A New U.S. Embassy Building is not Allowed at the Deoksu Palace Site

JANUARY 21, 2005 22:40 by Chae-Hyun Kwon (confetti@donga.com)

A decision was made to preserve a total of 7,800 pyeong, which includes 1-8, Jung-dong, Jung-gu, Seoul, where Gyeonggi Girls` High School was once located (some 4,500 pyeong) and adjacent areas around 1-39, Agwan Pacheon street (some 3,300 pyeong) as part of an effort to protect important cultural assets. The U.S. Embassy to Korea had planned to build a new embassy building and a residential apartment for its staff on the site.

The decision officially concluded the three-year controversy which began when the U.S. Embassy to Korea decided to build a 15-story new embassy building and an 8-story residential apartment for its staff on the former Gyeonggi Girls’ High School site in May 2002, and requested the National Cultural Properties Research Institute to check whether the site housed cultural assets underground.

The Cultural Properties Committee decided in a joint meeting among four divisions— Cultural Properties Policy Division, Historic Sites Division, Architectural Cultural Properties Division, Buried Cultural Properties Division- in the afternoon of January 21 in the meeting room of the former National Museum of Korea in Gyeongbok Palace.

Jung Yang-mo, head of Cultural Properties Committee, announced, “After researching cultural assets, it was concluded that the site of the area is a historic and cultural place with evidence of Korea’s history during the Daehan Empire era, including Agwan Pacheon street and important buildings of Gyeongwoon (Deoksu palace) such as Seonwonjeon, Heungbokjeon, Heungdeokjeon and Saseongdang, and that the area should be preserved and avoid damage.”

Jung added, “The participants of the meeting reached an agreement to designate the site as a historic relic through discussions with the U.S. right after the site is returned to Korea, and then recommend the government to restore the dismantled buildings there after a through investigation and research.”

In May of last year, Korea and the U.S. agreed that the U.S. will return some 7,800 pyeong of the former Gyeonggi Girls’ High School site which it owns, and in return, Korea will offer a 24,000-pyeong plot in Camp Coiner inside Yongsan Garrison for the construction of a new U.S. embassy building.

Yongsan to House US Embassy

By Ryu Jin
Staff Reporter

The U.S. Embassy in Seoul plans to offer an additional plot of land it owns in downtown Seoul for the envisioned land-swapping deal, under which the mission will be relocated to Yongsan, Seoul, officials here said Monday.

The U.S. Embassy, currently located just in front of Kwanghwamun at the center of the capital, originally wanted to move to a new grandiose diplomatic complex at the nearby site of former Kyonggi Girls High School.

But the 4,500-pyong (14,880-square-meter) site has recently been found to have cultural importance, along with the 3,300 pyong (10,910 square meters) of land adjacent to the former school, where a U.S. legation used to be.

``As the recent findings make it virtually impossible to take advantage of the former legation site, now talks are going in the direction of the U.S. offering the two sites in return for the alternative land at Camp Coiner in the U.S.' main Yongsan Garrison, which will be relocated to south of the capital,'' a government official said. The official hinted that the total area of land given for the new U.S. Embassy will exceed a combined area of 7,800 pyong (25,785 square meters) as the U.S. wants more land, citing the different land prices in the locations.

The U.S. project for building a new embassy complex began in 2001, but hit a snag as civic groups and activists claimed the proposed site, near Toksu Palace of the Choson Kingdom (1392-1910), should not be spoiled by construction.

The results of a cultural survey which came out last week suggested that both sites are of cultural importance and therefore worthy of preservation.

As this outcome for the survey had long been anticipated, the U.S. Embassy and the South Korean government have engaged in lengthy negotiations to find an alternative site for the new mission and housing facilities for embassy staff.

The two sides have all but formally agreed on Camp Coiner, a U.S. military base in the Yongsan Garrison, which will be vacated by American soldiers when they move the Osan-Pyongtaek area just south of Seoul under last year's agreement.

A swap of the high school site for Camp Coiner had long been expected, but the recent ruling also offered an additional 3,300-pyong plot, which has been in the U.S.' possession since the 1940s.

According to last week's findings, the previous proposed sites include a pathway via which Emperor Kojong, the last monarch of the Choson Kingdom, fled from the palace to the Russian legation in 1896 when his throne and life were threatened by the Japanese military not long after Empress Myongsong, his wife, was murdered.

ROK ACTIONS

The Tracks Get Tangled in South Korea's "Defense White Paper"

While Seoul was launching its peace initiative through its Unification Minister, who represents the Sunshine Policy of incentives diplomacy, presenting its national budget inaugurating its plan for independent self-defense, and negotiating a Security Policy Initiative with Washington, its Defense Ministry was preparing to issue its first white paper on defense in four years on February 4. The white paper, which is usually published annually, had been delayed because of internal conflict over whether North Korea should continue to be named the South's "main enemy," as it had been in the 2000 document.

The "main enemy" designation had been adopted in 1995 after Pyongyang had threatened to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire" during the ongoing conflict over Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. Conservative forces inside and outside South Korea's military establishment wanted to keep the designation in place, whereas liberal backers of the Sunshine Policy wanted it to be eliminated. In a compromise, the Defense Ministry substituted "direct and substantial military threat" for "main enemy," but made it clear that the enemy designation would be retained in internal Ministry documents and discussions. An anonymous Ministry official told the Associated Press: "The fact remains that North Korea is our main enemy."

Beyond the weak symbolic concession to the Sunshine Policy, the white paper had little new to offer. Much was made in press reports of the paper's statement that Washington had committed to send 690,000 troops, including 40 percent of the U.S. Navy and 70 percent of the Marine Corps, to South Korea, in case it was attacked by the North, but all reports failed to mention that exactly the same statement had appeared in the 2000 white paper. Adopting all tracks at once, a Defense Ministry press statement explained: "We considered the extraordinary dual nature of inter-Korean ties that we have to push for inter-Korean rapprochement and military preparedness simultaneously." (SITE NOTE: In April 2005, the ROK refused to negotiate its cost sharing stance that it was cutting its contribution by 8.9 percent. The US countered that some pre-positioned equipment may be removed -- and the result is that without pre-positioned equipment there will be cutbacks in some follow-on troops.)

Rather than a coherent policy statement, the white paper is a symptom of conflicts within South Korea's political class and wider society, as the country struggles for strategic focus. It is also an admission that, in a time of strategic uncertainty, it is best to keep all options open and to defer decisive choices.

Despite its tilt toward confrontation, the white paper evoked anger in the G.N.P., which accused Roh of "pampering" Pyongyang. G.N.P. legislator Hwan Jin-ha told Agence France Presse that "the 'main enemy' concept is important to maintain discipline and morale in the army. It must be kept intact as long as North Korea holds to its dream of communizing the Korean peninsula." Pyongyang was equally dissatisfied and threatened first to turn U.S. bases into a "sea of fire" should Washington launch an attack on the North, and then to "thoroughly incinerate the aggressor elements that collude with the U.S. imperialists."

The liberal administration in Seoul is committed to its three-track policy, and that policy reflects a realistic appraisal of Seoul's long term interests in a peaceful and prosperous East Asia in which South Korea is a strong and respected player. Pressures from conservative forces within the country and from Washington and Pyongyang make the success of the strategy dependent on the highest levels of diplomatic and political skill. Faced with the most complex geostrategic predicament in East Asia, South Korea has much to gain and much to lose, depending on how well it performs in the rebalancing act. (SITE NOTE: In Apr 2005, with President Roh in command, the ROK was not doing a very good job as it started into a "diplomacy war" over Tokdo and history. Seoul's three-track geostrategy was becoming a shambles. The first track takes it toward detente with Pyongyang (which continued unabated), the second toward military self-sufficiency (which was given lip service, but none of the funding to make it a reality) and the third toward maintaining and deepening its alliance with Washington (which by Apr 2005 was going swiftly down the toilet). Then it made its announcement of military cooperation with China -- a direct slap to the US and Japan. The ROK was locking itself into a road that was really not a good option for the present -- though one considered for the future.)

PINR: Geostrategic Multiplicity The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. It states, "Seoul's three-track geostrategy is an intelligible response to its predicament. The first track takes it toward detente with Pyongyang, the second toward military self-sufficiency and the third toward maintaining and deepening its alliance with Washington." The only problem is that the ROK has made moves towards an alliance with China -- while Washington is considering China as an adversary as it plans to build up a high-tech army to become the regional power. The full article is at PINR: South Korea Seeks Strategic Focus Among the Behemoths. The following are excerpts from the rather long and detailed analysis of Korea's struggle to position itself strategically.

Geostrategic Multiplicity

As South Korea grapples with its political divisions, which have stalled the reform efforts of Roh's administration and have caused a sharp decline in his popularity in the face of a slowing economy, Seoul has moved in January and February 2005 to begin its repositioning in the changing East Asian balance of power. Seoul's recent readjustment has placed the country on three separate tracks that take it in different directions, but that do not yet force decisive choices, reflecting uncertainty about the future and the need to compromise among conflicting domestic forces. Depending on how the rebalancing of power in East Asia proceeds, the tracks might eventually converge or they might diverge so much that Seoul will have to decide to take one or two of them. For now, it is keeping its options open.

At the top of Seoul's geostrategic interests is settling its conflict with Pyongyang and moving closer to reunification of the North and South, which would eliminate the major military threat to South Korea and, as a consequence, ease its dependence on Washington, free the country to maneuver more flexibly in the region, and eventually join the two Koreas -- either through a close alliance or a single state -- to create a formidable and independent power center. As it attempts to pursue its overriding interest, Seoul is confronted by the Pyongyang regime's determination to maintain its hold on power and, consequently, its reluctance to surrender its nuclear option and to liberalize its closed society, despite food shortages and the immiseration of its population. As long as Pyongyang does not commit itself clearly to detente, South Korea faces a serious threat from its northern neighbor's massive military presence on its border, including artillery that could -- as Pyongyang puts it -- turn Seoul into a "sea of fire."

Seoul's pursuit of detente with Pyongyang is complicated by its relations with Washington, which desires regime change in the North, and has still not taken military action against Pyongyang off the table insisting, at a minimum, that Pyongyang roll back its nuclear program irretrievably before offering it any incentives to cooperate or agreeing to negotiate with it bilaterally. At the same time that it takes a hard line toward Pyongyang, Washington is proceeding with its plans to redeploy most of its military presence in South Korea to the south of Seoul, diminish the number of its troops in the country, and redirect their mission from protecting the country against the North to responding to terrorism in the region and deterring Beijing. Since South Korea is not yet militarily capable of deterring military action from the North, Seoul must take Washington's interests into account as it executes its geostrategy, impeding its pursuit of detente.

Seoul's basic geostrategic predicament of finessing Pyongyang's conflict with Washington is further compounded by the rise of Beijing as a major military power and trading partner, and the possibility that Tokyo will choose to remilitarize if Washington's influence in East Asia diminishes, forcing Seoul to choose sides or to develop its own high-tech military capabilities, and perhaps even a nuclear option, to achieve a measure of strategic independence. Maneuvering among behemoths that have underlying conflicting interests, Seoul faces the most complex geostrategic situation in East Asia.

Seoul's three-track geostrategy is an intelligible response to its predicament. The first track takes it toward detente with Pyongyang, the second toward military self-sufficiency and the third toward maintaining and deepening its alliance with Washington.

INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS

T H E C H I N A F A C T O R

China remains an important factor in South Korea’s strategic calculations. Some suggest the Roh administration was clearly leaning toward China, while others stress it remains committed to the U.S.-ROK alliance but also wants friendly relations with China. However, most South Koreans seem to agree that China’s recent claims to the history of Koguryo — an ancient Korean Kingdom that extended from the northern part of the peninsula into northeast China — convinced many in South Korea to rethink the future role of China in the Korean peninsula. It was evident that most South Koreans interpreted China’s claim to Koguryo negatively, and it has rekindled South Korean perceptions of China as a threat. They took great umbrage (some even suspected Chinese territorial ambitions) at competing Chinese claims to “ownership” of the ancient kingdom’s historical heritage. The China debate appears to have persuaded many in South Korea that the U.S. is the only major power in Northeast Asia that does not have any territorial designs on Korea, while the others in the region have historical tendencies to dominate the Korean peninsula. The pendulum appears to have swung back in favor of the U.S. for the time being, but one is reminded that China still looms large in Korea. According to a recent opinion poll, nearly 50 percent of all respondents indicated that China should be the country that Korea maintains the closest diplomatic ties with if the U.S.-ROK alliance deteriorates.

U . S . - J A P A N R E L A T I O N S

South Korea is very concerned about U.S. efforts to expand the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Many believe the pace of change in Japan’s security posture is too fast and they fear its lofty status as America’s most important ally in the Asia-Pacific will result in an inevitable downgrade in Korea’s own status. Some wonder whether this is happening to counter China. As a shrimp among whales, South Korea is concerned about the rising tensions between Japan and China. South Koreans are also aware of the speculation that a Northeast Asia command will be formed at Camp Zama, Japan. South Korea is unlikely to accept any U.S. command structure that subordinates U.S. forces in Korea to a headquarters located in Japan. They seem to view this as an indication that Korean interests are being subordinated to Japanese interests. Although cultural exchanges between the two countries have advanced significantly over the last five years, South Korea appears to be wary of Japanese attempts to strengthen bilateral security relations. Some of the discussions also indicate that South Korea will continue to resist U.S. initiatives to expand U.S.-Japan- ROK security cooperation. This is in part because of its historical legacy with Japan, but also because it does not want to unnecessarily antagonize China.

US Policy on Asia Sound The following article by James Kelly expounds on the changes -- or lack thereof -- in US policy in Asia, as well as subtle changes in the opening of communication channels between China and the US. When looking at the changes in Korea, one must also consider the occurrences happening around it. James Kelly has hands-on credibility as the foremost negotiator in the frustrating DPRK nuclear negotiations up to 2005. James A. Kelly was the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs from 2001-2005. He is counselor to the Ho-nolulu-based Pacific Forum and senior adviser to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. These comments were made in remarks to the Pacific Forum CSIS' Honolulu International Forum on Feb. 23. and posted on March 20, 2005.

No need to shift gears in U.S. policy on Asia

By James A. Kelly

As President Bush begins his second term, many have asked how announced and anticipated changes in his foreign policy team will affect U.S. policy in Asia. Although I can't predict the prospects for U.S. policy over the next four years, it is safe to say there will be no profound differences.

First, many policy aspects worked reasonably well in the first administration; there is little reason to change them. Second, President Bush and Secretary of State Condeleezza Rice have been intimately involved in every important component of East Asia-Pacific policy over the past several years, so there is no reason to expect major shifts.

Finally, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick has both affinity for and firsthand experience in Asian political issues, as well as the economic issues on which he put so much attention as U.S. trade representative.

As I look back over the past four years, engaging China and handling its "peaceful rise" was inevitably the top priority. Since the "bad days" of the EP-3 crisis, we have developed a cooperative, constructive, and candid relationship with China.

By candid, I mean there are a number of issues over which we have strong disagreements: human rights and protection of intellectual property rights, to name but two. But it is important to note that there have been an increasing number of issues on which we cooperate very well.

China has changed a lot over the past decade. Its diplomats — and many of China's leaders — are very intelligent, and well educated. They are capable, and far more confident.

Before and during the Clinton administration, phone calls between top officials or senior diplomats were unusual, and sometimes they took 24-36 hours to arrange. During much of the EP-3 incident, no one on the Chinese side was taking calls. Now, we have as many as four to five senior-level calls a month, some with only 30 minutes notice on either side. Overhanging this is a complex and important economic relationship. The United States has an enormous trade deficit with China, and U.S. companies have invested significant amounts of money in China.

For its part, China (as has Japan and others) has huge foreign exchange reserves that are invested in U.S. Treasury instruments, and that has a powerful impact on the U.S. economy.

Two important domestic factors shape Beijing's thinking: the first is economic growth and improvements in the lives of many Chinese; the other is rising nationalism. There are many causes of that nationalism, but it's fair to say most Chinese people are sensitive to what they believe to be 200 years of mistreatment by foreigners and they "are mad as hell and not going to take it anymore."

This cultivated but real sense of victimization does put some limit on Chinese government action. But does that tell us where a most untransparent China is going to go?

Some, not many, believe that China is headed for a bad end and we had better be prepared for a new Cold War. Others are optimistic, given China's movement into status as a global power.

There are conflicting possibilities, and the United States must be mindful of both sets.

Another point of emphasis for the Bush administration has been its alliances in Asia. That is something we feel pretty good about. The U.S.-Japan relationship has never been stronger. That is the product of hard work on both sides and important changes in Japan.

North Korea's admission that it abducted Japanese citizens and its development of ballistic missiles have helped make Japan a supporter of ballistic missile defense. The joint declaration produced by the Feb. 19 Security Consultative Committee should not be seen as new or shocking, but it is a robust statement that goes beyond what earlier Japanese governments would have said.

The press is full of stories about how the U.S.-South Korea alliance is beset with difficulties. It is true that there are some problems but not as much as media suggest. There are tangible accomplishments, too.

South Korea has the third largest number of military forces in Iraq (behind only the U.S. and Britain). After years of effort, we have reached agreement on moving U.S. forces out of Yongsan Base in Seoul. We have agreed on the realignment of U.S. forces in Korea. And, President Roh Moo-hyun has excellent communication with President Bush. He speaks directly and sincerely.

On North Korea, when it counts, we are on the same page. The determination to have a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons is clear.

At the same time, South Korea has an understandable preference for keeping things calm. If tensions go up, the risk premium on South Korea's extensive public and private borrowing goes up. As a result, there is a powerful economic disincentive to raising tensions on the DMZ.

South Koreans, with 52 years of hard work to build prosperity south of a mostly peaceful DMZ, have complex views about the North that complicate issues, but the alliance endures for good reasons.

When I got back to Washington four years ago, I was surprised at the deterioration of U.S.-Philippine relations.

Concern for the war on terror and good leadership chemistry has improved relations, but there are still problems with the basic approach of the Republic of the Philippines to life in East Asia. Forty years ago, the Philippines was Asia's most prosperous country (less Japan) and that is not true today. Why?

When the Philippines finds the solution to that question and unlocks the unquestioned talent of its 80 million people, that will be very good news.

Our relationship with Thailand has been strengthened. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has proven to be a strong and occasionally mercurial leader.

While Indonesia is not a treaty ally, our relationship with that country also is very important. Last year was a remarkable experience in democracy with three national elections that ended with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as president.

The tsunami has been a setback for the new administration, and there are a host of other problems, but at the same time these have provided a catalyst for the United States to improve relations with that country.

The Indonesian experience is a reminder that the spread of democracy in the Asia-Pacific region has been a very strong story in many respects. Last year witnessed a long list of elections in more than 10 countries. Much is now routine, but no less remarkable given where Asia and the Pacific have been.

Our relationship with Vietnam has significantly improved. But Vietnam is still — with delays in its World Trade Organization membership — behind the economic power curve.

Four years ago, we signed a bilateral trade agreement, but for internal political reasons, Hanoi had delayed that for two years. It has since discovered that that action in turn delayed its accession to the WTO, putting it behind competitors and, in particular, adversely affecting the textile sector.

Although there is still lots of distrust, there has been a significant improvement in relations. Vietnam's prime minister is expected to visit Washington later this year.

The Vietnamese have a love of education and a determination to move ahead that is as strong as that in China and perhaps stronger than much of the rest of Southeast Asia. It will take them a few more years to sort though internal political impediments, however.

Now, I'll turn to regional organizations and opportunities.

Just a few years ago, China seemed to hate the idea of multilateral organizations. Beijing felt such gatherings were occasions to criticize China and its activities. Still, China decided to grit its teeth and join.

As a result, there is now a significant group of educated and experienced people who attend the events, and China is eager to participate in multilateral organizations. And if the United States isn't in them, that is just fine with Beijing. This applies to the various ASEAN plus 3 (or more) groupings and, now, the East Asia Summit.

Some worry that the United States is giving the initiative to China in the region. In particular, the China-ASEAN free trade agreements have won a lot of attention.

But the United States is not being dealt out. The Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative — a series of Trade and Investment Agreements with strong support from former Trade Representative Zoellick, are moving forward.

Leading emphasis continues to be on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the region's sole all-inclusive gathering, both for following through on its agreed trade liberalization and in relating it to political/security concerns that directly impact trade. We are still unclear about the proposed and poorly defined East Asia summit.

Is it different from the ASEAN Plus Three? No one knows. Possibly India is going to go to the meeting, but probably not Australia and New Zealand. The United States has not been invited.

Challenges remain. The threat raised by North Korea and the nuclear weapons it undoubtedly has remains a most serious problem. North Korea has had at least 14 years to work with plutonium and to make a weapon. It has hard workers who are smart and well educated. Logic alone says the North could have weapons — you don't need particular intelligence.

It was reported that Pakistani A.Q. Khan has said that he was taken to a cave and shown three nuclear weapons ready to fit on a missile. Eight or 10 times the North has said that it has such weapons, and it has certainly worked hard to that end in various kinds of technology.

The six-party talks are an appropriate venue — involving each national player with essential interests — but North Korea has been working on nuclear weapons for very many years and it is not about to easily give them up.

Pyongyang will certainly make a deal, but it wants an arrangement that guarantees what it sees as its security, avoids any issues like human rights, pays generously and only requires it to give up some of its nuclear-weapons capabilities. Solving this problem is going to be a long and difficult process. Delay involves risks.

The possibility that the DPRK might sell weapons or other fissile material to any buyer, although it says that it would not, is a potential nightmare. Yet, various ideas for a "quick" solution are unattractive. Patient, but persistent, diplomacy is needed. Resolution is not impossible. Although there have been some economic reforms, North Korea still requires certain resources from the outside — food, fuel, and cash. Its illicit attempts to seek such resources offer vulnerabilities. Japanese measures and diminished missile sales have hurt cash flow to the North. The prolonged opposition of Japan and the United States, and the careful attitude of the ROK put a certain amount of pressure on North Korea.

But is it enough? That is another question.

Cross-strait relations remain a serious problem. The Lunar New Year flight charters were a good step but considerable difficulties remain. PRC leaders seem to vie to be seen with the hardest line.

There is the anti-secession law, which just passed the National Peoples' Congress. The law authorizes a military attack against Taiwan if it declares independence. The timing of the law is poor.

U.S. policy on the Taiwan Strait remains necessarily steadfast, as it has since the 1979 normalization, notwithstanding the changes on both sides.

The phrases: "peaceful resolution," "our one-China," "three communiques," "Taiwan Relations Act," "non-support of independence," and "opposition to those who seek unilateral change to the status quo," remain arcane, but essential. Taiwan is a vibrant democracy that is deeply involved in both the global economy and that of China. But, frankly speaking, there are some difficulties in the very important, "unofficial" relationship between Washington and Taipei. These are less problems in communications than in a desire to hear what is wanted rather than what has been said. It is hard to discuss sensitive issues when so much is likely to turn up in the newspaper the following day. Moreover, Taiwan's inclination to hear what it wants, means the United States sometimes has to say things publicly to get the message through. The situation in Burma just gets worse. Years of looking for improvement signals seem fruitless. Sanctions neither satisfy nor work, but should not be lifted. More and more, Myanmar, as Burma's junta calls itself, seems to be moving toward effective rule by one man, Than Shwe.

Then there is the war on terror. Terrorism is part of the scenery all over the world, and especially in places with significant Muslim populations in Southeast Asia .

We have made progress but there is more work to do.

The tsunami crisis demonstrated broader U.S. engagement with the region. Notwithstanding some criticism, the United States responded quickly. Remember, even 72 hours after the tsunami, the estimates were still only 5,000 dead in Aceh.

Now the death toll there is estimated to be 200,000. For affected governments' ministers, the first call offering help came from then-Secretary of State Colin Powell. U.S. military aid was critical early on, but help from others was needed, too, such as Australia. Singapore was also quick to respond, and the countries affected responded well.

Now, the U.N. and relief organizations have much to do in helping, at least for Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

U.S. policy in Asia is practical and sound. I remain optimistic.

Action to Change Article 9 of Japanese Peace Constitution will Affect ROK alignment With the ROK distancing itself from the US with President Roh's statement that US troops in Korea will NOT be allowed to be used as a regional force set everyone on edge as this is the crux of the US Global Positioning Strategy. The ROK-US alliance suddenly seemed shakier than ever. At the same time, the Japanese-US alliance seemed to be stronger than ever. The Japanese SDF force has completed its massive realignment in preparation for assuming a greater defensive role in region that extends beyond its borders. There are moves to allow the status of Japanese troops stationed abroad by Constitutional amendment -- primarily intended for those involved in the Iraq War -- that would change their status from humanitarian aid instead to "defense roles" as their primary duties.

The Chosun Ilbo reported that a ROK expert attached to the US Congress has told Japan's Sankei Shimbun that ROK criticism of Japan hurt not just Seoul-Tokyo ties but also showed Seoul at odds with the essence of the US-Japan alliance. Congressional adviser Larry A. Niksch told the paper's Tuesday edition there were concerns that the three-way ROK-US-Japan alliance -- the pillar of post-war US policy in Asia -- could collapse. Niksch said the ROK and US were clearly at loggerheads over Japan's role in the region.

Niksch said Seoul and Washington were clearly at loggerheads over Japan's role in the region. When Korean President Roh Moo-hyun slammed Japan's constitutional amendments and the deployment of the Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF) overseas as "the rebirth of militarism," Niksch said, it flew in the face of the Bush administration's belief that Japan should take a regional military role as a "normal country". He said Roh's comments seemed to deny Washington and Tokyo's basic line of beefing up bilateral security ties.

Niksch said the U.S. had begged for the deployment of Japanese forces to Iraq. When Seoul then said Japan must not do something but Korea can, that too went against basic policy in U.S.-Japanese security cooperation. Seoul's attacks were serious enough to harden into opposition to the entire three-way alliance - a system the U.S. has maintained in East Asia since the end of World War II.

Diet panel majority OK Constitution revision, female emperor

TOKYO, March 29, Kyodo - A House of Representatives panel on Japan's Constitution revealed a draft for its final report Tuesday supporting a revision to the supreme law, including allowing for changes to the war-renouncing Article 9 and allowing females to assume the imperial throne, lawmakers said.

The report, officially presented to senior lawmakers Tuesday, said panel members were split three-ways over whether or not to permit the exercise of the right to collective self-defense and whether restrictions should be stipulated.

The Japanese Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party said they plan to oppose the report. The 670-page draft report categorizes panel members' opinions over the past five years under various topics along the lines of the articles in the Constitution. Opinions approved by two-thirds or more of panel members on each topic are described as ''majority opinion.''

A majority approved the continued existence of the current system that recognizes the emperor as the symbol of the state. Meanwhile, they agreed to allow for a female to assume the throne, which is currently limited to male heirs under the Imperial House Law.

They also agreed to rewrite the preamble of the Constitution to reflect Japan's history and traditions while upholding the principles of peace and respect for basic human rights.

On national security, the majority agreed to uphold the first provision of Article 9 that renounces war. As for the right to self-defense and the Self-Defense Forces, the draft says the majority said they ''do not oppose some kind of constitutional measure to be taken.''

The governing Liberal Democratic Party wanted the report to state that a majority backs Japan's right to collective self-defense, but apparently compromised out of consideration for its coalition partner, the New Komeito party, and the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan, which are cautious about expanding the rights.

The government interprets the Constitution as prohibiting Japan from exercising the right to collective self-defense, or coming to the military aid of an ally, even though it is allowed to do so under international law. A majority of panel members supported participation in international cooperation and U.N. collective security activities. They also agreed a framework for regional security in Asia needs to be created.

The draft report cited as majority opinions that the bicameral system of the parliament should be maintained, that a system to decentralize authorities to local governments should be introduced, and that the power of the premier should be strengthened.

The report is scheduled to be submitted in mid-April to House of Representatives Speaker Yohei Kono. The Research Commission on the Constitution was set up in the lower house, along with one in the House of Councillors, in January 2000 to study changes to the supreme law, which was drafted under U.S. occupation after Japan's defeat in World War II.

Partial Move to Camp Zama: US Still Hasn't Given Up on Idea to Move to Japan On 26 March Kyodo News reported that the U.S. Defense Department was planning to integrate the headquarters of the U.S. Army Japan at Camp Zama, Kanagawa Prefecture, and the headquarters of the 1st Corps in Fort Lewis, Washington, into a new multifunctional headquarters to be based at Camp Zama. An earlier reported U.S. proposal to move the 1st Corps headquarters outright to Camp Zama drew strong opposition in Japan out of concern as it may go beyond the terms of the bilateral security, under which Japan provides the U.S. military with bases to protect Japan and security of the Far East. The mission of the 1st Corps covers the entire Asia-Pacific region. (NOTE: On 9 Apr 2005, the Mayor of Zama city stated the city would not join with the camp in the annual O-bon dance festival because of the pending moves to Camp Zama by the military. The city protests the increased military presence, though it fosters good relations between the camp and city.)

This is part of the "warning" that the US gave the ROK that it would move part of the "administrative functions" of the Combined Forces Command out of the ROK. Though the ROK has been reassured by Donald Rumsfield that a four-star will remain in charge of the USFK, the key point was that it was not stated for how long. Gen LaPorte is on an extension. If the CFC administrative move takes place, the USFK will be dropped to a three-or-two star position -- most likely a two star. A three star will be in Camp Zama and the new War-fighting command will be a four-star position at Camp Smith in Hawaii. Once the move of the "elements" of the I Corps is completed, all that needs to be done is get the Peace Constitution changed and the rest of the move can take place.

If it came about, the move would be swift -- and it will shock the ROK. There is also a potential that the ROK may get to defend Korea by itself sooner than it expected. If the US troops were part of a mobile force, the ROK will then be faced with the decision to either tell the US to leave or shut its mouth. All knows that the ROK must shut its mouth -- but the USFK will NOT be aligned with the ROK. It will only be there to operate as an autonomous unit. This is really a nightmare scenario, but one which President Roh in his "Roh Policy" is setting up.

The following article from the Japan Times on 28 July 2004 was written when the initiative to move the forces in Japan met with strong resistance by local groups. It gives a historical perspective of what WAS happening in 2004 -- and what IS occurring today. The Okinawans were pressing hard to have the Marines relocated -- and there were actions to move the Marine air station to an off-shore island. Now the Okinawans have seemed to accept the fate of the move of the air station (though under protest) -- mainly because it looks like it is still ten years from completion. Now the present worry is that when the Marines leave the Futema air station, the JSDF will simply move in to replace them and the US will still have a contingency base in case of an all-out war. This is a definite possibility. However, 16,000 Marines were proposed to move to Camp Fuji was scrapped. In addition, the problem of the stationing troops involved in the US Global Positioning Strategy -- meaning that they would be used in regional conflicts -- conflicted with the Peace Constitution. The plans to move the I Corps to Camp Zama was scrapped -- but resurrected with a "partial" move of some elements in 2005. Article 9 had to be changed and the US started to lobby strongly to get the Constitution changed. At the same time, the ROK was giving the US fits with its dragging of its feet in sending troops its troops to Iraq. Finally the US withdrew 3,600 troops from the 2d ID and shipped troops and equipment to Iraq. With these factors in mind, the article gives some insight into what is still on the planning table -- just awaiting the Peace Constitution changes.

U.S. withdraws bulk of realignment of armed forces proposals

Japan Times, 28 July 2004

The United States has withdrawn most of its specific proposals for the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, Japanese government officials said Tuesday.

They said the U.S. government informed Japan of the withdrawal through its embassy in Tokyo on Monday, along with its plan to renegotiate the realignment.

A senior U.S. Pacific Forces official told Japan's Defense Agency on Tuesday that the U.S. government will announce its basic plan on the realignment soon, the officials said.

The U.S. government has apparently taken into consideration the opposition of some local Japanese governments to the proposals and the absence of a basic stance by Tokyo on the realignment issue, analysts said.

But a Defense Agency official said the withdrawal represents only a postponement of conclusions on the realignment. (SITE NOTE: Though the US put its realignment on a hold, the JSDF underwent a complete realignment in anticipation of it assuming a role outside of its borders in a regional peacekeeper role.)

At a bilateral meeting in San Francisco in mid-July, the U.S. proposed moving some of its Marine troops in Okinawa Prefecture to Camp Fuji in Shizuoka Prefecture and Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture. (SITE NOTE: In July 2004, the Pentagon proposed relocating the U.S. Army 1st Corps based in Washington state, a rapid deployment force covering the Asia-Pacific area, to the U.S. Army Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture as well as reportedly part of the Okinawa-based Marine Corps to Camp Fuji in Shizuoka Prefecture, Camp Zama, or the Ground SDF Yausubetsu Training Field in Hokkaido. The Marines still conduct artillery training at Camp Fuji and the SDF site in Hokaido is still periodically mentioned as a potential Marine relocation site.)

It also presented a plan to relocate the night-landing practices of aircraft aboard the USS Kitty Hawk carrier from Atsugi Base in Kanagawa Prefecture to Iwakuni Base in Yamaguchi Prefecture. The U.S. government has withdrawn these plans, which have come under fire from local governments, the officials said. (SITE NOTE: The U.S. 7th Fleet which covers the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the Eastern Coast of Africa is based at the U.S. Yokosuka Naval Base. The 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force is stationed in Okinawa. If the transformation plan is enacted with the change in Article 9, it will significantly increase the capability of the U.S. forces to launch military operations on a global scale, with Japan acting as a key hub. The changes involved with the USS Kitty Hawk carrier group involved the addition of two Aegis cruisers as part of the Japanese Missile Defense System that was spurred into motion by the North Korean launch in 1998 across Japanese air space. In addition, there are protests over the stationing of the Kitty Hawk's replacement by the nuclear-powered USS John F. Kennedy by anti-nuclear groups. There is also a proposal on the table to move the Marine aircraft from Futema, Okinawa to either Iwakuni or to Yokota AB.)

However, it still plans to integrate the 13th Air Force Command in Guam into the Yokota Air Force Base in suburban Tokyo and relocate a U.S. Army command from Washington State to Camp Zama. These plans do not involve any large-scale movement of troops or weapons, they said.

(SITE NOTE: Pentagon proposed that portions of I Corps will be relocated to Camp Zama. In July 2004, there was speculation to integrate the functions of the 13th Air Force in Guam with the 5th Air Force at the Yokota base for the command functions to be at Yokota base. Japan stated, however, that the integrated headquarters would need to be located outside of Japan should it cover a region larger than that outlined in the Japan-U.S. security agreement. The U.S. 13th Air Force commanded operations in the south and west Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and was used as a stepping stone for action in the Middle East and as a key base for long-range bombers and tanker planes to make preparations for operations in the Middle East. The planned move of integrating the 5th AF and 13th AF would shift the new U.S. Air Force command at Yokota will cover regions ranging from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and Africa's east coast.

Japan, for its part, was considering relocating the ASDF's Air Defense Command and Air Support Command, both in Fuchu, to nearby Yokota. The ADC, which operates F-15 jet fighters and a missile command, is directly involved in the defense of Japan's airspace. The ASC mainly handles transport and logistics missions, including the operation of C-130 transport airplanes currently being used for reconstruction aid efforts for Iraq. Observers said bringing the two organizations to Yokota would not only improve cooperation between Japan and Washington on airspace defense but would also help smooth bilateral coordination with a view to increasing overseas SDF dispatches to enhance Japan's contribution to international operations. The proposal was withdrawn, but the US as late as Oct 2004 still considered it only a postponement as it pondered its options. However, because of the setbacks in Japan, the 13th AF was to be relocated to Hickam in July 2005 to become a war-fighting command about 150 troops. Gen Hester, PACAF commander, in Mar 2005 stated that the only other Air Force increase would be the result of consolidating the headquarters of the Fifth Air Force in Yokota, Japan, and the 13th Air Force in Guam to create a new warfighting headquarters with about 150 people, either in Hawaii or in Guam -- meaning that things were still up in the air.)

Reduce Japan's burden

Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi urged U.S. Pacific Command Commander Adm. Thomas Fargo on Tuesday to reduce Japan's burden in hosting U.S. forces through an ongoing review of the disposition of the U.S. military in the Asia-Pacific region, Japanese officials said.

Kawaguchi was quoted as telling Fargo that it is "important" to reduce the burden on Japanese municipalities, including those in Okinawa Prefecture, that host U.S. bases and military facilities, the officials said.

She also called on Fargo to maintain the deterrence provided by U.S. forces in Japan through the envisaged global military realignment.

Fargo was quoted as telling Kawaguchi that the realignment is aimed at enabling the United States to more appropriately deal with the new security environment in the region.

Fargo told Kawaguchi that Japan's support for U.S. forces "is very important" for peace and stability in the region and the rest of the world.

Kawaguchi and Fargo met after senior government officials from Japan and the U.S. held talks on the planned military realignment earlier this month in Washington.

Sit-in stalls base work

NAHA, Okinawa Pref. (Kyodo) Protesters on Tuesday marked the 100th day of their sit-in to oppose a planned offshore airport for use by the U.S. Marine Corps, blocking the seabed drilling site off Nago, northern Okinawa.

The drilling, a project overseen by the Naha Defense Facilities Administration Bureau, has yet to begin due to the protest.

The proposed airport is intended to serve as a new base for the U.S. Marines, which would relocate from Futenma Air Station in Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture, under a 1996 Japanese-U.S. agreement. Since the sit-in began, some 80 people per day have taken part, setting up tents in a vacant lot near the fishing port and blocking the one road that leads to the site when bureau officials come.

Meanwhile, plans are under way to hold a massive rally in Naha in mid-September.

Plan puts SDF in control of Futenma

03/29/2005
By TAKETSUGU SATO, The Asahi Shimbun

With plans at a deadlock for relocating the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, the government is weighing whether to put the facility under control of the Self-Defense Forces rather than hand back the land to owners in Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture.

Under the new plan, the U.S. military could use Futenma as a strategic base in case of military emergencies. The offer represents a desperate attempt by Tokyo to cater to U.S. requests when it is unable to come up with an alternative to the Futenma facility.

In 1996, Japan and the United States reached agreement for the return of Futenma ``within five to seven years.'' The plan has hinged on building an alternative facility off Henoko in Nago, Okinawa Prefecture. But that project met with strong protests by residents. Also, officials estimate it would take more than 10 years to complete.

Washington has been frustrated at the slow progress. Tokyo has been unable to offer an alternative site.

Putting Futenma under the control of the SDF would not make the area any safer, officials noted. It would still pose a burden to the local community and for that reason some officials hesitate to go ahead with the plan.

During unofficial talks on the issue, the U.S. side said the Pentagon needs to secure two 2,000-meter runways inside Okinawa Prefecture, according to sources in both governments. Kadena Air Base, also in Okinawa Prefecture, has a 3,700-m runway.

The proposed facility off Henoko is to have a 2,000-m runway. However, residents are clamoring for the removal of the U.S. Marines from Futenma. The crash of a military helicopter at a university campus bordering the facility last August exacerbated the situation.

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has also acknowledged to the Diet that the relocation plan to Henoko ``involves quite difficult problems.'' In its long campaign to scale back the U.S. military presence, the Okinawa prefectural government insists that U.S. use of Henoko should be limited to 15 years.

Putting Futenma under the control of the SDF while allowing U.S. forces to use it in emergencies could solve the problem, sources said.

One idea that has been floated is to relocate the helicopter unit now stationed at Futenma to Kadena, or Marine Corps facilities at Camp Schwab or Camp Hansen, which are also in Okinawa Prefecture.

(NOTE: Futema is the home of the Marine Aircraft Group 36 (MAG-36), 1st Marine Air Wing (MAW), with two helicopter squadrons (Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 (HMM-262) -- CH-46E/ Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 265 (HMM-265) -- CH-43E) and a KC-130R tanker squadron (Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 152 (VMGR-152)) The proposal to split the helicopters from its C-130 tanker support -- especially for overwater missions that are involved -- seems unlikely from a Marine planning standpoint. HMM-262 is the Air Combat Element of the 31st MEU.)

Air tankers now based at Futenma would be relocated to the Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture or Yokota Air Base in Tokyo.

But this scenario is still in the very early stages of planning, sources said.

Having the SDF in charge of Futenma while allowing the U.S. military limited use is in line with an earlier agreement that Tokyo and Washington reached during bilateral defense talks on joint use of military facilities.

Handing over Futenma to the SDF would also provide an economic spin-off for the local community through employment and payments for land leases.

But even some government officials remain reluctant because their latest plan does not lessen the military burden placed on Okinawa Prefecture.(IHT/Asahi: March 29,2005)

ROK ACTIONS

ROK Planners start Action on Pyongtaek Expansion According to the Stars and Stripes on 8 March 2005, ROK planners will be scouting the Pyongtaek area looking for areas for incorporating an "international city" with facilities and schools for foreigners. The search will concentrate on the Songtan area.

Korean developers planning ahead to keep pace with expanding Humphreys

Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Monday, March 7, 2005

PYONGTAEK, South Korea — Korean developers and civic leaders are fleshing out plans on how to ensure this relatively rural city keeps pace with an expanded U.S. military hub at nearby Camp Humphreys.

Last week, city officials kicked off the early development phases of "Peace City," a massive complex that will eventually include schools for foreigners, hospitals, entertainment centers and administrative buildings.

Between now and next February, agents from the Korea Land Corporation will scout locations in the region and try to sell the public on building a development largely aimed at providing services for the thousands of U.S. troops expected to move into the area.

Under deals reached between the U.S. and South Korean governments, American military bases will be consolidated into two hubs — one in Pyongtaek, the other further south in the Taegu area.

Korea Land Corporation officials hope to have sites identified by October, with work beginning shortly thereafter.

The construction would require massive environmental oversight and a revamping of the city's traffic system, to support the likely increase in traffic both from an expanded U.S. base and a larger neighboring city.

KLC has not yet put a price tag on the project, but it is expected to run into the hundreds of millions of dollars. The group faces opposition from some civic groups and local residents, who are fighting the expansion of the base. Some of the groups simply don't want to move from their land — even though they will be compensated by the South Korean government — while others are politically opposed to the U.S. troop presence.

Even though it must still address the opposition's concerns, Pyongtaek City is "promoting the plan so that the announcement of the new city can be made no later than the end of this year," a city official said.

The sites under heaviest consideration are near Songtan, officials said, where a shopping and entertainment district geared toward American servicemembers already exists.

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President Roh will NOT allow USFK troops Expanded US Role in NE Asia The Yonhap News reported on 8 March that President Roh Moo-hyun would not allow U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula to expand their role and get involved in disputes in Northeast Asian nations without South Korea's consent. In a speech at an Air Force Academy commencement ceremony, Roh said, "I clearly state that the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) should not be involved in disputes in Northeast Asia without our consent," Roh said. (NOTE: Another translation in the Chosun Ilbo had him stating, ""The clear thing is that our citizens will not become embroiled in Northeast Asian conflicts without our consent." This could be interpreted as meaning the ROK would not become embroiled in the controversy which is reasonable. But the article stated it was meant for the USFK.)

Roh's remark follows a report that the United States is adopting "strategic flexibility," under which U.S. soldiers stationed in the South will be reshaped as "rapid deployment forces" to incede in military conflicts in Northeast Asia, and possibly any military conflicts between China and Taiwan. In recent months, U.S. officials have touted the transformation of U.S. forces worldwide into lighter, more maneuverable regional forces, able to deploy on short notice. The remaining pieces of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division in South Korea currently are undergoing a transformation to a Unit of Employment (UEX), combining the roles of a division and corps. "We will never compromise on this," Roh said, dismissing concerns that the expanded role of the USFK may eventually provoke China and destabilize regional security. The Uri and LDP parties applauded Roh's stand, but the opposition GNP expressed reservations.

South Korea and the United States have discussed the issue of USFK's strategic flexibility. The U.S. side has stated it cannot have its forces tied down in a static role in the new military structure which rapidly deploys it forces from backline areas -- and draws units back to the US from being forward deployed. The 2nd ID is now in a sweeping transformation aimed at reshaping units and using high-tech weapons. By midsummer, the division will have transformed into a Unit of Employment (UEx) that combines division and corps functions. (NOTE: Read between the lines as they are starting to realign the "administrative functions" under I Corps which may be moved to Camp Zama from Fort Lewis, Washington if Article 9 of the Peace Constitution is realized.) Washington's new military strategy, known as global repositioning for strategic flexibility, is aimed at turning American soldiers at bases around the world into rapid deployment forces. As part of the program, the U.S. military is changing the USFK by emphasizing capability over numbers and relying on light, mobile forces rather than Cold War-era massed guns. (NOTE: Gen LaPorte talks ad nauseum about the $11 billion investment in upgrading the USFK/ROK forces. Regional roles for both U.S. and South Korean forces have been addressed in recent months. For instance, in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Wednesday in Washington, U.S. Forces Korea commander Gen. Leon J. LaPorte praised South Korea's military contributions to U.S.-led missions in Iraq, Afghanistan and in tsunami relief.)

According to the administration spokesman, Roh's comments were a matter of principle and ways of setting them down formally were being studied in consultation with the U.S. The government also wants to make it mandatory for Washington to get prior consent from Korea when moving USFK forces elsewhere. The ROK position had been that the US would not use USFK troops in military conflicts in Northeast Asia without South Korea's consent. This in effect would give the ROK control over US military and political strategy -- a position that the US cannot support.

The ROK had been backed into a corner dealing with this issue and in January 2005 appeared to recognize the reality of the sitution -- and the issue was moved from the FOTA (Future of the Alliance) to a cabinet/ministry level discussion. Korea and the U.S. started discussion of the issue during the Security Policy Initiative (SPI) talks held in Seoul on Feb. 3, agreeing to decide it as soon as possible. Korea's position is that while some U.S. troops could be deployed from the peninsula to places of no immediate threat to Korea's security like Iraq, the USFK would not be allowed to intervene in matters with potentially grave consequences for regional security in Northeast Asia, such as the China-Taiwan standoff.

The first meetings were indecisive -- if not a failure. And now there seems to be a return to the original Roh stance of a self-reliant ROK military and depends on US hi-tech armaments (ATACMS and attack helicopters purchases that are still unfunded) and air defenses (Patriots that it won't purchase) to survive -- an absurd proposition. This would strip the United States of its power to assume control of South Korean troops in the event of a war, as agreed to by the South since the 1950-53 Korean War. Roh may get his wish -- but without the US tied to the ROK, there is no reason the US forces should remain in the ROK.

Roh ONCE AGAIN said the government will make efforts to regain full control over its own military within a decade. "The Korean military will develop in 10 years into an independent army which will take over wartime operational control [from the United States]," Mr. Roh said. "Unlike 100 years ago, we have enough power for self-defense. The military of Korea will become a stabilizer in the East Asian region by reforming its military structure and enhancing the efficacy of its defense capability," the president said. However, most experts have a hard time believing in the 10-year goal because the ROK has continued to shelve programs and unfund others.

But then Roh also reiterated the importance of the role of U.S. troops in the maintenance of peace and stability here. "U.S. troops will also continue to play a role on the Korean Peninsula," he said. South Korea will have to cooperate closely with its neighbors, as well the United States, to establish a regional security structure, Roh said. In other words, we need your armaments and manpower, but we don't want your control. (NOTE: This is based upon the childish radical concept that the US NEEDS to stay in the ROK to exert its political influence in Northeast Asia. Unfortunately, the concept is based up the outdated ideas of geopolitics that went out the window in the late 1980s. If America withdrew its forces to Japan and Guam, it still could exert this influence because of the speed that the forces could be relocated to the area. In addition, the geoeconomic structures in combination with geopolitical influences are at work -- with China and South Korea as a burgeoning economic powers dependent upon the US trade and at the same time, economic competitors of America.)

The point is that the USFK is getting tired of the ROK game. Roh is back to forcing a confrontation. According to an editorial in the Chosun Ilbo on 10 March, "That the president makes his opposition to the deployment of the USFK in Northeast Asia public is what they call a "strategic" choice, because it involves the entire framework of the Korea-U.S. security relationship. The U.S. made the strategic choice of transforming its forces stationed in the Asia and Pacific region into a rapid deployment force, and it will go ahead with it whether Korea supports it or not. If the strategic choices of Korea and the U.S. clash, Washington will have no alternative but to change the framework of the Korea-U.S. security alliance in a way that allows it to push through its own strategic choice. It is only natural to assume that it will first redeploy part of the USFK elsewhere in Northeast Asia. In the long term, Washington is going to reconsider the weight South Korea carries in its Northeast Asian security program. So far it has supported the Republic of Korea in the international community, knowingly and unknowingly, because it rated Korea's position in its security framework quite highly. Only when that support is gone will we be able to gauge the full extent of its importance." (NOTE: International business leaders have already stated that they will NOT relocate out of Seoul to do business, but if the US pulls out, they will leave Korea. The name of the game is security of investments -- no protection, no security, no investment. The US Congress is getting very hard-nosed with South Korea over its stance with North Korea. For example, the Human Rights Bill for North Korea was passed over the South's objections and Sen Hyde of the Foreign Relations Committee is stating that the US cannot justify its troops in Korea unless Korea declares its "main enemy" -- a term the ROK removed from its 2004 Defense White Paper.)

According to a Roh aide, it is the first time the South Korean government has officially revealed its position on the USFK's moves toward greater strategic flexibility, which Washington first raised in April 2003 during a Future of the Alliance (FOTA) forum. "The point is that we understand the U.S. global strategy for employment of rapid deployment forces," the aide said. "It is acceptable if the United States moves some of its forces to Iraq or any other conflict areas on condition that the troop redeployment does not have a critical effect on the Korean Peninsula." "However, such a U.S. troop redeployment should be restricted if it involves regional conflicts in Northeast Asia," he said. (NOTE: It should be noted the US yanked 3,600 troops out of the 2d ID for frontline duty because the ROK would not commit 3,600 troops to take over "hotspot" basethat would free up US troops to fill frontline taskings. The ROK ended up sending troops to the relative safety of Irbil up north.)

The aide dismissed an allegation that Roh's remarks on the broadened USFK role reflected China's concerns about U.S. expansionism in Northeast Asia, which would gain relevance if a military conflict arose between Beijing and Taipei over the former's One China policy framed against Taipei's leanings toward independence. "We've never discussed the issue with China," the aide asserted. (NOTE: This is strange as the ROK had ministry level meetings with the PRC over the DPRK nuclear issue AND other mutual issues.) There is a potential conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan, which Beijing regards as a renegade province of its own, contrary to the belief held by a growing number of Taiwanese that it should declare independence. Korea does NOT wish to be drawn into this conflict. Japan, however, has recently agreed with the US that Taiwan is their mutual security concern. Japan has promised to regard security in the Taiwan Strait as a "common strategic objective" and take a greater role in Asia and elsewhere as a U.S. ally. This shift in policy sets Japan, which competes against China for regional hegemony, apart from Korea, which wishes to have greater reservation about joint action with the US outside of the Korean Peninsula. The Korean newspapers all agree that what Roh said was true for Korea, but all also wonder why Roh would do such a foolish thing as now the ROK and US are firmly fixed on opposing sides -- and the US can do without Korea, but Korea can't do without the US. Given the circumstances, the newspapers feel that ambiguity and "strategic flexibility" would have been a better course.

On 11 Mar, the Prime Minister Lee Hae-chan was out mending fences after President Roh's broadside. He stated that the ROK wishes to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear weapons dispute on the basis of closer ties with the US. In a speech to the graduation and commissioning ceremony of the Korea Naval Academy, Lee stressed that Seoul and Washington undisputedly share a common goal of pursuing peace on the Korean Peninsula and in the entire region of Northeast Asia.

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Officials Meet for Cost-sharing negotiations The interesting point will be the bombshell that President Roh landed when he drew the battlelines over the use of USFK troops as part of the Global Strategy of the US. His stance may affect the amounts of troops stationed -- and reduce the cost sharing of the ROK -- but blast the ROK's defense expenditures (currently at 2.9 percent of GDP) through the ceiling. These talks should be interesting -- Roh's brand of "stick-in-your-eye" diplomacy and the Rumsfield brand of "shove-it-up-your-nose-if-you-don't-like-it" brand of negotiating.

In the February talks, the US dropped its demand for Seoul to share additional expenses for rent and maintenance of facilities and public utilities -- the contentious C4 ROK upgrade. Following the breakthrough, the two sides were left with deciding the total amount of shared defense costs and set the annual rate of raising those expenses. The U.S. wanted Seoul to contribute more than seven-hundred-46 billion won, the sum it paid last year. But Seoul wanted a cut in its share, citing Washington's plan to reconfigure its troops on the Korean Peninsula and relocate the Yongsan Garrison out of Seoul. The United States also wanted the costs to be continuously increased by ten percent annually while Seoul wanted to freeze or cut the increase rate.

Seoul, pointing to a U.S. troop reduction and its own contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan, wants to contribute less direct support than it did last year. In 2004, South Korea paid $623 million in direct contributions, U.S. and South Korean officials have said. In 1991, when the cost-sharing program began, South Korea contributed $150 million. Its contribution had more than quadrupled to $623 million by 2004.Under the Special Measures Agreement covering the 2002-04 period, South Korean government support equaled some 40 percent of the non-personnel costs of stationing U.S. forces in South Korea, Gen. Leon J. LaPorte, U.S. Forces Korea commander, said in early March. LaPorte put South Korea's total cost-sharing contribution at $1.162 billion, including $540 million in "indirect cost sharing."

The South Korean side wants payments either frozen at the current level or reduced. The last round of talks was in February in Washington. "There was progress, but differences still remain," Kim Sook, Foreign Ministry North American Affairs Bureau director general, said afterward. South Korea's request hinges on a U.S. plan to reduce its presence by 12,500 troops over the next three years. Under the plan, signed in 2004, the United States last year removed 5,000 troops (including the 3,600 2nd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division troops sent to Iraq). This year, it plans to remove 5,000 more.

The two sides share the goal of swiftly finalizing an agreement on the matter -- but the US is taking a "take-it-or-we-leave" attitude, while the ROK is taking a "stick-in-your-eye" attitude. That last time the ROK played this game, a battalion of the 2nd ID departed for Iraq. Though the troops withdrawal has been slowed, it can just as well be accelerated -- and the USFK has shown that they can bugout with ease.

US and South Korean negotiators met on 15 Mar for the fifth round of talks aimed at cementing how much South Korea will contribute this year to support U.S. troops. The one-day meeting was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. According to the Joongang Ilbo on 15 Mar 2005, Seoul and Washington have agreed in principle to reduce the amount the ROK pays to maintain US military forces in the country, a government official said yesterday. "The South Korean government presented an argument that it shouldered a heavy burden last year through the Yongsan relocation deal and the dispatch of South Korean troops to Iraq and thus needs to contribute less to the stationing costs of US forces," according to an official. "It has been accepted by the United States." South Korean officials through Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon have also repeatedly said that the reduction in U.S. troops must be taken into account. Without disclosing details, the official said that the total amount South Korea would have to bear would be less than what the country shouldered in the past years. Under the Special Measures Agreement, South Korea bears the cost of Korean nonmilitary personnel employed by the U.S. military, military construction, logistics and combined defense improvement projects.

According to the Stars and Stripes on 18 Mar, "Under the Special Measures Agreement instituted in 1991, South Korea paid $622 million in direct costs to support USFK. Gen. Leon J. LaPorte, USFK commander, testified to Congress earlier this month that South Korean government support equaled 40 percent of the command's non-personnel costs. LaPorte put South Korea's total cost-sharing contribution at $1.162 billion, including $540 million in "indirect cost sharing." According to the annual USFK Fact Book, the bulk of the direct cost-sharing comes in labor and construction costs. South Korea in fiscal 2004 paid $279.6 million in salary for South Korean national employees of USFK and $190 million in base improvement construction costs. South Korean contributions are increased automatically each year by 8.8 percent plus a variable annual inflation rate adjustment, the Fact Book states. This year, South Korean officials want their financial contribution either frozen or reduced. They point to USFK downsizing and other contributions such as a deployment of South Korean soldiers to Iraq."

The US negotiators have stated that there will be no comment until the deal was finalized, but the ROK side has said that most of the points they presented was accepted. According to the Chosun Ilbo on 16 Mar 2005, the ROK's share of the budget for the US troop presence has been cut by W60 billion (US$60 million).

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USFK ACTIONS

Reorganized 2nd ID brigade The following story appeared in the Stars and Stripes on 10 March 2005 about the changes in the 2d ID as it transfers taskings to the ROK and integrates the ROK into their battle scenarios. This is part of the combining of Corps and Division taskings to form a more flexible unit. The ROK has assumed the tasking for return artillery fire along the DMZ and other taskings such as the bridges are being turned over to the ROK as well. There have been previous exercises in 2004 along with the ROK and Combat Engineers in winter to ford the Imjin River in field exercises. In this exercise, the ROK 906th Engineer Company took part.

Reorganized 2nd ID brigade gets its feet wet with training on Imjin River

By Seth Robson, Stars and Stripes
Pacific edition, Thursday, March 10, 2005

IMJIN RIVER, South Korea — The 2nd Infantry Division’s new 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team (1HBCT) completed two weeks of field training Tuesday with hundreds of vehicles and soldiers crossing the Imjin River. The Warrior Field Training Exercise involved soldiers from 1HBCT and other 2nd ID units and included Tuesday’s river crossing, said 1HBCT commander Col. Mike Feil.

The exercise was a test for the recently reorganized brigade, composed of two task forces based around 1st Battalion, 72nd Armored Regiment and 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, he said.

“We have had a very beneficial training environment to take advantage of the new organization,” Feil said. The FTX tested some of the combat team’s new high-tech reconnaissance capabilities, digital information systems and tactical information exchange. They give commanders a better battlefield view of friendly and enemy forces, he said.

“We can see ourselves and the enemy more clearly and act fast and act decisively. (In the FTX) 2-9 could defeat and destroy 30 to 50 per cent of enemy combat systems (using indirect fire) before committing ground forces,” he said.

The combination of Bradley Fighting Vehicles and M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tanks within the units improved teamwork, Feil said.

“We always use Bradleys and tanks together but the ability to build a cohesive team and sustain it is enhanced by the reorganization. Teamwork is much better,” he said.

The new brigade structure required it to work with the Republic of Korea army during the exercise, he added.

“This is the first river crossing of this season. We used to have our own bridging assets. Now we are establishing a relationship with the ROK army,” Feil said as a procession of tracked vehicles traversed a floating bridge across the Imjin nearby.

About 175 vehicles and more than 500 soldiers from 2-9, 1st Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Regiment and several other units crossed the Imjin on Tuesday morning, he said.

2nd ID Engineer Brigade commander Rock Donahue praised the 906th ROK Engineer Company, which erected the bridge for the U.S. forces. Some of the engineering soldiers, who have crossed the Imjin many times, were on hand to help the South Koreans, he said.

“With our transformation, we are going to have to rely on the ROK allies to perform these functions and these assets that we don’t have within 2nd ID,” Donahue said.

Soldiers waiting to cross the river said they were excited to be part of the reorganized brigade but after two weeks in the field, some also were thinking about a hot shower and warm bed.

Sgt. 1st Class Kirk Hamlin, 36, of Hampton, Va., serving with Battery A, 1st Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Regiment, said his last shower was on the morning of Feb. 26.

The smell, he said, “really lets you know we are true combat soldiers.”

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USFK to Close Military Facility on Cheju Island The USFK announced on 11 Mar 2005 that it would close its resort facility in the southernmost South Korean island of Jeju on 21 March under a plan to reconsolidate its installations across the country under the Land Partnership Program. The U.S. forces will return its nine acres of land to South Korea.

Camp MacNab had been used as a religious retreat, training center and resort for more than 20 years. In years past, the U.S. military would hold events such as the “Cheju-do Challenge,” a race of military squads to test their mountaineering skills. The test was the culmination of a one-week confidence and teamwork course conducted on Camp MacNab training grounds. MacNab was also used as a religious retreat, and Morale, Welfare and Recreation offices have offered rest and relaxation trips. The U.S. military operates similar reduced-cost resorts for servicemembers throughout the world, including a beach resort in Hawaii and a ski retreat in Germany. What was ironic was the US had spent 2 million on upgrading the facilities with an indoor swimming pool and guest lodgings, but was now abandoning the facilities.

The ROK needs to be worried as "rest and recreation" facilities are the LAST things that are closed. Incidentally, these R&R sites at Cheju were first established for the folks from JAPAN in the late 1950s -- NOT for the ROK contingent. That's a fact!!! Camp McNab was established in the late 1970s when the ROK started developing Cheju, Pusan and Kyongju as Japanese tourist areas. However, the point remains that R&R sites are usually the last elements that are closed because of the impact to service and morale programs. The weighted factor shifts if you don't intend to have many USFK forces around to enjoy the facility -- or if there is under-utilization, which certainly is NOT a fact with Cheju Island.

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Camp Page Closure Thumping helicopters streamed out of the U.S. military base Camp Page on 9 Mar 2005, as soldiers packed trucks with equipment to prepare for moving as part of Washington's plan to reduce its forces in South Korea. The base was to be closed and turned over to South Korea by the end of March in line with U.S. plans to restructure its deployment of overseas forces in order to focus more on anti-terrorism operations. The 120 soldiers from the U.S. Army's 542nd Medical Evacuation Company are to move next week to Fort Campbell, Kentucky.

Camp Page Closure (29 Mar 05)

According to Asia Pulse/Yonhap Camp Page was officially closed down on 29 March. Tasked with providing aviation support to the US Army's 2nd Infantry, Camp Page, located in the city of Chuncheon, Gangwon Province, 85 kilometers northeast of Seoul, held its closing ceremony. In accordance with the US military's relocation plan, its soldiers and equipment have been relocated to other bases in the ROK and the ROK Army will receive the rights to manage the base in November.

NOTE: Camps Greaves, Garry Owen, Giant, Edwards and Stanton closed in 2004, and Camps Bonifas and Liberty Bell returned to the ROK in 2004.

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APRIL 2005

INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS

US, Japan to Rework Military Alliance The following is an article by Richard Halloran whose articles' content is constantly being denied by the USFK but always seem to have a lot of truth tucked into them. The article was posted on Sunday, March 13, 2005.

In December 2004, Prime Minister Koizumi's government published a new defense guideline and a plan to expand Japan's defense over the next five years that said Japan should "engage in strategic dialogue" with the United States to include role-sharing, intelligence exchange, cooperative operations, exchanges of technology, and "efforts to make the of stationing U.S. forces in Japan smoother." In Feb 2005, Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura, Defense Minister Yoshinori Ohno, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld met in Washington to approve "common strategic objectives" that called for U.S. and Japanese forces to "maintain the capability to address contingencies affecting the United States and Japan" in three stages: the review of strategic objectives just concluded, an examination of Japanese and U.S. missions and capabilities now started, and scrutiny of U.S. bases in Japan.

THE RISING EAST: U.S., Japan to rework military alliance

By Richard Halloran

In the coming months, American and Japanese military officers and defense officials will be sitting down in Tokyo, at the Pacific Command in Hawai'i, and in Washington to determine ways to put muscle into the swiftly maturing alliance between the United States and Japan.

If all goes well, those efforts will produce a joint declaration by President Bush and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi next fall that will reflect the most fundamental and far-reaching revision of the alliance since the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was rewritten in 1960.

The critical feature: The U.S. and Japan will transform their security bond from one of senior partner-junior partner to one of more nearly equals in policy and strategy even if the military power of America still overshadows that of Japan. Among the vital issues to be worked out, Japanese and American officials say:

• • Roles and missions, in which Americans and Japanese will decide on a division of labor and which forces will be responsible for what missions to make best use of those forces and to preclude duplication.
  
  
• • Expanded combined operations and training, especially between Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force and the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. The navies and air forces, which already coordinate many operations, would do more of the same.
  
  
• • Sharing intelligence as the Japanese, in particular, strengthen their ability to collect and analyze information and then to meld it with intelligence produced by American services.
  
  
• • Revised war plans, a touchy subject which officials are reluctant to discuss in public. An American said, however: "We continually review our bilateral coordination mechanisms and processes."
  
  
• • Moving a U.S. Army corps headquarters to Japan from the United States to put it in the region where it would operate and into close proximity to Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force for combined planning, training and operations. (SITE NOTE: Part of I Corps will move to Camp Zama in July 2005)
  
  
• • Researching and building a combined ballistic missile defense that would be aimed first at the missile threat from North Korea, which fired a missile over Japan in 1998, and then at the longer-range threat from China. (SITE NOTE: Two Aegis destroyers are now on-station as part of this Missile Defense System (MDS).)

All of this is part of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's plan for a rigorous overhaul of the U.S. military posture in Asia. It calls for dismantling the many-layered command structure in South Korea, consolidating control into a streamlined U.S. headquarters in Japan, reducing U.S. forces in South Korea, and giving those that remain a regional rather than a local mission.

When U.S. and Japanese officials began discussing the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, the Americans focused on the command element, while the Japanese sought to reduce the friction of U.S. bases next to Japanese neighborhoods. Before the negotiations went far, the two sides agreed that they needed basic reassessment of the alliance.

In Japan, Prime Minister Koizumi formed a commission on security led by a prominent business executive, Hiroshi Araki of Tokyo Electric Power. The commission recommended in October that Japan forge an "integrated security strategy" through "strategic consultations" with the United States.

Then came two declarations in Tokyo and one in Washington that would have been unthinkable five years ago from a Japan that had wrapped itself in a pacifist cocoon after the devastating defeat of World War II.

In December, Prime Minister Koizumi's government published a new defense guideline and a plan to expand Japan's defense over the next five years. The guideline said: "Japan's defense forces are the ultimate security of its national security."

The guideline further said Japan should "engage in strategic dialogue" with the United States to include role-sharing, intelligence exchange, cooperative operations, exchanges of technology, and "efforts to make the of stationing U.S. forces in Japan smoother."

Last month, Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura, Defense Minister Yoshinori Ohno, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld met in Washington to approve "common strategic objectives" that called for U.S. and Japanese forces to "maintain the capability to address contingencies affecting the United States and Japan."

Machimura told reporters that the strategic dialogue has three stages: the review of strategic objectives just concluded, an examination of Japanese and U.S. missions and capabilities now started, and scrutiny of U.S. bases in Japan.

Japanese and Americans have thus come a long way in 60 years. In April 1945, American and Japanese troops were locked in the battle of Okinawa in which 250,000 people, including 150,000 Okinawan civilians, perished. Today, Japanese and American military officers sit side by side, poring over maps and tables to figure out how best to deter mutual adversaries in the future.

Richard Halloran is a Honolulu-based journalist and former New York Times correspondent in Asia.

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Re-evaluation of Military Alliance: US Pushing Japan to Greater Role The following article appeared in the Associated Press on April 9, 2005.

In re-evaluation of military alliance, U.S. pushing Japan to greater role

By Eric Talmadge / Associated Press

YOKOTA AIR BASE, Japan -- In the most sweeping re-examination of the U.S.-Japan security alliance in years, Japan and the United States are negotiating a military realignment that could move some or all of the nearly 20,000 Marines off the crowded island of Okinawa, close underused bases and meld an Army command in Washington state with a camp just south of Tokyo.

But something even more fundamental may be at stake.

With its own military spread thin, Washington appears to be trying to use the talks to nudge Japan out from under the U.S. security blanket and make Tokyo a much more active player in global strategic operations. "The United States wants Japan to assume a role very much like the one it has vis-a-vis the British," said Tetsuo Maeda, professor of arms reduction and security at Tokyo International University. "The Self-Defense Forces would be regularly deployed overseas for military operations if this kind of realignment were realized."

It would not be an easy transition if the realignment is approved.

America's force of 50,000-plus troops in Japan dates back decades and has long been hailed by both sides as the key to stability in the Asian-Pacific region and a model of cooperation. In exchange for the security the U.S. troops provide, Japan pays a whopping $5 billion, an arrangement unparalleled anywhere else in the world.

But amid increasing calls in Japan for the U.S. to streamline its presence, and Washington's shifting focus from maintaining bases abroad to fine-tuning its deployments to respond quickly to specific flare-ups, topics are on the table that were long seen as virtually taboo.

Officially, there has been little comment.

"We are working very hard right now," Lt. Gen. Bruce A. Wright, said recently in his first news conference since assuming command of the U.S. Forces Japan in February. He said details of the talks will likely emerge this summer, though no deadline has been announced.

Few expect Japan to see the kind of drastic restructuring and downsizing that the U.S. forces in South Korea and Germany are going through. Wright stressed he did not expect a great change -- up or down -- in the overall number of troops here.

Their footprint may change substantially, however.

Wright acknowledged topics being discussed include relocation of Marine Corps Air Station, Futenma, a major cause of friction on Okinawa; possible joint use of this air base on Tokyo's western outskirts where U.S. Forces are headquartered; and integration of command functions for the Army's 1st Corps at Fort Lewis in Washington state with Camp Zama, just south of Tokyo.

According to reports in the Japanese media, based on anonymous government leaks, the idea has even been floated of moving the biggest contingent of Marines based permanently outside the United States from southern Okinawa to Japan's other extreme, the northern island of Hokkaido.

Reports have also speculated that the fighter wing of the USS Kittyhawk's battle group may be uprooted and sent south.

Ahead of a set of meetings in Hawaii this weekend, Defense Agency chief Yoshinori Ono said the future of unused or underused facilities would be discussed. But officials on both sides refuse to comment on specifics, saying only that a broad range of proposals are being considered and no final decisions have been made. Wright said whatever changes come out of the talks will not weaken the United States' military readiness in Asia.

He said his objective was to safeguard the credibility and deterrent power of the alliance and bolster "interoperability" with the Japanese.

"Interoperability" -- the focus on joint operations -- underscores a change in the way Tokyo and Washington are viewing their military relationship.

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has been a staunch backer of President Bush and was the driving force in Japan's decision to send several hundred troops to Iraq. He also advocates a more active role for Japan's Self-Defense Forces and supports a revision of the post-World War II constitution, which bans the use of military force to settle international disputes.

Developments in Asia have strengthened his hand: communist North Korea's nuclear ambitions, China's rapid rise as the region's military and economic power, and the withering of Russia's navy in the Pacific.

At the same time, Koizumi is under pressure to lighten the burden borne by Okinawa, which hosts the bulk of the U.S. troops, and any troop reduction would be a political coup for him and offer a chance for Tokyo to use its own military to fill the void.

Still, Tokyo appears undecided on just how far it should go, and for good reason: Because of their country's disastrous pre-1945 experiment with expansionism, many Japanese remain deeply suspicious of any attempts to rebuild the military. Japan's neighbors, who suffered under Japanese colonialism, are also wary of the direction the talks are taking.

"The U.S. will definitely expect Japan to be actively involved in the political and military affairs in the region. This will probably prompt strong reactions from neighboring countries such as China and Korea," said Toshihiro Nakayama, a political analyst with the Japan Institute of International Affairs, a private think tank. "They will perceive this as a new attempt by Japan to rise as a military power in the region."

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US to Conduct Survey in Okinawa: US Leave or Stay??? On 15 Apr the Yomiuri Shimbun reported that the US was going to conduct a survey on Okinawa over whether the US should leave or stay.

U.S. to survey Okinawans over bases

Toshiyuki Ito Yomiuri Shimbun Correspondent

The U.S. government plans to survey Okinawa Prefecture residents on their views toward U.S. bases to help decide on the U.S. military realignment and whether to send home marines based there, it has been learned.

A U.S. research team is expected to visit Okinawa Prefecture early next month, with the aim of reporting the survey results to the U.S. Defense Department and the White House by mid-May.

The outcome may affect the scaling back of U.S. bases in the prefecture, a matter that is currently being discussed by Tokyo and Washington.

The team will be made up of experts from the private sector, including Kurt Campbell, senior vice president and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank.

Campbell served as deputy U.S. assistant defense secretary for Asia and the Pacific when the return of U.S. Futenma Air Station in Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture, to Japan was decided.

Two members from a committee on the realignment of U.S. military bases also will join the team.

The committee is attempting to determine which bases on U.S. soil should be closed to improve the efficiency of defense operations under an inquiry ordered by U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

It plans to complete a draft proposal in May and seek approval from Congress in autumn.

The plan is expected to meet with strong opposition since many regional economies in the United States depend on military bases.

A movement for the bases' retention to accept troops transferred home from abroad has gathered momentum in the United States after U.S. President George W. Bush announced in summer a plan to withdraw between 60,000 to 70,000 U.S. personnel based overseas.

The movement has led to speculation that U.S. troops based in Okinawa Prefecture may be sent home. Washington therefore hopes to decide soon on whether to send U.S. troops in Okinawa Prefecture to a third country or to somewhere in U.S. territory, such as Guam or Hawaii, when considering a reduction of the U.S. military presence in the southernmost Japanese prefecture.

On 25 Apr, the Stars and Stripes reported that "High on the list of things being considered during bilateral talks on realigning U.S. forces in Japan is improving the ability of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to work with their American counterparts, according to U.S. Forces Japan. “Lately we have been discussing how we might improve the level of interoperability between our respective military services on both sides of the alliance, and how we might operate more effectively as a joint and combined force through shared command and control structures,” said Col. Victor Warzinski, USFJ’s director of public affairs."

In response to a Sankei Shimbu report that the two sides were discussing relocating the headquarters component of the III Marine Expeditionary Force from Okinawa to Guam, the USFJ had no comment. According to the report, the move of the Marine unit would be in exchange for accepting the headquarters component of the U.S. Army’s I Corps from Fort Lewis, Wash., to Camp Zama.

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Japan Moves Closer to Constitution Changes -- and Korea Continues with its Tokdo & History Textbook Disputes As we have been preaching for two years, a change in the Peace Constitution may entail massive changes in the structure of the Northeast Asia alliances. In 2004, the US wanted to move "some" administrative functions of the CFC to Camp Zama -- and in July 2005 will move portions of the I Corps to Camp Zama.

The US strategy in Northeast Asia now includes Japan in strategic calculatons to offset North Korea's nuclear threat and China's growing military power. According to an essay by Bruce Klinger in the Nikkei Weekly,

"The US has long advocated a stronger Japanese military role, first as a means to augment Washington's deterrence against the Soviet Union and later to defray US defense costs. Washington now sees Japan as an important bulwark against the looming shadow of the Chinese dragon. Then-Secretary of State Colin Powell told Japanese officials last August that Tokyo would need to revise Article 9 of Japan's pacifist constitution if the country were to attain a permanent UN Security Council seat. Secretary Rice affirmed US support for a Japanese position on the UNSC during her trip.

An increasingly confident Japan has in recent years stepped-up its efforts to attain status as a "normal country" and has evolved the role of its military. Despite domestic controversy, Tokyo reinterpreted its constitution to allow for "out of area missions" and deployed a contingent of troops to Iraq, the first such mission into a combat zone since World War II. Tokyo's recently revised defense policy broke new ground by specifically naming China and North Korea as key threats to Japan's security.

Japan triggered a strong Chinese response when it joined with the US in a joint statement defining a resolution to the Taiwan issue as a "common strategic objective." It was interpreted as the first Japanese foray into security issues beyond its immediate periphery and was lambasted by Beijing as interference in China's internal affairs.

Japan's neighbors are, of course, less sanguine about Tokyo's intentions and warn of resurgent Japanese militarism. Japanese territorial disputes over the Tokdo/Takeshima, Diaoyu/Senkaku, and Kurile Islands have strained Tokyo's relations with South Korea, China, and Russia respectively. Moreover, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and controversies over Japanese textbook depictions of World War II have generated intense nationalist backlash against Tokyo's perceived failure to atone for wartime atrocities. The Chinese leadership interprets the US outreach to Japan as part of an effort to encircle China.

In Japan, there has been a rise in nationalism led by the LDP's Premier Koizumi. The difficulty for Japan is that its growing nationalism - necessary for the boosting of its military potential - infuriates South Koreans and Chinese, who remember Japan's wartime atrocities during World War II. Japan's increase in its military projection capabilities also has contributed to South Korea's sense of concern. Confrontations over the Yasukuni shrine visits and Tokdo, in addition to Japan's military build-up, can be attributed to the country's growing nationalism.

According to the Asahi ShimbunArticle 9 changes were investigated by a Diet panel that was set up as a direct result of the Persian Gulf War of 1991. At that time, Tokyo was pressed by the George H.W. Bush administration to commit troops to the multinational forces. But Tokyo backed off, citing constitutional restraints. While panel members continued to discuss possible constitutional amendments that would allow for the dispatch of Japanese troops overseas, events in other parts of the world conspired to push Japan without waiting to make constitutional amendments.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States prompted Japan to enact the anti-terrorism special measures law and the law concerning the special measures on humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Iraq, which paved the way for SDF personnel to be dispatched overseas in non-combat roles. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said the laws were created as a result of "gaps" in the Constitution. That, ironically, caused the LDP to be less enthusiastic about pushing for revisions.

On the other hand, the main opposition Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan) has called for legal restraints to control the SDF through changes to Article 9. The state of domestic politics is another factor. When Koizumi burst on the scene in April 2001, LDP members itching to make constitutional changes saw their leader's huge popularity as their big chance. Minshuto, which has set its sights on taking power in the next Lower House election, has also become less enthusiastic about constitutional revisions. That explains the lack of momentum on either side for change.

In the past few years, the Japanese have been #4 in military spending (after the US, China and France) though it only accounts for only 1 percent of its GDP. However, this increasing expenditures have ensured that the Japanese have a first-rate military force -- albeit that they are limited to a defense role only. An article in the Asia Times: East Asia's power plays, Erich Marquardt on 7 Apr 2005 stated:

The increasing strength of the Japanese military has also prompted concern in East Asia. Due to its expansionist and militant actions before and during World War II, Japan was barred from rebuilding its military in any significant manner. For instance, Article 9 of the Japanese constitution states that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. However, as the memory of World War II fades further into history, both Japan and its strongest ally, the United States, have come to agree that Article 9 may be impractical and that Japan should become a "normal" country again.

Indeed, Japan's International Peace Cooperation Law, enacted in 1992, permits it to send troops to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. The US intervention in Iraq, for example, is utilizing Japan's Self-Defense Forces. As stated by Lo Fu-chen, who was Taiwan's envoy to Japan from 2000 to 2004, "When I was the representative to Japan, the administration of President George W Bush sent an official to Japan discussing the amendment of Article 9. The war ended 60 years ago and the US wanted Japan to become a normal country."

It appears that Tokyo is slowly working toward this objective by strengthening and increasing the status of the Japanese military. On March 21, Koizumi told a crowd of graduates at the National Defense Academy, "With the great challenges posed by new threats such as terrorism and ballistic missiles, we must improve our defense capabilities to respond efficiently to situations." Tokyo has increased its military budgets, has assisted in peacekeeping operations in locations as distant as Iraq, has agreed to join Washington's missile-defense program, and has publicly recognized that it will work to combat threats to its power.

For instance, in December 2004 Tokyo released a 10-year defense program that openly labels China as a potential threat to Japanese interests. Tokyo has spoken out against the European Union resuming the arms trade with China, has joined the United States in calling the Taiwan Strait a "common strategic concern", has agreed to a missile-defense program that could possibly be used one day to weaken China's military might, and has warned that Japan will use its Coast Guard to take control of the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (the islands were formally claimed by Japan in 1895, but are contested by China, Taiwan and Japan).

In 2004, the US started to lobby hard to make changes to the SDF and the Peace Constitution. It first gained support of major business organizations -- who smelled fresh markets in defense industries that it is prevented from exporting due to the Constitution. The US then courted the public by playing up the North Korean threat -- and after the 1998 missile shot over Japan airspace -- it didn't take much to scare the populace into fearing imminent threats. Thus Japan which previously had supported joint research in the Missile Defense Shield (MDS) committed itself fully to the MDS by 2008. The US added new Aegis destroyers at Yokohama to this build up the MDS shield. The draft of the Peace Constitution will be presented to the Diet in April and hopes are that differences between the various factions will be ironed out by Nov 2005.

For years, the SDF has played games with "definitions" of its armaments as a self-defense army, air force and coastal defense fleet while in reality it was a first-rate military power only limited to Japan because of its Constitution. It launched a massive reorganization to fit its new regional role and was complete in 2004. Its blue-water navy only lacked a carrier to have a Carrier Battle Group and there is active talk of procuring such a ship -- while at the same time calling its destroyers and cruisers special designations to get around the Peace Constitution anti-war mandates. It is investing heavily in its military hardware and is only limited by its Constitution from exerting this military power in its sphere -- something that Korea, Russia and China are opposed to.

On 5 Apr 2005, the Asahi Shimbun reported that the LDP was ready to submit its draft version of the Peace Constitution -- which came out of committee in a rather wishy-washy state due to compromises with the two other parties of the LDP coalition. The article is as follows:

LDP's new Constitution will widen SDF's role

By TETSUSHI KAJIMOTO Staff writer

The Liberal Democratic Party on Monday unveiled a rough outline of its planned constitutional amendment, which says the Self-Defense Forces should be defined as a military tasked with defending Japan and joining international peacekeeping efforts.

The outline was mapped out by 10 subcommittees of an LDP panel for drafting a new Constitution. The panel, headed by former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, will further try to iron out remaining differences within the party and put the finishing touches to the outline by month's end.

The LDP hopes to come up with a text draft of a new Constitution by the time the party celebrates the 50th anniversary of its founding in November.

But the LDP's proposal for partially rewriting the war-renouncing Article 9 is expected to fuel concern that it would end the Constitution's curbs on overseas force deployments.

The LDP will also have to rein in some of its right-leaning members because the party must work with its pacifist junior coalition partner, New Komeito, and the opposition Democratic Party of Japan to achieve a constitutional amendment.

Article 96 stipulates that amendments be initiated by the Diet through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all members in both chambers.

While retaining the principle of pacifism as stipulated by Clause 1 of Article 9, the outline says the Constitution should make it clear that Japan maintains a military for "self-defense" and should "make active efforts" to help keep the peace in international society.

This means Clause 2 of Article 9 might be revised from its current stipulation that "land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained."

The outline released Monday does not call for rewriting Clause 2.

The new Constitution must also stipulate civilian control of the SDF and the prime minister as supreme commander, according to the outline.

Issues to be further discussed include the possible establishment of a military tribunal to maintain discipline within the SDF and specific procedures for the government to declare a state of emergency.

The outline does not clearly say whether Japan should engage in collective defense with its allies. Currently, the government interprets the Constitution as banning this right.

Some members of the subcommittees proposed that the scope of SDF activities, including collective defense, be stipulated in fundamental laws on security and international cooperation that need to be enacted separately. (SITE NOTE: This is the reason the move to Japan was stopped in 2004 because of this interpretation.)

The outline also calls for a sweeping revision to the Constitution's preamble.

The new Constitution should declare that it was created "autonomously," whereas the current Constitution was drawn up when Japan was under U.S. Occupation following its defeat in World War II, the LDP said.

Under the outlines, the preamble would say the Japanese people should "love their country, which regards freedom, democracy, human rights and peace" as its fundamental principles, and should "steadfastly maintain its independence."

Chapter 1 of the new Constitution would define the Emperor as the symbol of the unity of Japan, although some LDP lawmakers advocated defining the Emperor as head of state, according to the outline.

On 15 Apr 2005, Yomiuri Shimbun ran an article that the Panel submitted its final report on the Constitution after five years of study. There were no surprises from the LDP version of the report. The report appears to be a compromise between LDP and its coalition partners.

Panel submits final report on Constitution

The Yomiuri Shimbun

The House of Representatives Research Commission on the Constitution on Friday adopted a final report on its five years of discussions on the Constitution, saying many committee members were in favor of amending the supreme law.

About two-thirds of the members felt the nation should be allowed to exercise the right to collective self-defense, saying either "the right should be acknowledged" or "the right should be acknowledged, but restricted." Taro Nakayama, who chairs the commission, later submitted the report to lower house Speaker Yohei Kono. The 683-page report, approved by the Liberal Democratic Party, New Komeito and Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan), covered 452 hours of discussions that showed many commission members supported amending the Constitution.

The report comprises four chapters dealing with the establishment of the commission, its purpose and management, research and contents, and references.

In the preface, Nakayama wrote: "There has been a dichotomy between what is stipulated in the Constitution and reality," citing Article 9 of the Constitution, which bans possession of military potential, and Article 89, which bans public subsidies to private schools and other institutions not under the control of public authority.

"Public confidence in the Constitution could be forfeited," Nakayama wrote. "From the point of view that the Constitution is for the people, it's a serious problem."

The report noted that the majority of the commission agreed the Constitution's fundamental principles--sovereignty of the people, pacifism and respect for basic human rights--should be maintained. With regard to Article 9, a majority of members agreed:

• -- The first paragraph of the article that states the country renounces war should be maintained.
• -- Use of force should be kept to the bare minimum.
• -- The Constitution needs to clarify the position on the right to exercise self-defense and on the role of the Self-Defense Forces.

But the commission members were split on the subject of exercising the right to collective self-defense, with two-thirds saying it "should be acknowledged" or "should be acknowledged but restricted," and one-third saying it "should not be acknowledged."

Referring to U.N. forces, multinational forces and other collective security activities, the report noted the majority of commission members said the country "should take part in activities without limiting to nonmilitary ones."

Regarding the Imperial system, the majority of members favored maintaining an emperor as the symbol of the state. The members also discussed Imperial succession, with the majority saying a female emperor, or empress regnant, should be allowed to succeed the throne.

The members shared a common view that new human rights should be included in the Constitution and many wanted a clause related to the environment to be included.

The report covered the pros and cons of such issues as granting local suffrage to foreign residents, a clause regarding family, and making some civic duties mandatory--including those related to national defense, environmental protection and voting. The report also examined the question of making it easier to amend the Constitution.

As for future discussions, the majority of commission members agreed on the need to establish a standing committee in each house of the Diet to handle constitutional issues and create a bill to stipulate procedures to revise the Constitution as soon as possible.

However, things may not be so easily accomplished as there appears to be opposition to the changes of the SDF force into a "real military." According to an editorial in the Asahi Shimbun, "As for the the role of the SDF, we cannot support the LDP's call for labeling them a self-defense military. It is a fact that the SDF are among the world's most powerful forces in terms of equipment and capability. People overseas also regard the SDF as a military force. Also, it is a fact that the SDF have taken root as a constitutional entity in the minds of the Japanese people. The public accepted the SDF and holds its members in high esteem because the members are distinct from ordinary military forces in that they are not allowed to use force overseas. It can be argued that the Japanese people accepted the SDF simply because they are self-defensive in nature. And this factor, combined with limitations on their military cooperation with U.S. forces, surely contributed to Japan's stable relations with other Asian nations. Given those facts, it is unlikely the public would support transforming the role of the SDF."

On 17 Apr the Asahi Shimbun wrote the pacifist Article 9 be expanded to clear up ambiguities about the legality of the Self-Defense Forces. The report by the Research Commissionon the Constitution was approved by a mojority vote on 15 Apr and would be voted on by an Upper House panel on 20 Apr ending debate on the issue. The next step is preparing legislation to subject it to a national referendum.

Panel members made clear they were not advocating any change to the first provision of Article 9 that renounces war. Instead, the majority of members apparently wanted additional wording that clearly states the legal status of the Self-Defense Forces and spells out the nation's right to self-defense. The panel's final report says members remain divided on two key issues: whether the Constitution should spell out the nation's right to collective self-defense and whether to include a new stipulation on Japan's participation in international cooperation activities that would involve the dispatch of SDF personnel overseas.

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The China Factor: Japan-China conflict complicates Japan-US-ROK alliance (OPINION) Japan must realistically increase the size of its military even at the risk of further isolating itself in Northeast Asia to offset the ever increasing influence of China in the region. One of the important reasons behind Japan's military build-up involves China's strengthening position in Asia. As Beijing grows in power and modernizes its military, Tokyo understands this will weaken Japan's own position in East Asia. An article in the Asia Times: East Asia's power plays, Erich Marquardt on 8 Apr 2005 stated:

Because of these factors, Japan has found itself politically isolated in East Asia. Its relations with the United States and Australia presently secure its influential position; however, Japan now faces the growth of China, which is rapidly modernizing its economy and military. China's population of 1.3 billion people dwarfs Japan's 128 million. China had a trade volume in 2004 of $1.2 trillion, third in the world behind the United States and Germany. The US Central Intelligence Agency predicted that, according to Beijing's current progression, China's gross domestic production (GDP) will equal Great Britain's in 2005, Germany's in 2009, Japan's in 2017, and the United States' in 2042.

China's size as a country means that if Beijing is able to continue its stable growth as a power, it should supplant Japan's influence in East Asia and force Japan to recognize a debilitating shift in the balance of power. For the United States, it will mean Japan will be forced to accommodate with China, thus diminishing Washington's influence in East Asia and marking a failure for US President George W Bush's current National Security Strategy that argues that in order to contain China, the US "must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge".

Japan's Closer Alliance with US Shifts Power Balance Japan, which is already isolated politically and geographically in Asia, is watching this change in the power balance with concern. Japan has strategically aligned itself with the US -- for better or worse -- and now has started to makes its move to assume its place in the world power structure -- not only as a financial and business power, but as a military power. Japan's attempt to obtain a Permanent Security Council Seat -- justified by its military and changes to its Peace Constitution -- are all being set in motion now. This move has brought out the most negative and irrational fears in its neighbors who worry that the militarization of Japan would again lead to military adventurism.

The situation deals with the basic insecurities of China, Japan and South Korea. The realignment in Northeast Asia is based upon these perceptions of their neighbors and their own interests in reflection upon these perceptions. An article Blame enough to go around in Northeast Asia by Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder stated:

China fears US-led containment; Japan fears abandonment by its ally and isolation within the region if the United States reconsiders who its preeminent partner in Asia is; South Korea worries that the recent strengthening of the US-Japan alliance will leave it once again at the mercy of great powers. Those fears are compounded by increasing friction between Seoul and Washington and uncertainty about the fate of their alliance. US efforts to contain bilateral tensions are essential to preserving multilateral cooperation on threats to regional stability, including the North Korean nuclear issue. The United States has a direct interest in the effective management of Northeast Asian tensions. The US military role as stabilizer in Asia is challenged by the further degradation of relations among the three countries. The US should undertake quiet efforts to contain the island disputes, to ameliorate emerging strategic distrust between Japan and South Korea, and to encourage Japan to settle the issue of historical reconciliation in East Asia.

While Japanese leaders are correct in recognizing that the Japanese military will need to become more powerful in light of changes in the regional balance of power, these leaders also recognize how important it is to retain strategic allies in East Asia, especially South Korea. Unfortunately, South Korea is headed on a divergent path in seeking a military alliance with China in its unrealistic move to become a "balancer" of Northeast Asia . The ROK seems to be intent on destroying the relationship with Japan -- though paying lip service to the economic benefits of a Fair Trade Agreement (FTA).

Anti-Japanese Sentiment Appears to be NOT Spontaneous, but Coordinated But the question needs to be asked: WHY HAS ALL THE ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT SURFACED IN BOTH KOREA AND CHINA AT THE SAME TIME???

We are starting to get an inkling that there is a COORDINATED Chinese-Korean effort to stir the pot on anti-Japan sentiment. If we accept that the ROK government was using the Tokdo and textbook furor for political reasons to boost their popularity in the 30 Apr 2005 by-elections, it might be understandable for a short term objective to win the Apr 30 by-elections, but there appears to long-term objectives in stirring up the pot. According to the Nikkei Weekly, "South Korean officials told the Choson Ilbo that Seoul will not be cornered into an exclusive alliance with Washington and that the current paradigm with South Korea playing one leg of a three-way alliance with the US and Japan was an outdated product of the Cold War. South Korea would, instead, choose sides on an issue-by-issue basis. Roh's remarks will further alienate Washington and reinforce US perceptions that he is working against common objectives to redress security threats." For all intent purposes, Korea looked like it was using this as a wedge to distance itself from the US-Japan alliance -- and in turn, move closer to a China-ROK alliance.

But why the Chinese? What is puzzling is the simultaneous -- and almost COORDINATED attacks on Japan -- when both nations are becoming more and more economically tied to Japan. Korea's misguided short term and long term aims are recognizable, but China's motives are more vague. Some blame the behavior of Japanese companies in short-changing their employees. Some blame the Japanese cultural differences. The majority blame the distorted history that does not recognize the pain that Japan inflicted upon China. Any of these may seem valid reasons for the demonstrations, but the timing is curious.

The outburst of anti-Japan sentiment came at a time when Japan sought to obtain a UN seat and realigned itself with the US over the Chinese anti-cessation law dealing with Taiwan. The LDP announced that the draft for a new Constitution with a revision of Article 9 peace stipulation was in the offing. Japan's SDF had completed its major reorganization in antipication of a regional role. The US and Japan had joined in cementing a partnership with the Missile Defense System (MDS) deploying Aegis destroyers as the first line of defense. Japan's disputed claims over territory Daobao Islands oil rights heated up. In the background was a proposed oil line from Russia that was announced to go to China FIRST, but Japan was bankrolling a majority of the operation. Energy hungry Japan wanted it to come to Japan FIRST. This was because higher oil prices translated to higher manufacturing and living costs -- something that costs Japan dearly.

On the other hand, the Roh administration was in deep trouble with its policies towards the North and the threatened downsizing of the USFK. It's "negligence" in dealing with the nations defenses are being revealed and public opinion was turning against him. His Uri Party had lost its majority in the National Assembly and the critical 30 April by-elections loomed ahead where his party had to win 4 seats to regain its majority. In March, Roh announced his "balancer" positions -- at the same time the anti-Japan protests exploded in earnest over seemingly trivial (on the international scale) items of "distorted history" and "sovereignty" of Tokdo.

Popular dissatisfaction in China exploded with 20 million internet signatures against Japan's UN Security Council seat -- and Korean internet followed suit. This stems from the Japanese history textbook furor that spread to China. Attacks on a Japanese department store in China during demonstrations ensued. On 8 Apr the Japanese Consulate General in Guangzhou in southern China advised Japanese nationals to stay away from areas in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, where more anti-Japan riots could take place and the same warning given in Beijing. The anti-Japanese rallies were spreading throughout China and the Japanese formally complained that the Chinese government inaction was the cause of the spreading violence against Japanese. In particular, April 9 saw an anti-Japanese demonstration and march with over 10,000 participants in Zhong'guan Village in Beijing. Demonstrators broke the glass of Japanese restaurants along the route to the Japanese Embassy, burnt Japanese flags and damaged Japanese cars. There were over a thousand police monitoring and controlling the parade the entire time. Residents in Beijing said that this was the biggest demonstration since the June 4th Massacre of 1989.

Japan's Foreign Minister demanded an apology for the destruction of Japanese property. In response on 12 Apr, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said that Japan must "face up to history squarely" on its actions during World War II and the period leading up to it, and how it tells that history in its own schoolbooks. On 16 Apr China's foreign minister, Li Zhaoxing, hosted his Japanese counterpart, Nobutaka Machimura, on a one-day visit. But he firmly rejected Japanese calls for China to apologize and pay compensation for damage to diplomatic and commercial property during three weekends of anti-Japan protests.

Some elements state that for China it is to draw attention away from the problems the Chinese Communist Party is now experiencing. But we think it is part of a larger ploy to establish China as the leader in Northeast Asia. The Chinese have issued vague remarks to support Roh's idea of "self-reliant defense" and its role as a "balancer" in Northeast Asia affairs, but always with caveats that the support is tied to "peace and prosperity" of Northeast Asia. Though Roh has some misguided notion that he is operating from a position of power, China knows that the ROK is simply "a shrimp amongst whales."

China is emerging as an economic power slated to overtake Japan in growth in a decade and as such, China is upgrading its military to fit this role. Korea on the other hand, mistakenly thinks it can operate as an equal in this mix -- but the old adage again comes to mind: "a shrimp swimming amongst whales." However, Korea's military is based on its US alliance and without the US, its military is a second-rate military missing a missile defense, satellite intelligence capability, and a blue water navy that its stronger neighbors possess. Thus we can imagine that it would be to China's advantage to "lead Korea on" in promising it a dinner seat with the "whales" -- when in effect it is a "shrimp" ready to be served as an appetizer.

It almost appears that China is offering Korea a "suzerainty" position -- the arrangement that the ROK so vehemently denies in its historical relationship with China. However, Chinese history views the ancient kingdoms of Korea as vassal states -- kings subserviant to the emporer -- and owing allegiance to the emporer. (NOTE: There is historical evidence that this was so, but this fact hurts the Korean national pride.) Perhaps, the Chinese are attempting to establish a modern version of suzerainty -- the concept being a new buffer state would be created in the form of a unified North-South Korea. The current moves of China to open a new era with India in 2005 after decades of bitter border disputes seems to be moving in this direction. Following its centuries old model, China appears to be building buffer zones around itself -- but in the modern version, foreign nations act as the filters to new ideas.

ROK Anti-Japan Campaign Part of Northeast Asia Realignment Drive Currently there is a realignment of power in the Northeast as China and Russia draw closer militarily and attempts to lure Korea into its sphere. The Russian-China border dispute was resolved a decade ago before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Now Russia is moving This would isolate Japan and the US with Taiwan in its sphere.

On 1 Mar 2005, the Joongang Ilbo reported that marking the 86th anniversary of the March 1 Independence Movement, President Roh Moo-hyun demanded that the Japanese government offer a formal apology and further compensation to its Korean victims. No ROK president has made such a demand since Japan paid compensation when the two countries restored diplomatic relations in 1965. "Korea and Japan have a common destiny to open the future of Northeast Asia," Mr. Roh said at the Yu Gwan-sun Memorial Hall in Seoul. "What is needed are the sincere efforts of the Japanese government and people. They will have to find out the truth of the past and make apologies and compensation, if necessary." "Japan must make the truth of the past known and offer sincere apologies and, if necessary, pay compensation. Only then can we be reconciled," said Mr Roh. "Japan should take a more positive attitude with a belief that before it is a legal issue, this is an issue of universal ethics in a human society and a matter of trust between neighbours," he said, indicating that Tokyo should follow the example of Germany.

Soon the Korean people were worked up into an irrational frenzy where Tokdo became a symbol of Korean sovereignty -- even though it never had been threatened -- and the claims of "distorted history" even though the ROK and Japanese scholars were at the time working on a joint history approved by both governments. The committee was disbanded by Roh in April 2005 AFTER he had started the ruckus.

• Suspicion that Tokdo simply a Political Ploy. The topic of Tokdo was NOT surfaced by the Japanese GOVERNMENT as making a move to assert its claim to the islets -- and all the ROK President had to do was ignore the Shimane Province council bill claiming Tokdo/Takeshima as Japanese. A province does NOT dictate national policy...and Roh knew this full well. The was no way the Japanese could take the dispute to the International Court of Justice without the Korean consent. Tokdo was a non-issue. The Japanese government wanted to simply turn a blind eye to the Shimane Province action -- but Roh blew it out of proportion to make himself and the Uri Party appear to be ultra-nationalists willing to fight to the death protecting Tokdo from the Japanese. Even former President Kim Dae-jung stated that the Tokdo issue was blown out of proportion. Kim said if too much noise is made about it, it will only play into the hands of Japanese attempts to turn the rocks into disputed territory. Because of the Roh's stance to make it a media event, the Japanese was FORCED to state in their diplomatic Blue Paper for 2005 that Takeshima/Tokdo was Japanese territory, but disputed. The Tokdo issue is simply a political ploy that politicians yank out when they want to appear patriotic -- as Roh was doing at this time. As the Mayor of Tokyo stated, it was a "third-rate politician's trick" to increase his flagging approval ratings.
  
  
• Suspicion that Distorted History a Political Ploy. The other topic of history text books is a non-issue as well. The textbooks was fermented by the ROK over a text book that had NOT EVEN BEEN APPROVED YET by the Ministry of Education. Despite the claims that it was a right-wing text, the book in question had been accepted by UNDER .01 percent of the schools. It was a miniscule number. Even though there was a joint Japan-ROK committee studying the history, Roh chose to ignore it -- and finally disband it. Whether the text was biased or not, it was NOT an issue...but Roh made it into one with his claims of distorted history. The Chinese just jumped on the bandwagon. Because of the frontal attacks by both Korea and China, Japan could do nothing but defend the procedure for selection without defending the content. The truth is that the Chinese and Korean man-on-the-street who was protesting so vehemently never read the text -- and only accepted the word of the "scholars" of the wording. This whole fiasco smacked of being contrived. Again it appeared to be to help Roh politically in his domestic battles as the Uri Party lost its majority in the National Assembly and his ratings were falling with scandal after scandal amongst his ministers.
  
  There have been some analysts who favor the approach of the European Union where they sat down to hassle out a "common history" before the formation of the European Union. For ten years, they did so, but in the end they only "agreed on history that they agreed upon." In other words, much of modern history could be agreed upon, but the deep-rooted nationalistic items (i.e., 100 Years War and who was the victor of certain battles) were left unresolved. Each nation still publishes their own historical viewpoints in their literature -- downplaying what is negative to their national self-image, but highlighting what is positive to their national image. The basic fact is children MUST be raised to be proud of their respective countries...and it should not be a matter of concern for the other nation.
  
  THIS IS THE FORMULA THAT THE PARTICIPANTS NEED TO AGREE UPON DEALING WITH HISTORY. Agree on what you can agree on ... and let the rest be history without one country trying to tell the other what the outcomes of ancient battles REALLY were. Japan has proposed the same solution to the Chinese with some positive reaction and perhaps more can be done in this area. Unfortunately, the historical committee between Japan and the ROK formed in 1998 under Kim Dae-jung was dissolved by Roh. Roh is going backwards. Roh seems to believe that the Japanese "distorted history" textbooks will raise a generation of militant fanatics -- but he hasn't really looked at the "distorted history" (from other nations perspective) that is taught in the Korean textbooks.
  
  
• Suspicions that Activist NGO Groups Inciting Unrest The Korean NGO activist groups are at the forefront to constantly keep the view of Japanese atrocities in the limelight. The anti-Japanese furor runs the gamut of topics from the Tok-do Island territorial issue; to territorial fishing boundaries: to Comfort Women of WWII; to confiscation of wages in WWII; to the controversy of the "Sea of Japan" versus "East Sea"; to the changing of "Korea" to "Corea" because the Japanese supposedly named it with a "K" (which is historically invalid and ludicrous). The intensity can get very heated. In the mid-1990s, the anti-Japanese hysteria peaked and resulted in the destruction of the National Museum in Seoul along with whole areas throughout Korea because of the Japanese construction. At its height, there were claims that Japanese had sunk iron rods into the ground to disrupt the energy flow of geomancy -- and some other very dubious claims. Pick a topic and it will turn anti-Japanese.
  
  From comfort girls (women forced into Japanese army brothels) to the protest for the return of chopped off noses from the Japanese Invasion in 1598, there is constantly news in the papers to keep the hatred of the Japanese alive. The "historical" melodramas on TV also perpetuate this hatred against the Japanese from the invasions in 1598 to the colonial period. Anti-Japanese sentiment runs deep in Korea. Japanese hatred is taught in schools based on the historical abuses of Japan dating back to Japan's 1598 invasion continuing through constant Japanese pirate raids up to the 1700s and through the traumatic experiences of the colonial period. The destruction of all things Japanese reached its high point in 1995 when the Seoul National Museum was torn down because the building once was the seat Japanese power in Korea -- regardless that it was a classic example of architecture of the period. Former Japanese-residential areas were targeted for reconstruction throughout the nation. However, on an emotional level, the WWII comfort women issues still is alive and become a heated topic. This irrational emotionalism caused the cancellation of the Emporer's and Japanese Prime Minister's visit to Korea during the World Cup 2002.
  
  Knowing full-well that the Japanese courts will reject all claims because they were supposedly settled by the Normalization Treaty of 1963, the NGO group financed claims have been made repeatedly by people seeking their savings claims, suffering allegations, etc. against colonial Japan. A Korea Herald editorial on 2 June 2003 stated, "Japan has persistently refused to compensate its Asian victims for its crimes before and during World War II. The question of its extremely slow moral atonement aside, Tokyo has cited the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the 1965 agreement with Seoul for normalization of relations, as well as domestic statutes, as the legal bases for its position. Both international accords are clearly flawed, however, because they failed to reflect the voices of the victims of imperial Japan's brutal aggression and exploitation of its neighbors." In June 2003 a Superior court overturned a 2001 Kyoto District Court's ruling to compensate the loss of family members being repatriated after WWII when a ship carrying the members was sunk between Japan and Korea. A family member stated that he would "never forgive the Japanese and would pass this hatred on to his progeny through the millenia." Two earlier rulings in favor of Korean compensation - the first in 1998 for a group of South Korean "comfort women" - were turned down by higher courts.
  
  Then the Roh administration started in on the witch hunt to find Japanese collaborators which soon had every student unions drawing up their own lists of teachers or intelligensia who had supported the Japanese. (See Kimsoft: List of 708 traitors.) Roh launched a personal attack on Park Chung-hee claiming his Japanese collaborator as a lieutenant in the Japanese Army. Understandably, the GNP chairman, Park's daughter, did not take this lying down. Roh was asked to clarify his "ideology" as it affected the nations plans. Roh has repeatedly expressed his views of supporting the investigation of history in search of Japanese collaborators. More and more people were starting to question his intentions in pursuing this tact. In March 2005, the Students' Union at Korea University said that it would disclose a list of former and current professors at the school who ostensibly took sides with Japan on 28 March. It is an open secret that a number of elderly professors at the country's universities and other academic figures supported Japan's colonization of the peninsula and benefited from it. The witch-hunt is starting to become the Salem Witch trials.

But in fermenting the hate campaign amongst the Koreans, Roh was effectively driving a wedge between the ROK-Japan relations as he elevated the dispute to a diplomatic level -- something that should NEVER have been done. This in turn would break the US-ROK and US-Japan tri-party agreement on the unified action against North Korea. This would also allow him to seek the role of "balancer" between China and Japan. Unfortunately, it is a pipe-dream that can never come true. All Roh is doing is alienating the US and Japan -- and disregarding the warnings of the anti-Korea grass-roots movements growing in the US -- though none has appeared so far in Japan.

However, the anti-China movement in Japan has surfaced -- and given more time, the anti-Korea element in Japan will surface too. When the pressure on the "distorted history" from the Chinese peaked in mid-April, Roh backed off on his attacks on Japan -- though smiting at Japan by backing the German seat on the UNSC, while rejecting Japan's bid. Then in Turkey he made his famous "more American than American" statement about pro-US supporters. The furor died down after a man immolated himself in protest against the Japanese. The furor that Roh had incited started giving Korea an almost fanatical reputation with people cutting their fingers off -- including the attempt in Shimane -- and then radical bare-shirted radicals carrying around pictures of Koizumi in death ribbons. Suddenly Roh stayed silent on the issue. When China seemed to be backing off its anti-Japan stance on 21 Apr, Roh did not issue any comments. Suddenly the man who was going to defend Tokdo to the death was silent.

China's Anti-Japan Campaign Part of Northeast Asia Realignment Drive China's leaders ignited a frenzy of anti-Japanese activism by permitting an online petition drive, a nationwide boycott movement, and then street demonstrations. The furor in China in April may have its roots in creating a new regional power structure -- with China intending to increase its influence in the region -- as it expands peaceful relations with China, Pakistan and other neighbors. The furor in Korea may be to aid the ROK in moving its alliances closer to China while weaning itself away from the US. (NOTE: To do so at this time is suicide, but Roh seems intent on pursuing this course as of April 2005.) There are allegations that the recent anti-Japan protests in China may have been staged. The following information was extracted from The Epoch Times on 18 Apr 2005:

• Suspicions that parade approved by Chinese Government as a special case. It was reported that the permit application for the Zhongguan Village anti-Japanese parade was submitted on April 9, the date of the parade, and was approved at the scene by the police. Historically, however, permits for others kinds of demonstrations have been difficult to get and have frequently landed the applicant in jail. In fact, most requests to stage a demonstration is simply rejected. In 2004, Beijing resident, Ye Guozhu, was arrested for applying several times to the Beijing government for a parade permit for 10,000 people; he was sentenced during 2005 to four years in prison. Ye Guozhu once complained to the Police Bureau that “you never actually approved any parade permit application submitted by citizens,” to which the police answered, “It is good that you understand this.”
  
  
• Suspicions that the demonstrations in China were staged. An eyewitness at the scene in Zhong'guan Village told an The Epoch Times reporter that many demonstrators were simply "hanging out" and that the demonstration seemed "half-hearted," with only a few people in the front row shouting slogans. A Voice of America (VOA) reporter, Celia Hatton, stated, "Political protests are rare in China. Even so, unarmed police watched Saturday's crowds passively. Some students said their universities and schools had encouraged them to attend." Some Chinese citizens were doubting the "validity" of the parade and thought it was staged by the CCP. Information on the Internet indicated that an anti-Japanese demonstration taking place in Shenzhen earlier was composed of mostly plain-clothes police.
  
  On 23 Apr, the Japan Today reported that Chinese university students targeted by Chinese authorities as anti-Japan protesters said that because they do not dislike Japan enough to sustain demonstrations, and because they do not want to break Chinese laws, they plan to obey the Public Security Bureau's reminder Thursday to avoid any Japan-related demonstrations not approved by local police. It seemed to be a very curious statement after the demonstrations.
  
  
• Suspicions over Chinese Govt has never reported on public demonstrations UNTIL NOW. Japan Sankei News concluded that Xinhua News has never reported demonstrations by citizens before and that its report on the anti-Japanese parade indicated that the Chinese government and the CCP allowed not only the reporting of the parade, but also the parade itself. Japanese media reported the anti-Japanese parade in Zhongguancun, emphasizing that Xinhua News did not report through Chinese media inside China any of the anti-Japanese parades that have occurred recently. The only reports have been in English to overseas media about the anti-Japanese parade in Beijing.
  
  On 23 Apr the Asahi Shimbun reported the Public Security Ministry released a statement for the FIRST TIME to inform Chinese residents about the violent protests against the Japanese Embassy, consulates-general and companies. The ministry described the violent part of the anti-Japanese protests as ``illegal acts carried out by a small number of individuals who have been unable to find work and who have damaged the image of our nation by upsetting social order and destroying public and private property.'' But the ministry also said the protests were caused by ``the wrong attitude taken by Japan toward history and other issues that injured the feelings of the Chinese people.'' The ministry banned the transmitting of information on protests through the Internet or mobile phone e-mail messages. This effectively pulls the plug on future anti-Japan protests -- for now.
  
  
• Suspicions that CCP using this anti-Japan demonstrations to tie Japan and Taiwan together in "Shared Common Hatred." According to a Central News Agency report on April 3, the political commentator Lin Baohua (Ling Feng) indicates that the CCP's actions in using this time to motivate an anti-Japanese mood is in fact to serve its own needs. It revolves around the issue with Taiwan, with a perceived need to tie Japan and Taiwan together in order to stimulate a "shared common hatred" psychology, with the intention of gaining more support from the public regarding the Anti-Secession Law. Up until Japan joined the US in stating Taiwan's strategic value to the US and Japan, Japan was not involved because of its Peace Constitution. However, the Peace Constitution's Article 9 may be revised in the near future and the CCP needs to state for the record that it opposes the Japan stance on its anti-secession law.
• Suspicions that Activist Groups Inciting Unrest On 20 Apr the Tokyo high court upheld a 1999 decision by a lower court. The court in Tokyo yesterday rejected compensation claims by the victims of Japanese military atrocities committed in China in the 1930s and 40s. The plaintiffs in yesterday's case included the relatives of people allegedly used as human guinea pigs by the Japanese imperial army's Unit 731 germ warfare unit, and others who suffered when Tokyo's soldiers killed and raped tens - possibly hundreds - of thousands of civilians in Nanking in 1937. In upholding a 1999 decision by a lower court, the Tokyo high court said international law did not allow foreign citizens to seek compensation from the Japanese government for wartime acts. Japan says any compensation claims were settled under peace treaties with individual states, including China. (NOTE: This is the same action that Korean activist groups have met with when they attempted to sue the Japanese government for everything from comfort girls to the victims of a sinking ship after the war was over.)

Though the situation of anti-Japanese discontent over history seems to be spontaneous, it certainly does not seem so when viewed at close range. In fact, the whole anti-Japan scenario seems contrived to provide a situation that the regional alliances are shifted. In order for Roh to make such a radical switch to China as its ally, Roh had to have popular support. The Cheong Wa Dae initiated a survey that showed that 70 percent of the respondents supported his "self-reliant defense" -- interpreted by the Roh administration that they would support breaking away from the US. This is a dangerous game indeed -- one that could destroy the country economically. For China's part, it has nothing to lose and everything to gain by driving a wedge between the US and ROK. If the ROK-US alliance could be shattered, it would gain a unified North-South Korea as a buffer zone -- and it would cement the ROK as its economic partner. Economic advantages favor China with an over-abundance of labor and need for technology. Its move to upgrade its military within the next decade makes it a rival with the US for a "superpower" slot...or at least a powerhouse of Asia.

Though the ROK has hardened its stance on the history and Tokdo issues, by mid-April China seemed to be backing off its tough stance -- apologizing for the attacks on a Japanese store during recent protests, but at the same time criticizing Japan for its "distorted history." The tensions between China continued to escalate as the government attempted to control the anti-Japanese protestors, but violence against Japanese citizens and businesses continued. The Japanese Embassy issued warnings to Japanese citizens. The friction escalated even further as the Japanese Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry started procedures on 13 Apr to grant Japanese companies exploratory rights for natural gas fields on the Japanese side of the median line the nation established in an exclusive economic zone in the East China Sea -- that both China and Japan claim. From 8 p.m. 13 Apr, calls for launching cyber attacks on Japanese ministries and agencies were made on some Chinese Web sites advocating anti-Japan campaigns. Cyber attacks blocked the sites from 9am-3pm. Police in China have warned people not to attend unauthorised anti-Japanese rallies on 16-17 Apr amid a mounting dispute over history and oil fields. The large-scale anti-Japan demonstrations in various cities have been greater than any since the two nations normalized diplomatic ties in 1972. The Japanese Ambassador to China protested demanding an apology on 16 April.

China and Japan held talks between their foreign ministers in Beijing on April 17. The talks between Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura and his Chinese counterpart Li Zhaoxing covered such contentious issues as Japan's adoption of a controversial history textbook, a dispute group of islands controlled by Japan but also claimed by China, and a dispute over China's gas project in the East China Sea. In the 17 Apr meeting, Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura and Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing remained divided over the recent anti-Japan demonstrations, with Li refusing to offer an apology and compensation for damage demanded by Machimura. However, there were indications that both sides were attempting to reduce the tensions diplomatically. However, it seemed more for show.

But the real danger is that once the genie is out of the bottle, it is hard to put it back in. Though China may be gaining economically, the anti-Japan protest pose a danger of getting out of hand and the focus shifting from Japan to the Chinese government itself. The anti-Japan protests have now continued longer than any major public demonstrations in China since the democracy uprising of 1989, which led to a bloody crackdown. The authorities have deployed thousands of police officers and paramilitary troops in Beijing and other cities, but they have not intervened to prevent protests from becoming violent. It is unclear how long authorities will allow protests to continue. A huge show of force around Beijing on 17 Apr - dozens of army transport vehicles and police buses surrounded Tiananmen Square and the main embassy district - prevented large-scale demonstrations in the capital during Mr. Machimura's visit on 16 Apr, suggesting the Chinese government might be starting to tighten the reins.

On 20 April, the CCP called mass meetings with large numbers of officials to state officially that citizens should stay away from the protests -- though no mention of a government crackdown was stated. On 21 April 2005, the New York Times reported that a day after the PRC ordered an end to anti-Japanese protests, Japanese officials softened their tone toward it and urged its leaders to meet with Japanese leaders later this week. With signs that both sides were groping for ways to defuse the diplomatic crisis, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi responded favorably to calls by the PRC foreign minister, Li Zhaoxing, to protesters to stop the sometimes violent marches and attacks on Japanese government offices and businesses in PRC. "You can see well that there is a tone that says it is necessary to lead it toward an improvement, and I think we share that view," Mr. Koizumi told reporters.

On 22 Apr, Koizumi again issued a "heart-felt" apology with "deep remorse" for Japan's past at a world summit of Asian-African leaders, but it was on the same day that 80 Japanese legislators and 1 cabinet member made a much publicized visit to the Yasukuni Shrine for the Spring Festival enmasse to make the point that Japan did not shun its past. Then on 23 Apr Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Chinese President Hu Jintao met in Jakarta to hopefully smooth things over as it appears China accepted the apology. Hu made five proposals for improving relations with Japan. (1) that Japan reflect on history; (2) Japan should not support independence for Taiwan; (3) the two countries should solve problems through dialogue; (4) the two countries should expand exchanges; and (5) the two countries should adhere to three particular documents including a 1998 bilateral declaration. Hu urged Japan to back up its apologies with action and not to hurt the feelings of Chinese people. Koizumi and Hu also agreed to work to improve bilateral ties, including anti-Japan protests in China. Koizumi said the two leaders "were able to share the importance of bilateral relations, without being affected by some sectors with anti-Japan or anti-China feelings." Koizumi said that he called on Hu to "take appropriate measures" to protect Japanese diplomatic missions, business and citizens in China.

As for Korea, South Korea's Prime Minister Lee said on 22 Apr that a nation attempting to distort the history of the past should show "sincere remorse" over its wartime atrocities. "Remorse over the past must be genuine and must be put into action," Lee said in his speech to the Asia-Africa summit. "A country that distorts history by glossing over the colonial past and hiding their misdeeds, thus concealing them from the younger generations, will not be able to free itself from the shackles of the past," Lee said. The saga goes on for Korea.

Japanese Backlash Anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan has started to spread rapidly. Japanese rightists, who have been quiet recently, have started criticizing China on megaphones while driving through downtown Tokyo. A Chinese school in Yokohama, which has been receiving threatening mail telling them to leave Japan, opens its main gate only three times a day at the beginning and end of school. In addition to the delivery of an intimidation letter with a razor in it to the Chinese Consulate General in Osaka on 16 April, a Japanese man threw a glass bottle at the Consulate General and made an attempt to burn himself to death. On 15 April, the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo received a letter containing white powder, the ambassador residence's mailbox and doorplate were damaged, and its wall was spray painted with graffiti in red paint as well. On 19 April a fire bomb was hurled at a China Bank in Yokohama. As of 20 April the National Public Safety Commission said there had been 25 acts of vandalism and harassment against Chinese interests in Japan, including diplomatic missions and schools since April 9. Chinese diplomatic establishments were targeted in 14 cases, including a bomb threat made against a consulate, while 11 were against other Chinese-related establishments. In the Mainichi public survey, 34 percent of the public cited "Chinese domestic problems" as a reason for the anti-Japanese protests, which shows that people believe China's social clashes between the classes have developed into anti-Japanese protests. A small anti-China demonstration by 200 activists in Tokyo's Shinjuku district on 23 Apr walked down streets waving Japanese flags, chanting, "We demand the Chinese government apologize" and "Stop anti-Japan education."

On 24 Apr, Kyodo News survey found that twelve of 74 senior high schools in Japan that were planning class trips to China have canceled or postponed them due to safety concerns amid the anti-Japan demonstrations taking place in the country. Fifty-eight of the remaining 62 schools intend to consider canceling or postponing their plans in the event the situation in China deteriorates.

On 24 Apr, Foreign Minister Maniuchi reacted to China's snub that Japan should reflect on its history and refusal to apologize with the ultimate in "what is good for the goose is good for the gander" campaign. He stated that China had "invited" a relook at history and therefore, Japan was going to relook at Korean and Chinese textbooks to review them for "historical inaccuracies." The Japanese response in informal surveys in the media showed public support for this tact. China's text books have been criticized in the international media for such things as glossing over the millions that died of starvation during Mao Tse-tung's "Great Leap Forward" and the purges under Mao's tutelage. Korea's textbooks have likewise been criticized for the same "errors." (NOTE: Our opinion is that these nations should follow the European Union model. In forming the union, they sought to find a common history. After ten years, they decided to agree on what they agreed on and not mention the rest. National pride and identities ran too deep to solve the problems of who won the wars hundreds of years ago...that were in actuality nothing more than brutal standoffs. The China-Japan-Korea historians should do the same -- and let each country teach its own children as it sees fit. What is dangerous is when the adults play with history -- as Hitler did.)

On 19 Apr a Chinese think-tank issued a report that said China should scrap the principle of "separation of politics and economy" in its relations with Japan. The principle marginalizes moderate forces in Japan that uphold improvements in bilateral relations by reducing their say and influence, while strengthening right-leaning conservatives and the large corporations that support them." The reports pointed out, "While continuing abrupt remarks and behavior such as distorting history textbooks, claiming territorial rights over Diaoyu Island, intervening in the Taiwan issue and expanding its military forces, Japanese rightists say that Japan will not suffer any economic damage thanks to China's principle of separation of politics and economy." Our way of thinking is that it again is suicide because the Chinese need the Japanese technology and would shoot itself in the foot if it followed the recommendations of this report. Diplomacy and economics are recognized as separate processes by China, Japan and Korea. In all countries, despite the on-going disputes, the Finance Ministers and business leaders have all encouraged economic ties between the nations.

Analysts in other countries feel each government should take steps to change the public focus from one that emphasizes national identity at the expense of external "enemies." For example, the countries should focus on "joint development ventures" in disputed territories or promoting the joint examination of history texts. On 21 Apr, the Japanese government agreed to talks proposed by China on the joint development of natural gas fields in the East China Sea -- which the Chinese proposed in June 2004. Japan stated it would accept the proposal on the condition that the waters subject to the joint development cover the entire East China Sea. The government has hitherto put a higher priority on Beijing ending its unilateral development of the natural gas fields, but the Chinese continued, leaving the issue deadlocked.

Thus far the Japanese anti-Korean campaign has not happened, but it may erupt unexpectedly. The Korean media make a big show of the Japanese media flocking to the sets of Korean melodramas to photograph the stars riding the crest of the "Korean Wave" in Japan. Tourism with Japan remains up, while just the opposite has occurred in Japan's tourist industry which showed drops of 45 percent from Korea.

An article, Blame enough to go around in Northeast Asia, by Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder of the Pacific Forum CSIS appeared in the Asia Times on 23 Apr 2005. It agrees with some of the points we made above in that the political leaders are exploiting the situation for their political needs -- though we interpret the facts slightly differently in that the authors view that Japan, South Korea and China "have been playing to domestic constituencies and ignoring international implications." However, our view is that the countries were NOT "ignoring the international implications." Rather, they were "playing to domestic constituencies" as a ploy to set up a realignment of the alliances in Northeast Asia.

Dig deeper and it quickly becomes evident that these incidents have triggered deep-rooted emotions. The leadership in each of the three countries is exploiting these situations for short-term political gain rather than demonstrating the leadership they all acknowledge is needed - and demand from their partners. All three are quick to point fingers, but have been reluctant to look in the mirror."

Japan has apologized for the past - by one count 17 times - but each statement has been qualified or subsequently undermined by comments or actions of other officials. Tokyo persists in creating artificial distinctions among issues, arguing most recently that the decision to proceed with drilling in the East China Sea is somehow distinct from its problems with China. The current leadership pleads powerlessness when challenged by foreign critics: the textbook issue is really a domestic issue related to freedom of speech, the territorial claim is merely a prefectural government act, visits to Yasukuni are domestic politics. All are true, but it is disingenuous to ignore the larger context.

In Beijing, the government continues to demand Japanese concessions without providing any of its own. It has been quick to point out Japanese misbehavior, although similar problems exist at home: its textbooks have also been sanitized, it "whitewashes" history, and it has taken unilateral and provocative actions, too: natural resource exploration in the East China Sea, surveying the sea bed, sending research vessels and submarines into disputed waters; it has facilitated demonstrations within China and failed to stop them when they become violent. Chinese counter that the protests are spontaneous, but they come from deep-rooted emotions that have been nurtured by patriotic education and ignorance about Japanese behavior over the past 60 years.

South Korean President Roh Moh-hyun reversed the position of his predecessor and played to the crowd, launching a "diplomatic war" against Japanese claims to the islands. In an open letter to the South Korean people titled "With Regard to Recent Korea-Japan Relations", Roh concluded, "These moves nullify all the past reflection and apologies made by Japan." Roh’s domestic political agenda has been cast as a fight with former ruling elites over collaboration with the prewar Japanese imperial government in South Korea. His sudden, over-the-top escalation of rhetoric on Tokdo/Takeshima only makes sense in this context.

In each case, the government has played to domestic constituencies and ignored the international implications of its actions. The Koizumi government is appeasing the right, President Roh is playing to the progressive left, and Beijing is venting the frustrations of the masses.

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China Military Buildup Prelude to Regional Realignment? Pentagon officials say China is focusing its growing defense spending on weapons systems that could exploit perceived American military weaknesses in case United States ever needs to respond to fighting in Taiwan. The hawks say China has purchased or built enough amphibious assault ships, submarines, fighter jets and short-range missiles to pose immediate threat to Taiwan and to any American force that might come to Taiwan's aid. Some American military analysts believe China could now defeat Taiwan before American forces could arrive at scene. However, even the most hawkish officials at the Pentagon do not believe China is preparing for imminent invasion of Taiwan, but it is quietly challenging America's reach in western Pacific by concentrating strategically on conventional forces.

The following is from Taipei Times on 18 Apr 2005.

If the resentment is now back on the streets, it is because China's rise is shifting the geopolitical tectonic plates, offering a direct challenge to Japan's economic dominance of east Asia and to the strategic dominance the US has enjoyed, with its major ally Japan, since 1945. In the East China Sea, China and Japan have been facing each other off over fossil fuel reserves in 36,000km2 square miles of disputed waters. China has been drilling for gas in an area that Japan claims, and this week Japan announced to Chinese protests that it would license oil and gas drilling in the same waters.

Then there is the military dimension: the rapid modernisation of China's armed forces means that the long-standing judgment that China could not mount a successful invasion of Taiwan is no longer a reliable guide to the future. The US is bound by an agreement to defend Taiwan and could once rely on the moral support of the region. But as the US loses influence, Japan is increasingly exposed as its most reliable military ally -- one that the US is encouraging to develop a more robust military profile.

In the longer game of influence, China is gaining ground. While the Bush administration has been preoccupied with Iraq, China has been steadily expanding its clout in Asia. In Australia, South Korea and Thailand it is the dominant economic and strategic partner, and is securing its own trading relationships by building networks in which it will be central - the Boao Forum, for instance, is the Chinese answer to Davos but the invitees are overwhelmingly Asian.

Beijing is the moving spirit behind the first east Asian summit, scheduled for Kuala Lumpur later this year. The US is not included.

It is an influence that China will certainly use in the future. The proposition, for instance, that Japan be given a permanent seat on the UN security council has been greeted with thinly disguised scorn by China.

But there is a paradox in this jostling for position. If China, Japan and the US are competing for predominance, it is also true that each is dependent on the others to a degree unprecedented in history.

Last year, Japan overtook the US as China's biggest trade partner. China needs the huge volumes of machinery and technology that are imported from Japan to feed industrial expansion. Japan needs the high levels of trade with China to keep its economy out of recession.

China needs the US markets to feed its export-led boom, and the US is dependent on Beijing continuing to buy and hold Washington's achilles heel -- its internal weakness. Nationalism is the last shred of Maoist ideology for a ruling party that has abandoned its socialist roots. Since the party allows no political challenge, nationalism is also the only safe political outlet for new generations. To divert the political frustration of young Chinese on to Japan may seem like a safety valve for a ruling group nervous of the growing political frustrations of its population.

But it is a dangerous strategy, as subsequent events demonstrated. Rage lies just below the surface in China -- a rage that breaks out in daily unreported incidents as disaffected citizens forcibly complain about their lot. The example of one government- sanctioned demonstration inspires others to try their luck. Before you know it, other resentments have exploded and the cities are restless. China can shut off the diplomatic provocation to Japan at will. Far more difficult is to shut off popular discontent.

According to the US, Beijing expects to reach the world's top level within the next 10 to 15 years. When it was pointed out by the media that the US stated that the Chinese military was 20 years behind the US and its allies -- a contradictory statement -- the Pentagon then claimed that China was five years ahead of schedule.

According to NewsMax.com Wires on 18 Feb 2005,

"China has invested heavily in its own defense in the past few years. Prohibited from buying U.S. and European arms under an embargo, Beijing purchased at least $13 billion worth of weapons from Russia between 1993 and 2003, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. China's arsenals now are stocked with Russian-made submarines, destroyers, supersonic fighters and anti-ship missiles, as well as weapons it increasingly is making on its own." "Behind this military progress has been the rapid growth of the Chinese economy that pays for the military power. China's defense budget is estimated to have ballooned to $80 billion, the world's third largest after the United States and Russia, and almost double that of Japan, which has Asia's second largest defense budget.

"The Chinese, who had insisted on self-sufficiency, have bought weapons and technology from abroad, notably from Russia. China could afford those purchases because Beijing's foreign exchange reserves, the world's largest, rose to $610 billion by the end of 2004, more than 10 times their holdings of $53 billion 10 years ago. … "China's missile force, called the Second Artillery, had been deploying 50 to 75 short-range missiles a year; that has increased to more than 100 and in 2006 Second Artillery will have 800 aimed at Taiwan. Accuracy has been doubled so that most missiles would hit within 60 to 90 feet of their targets.

"China's military has launched the first of a new class of ballistic missile submarines in what defense officials view as a major step forward in Beijing's strategic weapons program. "The new 094-class submarine was launched in late July and when fully operational in the next year or two will be the first submarine to carry the under-water-launched version of China's new DF-31 missile, according to defense officials. … "A second intelligence official said building submarines is a top priority of the Chinese, and the Type 094 will be 'China's first truly intercontinental strategic nuclear delivery system.' …"

Beijing has been riled by the quiet redefinition by the US of the Taiwan Relations Act -- the legislation that has guided Washington-Taipei relations since 1979 -- to allow for broader military ties with the island democracy. Under the Bush administration, the Pentagon no longer sees its assistance as being strictly limited to arms sales. The U.S. military support on offer now also includes training joint forces, setting up a hot line between Taipei and the Pentagon and sharing satellite imagery. The subtle shift has also opened the door for Washington to send military personnel to Taipei in an upgraded capacity to assist their Taiwanese counterparts -- perhaps as permanent "defense attaches." Ever since the United States switched its embassy from Taipei to Beijing 25 years ago, American interests on Taiwan have been served by resident U.S. personnel on leave from the State or Defense departments, but not active-duty diplomats or military officers.

According to the New York Times on 8 Apr 2005,

"A decade ago, American military planners dismissed the threat of a Chinese attack against Taiwan as a 100-mile infantry swim. The Pentagon now believes that China has purchased or built enough amphibious assault ships, submarines, fighter jets and short-range missiles to pose an immediate threat to Taiwan and to any American force that might come to Taiwan's aid. In the worst case in a Taiwan crisis, Pentagon officials say that any delay in American aircraft carriers reaching the island would mean that the United States would initially depend on fighter jets and bombers based on Guam and Okinawa, while Chinese forces could use their amphibious ships to go back and forth across the narrow Taiwan Strait. Some American military analysts believe China could now defeat Taiwan before American forces could arrive at the scene, leaving a political decision about whether to attack, even though Taiwan would already be lost."

Though not all analysts agree that China poses a potential threat, the CIA and Pentagon are of the opinion that it does. In the China assessment report of May 2004, the Pentagon claimed China's defense spending in 2003 ranged from US$50 billion to US$70 billion, ranking it third in the world behind the United States and Russia. Based upon this assessment, the Pentagon further asserted the Chinese mainland was pursuing aggressive military armament and deployment. In 2004, China's national defense expenditures were 247.7 billion yuan (29.9 billion dollars), up 12.6 percent from 2003.

This rise in spending caused Washington to voice concerns that China's military build-up could tilt the strategic balance with Taiwan and also threaten US forces in Asia. But compared to the US and Japan, the 29.9 billion dollar budget was still a fairly small amount. In comparison, the US defense budget is about 400 billion dollars this year, while Japan's is about 47 billion dollars. However, other military analysts say China's actual defense spending could be up to three times more than its stated figure as Beijing does not include new arms purchases and weapons research and development in the figures. According to the US Central Intelligence Agency, China's publicized military budget is "less than half of China's actual defense spending".

This was denied by China which claimed military spending for 2004 was only expected to be a little more than US$20 billion. It claimed its military had long remained at low-level and low-investment construction stages and its military personnel are relatively poor when measured against a number of foreign counterparts. The increases in spending involved improving the living conditions and pay of the troops, while at the same time, the Chinese People's Army planned to reduce its forces by 200,000. However, the Pentagon and CIA were quick to point out that purchases from Russia had continued to upgrade the military equipment of its forces from 1993 to the present -- but these purchases were NOT reflected in the budget.

Certainly, part of China's increased military spending is aimed at strengthening its military capability, given that its current equipment and combat forces are incompatible with its international status. It reportedly lags behind such neighbors such as Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and India in terms of weapons quality - especially land, naval and air armaments. The Chinese stated the increased expenditures was to be used to upgrade military armaments and modernize national defense. However, it was also to be used for raising the salaries and social security net of military personnel and for adjusting and transforming military systems and mechanisms. The People's Liberation Army is the world's largest standing army, with some 2.5 million members.

Israel -- in violation of US transfer of technology issues -- and Russia were the primary arms salesmen to China. The European Union considered the lifting of an arms embargo on China put in place following the 1989 military crackdown on the Tiananmen democracy protests in central Beijing, However, the United States adamantly opposed the ban being lifted and the EU backed down to keep the ban in place in Apr 2005. However, France stated that it would work to have the EU ban removed.

The ongoing information-oriented military reforms and adjustments carried out by China are part of the country's effort to adapt itself to the emerging current of the world's military development. They also serve as China's necessary alternative for effectively coping with various potential challenges to its national interests. China is now faced with different security concerns from the United States, which has already taken non-traditional issues, such as terrorism and transnational crimes as its most pressing security threats. For China, traditional security still serves as its top concern, although the country also pays attention to some non-traditional issues. China is yet to realize the "final reunification of its territory," which remains an arduous and overwhelming task. It has brought Hong Kong under its sway -- though not without a lot of friction from the inhabitants -- and now it sees Taiwan as the ultimate challenge.

Tensions between Beijing, Washington and Taipei are heating up and the rhetoric has been more confrontational than it's been in years. Chinese officials consider Taiwan a renegade province that must ultimately be reunified -- by force if necessary -- with the mainland. The March re-election of Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian came as a great disappointment to Beijing, whose leaders are growing increasingly impatient with Chen's policies, which they see as not-too-subtle attempts to separate Taiwan from the mainland. Beijing authorities perceive Chen's government as constantly pushing for Taiwan's independence.

Chinese military planners are believed to be preparing a contingency plan to attack Taipei by 2006 -- the year Taiwan's President Chen says he intends to revise the Taiwanese Constitution as part of what Beijing sees as a "timeline toward independence." Almost all experts agree that pre-empting a declaration of independence by Chen takes priority over the China's economic growth, its international prestige, even its hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games. Thus there is a sense of urgency to realign the power structure in Asia to isolate Taiwan from its "protector" -- the US. Now that Japan has declared that Taiwan is of strategic value to its national welfare and sided with the US, it too must be confronted.

Recently Chen has been lobbying for an $18.2 billion special budget to buy American weaponry. If Taiwan's Parliament signs off on the deal, it will be the biggest purchase of U.S. arms in a decade -- and is guaranteed to further rile Beijing. "I've been visiting China every year for 25 years," says Sinologist David Shambaugh, "and I've never sensed a higher level of anxiety over the Taiwan issue."

Japan, America's closest ally in East Asia and China's rival for regional dominance, is also watching China's buildup and reorganizing its own military. The Japanese prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, has echoed President Bush by calling on Europe to leave the arms embargo against China in place. A research center affiliated with Japan's Defense Ministry has also criticized China's increased military spending and cautioned that Beijing was rushing to prepare for possible conflict with Taiwan, an assertion China sharply denied.

According to the New York Times on 8 Apr 2005,

"In fact, American carriers responding to a crisis would now initially have to operate at least 500 miles from Taiwan, which would reduce the number of fighter sorties they could launch. This is because China now has a modern fleet of submarines, including new Russian-made nuclear subs that can fire missiles from a submerged position. America would first need to subdue these submarines. China launched 13 attack submarines between 2002 and 2004, a period when it also built 23 ships that can ferry tanks, armored vehicles and troops across the 100-mile strait. Tomohide Murai, an expert on the Chinese military at the National Defense Academy in Tokyo, said that China's buildup is intended to focus on an American response, but he is skeptical that China already has the naval and air superiority over Taiwan to dominate the strait."

In 2002, the Chinese military outfitted its Russian-made Su-30 fighter bombers with C-801 anti-ship cruise missiles. The upgrade gave China's air force a major strike capability against ships. China took delivery of 30 Su-30s from Russia in 2001 and had a contract for some 30 additional bombers, along with two additional Sovremenny guided missile destroyers.

It was predicted in 2003 that the size of China's SRBM force is expected to grow substantially. An expanded arsenal of conventional SRBMs (Short Range Ballistic Missiles) and LACMs (Land Attack Cruise Missiles) targeted against critical facilities, such as key airfields and C4I nodes, would complicate Taiwan's ability to conduct military operations. The improvements enabled Chinese missiles to be able to accurately strike the U.S. base at Okinawa and Taiwan with "satellite-aided guidance" navigation technology obtained from America during the Clinton administration. (President Clinton was warned in 1997 by a Rand Corporation report that selling satellite navigation technology to the Chinese military was clearly a threat to U.S. national security.) The Chinese army has (People's Liberation Army, or PLA) developed a new version of its DF-15 missile – also known as the CSS-6. The new version was reported to be guided by advanced satellite navigation systems allowing it to accurately strike targets in Okinawa and Taiwan. Missiles continued to be added to the Chinese military inventory at a rapid clip. In 2003, there were 450 missiles pointed at Taiwan, but by 2005 there were over 600 missiles.

By 2005, China had deployed both the CSS-6 and CSS-7 SRBM. According to Bill Gertz, The Washington Times, on 18 Feb 2005, "Adm. Jacoby identified three new missile systems, the DF-31, DF-31A mobile intermediate range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and JL-2 submarine launched missile, noting that by 2015 China will have increased its nuclear warhead arsenal to several times the current level. The DIA estimated in 2000 that China had a total of 157 nuclear warheads for long- and short-range missiles, and will have 464 warheads for its missiles by 2020."

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Rift between Japan and Korea widens over History-Tokdo Row As the emotional outcries of President Roh Moo-hyun against Japan grew louder, the rift between the two countries widened. Thus the ROK split with Japan was viewed as the leaning towards an alliance with China -- and a split from the US. The Friendship year between Japan and Korea was endangered as tourism fell off in Kyushu from S.Korea, though the Kabuki showing by a Kabuki master in Seoul still had 80 percent of the seats filled.

The recent turn of events may have ramifications that hit closer to home than Roh thinks. One casualty of this episode is the president's own prestige. The March 23 diatribe against Japan, coupled with recent dubious remarks about the South Korea-U.S. alliance, has cast Roh as more of a loose cannon than a respectable world statesman. The conservative Chosun Ilbo newspaper has lamentably called Roh's approach "Let-It-All-Hang-Out Diplomacy." South Korea's prestige on the world stage is suffering as Korea is being viewed as childish and petulant -- while the Tokyo government wishes to remain aloof and diplomatic in this escalating brawl.

However, Tokyo's self-restraint toward Seoul may not last. Lawmakers in the Liberal Democratic Party are reportedly calling for the party to make its own counterstatement against South Korea if the official response remains conciliatory. The Japanese politicians are starting to wade in on the fight with the Governor of Tokyo calling Roh a politician using "third-rate" tricks to improve his image at home. Public sentiment in Japan may also be turning against South Korea as Japanese grow weary of the "history card." There is a new generation in power in Japan -- just as the 386 generation has come to power in Korea -- and they do not feel apologetic about historical events their grandfathers committed. They feel Japan has apologized and apologized and apologized -- and paid compensation for the acts of WWII. The "history card" no longer works as a negotiating tool. On 22 Apr, Koizumi again apologized for Japan's past at a world summit, but it was on the same day that Japanese legislators made a much publicized visit to the Yasukuni Shrine enmasse to make the point that Japan did not shun its past. The Chinese President Hu met with Koizumi at the Africa-Asia world summit and attempted to mend the fences. However, Korea refused to accept the apology.

The issue of Tokdo started taking on ridiculous proportions as the head of the Korean National Police, politicians and even Olympic athletes sailed to the islands for photo-ops to stir up the nationalistic frenzy. (NOTE: These photo ops exercises are the same in Japan. On 10 Apr Kyodo News reported that fourteen lawmakers from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, its coalition partner New Komeito party and the major opposition Democratic Party of Japan took a look at the area close to what Japan claims is a "median line" separating the two countries' exclusive economic zones in the East China Sea. The nonpartisan group of lawmakers inspected natural gas projects being carried out by a Chinese consortium in waters claimed by both Japan and China in the East China Sea aboard a Japan Coast Guard airplane.) Ridiculous joint training missions between the ROK Maritime Police and ROK Navy was scheduled -- except that no ROK Navy ships would take part and the Navy would only provided "related information." The ROK reviewed the new Japanese textbooks and said it was "worse" because they added a picture that claimed Tokdo was Japanese -- and would officially protest. (See Tokdo Dispute for details) As the hysteria against Japan's request for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council heats up in Korea and China, the "diplomatic war" between Korea and Japan escalated.

NGO Activist group protest at Japanese Embassy (4 Apr 05)

On 6 Apr the South Korean government summoned Japanese Ambassador Toshiyuki Takano to the Foreign Ministry and filed a formal protest over Japan's adoption of a junior high school civic text that says South Korea is "illegally occupying" a disputed island in the Sea of Japan. However, the ridiculous part of this whole charade is that though the Ministry of Education approved the texts following their guidelines, the next step is the acceptance by the schools. In the past, these nationalistic texts have been accepted at about a .04 percent rate. The truth is that the ROK and China are raising the row not really over the books -- but over the larger issue of Japanese rendition of history dealing with their countries treatment during the Japanese colonial period.

(NOTE: According to the Japan Timeson 6 Apr 2005, the Japanese education ministry approved 103 textbooks for use in junior high schools from next April, including a revised version of a contentious history book criticized for glossing over Japan's wartime aggression. Authorization of the history textbook is expected to raise tensions further with South Korea and China, as it did in 2001, when the book was approved for the first time by the Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Ministry. However, being approved and being accepted for teaching by the schools is another matter. Previously these books had about a .04 percent acceptance rate.

References to "comfort women" has been removed and the description of the "Rape of Nanking" has been reduced to an "incident." The council composed of scholars and school teachers, ordered the publisher to revise the text so the description states that Japan holds the territorial right to Takeshima and Senkaku. The revised version now says that although the two disputed islands belong to Japan, China has insisted that it owns Senkaku and South Korea is "illegally occupying" Takeshima. All the civics texts meanwhile continue to refer to the Russian-held islands claimed by Japan off Hokkaido as Japanese territory. The corrections referring to the Iraq War banned the use of "unilateral" in the same sentence as "United States." It also required the change that showed Japanese troops were sent to Iraq in a humanitarian role away from combat. As to the Tokdo changes, a picture was added that showed Takeshima as Japanese.

The New York Times said on 17 Apr 2005 amid furor over historical distortions in Japanese textbooks, Korean and Chinese textbooks also wrongly describe or exclude historical incidents. The paper said Japan's textbooks do mention painful issues like the "comfort women" and forced conscription but are becoming more vague about them. "Given the scrutiny and Japan's comparatively long record of democracy, the textbooks here [in Japan] are perhaps more balanced than others in the region," the paper's correspondent Onishi Norimitsu wrote from Tokyo.

As a typical example, the NYT said Chinese textbooks "teach that Chinese resistance, not the United States, defeated Japan in the war; they say nothing of the postwar Great Leap Forward, in which some 30 million Chinese died because of Mao Zedong's misguided agrarian policies." In the case of Korea, the paper said textbooks had improved since democratization in the late 1980s, but subjects like collaboration with the Japanese occupation were still taboo. "Descriptions of the colonial period used to focus only on Japanese exploitation and Korean resistance, ignoring the role of Japanese colonialism in Korea's modernization," the paper quoted Seoul National University education expert Baek Shin-ju as saying. But Park said the textbooks now "include other issues, such as the consumer culture that developed during Japanese occupation. Our textbooks are getting better. But Japan is a problem -- it's going in the other direction.")

Stoking anti-Japanese sentiment is also tricky business -- once it is unleashed, it is hard to rein in. The Chosun Ilbo reported on 4 April that in Japan Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara fired a broadside at Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, saying his criticism of Japan was a "a third-rate political technique" to recover popularity at home. (NOTE: The April by-elections are scheduled and Roh's Uri Party had just lost its majority because of the election convictions were upheld for some of its members. (See Bean-counting for details)

Appearing on a Fuji TV interview program, Ishihara said Roh's repeated criticism of Japan over its colonial abuses and the Dokdo Islets was "a stopgap measure for President Roh to recover some of his popularity." He added, "For a politician it's a third-rate technique." Senior Vice Foreign Minister Ichiro Aisawa, who also appeared on the show, said there was "no change" in the Japanese government's position that Korea's Dokdo Islets "are Japanese territory."

The show also gave air time to the chairman of Japan's rightwing Society for History Textbook Reform, which is behind the controversial Fusosha textbook whitewashing the country's wartime atrocities. The chairman of the group said for Korea to demand corrections in the textbook was tantamount to "interference" in Japan's internal affairs. Also making an appearance was journalist Yoshiko Sakurai who said Korean and Japanese scholars trying to conduct joint research so that the two countries can share an understanding of history were giving up. "Both Japanese and Korean scholars are now saying, 'Let's quit. It's impossible,'" she said. "Traditionally, in Korea and China, they think its good to attack Japan over the history issue, and there is a need to be correctly aware of this."

Meanwhile, an opinion poll conducted by the Sankei Shimbun on 500 men and women in the Tokyo area found overwhelming support for Education Minister Nariaki Nakayama's call that educational guidelines must clearly state Japan's sovereignty over the Dokdo Islets. It found 60.2 percent in favor, though opinion was split whether the two nations needed to share a common view of history, with 43.4 percent saying they did and 48.4 percent saying they didn't.

"Why don't we restrain an emotional showdown and think about friendly bilateral relations?" Koizumi said, urging the Seoul government to take measures not to raise tensions between the two countries over the territorial and history disputes. Tokyo said private companies, not the government, were responsible for the texts, and that Seoul's reaction to one of the books was "extreme. Japanese Cabinet spokesman Seiken Sugiura told a press conference in Tokyo that the dispute should be dealt with calmly.

"The basic (stance) is to develop future-oriented, friendly relations," he said of Tokyo's ties with Seoul. He said South Korea's reaction to one of the books, a civic studies text which claims Japan owns a set of disputed islands, was out of proportion given other Japanese text books had made the same claim. He said a current row over the islands, known as Dokdo in South Korea and Takeshima in Japan, had inflamed the situation, and Seoul was "acting in an extreme manner".

On 12 Apr Kyodo News reported that South Korea's North Kyongsang Province invited Shimane Gov Nobuyoshi Sumita to a ceremony in May despite having said it would sever bilateral friendship ties due to the Tokdo row. It is the first time that the South Korean province has made a positive move since Sumita sent it a letter on March 23 calling for calm in the row over Tokdo. The ceremony is to celebrate the opening in the province of the secretariat office of the Association of North East Asia Regional Governments.

The Finance ministers of both the ROK and Japan met and stated that the countries should cooperate to make the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the countries a reality -- placing the politics aside and treating this as strictly business that is good for both countries' economies. On 12 Apr 2005, Finance ministers of South Korea and Japan have agreed to step up efforts to conclude a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) by the end of 2005, putting aside recent diplomatic rows over issues involving the Tokto islets and distorted history in Japanese textbooks. Both Korea and Japan have demanded the IMF to increase the portion of Asian financial contributions as a country's voting power and other influence depend on the size of the contributions to the organization.

On 22 Apr, Koizumi again issued a "heart-felt" apology with "deep remorse" for Japan's past at a world summit of Asian-African leaders, but it was on the same day that 80 Japanese legislators and 1 cabinet member made a much publicized visit to the Yasukuni Shrine for the Spring Festival enmasse to make the point that Japan did not shun its past. Ties between China and Japan have been at their worst since the normalization of relations in 1972, putting at risk economic links worth $212 billion in annual trade. Then on 23 Apr Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Chinese President Hu Jintao met in Jakarta to hopefully smooth things over as it appears China accepted the apology.

As for Korea, South Korea's Prime Minister Lee said on 22 Apr that a nation attempting to distort the history of the past should show "sincere remorse" over its wartime atrocities. "Remorse over the past must be genuine and must be put into action," Lee said in his speech to the Asia-Africa summit. "A country that distorts history by glossing over the colonial past and hiding their misdeeds, thus concealing them from the younger generations, will not be able to free itself from the shackles of the past," Lee said. The saga goes on for Korea.

What's Good for the Goose is Good for the Gander: Japan Does Same According to the Kyodo News on 24 Apr, Japan may ask China to amend anti-Japan history textbooks. Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura said in several TV debate programs that the Japanese government will examine China's history textbooks for alleged anti-Japanese references and ask the Chinese government to improve them if necessary. Machimura said in one of the programs, "The textbooks in China and South Korea are designated by the government...Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan told me when I met him that we can express our opinion on Chinese textbooks. We will examine them and convey Japan's opinions."

After this stories internationally were starting to appear about the Chinese history books. The Los Angeles Times on 10 May 2005 reported that when Li Xuanyao, a student at Beijing's No. 55 Middle School, wants to learn about the Great Leap Forward, she has her work cut out for her. Mao Tse-tung's disastrous 1950s policy, which saw 30 million Chinese die of starvation, is relegated to a few paragraphs in her 163-page history textbook. Although Xuanyao's history teachers have taught her a lot about Japanese atrocities, she said, they are reluctant to talk about the Great Leap Forward. And they never mention the deadly Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. The PRC has criticized Japan in recent weeks for whitewashing its militarist history, focusing in particular on a junior high school textbook recently approved by Tokyo. A close look at the PRC's corresponding textbook, "Chinese History Textbook for Junior High School," however, finds several areas where the PRC's official history appears to have gaps of its own.

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Japan Bid for a UN Security Council Seat in 2005 Dashed All the big regional players want permanent seats on the UN Security Council (UNSC), which is why it has taken so long to reach a decision. Germany, Japan, Brazil and India are pushing for a vote in June. But momentum is growing behind a separate initiative backed by 120 UN members that would add eight semi-permanent seats to the council. That plan - pushed by Italy, Pakistan, Mexico and several others - has the merit of bringing accountability to the process. Permanent members tend to be accountable only to themselves.

According to Asia Times, East Asia's power plays, Erich Marquardt on 7 Apr 2005,

"South Korean politicians are creating an alliance that aims to combat increased Japanese influence in the region and the globe. The alliance, currently dubbed the Lawmakers' Conference for Peace in Asia, plans to prevent Japan from acquiring a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council; it will work to do this by building alliances with organizations in other Asian states that also are concerned with Japan's growing power. The group has apparently made inroads with Beijing. The first meeting of the alliance is scheduled for August.

Kofi Annan, the secretary general, hopes that world leaders will adopt his comprehensive package when they meet in New York in September. But they are unlikely to heed his advice to adopt the package as a whole.

Although several countries including Japan, Germany, India and Brazil, have been lobbying hard to become permanent members, some regional leaders have expressed opposition. The plan is to first expand the number of permanent Security Council seats -- and then have the G-4 nations apply to fill those seats. China in April said it believed members of the United Nations should reach a broad consensus on expanding the U.N. Security Council through discussions and suggested dropping the September timeline proposed by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to allow for more time.

China, the US and Russia -- the three veto-wielding members of the Security Council -- whose support for the U.N. overhaul is considered crucial -- said there should be no "artificial deadlines" and made clear it would be impossible to accept all of Annan's proposals. They also stressed the importance of getting broad agreement on the divisive issue of Security Council expansion -- implicit criticism of Annan's call for the 191-member General Assembly to decide on an expansion plan before the September summit, preferably by consensus.

On 8 April the Korean and Japanese ambassadors to the UN drew a line in the sand at the U.N. General Assembly in New York over Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the world body’s Security Council. On the second day of discussions of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s reform plans, Korea’s ambassador Kim Sam-hoon announced Korea opposed expansion of the permanent Security Council, a plan Japan has thrown its full weight behind. Kim said, “Rather than expand the permanent council, we support the expansion of the Security Council through elections.”

Between the two reform plans submitted by Annan -- an expansion of the permanent council by six seats and an expansion by eight semi-permanent seats that countries would fill for alternating four-year terms Kim proposed making the latter “the basis for negotiations.” Japanese Ambassador Kenzo Oshima supported the six-seat model. Oshima urged a vote forcing the matter through the General Assembly which would require a majority of the 191 members to pass. US

On 8 Apr 2005, U.N. Secretary General Annan called for Japan to hold talks with China and South Korea in connection with the two countries' opposition to its bid to gain a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council hoping to settle the matter through dialogue. On 9 Apr the United States, though supporting Japan's bid for a Security Council seat, joined Russia and China in opposing Kofi Annan's call for adoption of the entire package at a summit of world leaders in September calling it an "artificial deadline." The U.S. position against "hasty reform" indicated that Japan faced a rocky road ahead in its bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council.

On 12 Apr 2005, it appeared that Japan's bid for a UN Security Council Seat was frustrated at least for 2005. Representatives of 116 nations including Korea, Italy and Pakistan met in New York and agreed to oppose hasty reform of the U.N. Security Council, which dashed the hopes of the so-called G-4 -- Japan, Germany, India and Brazil -- of a permanent seat on the council. The U.S. and China, both veto-wielding members of the Security Council, concurred that Security Council reform must be pursued by agreement without set deadlines.

The chairman of the 12 Apr meeting, Italian Foreign Minister Gianfranco Fini, said, "Each national representative expressed the opinion that consensus was important for Security Council reform, and they presented the opinion that it was illogical to set a deadline for such reform." At the meeting, Beijing's U.N. Ambassador Wang Guangya and Washington's U.N. delegation minister Howard Stoffer also voiced opposition to a vote before consensus is reached.

Actually all the accusations of Japanese nationalism and history was really all smokescreen. The latest campaign is being led by a group of about 40 "like-minded" countries - headed by Italy, South Korea, Pakistan, Argentina and Mexico. All five countries publicly oppose any increase in permanent members and instead back an alternative proposal to increase the number of non-permanent members in the Security Council.

As if to add insult to injury, on 12 Apr President Roh Moo-hyun stated he did not oppose Germany's bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. "President Roh thinks Germany is entitled (to permanent UNSC membership) if new seats are offered," Roh's chief national security adviser, Kwon Chin-ho, told reporters while attending a dinner meeting between Roh and a group of German lawmakers.

After the meeting, the Japanese government issued its Blue Paper report for 2005 which emphasized the need to increase the amount of official development assistance (ODA) to secure UN Security Council Permanent Seat, clarifying its intention of expanding Japan’s aid diplomacy for underdeveloped countries.

The Agence France Presse (AFP) on 20 Apr reported that Japan said it hoped that the United Nations would pass a resolution this summer to expand the Security Council, despite angry PRC protests against Japan's bid and US reluctance on UN reforms. Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura said the UN expansion was a key part of both continents' drives to build international partnerships. "Concerning the reform of the UN Security Council, Japan aims for the adoption of a resolution by this summer which would in essence expand the membership in both permanent and non-permanent categories," Machimura said.

Kyodo News reported on 21 Apr that Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura and Indian External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh agreed to boost cooperation over UN Security Council reforms, sharing the view that they may have to wait a long time if they lose the chance for changes now, a Japanese government official said. Machimura and Singh, in Jakarta to attend meetings commemorating the 1955 Bandung Conference, agreed the two countries should boost solidarity further with Brazil and Germany, which are two other countries seeking permanent membership in the council.

On 22 Apr, Koizumi again apologized for Japan's past at a world summit of Asian-African leaders, but it was on the same day that Japanese legislators made a much publicized visit to the Yasukuni Shrine for the Spring Festival enmasse to make the point that Japan did not shun its past. Though the ROK called the apology hollow, the Chinese "welcomed" the apology. Koizumi and Chinese President Hu met at the summit to mend the fences.

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ROK ACTIONS

Does Korea have any allies it can trust? During an international academic conference on Friday sponsored by the Korean Association for International Studies, Cato Institute researcher Doug Bandow said the U.S. has no vital interests in Korea that justify huge costs and sacrifices, and the two nations need to prepare for an amicable parting of ways. Bandow has been asserting this position since 2002, but only now are people paying attention. (See 2003 publication Bring the Troops Home: Ending the Obsolete Korean Commitment by Doug Bandow. (PDF file) and 2005 publication The Future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance: Equality, Mutuality, and International Security by Doug Bandow.

Meanwhile Dennis Halpin, a former aide to Rep. Henry Hyde who not so long ago demanded that Korea "name the enemy," said the U.S. Congress passed a resolution marking the 150 anniversary of U.S.-Japanese ties with overwhelming support, but a similar resolution marking the 50th anniversary of the Korea-U.S. alliance died for lack of support because of the fall-out from the 2002 anti-American hate campaign. There is growing animosity to the South Korean positions amongst the politicians in Congress.

The comments by these experts paint a picture of a U.S. where Korea is no longer thought of as an ally in the traditional sense. Roh's recent statements on the shift to China as its primary ally -- a snub to the US -- and his recent hysterics in his open letter on the Cheong Wa Dae website, has made his appear to be an unreliable ally. His "Roh Doctrine" of the USFK not being used as a regional force placed him on a collision course with the US. The ROK needs to be especially wary of the moves that are occurring in Japan. If the changes to the Peace Constitution come about, the value of stationing troops in Korea simply is not worth the money and effort it takes to support the "alliance."

The case for disengagement with Korea has been going on for years. (See 1987: Korea: The Case for Disengagement it stated, "The United States should execute a phased military withdrawal from the ROK and should sever its defense guarantee once all the troops have been removed. Economic and cultural relations should be maintained thereafter, of course, but South Korea, a wealthy nation with the capability to match North Korea's military, should be deemed to have graduated from the American military safety net. Even if the ROK then seemed somewhat less secure, the United States' position would be immeasurably better. America would no longer be forced to take sides in South Korea's internal political squabbles or subsidize the defense of a trading rival. Most important, the Korean tripwire, and the consequent threat of U.S. involvement in an armed conflict, would be gone."

In CATO Handbook for Congress: Weaning South Korea (1996) states: "Washington continues to maintain a large military presence in East Asia despite the collapse of Soviet communism and the growing strength of America's allies. Particularly dramatic is the transformation of the Korean peninsula, where the United States spends between $15 billion and $20 billion a year to defend South Korea, a nation fully capable of defending itself."

In 2002, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement by Selig S. Harrison proposes "specific trade-offs to forestall the North's development of nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, calling for the withdrawal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella in conjunction with agreements to denuclearize Korea embracing China, Russia, and Japan. The long-term goal of U.S. policy, he argues, should be the full disengagement of U.S. combat forces from Korea as part of regional agreements insulating the peninsula from all foreign conventional and nuclear forces." Basically he proposes that U.S. withdraw to the south of the peninsula and assume a "trip wire" role if North Korea invades. They would not be involved in the ACTIVE defense of Korea. Then the South would pull back from the DMZ and the North would reciprocate. The U.S. forces in the south would basically be a small contingent to take care of prepositioned stocks for "follow-on" forces.

The bottom line though is that President Roh has played the "self-reliant defense" song for so long that the Korean people are starting to believe it. (See Proposed ROK FY2005 Military Budget -- Is It the Last Straw??? (OPINION) over the inequities of the situation.) The only problem is that the "self-reliant defense" will cost conservatively about $92 billion -- and even phased in over the next five years, it is a pipe dream. The main reason is that the ROK government has shown that it is unwilling to foot its "fair share" of the defense burden.

There are some facts that the ROK conveniently seems to forget on how the ROK systematically gutted the military budget in recent years -- while proclaiming increases:

• 1995: Defense Budget $13.8B (22.1% of National Budget) or 3.3% of GNP (Kim Young-sam: Economy in doldrums, while Korea become one of 4 dragons of Asia.)
• 1996: Defense Budget $15.98B (20.8% of National Budget) or 3.1% of GNP (Kim Dae-jung: Start of IMF Crisis)
• 1997: Defense Budget $17.1B (20.2% of National Budget) or 3.1% of GNP (Kim Dae-jung: Height of IMF Crisis)
• 1998: Defense Budget $10.61B (18.3% of National Budget) or 3.2% of GNP (Kim Dae-jung: Midst of IMF Crisis)
• 1999: Defense Budget $11.45B (16.4% of National Budget) or 2.9% of GNP (Kim Dae-jung: Start of IMF Crisis Recovery)
• 2000: Defense Budget $10.61B (18.3% of National Budget) or 2.8% of GNP (Kim Dae-jung: Reapproachment with North Korea)

However, according to Global Security.com: ROK Budget, "The costs involved in initiating weapons production and the loss of military grant aid from the United States were the major reasons for the gradual increase of defense spending from 5.2 percent of GNP in 1979 to 6.2 percent of GNP in 1982." At the height of Chun Doo-hwan's (1980-1987) power in 1990, the ROK was spending 8.0% of GDP on defense. Then came Roh Tae-woo (1988-1993) who continued Chun's support of the military. By the Roh Tae-woo administration in 1990, defense spending had increased to almost US$10 billion a year, but because of the dramatic growth in the country's economy, this figure was below 30 percent of the government's budget and less than 5 percent of GNP for the first time since 1975. In other words, the country was earning more money, but still spending about the same amount. The ROK didn't really start paying for its "share" until 1991 after the SOFA was renegotiated for the first time since 1963. The idea of the ROK picking up its fair share of the defense costs actually came about in 1991 with the threat of the Nunn-Warner Initiative that sought to reduce the forces in Korea.

By the Kim Young-sam (1993-1998) administration, defense expenditures had fallen to below 5 percent of GDP -- though the amount expended did increase because of the Miracle of the Han. Annual growth for defense spending was 9.4% in 1994; 9.9% in 1995; and 10.7% in 1996. In 1994, the defense budget was $14.0 billion; and by 1996, the defense budget was $17 billion, about 3.3% of nominal GDP and 23.3% of government budget (prior to capital expenditures); In 1995, Kim Yong-sam was in power but everything he touched turned sour. The economy was in the doldrums. Under the Kim Young-sam administration, the 1994 defense budget grew from $14.0 billion to $17 billion in 1996 --about 3.3% of GDP. Defense spending in 1997 was to be increased by 12% to 14.27 trillion won from 1996 budget of 12.74 trillion won, the highest since 1993. Unfortunately, Kim Young-sam's tenure was one crisis after another -- North Korean spies invading, the Robert Kim spy fiasco, Sampong building collapse, bridge collapse, ferry sinking, airliner crash. Finally, the IMF Crisis appeared in 1997 and military upgrades were forced to be cut back.

However, during the Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) years, the military budget was gutted -- first because of the IMF crisis and then because of the reapproachment with North Korea in 2000. The defense budget increased to $12.8 billion in 2001 but the percentage of GDP dropped to 2.7%. For five successive years, Kim Dae-jung cut military spending -- shelving or delaying the proposed military upgrades. The South was supporting a 683,000-troop army with a defense budget of $12.8 billion annually, but Seoul's defense budget accounted for only 2.6 percent of GDP. Initially, it was understandable because of the IMF crisis, but the ROK climbed out of the hole within 2 years -- but the decreases in the military investment continued. On Jun 15, 2000 the historic North-South summit took place with Kim Dae-jung meeting face-to-face with Kim Jong-il. Based on this reapproachment, military budget increases were not in the cards. Koreans' per capita defense spending is ranked around 30th in the world with $13.90 as of 2001. At the end of the Kim Dae-jung tenure in 2002, military expenditures was only $13.094 billion -- three times less than Japan and four times less than China. The rate stood at 2.7% of GDP by 2002.

After Roh Moo-hyun (2003-Present) was elected in 2003, the rate remained at 2.7% of GNP for 2003. After hard-ball negotiations with the US of the Future of the ROK-US alliance starting in 2000, the ROK promised to increase its spending to 3.2% of GDP -- but this turned into a hollow promise. Instead the rate increased only to 2.8% of GDP in 2004. Koreans' per capita defense spending is ranked around 30th in the world with $252 as of 2001. However, the confrontation between the US and the ROK in June 2003 over "cost sharing" forced the ROK to promise to increase their "share" of the defense costs. The US forced the ROK to promise to increase its share to 3.2 percent in 2004. The US promised in return to invest $11 billion in the ROK to assure its defense capabilities. South Korea maintained the world's eleventh largest economy with a GDP of US$ 677.9 billion, but the ROK claimed it had no money to raise its defense spending to 3.2 percent of GDP -- an increase of $4 billion. In the third year of the Roh Moo-hyun tenure in 2005, South Korea spends 2.9 percent of GDP with a budget of , but is ranked #10 in terms of defense spending with $18.5 billion committed.

Though the economy was able to sustain higher defense spending, the ROK government opted for lower defense spending in order to increase social welfare programs. The ROK is walking a tightrope of increasing its capabilities, while at the same time not making any major improvements that might threaten North Korea. For example, it is better to allow the USFK to have Patriot missiles, while the ROK refuses to fund the procurement. The reason is that it has its North Korean reapproachment programs to consider as well. At the same time, there was a 14 percent growth rate in its armed forces indicating a restructuring was on-going as it added new equipment.

Despite the Roh administration's delusional "self-reliant" military arguments, the ROK needs the USFK's high-tech armament and intelligence gathering capabilities to survive. Without the USFK, the ROK is numerically inferior because the USFK has promised to bring in follow-on forces. These forces on paper bring parity to the military face off between North and South.

The bottomline is that the ROK cannot afford the high-tech hardware the US forces adds to the mix. Roh's talk of self-reliance sounds good politically, but it is delusional. Roh's own accounting experts come to the same conclusion. However, Roh has persisted in espousing these ideas when addressing Korean supporters -- as though American news reporters were so stupid as to miss these reports. Perhaps there is some truth as the American news services consider this trivially boring stuff.

In a ROK National Assembly report, weapons systems and military hardware owned by U.S. forces in South Korea in 2000 were valued at 132 trillion won (US$111.2 billion), an amount seven times larger than South Korea's annual defense budget. The finding indicated South Korea may need to greatly boost its military spending if Washington implements a plan to cut its troop level here by a third. In June 2003, the South admitted that without the U.S., it would be faced with a $20 billion annual defense bill. It also admitted that 60 percent of the wartime ammunition stores for their ROK forces was provided by the U.S. -- though they failed to mention that the WRSA-K ammunition support was disappearing in December 2006. The list goes on and on. Suddenly the Koreans are being faced with a new reality with the U.S. DEMANDING they increase their cost share. The ROKs failure to do so is being used as a ROK excuse to delay the USFK reductions or relocations off the DMZ and the US is not going to tolerate it any longer.

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ROK Games Continue: Iraq Reduction Last August, South Korea dispatched 3,600 troops to Irbil, a major city in the relatively stable and SAFE Kurdish region in the north of Iraq. The deployment in Iraq under National Assembly legislation was scheduled to end last year, but lawmakers extended the deployment until the end of this year because the ROK had delayed their sending the troops for so long. The ROK troops were only sent AFTER the US pulled out 3,600 troops of the 2d Bde 2d ID for Iraq -- which will NOT return. The significance of the numbers is not lost on anyone.

President Roh Moo-hyun said in January the troops would remain until goals set by Washington and its allies had been accomplished and the MND has not presented any reduction plan. Officially, the government is denying such a move. However, Kim Sung-gon, a member of the Uri Party, told Reuters some lawmakers wanted to reduce the size of the 3,600-strong Korean force in Iraq as conditions there had improved. Seoul's daily JoongAng Ilbo quoted a core member of the party as saying it may seek a reduction in numbers from August. Referring to reports from Iraq, Seoul officials and legislators said Iraqi forces will be ready to take over many security operations now handled by the U.S. and allied forces. "Around August, the Iraqi forces will be completed with 10 more divisions," a ranking government official said. "By early next year, the Iraqi police will see reinforcements of 134,000. Then, the multinational forces in Iraq will likely begin three to four-step reduction plans."

The official said reports from Iraq called for Seoul to slowly pull out the troops, but leave engineering and medical units until the end. "The reports suggested that South Korea maintain an independent command in Iraq until the end of this year, but merge with the multinational forces command in the long term."

According to the Joongang Ilbo on 27 Mar 2005, "The troop cut was viewed in a positive light by the governing Uri Party and the Roh administration because Seoul is disturbed by the absence of U.S. support in the recent diplomatic rupture with Tokyo, observers said. "The United States has chosen Japan as its proxy to control the growing Chinese influence in the region," a top Uri Party official said. "The United States has given full support to Japan, including Tokyo's bid to become a UN Security Council member. That is the background of why Tokyo is pushing its territorial claims over Dokdo against Seoul, and why Washington is silent about it." Uri representative Woo Won-shik said, "We have nothing to gain by deploying the troops in Iraq for a long time. I support the reduction." "To show that South Korea-U.S. relations are not unilateral, we should withdraw, or at least reduce the forces," Uri Representative Im Jong-in said."

On 8 Apr 2005, the Defense Ministry announced that it would cut its military presence there by 270 troops to 3,270. Officials say the country has already cut 240 personnel in recent months to consolidate its military units in Iraq. They say there would be a further cut of about 30 through August as security has improved in Irbil. The number of security guards would be reduced while medical teams and transport units would be increased under what he called a minor readjustment.

SITE NOTE: In April two Iraq news stories surfaced. The first was a large number of ammunition was found in Irbil, giving the impression that the ROK troops were being targeted. As it turns out, the munitions were left over from previous occupants of the camp.

The second news story dealt with an Iraqi security guard who was killed on 7 Dec 2004 when a South Korean soldier, Cpl. Hong Young-san, accidentally discharged his rifle while on a joint patrol in the northern Iraqi city of Irbil. ``Cpl. Hong Young-san on patrol in an outpost in Irbil fired an accidental discharge against a Kurdish Zerbani, injuring him in the abdomen,’’ Won said. ``The Iraqi man died at a hospital in Irbil four days later.’’ Hong was court martialed, but the family of the Kurd asked for mercy as it was an accident and the two individuals had become friends. The Dec. 7 accident occurred a day before President Roh Moo-hyun made a surprise visit to the South Korean unit. The JSC did not fully explain why news of the accident has been withheld until now.

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ROK-US Alliance Fracture Widens: ROK to Establish an Independent Geopolitical Policy During Secretary of State Rice's visit in March, Korean reporters asserted that many Koreans do not consider the U.S. an ally, that many thought the U.S. should make concessions to North Korea, and many wanted Rice to retract the accusation that North Korea is an "outpost of tyranny." Rice responded that North Koreans are "trying to change the subject. I'm not going to let them change the subject." This was as Korea continued with its reapproachment and Kaesong development while not naming Korea its "main enemy" -- causing a few like Rep Henry Hyde to ask why American soldiers were in Korea? Several Korean reporters asserted that the U.S. was encouraging Japanese military expansion, and that the U.S. should not support Japan's petition for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, and that anti-American and anti-Japanese feelings among Koreans were connected. Rice reiterated her praise for the U.S.-Japan alliance. This was as the ROK controversy over history and Tokdo heated up.

Japan and the US are now fully committed in the Missile Defense System against North Korea -- and aligned politically on strategic interests in Asia. Rice criticized a new anti-secession law giving Beijing justification for attacking Taiwan, over which China claims sovereignty but whose people wish to remain apart. Rice reiterated Bush policy that this dispute must not be settled unilaterally. Rice also addressed the trade imbalance with China blaming copyright infringement violations. This was as Korea was drawing closer to China as its ally in dealings with North Korea.

The Joongang Ilbo reported on 30 Mar 2005 that in a meeting with top Foreign Ministry officials, Prime Minister Lee Hae-chan said the time had come for the ROK to establish an independent geo-political policy that would move beyond old Cold-War prescriptions that sought to contain the PRC and DPRK. Mr. Lee's statement was endorsed by President Roh Moo-hyun. Mr. Lee told Foreign Ministry officials, "The ministry should get rid of the containment mindset against the continent."

The ROK was making some dangerous statements. Seoul's three-track geostrategy was becoming a shambles. The first track takes it toward detente with Pyongyang (which continued unabated), the second toward military self-sufficiency (which was given lip service, but none of the funding to make it a reality) and the third toward maintaining and deepening its alliance with Washington (which by Apr 2005 was going swiftly down the toilet). An independent geo-political policy would mean that the US-ROK alliance was in deep trouble. PINR states,

"Rebalancing occurs when a state's economic, political and cultural power grows or declines relative to other concerned states, which must readjust to the new challenge in the first case and compete to fill the power vacuum in the second. In East Asia, the first case is occurring, as Beijing puts into effect its strategy for making China the dominant power in the region through a 20 year program of building a state-of-the-art, high-tech military as a part of its vision of the country as a great power in all dimensions.

With China on the move, the other East Asian states and Washington, which is strategically involved in the region, are faced with a genuine choice of how to respond. Tokyo confronts the alternatives of breaking with its "peace" policy and investing in a military to rival China's, drawing Washington into a closer security relationship, or becoming Beijing's junior partner. Washington must decide whether to commit more military resources to the region -- the cost of being Tokyo's protector -- or to retreat slowly from it. The choices that the major players make, which as yet are still in the offing, will determine the configuration of power that eventually crystallizes in East Asia.

As the great tri-cornered game unfolds, the other East Asian states -- Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea -- are constrained to reposition themselves according to their best estimations of its final results, which are clouded with uncertainty. Taiwan and North Korea are parallel cases; Beijing wants to annex Taiwan, which depends on an equivocal Washington for security, and Washington desires regime change in Pyongyang or at least its non-negotiable submission to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and Pyongyang depends on an equivocal Beijing for energy supplies and protection. In each of those cases, the smaller power has little room to maneuver since it is locked into a dependency relationship.

South Korea presents a different case; similar to Japan, it is currently dependent on Washington for military security, but it is not directly threatened by a hostile great power with designs on it. Seoul is not desirous for Beijing to fulfill its strategic aims, but it is also aware that Washington might eventually retreat from East Asia or at least see its influence diminished. As a mature industrial power with the ninth largest economy in the world, South Korea is not a match for the big players but it has potential for latitude in its efforts at repositioning."

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ROK-US Alliance in DEEP TROUBLE President Roh's ambition of being a "balancer" in Northeast Asia is a pipe-dream. By 20 Apr, the ROK government was trying to explain away misunderstandings by telling Washington that Seoul envisions being a "facilitator" of peace in the region and NOT exercising a military and political balancing role between powers. The following is an editorial from the Chosun Ilbo on 1 Apr 2005:

U.S. Experts Dismiss Seoul's Regional Ambitions

American Korea experts read the Roh Moo-hyun administration's ambition for Korea to become a stabilizer in Northeast Asia as a barely concealed attempt to quit the alliance with the U.S. and call the plan unrealistic.

Georgetown University professor Bob Sutter said the concept could only mean an end to the Korea-U.S. alliance. It was also impossible to understand what the government meant by its stated aim of simultaneously strengthening the alliance and playing a stabilizing role in Northeast Asia. He said if Korea wants to leave its U.S.-alliance, it can do so, but there will be a price to pay later.

Heritage Foundation fellow Larry Wortzel said Korea lacks the economic, political and military strength to play a balancing role in the region, whereas Great Britain in the past and India now were able to play a balancing role because they had the national clout. Wortzel said Roh's arguments were likely intended to strengthen Korea's diplomatic leverage and get on a more equal footing with Washington. He added the U.S. and China resolved their diplomatic differences in a friendly manner without major conflicts since 1972 -- it was therefore unlikely they would become mired in Cold War-like tensions, as Roh appears to assume.

The Cato Institute's vice president Ted Carpenter, who has called for a "friendly parting" between Korea and the U.S., said if tensions erupted in Northeast Asia between the U.S. and China or Japan and China, far from playing a stabilizing role Korea would find itself in very hot water. He said Korea's regional ambition was ultimately unattainable. He added Korea should now end its security dependence on the U.S. and make a mature decision to take charge of its own security.

The Asia Foundation's Scott Snyder said it could be a natural choice for Korea to pursue multi-level and multi-faceted diplomacy, but just as the U.S. cannot play a unilateral role in Northeast Asia, it would be difficult for Korea, too, to exert a decisive influence in the region.

On 15 April, the Yomiuri Shimbun that the U.S. government planned to survey Okinawa Prefecture residents on their views toward U.S. bases to help decide on the U.S. military realignment and whether to send home marines based there. This brings into question whether a similar survey would be conducted in Korea -- and with the prevalent feeling of residents for the US to go home, it could be used to fulfill George Bush's 2002 promise that "if the Korean people wish us to leave, we will." In addition, there is a grass-roots movement growing in America to get the troops out of South Korea because of the perceived actions of the Roh administration. The Yomiuri Shimbun stated, A movement for the bases' retention to accept troops transferred home from abroad has gathered momentum in the United States after U.S. President George W. Bush announced in summer a plan to withdraw between 60,000 to 70,000 U.S. personnel based overseas.

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Korea Steps Up Military Cooperation with China According to the Chosun Ilbo on 4 April 2005, military exchanges between Korea and China will intensify to a level similar to those between Korea and Japan. According to Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung, "China, more than any nation, wishes for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, so we plan to strengthen our military exchanges with China, including making defense minister meetings a regular occurrence."

``It's time to further develop military cooperation between Seoul and Beijing to the level of that between Seoul and Tokyo,'' Yoon told reporters during a luncheon briefing on his recent trip to China. He said Chinese military leaders, including Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan, showed a keen interest in South Korea's move and gave a positive response. The minister proposed holding yearly ministerial defense talks between the two countries and holding working-level talks twice a year. The latest meeting between the two countries' defense chiefs was held in 2001. Seoul and Tokyo hold defense talks annually, along with two working-level talks a year.

Yoon's comments confirm hints of greater Sino-Korean cooperation following President Roh Moo-hyun's comments that Korea will act as a stabilizer between opposing forces in Northeast Asia. Korea and China agreed during a meeting of their defense ministers in Beijing on March 30 to make such meetings regular and hold discussions involving bureau and section chiefs twice annually.

An article in the Asia Times: East Asia's power plays, Erich Marquardt on 8 Apr 2005 stated:

China has reacted quickly to capitalize on South Korea's current dissatisfaction with Japan. Beijing aims to limit US influence in East Asia, and that requires pulling Asia's pivotal states into the Chinese orbit of Beijing, which has publicly labeled its present strategy the "peaceful rise" policy and is assuring that it is not interested in regional expansion and wants simply to increase its trade and economic clout with Asia - its conflict with Taiwan notwithstanding.

Beijing's massive economic growth has worked to foster positive relations with many Asian states, and it is this with which both Japan and the United States need to be most concerned. If states such as South Korea gravitate increasingly toward China, it will result in a major shift in power in Asia. This is why it is important for Japan, which under its current policies, stands to lose by such a power shift, to minimize avoidable conflicts with the states it is trying to woo in East Asia, most notably South Korea.

Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the United States will always stand close by Japan's side. As China grows in military strength, Washington may come to accept its increased role in the region. Under its current policies, this would not bode well for Japan as it would stand to lose power in the region and have a weakened capability to achieve its interests. Therefore, while this potential development induces Japan to increase the strength of its military, it must do so with the acceptance of East Asia's influential states; failure to earn their acceptance may leave Japan increasingly isolated in East Asia with few foreign-policy options at its disposal.

The move by Korea to align itself more closely with China at this time is a negative move that sets up China-Russia on one side and the US-Japan on the other -- with the ROK siding with China instead of being the "balancer" as President Roh wishes to characterize it. The South Korean government in talking about balancing things in the entirely hypothetical case of a "U.S.-China conflict" or "China-Japan confrontation" sent a message to the US and Japan that Seoul cannot be trusted any longer. The US and Japan have both condemned the anti-secession law of China -- but Korea has been silent. The continued support of North Korea while the US attempts to cripple the North has placed the US-ROK alliance at a crossroads.

It is significant that for the first time in history, China and Russia will hold a joint military exercise in the Yellow Sea in September. The two countries agreed to a strategic partnership in 1996 and have strengthened military and economic cooperation since then. Now, cooperation between them has developed into a military exercise involving navy and air force troops with state-of-the-art weaponry. The military drill is a response to the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In February, Washington and Tokyo proclaimed a "New Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security" which is aimed at China by defining Taiwan as their "joint security concern." The interests of China and Russia engaged in a territorial dispute with Japan over four northern islands coincide with each other.

If Japan degrades its relationship with South Korea, it risks Seoul improving its relations with Beijing at the expense of Tokyo and Washington. Seoul is facing a population growing more distant from the United States and is seeking to pursue a more independent foreign policy in Asia. Seoul and Beijing are improving their relations. Since Seoul still relies on US military support, it would be an avoidable setback for Japan to alienate South Korea enough for it to move further away from the Japan-US orbit and more toward the Chinese one.

PINR states, "That a rebalancing is underway is confirmed by recent official documents released by the main players, China, Japan and the United States. Beijing's white paper, "China's National Defense in 2004," issued on December 27, 2004, states that "new changes are occurring in the balance of power among the major international players, with the process of their realignment and the redistribution of their interests accelerated." Tokyo's new defense policy guidelines, also made public in December, name China for the first time as a possible threat and commit to seeking closer cooperation with Washington on regional security. The U.S. National Intelligence Council's projection of the future international situation, "Project 2020," released on January 13, 2005, asserts that "At no time since the formation of the Western alliance system in 1949 has the shape and nature of international alignments been in such a state of flux." The report goes on to surmise that, in Asia, the regional powers will determine the new balance, contingent on the choice that Tokyo makes between "balancing" against and "bandwagoning" with Beijing."

However, many people consider the idea of becoming a balancer in the region as not only unrealistic but also dangerous in light of complicated interests among four major powers: the U.S., China, Russia and Japan. They rather take it as the government's bid to make up for rapid erosion in cooperation with both Washington and Tokyo. On 5 Apr an article in the Korea Times stated in an interview with Rep Park Jin of the GNP, "The government's vision of becoming a ``power balancer'' in Northeast Asia is a ``dangerous idea'' that will undermine national interests and eventually bring about the potential isolation of the country in the region. Park criticized the Roh Moo-hyun administration for its recent move toward strengthening ties with China, distancing itself from the United States, the nation's long-term ally. Park, a member of the National Defense Committee of the National Assembly, said, ``Any unilateral attempt to change the existing trilateral framework for regional security, including the U.S. and Japan, will never serve national interests.''

The government's lukewarm attitude toward addressing the current issue with the U.S. is a sign of a possible rift in the 50-year-long South Korea-U.S. military alliance, Park said. ``North Korea's nuclear weapons development is the most imminent threat to South Korea and the international community at present,'' the GNP lawmaker said. ``This is not the time for the government to change the geographical framework, but to cement ties with existing allies to resolve the prolonged nuclear dispute.''

In a speech at the Air Force Academy on March 8, President Roh Moo-hyun unveiled his new defense doctrine, saying ``Korea must play the role of balancer so that tensions do not revive within Northeast Asia.'' The Ministry of Defense action is simply and extension of this Roh policy. Observers are reading the ideas as meaning that in the event of tensions in Northeast Asia, the nation would not chose sides.

On 7 Apr the Donga Ilbo reported that "the Ministry of National Defense was planning to create a policy desk, provisionally dubbed the Department of Northeast Asian Policy, to oversee military cooperation with China and Russia" by the year's end. It will be exclusively tasked with the role of bolstering military ties with regional neighbors such as China, Russia and Japan. It was reported in the Yonhap News on 7 Apr that the Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung stated, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff should take the initiative in promoting a 'cooperative self-defense' system by establishing integrated capability based on the functional, balanced development of the Army, Navy and Air Forces and military restructuring."

According to the article, "It is the first time since the establishment of the Korean armed forces that the defense ministry is creating a department to head up military exchanges with neighboring countries such as China and Russia. The ministry's current endorsement of international military affairs is processed through its twin offices of the Department of U.S. Policy, in charge of workings with Washington, and the Department of Foreign Policy, assigned with handling military involvement with other countries including those in the Northeast Asian region, on such themes as military exchange and the dispatch of Korean troops to overseas operations."

The defense ministry's recent move is reportedly making many within the armed forces circle very uneasy. Bringing up military cooperation with China at a time when the Korea-U.S. alliance is being tested is bound to ignite a divisive debate -- within the ROK and US. The feeling inside the military is that "the creation of the proposed policy bureau could invite Washington's resentment and misunderstanding, should this administration veer too close to China on the pretext of the notion of "equidistant military diplomacy" -- meaning Roh's so-called "balancing power strategy."

As expected, China supports South Korea's plan to play the role of a ``balancer'' in Northeast Asia -- with the caveat "as long as it contributes to peace and prosperity in the region." In an exclusive interview with The Korea Times, Ambassador Li Bin stressed that there would be no co-prosperity in Northeast Asia if regional actors are caught in a Cold War mentality of the last century. This seems to be the same words issued in the 6 April summit in Islamibad, Pakistan by China's premier that China was NOT seeking hegemony in the region despite its troop buildup plans -- and was seeking only mutual peace and prosperity. Ambassador Li stated, "China will give unreserved support to South Korea IF it plays a positive role in the peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia, though it is not clear, so far, as to how the `balancer' role will go in future" -- indicating doubts on the part of China on the feasibility of such a "balancer" role. The ambassador said it is natural that all the countries, including South Korea and China, should give top priority to their national interest, but one shouldn't harm the safety of another nor interfere with a foreign nation's domestic affairs. In other words, the ROK can play the "balancer role" but stay out of China politics -- and don't expect any help from China as Korea carries out its own private agenda against the US and Japan.

On 15 Apr, it was reported that the ROK was considering establishing hotlines for the ROK Air Force and Navy with China -- and that China had reacted positively to the proposal. Defense Minister Yoon said at the beginning of April that South Korea and China needed to strengthen their military ties, noting that a hot line would help both nations to cope better with disasters at sea and help prevent Chinese fishing boats from trespassing into South Korean waters.

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Textbook history issue and Tokdo driving wedge in ROK-Japan relationship Japan is also seeking talks with Korea as well. According to the Kyodo News on 7 Apr, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi received advice from his predecessors to try to move up a summit with President Roh Moo Hyun planned to take place by June, in light of soured bilateral ties. Koizumi agreed there is a need to hold talks with Roh but did not clarify whether he thinks the upcoming summit, part of the biannual meetings the two leaders have agreed on, should come earlier than the sought timing. The two countries are trying to arrange the meeting by the end of the first half of this year. There was a potential meeting in Moscow in May prior to the scheduled June summit. The meeting would be at an event in the Russian capital marking the end of World War II.

However, the Joongang Ilbo on 7 Apr reported that the foreign ministers from ROK and Japan met in Islamabad, Pakistan for the first time since the Dokdo islands dispute hit a crescendo and newly authorized Japanese textbooks added to an intense diplomatic furor between the two countries. Ban Ki-moon of the ROK and Nobutaka Machimura of Japan both acknowledged that ties between the two countries have cooled considerably. Mr. Ban flatly accused Tokyo of being responsible for the current strains in the relationship. In response, Mr. Machimura was brief. "I too think that ties between the two countries are not good. Nevertheless, such a situation should not continue. It has to be improved." Both sides agreed to arrange Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to Seoul in June or July. Machimura and Ban also plan to meet again when a foreign ministerial meeting is held during the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) slated for early May in Kyoto. They also agreed that events set for the 2005 Japan-South Korea friendship year go ahead as scheduled.

Then on 8 Apr President Roh stepped up his criticism of Japan's failure to repent its past crimes, calling the neighboring country a "misfortune" to the world. "It is a grave global misfortune to coexist with a nation anxious to glorify its history of aggression and cruelty," Roh said in an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, a leading German newspaper. Then on 13 April the government reaffirmed its resolute stance against Japan's claim to South Korean territory, calling the resolution an "act of independence." "We will not tolerate any claim to South Korean territory, which could amount to a challenge to our independence," Prime Minister Lee Hae-chan said.

These types of strong words makes everyone nervous. At Songtan where we live, a banner from a NGO activist group written in hangul was stuck up on the overpass on the railroad tracks on the road leading to base. It stated basically "Tokdo is our land. We hate the Japanese."

NGO Activist groups in Anti-Japanese protest in Seoul (4 Apr 2005)

On 13 April Japan's foreign minister Nobutaka Machimura reiterated an apology to South Korea over the country's 1910-45 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula, saying he hopes the current history row will not damage the countries' relations. "(We) repent for giving South Koreans tremendous suffering until 1945," Nobutaka Machimura was quoted as telling a group of South Korean lawmakers. The remarks were largely a repeat of previous apologies, including one by former Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in 1995. Murayama's apology was considered the most straightforward ever made until then as he directly mentioned that Japan's "colonial rule and aggression" caused "tremendous damage and suffering" to the Asian people.

Since then, former prime minister Keizo Obuchi and his successor Junichiro Koizumi have delivered similar comments at their summit meetings with South Korea -- in 2001, 2002, and 2003. (See List of War Apology Statements Issued by Japan for a very impressive list of repeated apologies that the Koreans conveniently forget -- or claim they weren't sincere.)

Then on 13 April officials from South Korea, China and Japan met in Beijing for two-day talks aimed at coordinating the agenda ahead of a foreign ministers' meeting scheduled for next month in Japan on the sidelines of a broader ministerial session of the Asia-Europe Meeting. Though the topic of the tension -- the claimed Japanese distortion of history -- is not on the agenda, the sources said it could be discussed informally at the dinner. Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura plans to propose to his Chinese counterpart on Sunday in Beijing that their countries launch a joint study on the interpretations of bilateral history as part of efforts to mend fences. It is interesting because the ROK quit its joint history project with the Japanese in disgust in March 2005.

On 13 AprThe United States called on Japan and China on Tuesday to mend their ties, while criticizing China for failing to protect Japanese interests there during a series of violent anti-Japanese protests. For the Chinese part, they simply scheduled more protests throughout the country...but this time, there is an chain-email campaign to NOT destroy Japanese property during these protests.

On 14 Apr the ROK media was attempting to make it sound as though the US did NOT understand the Tokdo issue. However, the point that the ROK media was missing was that the US wants the ROK and China and Japan to settle the matter through dialogue. According to an article in the Donga Ilbo on 14 Apr, "A US diplomat said in a private meeting that "even as late as Secretary Rice's visit to Asia last month, we didn't relate the Dokdo conflict to Japan's bid to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council." And this is true. In "normal" diplomatic circles, these types of incidents are NOT elevated to the diplomatic level. However, President Roh turned it into a "diplomatic war" AFTER Rice's visit. The bottomline holds -- the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 has a US Congress caveat that if the ROK starts an "incident" over the "Liancourt Rocks," it is on its own. The U.S. holds no opinion. The islets are "disputed" -- not Korean territory nor Japanese territory in the eyes of the U.S.

On the sidelines, both Japanese and Korean business leaders want to see an end to this "diplomatic war" as it is impacting business. The issue of Tokdo that arouses national frenzy is really a non-issue in the scale of things -- and only a Roh trick to rabble-rouse with the April by-elections coming up.

On 15 Apr, the right-wing factions announced that they had translated the offending history textbooks into Chinese and Korean and published them to the internet. They feel that the people have been condemning Japan without actually reading the texts for themselves -- only relying on "translations" or "interpretations" from NGO activist groups or highly-opinionated scholars.

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ROK Not Paying Attention to its Economy and Standing in World Opinion In the 1984 EUSA/ USFK Annual Historical Report and on page 13, Footnote 4. says that in May 1984 a Japanese national poll showed Korea as the third "most hated nation" after Russia and North Korea. In Apr 1984 a Gallup poll of 1000 Koreans showed Japan as the third "most hated nation" after Russia and North Korea. Things haven't changed that much, have they? The Koreans dropped the Russians and substituted the U.S. -- the Japanese dropped the Russians and substituted the Chinese. The South Koreans dropped North Korea (their "ethnic brothers") altogether -- and the Japanese bounced North Korea to number 1. But the biggest is that Korea keeps Japan in the top three -- and the Japanese have dropped Korea -- at least until now. In a April poll by the Joonang Ilbo, which surveyed 800 South Koreans on which country they believe poses the greatest threat to national security last week, 37.1 percent of respondents identified Japan as South Korea's greatest threat, replacing the United States and North Korea as perceived top menaces. (Surprisingly, in the Jan 2005 poll, Japan stood at 7.6 percent.) When asked with which country Korea should cooperate the most in terms of national security, 60 percent of respondents named the United States, followed by China at 16.5 percent, North Korea at 8.1 percent and Japan at 3.5 percent.

Local CEOs Don't Like "Balancer" Concept The next bad thing is that without a booming economy, the investment in the military defense budget cannot be increased. Japan invests on 1 percent of GDP on its defense, but that also makes it number four in amount invested after the US, China, and France. The ROK is number 30 and is still only committing 2.9 percent of GDP to defense.

The bottomline is how can the ROK realign itself militarily with the Chinese -- and still retain foreign investment. How can the ROK alienate the US and still maintain any sense of security for investment in Korea? It will be difficult to maintain its EXPORT driven economy. The following is extracted from the on 21 Apr 2005 entitled "Survey: More Than Half of CEOs Say Being a Balancing Force in Northeast Asia Is Not Proper."

It was reported that regarding the concept of Korea being a “balancing force in the northeast Asian region,” a large number of CEOs of local corporations and financial institutions expressed negative opinions on the plan since they felt it is not appropriate and feasible, and that it will undermine the ROK-U.S. alliance, given South Korea’s current economic and military capability. According to a survey regarding President Roh Moo-hyun’s remarks on Korea becoming a balancing force in the northeast Asian region and its effect on future ROK-U.S. relations that was conducted by the Korea CEO Forum on April 20, 60 CEOs of industrial and financial companies responded in the above-mentioned manner. According to the results of the survey, the proportion of respondents that, considering South Korea’s economic and military capability, felt that Korea being a “balancing force in the northeast Asian region was not proper and realizable,” reached 58.3 percent. A total of 36.7 percent of respondents responded that even though the idea was right in terms of long-term perspective, it was not timely, while a mere 1.7 percent of respondents said that it was an appropriate suggestion. Concerning the question over whether being a balancing force in the northeast Asian region’ and the ROK-U.S. alliance will be able to harmoniously coexist, 75 percent of respondents said that it would be difficult for both to coexist, and that it would inevitably alter the ROK-U.S. alliance. A total of 73.3 percent of respondents said, regarding the policy’s effect on the future relationship between South Korea and U.S., that their alliance would be undermined. Moreover, regarding the question of what affect the North Korean nuclear issue and changes in ROK-U.S. alliance will bring to business, the answer that “with the North Korean nuclear issue, changes in ROK-U.S. relations will elevate uncertainty,” stood at 43.3 percent. Also, 20 percent of those surveyed answered that “the aggravated North Korean nuclear issue and changes in the cooperation system between South Korea and U.S. have intimidated corporations.” On the other hand, 35 percent of respondents said that even if such factors increased uncertainty, it was not high enough for them to consider adjusting management strategies. The Korea CEO Forum, established in 2001, consists of about 170 members, including CEOs of corporations and financial institutions, and professors. Kim Seung-yu, chairman of the board of directors of Hana Bank, Yu Sang-ok, chairman of Coreana, and Cho Dong-sung, a business administration professor at Seoul National University, have served as a joint chairmen of the forum in the past.

Direct Foreign Investment Down The bad thing about this military row is that it is tied directly to Direct Foreign Investment as investment is linked to security of that investment. If the North is constantly talking of turning Seoul into a "sea of fire" and the USFK is starting to move their forces out -- while the ROK is attempting to become a "balancer" in Northeast Asia with only a pipedream of a "self-reliant defense" to enforce its position...investments don't look good. In April 2005, the ROK was at the bottom of the list of countries with FDI (Direct Foreign Investment). South Korea lagged far behind other countries in attracting foreign direct investment, with anti-corporate sentiment and regulations deterring flows of foreign capital into the country, a survey showed. South Korea attracted 0.314 percent of global foreign direct investment (FDI) between 2001 and 2003, the state-invested Korea Center for International Finance (KCIF) said, citing a survey by a trade promotion body under the United Nations. The ratio of foreign investment in a country to total investment in the world, came to 0.314, ranking 120th out of 140 countries surveyed. Among Asian companies, Singapore ranked sixth, China 37th and Thailand 87th.

It was also shown that the FDI in Korea was simply the buying of existing factories or companies so they did not really contribute to the economy. About 43 percent of FDIs in Korea in 2004 were engaged in merger and acquisition (M&A) activities compared to 7.1 percent of such activities in China. The government is moving to rely on stronger regulatory and taxation power to prevent foreign investors from bypassing domestic financial and tax rules -- something that may scare investors away. Excessive regulations and anti-corporate sentiment, together with the traditionally militant labor union, tend to discourage foreigners from setting up new businesses in Korea.

The KCIF said that Korea should carry out a wide range of measures, including cutting red tape and improving the residential environment for foreigners, to encourage international investors and companies to establish new businesses in the manufacturing and service sectors. However, the EUCCK says the "cutting of red tape" is simply words as past promises have not been kept.

Free Trade Agreements Endangered South Korea is aiming to have at least 15 free-trade agreements (FTAs) by the end of 2007 to help expand the country's share of the global market and fuel growth. The ROK is hungry for free-trade agreements -- though the bloody protests by the farmers of the Chile FTA makes it a political liability. The FTA between South Korea and Chile - Seoul's first - went into effect in April 2004, while a pact with Singapore was signed in November 2004, with the finishing touches still being added prior to ratification. The Office of Policy Planning and International Organizations, the trade policymaking body within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade revealed the plan in an annual policy report to President Roh Moo-hyun. The next FTA on the agenda was with Japan, but that soon fell through the cracks when heated debates over Tokdo started up. Instead, the ROK signed preliminary paperwork to complete a FTA with EFTA (European countries not in the EU). However, on 12 Apr 2005, Finance ministers of South Korea and Japan have agreed to step up efforts to conclude a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) by the end of 2005, putting aside recent diplomatic rows over issues involving the Tokto islets and distorted history in Japanese textbooks. Both Korea and Japan have demanded the IMF to increase the portion of Asian financial contributions as a country’s voting power and other influence depend on the size of the contributions to the organization.

AMCHAM, EUCCK and International CEOs Warn "Finance Hub" Concept Endangered But there are other dark clouds ahead. The AMCHAM (American Chamber of Commerce) has for years blasted the ROK over transparency, tariffs, protectionism -- and return has been the target of radical student organizations. AMCHAM's latest blast was that it thought that proposal for ROK English International Schools -- to attract foreign businessmen with families to Korea -- may become simply Korean schools with English classes. Now EU Chamber of Commerce in Korea (EUCCK) has some bitter criticism of Korean policies to draw foreign investors. The EUCCK feels that Korea currently lacks a real long-term development project for the future of its economy -- with the idea of a Northeast Asia Hub project as an "ad-hoc initiative" that was not well coordinated or thought out. The adding of a few free trade zones is not enough. The EUCCK complained that they have released the same 300-page trade barriers report over the last seven to eight years without the Korean government taking any action or countermeasures. The EUCCK will file a suit over Korean trade restrictions with the EU Trade Commission in Brussels.There is a danger that Korea would become only a logistics "niche" by virtue of its geographical position between China, Japan and the Russian Far-East.

The efficiency of Korean ports and airport facilities lagged behind that of other comparable Asian cities. Despite the high quality of Korea's port infrastructures, their competitiveness is being challenged by stiff regulations and unsatisfactory cargo handling and transportation procedures which play to Korea's disadvantage. At Incheon airport, the advantage of excellent cargo handling skills is offset by sudden and steep price increases which only eliminate its competitive edge. Over the last seven or eight years, the EUCCK had given plenty of advice to the Korean government as to how to attract foreign investment, but the problems were not being corrected. Korea's regulatory framework is still much mired in red tape and lack of coordination between the various administrations.

The confrontation had been brewing since late March when the probe was announced. The National Tax Service has launched a probe of overseas funds like Newbridge Capital, Lone Star and the Carlyle Group. The funds made billions of won in profits from selling local businesses they bought after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, but they have paid almost no taxes because they are headquartered in tax havens and don’t come under Korea’s fiscal authority. Because of this, the Korean people take rather a dim view of foreign capital, and some just want all foreign investors out. Foreign investors were quick to lash out. “The probe is political,” they say. In other words, they suspect that Roh and the Uri Party are playing politics to burnish Roh's image as a corruption fighter. The investigation got under way amid attacks in the international press saying Korea is hostile to foreign capital. Those complaints are going to get worse. Analysts said the stock market may be the biggest victim of the tax audit of foreign funds in the near term. Yi Seung-gook, CEO of BNP Paribas Peregrine Securities, said, ``It’s nonsense that after welcoming those funds during the currency crisis, the government now takes issue with their profits.’’ Yi said. He said that the probe may negatively affect the stock market, which is already suffering. The analyst said that the stock exchange will stay below the 1,000-point level this year. ``Ironically, the government-led financial hub plan is designed to attract foreign capital but it is moving to regulate them further. The positive effects of the foreign capital should be respected,’’ Yi noted. The move is likely to scare away foreign investors who think foreign capital is being subject to tougher scrutiny than domestic investment, he added.

On 17 Apr, the Chosun Ilbo ran an article about how foreign businesses were outraged by tax probe on foreign investment funds. American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM) claimed one or two overseas financial firms were getting ready to pull out of Korea. The raids on the funds by the National Tax Service (NTS) would have the impact of hurting Korea’s national image, and "Korea’s foreign investment environment will rapidly freeze over.” The resentment by foreign financial firms is that they’ve been tagged as criminals simply because they took the risk and invested in Korea after getting advice from the nation’s leading lawyers. They question, "if they are labeled criminals just because they made some money, who is going to invest in Korea?” The AMCHAM denied the media report that it demanded an explanation for Cheong Wa Dae and stated it trusted NTS in conducting a fair tax probe.

Korea is seen neither as a financial hub nor a country with rapid growth potential in the Asia-Pacific region, a survey of 456 chief executive officers from the United States, Europe and Asia (excluding Japan) has found. According to an IBM'Institute of Business Value study, China and India were seen as leading economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region, while Hong Kong and Singapore were considered the region's financial hubs. The study saw Japan, Australia and New Zealand as the countries in the region with mature economic foundations. Indonesia was selected as the country with large business opportunity. Korea, by contrast, was not mentioned in any part of the report as an attractive investment destination. CEOs see Korea as caught between developed and emerging market status.

McKinsey's Asia Warn ROK Economic Growth Endangered On 14 April 2005, McKinsey’s Asia chairman, Dominic Barton, said the next three to five years would be decisive for Korea’s development over the next 15-20 years. But he added current trends suggested the country “might be left out in the cold" like the Philippines was during the 1970s when that nation did not have a coherent vision of the future and failed to support its corporations. The rapid growth and change in China made Asia the center of change in the world economy. Corporations in other Asian countries like Malaysia and Singapore are pursuing aggressive strategies to take leadership positions for the next 50 years. However, based on current trends, Korea could become a "bystander” in regional growth. The main reason was the administration’s lack of an ambitious vision for the nation’s future. Korea’s growth has been slow. The government has not been able to present a vision for the future, and rather than stressing both growth and distribution equally, Seoul is putting too much stress on distribution. This ties in with the CEO warning that Korea may simply become a transportation and logistics hub. The advice was that Korea “must minimize rigidity in the labor market and simplify procedures for foreign investors.” He said Korean corporations had the “hardware” to make improvements in their control structure, but the “software” -- that boards of directors simply rubberstamp company policies -- needed to be improved. He also said public enterprises like the Korea Gas Corporation and Korea Post must be quickly privatized, and the government must expand the selection of civilians rather than public servants in various ministries. He said Korea should move faster with plans to become a high-tech, financial and transportation hub in Northeast Asia, and should establish an Asian regional fund like Singapore’s Temasek and boost investment in the region. Competitive Korean firms in the car, car parts and telematix industries to penetrate Asian markets quicker.

ROK Economy Still Not Out of Protracted Recession In Apr 2005, Korea's upbeat tone of coming out of a protracted recession was toned down. According to a Finance Ministry report, South Korea's economy will recover at a slower-than-expected pace because of sluggish private consumption and a struggling construction sector. "The economy as a whole shows signs of recovery but its transition characteristics have combined with seasonality to produce mixed indicators," the finance and economy ministry said in its monthly report. Taking a cautious step back from its earlier upbeat tone, the ministry said it needs to see more data before determining the pace of the turnaround. Exports were projected to see a slowdown as well. What Korea is doing is making a lot of foreigners very nervous. Basically while Korea says it wants to attract investors, it is actually driving them away. Some legislators said the economy had gone awry ever since the Roh Moo-hyun administration took office two years ago due to structural problems. Critics agree that recovery depends on a rally in domestic consumption and more stable oil prices and the domestic economy is past the worst given that household debts are partly cleared and consumption is on the rise.

Japanese Boycott May Backfire In April 2005, the Korean netizens started a boycott of Japanese products to protest the Tokdo affair. Though the Finance Ministers of both Japan and Korea agreed to press ahead with the ROK-Japan Free Trade Agreement by setting aside the political differences, the Korean public has been stirred up and was reacting hysterically. The Casio electronic dictionary is being boycotted because of the definition for "Takeshima" in the Japanese describes the islet as Japanese. The electronic dictionary uses contents from Kojien, the most authoritative dictionary in Japan. Other electronic dictionaries such as those from Sony and Sharp also use the Kojien dictionary, an employee of Casio's Korean branch said. Not only the dictionary but also other Japanese electronic products are becoming targets of boycott like in China. Shops that sell electronic devices, including Japanese digital televisions, are suffering from declining sales amid anti-Japanese sentiment over the Tokto issue. Hi-Mart stores have stopped sales of digital televisions made by Japanese brands such as Panasonic, Toshiba and Mitsubishi. LG International, importer of Canon digital cameras, had planned to begin a large-scale marketing campaign, including a television ad featuring Russian tennis star Maria Sharapova, but delayed the project.

Violence in China against Japanese citizens and restaurants was starting to concern the Japanese public. There was growing support for a hard-line against the Chinese government for not stopping these acts of violence. Though the Chinese government did take steps in mid-April, the violence continued -- and there was a growing public concern.

Surprisingly, the Korean "wave" is still on-going with the Japanese in love with Korean soap opera stars and tourism to Korea from Japan is up. Japanese media was still visiting the sets of the TV melodramas to photograph the stars idolized in Japan. Conversely, the tourism to Japan to Kyoto was reported to have fallen off 45 percent. There were concerns as the Japanese tourism target market was Korea and Singapore. However, the ROK public reaction was starting to affect the remarks negatively of readers of Japan Today on ROK-Japan related stories. The Japanese government was starting to take a hard stand on the Tokdo issue with the issuance of its Diplomatic Blue Paper for 2005, which clearly stated that Tokdo was Japanese territory. The right-wing supporters of the history textbook had the texts translated into Chinese and Korean and placed on the internet in mid-April because they felt that many protestors were reacting violently without even reading the texts.

ROK International Prestige Endangered As far as Korea's bloated self-image of itself as a "balancer," the truth is that though it is the 11th nation in terms of economic earnings, it has not translated this position into world political prestige. Though Roh's PR machine attempted to build up support within the populace, it fizzled. By 18 Apr, the Cheong Wa Dae spokesman was stating that the ROK role as a "balancer" was that of a "facilitator" for peace -- and not in the economic or military sense. The idea that the ROK was a "shrimp swimming amongst whales" finally was sinking in.

On the North Korean Human Rights issue, the ROK abstains -- though the world condemns the North's human rights violations of refugees, public executions, treatment of political prisoners (including the Korean War POWs who were never returned) and abductees (mostly Korean fisherman) who remain in North Korea. The South Korean government once again abstained from voting on a resolution on North Korean human rights conditions at a U.N. human rights panel meeting on 14 April in Geneva. Member countries of the U.N. Human Rights Commission adopted a resolution condemning rights abuses in North Korea.

On the problem of human trafficking, the South refuses to sign the UN protocal to prevent such occurrences -- and instead spend 4.1 percent of its GDP on its sex industry. Throughout the world, the ROK is becoming known as an EXPORTER of prostitution. Since the crackdown in Sep 2004 that shut down the red light districts, many of the pimps and prostitutes are going overseas to ply their trade. In America, there has been a sharp increase of illegal Korean aliens who were smuggled into the US for prostitution -- with massage parlors throughout the nation being used as brothels. Most of the prostitutes arrived on tourist visas and simply overstayed their visas, while others have entered the US through Canada.

In terms of humanitarian aid, the ROK is sorely remiss. The ROK is one of the lowest contributors to economic development programs in the world. Though its Christian missionaries are in all countries, the ROK government has not supported such programs in any significant manner.

ROK Credibility at UN Endangered because in Arrears Now as Korea seeks to exert its power on the international stage over Tokdo sovereignty and UN participation, it is finding itself again behind. Korea is in arrears to United Nations organizations, including for peacekeeping operations, will reach up to $100 million this year, an amount which government officials say may be too high for the nation to handle easily. According to the Korea Herald on 8 Apr 2005, "The amount of arrearage, added to Korea's relatively weak participation in the various PKO (peacekeeping) projects and meager voluntary contributions, could put Korea at a disadvantage in pushing for an expansion of the non-permanent seats in the U.N. Security Council, as well as its bid to enter the council in 2007." Korea opposes one of the United Nations' plans, which has garnered much support elsewhere, to expand the number of permanent seats in the Security Council. It prefers more non-permanent seats. The United Nations is set to launch wide-ranging reform of the Security Council from this September, while Korea is bidding for a non-permanent seat for 2007-2008 -- but because of its arrears, its position may be affected. So far, the government has failed to pay up to $70 million owed to U.N. peacekeeping operations, one of the two budget allocations to each member country. Assessed payments - divided into regular and peacekeeping budgets - are made against every member country, which can also choose to make additional voluntary payments. If nation's arrears exceeds two years of budget dues, voting rights can be suspended. Korea has been paying in full the regular budget, which is calculated annually, but has been failing to pay much of the peacekeeping dues, which change sporadically based on ongoing operations.

The government has been able so far to scratch up enough money so far to avoid losing voting rights. But to secure more influence in the U.N. decision-making process, three areas are deemed crucial: fulfillment of budget obligations, manpower participation in peacekeeping operations, and the amount of voluntary contributions. Korea rates 11th in allotment fulfillment among the 191 member countries, but is 70th or 80th in peacekeeping participation. There are currently only about 50 Koreans involved in peacekeeping activities in such areas as West Sahara and Pakistan. And, its voluntary payments are among the lowest of any member countries, government. Getting sufficient funds exclusively for U.N. budget obligations from the nation's yearly budget distribution by the Ministry of Planning and Budget have been difficult and sensitive.

Finally coming to terms with the gravity of the situation, the government decided this year to effectively manage and pay off arrearage to the international organization as one of the top priority projects by the Foreign Ministry. In order to effectively engage in U.N. peacekeeping activities, the Defense and Foreign Ministries are pushing to introduce a special law to set up a specialized unit in the Korean military.

The reason for such a sharp increase in the arrearage is due to Korea's increased allotment rate from 1.0 percent in 2000 to nearly 1.8 percent this year. The rate is adjusted according to the Gross National Product. Korea was among the fastest growing countries to be hit with drastic allotment increases over the past several years. "The actual amount of Korea's payment, therefore, has increased by 40 percent in total each year recently," the official said. The highest percentage allotment rates are 22 percent for the United States and 19.5 percent for Japan.

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GNP Criticizes Roh's "balancer" policy (8-13 Apr 2005) GNP leader Park Geun-hye criticized President Roh's vision of South Korea as a "Northeast Asia balancer," warning that it may harm the alliance with the United States. However, this conservative viewpoint may be too little, too late. The Roh administration is pushing the US-ROK alliance over the brink. In a 8 Apr report in the Korea Herald, "The president's Northeast Asia balancer vision contradicts the goal to strengthen the Korea-U.S. alliance," said Chairwoman Park of the Grand National Party in her opening speech to the National Assembly April extra session. "He must realize that it would be extremely difficult to restore the close relationship with the United States once the damage has been done." "Neither China, Japan, Russia or North Korea regards us as the balancer of Northeast Asia," Park added. "Disregarding this reality and slackening the alliance with the United States will only create diplomatic isolation and harm the nation."

Park also stressed the need for Seoul and Washington to come up with a joint strategy for North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons. "But also, there is a need to clarify that stern punishment awaits North Korea should it continue to pursue its development of nuclear weapons, crossing the so-called red line," said Park. "We have to make sure the North sees that there would be no guarantees for its economic problems or security as long as it possesses nuclear weapons."

The ruling Uri Party immediately criticized Park's comments against the president's diplomatic policy. "It is illiberal and narrow-minded to regard the government's diplomatic policy to be inconsistent with the Korea-U.S. alliance," said Uri spokesman Oh Young-sik. "The president's vision has its basis on the strong alliance with the United States. Park seems to lack international understanding." Uri floor leader Chung Sye-kyun's opening speech Thursday focused on the importance of the Korea-U.S. alliance, He spoke in line with Roh's diplomatic keynotes, emphasizing the importance of direct talks with North Korea. Unfortunately, in our opinion, simply saying "US-ROK alliance is strong and healthy" does not mean it is. The ROK under Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun have consistently undermined the alliance -- and the US is no longer playing a passive role to the ROK's ever increasing "self-reliant" policies. Instead, the US is saying, you want a "self-reliant defense" but refuse to pay for it -- you can suffer the consequences.

On 13 Apr 2005 Uri Party and GNP lawmakers confronted each other in the National Assembly over the issue of the security alliance with the United States in a debate over the direction of government policy. GNP members expressed concern over President Roh Moo-hyun's view that Korea can play a "balancing role" in East Asian geopolitics. A National Security Council official has said that the president envisions South Korea as a stabilizing force in a region where the interests of China, Japan and South Korea are closely intertwined.

GNP lawmakers criticized the government, saying that the policy had damaged South Korea's security relationship with the United States. Gong Sung-jin of the GNP said South Korea needed to be a firm U.S. ally. "The U.S. will for the next 20 to 30 years play the role of balancer," Mr. Gong said. ``Claiming to be a regional balancer when we’re not even on equal footing with China or Japan will only cause friction in the South Korea-U.S. alliance,’’ he said. Lee Seong-Kwon, another GNP lawmaker, pointed out that ties to the US which he called a longtime "blood brother" had been strained and warned that further deterioration could lead the country into trouble. GNP Rep. Go Jin-hwa described the vision as ``unfinished and immature.’’ He suggested what he calls a ``Peace Initiative Strategy’’ instead, calling for economic cooperation to pave the way for a community.

Lawmaker Lee Nak-yon from the MDP also questioned the feasibility of the president's new policy line. "The government says a balancing role will be based upon an alliance with the United States, but neighboring countries don't see it as credible," Mr. Lee said. But at the same time, he claimed that ``Tokyo is pushing Seoul in the direction of Beijing’’ by distorting history and laying claim to South Korean territory. He blamed Japanese politicians for tilting the scale the other way by souring bilateral relations.

Addressing the issue of strained ties, Uri Party lawmaker Lee Kang-rae placed the blame on Washington, pointing out that U.S. troop relocations in Japan have altered the function of U.S. forces stationed on the peninsula; thus the government needed to have a different approach to the alliance. "A stronger growing U.S.-Japan military alliance is making our choices harder," he said.

Chung Dong-young, Unification Minister and head of the National Security Council, said he was confident about the alliance with the United States. "In a brief period, South Korea and the United States have closed several sensitive issues such as the relocation of the Yongsan Garrison and the repositioning of U.S. forces stationed on the peninsula," said . "Different opinions have been cited throughout that process but overall the alliance is being maintained in good shape." He sees the strategy as an appropriate step toward peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia propelled by South Korea. Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung reiterated that the military alliance between South Korea and the U.S. remains as strong as ever in reply to the lawmakers’ questions.

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Kim Dae-jung Gives Advice to Uri Party: US-ROK alliance Central Axis (8 Apr 2005) Even former president Kim Dae-hung on 8 Apr told the newly-elected ruling Uri Party leadership it was best for Korea’s diplomatic relations to operate within three paradigms: a strong Korea-U.S. relationship, a tripartite alliance with Japan added, and cooperation with the region's four Great Powers. "This is not a choice but a position we have to accept fatalistically, our destiny," Kim added. Kim's remarks stress that ROK diplomacy should be forged in a multilateral structure with the Korea-U.S. alliance serving as the central axis, maintaining "mutual assistance" with Japan on a concentric circle, and formulating "cooperative" relations with China and Russia.

On the matter of the Dokto islets, Kim said if too much noise is made about it, it will only play into the hands of Japanese attempts to turn the rocks into disputed territory.

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Cheong Wa Dae Poll: 70 percent support "balancer" role Strangely, the Roh PR campaign style of "taking it to the people" is at it again. According to polls, seven out of 10 Koreans support President Roh Moo-hyun's aggrandized foreign strategy for the nation to become the "balancer" of Northeast Asia. A majority also felt the government must take stronger action against Japan's claims to the Dokdo islands and controversial history textbooks which Korea and other Asian countries criticize for history "distortions." The findings were in a survey of 1,000 people over 20 years old by Cheong Wa Dae's public survey office last week. The survey focused on questions about Roh's "balancer" policy, in which he contended Korea must seek to become the power balancer in Northeast Asia, a role that could possibly realign Korea's alliance with the United States in face of China's rapidly growing international status.

Nearly 15 percent of the respondents described Roh's policy as "very appropriate," while 60 percent called it "appropriate overall." However, a majority took a skeptical view, with 68 percent saying Korea as a Northeast Asia balancer had limitations but could be possible. More than 20 percent said it was virtually impossible, while 11 percent said it was viable.

Despite the contrasting responses, the survey showed a majority of the respondents, 72 percent, felt the recent guidelines differed little from the government's mainstream foreign policy. Nearly 68 percent, mostly respondents in their 20s and 30s, said Korea's move to become the balancer derives from changes within neighboring countries looking toward "supremacy." Some 35 percent said the reason behind the balancer role declaration was "to express an independent voice and to act on it," while 32 percent felt it was "to keep at bay the supremacy of China and Japan." Another 26 percent thought it was "to collaborate better with China by breaking away from the intensifying Washington-Tokyo influence."

In order to become the Northeast Asian power balancer, 58 percent felt the country required economic competency, 20 percent diplomatic skills, 15 percent national defense capabilities, and 6 percent intensified Seoul-Washington relations. Another survey conducted by a private polling agency TNS showed similar results, with nearly 70 percent of respondents expressing support toward the "balancer" policy.

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WRSA-K stockpiles to be Dumped??? According to Chosun Ilbo on 8 April 2005, a letter sent to the Ministry of Defense in which Washington officially told Seoul of its plan to eliminate its War Reserve Stocks for Allies-Korea (WRSA-K), ordinance stored on the Korean Peninsula for use in an emergency meaning first weeks of a war. The letter dated May 20, 2004 was signed by then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and addressed to South Korea's then-Defense Minister Cho Yung-kil following several years of discussion. According to the letter, the Pentagon formally notified the ROK MND that it would end the war reserve stocks program in December 2006. According to the USFK, the letter "provided a two-and- a-half- year notification to allow for adjustments to the loss of the program." The USFK stress that "the U.S. government never intended for WRSA-K to be a permanent program. With the ROK becoming the 11th largest economy in the world, the program outlived its original purpose and was deemed no longer necessary a few years ago."

Letter written by Paul Wolfowitz to Minister Cho Yong-gil on 20 May 2004

The bottomline is that the ROK was offered the munitions in 1996 but declined stating budgetary problems. The ROK was again offered the munitions during the FOTA negotiations in 2000, but again declined. This offer has also expired. The MND was notified in 2004 that the WRSK-A was to disappear in Dec 2006 and they still did nothing. Either through incompetence (unlikely) or with forethought thinking the US could be coerced into picking up the tab (most likely), the MND has failed the country it is sworn to protect. The MND now is running around trying to blame the US for this -- or atleast to divert people's attention.

This is old news that was in the newspapers in 2004, but some in the ROK media look at it as some sort of USFK scheme to punish the ROK. The National Assembly also debated on this item in 2004 and it was reported that much of the munitions the ROK had on hand was either outdated or soon would be. The most immediate need was for the ROK Navy in terms of munitions. The USFK used to be responsible for accountability but not the storage of the WRSA-K which was handled by the ROK in MAGNUM sites controlled by the ROK. The Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Secretary of State was permitted to transfer to Korea obsolete or surplus items in the DoD inventory which are in the WRSA for the Republic of Korea in return for concessions by the Republic of Korea. The authority expired on 29 April 1996 and required Congressional notification 30-days prior to the transfer which identifies the items transferred and the concessions to be given. In 2000, the munitions were again offered to the ROK during the FOTA negotiations, but the ROK again declined the offer stating budget problems. A similar offer was made in 2002, but again the ROK continued to ignore the offer until it expired in 2003. In 2004, US accountability for ROK munitions was transferred to the ROK in preparation for eliminating the WRSA-K program. Now the ROK is faced with a situation that in Dec 2006, its forces will have ten-days of ammunition in case the North attacks -- unless it can dig its chestnuts out of the fire. (NOTE: The Uri Party defense committee chairman claims that a new bill is before Congress to once again "offer" the munitions to the ROK, but we have no information on this at this time in Apr 2005.)

War Reserve Stockpiles for Allies (WRSA) War Reserve Stocks for Allies gives an excellent overview of the WRSA concept:

6-24. War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA) Overview and Guidance

• a. Specific equipment densities, a force structure, or a capability for the supported allied Armed Forces are recommended by the U.S. forces, the allied government, and the supporting CINC under OSD or HQDA guidance for inclusion in the WRSA structure. Also included are appropriate data on equipment requirements, on-hand densities, existing APS, projected FMS, and production capabilities. After development, these recommendations are validated annually by HQDA committee. This review process ensures that APS recommendation meets OSD or HQDA guidance. It also ensures that the APS stocks for the program are limited to combat essential items and provide only austere levels of support. The validated on-hand density of equipment in the supported force structure (e.g., Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) and Republic of Korea Marine Corps (ROKMC) units) will become the database for requirements computation.
  
  
• b. The WRSA stockpile replaces allied combat losses and combat consumption only. Items for Initial Issue Quantity (IIQ) and float stockage are not authorized.
  
  
• c. Missiles and rockets are distributed to WRSA only after all U.S. requirements are filled.
  
  
• d. The U.S.-supported portion of the WRSA requirements will be determined based on validated structure and appropriate loss and consumption factors. The requirements are then adjusted by applying the ally's assets, to include: additional assets provided by transfers from various military assistance programs; in-country production capability; co- production projects; programmed FMS; and programmed third-country assistance. If the actual allied asset cannot be determined, then the pipeline and stockage levels will be considered full. The stockage materiel requirements, adjusted by the above, constitute the U.S.-supported portion of WRSA. They are part of the AAO for major items and ammunition, and stockage requirements for secondary items.

The following is from DISAM: Greenbook: War Reserves Stockpiles for Allies (WRSA) provides a wealth of information that discredits a lot of the misinformation put out by the Uri party and Ministry of Defense to mislead the media and sway public opinion -- or rather to deflect attention from their own ineptitude in handling the WRSA-K situation back in 2002-2003. DISAM: Greenbook: War Reserves Stockpiles for Allies (WRSA) states, "Security assistance, like other U.S. government programs, is governed by U.S. statute. The primary or basic laws are the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended. Funds are appropriated for security assistance in the annual Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriation Act, FY20XX. Notwithstanding certain security assistance sales programs, such as foreign military cash sales and commercial sales which do not involve funding authorizations or appropriations, the Congress still has an interest in these programs and has, over the years, incorporated certain control and reporting measures in the law affecting these as well as appropriated programs."

War Reserves Stockpiles for Allies (WRSA)

Section 514(b) of the FAA sets an annual ceiling on the value of additions to stockpiles of U.S. defense articles located abroad that may be set aside, earmarked, reserved, or otherwise intended for use as war reserve stocks for allied or other foreign countries (other than those for NATO purposes or in the implementation of agreements with Israel). From 1979 until 1988, the Republic of Korea was the only country outside of NATO where such war reserve stockpiles were authorized to be maintained. For FY 1988, Congress approved an Administration request to establish a new stockpile in Thailand, and $10 million in defense articles was authorized to be transferred for this purpose. Then, for FY 1990, at the initiative of Congress, $100 million in defense articles was authorized to establish a stockpile in Israel. For FY 1991, Congress authorized stockpiles in the major non-NATO allies' countries, and $378 million in stockpile additions, of which not less than $300 million was designated for stockpiles in Israel, with the remainder divided between Korea ($68M) and Thailand ($10M). For FY 1993, Congress authorized a total of $389M worth of U.S. defense equipment to be transferred to the WRSA in FY 1993; not less than $200,000,000 was designated for stockpiles in Israel, and up to $189,000,000 was available for stockpiles in Korea [Section 569, P.L. 102-391]. Congress authorized a total of $292M worth of equipment to be made available for transfer to the WRSA during FY 1994. Of this total, $200M would be available for stockpiling in Israel, with up to $72M for South Korea, and up to $20M for Thailand. For FY 1995, Congress authorized an additional $200M for the stockpile in Israel and up to $40M and $10M for South Korea and Thailand respectively [Section 535, P.L. 103-306].

Beginning in FY 1996, the President can also designate any country for such stockpiling [Section 541(c)(2), FAA] with a 15-day notification to Congress; however, the value of the stocks to be set aside each year for any country (other than NATO or Israel) must be approved by annual security assistance authorizing legislation [Section 541(b)(1), FAA]. Up to $40M and $10M of defense articles may be stockpiled in Korea and Thailand, respectively in each of FY 1996 and FY 1997 [Section 531B(b), P.L. 104-107]. For FY 1998, Congress authorized up to an additional $40M and $20M in stockpiles for South Korea and Thailand respectively [Section 575 P.L. 105-118]. For FY 1999, Congress likewise authorized up to an additional $320M and $20M in the stockpiles for South Korea and Thailand respectively [Section 571, P.L. 105-277]. Additionally for FY 2000, Congress authorized up to $40M and $20M more for the stockpiles for South Korea and Thailand respectively (Section 1232, P.L. 106-113]. During FY 2001, Congress authorized up to $50M more for the South Korea stockpile [Section 111, P.L. 106-280].

It should be understood that no new procurements are involved in establishing and maintaining these stockpiles. Rather, the defense articles used to establish a stockpile and the annual authorized additions represent defense articles which are already within the stocks of the U.S. armed forces. The stockpile authorizing legislation simply identifies a level of value for which a stockpile may be established or increased. Moreover, the defense articles which have been placed in these stockpiles remain U.S. military service-owned and controlled stocks. As the term "war reserve" implies, these stocks are intended only for use in emergencies. Any future transfer of title/control of any of these stocks to an allied or friendly country would require full reimbursement by the purchaser under FMS procedures, or from military assistance funds made available for that purpose under security assistance legislation prevailing at the time the transfer was made. An example of the requirements to transfer WRSA material is illustrated in Section 509(a)(1) of The Foreign Relations Authorization Act FY1994 and 1995 [P.L. 103-236] with respect to Korea. The Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Secretary of State was permitted to transfer to Korea obsolete or surplus items in the DoD inventory which are in the WRSA for the Republic of Korea in return for concessions by the Republic of Korea. The authority expired on 29 April 1996 and required Congressional notification 30-days prior to the transfer which identifies the items transferred and the concessions to be given. Section 112, P.L. 106-280, provided a similar transfer authority with the government of Israel to expire 6 October 2003.

War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA) is a Department of Defense program to have the Services procure or retain in their inventories those minimum stockpiles of materiel such as munitions, equipment, and combat-essential consumables to ensure support for selected allied forces in time of war until future in-country production and external resupply can meet the estimated combat consumption. As this applies to the ROK, the last portion applies -- "until future in-country production and external resupply can meet combat consumption." The ROK is now G-11 nation capable of supporting its own resupply -- and notification was made when the ROK was a G-12 nation.

According to the 2004 RAND Report, "More specifically, security cooperation with the U.S. significantly reduces strains on the ROK defense budget. For illustrative purposes: the U.S. War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA) constitutes roughly 60 percent of the ammunition required in wartime; at roughly $4 billion, this would fund the ROK military training program for 30 years.7 The relationship with the U.S. also frees up Korean defense resources for other purposes. By relying de facto on the U.S. to pick up some of the short-term readiness requirements for dealing with the North Korean threat, for example, Korea has been able to focus its military modernization program in recent years on longer-term objectives related to Korea's future regional role. Still another way to think about this aspect of the relationship is in terms of what effect a U.S. military withdrawal would have on Korean defense spending. According to one account, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) has estimated that an American departure would more than double South Korean defense spending from 2.7 percent to as high as 6 percent of Korea's gross domestic product. (8) This U.S. role in ameliorating the effects of Korea's budgetary strains should not be underestimated. Although Korea's economic recovery in the past couple years has enabled the government to restore some of the cuts made in its force improvement program as a result of the Asian financial crisis, key items such as airborne warning and control system (AWACS), attack helicopters, and air refueling aircraft remain deferred because of insufficient funding.(9) It is uncertain whether Korea will even be able to procure some of the equipment currently budgeted.

WRSA is an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) directed program that ensures US preparedness to assist designated allies in case of war. WRSA assets are pre-positioned in the appropriate theater and owned and financed by the US. They are released to the proper Army component commander for transfer to the supported allied force under the Foreign Assistance Act upon a declaration of defense condition 2, and under existing country-to-country memorandums of agreement. The program was established in 1961. The WRSA-K stockpiles were established in 1978. From 1979 until 1988, the Republic of Korea was the only country outside of NATO where such war reserve stockpiles were authorized to be maintained. In 1984, a ROK-US memorandum of agreement was concluded on the ROK-US WRSA and the sale of stockpiled US supplies to South Korea. Korea through the bilateral agreement funded storage, maintenance, in-country transit, and other WRSA-related costs. Congress limits the value of assets transferred into WRSA stockpiles located in foreign countries in any fiscal year through authorizing legislation. The U.S. retains title to the stocks; title must be transferred before the foreign country may use them. The topic was broached of the ROK picking up the responsibility of its own WRS munitions in 2000, but the ROK claimed budget problems. In 2002, the subject was again broached during the FOTA negotiations, but no action was taken. In May 2004, the U.S. formally informed Korea that it would eliminate the WRSA-K by December 2006 because the US felt that the ROK could afford to support its own defense.

According to 11.3.5 WAR RESERVE STOCKS FOR ALLIES (WRSA),

"The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 established the WRSA program, which allows stockpiling U.S.-owned war reserve materiel during peacetime in order to ensure U.S. ability to supplement selected allies’ sustainability during wartime until they can be resupplied. U.S. policy requires allies provide for their own sustainability to the maximum extent possible; any action to supplement established allied war reserve requirements will be considered only on a case-by-case basis. Any nation hosting such a stockpile is expected to fund storage, maintenance, in-country transit, and other WRSA-related costs."

"Congress limits the value of assets transferred into WRSA stockpiles located in foreign countries in any fiscal year to the amount of security assistance specified in authorizing legislation for that same fiscal year. The U.S. retains title to the stocks; title must be transferred before the foreign country may use them. WRSA complements U.S. allies’ capability to support themselves, and WRSA assets, in combination with allies’ assets, are expected to provide minimum essential war reserve stocks needed to satisfy combat consumption until resupply can be established."

Also see Armament Cooperation Handbook for overview of Armament Cooperation Programs.

The following is from DISAM Journal, Winter 1999-2000 detailing the stockpiling of munitions in Korea and the disposition of "obsolete" munitions:

• Additions Relating to the Stockpiling of Defense Articles for Foreign Countries (§584)

• • §514(b)(2), FAA, establishes the annual value of defense articles located abroad that may be set aside, reserved, or otherwise earmarked from U.S. military inventories for use as war reserve stocks for allies (WRSA) or for other countries other than for NATO or Israel. The title to these stocks and their control remains with the U.S. government, and any future transfer of any of these items must be in accordance with the provisions of the security assistance legislation prevailing at the time of such transfer.
• • Congress has amended §514(b)(2), FAA, to approve WRSA additions totaling $60M for FY2000. Of the total, such additions valued at not more than $40M are authorized to be transferred to stockpiles in the Republic of Korea, and not more than $20M for stockpiles in Thailand.

============================ • Section 1232 authorizes the transfer of munitions, equipment, and material to the Republic of Korea and Thailand in return for concessions negotiated by the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. The items eligible for this transfer must be:

• • Obsolete or surplus,
• • In the DoD inventory,
• • Intended for use as reserve stocks in the applicable country, and
• • As of 29 November 1999, located in a stockpile in the applicable country.
• • The value of the negotiated concessions shall be at least equal to the fair market value of the items transferred. The concessions may include cash compensation, services, waiver of charges otherwise payable by the U.S., and other items of value. Congress is to be notified not less than 30 days before the transfer with details of the transfer and the concessions received.

The Korea Primer (March 2003) for the "U.S. – ROK Umbrella Agreement concerning Wartime Host Nation Support reaffirms the obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty of October 1, 1953; Desiring to enhance the capability "to defend the Korean Peninsula, in times of crisis, hostilities, or war, by facilitating the deployment of U.S. reinforcing forces and thereby improving their combat power, through Wartime Host Nation Support." "Wartime Host Nation Support" (WHNS) means military and civilian resources and assistance provided by the Republic of Korea for the reception, onward movement, and sustainment of U.S. Forces in times of crisis, hostilities, or war, the provision of which may be set forth in support agreements, arrangements and plans concluded between the parties. The WRSA-K is impacted by the following Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) dealing with ammunition operations and resupply for the ROKN, ROKA and ROKAF.

• (1) 5. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE COMMANDER UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES KOREA AND THE COMMANDER NAVAL BASE KOREA FOR THE COMBINED UNITED STATES/REPUBLIC OF KOREA NAVY LOGISTICS COORDINATION COMMITTEE (CLCC). FEBRUARY 1982.
• (2) 6. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA ON THE AMMUNITION SUPPLY COORDINATING GROUP (ASCG). DECEMBER 1982.
• (3) 7. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON SINGLE AMMUNITION LOGISTICS SYSTEM-KOREA (SALS-K) REIMBURSEMENT RATE. AUGUST 1984.
• (4) 11. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AIR FORCE CONCERNING STORAGE OF UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WAR RESERVE MUNITIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AIR FORCE MUNITIONS FACILITIES (MAGNUM). AUG 1987. (SITE NOTE: See PACAF MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF NON-NUCLEAR MUNITIONS for detailed operations.)

ROKAF MAGNUM Storage The United States Air Force has a continuing requirement to maintain adequate supplies of ammunition and explosives within the ROK to support wartime and contingency operational plans. Since capabilities are limited on USAF-controlled installations, the US obtained additional storage capabilities through a concept known as MAGNUM (Munitions Storage Activities Gained by Negotiations of USAF/ROKAF Memorandum). (SITE NOTE: One of the largest ROK MAGNUMs operates just outside the North Gate of Kunsan AB -- though unknown to most airmen at Kunsan.)

MAGNUMs are a concept unique to Korea, where USAF-titled munitions are stored at facilities which are owned, operated, and protected by the ROKAF. Accordingly, the USAF has very little control over the storage of munitions within these areas and no authority to enforce the maintenance of Q-D clear zones. As a result of encroachment by the Korean civilians into the explosive clear zones, there are large numbers of exposures around the MAGNUMs.

There is a permanent exemption from US DOD Q-D standards for off-installation and ROK exposures created by storage of USAF munitions at MAGNUM locations. This exemption applies for all off-installation and ROK violations created by the originally sited net explosives weight (NEW) of storage structures located at the Osan, Kunsan, Suwon, Kwang Ju, Sachon, Taegu, and Cheong Ju MAGNUMs. (SITE NOTE: In the past, PACAF semi-annual inventories of munitions were required, but waived for Cheong-Ju, Sachon and Taegu.)

Where the WRSA-K munitions are collocated with USAF munitions, the assets are labeled with an "FV" account number and stored separately. Basically the ROKAF stored that munitions in MAGNUMS and provided custodial duties, while the USFK function provided the accountability of the assets as the munitions were US titled assets. US titled munitions in ROK MAGNUMs are not the responsibility of the USFK dealing with "denial" procedures (blowing munitions if overrun). The following applies to PACAF operations and WRSA-K assets in ROKAF MAGNUMs to provide a general understanding.

MAGNUM (MUNITIONS ACTIVITIES GAINED BY NEGOTIATIONS OF USAF/ROKAF MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING) sites are used to store USAF titled munitions in ROK facilities. Reporting procedures to PACAF are mandated for the Kunsan and Osan MAGNUM sites. According to PACAF SUP 1, AFI 21-201, 8 Oct 2004, pg 24, "40.1. General. MAGNUMs store USAF titled munitions in ROKAF facilities. USAF personnel provide technical assistance, surveillance and evaluation of ROKAF management and maintenance actions IAW the USAF/ROKAF Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). The primary purpose of the MAGNUMs is to ensure accountability and serviceability of the USAF titled munitions to ensure readiness for war plan taskings. The 8 and 51 MAGNUMS will be managed and controlled through their respective commanders. This is the only section pertaining to the management of the MAGNUMs and for the evaluation of ROKAF MAGNUM management." (This means only the US titled munitions stored in the MAGNUMS were tracked. ROK assets were the ROK's business.)

"40.6.1. Although they may be in the same storage structure, War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA) munitions will be separated from USAF WRM stocks. All WRSA stocks will be marked with the appropriate FV account number and will not be marked with the term “WRSA”." (This indicates the term "WRSA" was NOT an approved marking and the FV account numbers designating the user would be used for tracking.)

"40.6.2. WRSA and USAF WRM stocks will be maintained on separate stock record account numbers (SRANs)." (SITE NOTE: The WRSA was to be used by the ROK and USAF WRM to be used by follow-on forces.)

"The MAGNUMs will report WRSA munitions condition code changes to 607ASUS/LGW for evaluation. 607ASUS will determine if the munitions cannot be used for their intended purpose and require replacement. 607ASUS and 607ASUS/LGMW will determine if replacement munitions are available in Korea. 607ASUS will direct the RDO of munitions between units under their supervision to replace unserviceable WRSA munitions. 607ASUS will prepare RDOs for replacement munitions from all other PACAF units in Korea. Requirements for WRSA munitions that cannot be replaced in Korea will be forwarded to HQ PACAF/LGWX for resolution." (SITE NOTE: WRSA was kept on separate munition stock accounts. In Dec 2004, this reporting was eliminated and the ROK took over inventory and restockage on their own. Indications are that this was NOT happening simply because the ROK did not program funds into their budget for replacement stocks. The National Assembly report -- when they were trying to ascertain the cost of the move from Yongsan that the ROK would have to pay -- brought to light the fact that much of the munitions under the WRSA was going to be outdated soon and needed replacement.)

Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-4) and WRSA-K The WRSA-K munitions stockpile is part of the Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-4) for the Pacific Area. As to the USFK role in the war readiness munitions, the USFK operates separately from the ROK. This deals with the Army Prepositioned Land (APL) stocks that in turn impact the RSO&I operations of the follow-ons and encompasses APS-4 (Pacific) -- Korea, Japan and Guam.

Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) are positioned as follows:

• (1) APS-1 ((Continental U.S. (CONUS)) -- OPROJs and AWRS.
• (2) APS-2 (Europe)--Contingency unit sets, which includes the Immediate Ready Force, OPROJs, AWRS, and WRSA-Israel.
• (3) APS-3 (Afloat)--Unit sets, OPROJs, and AWRS.
• (4) APS-4 (Pacific and Northeast Asia)--Unit sets, OPROJs, AWRS, and WRSA. War Reserve Stockpile --Thailand (WRS-T), although not part of APS-4, is a U.S. owned, Joint Service ammunition stockpile held in and for Thailand.
• (5) APS-5 ((Southwest Asia (SWA)) -- APS unit sets, OPROJs, and AWRS.

APS-4 (Pacific) includes pre-positioned sets, operational project stocks, war reserve sustainment stocks, and War Reserve Stocks for Allies-Korea (WRSA-K). Currently a 2x2 Brigade set is located in Korea. This means equipment for two armored battalions and two mechanized infantry battalions. There are munitions available to provide for 90 days of war-fighting capability. (SITE NOTE: The ROK has a target of 60 days of war-fighting capability.)

The WRSI are the prepositioned assets to be used by the follow-on forces in Kimhae -- and at Taegu, Osan and Kunsan. However, because the ROK does not want to fund Korean positions that maintain these WRSI (War Readiness Secondary Items), some of the assets may be considered for return to the US -- and the follow-on numbers cut. This is only guessing -- but Lt.Gen Campbell strongly hinted at this.

The 6th Ordnance Battalion exercises command and control over six ordnance companies located throughout the Republic of Korea and is headquartered in Camp Carrol at Waegan. It performs accountability, visibility, maintenance and surveillance functions for US titled munitions in support of Eighth United States Army and the Republic of Korea Army. The Battalion plans, coordinates and supervises all field maintenance; demilitarization operations on US titled munitions and are responsible for the safe operation of Korea's only peacetime ammunition pier – Chinhae. Subordinate units coordinate directly with the Republic of Korea Army to receive, store, issue and transport munitions in accordance with the Single Ammunition Logistics Systems-Korea (SALS-K) agreement -- for United States titled ammunition support EUSA signed in 1974.

On order the Battalion executes the War Reserve Stocks for Allies-Korea (WRSA-K) ammunition title transfer operations, provides GS CL V support to EUSA and common items. The accountability under ROKA IAW WRSA MOA #1 (the Critical Requirements Deficiency List (CRDL)) was transferred to the ROK in December 2004. (See Military Relocation: March 2004 for Congressional testimony.)

As far as munitions for USAF follow-on forces, multi-million dollar construction projectshave been completed for munition igloos at Osan, Kunsan and Taegu to store munitions for the follow-on aircraft that will be arriving. These munitions are for the intial days of the war. It may come as a surprise to some that the Army and Air Force PRIMARY war reserve munitions are on floating ships out of Saipan and Diego Garcia. These floating munitions ships are assigned separately to support the USAF, Army and Navy in case of war.

Disposal Procedures of Outdated Munitions Changed in Sep 2003 The Chosun Ilbo on 5 Sep. 2003 reported that an agreement was reached on munitions demolition. The ROK and USFK decided to revise the memorandum of understanding (MOU) on 4 Sep 2003 regarding the ``ammunition demilitarization process'' as it has been under fire for being "unfair" to the South Korean side. Under the 1999 accord, the pact required the South Korean military authorities to hold prior consultation with the U.S. military before disposing of its own ammunition. This item has been an arguing point with politicians and activists, but in truth it is really only a hassle point.

ROK and USFK officials agreed to revise a controversial ammunition disposal agreement in a "fair and environment-friendly way" according to the Ministry of Defense. Under the old 1999 accord, U.S. forces in South Korea were allowed to "detonate or incinerate" their ammunition, not only from its bases in the South but also from other nearby overseas bases such as Okinawa. The importation of outdated munitions from Japan or Okinawa for disposal is NOT a major concern. Though the provision was in effect, the U.S. has NEVER imported munitions for disposal simply because it was NOT cost effective.

On the opposite side of the coin, transporting the outdated munitions out of Korea for disposal would be prohibitively high as well if sent to the nearest safe disposal sites in the Pacific. It would be better to construct facilities in Korea and dispose of it in-country. Once built, the new facilities will be capable of reprocessing more than 10,000 tons of used ammunitions annually. Currently, the two nations store and incinerate the used materials but the new facility is expected to save up to 120 billion won in expenses for dealing with the used ammunition over the next 15 years.

The new environmentally-friendly treatment facilities will be built by 2006 and cost W49.6 billion ($42 million), half paid by Washington, half by Seoul. They will be able to treat up to 10,000 tons of old ammunition, and will save W120 billion won over the next 15 years by eliminating management and storage costs. The site for the facility is yet to be selected.

The process of the WRSA-K being eliminated and the ROK refusing to assume the outdated munitions will cause multiple complications due to the provisions that the USFK cannot "detonate or incinerate" munitions harmful to the environment. According to the agreement, the United States will no longer be able to bring in for disposal here old ammunition from U.S. forces based outside of America or Korea. Also, ammunition owned by the USFK but judged dangerous for the environment cannot be treated in the new facilities. Also, the Korean military will be allowed to dispose of its ammunition without consulting the USFK, which it had to do in the past.

Under the agreement signed on 4 Sept 2003, Korea may dispose of their own outdated munitions without notifying the USFK. Signing the agreement were Choi Dong-jin, chief of the ministry's acquisition office, and Charles Campbell, U.S. Forces Korea chief of staff. (NOTE: The term "outdated munitions" or "spent munitions" implies that these items are WRM ordnance that has not been fired and has exceeded their shelf life for safe storage.)

The significance may not seem apparent until you consider that over 70 percent of all the ROK War Reserve Stock munitions are provided by the U.S. (NOTE: This startling fact is from the ROK's own assessment in March 2003 of its ability to be "self-reliant" by 2010. By Apr 2004, the MND was talking about 60 percent of the WRM)

Reading between the lines, it appeared at the time that they had just split the accounts to allow the ROK to handle their WRM munitions on their own. If this was true, this meant that the U.S. would transfer their WRM munitions assets gratis to the ROK -- and resupply would have to be renegotiated. In this way, the USFK and ROK would each replenish their own WRM stocks through their own supply sources. It was confirmed in Apr 2004 that an offer was made, but the ROK had declined this offer at the time.

A joint-use WRM account provided the bulk of the munitions up till Dec 2004. However, with this agreement, the ROK would handle their own WRM assets after Dec 2004 and therefore, it would be logical that the ROK would have the ability to dispose of its assets without reporting to the U.S. for accountability purposes. After Dec 2004, the ROK responsibility was to start picking up the cost of its own WRM munitions in the future -- something that was long overdue.

WRSA-K and Distorted Korean Media Reports The ROK media at first confused the ROK munitions that it had on-hand and the WRSA-K munitions which belonged to the US. The WRSA equipment and munitions belongs to the USFK and the DoD determines its disposition -- NOT the ROK.

The ROK media also seemed to have the impression that the USFK controlled the sales of the munitions in the WRSA-K. The Congress has to approve any munitions sales. The latest "plan" proposed by the ROK is to simply buy the munitions at bargain rates -- though it will still cost at a minimum W1 trillion (US$1 billion).

The USFK has stated emphatically that it has "not offered to sell the stocks to the ROK government, nor engaged in any negotiations concerning the potential sale of WRSA assets. The sale, destruction or removal of the stocks is a U.S. Congressional decision." Supposedly, the U.S. has been raising questions to Korea on how to deal with the WRSA issue since 2000. In addition, a relevant bill is pending in U.S. Congress. Any overseas sale, disposal or transport of WRSA should be approved by the Congress.

According to the Chosun Ilbo editorial, "The allied forces of the U.S. and Korea set for themselves the goal of having enough ammunition to last 60 days in the event of an emergency." The use of the word "dump" instead of "eliminate" speaks loads of the media intent -- giving the impression that the US was doing something spiteful. Without the WRSA ammunition, the Korean forces possess only 10 days of ammunition. The amount stands at only one sixth of the storage target set by the Korean forces (60 days munitions) -- though the WRSA is set up for 90 days. To put it succinctly, the US currently supplies 60 percent of the ROK ammunition needs and in 2006, the ROK will be left with only a gaping hole as the munitions are US owned and the WRSA-K will disappear. The bottomline is that the ROK has NOT taken any measures to fill the gap to procure munitions prior to the December 2006 through their own negligence -- or because they insanely thought the US would continue to pick up the tab.

U.S. Told Seoul of Plans to Dump Ammo Stocks

Washington told Seoul last May it planned to dump War Reserve Stocks for Allies-Korea (WRSA-K) -- ordinance reserves for use by Korea in an emergency - but the government kept the announcement to itself, it emerged Friday.

"Then-defense deputy secretary Paul Wolfowitz sent an official letter to then-defense minister Cho Yong-gil on May 20 of last year informing him of plans to do away with the WRSA-K," the U.S. Forces Korea said Friday. The stocks consists of about 600,000 tons of materiel worth about W5 trillion (US$5 billion). Some 99 percent of it is ammunition. That is 60-70 percent of the ammunition stocks Korea would need in an emergency and is therefore crucial to Korea's ability to carry out a war.

Resulting from the move, there is expected to be controversy between Korea and the U.S. over how to dispose of the reserves. The stocks might be sold to Korea, destroyed inside Korea or taken by the U.S. outside of Korea.

Wolfowitz wrote the plan called for a two-year-and-six-month period for Korea to prepare for the loss of the reserves; the scrapping of the WRSA is supposed to be completed by December 2006. Wolfowitz said the WRSA-K and the Critical Requirements Deficiency List (CRDL) played an important role in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula but were no longer serving their original goal of boosting Korea's ammunition distribution power or deterrent strength. He said the CRDL would be suspended in December 2004 and the WRSA-K scrapped two years later.

CRDL usually refers to bombs and equipment needed within the first 30 days after the outbreak of a war.

The USFK said Friday it considered the situation of Korea, the world's 11th largest economic power, and "judged that the WRSA plan had continued longer than initially planned, and that its maintenance has been unnecessary for several years."

Myth: Munitions Can Be Bought at Discount rates One MND official blithely stated, "All we need to do is negotiate to buy the supplies in 2006," a government official said. This attitude is based upon the belief that the US will sell the munitions it has in place. The ROK suggests that the US "asked" them to buy the munitions -- but this is emphatically denied by the USFK. Later the media was playing it up that the USFK had "demanded" that the ROK buy the munitions. In truth, on 25 Mar 1984, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed between the US-ROK on the selling of stockpiles to the ROK -- with the exception of WRSA. When the decision to eliminate the WRSA worldwide in 2000, the offer was again made to the ROK to buy the WRSA stockpile, but the ROK declined because of budgetary problems. Supposedly the offer was again made in 2002 during the FOTA, but again the ROK declined. These munitions were not to be sold at "discount" but at cost -- with the approval of the US Congress.

According to a ROK source, Korea would buy only what it needs, excluding unnecessary ammunition and supplies the U.S. plans to remove or destroy. The ROK agreed to buy a "set amount" -- only what it needs. This is emphatically denied by the USFK saying it was NEVER DISCUSSED. In the National Assembly inquiries in 2004, it was revealed that much of the ROK munitions were becoming outdated and needed replacement -- the most serious and immediate shortfalls in naval munitions. These are munitions that have gone past their useable life -- meaning the point where they become unsafe to store and handle.

Remember that there is a dire need to replenish the stocks depleted by the invasion of Iraq. These transfers to off-shore stockpiles would be first priority. However, much of these munitions are stored on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. Other munition stocks are aboard ships positioned in Saipan and Diego Garcia. Currently the Army is at "high risk" because the WRSI (War Reserve Secondary Items) are in short supply and need to be replenished. The status of War Reserve Stocks is also a priority because of Iraq War and Afghanistan situations.

What is disturbing is that the ROK believes the US will sell them the munitions at a "discount." According to the article one sees that current worth is about $5 billion dollars, but the ROK thinks it's going to buy it for $1 billion. The USFK emphatically denies any such discussions. But realistically, if such a deal were even hinted in the halls of Congress, there would be a great "discussion" -- especially since the ROK is now initiating realigning itself with China. This is a Congressional area of responsibility to approve or disapprove.

Basically the Congress does NOT give discounts. The Congress approves the Competitive Pricing For Sales of Defense Articles -- meaning the items are sold at cost. Direct costs associated with meeting a foreign customer’s additional or unique requirements will continue to be allowable under contracts under Arms Export Control Act (AECA). Loadings applicable to such direct costs shall be permitted at the same rates applicable to procurement of like items purchased by the Department of Defense for its own use.

MYTH: Missile under FMS Program at Discount Rates Perhaps the ROK is looking for some cheap buys under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program in the form of FMS grants ("free" gratis transfers) -- a program separate from the WRSA-K. (See DISAM: Greenbook: Conditions of Eligibility for criteria of "grant" aid.) Though the ROK continues to purchase equipment through the FMS program, the "free" FMS grants ended on 16 Dec 1986. The FMS grants to the ROK (gratis transfers) stopped in 1987. (See ROK MND: 2003. After 1986, the US was starting to recognize that the "miracle of the Han" had made the ROK into one of the four dragons of Asia -- a country well able to support its own defense.)

Normally munitions do NOT fall under FMS -- though missile and weapons development and aircraft upgrade kits for munitions does. The items that could fall within the FMS area are (1) munitions, sub-systems, and related equipment for possible sale of F-15K aircraft, including 105 AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles and 157 AIM-120C Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs); (2) 45 AGM-84-H Standoff Land Attack Missiles-Expanded Response missile systems, 1 ATM-84-H Exercise Missile and related equipment for use on F-15K aircraft. (3) Cooperative Logistics Supply Support agreement for radar and missiles. (4) Three MK-41 Vertical Launch Systems for South Korean destroyers. (5) 36 AH-1Z Super Cobra or AH-64D Apache attack helicopters with weapons and support equipment.

The basic legal controls of FMS which restrict the FMS program from quickly responding to a crisis, however, have not changed. This is normally a long and drawn out process because of the multiple levels of approval and regulations involved. This is NOT the method the ROK would seek to use because their shortfall is IMMEDIATE. The FMS program is normally for "hardware" meaning ships, spare parts, electronics and such. FMS Sales are primarily for "hardware" such as popular U.S. Army systems, including the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), Black Hawk helicopter, and TOW missile upgrades. However, there is increasing global competition in the international sales community, typified by intense competition for main battle tanks, attack helicopters, and tactical missile systems.

The FMS program is legally sanctioned in the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, as amended. The FMS program is the means by which military articles and services are transferred from a component of the U.S. government to a foreign government or international organization in non-emergency circumstances. From a legal perspective, the FMS program is a peace-time program, but world events now has made the FMS into a critical component of coalition defense operations, war-time planning, and logistics support.

The ROK media seems to be under the impression that the latest high-tech missiles and munitions are going to be sold at discount rates. This is up to Congress to approve these types of sales. Selling off "special" munitions (JDAMS, etc.) may not be in the offing as there are current shortfalls -- and WRSA-K stocks may be shifted elsewhere if the follow-ons are removed. Besides, the fills of missiles into an WRSA is only AFTER all other requirements are filled.

The following article from the Chosun Ilbo on 6 Apr 2005, was refuted by the USFK. The USFK stated that the "USFK has not offered to sell the stocks to the ROK government, nor engaged in any negotiations concerning the potential sale of WRSA assets. The sale, destruction or removal of the stocks is a U.S. Congressional decision." Even if the munitions were declared Excess Defense Equipment (EDA) and offered on a grant basis, the DoD must still notify the Congressional Committees on Appropriations. "Before issuing a letter of offer (LOA) to sell EDA under the AECA, DoD shall notify the Committees on Appropriations in accordance with regular notification procedures if the articles are significant military equipment (SME) or are valued (original acquisition cost) at $7,000,000 or more, or if notification is required elsewhere in this Act for the use of appropriated funds for specific countries that would receive such EDA. The notification is to include the original acquisition cost for the articles." The WRSA munitions could possibly be interpreted to fall within this category.

MYTH: USFK asked ROK to buy Munitions In the past, the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Secretary of State was permitted to transfer to Korea obsolete or surplus items in the DoD inventory which are in the WRSA for the Republic of Korea in return for concessions by the Republic of Korea. The authority expired on 29 April 1996 and required Congressional notification 30-days prior to the transfer which identifies the items transferred and the concessions to be given.

It is claimed that the ROK was again offered the munitions in 2000, but again declined because of "budgetary problems." According to the Korea Times on 11 Apr, "The termination of the WRSA program has been going on at global level,'' ministry spokesman Shin Hyun-don said in a press briefing. ``The U.S. first notified us of the issue in 2000, long before the so-called balancer policy emerged.'' The WRSA programs with the Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand ended before 2002, he said. South Korea and Israel only maintain the programs.

Suggestions were supposedly made in 2002 as the US started to feel the ROK being a G-12 nation (and later G-11 nation) could afford to shoulder more of the costs of its own defense. Again the ROK declined. Currently the ROK is suggesting that there is a bill before the US Congress to once again offer the munitions to the ROK but this has not been substantiated.

The media hype first stated the US "asked" the ROK to purchase the WRSA munitions -- but later the media substituted "demanded" instead. The intent is plain that the media wishes to somehow shift the blame to the US. However, the USFK flatly denies that there was ever any offer to have the ROK purchase the munitions.

The ROK media continues to view the WRSA-K munitions as being part of the cost-sharing formula. It was not -- and never has been. The munitions are stored by the ROK at their expense though the munitions are US titled. In other words, the ROK stored and maintained the munitions, while the US handled inventory and accountability ONLY. All of this is covered under the various Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) covered by the ROK Umbrella Agreement concerning Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS). The cost-sharing is part of the WRSI (War Reserve Secondary Items) which are the follow-on gear stored in Kimhae and other locations -- and the Korean workers are paid for by the ROK. Both the WRSA-K and WRSI falls under the APS-4 (Army Prepositioned Stocks (Pacific)).

Seoul Will Buy U.S. Ammunition Stocks

In negotiations with the U.S., the Korean government agreed to buy a large quantity of the WRSA (War Reserve Stocks For Allies) ammunition stocks pre-positioned on the Korean Peninsula for use in an emergency.

"The U.S. asked Korea to buy the ammunition stocks during USFK burden-sharing negotiations held at the end of last month," a government spokesman said. "Following consideration in the Defense Ministry and National Security Council, the government decided to purchase a set amount." The official said Korea would buy only what it needs, excluding unnecessary ammunition and supplies the U.S. plans to remove or destroy. But he said the exact amount Korea would buy was "a military secret."

"The purchase of the ammunition stores is in accordance with plans for an independent defense our government is pursuing," a Foreign Ministry official said. "This is not an instance of the U.S. military suddenly dumping the problem on us without consultation."

Current WRSA ammunition stores in Korea are about 600,000 tons and worth nearly W5 trillion (US$5 billion). This is roughly 60~70 percent of the ammunition that would be needed in an emergency. Thus even if Korea buys the stores at a discount, Seoul will likely have to spend about W1 trillion to get what it needs. "The cost of the purchase could exceed the costs saved by cutting our USFK cost-sharing contribution -- a reduction of about W60 billion," the official said. "But this is a cost we're going to have to pay eventually to attain independent defense capabilities."

Costs for maintaining the WRSA stores have so far been shared between the U.S. and Korea, with Korea paying W70 billion a year. Korea's defense budget for this year swelled to W20.8 trillion, a 9.9 percent increase over last year's. (SITE NOTE: This remark of WRSA and cost-sharing is not quite true. The USFK handled the requisitioning, but the ROK handled the storage. There was very little in the way of cost-sharing...with the US footing the majority of the costs.)

Of this, W7 trillion was earmarked for investment in fighting strength in line with the independent defense initiative, a 12.8 percent boost from the previous year.

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USFK Refutes Misleading Statements on WRSA-K The USFK took exception with some items from the ROK media reports and the misinformation disseminated by the ROK Ministry of Defense. The following is from the USFK Website on 8 Apr 2005.

USFK: WRSA Independent of Cost-sharing negotiations

YONGSAN GARRISON, Seoul, Republic of Korea -- USFK clarifies that the War Reserve Stock Allies-Korea issue is independent of the recent burden-share negotiations between the Republic of Korea and the United States governments and has no impact on the proposed job cuts announced by the command last week.

Stories about the WRSA-K, published in the Chosun Ilbo April 5 and 7, 2005 presented some inaccurate facts. USFK wasn't asked its position in the WRSA articles and wishes to correct the record to ensure that accurate, fair and balanced reporting is presented to the public.

The U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense formerly notified the ROK Minister of National Defense of the termination of the program in a letter dated May 20, 2004, following several years of discussions. The letter provided a two-and- a-half- year notification to allow for adjustments to the loss of the program. It is important to note that the U.S. government never intended for WRSA-K to be a permanent program. With the ROK becoming the 11th largest economy in the world, the program outlived its original purpose and was deemed no longer necessary a few years ago.

Additionally, USFK has not offered to sell the stocks to the ROK government, nor engaged in any negotiations concerning the potential sale of WRSA assets. The sale, destruction or removal of the stocks is a U.S. Congressional decision.

Other inaccuracies are as follows:

The April 5 article, "War-time ammunition in Korean Peninsula to be disposed of" asserts that:

• a. The U.S. had unofficially informed Korea's military authorities that it plans to scrap the War Reserve Stocks Allies-Korea."
• b. "But the Korean Government and military say rather than destroy the stocks or ship them back to the US, Washington will ask Seoul to buy them."
• c. "A military source familiar with the USFK said Monday cost saving and changes in "operational thinking" prompted the US to decide to get rid of WRSA-K.
• d. "The disclosure follows an announcement that the USFK is laying off 1,000 Korean workers and could remove pre-positioned USFK equipment and supplies from the peninsula…." .
• e. "… but experts say that due to the large quantity of obsolete ordnance in the WRSA stores they could be bought for about 1 trillion won."

Inaccuracies in the April 7 "Seoul Will Buy U.S. Ammunition Stocks" article include:

• a."In negotiations with the US the Korean government agreed to buy a large quantity of the War Reserve Stocks Allies-Korea (WRSA-K) ammunition stocks prepositioned…"
• b."The US asked Korea to buy the ammunition stocks during USFK burden-sharing negotiations held at the end of last month…"

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ROK WRSA-K Hype Continues: South Korea to "Selectively" Buy Stocked US Ammunition The following articles gives the impression that the USFK is attempting to "force" the entire stocks of ammunition onto the ROK. In addition, the impression is that most of the stocks are outdated and unusable. Then the hype has the ROK "gratuitously" purchasing the munitions -- like it was doing the US a favor. According to the hype, the ROK claims the munitions are mostly "obsolete" -- which is ridiculous as these items were inventoried and requirements reviewed SEMI-ANNUALLY. The ROK sources state, "The arsenals nationwide currently have 280 types of WRSA ammunition, ranging from outdated firearms, and bombs to the latest missiles, amounting to 600,000 tons, but most of what is stored is considered obsolete." Under the WRSA program, Washington has maintained about 600,000 tons of ammunition here since 1982, though the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed in 1984. The whole theme of the media hype is insulting to American sensibilities. Despite the letter which specifically stated that the WRSA-K was being eliminated because the ROK was able to afford the costs as a G-12 nation -- under the guidelines that established the WRSA -- the ROK still wants to give the impression that it was the rising costs of maintaining the stockpiles.

The bottomline is the MND wants to go "cheap." The National Assembly just isn't funding its requirements -- though the MND itself stated that to have a viable military force it needed funding at 3.2 -3.5 percent of GDP. According to MND: 2003, "Currently, the national defense budget is appropriated at around 2.7% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as of 2003. This allocation rate has been declining for the past few years, rendering overall maintenance and investment in future defense buildup even more problematic. The ROK Armed Forces projects that, in order to overcome these impediments and build a military force that can guarantee the nation's survival and prosperity, a budget at the 3.2~3.5% level of GDP must be appropriated for national defense."

The MND doesn't have a clue as to what it needs. "We are currently analyzing what we need and what we don't," said an official with the Korean Defense Ministry yesterday. The official said some of the WRSA-K stocks could be used by Korean forces, while others, too old to be used, would be disposed of. We believe the ROK is right now trying to establish the minimum requirements -- using their standards. (NOTE: The US sets the War Reserve Stock requirement at 90 days supply, while the ROK target is 60 days. This is strange as the ROK must fight a delaying action because of the numerically superior North and await the arrival of the US follow-on troops. 60 days is cutting it very thin.) In addition, first time tasks such as the artillery counterfire mission will require determination of how much is required for this mission.

The ROK produces the ammunition for most of the weapons that are co-produced under license in Korea -- but this is mainly small arms ammunition, grenades, mortars, mines, and recoilless rifle ammunition. On 8 Jun 1989, the ROK-US signed a MOU on the use of technology on the production of defense materials in the ROK. (See Dumb Bombs to get an idea of the great diversity in the types of "dumb bombs" that there are to choose from. Dumb bombs hung on "smart fighters" are highly effective -- though JDAMS "smart bombs" do allow release farther from the target and precision is a big plus.)

Whether the Roh, the Ministry of Defense and the Uri Party are trying to incite the public to anti-Americanism -- or simply trying to convince the public that they don't need all the munitions -- or trying to say the munitions were all outdated -- we don't know. What we do know is that the MND is in a big bind -- and it will cost them. The ROK locally manufactures munitions under license, but there is no way that they could meet the demand to fill their requirements.

The Joongang Ilbo ran an article on 13 Apr that stated: "When Thailand terminated its war reserve stocks program with the United States in 2002, it received almost all the stocks for free,” said the official."

The idea behind this is obvious -- the ROK is looking for a "good deal" like the Thai's got. However, the Thailand stockpile is strictly for US forces in operations such as Cobra Gold as well as a lot of exercises in the region. In addition, Thailand provides "contingency" bases if there is ever a need. The WRS-T (War Reserve Stockpile --Thailand (WRS-T), is NOT a part of APS-4 -- Army Prepositioned Stocks (Pacific). It is a U.S. owned, Joint Service ammunition stockpile held in and for Thailand.

The article went on to say, "Korean officials have been keen to emphasize that the termination of the program does not indicate any rift in the Korea-U.S. alliance, as some local newspapers speculate. "This has been an issue that was discussed between the two countries for a long time," said the Defense Ministry official, who added that selling munitions to Korea instead of maintaining a vast stock on the peninsula was feasible. "This is purely an issue of money."

On 14 Apr, the MND and Uri Party discussed the WRSA issue According to an article in the Joongang Ilbo on 14 Apr, during the MND and Uri Party meeting on 13 Apr, some more reasonable comments were made. Representative Kim Sung-gon, a defense policymaker of the Uri Party said, "We believe that some of the munitions will have to be disposed of, while some will be relocated to the United States." "Some may still be left in Korea free of charge or if Seoul purchases it." This was first intelligent remark so far -- admitting that the ROK really doesn't know what to do about this situation at this time. The article also stated that the reason for the WRSA-K being cancelled because "the South had become a leading industrial power" without mentioning that it could afford to pay for its munitions by itself.

The MND is in deep trouble!!!

S. Korea to 'Selectively' Buy Stocked U.S. Ammunition

SEOUL, April 13 (Yonhap) -- South Korea will seek to "selectively" purchase a massive amount of U.S. ammunition stockpiled here for use in an emergency situation, as Washington plans to scrap the war reserve program, officials said Wednesday.

The U.S. military has stockpiled 600,000 tons of ammunition in South Korea since the 1970s for use in the event that armed conflict erupts on the peninsula.

Washington, however, notified Seoul last year of its decision to scrap the so-called War Reserves Stock Allies-Korea by the end of next year, citing rising cost for keeping the munitions and South Korea's improved military and economic capability. (SITE NOTE: The letter cited the ROK being a G-12 nation capable of paying for the munitions without US assistance. The USFK has refuted this.)

According to some press reports, the United States demanded that South Korea buy the whole stockpile, which could amount to 5 trillion won (US$4.9 billion). The U.S. military denied the reports. (SITE NOTE: In previous media stories, the US "asked" but now the US "demanded" the ROK buy the munitions. The USFK has emphatically denied this.)

"In future negotiations with the U.S., we will consider the idea of buying U.S. ammunitions on a selective basis that are necessary for our combat capability," an official at the ruling Uri Party said, requesting anonymity. (SITE NOTE: Who cares what a politician says -- it is an official of the Ministry of Defense that matters.)

The position was agreed upon by Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung, members of the National Assembly's defense committee and top Uri Party officials, the official said.

He said most of the U.S. ammunition is more than 20 years old and needs repairs. (SITE NOTE: This is garbage from a munitions standpoint. The age of the munitions is not the criteria used to determine whether the munitions are safe or usable.)

About 32,500 U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea, a legacy of the 1950-53 Korean War.

An editorial that ran in the Hankyoreh News on 11 April was even more ridiculous. It stated that the "ammunition is not very strategically significant in the era of electronic warfare. Most of it is old and cannot perform a deterrent role, while still being extraordinarily expensive in terms of maintenance and repair." These remarks are stupid. "Cannot perfor a deterrent role???" So the ROK tanks will throw stones at the advancing North Koreans??? What "electronic warfare" is going to knock out the hoardes of North Koreans pouring across the border??? This newspaper's editorial staff thinks war is like a computer game where you can push reset to start all over if the outcome is not to your liking.

Don't Exaggerate About US Munitions

It has been learned well after the fact that he United States has told Korea that its plans to maintain reserve materials will be terminated by the end of next year. Controversy is stirring because the US told Korea of its plans in June of last year but the Korean government kept the information undisclosed for a year after that.

Some 99 percent of these materials are "War Reserve Stocks for Allies" (WRSA). That ammunition is not very strategically significant in the era of electronic warfare. Most of it is old and cannot perform a deterrent role, while still being extraordinarily expensive in terms of maintenance and repair. That is why the US Congress is terminating similar plans around the world, and the only countries have not seen reductions are Korea and Israel. In addition, most of the weapons being removed are things Korea produces on its own. Put simply, the end of such plans actually feels late in coming.

The only problem is that the Ministry of National Defense (MND) kept the matter a secret. Believing that shipping them back to the United States would entail too much expense the US Congress would like to see them sold or destroyed, and so the MND might have been thinking that it would lose its edge in negotiations should the information be made public and the focus of public opinion. It is an issue of war deterrence, and as such there can be issues which must be examined from a variety of perspectives. There could be serious environmental problems should the munitions be destroyed in Korea. One cannot understand how the MND consistently insisted on keeping the information a secret, without there having been any public discussion, and to have done so supposedly for the sake of the national interest. In the end, the ministry's shortsightedness has led to all sorts of speculation about the country's security.

It is very inappropriate for some in our society to exaggerate the significance of the move by suggesting there are signs of a crack in the US-Korea alliance, because it is something that was discussed between the two countries back since 2000. It is also not something that should be used to promote anxieties in the area of security. It was in December that the US stopped maintaining munitions that Korea can use in an emergency, and the reason given is that the Korean military has an appropriate amount of firepower.

The Hankyoreh, 11 April 2005.

Then on 13 April, the Donga Ilbo published an article about the policy coordination meeting between the Uri Party and the MND that has the ROK "gratuitously" buying the munitions from the US -- as though the US should bow down and thank the ROK for this honor. Our advice is to sell the munitions to the ROK "AT COST" -- and if the ROK refuses, simply blow the munitions up in place or transport them out.

Government Plans Take Over, Purchase of Reserve Munitions

APRIL 13, 2005 23:05 by Yong-Gwan Jung (yongari@donga.com)

It was reported on April 13 that the government and the Uri Party are considering a measure to gratuitously take over or partially purchase ammunition from the War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA), which the U.S. has saved for an emergency on the Korean Peninsula.

The minister of National Defense, Yoon Kwang-ung, and ruling party members from National Defense Committee, including Kim Seong-gon, deputy commissioner for policy coordination, had a meeting on a plan to improve the alliance between Korea and the U.S. at the National Assembly on that day, and discussed the countermeasure following the U.S.’s notification that it will abolish the WRSA program.

A key official of the Uri Party said that Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand also took over much of their reserved stock of munitions or bought items at a discounted price when their WRSA programs ended in 2000, adding that considering those precedents, the government would try to take over items free of charge or selectively purchase the munitions necessary to reinforce its military power in the process of negotiations with the U.S. (SITE NOTE: Again the Koreans are attempting to "go cheap." Taiwan NEVER had a WRSA as such would have created a confrontation with China -- instead Taiwan purchased munitions and armaments WITH CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL under various FMS or DoD programs. The Philippines NEVER had a WRSA -- only massive stockpiles for US forces operating in the region. When the Philippines "kicked out" the US, the stockpiles left via ships through Subic Bay. Thailand has a WRS STOCKPILE -- meaning it is US titled munitions for use by the US forces during exercises or contingency.)

Regarding the matter, the Ministry of National Defense was reported to have started classifying ammunition in order to identify how much ammunition the military needs.

A key source from the ruling party stated that the government and the ruling party were examining a plan to buy 800 billion won worth ammunition out of total WRSA ammunition stocks worth five trillion won. (SITE NOTE: 800 million will not even scratch the surface of the requirements.)

The arsenals nationwide currently have 280 types of WRSA ammunition, ranging from outdated firearms, and bombs to the latest missiles, amounting to 600,000 tons, but most of what is stored is considered obsolete. (SITE NOTE: The JDAMS and missiles will NOT be transferred as there is outstanding requirements in US arsennals outside of Korea that require fills FIRST. Other types of outdated munitions (or unsafe munitions) will be destroyed in place and the ROK can figure out how to replace them...as they should have been doing all along. In Dec 2006, the full brunt of the problem will collapse in on the ROK.)

Finally the Korea Times published an article on 13 Apr that brings to light an important item that the ROK press has failed to mention before.

``A bill over the program’s termination is now pending in the U.S. Congress,’’ ministry spokesman Shin Hyun-don told reporters. ``The government will negotiate the issue with the U.S. when Congress passes the bill with all of the options on the table, including the partial purchase of the WRSA.’’ Shin dismissed speculation that the war reserve issue might be an expression of Washington’s discontent at the negotiations of defense costs between the two countries that cuts Seoul’s shares. ``The withdrawal of the WRSA program has been going on at a global level,’’ Shin said.

The U.S. first decided to scrap the WRSA-K in 2000, he said. At the time, the U.S. Defense Department introduced a bill to eliminate the WRSA-K that was later passed by Congress, but Seoul declined to buy the supplies, citing budget problems. The bill was automatically repealed in 2002, when it became invalid." (See Fiscal Year 2000 Security Assistance Legislation for 2000 Congressional details.)

The key point is that the ROK was offered the munitions at the onset of the process in 2000, but failed to act. Thus it was during the Kim Dae-jung term that this occurred -- and it is noteworthy that it was also at a time when the ROK was seeking reapproachment with the North. Procuring munitions would not have been prudent at the time. However, over a period of TWO YEARS, the ROK did nothing to resolve an obviously impending problem. Instead of committing monies to its defense, it cruised along feeling that the US would pick up the tab.

This is blatant negligence. And when you leave your armed forces with only ten days of ammunition in case your "ethnic brother" attacks you unexpectedly, places the Roh administration dead center in the bulls-eye.

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Roh Self-reliant Defense Reason for WRSA-K Demise According to the Donga Ilbo on 17 April, the ROK asked the US to reconsider the shutting down of the WRSA-K program when the US OFFICIALLY notified the ROK of this action in 2003 as Roh started his "self-reliant defense" strategy. This was in a lower level meeting in Jun 2003 on one of many topics to be brought up at the 38th Security Consultative Meeting in Oct 2003. Basically the dialogue went something like, "US: WRSA-K is dead by 2007. PERIOD!!! ROK: We can't afford it so let's talk about it later. US: Are you deaf??? WRSA-K is dead by 2007."

It seems very clear that the US was NOT going to discuss this later irregardless of how much the ROK wanted to implement its now famous "stall and conquer" negotiation techniques. Remember that Donald Rumsfield got tired of the technique to stall things. In 1990 the ROK agreed to have the USFK out of Yongsan by 1996, but delayed it (while stabbing the USFK all along) until 2003 when Rumsfield said "enough is enough" in Jan 2003 and said we're moving EVERYTHING out of Yongsan. We are playing hardball.

There was NO joint communique after the end of the Oct 2003 SCM because of the contentiousness of the meeting. We remind the reader what we wrote on Oct 2003 on Military Affairs: 2003: "The ROK Ministry of Defense has stated repeatedly that they will try to sell the Yongsan land FIRST to offset the costs of relocation. If they are intending to follow through on their pledge, how will they do so while the land issues are still unresolved as to the how much of Yongsan will remain in USFK control. This seriously smells like a ploy to get through the SCM scheduled for 28 October and then start on the renegotiation process under the classic "stall and conquer" strategy. During a succession of recent working-level consultations, the U.S. reportedly accepted most of South Korea's demands on revisions of agreements that stipulate the conditions of the relocation. Seoul has insisted the memorandum of understanding (MOU) and memorandum of agreement (MOA), signed between the two sides in 1990, imposed an unfair financial burden on South Korea. The U.S. states that it is willing to bend, but the MOA will remain in effect."

This article seems to try to PROVE that the ROK had entered into negotiations to extend it out. But it certainly didn't say anything in Dec 2004 when the USFK turned control of accountability for WRSA-K stocks to the ROK -- though it retained ownership of the US-titled munitions. In other words, the ROK was supposed to start restocking THEIR war reserve stocks with an accountability system that was already in place. The ROK did NOT do anything.

Korea Asked U.S. Not to End Munitions Stockpile Program

APRIL 17, 2005 23:23 by Sang-Ho Yun (ysh1005@donga.com)

It was confirmed that when the U.S. first notified the Korean government that it decided to end the War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA) program in 2003, Korea strongly requested the U.S. to review the measure because it “could be interpreted as a weakening of the Korea-U.S. alliance.”

Controversy is expected as the aforementioned fact contradicts the government’s recent explanation that the abrogation of the WRSA program does not signify a weakening of the Korea-U.S. alliance. In particular, since it was revealed that the U.S. then brought up President Roh Moo-hyun’s policy to reinforce “independent national defense” as a major reason to end the WRSA program, it was found out that the emphasis on independent defense provided the U.S. with a reason to pressure Korea to augment its defense expenses.

According to the minutes of the 35th Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting’s (SCM) Logistics Cooperation Committee (LCC) held on June 12, 2003 that the newspaper acquired through a U.S. Pentagon channel yesterday, the U.S. notified in the meeting in Washington that “[we will] phase out and terminate the WRSA program by 2007.”

The U.S. argued, “The USFK is very pleased that President Roh re-manifested Korea’s policy to reinforce independent defense. This measure is integral to achieving President Roh’s objective.”

Subsequently, the U.S. added, “The WRSA program was made when it was difficult for Korea to buy or produce the necessary logistics for its military because its economy and industrial basis were frail. But the Korean economy has rapidly developed since then. For Korea to achieve independence in defense, it should not depend on the WRSA program any more.”

To the above remark, the Korean government expressed apprehension, saying, “Since Korea cannot increase its defense budget rapidly in the short-term, it is difficult to accept the U.S. suggestion. If we agree to the abrogation of the WRSA program, neighboring countries could think that the Korea-U.S. alliance has weakened.”

In addition, the Korean government suggested, “It is premature to end the WRSA program. Let’s discuss the revision or abrogation of the WRSA program again after enough logistics are stocked in the Korean Peninsula.”

At the conference, the U.S. Defense Department’s international cooperation bureau director Al Volkman and the Korean Defense Ministry’s logistics officer, Maj. Gen. Choi In-soo, attended as delegation leaders.

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Defense Ministry Proposes Robot Guards The most ridiculous "high-tech" suggestion from the Ministry of Defense occurred on 8 Apr 2005 when Yonhap News reported that the Defense Ministry had decided to develop an automatic surveillance system to guard the southern section of the 4-kilometer-wide heavily fortified DMZ.

The idea has merit especially since the Roh administration reduced the time the ROK military enlistments by up to six months -- meaning there will be a shortfall in troops in the future. It was a stupid idea -- but Roh made a promise for political gains and now the MND is stuck with it. According to MND: 2003, "With the service period of the military and other alternative services being reduced by 2 months, our military is seeking a plan to secure sufficient military manpower. As for the reserve forces system, an improvement plan will be proposed in 2003 and implemented in 2004, considering the required number of reserves according to the current security situation." The bottomline is the ROK just will not have enough enlistees to fill its billets within two-three years -- but to a short-term specialist like Roh, it will be the next President's problem.

These robots were given a short test with the ROK troops in Iraq to test its capabilities on their perimeter. As there is no one attacking in Irbil, it wasn't much of a test. Supposedly they were used to fire on insurgents who approached the base -- but other stories state that they never were anywhere near the fenceline.

According to the writeup, "Tens of thousands of South Korean soldiers guarding posts along the southern boundary of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) may be relieved of duty as early as 2007, as they will be replaced by high-tech surveillance cameras and robots. The MND said that it would complete a feasibility study of the planned system by the end of 2005, and the robots could be in operation as early as 2011. Korea Herald stated the Defense Ministry plans to deploy robots with combat capability along the heavily fortified inter-Korean border as part of revamped security measures to deter North Korean infiltration. Other measures include installing electronic warning systems and computerized surveillance cameras, including remotely monitored battlefield sensor systems and closed circuit televisions, along the 253-kilometer border in stages by 2011.

The ministry expects it will cost about 20 billion won to set up 250 robots every 1 kilometer along the border. Robots with weapons mounted on their frames are each expected to be able to observe from 2 and 1 kilometers during the day and night, respectively, and will have the capability to record voices and take pictures in a 180-degree circle. The robots were tested with larger .50 caliber machine guns as well as rocket and grenade launchers. The ministry here said it plans to equip its frontline guard posts with automatic alarm and surveillance systems by June 2006. It will also increase thermal detectors, or TOD, aimed at detecting moving objects with thermal characteristics. Elevated outposts, additional searchlights and rewired fences will also be part of short-term security plans. Currently, the border is protected by two-member patrols from guard posts located every 400 meters along the border fences. The teams change their positions about every 90 minutes. Some of the fences have rocks stuck into gaps, so that if the fence is bumped they will be dislodged and show possible intrusion. But there are no electric fences, nor electronic sensors and surveillance cameras.

NOTE: We believe the ROK is trying to divert attention away from all the other glaring problems -- equipment shortfalls; non-existent funding; and lack of ammunition. The ROK actually "stole" the idea of robotic sentries from the Israelis who intend to use it along the Gaza Strip. It appeared in a 19 June 2004 Associated Press story Defense News -- and the same story surfaced again on 7 Apr 2005. "Israel sees 'remote control' border with Gaza Plan includes unmanned patrol cars." Military officials also said, an army think tank has been working on a new border design for months. Planners envision a "remote control" border to cut down on the number of troops deployed in the area. High-tech equipment for border control is already being tested, they said. -- Under the new plan, first reported Friday in the Yediot Ahronot newspaper, the army will beef up the security fence that currently surrounds Gaza with special sensors that can see clearly in all types of weather and light conditions, military officials said. The new observation system, which will be able to identify potential assailants, will let a soldier in a remote operations room aim and shoot at the attacker, with the system deciding which weapon is the most appropriate to use, Yediot reported.

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ROK to Take Over Artillery Fire as of August 2005 The Joongang Ilbo on 11 Apr 2005 reported the ROK Army will take on the mission of countering long-range North Korean artillery fire this year, perhaps as soon as August. The ROK Ministry of Defense claims neutralizing the North's long-range artillery counterfire is one of the 10 military missions that are scheduled to be gradually assumed by the South Korean military as it takes on more responsibility for defending the country against potential attacks from North Korea. "The South Korean military has successfully conducted a couple of drills regarding the operation of the systems involved in counterfire missions," a senior Korean military official said yesterday. "Lately, our operational ability has greatly improved, and we expect a handover from the U.S. military by August."

According to the article, "Military analysts call counterfire the most important element of a response to an attack from the North. Currently, that mission falls to the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division, which operates 30 multiple launch rocket systems and 30 M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzers. Korean forces' recent training has focused on the use of a command system known as C4I, which integrates and relays intelligence collected by spy planes and radar stations to the counterfire artillery units, another Korean military official said. "Getting used to the C4I command and control system is the most important part. Now that that is done, we are ready to assume the missions," the official said." The problem, however, is that the ROK does NOT want to pay for the upgrade of their C4I systems claiming the USFK agreed to upgrade the systems according to their interpretation, while the USFK disagrees and wants the ROK to foot the bill. The matter is stalemated. The current situation appears to be that the US will simply NOT upgrade the ROK systems and the ROK is on its own -- simply relying on intelligence relayed from the US.

The USFK numbers do NOT seem to agree with the Joongang Ilbo article. According to the listing at Order of Battle: 2nd ID Division Artillery the numbers given in the ROK article do NOT match with USFK numbers. Currently there are 18 155mm M109A6 Paladins in country as the 2nd BN, 17th Field Artillery was sent to Iraq in Aug 2004. There are about 36 M270 MLRS (Multiple Launcher Rocket System). According to GlobalSecurity.org: DIVARTY, 2nd Infantry Division, "In order to execute that mission, DIVARTY employs two 155mm Direct Support Cannon Battalions, one Multiple Launch Rocket System-Army Tactical Missile System (MLRS/ATACMS) battalion, a separate MLRS/ATACMS battery, a target acquisition battery and a headquarters and headquarters battery. These units have a total of more than 2,000 highly trained and focused U.S. and Korean Augmentee to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) soldiers and support the Warrior Division from six separate camps." DIVARTY, 2nd Infantry Division (Camp Stanley) - Divisional Artillery, (NOTE: Orbat also lists 1-37 FA, Fort Lewis with 18 M109A6 SPA 155mm: A-38 FA; F-26 FA the location of 3rd BDE, 2d ID, the Stryker Combat Team.)

• DIVARTY, 2nd Infantry Division1st BN, 15th Field Artillery -- 24 - M109A6 (Camp Casey) (NOTE: Orbat gives 18 M109A6 SPA 155mm)
• DIVARTY, 2nd Infantry Division2nd BN, 17th Field Artillery -- 24 - M109A6 (Camp Hovey) (NOTE: Orbat gives 18 M109A6 SPA 155mm) (DEPLOYED TO IRAQ. REMOVED FROM USFK IN AUG 2004. TO RELOCATE TO FORT CARSON AFTER TOUR.)
• DIVARTY, 2nd Infantry Division6th BN, 37th Field Artillery -- 18 - M270 MLRS (Camp Stanley) -- three batteries ATACMS capable
• DIVARTY, 2nd Infantry Division1st BN, 38th Field Artillery -- 18 - M270 MLRS (Camp Stanley) (On 11 June 1993, the 2nd Infantry Division's newly activated separate battery, Alpha Battery, 38th Field Artillery, was attached to the 6th Battalion, 37th Field Artillery. This move made 6-37 FA (+) the largest MLRS battalion in the United States Army. In June 1994, the battalion (+) was moved to Camp Stanley. Unit stood up on 2001 with four batteries and one HHS.)

The first ATACMS was deployed in 2003 and a second battalion of MLRS deployed in 2004. The K-55 155mm howitzers fielded in 1997. The transfer of the artillery counterfire responsibility was in 2003 with the final transfer scheduled for August 2005. (See GlobalSecurity.org: Korea for details on USFK-ROK agreement.) According to the Joongang Ilbo, "Reduction of U.S. Forces in Korea to be Completed by 2007" (21 Aug 2004) during the 11th Future of the Alliance (FOTA) meeting in Seoul, the two countries decided to process the U.S. forces relocation, with the exception of some units, according to the schedule (2004-2006) as agreed to in 2003 with the transfer of 10 major U.S. tasks to the Korean army. There was a high possibility that the complete relocation was going to be delayed until 2007. In particular, the U.S. multiple rocket launcher unit, which is the countermeasure to the North Korean long-range missiles, and the Paladin Mobile Artillery Unit were to be retrieved in August 2005 after evaluating the Korean army's capabilities and if the Korean army agrees to their retrievals. An official in the National Defense Ministry said, "These units will be relocated only with agreement from the Korean army and because of this, the relocation time could be delayed to 2006 or 2007." Supposedly the US Sec of Defense Rumsfield and ROK Minister of Defense signed off on the agreement in Nov 2004 to keep the MLRS in place -- but NOT for slippages past the August 2005 deadline.

According to GlobalSecurity.orgOn 04 December 2001 Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control announced that it had received an $80.7 million contract to produce 111 Army Tactical Missile System (Army TACMS) Block IA missiles for the Republic of Korea. The contract represented the second purchase of the Army TACMS system by Korea and the first international sale of the Army TACMS Block IA system. The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contract included 110 Army TACMS FMS Block IAs and one ATACMS FMS Block IA for testing, and 29 multiple rocket launchers. The contract with South Korea had a total value of 400 billion won ($307 million). South Korea began deploying US-made missiles in December 2003 that can strike most of North Korea. The Army Tactical Missile System Block 1A missiles are being deployed near the Demilitarized Zone. South Korea deployed 110 surface-to-surface missiles with a range of up to 300 km (187 miles) by April 2004. This marks the first time that South Korea will deploy 300-km medium-range missiles, which are capable of striking Pyongyang and other key North Korean cities."

The ROK military does not have the M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzers with its self-contatined counterfire capabilities and "shoot and scoot" performance, but has the older K55 155mm howitzer manufactured under license in Korea. According to GlobalSecurity.org, "Samsung Aerospace Industries (SSA) was the prime contractor for local production of 155mm M109A2 self-propelled howitzer of which 1,040 were built under the co-production license with United Defense LP. Licence production of the M109A2, also designated the KM109A2, was completed in 1997. The K-55, a derivative of the American M109, provides full tracked, armored protection for the crew and ammunition. It features excellent all-terrain mobility and speed, with an aluminum armored hull and 360-degree turret. Artillery fire direction and overall battlefield management centers need the mobility and armored protection of the forces they control." ... "For firing battery and troop maneuvering to be effective, timely control and coordination are vital. The Fire Direction Center Vehicle [FDCV] provides such control and coordination through its unique combination of mobility, armored protection, and its on-board Battalion Tactical Computer System (BTCS)." The K55 is powered by the Detroit Diesel 8V-71T and eight cylinder, turbo-charged engine and can reach speeds of up to 56 kph.

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1,000 JDAMS to counter North's artillery??? The Donga Ilbo on 11 Apr 2005 reported that JDAMS were being considered to offset the North's artillery. This would be only good if you (1) did a PREEMPTIVE STRIKE with aircraft and (2) knew the LOCATION of the North's artillery which are hidden in tunnels when not exposed for firing. This is NOT feasible and that is why this appears to be the same distracting material as the Robo-border cops in a previous story to offset the growing criticism of the MND. Even the reporter does not know the difference between a bomb and a missile. The JDAMS is a "smart-bomb" -- not a "missile" which has internal propellant. It is a "bomb" that is guided to its target.

The media believed the JDAMS-hype put out by the MND. The Korea Times stated, "In a move toward building an independent defense system, the ministry said Monday that it is considering procuring 1,000 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bombs. The plan aims to enhance independent deterrent capabilities against some 3,000 long-range artilleries deployed near the Demilitarized Zone by the North. The JDAM, dubbed ``smart bombs,'' are cutting-edge missiles guided by global positioning satellite technology. With the JDAM kits, South Korea's military force would be able to carry out a surgical strike, accurately destroying North Korea's artillery capabilities, the officials said."

To use smart-bombs to take the place of return fire artillery is the STUPIDEST idea so far. Return fire is calculated from the round fired and then a round is fired on the same trajectory to blow up the weapon. The Paladin in Iraq was highly effective -- and then the Republican Guards figured this out and just didn't fire anymore. However, when you substitute an aircraft that is twenty minutes away to drop a JDAMS against such a target is dumb. Ask how many rounds can an artillery piece fire in 20 minutes? That makes this a dumb proposal. An aircraft mounted system is NOT intended to replace an artillery system.

But the JDAMS system is a great weapons system, but the question that comes up is that lead time must be figured into when the JDAMS can be in operation. Also doesn't the ROK planners realize that the fighter aircraft must be modified (connection to the INS and electrical systems) -- and do they have the kits??? These questions If the ROK wants these in place before Dec 2006, I think they have a hard row to hoe. This kind of planning should have been initiated by the ROKAF months ago.

But the bottomline is that the ROK capability to access incoming trajectory of weapons fired is "weak." The 155mm Paladin M109A6 can do this on the fly -- and has proven itself in combat in Iraq. The ROK does not have this capability with its K-55 (KM109A2) 155mm howitzers. This ability to return fire of the North's artillery on Seoul is one of the first responsibilities transferred to the ROK. The ROK has two MLRS (ATACMS) but the problem is getting the information to return fire. Unfortunately, the ROK does not want to fund its upgrade portions of the C4I and this info can be a problem...with the reliance on the USFK to supply the targeting coordinates. In addition the ROK does NOT have the penetrating capabilities of the new missiles on the USFK MLRS/ATACMS.

The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) GBU-29, GBU-30, GBU-31, GBU-32 is a tailkit under development to produce a weapon with high accuracy, all-weather, autonomous, conventional bombing capability. It will have to be used on the existing fighter aircraft that the ROK has: F-4, F-5E and F-16C/D -- with F-15K The following info is from FAS: JDAM

JDAM will upgrade the existing inventory of general purpose and penetrator unitary bombs, and a product improvement may add a terminal seeker to improve accuracy. JDAM can be launched from approximately 15 miles from the target and each is independently targeted. JDAM is not intended to replace any existing weapon system; rather, it is to provide accurate delivery of general purpose bombs in adverse weather conditions. The JDAM will upgrade the existing inventory of Mk-83 1,000- and Mk-84 2,000-pound general purpose unitary bombs and the 2,000-pound hard target penetrator bomb by integrating a guidance kit consisting of an inertial navigation system/global positioning system guidance kit. The 1,000-pound variant of JDAM is designated the GBU-31, and the 2,000-pound version of the JDAM is designated the GBU-32. JDAM variants for the Mk-80 250-pound and Mk-81 500-pound bombs are designated GBU-29 and GBU-30, respectively. Hard Target penetrators being changed into low-cost JDAMs included the 2,000 pound BLU-109 and 1,000 pound BLU-110.

Mission plans are loaded to the host aircraft prior to take off and include release envelope, target coordinates and weapon terminal parameters. The weapon automatically begins its initialization process during captive carry when power is applied by the aircraft. The weapon performs bit, and aligns its INS with the host aircraft’s system.

The following story is from the Donga Ilbo on 11 Apr 2005. It appears to be the same distracting material as the Robo-border cops in the preceding story to offset the growing criticism of the MND. The reporter does not know the difference between a bomb and a missile. The JDAMS is a smart-bomb -- NOT a missile.

This is another pipe dream thought up by the MND to divert attention from its apparent ineptitude in not dealing with the situation.

1,000 Guided Missiles to Be Introduced to Counter North Korean Artillery

APRIL 10, 2005 23:02 by Sang-Ho Yun (ysh1005@donga.com)

The Ministry of National Defense (MND) has decided to introduce 1,000 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kits, a cutting-edge guided missile, in an effort to guarantee South Korea’s independent deterrence against the North.

A MND official said on April 10, “The ministry recently reported the option of introducing 1,000 JDAM kits as part of its 2006-2010 Mid-Term National Defense Plan, and the National Security Council (NSC) is currently reviewing the details of the plan.”

The need for adoption of JDAM has long been discussed within the military, but this is the first time that the exact scale of introduction has been clarified. By introducing a huge number of JDAM units, the Defense Ministry aims at carrying out a surgical strike against, and eventually destroying, numerous field artillery pieces deployed by the North Korean armed forces near the Demilitarized Zone in case of an emergency.

According to the Defense White Paper released in early February, the number of field artillery units deployed by the North Korean armed forces reaches as many as 13,500, up by 1,000 compared to five years ago. Among them, approximately 3,000 units, including 170mm self-propelled guns and 240mm rocket launchers near the demilitarized zone. Military experts are worried that these field artillery pieces, ranging 50 to 60 kilometers, could serve as a serious threat to Korea-US core military facilities and the metropolitan area in the early stage of a possible war.

In response, Korea-US military authorities have come up with strong anti-firepower posture, aiming at grasping the location of North Korean artillery units with radar and immediately destroying them in case the North’s field artillery pieces are about to be fired or have already done so.

Anti-firepower operations have been the core of 10 major USFK services that have been carried out by the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division artillery component, equipped with approximately 30 units of Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) units and Paladin self-propelled howitzers respectively, and will be transferred to the Korean forces.

The Korean armed forces also possess dozens of MLRS units, but Korea’s Command & Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) system—designed for seizing signs of and striking the North’s long-range artillery being fired—as well as its operational ability within the system has been assessed to be somewhat weak. However, as the Korean armed forces’ anti-firepower capability has recently been greatly improved, it is highly likely that Korea will take over the responsibility for those operations within this year.

Korea-US military authorities formed a joint review team last October and agreed to decide the final transfer date by assessing Korean forces’ anti-firepower capability on a six-month basis starting from this August.

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Old News: ROK failure to procure Patriots Leave Gapping Hole in Air Defense According to the Yonhap News on 13 Apr, South Korea's indecision to introduce U.S.-made Patriot missiles is creating a big hole in its air defense system but the country is unlikely to make a decision on it any time soon and may even kill it, analysts say. The issue has drawn new attention as South Korea has already begun disbanding its aging U.S.-made high-altitude Nike Hercules missile units without any decision on substitute missiles.

In 2004, the ROK "reprioritized" their procurement projects and the SAM-X (next generation missile) was placed at the bottom. The SAM-X project has been shelved after the ROK decided not to procure used PAC-2 Patriots from Germany. Instead, the ROK is sitting under the USFK umbrella of PAC-3 Patriots at Suwon, Osan, Kunsan and Kwangju. These weapons are intended to protect the US forces against SCUD attacks from the North in case of an outbreak of war.

The Nike Hercules are vintage 1960s era weapons originally intended for anti-bomber use with proximity fuses. These weapons were upgraded by the ROK, but still are not considered to be effective anti-missile weapons. Even more deadly to maintainers -- and completely worthless in any real defense mode -- are the Honest John missiles that are a hazard to the ROK military maintainers and ROK citizenry nearby.

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ROK Seeks Russian Weaponry The same scenario is occurring again and the ROK has not learned from its lessons from the past. In the 1990s, the ROK rushed in where angels feared to tread based upon their greed...and got burnt big time. The US was pulling out in disgust under the Nunn-Warner initiative and the ROK was stunned that their "big brother" was leaving them. (NOTE: This concept of "big brother" is NEVER heard of in recent times.) The ROK started to think that it could go it alone only if it had toys like the big boys. The Russian empire collapsed and the ROK was left with a $1.7 billion loan debt that couldn't be repaid. In the mid-1990s, the ROK thought they could sneakily buy a scrap Russian aircraft carrier out of Vladivostok and convert it to the real thing -- against its signed treaty agreements. In order to do this it would also need Russian equipment. After years of haggling, the ROK decided to accept Russian equipment as part of the loan repayment. The bad news was that the ROK military is primarily US based in military technology and armaments. Nothing matched and resupply was a nightmare. The Russian equipment was shifted into a separate unit and slowly sank into oblivion -- only to resurface later when it moved the unit up to frontline positions on the DMZ. We wondered at the time how much Russian ammo and WRSI (War Reserve Secondary Items) had the ROK procured -- and the answer seems to be very little. The unit is eye-wash only. In later years, the ROK again considered using Russian technology on its ships and military upgrades (especially the FX fighter program), but the main set back was "interoperability." Now the ROK is considering doing this again. This time it thinks it can get Russian technology for an "anti-aircraft guided-missile system" to build its own home-grown requirement for its SAM-X Program. (See Story April 2005 story: "Old News: ROK failure to procure Patriots Leave Gapping Hole in Air Defense".) Remember that Korea has always preferred technology transfer when procuring anything from the ICE high-speed trains (which it reneged on) to the latest Golden Eagle Trainer joint venture (which it reneged on and had to pay millions on). In the past, the Russians have refused to discuss technology transfer except on "outdated" technologies.

Seoul Wants Russian Weapons Technology

By Jung Sung-ki
Staff Reporter

The Defense Ministry said Wednesday that it will ask Russia to transfer its advanced weapons technology, including an anti-aircraft guided missile system, to South Korea to repay its overdue debts to Seoul. (NOTE: The ROK is looking for a cheap substitute for the Patriot PAC-3 system under its bamboozled SAM-X system.)

During a four-day visit to Russia, Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-ung will meet his Russian counterpart Sergey Borisovich Ivanov to discuss a range of issues to boost bilateral military cooperation, including Russia's debt reimbursement via the supply of weapons, the ministry's spokesman Shin Hyun-don said.

``Yoon will negotiate the transfer of Russian advanced weapons systems during a meeting with Ivanov, but it's unclear if Moscow will agree on it,'' said Shin. He said Russia wants to sell its products, not technology.

Seoul and the Kremlin have engaged in an armaments deal, dubbed the ``Brown Bear'' project, since 1995, when the Russian government proposed to pay back its overdue loans extended by the Seoul government in 1991.

Seoul extended $1.47 billion (some 1.5 trillion won) in bank loans and a $470 million commodity to the former Soviet Union in 1991,when the two countries established diplomatic ties to help its ailing socialist economy.

However, the Soviet Union was unable to service its foreign debts when it collapsed in December 1991. Then the two countries signed a deal under which Moscow provides Seoul with $214 million worth of its modern armaments, including T-80 tanks, METIS-M anti-tank missiles and BMP-3 infantry combat vehicles, from 1995-1998 to pay off its debts.

The second-term project resumed in 2003. Under the deal, Seoul is supposed to buy $530 million worth of Russian advanced weapons systems, such as KA-32 helicopters, 33 BMP-3 infantry combat vehicles and IL-103 aircrafts.

The two sides agreed that Seoul would pay $267 million, or half of the total arms purchase amount, in cash and offset the remaining half with part of the debt owed by Russia.

The two defense ministers is expected to discuss ways to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue in a peaceful manner, ministry officials said. Russia is a participant in the six-party talks aimed at persuading North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions. The six-way talks include the two Koreas, the United States, China and Japan.

It is the first defense ministers' talks between the two nations since 2003 when the Russian defense minister visited Seoul.

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Roh Dismisses Rift in Ties with US??? A laughable article appeared in the Korea Times on 17 Apr claiming there was no rift in the ROK-US relationship.

The situation is laughable as one considers what Roh did when he took office in Feb 2003. In March 2003, Roh had been in office only a month when he ordered the Ministry of National Defense at a March 15 briefing to prepare a plan for its "independent defense vision." The plan was to outline how to transform the military into a more high-tech and elite force. The weak link of the military is intelligence gathering as 90 percent of the ROK's strategic intelligence comes from the Americans. So the plan calls for investments in intelligence gathering tools, such as AWACS planes and advanced systems for command, control and communication. According to the military authorities, it would cost at least $26 billion over five years for the military to replace the contributions by U.S. forces. President Roh wanted to recover South Korea's operation and command authority during wartime, but the MND was cautious about it, fearing it will bring a negative reaction from Washington.

Now in Apr 2005, the Roh administration refused to pay for the C4SI upgrades for the ROK forces. The Roh administration has shelved the AWACS bids and want to start it anew. The Roh administration has refused to increase the military budget to 3.2 percent of GDP that it promised to do -- instead raising it to 2.9 percent of GDP in 2005. However, the Roh administration can continued on its plans to gain control of the command authority for the ROK forces in WAR TIME. The bottomline is the Roh administration has stretched the "alliance" to the limit -- and continues to force conditions that push the ROK-US alliance to the brink of dissolution.

Doesn't this seem to STILL be the case with Roh's "self-reliant defense" posture?

President Dismisses Rift in Ties With US

By Shim Jay-yun
Korea Times Correspondent

ISTANBUL, Turkey- President Roh Moo-hyun on Saturday dismissed concerns over a possible rift in the decades-old alliance between South Korea and the United States.

``There is no problem in relations between South Korea and the United States, although the bilateral relations have been changing a little recently compared with the past," Roh said in a meeting with a group of South Korean residents here.

Roh's remarks follow reports over a possible break in South Korea-U.S. relations after South Korea's refusal to accept a U.S. proposal to formulate a contingency plan on North Korea in the event of serious internal turmoil in the North. (SITE NOTE: The rift comes as the ROK continues to talk of a "self-reliant defense" but has not been willing to fund the upgrades or even basics -- rather relying on the US to provide for its defense.)

In Seoul, the presidential National Security Council (NSC) said in a statement Friday that it opposes a contingency plan allowing the U.S. military to gain wartime command of South Korean troops in case of an emergency situation in North Korea.

South Korea has retrieved the right to the peacetime operation of its military from the United States and is negotiating the transfer of the right to control wartime operations as well.

Since the end of the 1950-53 Korean War, the United States had controlled military operations of South Korea in both peacetime and wartime. (SITE NOTE: This is incorrect. The UNC, 8th Army and USFK collocated at Yongsan since 1957. The UNC controlled the operations when it transferred control to the US JCS on 12 Dec 1974 -- making the commander of the USFK also commander of the UNC. The commander of the 8th Army is the deputy commander of the USFK. That the commander of the UNC has always been an American General is irrelevant. The UN was in control until 1974.)

Under the South Korean constitution, the entire peninsula is the South's territory, so Seoul regards itself as responsible for control of wartime military operations in the North in case of contingencies.

The United States, however, considers North Korea a ``sovereign state," just as U.S. Secretary of State Condolleeza Rice said in Seoul in March.

``The (South Korea-U.S.) alliance has been reshaped recently and, in the process, South Korea's voice has been heard more loudly," Roh told the Korean residents of Istanbul, where he flew earlier in the day on the last leg of his eight-day tour of Germany and Turkey that began Sunday. (SITE NOTE: His "voice" has been heard in Washington and Congress, but it has not been a positive reaction.)

Roh said he was dissatisfied with some South Koreans ``who speak in a way more like Americans than Americans." (Also translated in the media as "They act in a way more like Americans than Americans.") Roh expressed concern over the Korean people who speak in support of the US more proactively than US citizens. Roh said he has been suffering setbacks due to stalwart conservatives stubbornly backing the US. (SITE NOTE: Roh supposedly added, ""They talk with not Korea but the United States at heart," he said. "Koreans should think and judge like Koreans." An editorial on 18 Apr in the Chosun Ilbo picked up on this as an attitude of either you are for us Koreans or against us Koreans intended to divide the country. It felt it was an attempt to stifle any dissent over his foreign policy, nothing more. Roh fired the first negotiator for the FOTA because he "gave away too much" because he was overly-American in his thinking. Roh is anti-American in all his past actions up to one month after he assumed the Presidency, then he became a pragmatist talking out of two sides of his mouth.)

``The important thing in South Korea-U.S relations is coordinating the different views of order in Asia by South Koreans and Americans," he said.

``We continue to talk to Americans to that end and are making efforts to reach a consensus despite the fact we have conditions which should be different," he said.

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USFK ACTIONS

USFK to Cut 1,000 Workers after ROK Reduction in Cost-Sharing Demands Lt. Gen. Charles C. Campbell, USFK chief of staff, announced plans to lay off 1,000 Korean USFK workers due to frozen bilateral cost-sharing negotiations, at a snap press conference on 1 Apr 2005. Lt. Gen. Campbell said that 1,000 of the current 12,000 Korean employees of the USFK will be laid off and cut construction and service contracts by 20 percent over the next two years. Campbell also suggested relocating some key military equipment reserved here for an emergency from South Korea. The measures are a response to a decision reached in Korea-U.S. negotiations to slash Korea's share of the cost of keeping U.S. forces here by some W60 billion (US$60 million) this year.

The Stars and Stripes article matched the ROK articles except that the tone was that the US was fed up and that the US was simply saying that it could not continue the level of services with the amounts the ROK was willing to pay. We suspect the US agreed to the ROK demands in the last round of talks to simply get the protracted negotiations over with -- and now the USFK simply is going to shove it up the ROK's nose. The message is that the "free ride" is over. If they go cheap, there will be consequences -- that THEY are responsible for. The US will no longer pick up the tab.

Campbell was careful to say his remarks were "a coordinated and U.S. government-approved statement," making clear they reflect Washington's position. T