Global Posture Review will begin from June. "USFK reductions were first proposed last June by the U.S. side, but due to Korea's desire to discuss USFK reductions in the public sphere and the U.S.'s negative take on this, a year has gone past without an agreement."

This US position started to solidify in Nov 2002 after the violent anti-American protests that started in July 2002 and reached its peak in Dec 2002 -- after which the protests died down. One official said the troop reduction issue and U.S. military realignment plans initially came up at the end of the administration of President Kim Dae-jung -- in the midst of all the anti-American rhetoric. Supposedly in Sept 2003, the U.S. government told South Korean defense officials on a visit to Washington that the plan for a reduction of U.S. troops in Korea was "irrevocable." The Korean version of the story is that the USFK entered into negotiations under the ROK-US Future of the Alliance over items the exact same items that the U.S. were "irrevocable."

In other words, the ROK did not want to give up its tripwire. In Jan 2004, Donald Rumsfield simply said, "We're out of Yongsan" after bending-over to accomodate the ROK. It was then the U.S. started playing hardball. Actually the same items surfaced in April 2003 ROK-US Future of the Alliance meeting -- but only now the U.S. is simply unilaterally making these items come into effect.

In particular, he said, "During the second round of the Future of the Alliance talks that opened on June 5, 2003, the U.S. explained its idea for a USFK reduction... Its initial position was that it hoped for an agreement on USFK reductions." Asked if the U.S. had said it would withdraw 12,000 men as recently proposed, the official said that the U.S. had discussed a reduction of that size.

Concerning these reductions, the government has set out to 1) prevent economic unease and political confusion; 2) prevent the security situation, including deterrence against the North, from weakening; 3) complete programs connected with independent defense and USFK redeployments and reductions; and 4) release to the public negotiation points.

At the same time, a committee headed by the prime minister concerning USFK policy commenced in August 2003 set down policies to discuss publicly the USFK reduction issue. In late September 2003, a negotiating party composed of Defense Ministry, Foreign Ministry and National Security Council personnel visited the U.S. to discuss the issue.

To go back to review the issue back in 2003. A Korea Times article on 12 Apr 2003 gave some highlights of the what the U.S. TOLD the Koreans at the ROK-US Future of the Alliance Meeting in April 2003.

• "The U.S. told South Korea that the relocation of its Yongsan Garrison will be started and finished next year" a U.S. source said. (SITE NOTE: This meant that relocation to be completed before Dec 2005. In Jun 2003, the ROK still has NOT procured the land at Pyongtaek -- though the lands have been identified -- nor has the ROK attempted to allocate an additional 300,000 acres the US has requested.)
• "Osan, where U.S. Air Force and other big camps are located, is preferred as the new home for the U.S. theater headquarters because it would reduce moving costs," the source said. (SITE NOTE: In 2004, the new apartment towers under construction on Osan AB land outside the perimeter. New officers quarters under construction. New underground airborne control center completed.)
• "The Pentagon is seeing to it that there will be no repeat of a delay on the relocation of the garrison that happened in the early 1990s and the choice of Osan shows such U.S. determination." A Foreign Ministry official confirmed that the U.S. presented a timetable for the relocation of the Yongsan Garrison. A senior Seoul government official said, "Yongsan Garrison is set to move at any time." However, he declined to comment on whether the timetable was handed over during the Cha-Lawless meeting. The two sides agreed to move the U.S. base in Seoul as soon as possible without disclosing the exact timetable. (SITE NOTE: In 2004, the same thing is still being said, but the ROK seems to have a hearing problem.)
• Regarding the potential relocation of the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division, 14,000-strong mainstay of U.S. commitment to deterring an invasion by North Korea, the two sides didn't reach agreement with Seoul wanting to postpone its relocation after the settlement of the North Korean nuclear crisis. The U.S. wants to have both the Yongsan Garrison and the 2nd Infantry Division relocated at the same time. (SITE NOTE: In 2004, the US wants the move complete by 2007, while the ROK still trying to postpone movement.)
• "The two sides disagreed on the timing of the relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division, but, whenever it is moved, it will most likely entail a reduction in the number of U.S. ground forces," the U.S. source said, saying that it will be tantamount to rolling the suspended Nunn-Warner Amendment back into life.
• Under its present plan, called the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), United States Forces in Korea (USFK) will transfer the responsibility of defending one of the two main supply routes, which the North is bound to use in the event of its invasion, to South Korea, triggering speculation that the size of the 2nd Infantry Division will be halved into one infantry brigade with its support personnel. "However, the LPP itself is up for a change now and it is hard to tell what the USFK will come down to, considering the entire division will be taken out from its border area," a military expert said. (SITE NOTE: In 2004, the ROK is trying to link the LPP and troop reductions together. In other words, it is trying to reduce the land area allocated to the USFK, as well delay the movement of troops off the DMZ.)

S. Korea, U.S. to Begin Negotiations for Possible Troop Withdrawal

SEOUL, May 28 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States will officially begin negotiations for possible withdrawal of U.S Forces in Korea (USFK) in June under the framework of the global troop redeployment of the United States, a senior government official said Friday.

"We will begin negotiations for the possible U.S. troop reduction in South Korea in June or July," said the official, requesting not to be named.

In the first official confirmation by any government official on possible reduction in the size of U.S. troops in the Korean Peninsula, the official said the United States lodged a formal request with South Korea to start negotiations for the troop withdrawal under the Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) in June last year.

"We, however, persuaded the U.S. side to accept the postponement of the negotiations up until the summer of this year," he said, adding the delay came as a compromise as South Korea insisted on releasing the start of the talks to media organizations but the United States refused it for unknown reasons.

The official assumed the U.S. side did not want to let the Korean public know about the talks amid heightening security concerns at that time when suspicions erupted over North Korea's uranium-based nuclear weapons program.

Since the beginning of the latest dispute in late 2002, North Korea has attended two rounds of talks, in August last year and February this year, to address the international concerns over its nuclear weapons programs.

No major breakthrough was made in the past two rounds and a third is expected to be held by the end of June.

The official would not deny reports that the U.S. requested a reduction of up to 12,000 troops from South Korea, saying "It is roughly correct."

He did not elaborate on the Seoul government's position on the U.S. proposal, saying "It is not desirable for us to make our position on that known because we need to negotiate it with the U.S. later.

"It is clear, however, that the government has been preparing for its own counterproposal since the U.S. side made the request for negotiations on the troop withdrawal." The official would not predict how long the negotiations will last, saying "We need to narrow the differences in the proposals from the two sides."

He put forth several principles under which Seoul will negotiate with Washington.

The priority is not to undermine the South Korea-U.S. joint deterrent against a possible attack from North Korea, he said.

(SITE NOTE: The ROK position is that security of the Korean Peninsula must take precedence, while the USFK position is that this would impact the flexibility of the global forces. From the ROK standpoint prior consultation must be held before any troops are withdrawn. It is likely that the U.S. will disapprove of a more strenuous prior consultation system due to the serious impact it would have on the rapid mobilization capabilities of the USFK.)

Any troop withdrawal should also be made in a way that does not destabilize the existing alliance between Seoul and Washington, he said. (SITE NOTE: The USFK feels comfortable that its $11 billion investment to upgrade systems in the ROK will qualify. It points to the additional Patriots. The USFK position will be that troop withdrawals will NOT impact the stability. The ROK position is that it will.)

The official dismissed claims that the U.S. move to reduce its troop presence in South Korea was made following the inauguration of the administration of President Roh Moo-hyun, who was elected partly on an election pledge to secure a more equal footing in relations with the U.S.

The U.S side first proposed in November 2002 that the two sides establish a joint committee to discuss a possible U.S. troop reduction in Korea, he said.

The proposal was made immediately after the Bush administration officially announced the GPR to establish U.S. troops abroad as rapid deployment forces relying more on state-of-the-art equipment than manpower, to keep up with the changing security environment since the end of the Cold War, he said.

The Global Positioning Review (GPR) is treated as some sort of surprise by the ROK. It was not. The U.S. at the end of 2003 was OPENLY talking of shutting down bases in Germany because of the Iraq War realities when Germany refused permission to overfly their territory to send troops to Iraq. The Pentagon is reportedly preparing to withdraw its two Army divisions from Germany, thus freeing them for more strategically significant regions. At the beginning of 2003, the US was "sniffing around" for other bases for their forces. In addition, because of the persistent anti-Americanism in Korea, the US was looking for a way out of Korea. Because of problems with soldiers and sailors in Japan, the US was also thinking of options to get the ground troops out of Japan -- though the other AWACS, Patriot and Aegis destroyers would still remain in the area. In the future, the problem will be that the Kitty Hawk replacement since the next aircraft carrier will be a nuclear one...which Japanese have an aversion to. The Philippines were starting to look good again with its deep water port of Subic Bay -- though it would require a Constitutional amendment to allow the U.S. back in. President Arroyo was welcoming the Americans help in fighting the Muslims. Thailand was also an option with the deep water port of Satahip.

"The U.S. proposal was first made during the Kim Dae-jung administration," he said. "The timing was in November 2002, when opposition candidate Lee Hoi-chang was leading the opinion polls just a month ahead of the presidential election."

(SITE NOTE: The ROK is now tap-dancing -- trying to shift the blame from Roh. The U.S. told the ROK what was coming up in the future in April 2003. The ROK thought it could blackmail, stall, renegotiate and all the U.S. plans would go away. The U.S. tried to appease the ROK to get them on board, but when the ROK took the appeasement and attempted to get more renegotiations, this situation arose. The bottomline is that the ROK is no longer of PRIME important to the US plans for security in Asia. It is simply a hub for deployments -- not a key extension of power.

Then the officials attempted to deflect any blame from Roh. Because the United States first suggested setting up the Future of the Alliance talks between the two nations to discuss realignment issues in November 2002, the official said that "one cannot say that the reduction came about because the U.S. did not like the Roh administration." But if they knew of this in Nov 2002, then Roh knew about this position all along in 2003 and created this issue by his refusal to send ROK troops to free up the US troops in Iraq. Roh is to blame!!!)

The official was not sure if the proposed redeployment of about 3,600 U.S. troops in Korea to Iraq is part of the GPR.

"The troop pullout decision was made in such a rush," he said, adding that the issue should be discussed in the upcoming negotiations on the GPR on the Korean peninsula.

(SITE NOTE: This decision was NOT made in a rush!!! The U.S. stated they needed the ROK COMBAT troops by the summer rotation in 2003. The ROK knee-jerked the US around and finally with the latest move to send RECONSTRUCTION troops to a SAFE area in Irbil (guarded by 300 US Special Forces) it set up this confrontation.)

The pullout of about 3,600 U.S. troops to Iraq will not have an impact on South Korea's proposed dispatch of 3,000 troops to Iraq to help rehabilitation work there, he said.

"We are cautiously following the procedure for dispatch of the South Korean troops to Iraq," he said.

The revelations of the abuses of Iraqi prisoners of war by U.S. troops added momentum to moves opposing the dispatch of South Korean troops.

Civic groups urged the government not to send troops, saying there is no justification.

hdh@yna.co.kr

Thus AS OF 30 MAY, it is FACT that there is a 3,600 reduction with the POSSIBILITY of an overall 12,000 reduction. The impacts to projected manning, facilities and expansion are obvious. This would affect the entire move to Pyongtaek. In fact, people could take the brigade that is left and move them down to Pohang in the new training range that the LPP was supposed to bring about. The possibilities are endless. As of 7 June, the press was still stating the POSSIBILITY of a much greater U.S. force reduction with ROK press reports, quoting a "high-ranking government official," saying the United States told the ROK a year ago that it may withdraw as many as 12,000 of its 37,000 men from Korea as part of its Global Defense Posture Review.

• USFK manning: 37,500 military personnel (Aircraft: about 225 aircraft of all types.)
• Total Army: 27,500 soldiers. (Ground forces include a variety of units that are normally employed in the region, which total about 10,000 troops. Patriot missile batteries, Apache helicopter squadrons, a mechanized infantry brigade, an air assault brigade, various support, intelligence and other units. NOTE: In the near future, the Army will be adding an additional Patriot Brigage for Osan/Kwangju.)
• Total Air Force: 8,300. Two wings with approximately 3,500 at Osan AB and 3,500 at Kunsan AB.
• Total Navy: 293 sailors and 52 marines.

A Chosun Ilbo editorial stated that the combat power of the 2d Division equals that of roughly three mechanized Korean divisions. According to the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, the total cost of obtaining the defensive capability to stand alone with U.S. assistance amounted to 64 trillion won ($55 billion) extended to 2010. THIS IS OLD NEWS!!! Roh wanted a "self-reliant" military -- but to do so will cost!!! The 2d Bde 2d ID, a heavy infantry unit, is considered one of the finest in the U.S. order of battle and is the key U.S. combat unit that guards the traditional invasion corridor to Seoul. There is concern here that the deployment is meant to compensate for Korea's failure to commit its own brigade-sized contingent to Iraq, a move that would have made Korea the third-largest contingent there. YOU CAN'T POKE A TIGER WITH A STICK AND EXPECT TO COME AWAY UNSCATHED!!!

Sources close to the U.S. command said there is a feeling that South Korea needs to take on a greater share of the burden for its own defense. The South, with 48 million people, has more than twice the population of the North, at 22 million, and as the world's 11th-largest economy, has much greater economic power than the impoverished North.

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Protest near Humphreys According to a Stars and Stripes article on 28 May 2004, Camp Humphreys officials geared up for a large anti-American demonstration on 29-30 May near the base and cautioned U.S. soldiers to steer clear of the protest. Protest leaders objected to plans by the South Korean government to buy farmers' land to enlarge Camp Humphreys. They say the farmers should be paid more than the government has offered. Camp Humphreys is a 1,230-acre U.S. Army helicopter base in Pyongtaek's Anjung-ni section, about 45 miles south of Seoul. It's also a centerpiece of U.S. plans to consolidate many forces to bases south of the Han River.

Protest planners scheduled a two-day "anti-war, pro-peace" festival at the Pyongtaek Sports Complex; the "peace march" is scheduled for May 30. Organizers sold festival tickets for 10,000 won [around $8]. Events included an anti-war concert and other entertainment, street vendors — selling only peace-related items — and a "turtle marathon" running event with prizes that include "anti-war" T-shirts. Turnout estimates vary, but planners forecast at least 2,000. Officials said marchers are expected to proceed to the Dae Chu-ri Elementary School about a block from the camp's northern perimeter. Korean National Police will maintain a cordon outside the installation perimeter.

A protest sponsor's Web site states in Korean, "For so many years, the city of Pyongtaek was putting up with the foreigners who came in and took over our lands. At first, it was the Japanese, then it was the Americans. We've shared a part of our land with the Americans this long, and now our own government is giving them more of OUR land."

It was estimated around 700 marchers marched along the perimeter of the base. The protestors, shouting "No to the U.S. expansion of the military base and dispatch of troops," marched some 800 meters along Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek. That evening some 2000 NGO civic activists held a rally to protest a U.S. plan to expand the base and Seoul's upcoming contribution of 3,600 troops to U.S.-led efforts to rebuild war-torn Iraq.

The gradual enlargement of Camp Humphreys is called for under the Land Partnership Plan, a 2002 U.S.-South Korean agreement. The United States is to close many existing U.S. military installations around South Korea but expand certain others — including Camp Humphreys — with additional lands provided by the South Korean government.

What is NOT mentioned here is that the ROK actually stalled the withdrawal from Yongsan back in 1992 when it shrugged its shoulders when the Pyongtaek mayor and politicians refused to accept additional GIs into their community. This caused the Yongsan move to return to the status quo. The difference is that if the ROK refuses to grant the lands this time, the troops have every reason to be removed from the country. The U.S. is playing hardball and the ROK is against the wall. The ROK cannot waffle as it has in the past -- it is put up or shut up...despite the protestors.

Korean Perspective on Troop Cuts South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun has been sending mixed messages. In a speech on 6 Jun, Mr. Roh called for both "collective security" — understood by some analysts to mean a NATO-like Northeast Asia security pact — and a "mutual alliance." But at other times he has called for greater independence in security.

The following appeared on . It is an interesting article written by Cheong Wook Sik who is a representative of Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea (www.peacekorea.org). This article was translated by Yoon Myeong Jee, a volunteer of CNPK. It provides an insight into the way the Korean activist views the situation. This is a calm presentation of the activist view instead of the rabble-rousing, finger-pointing types of articles that are normally seen.

Less Military Means More Peace

U.S. troop cuts are an opportunity for disarmament talks on the Korean peninsula

Cheong Wook Sik (cnpk)

While shifting some of its troops from South Korea to Iraq, the United States has decided to beef up its military capability in and around the Korean peninsula to avoid a "military vacuum." According to both domestic and international news agencies, the U.S. is planning to deploy a PAC-2 and a PAC-3 in Gwangju (Gyeonggi Province) and Osan, respectively. The U.S. already deployed a PAC-3 in South Korea last August. (SITE NOTE: The PAC 3 was deployed in Korea in July 2003 and announced as operational in Sep 2003. The new PAC 3 are actually part of the US-Japanese Missile Defense Shield (MDS) system -- not for the protection of Korea per se. The new 8th Army unit, the 35th Air Defense Brigade, located at Fort Bliss, Texas, with their Patriot Advanced Capability 2 and 3 equipment will deploy to Korea. Two batteries will deploy to Kwangju Air Base (South Cholla Province) and their brigade and brigade headquarters will be located at Osan Air Base with approximately 500 soldiers in total. We find Kwangju interesting as it is the contingency base where aircraft will deploy into.)

The Washington Post also reported on May 18 that the U.S. would instead dispatch the Stryker battalions to Korea and strengthen its military forces in Asia Pacific region, including more bombers in Guam and an Aegis destroyer in the East Sea. (SITE NOTE: The 3d Bde 2d ID was slated for Korea but diverted to Iraq. Latest rumors are that negotiations were underway for it to be at Camp Zama in Japan because of all the problems associated with Korea.)

This series of announcements and movements lead us to believe that the U.S. is accelerating its military beef-up with its shift to Iraq. Both the U.S. and Korean governments claim that the strengthened military capability is enough to offset U.S. forces left in Korea, thus avoiding a "security vacuum."

What makes the U.S. build up of naval and air forces in and around the Korean peninsula possible while shifting some of land forces to Iraq is the fact that the U.S. no longer needs to mobilize naval and air forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. But it has been under pressure when it comes to land forces.

The changes in military operations are in line with the new plan for U.S. forces in Korea to reduce land forces while strengthening naval/air forces, intelligence capabilities and missile defense capabilities.

Here is the problem. Military buildup in and around Korea to avoid a "security vacuum" can create and heighten uncertainty. In other words, without any progress in U.S.-North Korea relations, the changes in military power, considering the U.S. adapted the preemptive strike doctrine against "rogue states" such as North Korea "if necessary," can bring about a backlash from North Korea.

What we should not forget is that this military buildup can cause a "security dilemma" and exacerbate tensions in Korea. In this regard, the new military plan may promote another arms race.

North Korea has been condemning the U.S. movement as a preliminary step in its invasion of North Korea. In their eyes, the U.S. military base relocation and expansion of offensive, defensive and intelligence capabilities are seen as a threat to their nation. North Korea believes that relocating U.S. military bases out of North Korea's long-range artillery reach, while strengthening both its offensive and defensive capabilities, will undermine North Korea's deterrence.

Wary of military budget increase

What is even more troubling is that the transformation of U.S. troops in Korea may lead South Korea to significantly increase its military budget out of fear of a "security vacuum." Pledging "cooperative self-national defense," the Roh administration has been promoting an increase in the military budget. Its efforts were rewarded with substantial military budget increase by 9 percent, which is relatively high considering the average budget increase of 2.1 percent. (SITE NOTE: Korea percentage of GDP spent in 1980 stood at 8 percent, but steadily decreased until 2002 when it stood at 2.8 percent of GDP. After being lambasted by the US for not doing its "share," the ROK reluctantly increased investment in military hardware to 3.8 percent of GDP. It should be noted that nations identified as "flash points" (India, Pakistan, Isreal, etc.) spend a MINIMUM of 6 percent of GDP. The ROK has been coasting under the USFK umbrella for many years. It's Patriot missiles are on order, but unfunded. This and many more shows why the ROK needs the US high-tech armaments -- money needs to be spent.)

Given this trend, the argument for asking the government to use the reduction in the USFK as an opportunity for national defense is highly likely to be the key to future military budget increases. If this assumption comes true, it will be seen as an act reversing the tide of defusing military hostilities and building peace.

Moreover, the argument that the Korean Army should fill the gap left by a departing U.S. Army may aggravate an already problematic military deployment. As many military experts have pointed out, reducing land forces while strengthening naval/air forces to balance the deployment and for better intelligence is key to reforming the Korean military system. If the Korean forces go this route, they will have a head-to-head collision with the U.S. forces in Korea that are reshaping in the exactly same way Korea does.

U.S. troops cut: opportunity for disarmament in the Korean peninsula

Filling the military gap with the Korean forces may ignite another round in the arms race and heighten military tensions, as well as put an enormous burden on the Korean people.

Therefore, the Roh administration should change its view and see the reduction of USFK as an opportunity for disarmament talks between the two Koreas or the U.S., South Korea and North Korea. This will benefit all three parties and lay the groundwork for "compromise" on the nuclear issue as well as expediting the peace process here.

It will be a quite a burden for the U.S. to maintain and manage more than 30,000 U.S. troops in Korea while reshaping its military. Given this fact, disarmament on the Korean peninsula will not undermine the U.S. pledge for security in Korea and could ease the burden to maintain and manage military forces.

North Korea, with its 1 million military personnel, can use this opportunity to change its image from a "hostile nation," to lay the groundwork for a debut on the international stage and to invest its human and physical resources in rebuilding its devastated economy. (SITE NOTE: This is unrealistic and "peace" to North Korea means 1.2 million soldiers will be unemployed in a society that has no jobs. War-based society is its only alternative until a economy-based society can take root.)

It will also be a good opportunity to South Korea because it will be more self-reliant in terms of national defense through three-party disarmament. Moreover, South Korea will be able to restructure its military system without additional economic pressures. It may even be able to cut its military budget. Although it sounds paradoxical, disarmament will be the first step for South Korea to become more self-reliant. (SITE NOTE: Korean authorities readily admit that the ROK has no money to go it alone -- even if it were stretched out over ten year period. If Korea wants to play with the big boys, it needs to speed some major amounts of money.)

Open your eyes and wake up

Conservative media, experts and the Grand National Party (conservative opposition party) exaggerate and reproduce the so-called "security vacuum" paranoia. It may be uncomfortable for the Korean people to see the U.S. pulling even a few of its troops out of Korea.

But the "security vacuum" argument doesn't make much sense. Without the strengthened military presence in and around Korea, the U.S.-Korea alliance is seen to have already secured an "excessive" level of deterrence against North Korea.

Excluding the U.S., South Korea has injected three to four times more money than North Korea to buildup its military capability over the last 20 years. Today, South Korea's military budget is almost same as North Korea's GDP. If South Korea is losing its ability to fight with North Korea despite all the money it is poured in, the South Korean government is either lying to its citizens or plagued with inefficiency.

North Korea is indeed a great military threat to South Korea. Even though it is not able to win a war against South Korea, any military conflict between the two Koreas will claim a lot of lives and result in widespread damage. This means that preventing a war, at any cost, is a top priority.

How to deal with the shocking news that the United States is pulling out some of its forces stationed in Korea will be the chance for both the Korean government and civil society to show how mature and different Korean people are now. Also this should be a time to assess and evaluate the real threat of North Korea and the current military status on the Korean peninsula.

In the meantime, the reduction of USFK should be seen as an opportunity to promote disarmament in the Korean peninsula. Excessive deterrence between two countries is just a balance of terror. It will only result in a vicious circle of a "security dilemma."

JUNE 2004

U.S. policy shift worrying Seoul

Foreign Ministry officials appear increasingly concerned that the United States is placing less importance on South Korea in formulating its policies.

A recent speech by a top U.S. government official has prompted concern among policymakers in Seoul that South Korea is becoming marginalized in the U.S. outlook on Asia.

One bit of evidence of the shift is a speech made at the Asia Foundation on May 14 by Mitchell Reiss, director of Policy Planning at the U.S. State Department. Mr. Reiss did not include South Korea among "key bilateral relationships" of the United States, which include Japan, China, India, and Pakistan. His speech, titled "Challenges and Opportunities in a Changing Asia," touched upon the main relationships. He mentioned South Korea merely by saying, "We view our alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines as well as Singapore as the key to assuring peace in East Asia and stability and prosperity for the entire region."

It is rare that a top U.S official would explain the future of U.S. policy in Asia without making any reference to the U.S.-South Korea alliance and its future.

Mr. Reiss said, "The United States is simultaneously transforming its relations with Asia's major states - Japan, China, India, and Russia. And we are remaking many other key bilateral relationships, including Pakistan."

South Korea's Foreign Ministry believes a fundamental change in U.S policy towards Asia may be under way, shifting from the focus on U.S.-Korea and U.S.-Japan ties to a broader strategic approach. Mr. Reiss, former general counsel to the Korea Energy Development Organization, is responsible for drawing up the mid- to long-term diplomatic approaches of the United States. He is known to be a close aide of Secretary of State Colin Powell. Mr. Reiss said in his speech, "Japan remains our key ally in the Pacific. But more, we believe it is a great power with global interests and a natural partner for the United States around the world." Implying that Japan would play a major role in the U.S.'s Asia policy, Mr. Reiss added, "It is imperative that we seek to define a more global basis for the U.S.-Japan alliance so that we can continue to lead together on the international stage."

The speech also contain a lengthy explanation about relations with China and the role that China could play in the future with the United States.

"We are pursuing complementary and sometimes common policies around the world," Mr. Reiss said. "We welcome a global role for China as long as it shoulders the burdens and assumes the responsibilities commensurate with that role."

by Oh Young-hwan jieho@joongang.co.kr 2004.06.04

Challenges and Opportunities in a Changing Asia

Mitchell B. Reiss, Director of Policy Planning

Remarks to the Asia Foundation Washington, DC May 14, 2004. Released by the Office of Policy Planning

Thank you, Ellen. And thank you to all of the members of this distinguished bipartisan panel.

I’m particularly delighted to speak on “U.S. Policy Challenges and Opportunities in Asia” to a group led by two of America’s finest diplomats: Ambassadors Michael Armacost and Stapleton Roy. Across several Administrations and several decades, they have matched insight and creativity to effectiveness and wisdom. They truly are among the very best that American diplomacy has produced.

This panel on “America’s Role in Asia” will confront the challenges of a region in the midst of rapid change. I say “change” because although Asia comprises some of the world’s oldest and most enduring civilizations, the region is today being reshaped by trends that are unprecedented.

Taken together, these trends have the potential to permanently alter the strategic landscape that confronts American policymakers. And so in the brief time I have with you today, I’d like to reflect a bit on five of these important trends. I’ll also talk about how the Bush Administration has worked to shape these trends in support of American interests and values.

Asia Goes Global

The first of these trends is the unprecedented globalization of Asia. Today, Asian governments, industries, NGOs, and militaries are bursting old boundaries and taking up new roles on a global stage. Asians are contributing to stability and prosperity beyond their region and across the world – from Africa to Latin America to the Middle East.

Consider, for instance, that behind the headlines about outsourcing and industrial restructuring, China has become a workshop of the global economy. India is its emerging software laboratory. And Japan, the world’s second-largest economy, is a global leader in many promising new technologies, such as nanotechnology, that have the potential to change the very face of the global economy. Likewise, Asian diplomacy and security policy have begun to “go global.” Standing with us in Afghanistan and Iraq are Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Mongolia, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Thailand. Japan plays a pivotal role in supporting key infrastructure projects, such as construction of the Kabul-Kandahar highway. And many others are providing less direct, but important, forms of support.

These new roles, especially among East Asians, are emerging in nearly every region of the world: Japan is the largest aid donor to Jordan and Pakistan. China has bailed out struggling grain producers in Kenya and contributed peacekeepers to Liberia. China is providing tents, generators, and electric lighting for electoral polling stations in Afghanistan. Asians are spreading aid and development assistance across Africa. They are making big-ticket oil investments in Kazakhstan, Sudan, and Iran. Indeed, Asian consumption increasingly is a dominant influence on the price of major commodities, such as iron, steel, and strategic minerals. For our part, the Administration views this global engagement as a benefit for the United States because we ourselves are wrestling with so many challenges that are global in scope: terrorism, a cleaner environment, secure energy supplies, and the spread of disease are transnational challenges, not just regional ones. Al-Qaeda operates on six continents. High oil prices affect global consumption. As we learned all too well from the spread of SARS, infectious disease can move aboard the planes, trains, and ships that circle the world.

Secretary Powell likes to say that the United States is pursuing “a strategy of partnerships” around the world. And against this backdrop, I think you will agree that Asians are among our very best allies and partners. Together, we are working to tip the balance in favor of a world where democracy and markets prevail, where terrorism is rare, women’s rights are protected, WMD is controlled, and the realm of human freedom can expand across the globe.

These are not just Asian challenges but global challenges. And it is clear that Asians are contributing a great deal beyond the borders of their region and on a worldwide scale.

Major Power Cooperation, Improved Bilateral Relations

The second major trend is that for the first time in two centuries, Asia’s major nations are at peace. The United States is simultaneously transforming its relations with Asia’s major states – Japan, China, India, and Russia. And we are remaking many other key bilateral relationships, including Pakistan. In fact, these states are themselves remaking their relations with one another. And thus, as President Bush’s National Security Strategy declared, “We have our best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the 17th century to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war.”

We are hardly complacent about this opportunity. We can’t afford to be. We understand well the powerful legacy of perception, emotion, and history. And we know, too, that the potential for large-scale inter-state conflict remains: most notably, on the Korean Peninsula, in the Taiwan Strait, and across the India-Pakistan Line of Control in Kashmir.

But by and large, Asia’s major powers are forging more complex – and peaceable relations than ever before. And on more issues than ever before, they increasingly find themselves on the same side.

For the United States, this means, above all, that we do not view our relations with Asia’s major states in zero-sum terms. We seek strong and productive relations with all of them.

In East Asia, the backbone of our strategy must remain the enduring U.S. commitment to our five bilateral alliances and key security partnerships. We view our alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines, as well as our partnership with Singapore, as the key to assuring peace in East Asia and stability and prosperity for the entire region.

In South Asia, our new strategic relationship with India and enhanced relations with Pakistan are proving crucial to assuring American interests while promoting stability and dialogue. Let me just touch briefly on four of these key bilateral relationships: with Japan, China, India, and Pakistan. Japan remains our key ally in the Pacific. But more, we believe it is a great power with global interests and a natural partner for the United States around the world.

Japan has the world’s second-largest economy. It is the world’s second-largest donor of overseas development assistance. It is the second-largest naval power in the Pacific. And as our distinguished Ambassador to Tokyo, Howard Baker, has pointed out, Japan’s achievements, influence, and interests have earned it a seat at the top table for the negotiation of international relations.

That is why we continue to support Japan’s permanent membership in the UN Security Council. It is why we have welcomed Japan’s support of peacekeeping operations in East Timor, Cambodia, Mozambique and the Golan Heights. And it is why we are so very pleased and grateful that Japan has provided important support in the war against terrorism, for operations in Afghanistan, and as part of the coalition in Iraq.

We are bound by shared interests and democratic values. And it is imperative that we seek to define a more global basis for the U.S.-Japan alliance so that we can continue to lead together on the international stage.

China, too, is making important choices about how it will use its growing power. Above all, we want a rising China to rise also to the challenges of global responsibility. And we must measure success not just by whether we have shared interests but by the tangible decisions and actions we take in support of those common interests. Where once we defined our relationship by our common opposition to the Soviet Union, we have the best opportunity in a generation to redefine those relations on the basis of the common interests we both are working for.

Indeed, as never before, we are combining our resources, power, influence and prestige. We are pursuing complementary – and sometimes common – policies around the world: China donated $150 million in bilateral assistance to Afghanistan and $25 million in multilateral assistance to Iraq. It is helping to forgive Iraqi debt. And of course, we are coordinating in the regional effort to end North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs.

The Administration is challenging China each and every day, raising the bar of our expectations from talk to action. We want China to step up. As Secretary Powell has said, “we welcome a global role for China so long as it shoulders the burdens and assumes the responsibilities commensurate with that role.” This means, however, that we must speak candidly about our differences, even as we work to ensure that those differences do not preclude cooperation where we agree. We cannot, for instance, shy away from or understate our concerns about human rights, where we have seen backsliding over the past year, or nonproliferation, where we are looking to China to enforce its laws, commitments, and export controls.

Likewise, we differ on Taiwan, where, as my colleague, Assistant Secretary James Kelly, said in his recent testimony to the House: “Our foremost concern is maintaining peace and stability in order to advance U.S. interests, spare the region the dangers of war, safeguard Taiwan’s democracy, and promote China’s constructive integration into the global system, as well as the spread of personal freedom in China.”

We are committed to the pillars of a policy that have worked so very well for both China and Taiwan these past thirty years. Indeed, it is, in part, the very success of American policy that has allowed both to prosper and Taiwan to make its transition to democracy: We adhere to our “one China” policy, based on the three joint communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act. We do not support Taiwan independence. We oppose unilateral moves by either side that would change the status quo as we define it. And we insist on a peaceful resolution of differences and no threat or use of force. That, too, is an abiding U.S. interest. And it is an interest we believe Beijing, too, should share.

With India, we are looking forward to working closely with the new government. And our goal remains to develop a new strategic relationship. This “de-hyphenation” of our policy – dealing with India and Pakistan individually rather than as part of some hyphenated “Indo-Pakistani conflict” – is a pivotal part of our approach. We share democratic traditions and interests with an India that is developing into one of the most important nations of the 21st century. India is a potential partner for the United States on issues of global scope. And we have more at stake bilaterally than ever before. To this end, we are pursuing a variety of steps designed to expand our dialogue, including enhanced civil nuclear and space cooperation and more high-technology trade.

Likewise, with Pakistan, we are pursuing a bilateral relationship on the merits, even as we remain attentive to the broader issue of India-Pakistan relations. This is a moment of enormous opportunity for both countries. And we see hopeful signs, including more people-to-people exchanges and other new forms of economic and social interaction. It is imperative that both sides seize this historic moment, for neither India nor Pakistan can realize its full potential when their relations are fraught with the potential for destructive conflict.

Our goal is a Pakistan that is a secure, prosperous and moderate democracy. We seek a Pakistan that contributes to growth and stability in the region and is a robust partner in the shared fight against terrorism. Pakistan has been a key ally in that struggle and we will continue to look to it to wage the fight vigorously and on all fronts.

Of course, we remain concerned about the overall direction of Pakistan’s political development. And with our initial success against A.Q. Khan’s proliferation network, we are working with Pakistan to ensure that its system of export controls and its legislation come up to the necessary standard. But we are determined to work together on shared interests. There is much at stake, including a stable future for a country with nuclear weapons that stands astride the crossroads of the subcontinent and the Islamic world.

Accelerating Regional Integration

A third major trend is the growing integration of the region, particularly of East Asia. We all recall the strategic debates of the 1990s, when so many analysts blithely dismissed the prospects for economic and institutional integration in Asia. Asians, we were told, were handicapped by traditional strategic fault lines among the powers. The region lacked “meaningful” institutions and could not be expected to overcome the divisive “legacies of history.”

Well, Asia is not 19th century Europe. And Asians are proving it every day. East Asians, in particular, are developing a distinctive path to regional integration. And the United States, as a traditional western Pacific power, must remain involved. It has not escaped our notice, for example, that a regional trade and financial system is emerging, pushed forward in part by accelerating intra-Asian trade and investment.

China has become a regional growth engine. And China and Japan both seek to convert their economic weight into political influence, proposing a variety of ideas such as free-trade agreements with Southeast Asia. Asians are coordinating currency swaps through the Chiang Mai initiative – this, in a region with nearly $2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves. ASEAN countries, too, are integrating their own sub-region, working to define an identity among all of Southeast Asia’s states, including newcomers to the grouping : Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

This poses some new challenges for the United States. We seek an East Asia that is open and inclusive. We want a regional architecture that allows states to build partnerships with each other as well as partnerships with the United States. The Administration is working to ensure that we remain a pivotal part of the region’s major institutions. And we want those institutions to foster partnerships to solve problems, not just talk about them.

In fact, some of these partnerships already exist, and we are working with our allies and others to improve them. There is APEC, and there is the ASEAN Regional Forum. But we also are creating new mechanisms – sometimes informally – to combine the power of those countries best positioned to wrestle with specific challenges.

Take the Six-Party Talks. For the first time, all of North Korea’s neighbors are sitting at the same table: those with the most immediate equities in its behavior; and those with the most tangible ability to demonstrate that there will be costs to non-compliance with its commitments.

We have succeeded, as Secretary Powell has said, in defining the North Korea issue as primarily a regional problem for the North Pacific community of which we are a part. We speak with a common voice. And we all are hearing the same message back from Pyongyang’s representatives across the table. Thanks to the Six Party format, we have developed a common understanding and approach to the problem. No longer can the North tell Beijing one thing, Tokyo another, and Washington yet another. No longer can it harbor any illusions that its nuclear weapons program is – as it so often claims – a purely “American” concern.

On the contrary. North Korea is hearing the same message again and again from Seoul, Tokyo, Beijing, and Moscow. Nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula are unacceptable. Full stop. And North Korea now must ask itself: Is it prepared to transform its behavior and, its relations with all of these neighbors? Or will it cling to an outdated approach that can only deepen its self-isolation from the region?

Indeed, even as we seek progress in these Talks, we also have an historic opportunity to build on them, and thus capture the promise of cooperation among the region’s major powers. Whether it is energy security or environmental pollution, shared transnational and economic interests increasingly bind at least five of these Six Parties together. If the 20th century was marked by the struggles among the powers, we now have an opportunity to define a new pattern of cooperation in Northeast Asia, while addressing common challenges as a group.

By building on our experience with the North Korean nuclear issue, we five can hold out to Pyongyang the prospect of joining in this cooperation if it makes the right strategic choice – to embrace the economic dynamism that has transformed the rest of the region while passing North Korea by.

The Flowering of Asian Democracy

A fourth major trend is the spread of democracy through both East and South Asia. This week’s headlines are abuzz with stories about India’s impending change of government. But it is remarkable that in recent months and into next year, executive and legislative elections (or both) have been or will be held in Afghanistan, Indonesia, India, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Malaysia, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand. An impressive list.

Some of you may have attended Secretary Powell’s recent B.C. Lee lecture at the Heritage Foundation. He spoke to just how unthinkable the spread of democracy in Asia once was. Forty years ago, he noted, there was just one genuine democracy in East Asia – Japan – one compromised democracy, in the Philippines, and one young and incomplete democracy, in Malaysia. In South Asia, India was democratic, but the prospects for democracy elsewhere in the region were not at all promising. Simply stated, indigenous democratic traditions were weak throughout the region.

Today, democracy has blossomed. And the emergence of distinctive Asian democracies spans both culture and creed: We see it in predominantly Buddhist Thailand, in predominantly Hindu India, in predominantly Muslim Indonesia, and in the predominantly Catholic Philippines. We see it in constitutional monarchies, such as Japan, and in former Communist states, such as Mongolia. We see democracies emerging in states with vastly different political cultures and traditions. We see it in ethnically homogeneous states, such as South Korea, as well as in ethnically diverse countries, such as Malaysia.

In short, the spread of democracy in Asia demonstrates once again that democratic ideas are universal. Democracies can take distinct forms and emerge from diverse political traditions. But clearly, as the Secretary has said, “no-one can now claim that political liberty is beyond Asian interests and capacities. The record speaks for itself.”

Just take Indonesia, now one of the world’s most populous democracies – and, I should add, a majority Muslim democracy. Indonesia is now conducting its second set of elections since the fall of Suharto – elections that already have involved the largest single-day balloting in the world: India may be more populous but its multiweek election means that more people went to the polls in Indonesia’s first round of presidential and legislative balloting on April 5th than in any democracy on Earth.

That demonstrates some things that are important: First, while no-one can deny that Indonesia faces many challenges, neither should observers deny its extraordinary successes. I hope this panel will highlight those successes and opportunities in your report, for Indonesia has, after all, come a long way in a very short time.

Second, together with Malaysians, Indonesians are proving day-by-day that there is nothing incompatible about Islam and democracy. In fact, there are more Muslims living in Indonesia than in the entire Arab world, and these majority Muslim countries have achieved economic growth and are setting ever deeper the roots of democratic traditions.

Finally, as the threat of terrorism has spread throughout Southeast Asia, these countries have continued to nurture democracies, representative governments, and longstanding traditions of tolerance. At a time when democratic societies everywhere are striving to find the right balance between openness and security, Southeast Asians are at the forefront of that debate. And this is equally true of South Asians: We have India, where one of the world’s largest Muslim populations is a vital part of a successful democracy. And there is Bangladesh – a fragile democracy, to be sure, but one that has improved literacy, reduced its birth rate, and empowered women through employment and education.

Asians are providing these lessons in democracy to the world. And they are providing them, too, to the remaining outliers of Asia: We hope, for instance, that Burma’s ruling junta will draw the right conclusions, starting with the national convention scheduled for May 17th, and begin a real transition to democracy at long last. Likewise, Americans look to the day when countries such as China, Vietnam, and Laos achieve representative government for their people.

I do not pretend this will be easy. And there is, of course, an enormous amount of work yet to be done. But as the people of these nations clamor for justice, representation, and the rule of law, the United States can help the process along. We are doing so through our own rule of law and civil society programs. We are making efforts with NGOs to promote free and fair elections. And of course, we have the Millennium Challenge Account, a new multibillion dollar aid fund for which 63 countries were initially eligible. 11 of those 63 countries are in Asia.

Evolving Economic Openness

Fifth and finally, we need to highlight the trend toward greater economic openness in Asia: Barriers to trade are dropping. We see greater investment in scientific research. And we see the emergence of several free-trade proposals. China and Japan have each offered FTAs to ASEAN. Japan has concluded an FTA with Mexico. The United States leads the way with our FTAs with Australia and Singapore and our negotiations with Thailand that will commence this year. We have offered our broader vision of a network of bilateral FTAs in Asia, anchored by our “Enterprise for ASEAN” initiative, which aims to begin the process in Southeast Asia. This is good for everyone: The rising tide of enhanced trade, expanding capital flows, accelerating growth, and new investments in research and development has the potential to lift all Asian boats.

But there are challenges aplenty. For one thing, it is too easy to forget just how vital Japan remains to Asia’s prosperity. Japan is in the midst of a painful economic restructuring. And we are trying to be supportive of Prime Minister Koizumi’s reform efforts. But it is essential that Japan tackle these challenges, not least because a vital economy underpins Japan’s expanding leadership role in the world. To lead, Japan must be strong. And a robust Japanese economy remains the cornerstone of Japanese strength.

Ultimately, I am bullish on Japan because it has risen to the challenge each time the analysts have glibly counted it “out.” In fact, as anyone who has driven Toyota’s hybrid Prius will tell you, Japan’s immense R&D efforts have begun to pay off. It quietly leads the world in many areas of hydrogen, fuel cell, and importantly, nanotechnology research. This R&D will foster the new industries that will drive economic growth over the next generation, and Japan is well-positioned in most of them.

And then there is China, which is fueling much of Asia’s explosive growth. I don’t have to repeat to this audience our strong concerns about and the efforts we have undertaken to ensure WTO compliance and intellectual property protection. We have a compelling interest in ensuring that China functions well within the global economy. In the view of many economists, China’s overheating economy is headed for a fall, taking increasingly China-dependent countries in Southeast Asia with it. They argue that China is burdened by a vulnerable banking system, under-funded pensions for its aging population, and inefficient industries tied to the apron strings of the state.

I’m not an economist. But it’s worth noting several factors that may make China far less vulnerable to a hard landing, much less a financial meltdown, than it was in 1997-98, when it emerged virtually unscathed from the financial crisis that afflicted most of its neighbors: China’s reserve war chest has grown to over $400 billion, up from $100 billion in 1997. It has a vital private sector that increasingly drives its investment surge.

Its capital controls make a run for the border impossible. Its trade is growing rapidly and is increasingly diverse. And its economic management team, from Premier Wen Jiabao on down, is committed to finding prudent ways to sustain economic dynamism while restraining overexpansion in a number of sectors.

A China that grows at sustainable levels would pose less risk to the increasingly China-dependent countries of Southeast Asia who, I would add, have also built up reserve war chests to avoid a repeat of 1997-98 and, in the view of many, maintain undervalued exchange rates or dollar pegs.

India, too, is growing rapidly, but we have yet to realize the full potential of our commercial relations. Let me give you some revealing figures: In 2000, U.S. exports to India were valued at $3.8 billion, more or less where they had been for the previous five years. U.S. exports to China are about five times greater. In fact, U.S. exports to Ireland in 2001 were almost twice as great as exports to India. And the situation is even worse with U.S. direct investment.

We have the ambition to do better. And we know we can. But more will be needed, including deepened economic reforms, trade liberalization, and a more predictable investment environment. Still, the economic potential of this region remains enormous.

Conclusion

We are at a moment of remarkable change and exciting opportunity in Asia. And the United States remains an essential partner for Asians to meet the challenges of their evolving region. Indeed, as Asia “goes global,” Asians and Americans must expand our partnership in wrestling with the challenges of an increasingly turbulent world.

While America’s role will adapt as new challenges evolve, some things must – and will – endure: Our commitment to our allies and partners. Our efforts to secure peace and prosperity for all Asians. And our desire to help spread the blessings of liberty. We must continue to play a vital role in Asia’s tomorrow that is taking shape today.

Thank you very much.

Anti-War activists outside Yongsan Garrison (7 Jun 04)

DAY ONE (June 7): According to Associated Press, "Third Of Troops To Leave S. Korea" (June 7, 2004), the US wants to withdraw some 12,500 U.S. troops by December 2005. The figure would include about 3,600 already slated to be redeployed this summer from South Korea to Iraq. The withdrawal would be the first major troop cut on the Korean Peninsula since 1992. The U.S. request came on June 6th as both sides prepared to open the FOTA, said Kim Sook, head of the South Korean Foreign Ministry's North American bureau.

Kim said officials at the South Korean National Security Council, Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry would review the proposal before giving a response: "We'll formulate a position and then notify the United States." South Korean and U.S. official opened formal talks Monday afternoon about repositioning troops on the divided Korean peninsula. A South Korean Defense Ministry spokesman declined to comment on the progress of talks or the U.S. proposal to withdraw 12,500 troops by Dec 2005.

But the country's Yonhap news agency quoted an unnamed South Korean official as saying South Korea proposed that the pullout happen gradually through 2013.

The proposal also would transfer about 7,000 U.S. forces and their families from the sprawling Yongsan Base in downtown Seoul to an expanded facility south of the capital by 2006. They reportedly failed to narrow differences on such key issues as a legal framework for a comprehensive agreement on the relocation. South Korea intends to initial the agreement on Tuesday. (SITE NOTE: It appeared the funding issue still remains the problem.)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Brief (7 Jun 04)

DAY TWO (June 8): South Korean and U.S. officials ended their high-profile military talks on the realignment of U.S. troops here without an agreement, a day after Washington disclosed its plan to scale back one third of its 37,000 troops in its major Asian ally, Seoul officials said. The allies failed to finalize their earlier agreements to relocate most of the U.S. troops in South Korea away from the border with North Korea and out of Seoul, the capital, by 2007, said Lt. Gen. Kwon An-do, the chief South Korean delegate.

According to Yonhap News, "U.S. Says Troop Reduction Plan Subject to Consultation" (June 8, 2004), the U.S. plan to reduce troops in South Korea is subject to consultation with the ROK and hopes to complete the talks "within a few months." Washington formally conveyed its intention to slash the number of its troops here by 12,500 to 25,000 by the end of next year. The troop cut proposal did not contain specifics, such as what units would be withdrawn, and those issues will be discussed at military-to-military talks between the two countries. This was the first full consultations and briefing on the outline of the concept plan and it would take "a few months" before making decisions on the scope and type of units that would leave Korea.

The settling of details on both the closing of Yongsan Garrison and the consolidation and eventual relocation of 2nd ID units to Osan and Pyongtaek was NOT finalized during this round of talks, though a previous outline agreement has all 7,000 U.S. troops — including USFK and the Combined Forces Command — moving out of Yongsan by 2007. Final negotiations on “technical issues,” including a renegotiated agreement on who will pay for the move, have stalled conclusion of those talks. Last week, a South Korean government report estimated the moving costs at up to $4 billion. Lt. Gen Kwan An-do, the lead South Korean delegate to the FOTA talks, confirmed that no agreements had been reached on either issue.

Seoul and Washington have held the talks since 2002 to reshape their half-century alliance amid rising anti-American sentiments here, with emphasis placed on working out details for the realignment of U.S. troops, which are expected be cut to 25,000 by the end of next year. The 9th FOTA failed to produce an agreement. The 10th FOTA talks will be either in late June or early July in an effort to conclude terms for relocating U.S. forces away from the border with North Korea and out of Seoul according to the Foreign Ministry.

FALL OUT AFTER MEETING North Korea, meanwhile, greeted the troop-reduction announcement 8 Jun by repeating its long-standing demand that all U.S. forces be withdrawn from South Korea. However, the demand was not associated with this meeting's announcement of a 12,500 man reduction, but over the ROK troop deployment to Iraq and the 3600 troop reduction by the US. (NOTE: The last big cut in US forces in South Korea was during the Vietnam War in 1971 when President Richard Nixon brought the US Army's 7th Infantry Division, some 20,000 troops, back to the US. In 1977, President Jimmy Carter announced he would withdraw all US troops from South Korea, but the plan drew fire and only 3,400 troops ultimately returned before the plan was cancelled by President Ronald Reagan. US ground troops have served as a guarantee since the end of the Korean War that any invasion of the South would immediately draw in the US. But more than half a century later, Pentagon officials contend the so-called "tripwire" is an anachronism in an age of high tech sensors and computer networks, precision weapons and US military dominance in the air and at sea. The US plans to withdraw its remaining ground forces from areas near the de-militarized zone, on the North-South border, to air (Osan/Kunsan) and naval hubs (Ansong/Pusan) south of Seoul.)

South Korean officials — and the general public — worried about the shift in part because it comes at a crucial stage in the dispute over North Korea's nuclear ambitions. The US feels it will not impact the six-party talks as the US commitment to Korea and the "qualitative" strength has been increased by the $11 billion investment in the ROK defense.

Suddenly there were worries that the troop reduction also could lead to other changes. According to a 8 Jun report from the Yonhap news service, the two allies are discussing modifications in the military command systems that would operate during wartime. According to the Chosun Ilbo (quoting the Kyodo News of Japan of 2 March), the U.S. informed the Japanese government of its desire to move the First Army corps headquarters located in Fort Lewis, Washington to the U.S. military installation at Camp Zama, located in Kanagawa, Japan. The First Army corps is in charge of Asia-Pacific region and consists of 40,000 military personnel including an infantry division. It is commanded by a lieutenant general. GlobalSecurity.org describes I Corps as "an early deploying corps for military contingencies in the Pacific … able to deploy on short notice. … War plans for I Corps include the defense of Korea or the defense of Japan. … I Corps base units include approximately 20,000 active-duty soldiers at Fort Lewis, Washington, and an equal number of U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard soldiers based in many of the fifty states." (SEE March 2004 for details.)

Kyodo News reported that the U.S. administration planned to restructure the U.S. Army's command in Korea and Japan, unifying its headquarters. If the headquarters is moved to Japan, the U.S. military command in Korea will be unified with the command in Japan in order to be absorbed into the headquarters of First Army corps, reported this newspaper.

In a policy paper released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, South Korean officials said bilateral discussions are under way to change the operational command structure for South Korean and U.S. troops; currently, the Combined Forces Command is headed by a U.S. four-star general, with a South Korean four-star as his deputy. The SOFA Agreement with Japan was updated in April 2004 -- ostensibly over soldier criminal jurisdiction issues -- but we noted that soon after Camp Zama signed a host-tenant agreement over terrorist protection in May.

Referring to recent ROK media reports that the United States appears to be downgrading the importance of Korea and its military commitment, the US dismissed the suggestion by emphatically stating that there has been no degradation of the alliance. The Koreans in their expression of self-importance have been saying the US needs to be in Korea to project their power in the Northeast Asia region so therefore the ROK should not have to pay their "share of defense costs." The latest turn of events by the US seems to be a retort that the ROK is NOT that important to the US -- in the big scheme of things. Destruction of the enemy can be done from long-distance overwhelming force as in Iraq -- and NOT by forward-positioning forces as a "tripwire" as seen along the DMZ.

It was announced in April that the USFKCommander might be downgraded to a Major General position because of the possible move to Camp Zama. General LaPorte (4 star) was asked to remain on past his normal rotation date to oversee the major changes that were coming about. At the same time, there has been rumors that the US was planning to shift some of the "administrative" tasks of the CFC to Camp Zama -- along with rumors that a Stryker unit from Washington state might be relocated there.

Some Korean officials feel that pulling out U.S. troops in 2005 would be difficult considering the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and the readiness of Korean military troops to fill in the security vacuum. Thus, the official said the Korean negotiators should make an appropriate proposal, paying due regard to the U.S. military power enhancement plan for 2006. National Security Advisor Maj Gen Kwon Jin-ho said it is too early to presuppose the U.S. proposal as a final proposition.

DIFFERENCES ON TIMELINE Supposedly the scale of the proposed reduction came as no surprise, but its relatively short timeline caught Seoul officials off guard. They thought the U.S. would propose to begin to pull out troops from after 2007 in step with a project to relocate frontline American troops away from the border with North Korea. This difference led to calls in South Korea for the Seoul government to try to persuade Washington to delay the proposed reduction. "No decision has been made on that because the United States just made its own suggestion. We've not yet reached the stage for presentation of our position," Defense Minister Cho Young-kil said on 8 Jun. (SITE NOTE: Later reports stated that high-ranking ROK officials WERE informed of the timeline long before this meeting.)

South Korea believes that the U.S. decision to downsize its 37,000 troops on its soil is irreversible and non-negotiable, but terms of the pullout, including its timing, can be negotiable. When asked whether there is a chance for negotiation, National Security Advisor Maj Gen Kwon Jin-ho said that there is nothing nonnegotiable, even the number of U.S. troops to be withdrawn from Korea, and that there is no deadline for negotiations. “The timetable is nothing but a suggestion from the United States, and we need to examine and negotiate it,” said Kwon.

Kwon continued, “In the review process, we also need to closely consult on which U.S. troops in Korea should be moved. We’ve made the decision to let people know about what’s going on in the FOTA (Future of the Alliance) talks because we wanted to let them know as it is happening and proceed with the negotiations in a transparent manner. We also wanted to stave off possible misunderstanding and rumors involving the U.S. troop reduction talks.” South Korean officials said they would mull the U.S. request, then make a counterproposal on everything from the timing to the size of the drawdown.

(SITE NOTE: It has been common in Korea under the Roh Moo-hyun administration to allow the decisions of critical issues to hammered out in the press. Under the guise of seeking consensus, it is actually a method used in 2002 to stir up public desent. The ROK troop deployment to Iraq is one such issue. In the past, it has worked in gaining public support -- both nationally and internationally -- for its positions. However, in this case, the result was muted silence from the ROK -- even the newsgroup (soc.culture.korean) normally filled with "Yankee Go Home" diatribes was silent. Though the populace overall felt the withdrawal was a positive thing, all were concerned with the withdrawal in terms of increased military expenditures in the midst of its recession. On the other hand, international opinion in a Fox Online Poll on 9 Jun showed 82 percent favored immediate withdrawal.)

M/Gen Kwon Jin-ho Brief (8 Jun 04)

According to Donga Ilbo on 9 Jun, the presidential aide of national security, Kwon Jin-ho, said, "Giving the impression that the government cannot help but accept the measure from the U.S. is problematic because it injures the people's pride." At the tenth round of the FOTA conference, which is scheduled to be held in early this month or the end of next month, the Korean government is known to suggest its version of the "Bill of Reducing U.S. Armed Forces in Korea" to the U.S. side.

According to several South Korean media reports, a senior U.S. official briefed selected national news outlets on 8 Jun "on condition of anonymity." This "anonymous" US official expressed "frustration" at the failure of talks between the two countries on relocating U.S. troops out of Seoul and away from the border with North Korea. Unless the two countries reach an agreement in the next few weeks, there will not be enough time left for South Korea's parliament to review and approve it by the end of this year. "If we don't get National Assembly review and approval of these documents in the September-to-December timeframe, there may also be problems in budgeting necessary funds for the 2005 budget." "If we miss the timeline in 2004, fail to approve the agreements in 2004 and fail to budget for them, and then find ourselves in the year 2005, we will have lost an entire year on a relocation out of Yongsan." According to the Joongang Ilbo on 9 Jun, "The official said: "If we continue to fail to reach agreement on Yongsan, we would create disappointment and increase uncertainty that we were not fulfilling obligations to return Yongsan to the Korean people." The official agreed the troop reduction plan was subject to consultations between the two governments and said the United States hopes for a final agreement within "a few months."

If one reads between the lines, the comments of the "anonymous" US official is a warning to the ROK negotiators. US officials who make statements at high profile meetings are making those statements for a purpose -- and with the full knowledge of their superiors. Career bureaucrats don't risk their careers making off-the-cuff statements -- especially at such high profile meetings as the FOTA. The "anonymous" official turned out to be Richard Lawless who gave an exclusive interview to the Chosun Ilbo. The following is excerpted from Stars and Stripes on 13 Jun.

While in Seoul, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless — who led the U.S. negotiating team in the Future of the Alliance talks — granted one interview, to the South Korean Chosun Ilbo newspaper. In that interview, Lawless said both the timing and size of the drawdown could be negotiated over the coming weeks.

“We are prepared to listen to whatever opinion Korea has,” he said. “We haven’t explained anything concrete yet, nor have we explained how we would proceed or which units would be reduced.”

But, he said, the reduction negotiations can’t drag on the way the base reorganization talks have.

“For this to become a political issue,” Lawless said, referring to negotiations over the amount of land needed for new U.S. military hubs, “leaves us frustrated.

“If this rational proposal is not accepted at the military level and instead develops into a political one, finding compromise might prove difficult.”

(SITE NOTE: We believe the term "consultations" is being viewed in different ways by the ROK and US delegations. "Consultations" from the US standpoint is equivalent to "close discussions" and "sharing of ideas." It in no way implies "negotiations." The troop reduction is non-negotiable as the whole GPR concept rotates around the plan coming together. If the ROK delays and the 2d ID troop reduction does NOT take place, the GPR plan starts to unravel at the edges. We believe the US is "consulting" with the ROK -- telling it how it will reduce the troops -- and the ROK can take it or leave it, but the time table stands (with minor modifications possible through negotiations to conclude in a few months). (SITE NOTE: Richard Lawless stated in an interview that the "both the timing and size of the drawdown could be negotiated over the coming weeks" but that it was NOT going to be a drawnout negotiation process.)

On 10 Jun on AFKN, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz talked about a "proposal" to the ROK. He explained the rationale that forward positioning troops did not make sense in the modern warfare where the US can deliver "overwhelming firepower" from anywhere in the world. He also mentioned that the ROK needed to take up more of its own defense. Listening to the "tone" of the report, one gets the idea that the "proposal" leaves the ROK with the option of rejecting the U.S. proposal for reductions -- but its going to happen anyway...and if the ROK rejects it, it can live with the consequences. (SITE NOTE: Wolfowitz created a furor in the ROK press as the first to OFFICIALLY declare the "trip wire" use of troops as an outdated concept.)

The Roh administration, on the other hand, views "consultations" as a means to reach a bilateral agreement. We believe the ROK chooses to interpret "consultations" to mean that they have approval/disapproval authority on changes -- and things are "negotiable" (re: National Security Advisor M/Gen Kwon Jin-ho's comments). This would be unacceptable with the US. Despite this, the line that Seoul officials are standing by is that nothing is set but that the United States remains committed to peace and security on the Korean peninsula, and that "a final decision on the GPR will be made bilaterally after close consultation."

In recent months, there was a relocation of 3,000 U.S. troops stationed in Okinawa, to Iraq WITHOUT any prior consultation between the Japan and the US. This same action if applied to Korea would create great concern amongst the ROK military. The USFK forces could be deployed on a moment's notice at the expense of the ROK defense. On June 4, Cheong Wa Dae announced its intention to "pursue the establishment of a stronger prior consultation system with the U.S. on the USFK relocation issue." Due to the serious impact it would have on the rapid mobilization capabilities of the USFK, the US most assuredly will NOT agree to "prior consultations" with the ROK over the use of American military forces. The US will NOT allow the ROK to control the US global military policy.

The Roh Administration STILL doesn't realize that their local knee-jerk politics to continually stall the PROMISED Iraq troop deployment created major problems. The ROK troops were to free up US combat troops needed in other Iraq "hot spots." Spain pulled out of Iraq. By stalling their ROK troop deployment, the summer rotation could not take place at the same time new troops were needed. A stop-loss was initiated and personnel frozen in place. The ROK's little 3,600 contribution created a mess in the summer rotation. It will NOT be given a second chance to mess up the US global military plans again using "prior consultation."

However, in the press, the Roh administration is trying to put down any rumors of animosity between the US and ROK negotiators. Korean ambassador to the U.S. Han Seung-ju stated when asked on 9 Jun if the recent deterioration of Korean-U.S. relations has affected the USFK reduction plan, answered, "I do not think the U.S. made such an important decision based on feelings. Moreover, the U.S.'s plan is not a definite one, and they did not make such a plan to show their dissatisfaction with the Korea-U.S. alliance

At the same time, there are other Koreans in leadership positions who understand exactly how the US views the word "consultation" and that some things are "non-negotiable." Kim Sook, the ministry's director-general in charge of North American affairs, said Seoul and Washington will hold a special meeting in either late June or early July, but an agreement on the relocation cannot be delayed beyond the next year. "We set the next FOTA as our deadline," Kim said. (SITE NOTE: We also believe the the involvement of Kim Sook from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) -- instead of officials from the Ministry of Defense -- has made this a POLITICAL issue rather than a MILITARY one. The ROK MND and US Department of Defense are counterparts. The ROK MOFA and US State Department are equivalent. The Roh administration deliberately turned the FOTA into a political issue.)

We believe some in government realize that an ultimatum has been given. Korean ambassador to the U.S. Han Seung-ju said on 9 Jun that Korea and the U.S. could coordinate the timing and term of reduction plus complementary measures through negotiations. Han said that it may be difficult to adjust the size of the reduction the U.S. proposed, which is 12,500, but they can negotiate over the timing and the term. He also said, “The U.S. has yet to decide which troops will be withdrawn. Thus, it has to be part of the negotiations as to whether the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division will be withdrawn, and if so, what complementary measures to take.”)

(SITE NOTE: Our opinion is that this "frustration statement" contains a warning to the ROK that delays may have reprecussions. On the ROK side, they are saying things are negotiable -- meaning they are going to force delays.

The discord over the negotiation progress is expected to be aggravated because the ROK is planning to connect the GPR-associated troop reduction plan with the the relocation the 2d ID and the revision of the Land Partnership Plan (LPP). The whole concept is ridiculous. The USFK returns a massive amount of land under the LPP and asks for a bit more (300,000 pyong) and suddenly it is a point for national debate.

What makes this land question more ridiculous is that the land in question are rice farm lands. We agree that the farmers should be compensated for their lands, but the problem is not the US -- it is the ROK. The ROK will not give adequate compensation to the farmers for their land and are instead of trying to condemn their lands and give the farmers a pitiance. The big picture is that rice consumption is on a decline in Korea, the Fair Trade Agreements (FTA) are set to open the rice markets and these farmers will lose their lands eventually if they don't seek other crops. We would think the farmers would end their protests if the ROK government would stop being so "cheap." We also suspect that massive profits are being made now over the division of Yongsan acreage -- in collusion with people in the MND -- who aim to turn the natural beauty into another mass of exclusive high-rise apartments. The MND wants the sale of Yongsan to fund the move -- but the potential for sticky hands in such a process is obvious. The ROK's track record in such affairs are replete with corruption, pay-offs and kickbacks.

The ROK is playing a dangerous game that may mean even further troop cuts -- "no land" in turn means "no place to put the functions that will be relocated" -- which in turn may mean "the troops will be reduced even further" -- with the blame falling on the ROK. The ROK has forgotten the US warning in Apr 2003 FOTA that delays as in the past will not be tolerated.)

A Change in ROK Outlook???? Has reality finally started to settle in??? The following is the Chosun Ilbo editorial on 4 April 2004:

Prerequisites for New Korea-U.S Joint Security Declaration

The Korean government is scrutinizing the “Korea-U.S Joint Security Declaration” in order to rebuild the alliance between the two countries. As the press has reported that even Japan is worried about the currently shaky Korea-U.S alliance, the government is seemingly attempting to prepare a breakthrough for a new alliance with the U.S., based on the “U.S-Japan Joint Security Declaration” that provided a turning point in the security relationship between the U.S. and Japan in the 1990s.

(SITE NOTE: U.S-Japan Joint Security Declaration -- Alliance for the 21st Century signed 17 April 1996. The treaty is based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America signed in 19 Jan 1960.)

However, the past U.S-Japan relations in which the “U.S-Japan Joint Security Declaration” was born and the current Korea-U.S relations are totally different, except for the insecure future of the alliance. At that time, the U.S. and Japan had a vast human network across both countries who shared worrisome views about the future of their alliance and resolved the issue willingly. By contrast, in the U.S., not only the State Department and the Defense Department but also even experts on Korea are saying that Korea is no longer an area of interest. In Korea, people in charge of diplomacy and security within the government are offering empty diplomatic rhetoric of “cooperative independent defense,” neglecting the true meaning of an alliance. Therefore, we cannot expect that the Korean government would move toward strengthening support and cooperation for U.S forces stationed here, as Japan did for U.S forces stationed on the islands despite fierce objections from leftists, opposition parties and civic organizations.

Accurate and realistic recognition of the current international relations and security situation is the prerequisite to a new security declaration between Korea and the U.S. The recent Korea-U.S relationship lacks this basic precondition. The typical example of the wrong recognition is the mistaken understanding on the presence of U.S forces in Korea. Some say that U.S. forces are stationing here for their own purposes, not for Korea’s interests. Behind this understanding lies self-contradictory logic that even if Korea demands that U.S forces leave this country, they would not.

The U.S unhesitatingly gave up Subic Naval Station and the Clark Air Base in the Philippines, which were crucial outposts in its Asia-Pacific strategy to secure maritime transportation routes and to check the influence of China. The two bases’ strategic importance was several times as great as those in Korea. The U.S. said at that time that it would not go to any country that doesn’t need the presence of U.S. forces. The U.S. is telling Korea the same thing now.

The Korean government should recognize calmly and accurately the reality and the meaning of the Korea-U.S alliance before signing a new Korea-U.S joint security declaration. Otherwise, Korea would bear resemblance to the Philippines, which is asking the U.S to return to it only several years after the departure of U.S forces.

There is a need for us to observe this matter from two different perspectives. First, the number of troop reductions confirmed by the U.S. delegation may not be a big problem after all. Strictly talking numbers, the 12,000 soldiers proposed by the U.S. delegation is about a third of the total number of U.S. troops stationed in Korea. This scale of reduction, of course, may weaken the manpower of U.S. troops in Korea and could trigger social unease and create a security vacuum. However, sources have confirmed that this reduction of U.S. troops is somewhat different from normal troop reduction, because it reflects changes in the U.S. policy that deals with its global troop disposition and strategic military plans. The United States has already established its future role in Korea and decided to leave 25,000 troops in Korea, which the United States thought of as the minimum number of troops adequate to perform military operations promptly without a hitch. Therefore, there is no need to be shaken up by the reduction of 12,000 U.S. troops.

The problem is how our government looks into the Korea-U.S. alliance, because it hardly reflects the opinions of the people. There is a big gap between how the United States and Korea thinks regarding security. While the United States perceives of security on a global scale, Korea limits its understanding to the security of Northeast Asia. The only reason as to why the Korea-U.S. alliance had been kept all these years was the two nations' common standpoint concerning North Korea and the balancing role played by the United States in Northeast Asia. However, at this point of time, Korean society is showing subtly contrasting view from the United States relating to security threats, the United States is asking the Korean government whether or not the government agrees with certain civic groups. I believe that the people of Korea have the right to hear the answer to this question, and whether it thinks there's a necessity to enhance the nature of Korea-U.S. alliance, before the United States hears it.

Chosun Ilbo editorial on 10 Jun stated some shifts in views that the FOTA idea of a "future" for the alliance may not be in the offing. The "glossy words" have shown there is a real problem with Korea.

Yongsan Garrison Negotiations Become Battle of Emotions

Korea and the U.S. are staging an emotional war after their negotiations over the relocation of the Yongsan base broke down. The chief U.S. negotiator outspokenly expressed disappointment, saying that he felt frustrated at the negotiations becoming a political issue, although the U.S. side made reasonable demands. Korean negotiators also said the U.S. made unreasonable demands and they felt disappointed. The Korea-U.S relationship and alliance have finally reached this point. The ruined Korea-U.S alliance has passed the point that can be covered up by the government’s glossy words.

The area in question is land measuring about 300,000 pyong, which the U.S. additionally demanded, in Osan and Pyeongtaek, the new site for the relocation of the Yongsan base.

The two countries initially agreed to that Korea would provide land measuring 3.12 million pyong in Osan and Pyeontaek, in exchange for the Yongsan Garrison. Negotiations began to go awry, as the U.S. demanded an additional land in Osan and Pyeongtaek after it decided to move the Korea-U.S Combined Forces Command and the U.N Forces Command in January. The two commands were supposed to remain in Seoul. In response to the demand, Korea said that it could not accept any additional land request because more than 12,000 U.S soldiers would be withdrawn. The U.S. responded that since it was returning to Korea 52 million pyong of the 74 million pyong it had been using up till now, should Korea provide at least the 300,000 additional pyong required for the base and housing? It was known that the U.S. was suspicious of the Korean government’s hidden intentions, as some Korean broadcasters and pro-government media have reported that the U.S. demand is unreasonable, simply comparing the reduction of USFK with the relocation of the Yongsan base.

The Korean negotiating team should specifically reveal the process of the negotiations, and the background and details of the additional U.S. land demand. With the revelation, the Korean people will have an opportunity to judge whether the U.S. demand is unreasonable or not, and they can cool-headedly think about whether it's right and wise to let a dispute over land measuring a third of Yeouido in Seoul rupture the 50-year-long alliance between Korea and the United States. The U.S., too, should clearly see that an emotional response like, "Unless this issue is resolved, there will be no augmentation of fighting strength," would not only hurt the pride of Koreans, but also entangle the situation.

Fox Online Poll: Support of Pull Out The following is the results on a 9 Jun online poll by Fox News Poll. The results are hardly conclusive and proves nothing -- but it does indicate a "general" feeling amongst the readers (liberal & conservative) of support for a pullout. The Bush Administration is planning on cutting 1/3 of 37,000 troops in South Korea by end of next year (96,603 total votes)

• a. This is good idea -- we need those troops elsewhere (82%) 79,409
• b. This is a bad idea -- and endangers South Koreans (9%) 9,048
• c. Neither answer above (9%) 8,146

Iraq Troop Reduction Specifics Starting to Take Shape The 2d ID USFK soldiers have been warned that communicating with the press would fall under the category of an OPSEC violation. Thus only official "news" sources can give any clues. The USFK has stated that the unit shipped to Iraq will be a "mixed" unit. The 2d Bde of the 2d ID is the " mixed", or "light" component with 2 light infantry battalions and 1 mech battalion.

2nd BDE, 2nd Infantry Division (Camp Hovey, Tongduchon-Ni) -- In Feb 2004, 2nd Bde moved into its new command center, touting it as a kind of above-ground bunker -- with blast-proof doors and windows. The two-story, 12,000-squarefoot building allows the brigade's command staff to finally gather under one roof. The $2.3 million project began in March 2002, with most construction completed by October 2002. Funding came from Congress. In Jun 2004, the 2d Bde was flagged for permanently departure from the ROK due to the ROK failure to deliver on its promise of 3,600 troops for Iraq. Departure was slated for August 2004, but details of exact mix unknown. The 2nd Bde is known as a "mixed brigade" with 2 light infantry air assault battalions (1-503 INF (L), Camp Casey, Co. C Cp Hovey, and 1-506 INF (L), Camp Greaves (to be returned to ROK under LPP in Nov 2004) and 1 mechanized battalion with 58 M2A3 Bradley (1-9 INF (M)).

• 1st BN, 503rd Infantry Rgt (Air Assault) -- 58 - M1A1 MBT (Camp Casey)
  
• 1st BN, 506th Infantry Rgt (Air Assault) -- 58 - M1A1 MBT (Camp Greaves) (NOTE: Camp Greaves, 1.5 miles from DMZ, to be returned to ROK under LPP in November 2004)
  
• 1st BN, 9th Infantry Rgt (MECH) -- 58 - M2A2 BFV (Camp Hovey)
  
• 2nd Battalion, 17th Field Artillery Regiment -- 58 M-109A6 self-propelled Paladin howitzers Announced for deployment on 30 July

Commander says Iraq-bound troops equipped with specialized training

By Seth Robson, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Saturday, July 3, 2004

CAMP RED CLOUD, South Korea — The Army has brought specialized training teams to South Korea to school Iraq-bound 2nd Infantry Division soldiers in the latest tactics developed by soldiers working and fighting in the desert, 2nd ID commander Maj. Gen. John R. Wood said Thursday.

"We have over 27 training teams that have come from outside the division to train in everything from sniper operations to urban operations to medical practices to intelligence techniques. They are on the ground here now adding to the training we are doing … making conditions as relevant and as real as we can,” Wood said in his first interview since the deployment was announced late last month.

The teams are passing on the latest knowledge from the desert to soldiers from 2nd ID’s 2nd Brigade Combat Team, due to deploy to Iraq in late summer. Combat team members returned recently from block leave and are preparing for the Iraq mission at camps and training facilities all over Area I, Wood said.

The division also is using new training manuals developed specifically for Iraq to school soldiers on what to expect when they get there. The manuals focus on conditions as they exist today and the latest techniques for dealing with threats such as improvised explosive devices, Wood said.

Many of the manuals are the work of specially-fielded teams tasked to go to Iraq and capture lessons from the field, he said. “In 32 years in the Army, I have never seen such a high quality of rapidly-developed training products available for training individual leaders to squads, platoons, companies and battalions. All of this helps us understand the conditions or experience of this theater and be able to set the conditions for our training,” he said.

The U.S. Army is learning and adapting quickly to the Iraq experience, he said.

“We are learning, not only from U.S. forces. We are also learning from the experiences of, for example, our British coalition partners,” Wood said, pointing out passages in a training manual contributed by British soldiers.

Secure and non-secure Internet sites also are a source of information about Iraq, with some training tips only days old, Wood said.

2nd ID has sought out Iraq veterans who recently transferred into the combat team unit and recorded their areas of expertise and where they served, Wood said.

“About 15 percent of soldiers in the division are veterans of Iraq. There are several soldiers who have experience in the vicinity of where we are going who can talk specifically about the community, the population and the threats they faced in this area,” he said.

2nd ID sent its own reconnaissance team to the area where the combat team will be deployed; team members have brought back more valuable knowledge about the conditions there, Wood said.

Exactly where in Iraq the 2nd Brigade Combat Team will end up still is secret, officials said. However, Wood said the area has little in common with the South Korean environment with which 2nd ID soldiers are familiar.

“The conditions in Korea are different than the conditions in Iraq but the military task and standard remain the same. It is the conditions that change dramatically, between the hills and forested slopes of Korea to the deserts and towns of Iraq,” he said. Intense heat and the different cultural practices of an Islamic society are other changes soldiers will notice, he said. The primary threat in Iraq is the unconventional attack, whereas in South Korea the attack threat is primarily conventional, Wood said. Troops in South Korea practice dealing with unconventional threats but “the unconventional threat is more relevant to Iraq,” he said. “There is an emphasis on very small-scale or low-level operations that we accomplish well here with the Korean conditions but we are emphasizing those specifically in Iraq for the company, platoon and squad-level missions.”

Like its destination, the exact composition of which 2nd Brigade Combat Team units will deploy is under wraps.

“The brigade is multifunctional. It can handle the full area of the missions that are required. It is constituted of combat, combat support and combat service support, which are the three major components of our military,” Wood said.

To prepare soldiers for their mission, 2nd ID is attempting to replicate in Area I the conditions its troops will face in Iraq, he said. The division is doing this in part by placing units and soldiers at South Korean locations that mirror the bases where they will establish themselves in Iraq, he said.

“The mechanics of that have a lot to do with establishing the teams as they will be positioned in Iraq — essentially where the base camps will be and how to establish the teams that work together from the various bases — the physical living setting,” he said.

2nd Brigade Combat Team soldiers are training for the typical missions they will be asked to accomplish in Iraq, Wood said. Those missions “may be slightly different or accomplished in a theater-specific way. For example, mounted patrolling along the highways, urban operations in areas in which they will be. These are missions that we are trained to accomplish but we wanted to focus specifically on them and develop additional skills,” Wood said.

Iraq-bound soldiers also will train to sharpen core military skills “in terms of rehearsal and process and frankly, intensity of marksmanship, of sustainability functions, of patrolling, of reporting,” he said.

The combat team just finished an intense training year and is well prepared for its mission in South Korea or combat missions in general, Wood said.

“The great part is we are starting very high on the learning curve, and we are able to sharpen specific skills, adapt to specific conditions and use the training products available in theater and within our Army to move to a much higher state of training readiness,” Wood said.

The 2nd ID commander said he would like to be with his soldiers in Iraq but that the mission in South Korea remains 2nd ID’s focus.

At the end of the Iraq mission, Wood said, he hopes he can look back and say the 2nd Brigade Combat Team soldiers were well trained and ready for the job at hand, their families were well cared for, they were properly equipped and they had a successful mission.

Reductions Go Ahead as Scheduled: Admiral Fargo According to the Agence France-Presse ("US SAYS TROOP PULLOUT FROM SOUTH KOREA PART OF GLOBAL CHANGES", 2004-06-22), the planned withdrawal of thousands of US troops from the ROK is part of a global restructuring of Washington's armed forces and more changes can be expected, Admiral Thomas Fargo, commander of US forces in the Pacific, told a news briefing during a visit to Malaysia.

The US told the ROK earlier this month that it wanted to pull 12,500 troops out of the peninsula by the end of 2005, which in turn triggering alarm in the ROK. The ROK wants the timeframe to be pushed back to between 2007 and 2013 to allow for the upgrade of its own military forces. Later the ROK stated that it would not be "self-reliant" until 2020 -- a shift from Roh's previous 2010 target. Though the ROK wanted it to be an exception, the changing realities came as a shock to South Korea, which had come to rely on a seemingly open-ended commitment for American troops to be deliberately placed within range of North Korean guns.

Despite an unresolved showdown with North Korea over its nuclear weapons program, Pentagon officials maintain that the nearly 700,000-strong South Korean military can plug any troop gap, while the United States compensates with air and naval power. Fargo said, however, that the withdrawal of 12,500 troops from the ROK "makes great sense" and could be done with "minimal risk", while stressing that any shuffling of forces would be carried out in close cooperation with US allies. In essence, this says to the ROK -- there will not be a shift in the time-table.

"Militarily it may make sense. Politically, it's dicey," says Joel Wit, a senior fellow at the Center for International and Strategic Studies and an expert on North Korea. "You do+n't want to be tinkering with your military posture in the middle of a crisis over the North's nuclear-weapons program." He added that South Koreans fear that the US has "a hidden agenda to pull out. That is their worst nightmare." The greatest fear of the South is that the pullout will allow the US to change its strategy to a more aggressive stance -- leading to a preemptive strike on the North.

Admiral Fargo complimented the ROK capabilities where they have "a very professional army that numbers some 20 divisions of active forces and they fly a very modern capable aircraft." "They've got a very solid and improving maritime capability. Their capability is vastly improved to take over a larger share of their own defense." In other words, they can defend themselves.

In BBC, "S Korea's shock at US troop cuts" (8 June 2004), Military analyst Bruce Bennett, of the Rand Corporation in California, said there were doubts in the short term about South Korea's ability to counter the massive artillery threat from its northern neighbor. "The South Koreans still have equipment that's decades old - there's an anomaly between the society, which is modern and wealthy, and its armed forces," he said. But officials also say it is time for South Korea to take more responsibility for its own defense. "The United States spends as much $10bn a year on its forces in Korea, but the Korean Government spends only $15bn on its entire defence budget," said analyst Bruce Bennett. That may have been acceptable when South Korea was a poor country, he said, but now it is the world's 11th largest economy and should do more.

Of more concern, they say, is the state of the alliance between Seoul and Washington. Anti-American sentiment has given the impression that US troops are not welcome in South Korea - it has contributed to uncomfortable relations between the two countries. There is an underlying fear in South Korea that the country is being punished for massive anti-American demonstrations two years ago, after two South Korean school-girls were crushed to death by a US armoured vehicle.

These global changes are creating a stir everywhere. On 4 Jun, the German government stated the US has yet to complete plans for any troop withdrawals from Germany. German deputy foreign minister Klaus Scharioth met Douglas Feith, the U.S. under secretary of defense for policy, in June in Berlin to talk about current proposals. But discussions are still preliminary and it is too early to discuss timetables and numbers, Foreign Ministry spokesman told reporters. He called a New York Times report “speculation” that Pentagon planners had proposed replacing its two Germany-based Army divisions with a brigade of Stryker light armored vehicles, and possibly relocating a wing of F-16 fighters from their base in Spangdahlem to Italy.

According to Reuters ("U.S. TO BOOST NAVAL, AIR PRESENCE IN ASIA PACIFIC", 2004-06-24), the US plans to put "substantially" more ships and warplanes in Asia and the Pacific, even as it pulls troops out of the ROK in a report to Congress. The build-up of armaments is part of the broadest repositioning of U.S. forces worldwide since the end of the Korean War more than 50 years ago. In Asia, the moves are intended to boost the U.S. ability to meet commitments on the divided Korean peninsula and elsewhere in the region, despite any permanent cut of troop numbers on the ground. Douglas Feith, under secretary of defense for policy, told the House Armed Services Committee, "We are not focused on maintaining numbers of troops overseas," Feith said. "Instead, we are focused on increasing the capabilities of our forces and those of our friends." (NOTE: Recently the US is using the term "friends" rather than "allies" in their statements which may be allusions to Korea and the Philippines.) Once the changes are in place, the United States "will have increased substantially our naval and air assets in the Asia-Pacific region that increase our abilities to operate effectively ... and fulfill our commitments in the area -- on the Korean peninsula and elsewhere," Feith testified.

The increased activity of "fast ships" to transport troops from Guam to Cobra Gold in Thailand in 2004 and the off-loading at Ansong of the Logistics Ships during 2004 exercises can be seen as tests of this strategy. The "fast ships" are high-speed vessels that can more rapidly ferry Marines from Okinawa to the peninsula. There is also continued talk of the 3d Brigade of the 2d ID returning from Iraq to Korea -- but there is also talk of it going to Camp Zama, Japan as part of the I Corps proposal.

In conjunction with this, Prime Minister Koizumi promised the reduction in bases in Okinawa during a speech in June marking the Invasion of Okinawa at the end of WWII. There have been on-going discussions to return bases to the Japanese and consolidate them in other areas. There is on-going talks over having the Okinawa-based U.S. Marines moving to the northern island of Hokkaido, most likely to the Yausubetsu Training Area. (SITE NOTE: According to Associated Press, "Japanese governor opposes Marines’ planned move" (June 08, 2004), Harumi Takahashi, governor of the Japanese island of Hokkaido, voiced opposition to a proposed transfer of Marines from Okinawa to his prefecture. ”It would be difficult for us to accept it,” she told a news conference after Japanese government officials unveiled a U.S. proposal for relocating some of the 16,000 Marine Corps troops stationed in Okinawa to Hokkaido. Takahashi said she has heard nothing about the proposal from the central government. She also said that the Hokkaido government has urged the central government not to make permanent the use of an artillery range in eastern Hokkaido by Marine units. The Ground Self-Defense Force’s Yausubetsu Training Range has been cited as a possible site for relocation of some of the Okinawa-based Marines. The United States has informally asked Japan to consider allowing the moving of the artillery unit of the 3rd Marine Division’s 12th Marine Regiment to the Yausubetsu range. The Yausubetsu range, the largest in Japan, has been used by the Marines since September 1997, after Japan and the United States agreed in 1996 to relocate to other parts of Japan training involving the firing of live artillery shells over Highway 104 in Okinawa. The Marines are scheduled to do live-fire artillery training this year from July 28 at the Yausubetsu range, where shells can be fired for a distance of up to 18 kilometers.)

Yongsan Base Workers Rally over Job Loss According to the Stars and Stripes on 24 Jun stated that a 24 Jun rally would close the Yongsan Main and South gates temporarily. An estimated 2,000 base employees marched along the road separating the two sides of the U.S. Army's headquarters in South Korea. The Korean employees rallied against possible job cuts at American bases in South Korea, chanting and singing their fears that they could be left out in the cold by proposed U.S. base realignments or troop reductions on the peninsula. Korean Employees Union members from as far as Pusan and Taegu took part in the afternoon-long rally in front of the Korean War Memorial, just down the road from Yongsan Garrison. Because neither relocation nor reduction plans have been finalized, U.S. military officials said, it's too early to speculate about future job cuts.

According to Stars and Stripes on 26 Jun:

"We do not know what the effects of future decisions will be on the workforce," said 8th Army spokesman Lt. Col. Steve Boylan. "But 8th Army will work closely with the Korean Employees Union to provide information on any loss of jobs as far in advance to minimize any disruption. "Our agreement is to provide six months' notice for issues such as these to the KEU. We will continue to strive towards that end," Boylan said.

But many of the workers said they are upset with the South Korean government's inability so far to come up with job training or adjustment plans for any future large-scale layoffs. "They say our companies will be protected. But what about the people?" asked Kim Ki-tae, who works at Yongsan Garrison.

Under contract agreements, the U.S. military does not provide severance benefits to employees who lose their jobs. Many of those at the rallies demanded the South Korean government make the positions public servant jobs, ensuring them benefits.

The crowd Thursday stretched from the main entrance of the War Memorial up the street to the overpass linking the two sides of Yongsan Garrison. A sea of workers in white paper hats — adorned with pro-union slogans and small heart-shaped cutouts — sported yellow and red bibs with messages of protest. "Don't move Yongsan base!" they chanted, following that with cries of "Don't move 2ID to Iraq!"

At one point, several union leaders had their heads shaved as a symbolic protest; another union leader sliced open two of his fingers, then scrawled a sign reading "Defending peoples' right to survive" with his own blood. The rally was largely peaceful until a few participants got overly zealous with protests against the militants in Iraq who beheaded a young South Korean businessman earlier this week. After one protester burned a poster with the image of the young man being held at gunpoint, several union leaders shoved the protester away from the rally, causing a brief melee in front of the crowd.

But the focus quickly returned to the job security issue, with speaker after speaker voicing support for the United States and its presence in South Korea but also condemning the possible moves. "Not only is the American presence essential for our national security but also for our economy," union boss Kang In-shik told the crowd.

"Throughout the years, they are the ones who fed and saved our families." But now, he claimed, "they work us hard and dispose of us when they no longer need us."

Grand Opening of Yongsan Burke Towers A "Grand Opening" ceremony for Lloyd L. Burke Towers, the first U.S. government-owned and -operated apartment complex on Yongsan Garrison. The towers physically opened June 1, after just two years of construction. The five-story buildings are the first new family residence on the base since 1985. The mid-rise towers contain 20 three-bedroom units, nine four-bedroom units and one five-bedroom unit. Named after 1st Lt. Lloyd D. Burke, a Medal of Honor recipient from the Korean War, the towers are being offered to field-grade officers with command-sponsored families in Seoul. About 140 such families now are in Area II.

According to Stars and Stripes, "Yongsan celebrates opening of two new U.S.-operated high-rises" (June 30, 2004) "Base officials celebrated the opening of two South Korean-funded housing towers Monday — just two years before U.S. forces are to move out of Seoul. The five-story Lloyd L. Burke Towers, with three-, four- and five-bedroom units, are the first new family residences in Area II since 1985, said Col. Timothy McNulty, the Area II and 34th Support Group commander. They also represent some of the Army’s most modern housing, with barbecue areas, a basketball court, balconies, underground parking and an intercom security system, officials said. “I must say this is an awesome complex,” McNulty said. South Korea funded the $24 million towers through the host nation-funded construction program. Under that, South Korea bears some of the cost of maintaining infrastructure for U.S. forces stationed here. The towers are named after a Korean War Medal of Honor recipient who also fought in World War II and Vietnam. As a first lieutenant, Lloyd L. Burke of the 1st Cavalry Division killed about 100 enemy soldiers while advancing on a position near Chong Dong Korea in October 1951, officials said."

Later in the article it stated, "The project was almost never started after wide opposition arose in 2001 to the Army’s plan for 21 new high-rise buildings with a total of 1,066 apartments. Civic groups feared high-rises would spoil Seoul’s skyline; others maintained the U.S. military should vacate Yongsan Garrison altogether. The U.S. military said it needed new housing to compensate for deteriorating buildings and servicemembers who dreaded a tour in South Korea because the facilities were so bad. Two buildings were approved for construction but the rest of the project was scrapped in 2002. The U.S. military now has been focusing its efforts on Camp Humphreys, where most of the troops likely will be relocated when Yongsan Garrison is vacated. The U.S. and South Korean governments have said forces will move out of Yongsan by 2007, but funding the move and land allotments remain sticking points."

With the opening, the ROK media was hopeful that $24 million project raised a question over whether Washington will proceed with an initial plan to relocate the command out of the capital. The point is that this falls into the same category as the $2 million upgrade of the Yongsan Medical Facility -- when the USFK leaves, it will simply be left behind and the structures will belong to the ROK. However, the Hankyoreh editorial was angry that the ROK paid for the building claiming that the Ministry of Defense had lied to the public.

Special Meeting for FOTA postponed On 26 Jun, the ROK and US cancelled a special military alliance meeting slated for Jun 28-29. "We have agreed to review more data to reach an agreement at the 10th Future of the Alliance talks in July," a spokesman from the Ministry of Defense.

Possibly it might have to do with the Kim Sun-il beheading and the rise in protests blaming the US for not providing "timely information." A rally on 26 Jun by about 6,000 people in Seoul with some blaming the ROK government -- and some blaming the White House. Though the finger pointing by the ROK government to deflect the blame, it is apparent that the Foreign Ministry received a call about the kidnapping from APTN (Associated Press Television News) about the videotape on 3 June. The NGO Anti-War groups are using this kidnapping to stir up anti-troop deployment fervor and anti-Americanism along the way.

Richard Lawless, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, expressed hope on 27 Jun that the US would hold alliance talks in July.

According to Stars and Stripes, "Yongsan relocation talks pushed to July" (June 30, 2004), "YONGSAN GARRISON, South Korea — After abruptly canceling talks scheduled to begin Monday, South Korean and U.S. officials say they’re eager to reschedule the meeting and finalize plans for moving Yongsan Garrison. Over the weekend, South Korean Ministry of National Defense officials said the talks — intended to clear lingering issues before negotiations over the much larger troop-reduction topic — would be moved back to late July. Though some media outlets speculated the move was in deference to this weekend’s return of the body of a South Korean man beheaded by terrorists in Iraq, the official explanation was that both sides needed more time to study the proposals. Richard Lawless, lead U.S. negotiator in the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA) talks, expressed hope that this time, remaining issues could be resolved."

The article went on, "In comments to reporters before boarding a return flight from the six-nation talks in Beijing, Lawless, a deputy assistant defense secretary, said it was unclear whether the next round of talks would be in Seoul or Washington. Earlier this month, after the last round of FOTA discussions, Lawless expressed “frustration” with the process, which has dragged on for almost two years. The two sides now are at an impasse over how much land should be provided for an expanded U.S. military hub in Pyongtaek. A broad agreement, which will see Yongsan Garrison completely moved by 2007, was reached but “technical issues” remain unresolved, officials say. Another factor is the move’s cost, which South Korean government officials have estimated at $3 billion to $4 billion. Under current agreements, the South Koreans will pick up that whole tab, but officials are negotiating for a revision. The urgency in finalizing the relocation talks increased when the United States proposed removing 12,500 of its 38,000 servicemembers on the peninsula by next year. The proposal, first broached by U.S. officials last summer, quickly overshadowed the relocation issue, though the two are tied together. South Korean and American officials agreed that the relocation issue should be completed before the much tougher negotiations over the troop reduction were undertaken.

Governor of Kanagawa, Japan Doesn't Want More Troops The governor of Kanagawa Prefecture does not want additional troops in his area in meetings in Washington. Instead he wishes naval bases to consolidate. Also he expressed concerns over the stationing of a nuclear-powered replacement for the USS Kitty Hawk at Yokosuka.

The impact is that future expansions of I Corps at Camp Zama to possibly include the 3d Bde 2d ID and the movement of the "administrative functions" of the CFC to the I Corps. According to the Stars and Stripes stated on 25 Jun:

Governor: Don't put more troops at Zama

By Hana Kusumoto, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Friday, June 25, 2004

TOKYO — Kanagawa’s governor visited American officials in Washington on Monday and expressed concern about the U.S. bases in his prefecture.

Gov. Shigefumi Matsuzawa told Pentagon East Asia Affairs and State Department officials he opposes stationing any additional troops at the U.S. Army’s Camp Zama, according to a news release from his office. Recent Japanese news reports, quoting unnamed sources, suggested possible U.S. troop moves, including Army I Corps headquarters moving to Zama and Okinawa-based U.S. Marines moving to the northern island of Hokkaido, most likely to the Yausubetsu Training Area.

According to the release, Matsuzawa told Pentagon officials he can’t allow base buildup in a populated area and can’t accept additional housing for U.S. servicemembers. He said he wants U.S. bases — including Atsugi Naval Air Facility, Yokosuka Naval Base and Sagami Depot — to consolidate.

According to the release, U.S. officials said the Army wants modernization at Camp Zama.

Matsuzawa also urged the officials not to deploy a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to Yokosuka after the USS Kitty Hawk retires in 2008, emphasizing the Japanese people’s adverse reaction to nuclear power. The U.S. officials did not deny the possibility but asked for Japan’s understanding, noting their confidence in its safety and the fact that no accidents have occurred, the release said.

Mayors of Sagamihara and Zama cities near Camp Zama visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, urging it to provide information regarding any troop movements to Camp Zama.

Article 9 states: "CHAPTER II: RENUNCIATION OF WAR Article 9: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

According to Japan 101: Soon after the adoption of the constitution of Japan in 1947, there was a desire on the part of the US occupation forces for Japan to take a more active military role in the struggle against communism.

Some historians attribute the inclusion of Article 9 to Charles Kades, one of MacArthur's closest associates, who was impressed by the spirit of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war. MacArthur himself claimed that the idea had been suggested to him by Prime Minister Shidehara. The article's acceptance by the Japanese government may in part be explained by the desire to protect the imperial throne. Some Allied leaders saw the emperor as the primary factor in Japan's warlike behavior. His assent to the "No War" clause weakened their arguments in favor of abolishing the throne or trying the emperor as a war criminal.

Article 9 has had broad implications for foreign policy and has been reinterpreted by the ruling government as renouncing the use of force in international affairs, but not renouncing a national right to self-defense. The institution of judicial review as exercised by the Supreme Court, the status of the Self-Defense Forces, and the nature and tactics of opposition politics. This interpretation, which is opposed by many in the left-wing in Japan, allowed for the creation of the Japan Self-Defense Force. In practice, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are very well equipped and the maritime forces are widely considered to be stronger than the navies of Japan's neighbors.

Since the late-1990s, Article 9 has been the central feature of a dispute over the ability of Japan to undertake multilateral military commitments overseas. During the late 1980s, increases in government appropriations for the Self-Defense Forces averaged more than 5 percent per year. By 1990 Japan was ranked third, behind the then-Soviet Union and the United States, in total defense expenditures, and the United States urged Japan to assume a larger share of the burden of defense of the western Pacific. Given these circumstances, some have viewed Article 9 as increasingly irrelevant. It has remained, however, an important brake on the growth of Japan's military capabilities. Despite the fading of bitter wartime memories, the general public, according to opinion polls, continued to show strong support for this constitutional provision.

Analogues of the article 9 existed in the in the German post-war Grundgesetz. Both Eastern Germany and Western Germany had similar laws and the rearmament of these states also happened under pressure of their corresponding allies the United States and the Soviet Union. The constitution has changed over the years from "no army" to "army for self-defense or defense of NATO-allies" to include also participation in UN-missions.

Old News: USFK Air Force Units Untouched by Reduction The following from Yonhap News on 27 Jun confirms what was known all along -- the USAF units would be untouched. However, this does NOT mean that the bases will not be affected by the relocation of units. It is of note the the Air Component of the CFC will remain in its underground bunkers at Osan -- but we wonder if the CFC will relocate to Osan -- or to Camp Zama in Kanagawa, Japan -- if the ROK does NOT provide lands in accordance with its agreement. There will also be a restructuring of the reception and follow-on contingency plans. The importance of Ansong has not mentioned in the press dealing with these contingency plans.

Key Air Force Elements Not Part of U.S. Troop Cut Plan: Official

SEOUL, June 27 (Yonhap) -- Combat elements of the United States Air Force are not included in the plan to reduce the number of American troops in South Korea, a defense official here said Sunday.

The Defense Ministry insider said that under the planned troop readjustment, key units that have acted as the "eyes and ears" and the fighting elements of the South Korea-U.S. military deterrent strategy were not slated to be cut. He stressed it meant that both the reconnaissance and fighter-bomber presence will remain at current levels.

The U.S. Seventh Air Force deployed here is made up of the 8th Fighter Wing, the 51st Fighter Wing and the 607th Air Operation Group. The United States also operates a tactical reconnaissance group as its troops jointly man the Combined Air Component Command and the Korean Combat Operations Intelligence Center with South Korean counterparts.

The Seventh Air Force is comprised of 70 F-16 fighter bombers, 20 A-10 ground attack aircraft, three U-2S high altitude reconnaissance planes and a flight of C-12s and other support aircraft.

Under a blueprint which is part of Washington's new global strategy to reposition its troops, the United States will cut its presence on the peninsula from 37,500 at present to 25,000 by 2005. Both South Korea and the United States have said that the reduction of about 12,000 troops did not signify any weakening of the latter's defense commitment to the Korean peninsula.

The official, however, said that certain support troops may be cut back.

JULY 2004

• US Continue to Play Hardball: Meet With ROK Leaders on THEIR TURF: The US will send people of increasing responsibility prior to the July meetings over the relocation and nuclear confrontation issues. The intent is to keep the pressure focused on meeting the US demands prior to the July FOTA meeting. In June, Deputy Secretary of Defense Lawless and Under Secretary of State Kelly have made stopovers in Seoul. The next step up is National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice who will be in Seoul on 7 July -- after meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and his foreign minister on 7 July. Rice will meet with the Chinese on the DPRK and Iraq issues, and then proceed to Seoul. According to Chosun Ilbo, "Rice Visit Seeks to Solidify the Korea-U.S. Alliance" (28 Jun 04), the U.S. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice would visit Korea on July 9 as a "special envoy" for President Bush. Supposedly Rice was to meet President Roh; Kwon Jin-ho, Advisor for National Security; and Ban Ki-moon, Foreign Minister, in order to negotiate key issues, on the three big issues in U.S.-Korean relations -- the ROK Iraq troop dispatch, redeployment of USFK, and the North's nuclear issue. She was to deliver signed documents from President Bush to Roh and Ban on pending issues. It is most likely documents that spell out the changing US policy in dealing with Korea. (See to Shifting US Policy for article dealing with the changing US policy towards Korea that has the ROK in a panic.)

  A high-ranking government official evaluated the significance of Rice's visit, saying, "The purpose of her visit is to consolidate the shaky alliance of the two countries. Her visit would contribute to stabilizing U.S.-Korean relations by coordinating each other's opinions on the three big issues." This means that with anti-American feelings running higher in Korea and anti-Korean feelings sprouting in the U.S., the U.S. is trying to end misunderstanding between the two countries by sending its highest security official.

  The statement above was the ROK outlook of preserving the alliance. However, as the US calls up 5,600 of its Inactive Ready Reserve and activates its Army National Guard units -- it really does NOT have any sympathy for a country that still refuses to help out its "ally" who is desparately in need of combat troops. The ROK is not really on friendly terms with the US. In conjunction with this, there appears to be a growing anti-Korean blacklash over this issue.
  
  When Rice met with President Roh, she conveyed U.S. President George W. Bush's personal letter. However, the contents of Bush's letter were not revealed. In conveying the letter, Rice said, "The letter outlines his thinking about the relationship (between South Korea and the United States). And he also values his personal relationship with you." Just before meeting with Roh, Rice told her South Korean counterpart, national security adviser Kwon Chin-ho, that "Bush really wanted me to come and reaffirm that the relationship is very, very strong and central."
  
  As the FOTA will be in Washington between July 20-25 visits of ROK dignitaries to Washington will be limited. However, Yonhap ("South Korea Proposes Alliance Talkw with US 22-23 July", 2004-07-08) reported that Seoul has PROPOSED holding talks with Washington 22-23 July. The ROK also requested the US host the 10th round of the Future of the Alliance forum in Washington. Brig-Gen Nam Nam Dae-yeon, a Defence Ministry spokesman, said, "A response from the US side has yet to arrive."
  
  
• Hold Trump Card: Change in S.K.-U.S. Alliance Likely to Destabilize Markets Any major change in South Korea's alliance with the United States will destabilize South Korea's financial and foreign exchange markets and adversely affect the country's sovereign credit rating. For quite some time, we have stated that the primary rule of investment is security. If the USFK is removed, people will be very leery in investing in Korea. This is the trump card of the US. As long as the US presence in Korea is assured, investment will remain steady. If the ROK fails to provide funding and land, the reduction in forces will be immediate.
  
  According to the Chosun Ilbo, "Continued Weakening of Korea-U.S. Alliance Could Cause Economic Instability" (8 July 2004), "U.S. financial service companies and institutional investors generally make investment decisions in South Korea and other countries after analyzing reports coming out of the White House, the Treasury Department, and the Defense Department on the political, financial and security situations of each country. This might destabilize the financial and foreign exchange markets due to the possible shrinkage of companies' investment and consumption. Eventually, it would make the actual economy to be affacted in a large scale.
  
  In a report presented to President Roh Moo-hyun on 7 July, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) said, "South Korea's financial and foreign exchange markets will be greatly destabilized if any serious doubts are raised about the South Korea-U.S. alliance." In that case, South Korea's sovereign credit rating will be lowered, stock prices will fall with the exodus of foreign capital and risk premiums on South Korean bonds will rise.
  
  
• Visa Interviews Will Remain in Place: In recent months the visa restrictions between Vietnam and Russia have been reduced. However, the visa restrictions remain in place. Anti-American sentiment deepened and the South is learning about the consequences. U.S. visas will further tighten visa issuance regulations starting in August, including the introduction of fingerprinting. Approximately 420,000 people here applied for nonimmigrant visas last year, 397,000 of them being approved, according to officials at the U.S. embassy in Seoul. "Our consular section in Seoul is the largest single U.S. nonimmigrant visa processing post in the world," Bernard Alter, consul-general at the embassy. U.S. visa regulations now require an interview in virtually all cases, instead of granting as many waivers as in the past, because of security concerns, he added. While few disagree with the need for greater screening, many visa applicants here complain about the inconvenient and time-consuming process. The issuance process can be expensive for the many who need to resort to visa brokers or travel agencies to get help with the paperwork.
  
  The Koreans call for the U.S. to introduce a visa waiver program, pointing out that their country's economy has developed significantly and that fewer people have been found ineligible for U.S. visas. The U.S. has the visa waiver program with 27 countries, including Japan and Singapore, enabling passport holders from those countries to enter the U.S. for up to 90 days without a visa. But the embassy here said it is still premature to grant this privilege to South Korea. The visa refusal rate hovers around 5 percent each year here, and needs to go below 3 percent to benefit from the program.
  
  Some Koreans are attempting to state that the US is losing billions of dollars in tourism, but the truth is that the most Korean money is remitted to the US for the maintenance of Korean students and for emigrees. The people wishing to visit the US are primarily for business and education -- not tourism. The point is that the ROK needs the US -- not vice versa. The US is not Russia or Vietnam which needs the ROK money.
  
  On 30 July it was announced that the U.S. embassy on adopted an online appointment system for personal visa interviews ahead of the introduction of the fingerprinting of U.S. visa applicants. The embassy also announced an end of the personal appearance waiver program, which will lead to a significant surge in the percentage of applicants interviewed.
  
  
• US-Japan Will Continue to Press for "Collective Self-Defense" Policy
  
  Collective Defense: The US regional strategy calls for the dismantling of the United States Forces Japan (USFJ) and come up with a new structure at Camp Zama -- and the movement of the CFC "administrative functions" under this new structure. In essence, the USFK would be downgraded. However, there is continued political resistance in Japan to the concept of "Collective Self-Defense" and a revision of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. At the same time, the Japanese has continued to integrate their SDF assets that operate outside the coastal defense perimeter (AWACS, Aegis Destroyers) into the US integrated plans for defense of Japan -- as well as defense from North Korean attack.
  
  

  According to the Asahi Shimbun ("Koizumi Pushes Collective Self-Defense") on 28 Jun 2004 reported that in debate over the role of Self-Defense Forces (SDF), Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi called for constitutional revision so that Japan could engage in collective self-defense with US forces for the defense of Japan. "The issue ... is not about Japan joining the fight when US forces engage in combat. However, if Japan is unable to take joint action with US forces when they are fighting for the defense of Japan, I find that wrong," Koizumi said Sunday. During a televised debate aired on Japan Broadcasting Corp. (NHK) in which Koizumi made the remark, the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Katsuya Okada countered Koizumi. The "spirit of Article 9, which forbids use of force overseas, should be maintained," he said. "If the notion of collective self-defense becomes widely accepted, there is a strong possibility that Japan will have to join wars waged by the United States in other countries," Okada said. Takenori Kanzaki, head of the ruling coalition junior partner New Komeito, took a cautious stance toward Koizumi's statement. "We are conducting debate on the Constitution without taboo subjects, but that debate has yet to reach the point where we are able to change our support of Article 9," Kanzaki said, adding, "The overwhelming opinion in our party is that collective self-defense should not be permitted."

  Increased Self-defense Capability: The Donga Ilbo, "Japan is Considering Offensive Missiles to Attack Enemy Bases", (28 July 2004) reported that a Japanese newspaper agency, the Asahi Shimbun, on July 26 reported the Japanese Defense Agency was considering including plans to retain weapons to attack enemies' ballistic missile bases for the next "National Defense Program Outline" to be revised at the end of this year. The weapons being considered are precision guidance bombs; the U.S. anti-ship missile Harpoon 2 with a 200-kilometer range and designed to attack ground targets; and Tomahawk cruise missiles with a range of around 2,000 km. Light aircraft carriers are also being considered for introduction next year. As for this move, the Asahi Shimbun added, "Some in the government have raised concerns that possessing such missiles as the Tomahawk could be seen as a threat to northeastern Asian nations and cause diplomatic conflicts." According to the Constitution's restrictions on owning war potential, Japan has not retained weapons to attack enemy bases and is dependent on U.S. forces in times of urgency. However, many are demanding Japan possess missile capability as a precaution to a possible missile threat by the DPRK.
  
  US Troop Relocations: In mid-July 2004, the US and Japan held bilateral discussions in San Francisco though the topics were not revealed. The Pentagon would not comment on the nature of the talks. “The U.S. and Japan engage in consultations on a regular basis, both as part of normal alliance management and, more recently, as part of U.S. efforts to realign the U.S. global force structure and posture,” said Navy Lt. Cmdr. Flex Plexico of the Pentagon. Two objectives are in play at this week’s bilateral talks, USAF Col. Victor Warzinski, a U.S. Forces Japan spokesman, said, "We want to strengthen and support our relationship. Japan is a cornerstone of northeast Asian regional security and that’s something we hope to enhance. Secondly, both governments are committed to easing the burden of our presence on Okinawa. How we accomplish that is still a matter for discussion. No decisions have been made.” U.S. officials hope to have proposals ready for presidential review within the next few months, Warzinski said. The Japanese Kyodo news agency reported that the two countries may discuss shifting U.S. Marines on Okinawa to Camp Fuji in mainland Japan and relocating an Army brigade in Washington state to Camp Zama.
  
  At the same time, the US will coordinate closely with China which has expressed reservations with the mobile regional forces concept -- especially when located next door in Korea.
  
  

  According to a report by the Japanese newspaper agency, Yomiuri Shimbun, on July 23, as part of the realignment process of its military forces overseas, Washington is consulting with Tokyo on the withdrawal of 3,000 U.S. marines stationed in Okinawa Prefecture in Japan. The two nations are expected to finalize this plan at meetings between their foreign and defense ministers that will be held in late October.
  
  The main pullout will include the 31st Marine Expeditionary Force (2,100 troops) that belongs to Camp Hansen in Okinawa. It is a Special Operations Force which carries out duties including a landing operation in the face of the enemy, evacuation of noncombatants, and humanitarian support. The Yomiuri Shimbun reported Tokyo held a positive view on the U.S. decision since it understood its defense posture would remain intact.
  
  The U.S. government is also considering the relocation of 2,600 troops out of 16,000 marines in Okinawa Prefecture to Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture in Japan and the pullout of 600 troops from its supply unit. The total number of U.S. military in Japan to be repositioned or withdrawn will be 6,000 troops as part of U.S. military reconfiguration process. (NOTE: This proposal withdrawn on 27 July by U.S. through the embassy -- but a Defense Agency official said "the withdrawal represents only a postponement of conclusions on the realignment.")
  
  In order to enhance its mobility, the U.S. military plans to realign its troops in the Asia-Pacific region by shifting its forces concentrated in bases in Okinawa Prefecture. (NOTE: As of 28 July, protesters continued their sit-in to oppose a planned offshore airport for use by the U.S. Marine Corps, blocking the seabed drilling site off Nago, northern Okinawa. The drilling, a project overseen by the Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau, has yet to begin due to the protest. The proposed airport is intended to serve as a new base for the U.S. Marines, which would relocate from Futenma Air Station in Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture, under a 1996 Japanese-U.S. agreement. Meanwhile, plans are under way to hold a massive rally in Naha in mid-September.)
  
  
  
  On 12 Oct 2004 Kyodo News ("Japan, U.S. Agree to Speed Up Military Realignment Talks", 2004-10-12) reported that Japan and the US agreed on 12 Oct to speed up bilateral talks on the planned review of the US military deployment in Japan. The Japanese official declined go into details of the Takeuchi-Armitage talks related to the military realignment. Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura said in October that there was a need for Japan and the US to see a path by the end of this year to reaching an agreement over the details about how to realign the US forces.

• FOCUS: US will continue to play hardball.
  
  
  • US Will Present Detailed Troop Cut Schedule in July On 7 July, the Defense Minister Cho Young-kil stated the US will make the notification of its units to be relocated out of Korea in a detailed schedule within the month. This validates our statement that the US is actually in a unilateral mode -- meaning its "consultations" are actually "notifications." The US continues to play hardball. (NOTE: In the FOTA Meeting, the US alluded to further troop cuts if the land/funding issues are not resolved. The US is playing hardball. The recent 2d Bde 2d ID move was briefed to Congress as being in March 2005 but now has been changed.)
    
    
  • USFK will attempt to Flood Korean Media with Friendship Messages The USFK will attempt to flood the media with "friendship" messages -- Jul 7 Korean language contest by USFK soldiers; Good Neighbor program events; etc. The intent will be to offset the growing anti-Americanism associated with projected Yongsan move.

National Assembly Wants Base Move Audit The latest move by the National Assembly to call for a base move audit will only antagonize and "frustrate" the US negotiators more. The meeting of the FOTA in Washington in July 22 will most certainly have this as a topic on the agenda. The National Assembly has the power to approve/disapprove the funding -- and the US has stated that it seeks to have it approved by Sept-Oct before the session ends. If not there would be unspecified "serious problems." As the three major parties jointly sponsored the request, the audit proposal is highly likely to be passed by the Assembly. Although the request is slated to be submitted in late July, the voting on whether to approve it by the Assembly will take place in September. Politicians said the timing of the request would benefit Seoul at the defense talks.

According to the Joongang Ilbo, the National Assembly is showing unusual unity for an audit on the South Korea-U.S. agreement to relocate Yongsan Garrison and the cost of the agreed move. The governing Uri Party, opposition Grand National Party and pro-labor Democratic Labor Party jointly sponsored the proposal, which is slated to be submitted to the Assembly. It is the first time the National Assembly has ever requested an audit by the Board of Audit and Inspection on a foreign affairs issue.

The February 2003 National Assembly Act revision gave lawmakers the right to request audits by the board. Under the revision, it must begin audits at the request of legislators, if the requests are passed by the Assembly, as soon as they are approved. And after the board starts such an audit, it must also submit a report of the audit's results within three months. (NOTE: If the report is not done before Sept, the deadline will conflict with what the US claims is critical deadline for ROK approval of funding. The ROK is not taking the US "threat" seriously if they press forward with the audit.)

In the request, the lawmakers plan to ask the audit board to examine the reasonableness of the Defense Ministry's estimate of the cost of the relocation project. The ministry's official estimate is that the move will cost about $3 billion. The auditor will also be requested to look into the fairness of the initial agreement between South Korea and the United States, reached in the early 1990s, on the relocation. It will also be requested to conduct an audit on whether the cost sharing between the two countries with respect to the move is appropriate.

The cost-sharing is to be finalized at the upcoming defense talks between the two nations in Washington on 22 July. The U.S. and South Korean governments have agreed to relocate the U.S. military's base in central Seoul, Yongsan Garrison, to Osan and Pyeongtaek, areas south of the Han River, by 2007, but are still negotiating on details of the move.

On 22 July, the KBS News reported that legislators told reporters that it would be inappropriate for Seoul to be burdened with the entire expenditures of the move - estimated at up to four trillion won - which is a part of Washington's plan to realign its overseas military presence.

The lawmakers said the Board of Audit and Inspection should examine whether South Korea and the United States calculated the costs of the planned move under proper international procedures. In particular, the lawmakers alleged that the United States had one-sidedly drawn up the document signed by the two nations at the joint committee of the Status of Forces Agreement in May 1991, adding that government papers show that Washington had coerced Seoul into signing the document. The legislators said such facts should also be subject to the state auditors' investigations.

However, in August 2004 the Roh administration attempted to head off the audit by requesting the Uri Party leadership "delay" the audit to a vote. The Joongang Ilbo, "Roh, party to delay audit of base move" (11 Aug 2004) stated, "The Uri Party's leadership accepted yesterday a Roh administration request to "delay" a National Assembly vote on a request to audit the relocation of Yongsan Garrison, the current U.S. military headquarters. Sixty-three lawmakers introduced a bill in July asking the Board of Audit and Inspection to look at the cost of the U.S.-Korea agreement on the move. The Defense Ministry has estimated the price tag at over $3 billion. Yesterday, Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon asked the party to delay the vote on the audit request. But because he said the administration would ask the Assembly to ratify the agreement on the base move in September. He said he wanted the ratification concluded by the end of the year. Several of the sponsors of the audit bid criticized the party leadership's decision."

The Roh administration has realized the volatility of the situation by this stall tactic. As the vote would come up in September and the BAI would take three months (as a minimum) to complete the task, the ratification of the Yongsan move would have been pushed into 2005.

The US is playing hardball and has already stated that it will not stand for this.

That the Roh administration took this long -- over a month -- to "request" the Uri Party shelve ("delay" is the wording) their audit vote indicates that Roh and party are starting to realize that the delay techniques are in trouble. The stalls on procurement of land is also in trouble for the same reasons.

Camp Humphrey Building First Housing Tower Families moved into the first five-story apartment building last September in the first phase. Second phase of building an eight story apartment building. Another eight-story apartment is planned for the three building complex. This is part of the improvement funded by the ROK.

Camp Humphreys begins building first housing tower

By Franklin Fisher, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Friday, July 16, 2004

As part of a broader initiative to build up the Camp Humphreys infrastructure and ready it to serve as a major military hub in central South Korea in coming years, the U.S. Army is building a new eight-story apartment building.

The circular eight-story tower marks the second phase of a planned three-building complex for military families.

Workers also are building a two-level underground parking garage at the site on the southern portion of Camp Humphreys, a 1,230-acre U.S. Army helicopter base in Pyongtaek 45 miles south of Seoul.

The project’s remaining stages — two apartment towers, a garage and related work — are estimated to cost $40.7 million and are to be completed by December 2006, officials said. Under the first phase, the Army last September opened a five-story, 52-apartment, three-elevator building at the site. The second phase calls for building the first of two identical eight-story buildings, each with 48 apartments and three elevators.

Construction on the first tower and the 220-space parking garage began in January. Both are to be completed by January 2005.

“It’s just a big benefit to the community,” said Helen C. G. Nurse, housing division chief for the Army’s Area III Support Activity at Camp Humphreys. “All the military families want to live on post, for the security reasons, for the convenience of using all the facilities on post.”

The United States and South Korea agreed the Army will shift the 7,000 troops from Yongsan Garrison in Seoul to the Pyongtaek region by 2007. That move is part of a still-larger plan under which the U.S. military will reposition its forces in South Korea in coming years.

No date is set to build the second tower but it’s to open sometime around December 2006, said Greg Reiff, resident engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Far East District resident office at Camp Humphreys.

Each tower will have 32 three-bedroom apartments and 16 four-bedroom apartments. Each apartment will have two bathrooms, a separate family room, a laundry room and storage. The master bedrooms will have walk-in closets.

Living rooms and hallways will have hardwood floors and rooms will be wired for phone, Internet and cable television, Reiff said.

In addition, the complex will feature three picnic areas, two multi-purpose courts and two playgrounds. Elevators in the two eight-story buildings will run to the underground parking garage, Reiff said. Residents in the existing five-story structure also will be able to reach the garage by elevator but will have to walk from the lobby to an elevator just a few yards outside the front entrance, he said.

The Pumyang Construction Co. Ltd., of Seoul, is doing the work under contract with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

“It’s a huge quality-of-life improvement,” said Nurse. “It’s going to be a community inside of a community, the housing units. It’s a landscaped area, it’s going to have playgrounds and barbecue areas. ... We’re all looking forward to it.”

Nat'l Assembly to Begin Deliberating Yongsan Base Relocation Plan According to the KBS News, "Nat'l Assembly to Begin Deliberating Yongsan Base Relocation Plan" (23 July 2004) The planned relocation of the Yongsan Garrison appears to be picking up speed, with the goverment pushing to submit the Umbrella Agreement (UA) and the Implementation Agreement (IA) inked between Seoul and Washington to the National Assembly by the end of next month.

The agreements were finalized Friday between the two allies on transferring the American military base in Seoul to a location south of the Han River.

The agreement states that Seoul is to provide some three-and-a-half million pyeong, or some 2,800 acres of land for the new U.S. military base.

The size of land was a major bone of contention in negotiations - the U.S. had pressed for nearly 3,000 acres, while South Korea insisted on ceding less than 2,700 acres. (NOTE: In actuality, the USFK got what it wanted with a minor concession on land at Pyongtaek.)

With the agreements poised to go to the Assembly for parliamentary approval, legal wrangling between the two sides is expected to die down.

Some contents of the UA that Seoul called disadvantageous to South Korea, including compensation for business profit losses following the relocation and environmental issues, were revised in Washington during the latest round of negotiations. The ammendments have raised prospects of the agreement winning parliamentary approval.

However, one remaining sticking point is the price tag of the move - estimated at 3 to 4 billion dollars, and to be shouldered solely by South Korea. (NOTE: In July the National Assembly called for a budget audit on the Yongsan relocation and to investigate the "fairness" of the movement as well as cost. The key point was that it would be voted on in Sept and that meant that it would take the BAI about three months to complete its review which would shove the approval of the Umbrella Agreement (UA) into 2005 -- a position that the US finds totally unacceptable before -- but with the movement date moved to 2008, it might be acceptable now.)

The relocation of the U.S. Yongsan base out of Seoul is to be finalized by 2009 at the latest. (NOTE: That the 2008 date is moved to "2009 at the latest.")

Under a 1990 agreement, the two countries agreed to relocate U.S. military units in central Seoul to the Pyeongtaek area, 70 kilometers south of the capital, by 2007.

U.S. outlines defense plans here The Joongang Ilbo "U.S. outlines defense plans here, Official says tasks handover will determine timing" (30 July 2004) stated:

According to the U.S. official, the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, now stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas, will be moved to Osan in southern Gyeonggi province.

"The brigade will command a total of eight Patriot batteries in Korea, including two batteries to be added in Gwangju by the end of this year," the official said. Each of the Patriot batteries is equipped with six to eight launch pads, and each launcher can hold four PAC-2 missiles or 16 PAC-3 missiles. The United States has also told South Korea of its plans to minimize any gap in the country's defenses that could arise from the force reduction. Including the 23rd Chemical Battalion, responsible for decontamination operations throughout Korea in the event of hostilities, some units are scheduled to leave Korea only after they complete a transfer of missions to Korean forces, the official said. (NOTE: The 23rd Chemical Battalion is the only forward deployed U.S. chemical battalion in the world. Organized into a headquarters and headquarters detachment and five decontamination companies, it has a wartime strength of 588. Of those, approximately 50 percent are U.S. soldiers and 50 percent are Korean Augmentees to the United States Army (KATUSA) soldiers. In addition, twenty-six full-time Korea Service Corps personnel and 76 part-time members of the Korea Service Corps, who are mobilized for training at minimum of one week per quarter, contribute to the mission accomplishment of the battalion. The battalion is responsible for decontamination operations throughout the Republic of Korea south of the 2nd Infantry Division sector.)

He added that the units responsible for transportation and wartime reinforcement processing will not leave the peninsula. The 6th Ordnance Battalion, which performs ammunition accountability and maintenance supervision from the rear echelon, and the 25th Transportation Battalion are to stay, he said. (NOTE: The 6th Ordnance Battalion exercises command and control over six ordnance companies located through the Republic of Korea. The 6th Ordnance Battalion performs ammunition stock accountability, visibility, and surveillance functions in accordance with SALS-K for United States titled ammunition support EUSA and ROKA IAW WRSA MOA #1. The battalion has the mission of ammunition accountability, surveillance and maintenance supervision. Its subordinate units coordinate directly with the Republic of Korea Army units who receive, store, issue and transport the ammunitions in accordance with the single ammunition logistics system-Korea. This was an international agreement established in 1974 to govern the handling and management of U.S. titled ammunition.) (NOTE: The 25th Transportation Battalion is responsible for transporting machines, materials, and manpower throughout the Republic of Korea. The mission of the 25th Transportation Battalion is to provide movement control services and transportation management during Armistice and Contingency to include the Common-User Land Transportation (CULT) system for personnel and material movements into, within, and out of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in support of the 19th Theater Support Command, Eighth United States Army (EUSA) and United States forces Korea (USFK). Within the theater, the 25th Transportation Battalion provides movement control. The battalion’s mission is to provide movement control services and transportation management during Armistice and contingencies to include the common user land transportation (CULT) system for personnel and materiel movements into, within, and out of the ROK in support of the 19th TAACOM, EUSA and USFK. The 25th Transportation Battalion provides movement control support to the 2ID. The 25th Transportation Battalion is organized with two regional movement control teams (RMCTs). The 1st RMCT is co-located with the 25th Transportation Battalion in Seoul and provides movement control in the northern sector. The 2nd MCT provides movement control for the southern sector of the Korean peninsula. The 1st RMCT supports 2ID.)

Confirming the JoongAng Ilbo's report yesterday, a Defense Ministry official said the United States presented specifics of its planned force cut at last week's defense talks in Washington. "This is only a U.S. proposal, and we plan to seek adjustments to the reduction plan at the talks in October," the official said. (NOTE: This means the troop timetable from the US presented at 10th FOTA in preparation for 11th FOTA in August.)

To counterbalance the possible decrease of defense capabilities after the U.S. troops' departure, Seoul is also planning to ask the United States to deploy Stryker brigades to Korea on a rotating basis, a Korean official said. (NOTE: This strategy ensures there is no "replacement" of forces from the 1st Brigade 2d ID when the 3d Brigade 2d ID Stryker SBCT returns from Iraq.)

Japan Plans Affecting ROK CFC Postponed while Others GPR Moves implemented On 27 Jul 2004, the Asahi Shimbun, "Misawa Air Base Takes over Hawaii's Patrol Command for Asia" (2004-07-28) reported that the US air base at Misawa in Aomori Prefecture has taken over command functions from Hawaii for naval patrol and reconnaissance for Asia as part of the US military's global repositioning. Naval patrol command functions for Hawaii, meanwhile, have been reduced to cover only waters surrounding the Aloha state. Responsibility for Asian reconnaissance now comes under the Command for Patrol and Reconnaissance Force Fifth Fleet and Patrol and Reconnaissance Force Seventh Fleet, established in Misawa Air Base last October under a rear admiral. The base is in charge of patrol and reconnaissance over areas covered by the Fifth and Seventh Fleets -- the Gulf region for the former and, for the latter, from the western Pacific to the Indian Ocean as far as the east coast of Africa. About 10 aircraft -- P-3C patrol planes and EP-3 electronic surveillance aircraft -- will be deployed to Misawa from Hawaii and the US West Coast. Last September, the Foreign Ministry informed Misawa city that the Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing One would be transferred from the Kamiseya naval support facility in Yokohama to the Misawa base. But the air wing was abolished soon after and replaced by the reconnaissance force at Misawa Air Base.

On 28 Jul 2004, the Japan Times ("U.S. withdraws bulk of realignment of armed forces proposals", (2004-07-28) reported that the US has withdrawn most of its specific proposals for the realignment of US forces in Japan, Japanese government officials said. They said the US government informed Japan of the withdrawal through its embassy in Tokyo on July 26, along with its plan to renegotiate the realignment. But a Defense Agency official said the withdrawal represents only a postponement of conclusions on the realignment. (NOTE: This postponement is in line with the problems currently being faced over the relocation of the CFC from Yongsan to Pyeongtaek. The ROK is dragging its feet and not providing the land and funding in a timely manner. Potential for a showdown exists with the removal of the CFC function altogether -- not at some far distant future date, but almost immediately as it is increasing the size of the CFC administrative function, though the 2d BDE 2d ID has left permanently.)

At a bilateral meeting in San Francisco in mid-July, the US proposed moving some of its Marine troops in Okinawa Prefecture to Camp Fuji in Shizuoka Prefecture and Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture. It also presented a plan to relocate the night-landing practices of aircraft aboard the USS Kitty Hawk carrier from Atsugi Base in Kanagawa Prefecture to Iwakuni Base in Yamaguchi Prefecture. The US government has withdrawn these plans, which have come under fire from local governments, the officials said. (NOTE: This was the meeting hurriedly arranged prior to the 10th FOTA to give it some options going into the meeting. The Marine troops were the 2,600 to Camp Zama and 3,000 to Camp Fuji from Okinawa.)

Camp Zama: (THIS IS IDEAL AS A HEADQUARTERS ELEMENT ASSIGNMENT AND COMBINING OF CFC/SDF UNDER AN UMBRELLA GROUP. CURIOUS WHAT ROLE 2,600 MARINES PLAY AT CAMP ZAMA. PROPOSED HOME OF I CORPS. (Note: Camp Zama former home of IX Corps)) Camp Zama is located about 25 miles southwest of central Tokyo in the cities of Zama and Sagamihara in Kanagawa Prefecture, Honshu, Japan. Camp Zama is home to the US Army Japan/9th Theater Army Area Command, the 17th Area Support Group, the United Nations Command (Rear), the 500th Military Intelligence Brigade, the Japan Engineer District, the 78th Signal Battalion, the 3d Engineer Group of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, and other units.

An awarding winning community, Camp Zama has been honored to win several awards for its outstanding facilities and services. A mixture of historic and modern buildings provides for a unique and pleasant surrounding. Located in the Kanagawa Prefecture(about 25 miles southwest of Tokyo),Camp Zama is known locally as "the jewel of the orient". At first glance Camp Zama could easily be mistaken for vacation resort or a college campus. Beautiful trees line the streets and surround the area. During the spring the cherry blooms add to the beauty of the base. There is even an award winning 18 hole golf course and a fishing pond (Dewey Park) located right on the base.

There are 4 gates where access to this installation can be obtained. Identification cards are required at all times and will be checked at each entrance point. The nearest interstates are Route 16 and Tomei Expressway. Route 16 is frequently used to visit nearby installations such as Yokota Air Force Base and Yokosuka Naval Base. Atsugi Naval Air Facility is also only a short drive away.

Camp Zama is located in the beautiful foothills of the Tankard Mountain Range. The installation resides in Zama City while both the housing areas are in the adjacent Sagamihara City. Traffic is extremely congested and will usually triple the travel time in comparison to the United States. However, public transportation (trains and subways) is accessible and reliable.

Camp Fuji: (TACTICAL ELEMENTS ASSIGNMENT. 3,000 MARINES PROPOSED. POSSIBLE SBCT ASSIGNMENT BECAUSE OF MANUEVER AREA.) Camp Fuji is one of several Camps of the Marine Corps Base Camp Butler complex. It is located on the island of Honshu, at the side of Mt. Fuji, 800 miles from the parent command in Okinawa. Camp Fuji is located at the base of Mount Fuji, Japan, approximately 2250 feet above sea level. The first recorded military training in this area was for a Samurai army over 800 years ago. Camp Fuji was turned over to the Marine Corps from the US Army in 1953.

Camp Fuji's mission is to support military training by US Forces in the adjacent 34,000 acre Fuji Maneuver Area. The Fuji Maneuver Area has been the premier training ground in Japan ever since. The Camp's mission is to provide garrison facilities, administrative, communications, and logistical support to US Forces that deploy there for training. The mission of Camp Fuji is to coordinate the use of ranges and training facilities within the Fuji Maneuver Area, and to provide necessary support for using units. In other words, it is a full service Marine Corps Base, providing all the services required for training, health, comfort, welfare, and morale.

The United States and Japan released the Final Report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa on December 2, 1996. The report made 27 recommendations to reduce the impact of the US military presence on the Okinawan people. The 3rd Marine Division's artillery live-fire exercises have been relocated from the Central Training Area on Okinawa to the Kita-Fuji, Higashi-Fuji, Ojojihara, Yausubetsu, and Hijudai training ranges on the Japanese mainland. Prior to the SACO Final Report, the 3rd Marine Division was already conducting 60 to 80 days of artillery live-fire exercises at the two Fuji ranges. Under the SACO relocation, another 35 days of training will be split among the five ranges. Japan has agreed to pay transportation costs to the artillery ranges and wants to use Japanese commercial airliners for this purpose. The III Marine Expeditionary Force believes the training at the five ranges is comparable to that available on Okinawa and other ranges in the United States. (SITE NOTE: This would be the justification for the 3,000 Marine movement as a cost savings for Japan.)

AUGUST 2004

1st Bde 2d ID Not to Be Rapid-Reaction Force???? The Donga Ilbo "U.S. 2nd Infantry Division Will Not be Transformed Into Rapid-Reaction Force" (2 Aug 2004) stated, "It was reported that the U.S. 1st brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division, which will stay in Korea after the reduction of the U.S. Forces in Korea (USFK) scheduled for late next year, is likely not to take a role of a rapid-reaction force which can be involved in disputes in East Asian countries. Therefore, it is expected that the USFK will not leave Korea on a large scale for military operations in other areas outside the Korean peninsula." (NOTE: Whether this is wishful thinking or fact is unknown as of the beginning of August. It is certainly the wish of the ROK as their hand gets weaker and weaker.)

The article continued, "A high official in the Ministry of National Defense said on August 2 that a Unit of Action (UA) is quite different from Stryker, which assumes the role of a rapid-reaction force as he quoted the U.S.’ suggestion at the meeting of the 10th Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA) that it would transform the 1st brigade of 2nd Infantry Division into a UA. Up to now, related people within and outside the military had been worrying that the U.S. 1st brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division might be reorganized for military operations for disputes in East Asian countries by being transformed into a Stryker unit as part of the U.S.’ worldwide military realignment plan." (NOTE: The 3d Bde 2d ID currently in Iraq is the Stryker CBT.)

It continued, "The Ministry of National Defense appreciates that a UA creates more stress on regional defense functions for specific areas such as the Korean peninsula even though it has both rapid-reaction and regional defense functions. For this purpose, each UA is broadly equipped with related military equipment such as artillery, aviation, and reconnaissance assets." This is what the 2d Bde was a light/heavy mix with two air mobile battalions and Paladin attached as a the 2d Strike Force.)

According to "a high official in the Ministry of National Defense said that he evaluates this proposal from the U.S. is positive for Korea, stating that a UA in Korea doesn’t have to go to hotspots in East Asia in a situation that U.S. forces in Japan are being reinforced. A military expert in Korea said that a UA is armed with stronger firepower and equipment, which cannot be easily carried, than those of the division level, in contrast to Stryker units with lighter weapons and equipment. He added that the U.S.’ core fighting power will stay in Korea in order to operate heavy weapons and cutting-edge arms in Korea."

The US Sticking to Reduction of 12,000 by 2005 After the 10th FOTA, the ROK proclaimed that relocation put off till 2008 -- much to our confusion. We stated that the Koreans have a way of stating their wishful thinking in the press and then are angered when it doesn't come about. This is another example. It was reported that the U.S. didn’t change its policy of reducing the USFK by 12,500 soldiers by late next year, even though Korea asked to postpone the reduction time at the 10th FOTA meeting. The Ministry of National Defense planned to discuss with the U.S. about the realignment problem of the U.S. 1st Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division and the time and scale of the USFK reduction at the 11th FOTA meeting to be held in Seoul from August 19 to 20."

2d Bde 2d ID Pulls Out On 28 July 2004, the Stars and Stripes reported that ships carrying the 2d ID gear was headed for Kuwait. The elements of the 2d Bde, 2d ID will marry up with their equipment in Kuwait and move into Iraq. The 18 day around-the-clock operation was started on 7 July and the last trucks pulled into Pusan on 18 July. According to the report, "Two U.S. cargo ships are steaming toward Kuwait this week with the tanks, Humvees and other combat equipment to be used by soldiers set to deploy soon from South Korea to Iraq, officials said. The ships left late last week from piers in Pusan, South Korea, with equipment slated for use by the 2nd Infantry Division's 2nd Brigade Combat Team. The ships' departures marked an end to what officials have said is one of the biggest logistical operations in the Army's five-decade history on the Korean peninsula. The 18-day, around-the-clock operation began around July 7 and saw the Army move almost 1,800 tanks, trucks and other hardware down the Korean peninsula's length by truck and train to Army installations in Pusan. It later was stowed aboard ships for further transport to Kuwait. The brigade's 3,600 troops will "marry up" with their equipment in Kuwait, then take it into Iraq, said Lt. Col. Brian Imiola, deputy commander of the Army's 20th Area Support Group at Camp Henry in Taegu."

The article continued, "Getting the equipment to Pusan required 200 truck trips with each driver logging an average of 290 road miles from points around the 2nd Infantry Division area; 40 train trips from railheads at Camp Casey and Camp Edwards in the 2nd Infantry Division area; and the deployment of 430 U.S. troops from various units in Korea to Pusan to get the gear off the trains and trucks, into staging areas, then later onto the ships. One ship left from the Army's Pier 8 in Pusan's north harbor; the other from a pier adjacent to the Pusan Storage Facility, a major supply depot for the U.S. military in South Korea. The last train pulled into Pusan July 17; the last trucks, July 18, Imiola said."

According to the Army Times, "2nd ID's 2nd Brigade Combat Team prepares for Iraq deployment" (16 July 2004), "The 2nd Infantry Division's 2nd Brigade Combat Team is in the process of moving out of Korea and will be in Iraq by the end of August to begin its one-year deployment. The brigade is slated to be working with three expeditionary brigades of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force between Hadithah, Ramadi and Iskandariyah in central Iraq, west of Baghdad. Early next year, the 2nd MEF will replace the 1st MEF in the same area with two Marine regiments. "They're going to be in a Marines sector, probably doing a changeover with the 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Infantry Division out of Fort Riley," Gen. Richard Cody, vice chief of staff of the Army said July 16." (NOTE: In it was erroneously briefed to Congress that the 2d Bde would deploy in March 2005.)

According to the Chosun Ilbo, "The U.S. Pulls Key Military Equipment out of Korea to Iraq" (29 July 2004)

It has been confirmed that in connection to the redeployment of the 2nd Brigade of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division from Korea to Iraq, the U.S military has been shipping key combat equipment that doesn't belong to the 2nd Brigade to Iraq. The equipment includes M-1A1 Abrams tanks, M-109A6 self-propelled Paladin howitzers and other equipment belonging to the 8th Army and artillery brigades under the 2nd Infantry Division.

Since the U.S. had notified Korea that only the 2nd Brigade would be sent to Iraq, it is expected that the redeployment of the equipment and some forces belonging to the 8th army and the infantry brigade would cause a controversy over a possible military power vacuum and the earlier withdrawal of U.S forces stationed in Korea.

Military authorities explained that although the 2nd Brigade would be deployed to Iraq, there would be no military power vacuum because mainly manpower would be sent while key equipment would remain in Korea.

A military source said Wednesday that USFK moved equipment to the port of Busan, prior to the redeployment of the 2nd Brigade and finished the shipping of the equipment on two freighters last week. The freighters are now heading for Iraq. The source said that the equipment bound for Iraq includes M-2 infantry combat vehicles called Bradleys belonging to the 2nd Brigade, M-1A1 Abrams tanks and M-109A6 self-propelled Paladin howitzers.

The USFK has 140 M-1A1 Abrams tanks and 30 Paladin howitzers, but it has not been revealed how many tanks and howitzers would be deployed to Iraq U.S. military newspaper Stars & Stripes reported that the USFK had conducted a transportation operation, the largest ever, to move 1,800 tanks, truck and other equipment from the bases of the 2nd Infantry Division in northern Gyeonggi Province to Busan for 18 days from July 1. (NOTE: The 140 M-1A1 and 30 Paladin may be wrong. 2d Bde has 116 M-1A1, 58 Bradley Fighting Vehicle and 58 Paladin according to Order of Battle -- 1st Bde has like numbers. ATACMS MLR (Multiple Launcher Rocket) units not included.)