The following is our opinion which is not worth a hill of beans. Only time will tell if we are right -- and Sept 2003 is the date that the future of the ROK-US alliance will be revealed. The ROK is attempting to delay relocations, but the U.S. is simply TELLING the ROK what is going to happen -- though calling it "close consultations." The U.S. is playing hardball -- and the ROK is at a serious disadvantage. The U.S. is using its new global military strategy as the reason for "restructuring" the USFK -- and the ROK is powerless to challenge it. The U.S. is playing hardball.


Stryker Vehicle

We are questioning the sudden turnaround support for the Stryker systems by Rumsfeld -- when in Oct 2002 his office expressed concerns about the effectiveness of the new Stryker wheeled combat vehicle designed to replace the tank in the Interim Brigade Combat Team. We understand that though the Stryker has some non-correctable faults, to cancel the Stryker outright would cause a great deal of political damage to the President as this is the backbone of his "vision for the military of the 21st Century." In his 2001 QDR he promoted a new vision for the military and this was one of the backbones of that concept. Though the Sept 11th event changed the QDR sent to Congress, it essentially remained the same with the retention of some of the elements that Bush wanted eliminated, such as a reduction in the carrier force and amount of divisions in the Army. However, when these non-correctable faults appeared, the first move was to slow down the procurement of the Strykers -- "budgeting" for them rather than "funding" them.

In the debate over the Stryker in Oct 2002, the Stryker was viewed by the DoD as NOT being a transformational unit. There were faults exposed in the July 2002 Millenium Challenge that were NOT correctable such as the C-130 requirement. This seemed to doom Gen. Shinseki's concept of a wheeled vehicle from the start. It seems rather suspicious that Rumsfeld would do a turnaround so suddenly after his office axed the Stryker Brigades funding for procurement from six in 2002 -- and stretched out procurement to 2007-2009.

The reason appears to be political because the Stryker fits so ideally into the concept of reduction of forces in Korea, we believe that Rumsfeld changed his views for political reasons. A Stryker "medium" brigade would be about 3,700 personnel and would replace a significant amount of the now 14,000 strong U.S. Army element of the USFK. With the current global military restructuring, the ROK cannot object to the Stryker as this would be part of a global plan -- not simply a Korean plan. However, the ROK is attempting to drag its feet and place stumbling blocks into the USFK relocation plans -- and subsequent troop reductions. But again the U.S. is playing hardball and simply dictating the changes.

In February 2003, Donald Rumsfeld stated that the USFK would relocate south of the Han River. At the same time, he issued his statement that the US would remain in Korea "as long as the Korean people wanted the forces to remain." (NOTE: Remember that Bush and Donald Rumsfeld had been on the receiving end of a very vicious anti-American campaign in 2002.)

Then in May, Rumsfeld leaked that an Interim SBCT would REPLACE the 2d ID. This is why we suspect Rumsfeld's deployment of the Interim SBCT to Korea is more of a political move to justify the reduction in force of the 2d ID using the global military restructuring as the reason. (See Shift in Global Military Forces for more details.) The only SBCT that has passed testing and scheduled for deployment in May was the 3d Bde 2d ID, thus it didn't take a genius to figure out WHICH unit he was talking about.

We believe that Rumsfeld realizes the shortcomings of the Stryker, but the much vaunted highly mobile force of the future is based on this vehicle. In addition, the Stryker Interim SBCT fits ideally into the scenario for pulling the 2d ID off the DMZ something that was started by Nixon in 1970, attempted to complete it by Carter (but failed), started again by the senior Bush in 1990 with the Nunn-Warner initiative (but put off because of the North Korean nuclear crisis) and now restarted again by George Bush Jr.

The goal of relocating the 2d ID south of the Han also plays perfectly into minimizing the liabilities of the Stryker. The match of the two purposes seem ideal.

The selling main feature is that the SBCT has more infantry than a "heavy" or "light" brigade, but does away with the M1A1 Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. These would be shifted to the "heavy" brigade whose assets would be assigned to a ship "off-shore." The companies are combined arms teams that consist of a mobile gun platoon, mortar platoon (120-mm, 81 mm and 60 mm mortars), forward observers, a sniper team and three infantry line platoons. Eventually, they will also have TOW anti-tank missile launchers. For urban combat, the plan is to have a bunker buster weapon with a round would be able to go through double reinforced concrete walls.

We believe there is a grain of truth in the controversy of the Stryker having many problems that delayed the testing and certification. We believe that the Stryker testing scenarios were skewed to favor its passage -- based on many eye-witnesses of contractor prepping of Stryker vehicles prior to testing and multiple reports of systems failures.

However, we are confused by reports that the 3rd Bde 2d ID will be reverting from a Stryker IBCT to a "normal" brigade in 2007 because of changes in Germany. These reports may have been made PRIOR to the Iraq War based on the 2001 QDR. The events of the Iraq War highlighted a major problem with stationing the SBCT in Germany as the NATO powers refused to give fly-over authority for the U.S. forces to move to Iraq. If these types of actions are done in the future for an unpopular conflict, the refusal would "trap" a SBCT in Germany ... a situation which is unthinkable. Following the Iraq War, there were reports in 2003 that all bases in Germany will be closed with the exception of one with its major hospital facilities. Thus the comment below of the 3d Bde 2d ID reverting to a "medium" brigade must be considered as a process "under review" at this time.

According to GlobalSecurity.org: Interim Brigade Combat Team, "The Army is currently converting the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division (Medium) and 1st Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division (Light) at Lewis. There are already more than 100 Strykers at Lewis. Under current plans, the next units to convert to the Stryker would be the 172nd Infantry Brigade stationed at Ft. Wainwright, Alaska, the 2nd Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division (Light) at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light) at Ft. Polk, La., and the 56th Brigade (Mechanized) of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard's 28th Infantry Division (Mechanized), located in Philadelphia.

The Army plans to shift one of the two Ft. Lewis, Wash.-based Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) to Europe by FY '07 to meet a recommendation in the FY '01 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The QDR advised that the Army station a BCT in Europe to augment its forces in Europe, which include the 1st Armored Division, the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 173rd Airborne Brigade. Each of the two divisions has two maneuver brigades located in Germany, while the 173rd Airborne Brigade is stationed in Italy. Such an assignment would mean either retasking one of the six already-planned BCTs, or adding a seventh brigade. The Army would convert one of the current five Europe-based brigades to a BCT by FY '07, while the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division (Medium) would revert back to a normal brigade, such as with M1 Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles."

In August 2003, a platoon-size element (65 personnel and six vehicles) deployed for a 10-day exercise at the Rodriguez Range Complex in northern Gyeonggi province for a "live fire training exercise." It is significant that the period chosen is the dry season where the Stryker's potential for becoming mired in mud is minimized. This exercise would be considered nothing more than "familiarization training" -- rather than any sort of evaluation. However, there certainly will be eyes focused on its performance in the Korean environment to spot any potential problems. The Warrior News article described the Stryker presence for a "demo" -- rather than an exercise.

The small number of vehicles (6) were NOT significant enough to provide any justification for future reductions. On 28 Jul the USFK officially stated that the unit would return to Fort Lewis, WA after the exercise in a news release, Stryker Platoon Comes to ROK for Training. As the Stryker platoon returned to Ft. Lewis in Washington state in August, we had to rethink our second-guessing of Rumsfeld's future plans for Korean reductions. The Stryker is the cornerstone of the 2d ID relocations and reductions.

However, in mid-October 2003 the 3d Bde 2d ID was headed to Iraq, so this would postpone any thoughts of relocations to Korea until October 2005 as a minimum. However, though it is a great gamble to place the Stryker "in harm's way" it is also a way to "blood" the untested combat vehicle. It is a sink-or-swim trial. If the Stryker comes out of this relatively unscathed, then its entry into Korea as a combat-veteran unit cannot be used against it by the ROK. However, if it fails in combat, the DoD can just cut its losses and stop the FUTURE Stryker units -- as only two have been funded so far. Either way, it is a win-win situation. Even if the Stryker fails in combat, the lessons learned will be invaluable in developing the transitional vehicle for the 21st Century.

In September for the first time, the ROK announced after the fourth round of the Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Initiative that the U.S. was REDUCING its forces -- a thing that the ROK has denied up to now, though admitting that there would be a relocation in the future. Another meeting has been scheduled to attempt to iron out the remaining differences. The fifth round of meetings would be held In October in Seoul to draft the new unified agreement, as well as agreements for implementation and engineering purposes. These would then be formalized in the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in Seoul on 28 October. Though the Oct 2003 cabinet-level meeting between the ROK and U.S. was to finalize the course for relocations and reductions, it resolved nothing. The end result was that both sides refused to sign a joint communique dealing with the results of the SCM.

The results of the ROK-U.S. negotiations are still on-going. However, the handwriting is on the wall. Though the USFK tried to paint happy faces on the SCM and initially denied that the USFK was contemplating relocations/reductions in forces, President Bush's announcement that the U.S. was "restructuring" worldwide sealed the fate. The U.S. was starting to move unilaterally. The U.S. started to send messages that the UN/CFC Headquarters that was to remain in Seoul would be moved south to Pyongtaek. The Koreans keep using the year 2006 as the move, but I would anticipate the moves to start much earlier with non-mission essential elements packing up in 2004.

The DMZ relocations are still up in the air, but there appears to be relocations already taking place to move the forces closer to Uijongbu in accordance with the Land Partnership Plan (LPP). Once the consolidation has taken place, then further moves of units south could take place.

The KEY element was that the ROK acquiesced to the U.S. forces having a REGIONAL role in defense. In other words, the road was paved for the Stryker to be stationed in Korea as a deployable force. It is evident that it is the U.S. strategy to get the Stryker into Korea and then reduce the forces. Despite all the rhetoric, the words that continue to be heard are the the U.S. will not reduce the capability. There seems to be a trend within Defense thinkers to talk about the return to the "Nixon Doctrine" from the Vietnam War years. The U.S. would provide air and naval support in case of an attack, but no ground troops. The U.S. would leave the ground defense to the ROK. This has been heightened as the U.S. touted its $13 billion in improvements in the ROK, while the ROK still committed only 2.8 percent of its GDP to defense. It was not doing its fair share.

There has been a definite shift in the attitudes. As late as two years ago, the U.S. was stating that the U.S. would remain in Korea for stability in the region even AFTER the Koreas united. In Dec 2003, Donald Rumsfield emphatically stated that the U.S. will NOT remain in a unified Korea. Under the new vision, ground forces need will not be tied down to stationary positions overseas, but rather be stationed in the CONUS and deployable to any trouble spot.

However, the Stryker will be tied up in Iraq at least until Nov 2004 or longer. This leaves at least a year for the U.S. to finalize and formulate its reduction strategy in Korea. However, it appears at this time that it will still rotate around the Stryker Brigade to form the nucleus of the reductions by releasing the heavy armor units into prepositioned status on ships.

The ADA Magazine on 17 Jul published an article entitled "General Dynamics' Stryker Brigade May Deploy To Iraq This Year" in which it states that the Army was seeking permission to deploy Stryker brigade to Iraq by November. According to GlobalSecurity.org: U.S. Forces Order of Battle 23 July 2003, "Despite discussions that a Stryker unit would begin to rotate to the Korean Peninsula sometime this Summer or in the Fall reports in US papers indicate that the Department of Defense plans on deploying the only Stryker Brigade currently certified to Iraq rather than South Korea, delaying the arrival of such a brigade to the 8th Army AOR for some time. Provided that the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (SBCT) is certified, it might not be available for a deployment until late 2004." The inference is that the 3d Bde 2d ID would be stuck in Iraq until the 1st Bde 25th ID was certified in May 2004.

Why would the Army promote a conversion in Korea if it never intends it to come to fruition? (See Delay in Stryker Rotating into Korea for details.) In September, the US was looking for other options to relieve the 3rd Regiment through the use of international troops to take over pacified sectors of Iraq -- areas where troops are not under constant attack.

However, if the Stryker were to be deployed to Iraq, it would probably be ideal in the guarding of the pipelines. Unfortunately, its weaknesses would be exposed in Iraq in the hostile urban environments as the Iraqi "guerillas" are using road side bombs that would disable the tires and RPG rockets which the Stryker has a workaround solution with a grill to explode the rocket away from the vulnerable armor.

It was reported that the 3d Bde 2d ID still had not been retrofitted with armor plate as of July 2003. Instead they have developed a "slat armor" that will explode the RPG away from the main armor -- an interesting concept, but would you bet your life on it? Before it even is considered for such a deployment to Iraq, it best have the armor plate in place. In the high stakes game that it being played, any failure in Iraq could eliminate the use of the Stryker in Korea and then lock the 2d ID on the DMZ indefinitely.)

Unfortunately, there were a lot of critics in Congress who don't want this deployment to happen until many of the unanswered questions of the Stryker's performance are answered. In August, the critics surfaced a 108-page report in Congress critical of the Stryker. (See Criticism of Stryker grows as Army Seeks Deployment to Iraq for the 26 Aug Washington Times article.)

To complicate matters, as of July, the ROK seemed to be changing their strategy to delay reductions and relocations through the classic Korean "stall-and-conquer" strategy. It has been using a "denial-and-delay" strategy since April, but it has been ineffective at stopping U.S. demands. The change in ROK strategy will be in three areas.

• First the ROK is attempting to tie the relocation off the DMZ to AFTER the resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis -- whenever that might be.
• Second, there are indications that they are attempting to tie the purchase of the lands at Pyongtaek to the sale of Yongsan lands -- despite their written promise to Congress that they would procure the land to facilitate the move.
• Third, it appears that the government is going to attempt to "renegotiate" some "unfavorable" articles that it signed off to in the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding on the relocation of Yongsan. These would expand on recent concessions that the U.S. made to environmental concerns -- and could turn into a big cesspool if the U.S. is not careful.

In conjunction with this, the ROK will probably turn the matter over to the "court of public opinion" -- by taking the matter to the National Assembly. It has used this method effectively in the past to pressure the U.S. into making concessions. However, since the U.S. has started playing hardball, this method has lost its effectiveness in pursuading U.S. leaders to change their course of action. The bottomline is that the U.S. is unwilling to accept the same circumstances that led to the return to the status quo on Yongsan in 1993 after the ROK basically reneged on their promises -- claiming no one wanted the 8th Army Headquarters in their cities including Pyongtaek. The ROK used the "stall-and-conquer" strategy then to achieve their goals and probably believe it will work again.

Until the Stryker is certified by the Secretary of Defense to Congress, the USFK will continue to state that it has "no policy" on the reductions of USFK forces. The Stryker Interim Brigade Combat Team becomes a highly POLITICAL matter when one starts to consider reductions in USFK forces. Thus until the Stryker passes its IOE&T, the USFK will continue to deny future reductions tied to the Stryker. However, slips of the tongues of USFK leaders indicated that the troop reductions are in the offing. For example the 8th Army Commander, Lt. General Kimball, made a gaffe of reductions in forces (in the media-distributed text of his speech) at a seminar in June. It created quite a stir.

WHY Will the Stryker Be Deployed in Korea? We feel the reason that Rumsfeld switched his position from cutting the Stryker procurements in half in Oct 2002 to supporting the SBCT deployment in Korea as a replacement for the 2d ID in May 2003 was both POLITICAL and REALISTIC. Though Rumsfeld was reluctant to field the Stryker last year, the anti-American demonstrations in 2002 coupled with the changed political realities of South Korea with a radical reformist President elected on his promise to "change the relationship with the U.S." made the relocation of American troops essential.

In order to extract the U.S. from the quagmire of being used as a "tripwire" and held hostage by the North in its negotiations, the solution of the Stryker Brigade replacing the 2d ID seemed a viable solution. Using the reason for the drawdown as a change in the overall U.S. GLOBAL military strategy, the South can NOT protest.

Though the framework for relocations off the DMZ are set for 2007, we believe the time table can be moved up dramatically. In fact, the Jun 27 meeting between Rumsfeld and the Korean Minister of Defense resulted in the announcement that relocations may start its relocations in 2003 both for Yongsan and some units along the DMZ.

Something that people seem to forget is that then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney oversaw the drawdown of Korea in 1990 under the Nunn-Warner initiative in 1990 -- and it was Dick Cheney that also put it on a hold because of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Dick Cheney has been on the receiving end of the shaft in dealing with the Korea situation -- and as Vice President, he has a very important say-so from his first-hand experiences in dealing with the North Korean deceipt and South Korea's failed promises. Reducing the troop strength is going to be a fact -- and the U.S. is playing hardball.

But there seems to be an underlying issue that no one seems to have covered so far. Why is it essential that the Stryker be positioned near an "air hub" that can support the C-17 such as Osan AB? The answer is that the Stryker is programmed to be deployed out of country to hot spots if needed. But if the Strykers are subject to deployment to hot spots, where does this leave the Korean defense under the ROK-U.S. Combined Command structure?

We are not high paid analysts but we see that no one mentions the defense of Korea in the same breath with the SBCT deployment capability. The reason is simple. The two statements are incompatible. You cannot defend Korea if you are deployed to Bosnia. This is a very unsettling thought if you were a Korean military Chief of Staff depending on the USFK to plan your defense of Korea. How can you plan for Korea's defenses if the Strykers may be pulled out for a hot spot in another part of the world on short notice? If the SBCT replaces the 2d ID and then deploys some of the Strykers to a hot spot elsewhere, it will create quite a stir. In other words, how can you promise the Koreans full protection based on your hi-tech hardware, then pull some of it out to support contingencies elsewhere.

If you follow this train of thought, the only answer is that the U.S. really does NOT believe that the North will attack. If the U.S. really believed the threat from the North was imminent, there would never be any thought of the SBCT being deployed to hot spots. Many experts -- and most of the South Koreans -- believe that North Korea is only interested in its regime's survival. The North realizes that if it attacked the South or Japan, it would cease to exist as a nation. The North also knows that if it exported nuclear weapons to terrorists, it would give the U.S. reason to attack and again cease to exist. If you see North Korea in this light as struggling to survive a threat to its existence -- and not as a threat to South Korea -- then the positioning of Strykers in Korea with deployment capability is feasible. Besides, if the In addition, Marine forces from Okinawa could be on the peninsula within 24 hours via their high-speed transports.

This is the only explanation of why anyone could possibly preposition the Strykers in Korea for defensive purposes -- then use them as a reason for removing the 2d ID off the DMZ -- and then turn around and say that they will be deployable to other hot spots in the world. Who knows what new strategies and concepts the DoD is coming up with next and how the SBCT will fit into it all. For example, the Navy-Marines have fielded a strike group composed of three amphibious ships, a cruiser, destroyer, frigate and nuclear-powered attack submarine: The amphibious unit includes the Peleliu, dock landing ship Germantown and transport dock Ogden - loaded with 2,200 Marines from Camp Pendleton and Miramar and Yuma, Ariz., air stations, along with Navy SEALs. The Strykers fall into this category whereby no one is certain how all the pieces will come together.

However, one thing is certain. The Strykers represent a new highly mobile force of the future, while the 2d ID along the DMZ stuck in stationary positions are a thing of the past. The U.S. wants out.

WHERE Will the Stryker Be Deployed in Korea? Upon completion of the IOE&T, the Army will prepare an evaluation report, as required by the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act for procurement of SBCTs. The Secretary of Defense will then certify to Congress that the results of the evaluation indicate the design of the SBCT is operationally effective and suitable before it can be deployed on operational missions.

After the Stryker is certified by Rumsfeld, it would then be possible for it to assume immediate DEFENSIVE positions SOUTH of the Han. Rumsfeld has already stated that it WILL replace elements of the 2d ID. The first interim brigade combat team will contain three substitute vehicles, because the mobile gun system (MGS) and support systems for the nuclear, biological and chemical reconnaissance vehicle, and the fire support vehicle, will not be ready by May 2003. The Army will NOT field an interim brigade combat team supported by all configurations of the Stryker IAV until 2005. However, this is not a problem as systems to substitute the MGS, NBC and FSV are in place with the 2d ID.

The prime prerequisite is that the Strykers must be positioned near an air hub that is capable of landing C-17s. Though the Strykers were supposed to be C-130 deployable, all indicators point to the C-17 as the ONLY choice. (NOTE: The Stryker was supposed to be C-130 deployable, but because of so many trade offs for weight and size, this will only be for short hauls.)

At that time, it will most likely be stationed at Pyongtaek's Camp Humphries -- next door to Osan AB -- with elements possibly at Taegu's Camp Walker or Pohang if the ROK drags its feet on procurement of required lands. The 6th Cav airborne elements of the 2d ID will remain intact along the DMZ for the time being, but the other tracked forces of the 2d ID will suddenly become redundant as these tracked vehicles/tanks will be part of the "heavy brigade" earmarked as "follow-on" forces. Rumsfeld envisions these assets pre-positioned on transport ships off-shore.

However, because of the current North Korean nuclear crisis threats, it will probably retain the 148 M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tanks in country -- though not necessarily on the DMZ -- until the Koreans procure more K1A1s to beef up their defenses on the DMZ. (Note: The ROK currently manufactures the K1A1 in Korea with over 70 percent of the parts locally manufactured. See K1A1 Main Battle Tank.)

The smaller camps along the DMZ scheduled to be shutdown under the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) could be turned back to the ROK on a speeded up time table. Instead of relocating the units and equipment to Camp Casey or Camp Red Cloud, they would simply be reassigned out of Korea. Once the SBCT is certified, troop reductions suddenly become a reality. The forces in the camps along the DMZ become redundant and can be sent home.

However, we believe that until the 3d Bde 2d ID Interim SBCT is certified for Korea operations, no USFK leader will mention anything of reductions in USFK forces. The whole reduction in forces strategy revolves around getting the 3d Bde SBCT in country and certified. In August 2003, a platoon size element of the 3d Bde 2d ID had a demonstration of its capabilities in Korea. This was nothing more than familiarization training -- and further testing on the ability to transport the Strykers to overseas locations with a C-17. (See Stryker Demo in Korea for details.) Because of the current request to send the 3d Bde 2d ID to Iraq, the schedule may be put off till July 2004 -- or even as late as 2007.

So how do you sell a white elephant? If the Stryker is not meeting the specifications that were called for in the original specifications, what do you do? You change the scenario to fit the circumstances.

The report on the side by side Stryker vs. M113A3 was released in Jan 2003 and "proved" that the Styrker was the superior war fighting vehicle for the BCT concept. The report was submitted to DoD on 20 Dec 2002 and the results were then submitted to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and then to Congress. The Army's study judged the two vehicles on performance and cost. Styrker is superior in speed, armor, gas mileage, noise, comfort, and target aquisition. The M113A3 was better in turning, operating in water, and range.

However, opponents at Strategy Page claimed, "You can SAY whatever you want. I know the participants in the side-by-side; the M113A3 Gavin platoon beat the LAV Stryker platoon in EVERY category including the road march! It seems when you are in a wheeled vehicle you have to gingerly drive AROUND ruts that tracks drive through. Why don't you get inside a heavy 19-ton armored car like Stryker and try going cross country breaking brush? Why don't you try it in the real world, get stuck, call out the M88 and get over this wheeled fantasy?" (See Anatomy of a Deathtrap for unofficial photos taken during NTC testing showing rollovers, cheating for MILES (laser scoring), armor inadequacy and cramped quarters. Combat Reform contains many articles criticizing the LAVIII/Stryker as an overweight, non-transportable, ill-advised system.)

Other critics have commented that tracked vehicles are more compact and significantly lighter because of they don't have the suspension systems, transmissions, etc. and can literally turn on their own vertical axis -- while the Stryker has a turn radius of a Greyhound bus. From this standpoint, all the statements made by the Army about "new wheeled technology" were simply smoke-screens made up of lies to justify the Stryker.

The Canadian military uses both wheeled and tracked vehicles for its operations. They concluded that the wheeled vehicles are best for peacekeeping operations, but tracked vehicles are better for combat. These conclusions are NOT what the U.S. Army wanted to hear as the SBCT is purported to be a COMBAT vehicle.

So what happened that the Stryker received better scores in a face-off between the M113-A3 and the Stryker? Opponents to the Stryker claim that the U.S. Army skewed the scenarios so that it favored the urban environment. The National Defense Magazine in July 2003 stated, "A critical test took place in April, when a Stryker Brigade Combat Team participated in a series of mid- to high-intensity exercises at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, Calif. Following that, the brigade was transported by rail, sea and air to the Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk, La., where, for two weeks in May, it conducted operations, primarily in urban terrain." (See The Stryker Armored Car is a Scam by Don Loughlin, a retired ordnance engineer, who has documented his blunt criticisms (using the Army's own data) in his report.)

One person said that "the Stryker is best under ideal conditions, but the tracked M113A3 Gavin is best under the worst conditions." In other words, war planning is based on planning for the worst and the M113A3 Gavin is the logical choice -- but it is an instrument of the 1960s which doesn't fit the NEW military that the Bush administration is selling. Thus you keep the M113-A3 Gavin tracked vehicles around as part of the "follow-on" packages or Base/Camp Security Forces, but preposition Strykers for the PR value. We believe the DoD simply shaped the scenarios for the testing to get the Stryker approved -- despite its obvious shortcomings. The first part of the "rigging" the scenario is that the 19-ton Stryker/LAV III has never been in a face-off with the 10.5-ton M113-A3 Gavin. Instead there was a STUDY released by the DoD that proved the Stryker was superior. (NOTE: The report on the side by side Stryker vs. M113A3 was released in Jan 2003 and "proved" that the Styrker was the superior war fighting vehicle for the BCT concept. The report was submitted to DoD on 20 Dec 2002 and the results were then submitted to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and then to Congress. The Army's study judged the two vehicles on performance and cost. Styrker is superior in speed, armor, gas mileage, noise, comfort, and target aquisition. The M113A3 was better in turning, operating in water, and range.)

Since the inception of the LAVIII/Stryker concept, proponents of the tracked vehicle have complained that there was no comparison between the LAVIII/Stryker and the M113A3 Gavin. Instead of an actual face-off between the Stryker and the M113A3, there have been comparisons between the 70-ton M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank (MBT) and 33-ton M2A2/3 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (BFV). According to opponents to the Stryker, this is comparing apples and oranges -- light vehicles against heavy vehicles.

Finally, a formal side-by-side evaluation was conducted by the Army Test and Evaluation Command IATEC) in Sept 2002. The 16-day field-testing portion of the formal comparison between the new Stryker Armored Vehicle and the M113A3 Armored Personnel Carrier started on Sept. 12 at Fort Lewis, Wash. The test was required by the 2001 National Defense Authorization Act. The problem with the tests was that they were conducted on "mostly mixed improved asphalt-covered roads, as well as secondary gravel and logging trails in restricted wooded and urban terrain" as well as some cross-country movement as the platoons maneuver through ambushes, obstacles and other situations. During the test at Fort Lewis, the vehicles operated "on a combination of primary (hard surface) and secondary roads, as well as "cross-country" dirt tracks and urban terrain." However, the vehicles spent most of their time on some form of road or track, unless in contact with the enemy. According to critics, the tests were designed to favor vehicles that do better on roads because the Army's O&O concept favors road operations. In other words, the test results were skewed because the operational scenarios were skewed.

Specifications:

Stryker: The following is excerpted from Army Technology. Stryker is a family of eight-wheel drive combat vehicles, transportable in a C-130 aircraft, being built for the US Army by GM GDLS, a joint venture set up by General Motors Defense of Canada and General Dynamics Land Systems Division of USA. Stryker is based on the GM LAV III 8 x 8 light-armoured vehicle, in service since early 2001. The LAV III is itself a version of the Piranha III built by Mowag of Switzerland, now owned by General Motors Defense. GM Defense and GDLS are sharing the fabrication and final assembly of the vehicles among plants at Anniston, Alabama; Lima, Ohio; and London, Ontario.

The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) combines the capacity for rapid deployment with survivability and tactical mobility. The Stryker vehicle enables the team to manoeuvre in close and urban terrain, provide protection in open terrain and transport infantry quickly to critical battlefield positions.

GM Defense and GDLS were awarded the contract for the US Army's Interim Armoured Vehicle (IAV) in November 2000. The vehicles are to form the basis of six Brigade Combat Teams. The contract requirement covers the supply of 2,131 vehicles. Deliveries of Stryker infantry carriers began from General Motors London, Ontario, plant in March and General Dynamics Anniston, Alabama, facility in April 2002. Over 200 vehicles have been delivered.

The eight-wheeled Stryker is the first new military vehicle to enter service into the United States Army since the Abrams tank in the 1980s.

The United States Army first deployed 14 Stryker vehicles as part of its forced entry package for Millennium Challenge 2002, the Joint Forces Command field experiment and demonstration in July and August 2002. The Strykers were deployed from C-130 and C-17 aircraft during the exercise. Formal brigade certification is planned for May 2003.

VARIANTS

Stryker variants include the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) and the Mobile Gun System (MGS). There are eight configurations of the ICV including Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBC RV); Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM); Medical Evacuation Vehicle (MEV); Mortar Carrier (MC); Engineer Squad Vehicle (ESV); Command Vehicle (CV); Fire Support Vehicle (FSV); and the Reconnaissance Vehicle (RV). They have parts commonality and self-recovery abilities and are equipped with a central tire inflation system.

STRYKER INFANTRY CARRIER VEHICLE

The Stryker is a full time four-wheel drive, selectively eight-wheel drive, armoured vehicle weighing approximately 19t. The vehicle can attain speeds of 62mph on metalled roads and has a maximum range of 312 miles.

The basic infantry carrier vehicle (ICV) provides armoured protection for the two-man crew and a squad of nine infantry soldiers. The basic hard steel armour is augmented by applique panels of lightweight ceramic/composite armour produced by a team led by IBD/Deisenroth Engineering of Germany. The armour provides integral all-round 14.5mm protection against machine gun rounds, mortar and artillery fragments. RPG-7 protection is optional.

The ICV has a Kongsberg Remote Weapon Station with a universal soft mount cradle, which can mount either a 0.50 caliber M2 machine gun, MK19 40mm grenade launcher or MK240 7.62mm machine gun. It is also armed with four M6 smoke grenade launchers.

The vehicle's commander has an FBCB2 (Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below) digital communications system that allows communication between vehicles through text messaging and a map network, as well as with the battalion. The map shows the position of all vehicles on the battlefield and the commander can mark the position of enemy forces on the map which can then be seen by other commanders. FBCB2, "the tactical internet", includes the Raytheon AN/TSQ-158 Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS).

The Stryker driver has three M-17 periscopes and a Raytheon AN/VAS-5 Driver's Vision Enhancer (DVE). The vehicle commander has seven M45 periscopes and a thermal imager display with video camera.

STRYKER MOBILE GUN SYSTEM

GM GDLS delivered the first of eight pre-production Stryker Mobile Gun Systems to the US Army in July 2002. Production of 72 additional mobile gun variants begins in 2003 at General Dynamics Anniston, Alabama, facility.

The Stryker Mobile Gun System variant consists of the basic vehicle with a General Dynamics Land Systems fully stabilized shoot-on-the-move Low Profile Turret. The turret is armed with a M68A1E4 105mm cannon with muzzle brake and an M2 0.50 calibre commander's machine gun. The Stryker Mobile Gun System can fire 18 rounds of 105mm main gun ammunition, 400 rounds of 0.50 calibre ammunition and 3,400 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition. Two M6 smoke grenade launchers are also fitted.

The Mobile Gun System has the same C4ISR communications and driver's vison equipment as the ICV, but the gunner has three periscopes and a compact modular sight with dual field of view day and thermal channels. The MGS also has detectors for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

An advantage to the Brigade Combat Teams in having the mobile gun vehicle of the same Stryker family of vehicles is the commonality across the entire capability and the reduced logistics requirement. The Stryker mobile gun does not require a track-vehicle mechanic as would be required for example for the deployment of an M-8 mobile armoured gun system.

TRANSPORTATION

Stryker can be transported on the ground using trucks or by air on C-17, C-5 and C-130 aircraft. The C-5 and C-17 aircraft can carry seven and four Strykers respectively. The C-130H can fly safely carrying a maximum 38,000lb load for up to 1,000nm. The Stryker's weight, 36,240lb, and size are within the payload limit of the C-130H. The C-130 can operate from smaller airfields in more remote locations. All configurations of the Stryker can disembark from the C-130 in combat ready status.

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LAV III

Description and use of LAV III:

The LAV III is a key component of the Army's leading-edge battlefield systems as it enters the next century. This state-of-the-art Light Armoured Vehicle is a fast, well-armed, well-protected infantry troop carrier. It can be used in all weather conditions, in normal battlefield smoke, at night and on most types of terrain. The LAV III will give a vehicle commander many more options in both combat and non-combat situations. For example the commander may choose to keep the troops mounted and protected while using the 25-mm stabilized cannon – an option not available in the past. The driver and the commander have computer display terminals for the Tactical Navigation System (TACNAV), as well as thermal viewers. The TACNAV links a Global Positioning System (GPS) with a digital magnetic compass and laser range finder. Anti-mine protection and an automatic fire and explosion suppression system provide additional safety for the crew.

Crew

Ten soldiers in the Infantry Section Carrier (driver, vehicle commander, gunner plus seven soldiers) and six soldiers in the Tactical Command Post.

Characteristics

Length: 6.93 m
Width: 2.66 m
Height: 2.17 m over hull / 2.7 m over turret
Speed: 100 km/hr
Range: 500 km
Weight: 16.3 t
Gradient: Maximum 60%
Side slope: Maximum 30%
Minimum turn diameter: 17 m
Trench crossing: 2 m
Fording
Shallow: 1m
Deep: 1.5m
Armament:
25-mm stabilized chain gun with thermal imaging sight
- 7.62- mm coaxial machine-gun
- 5.56-mm/7.62- mm top-turret mounted machine-gun
- 76-mm smoke and/or fragmentation grenade launchers
Sights: Daytime optical
Thermal Imagery (TI)
Generation III Image Intensification (II)
Spotlight: Maxa Beam, 6 million candle power, portable, with infra-red filter
Winch: Capstan constant pull winch
Engine: 350 hp Caterpillar diesel
Transmission: 6 forward gears, 1 reverse
Transfer case: 2 speed
Suspension: Hydropneumatic
Brakes: Power (air) with ABS

8 x 8 drive

1200 R20 (20" rims) with Central Tire Inflation System
Electrical system: Central 28 V system, inverter, auxiliary power unit Batteries
automotive: 2 X 12 V
auxiliary: 2 X 12 V
Alternator: 300 A
CostTotal project cost for the first 360 LAV IIIs is $1.1 billion.
Status First delivered in spring 1999
Manufacturer Diesel Division General Motors of London, Ontario. (Consortium formed by General Motors Defense of Canada and General Dynamics Land Systems of the US awarded contract for the Stryker/LAV III.)

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"In-lieu-of" Equipment:

3d Bde, 2ID has 8 of the 10 Stryker variants planned for fielding. The brigade does not have the Mobile Gun System Stryker vehicle or the NBC Reconnaissance vehicle. Also, 3/2 does not have the add-on armor for its Stryker vehicles at this time. 3/2 will use selected service-approved "in-lieu-of" equipment – Anti-Tank Guided Missile vehicle for MGS, and FOX vehicle for NBCRV. The Fox vehicle dimensions preclude it from C130 transport.

Anti-Tank Guided Missile Vehicle According to Army Link News in May 2003, "Until the 105-mm cannon equipped MGS Stryker can be fielded, SBCTs will use a Stryker Infantry Carrier modified to carry the Improved Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-command-link guided missile. The MGS is not designed to be a tank killer, but rather a fortification/bunker buster."

The Anti-Tank Guided Missile Vehicle will be similar in function as the USMC version of a TOW-2A/B mounted on M966 HMMWV (High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle) launching platform (See M-220 Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided missile (TOW) for details.)


TOW-2 mounted on HMMWW Launching Platform

Fox M93A1 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance System (NBCRS The FOX is a rolling laboratory that takes air, water, and ground samples and immediately analyzes them for signs of weapons of mass destruction. The Fox M93A1 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance System (NBCRS) is intended to improve the survivability and mobility of the Army ground forces by providing increased situational awareness and information superiority to headquarters and combat maneuver elements. With the ability to provide rapid, accurate chemical and radiological contamination information to these elements, the NBCRS vehicle forms a key portion of the full-dimensional protection concept. (See FAS: Fox M93A1 NBCRS for details.)

Fox M93A1 NBCRS

Since the Gulf War, the United States has improved Fox doctrine, training and equipment. This includes the addition of the Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm - the M21 - a device that alarms to the presence of nerve and blister agent vapors from outside the boundaries of ground contamination. Training for Fox crews has also been increased. The Army now provides more than 38 hours of MM-1 training and a certifying exam to operators. Procedures for the retention and archiving of the printed tapes are now in place. The Army is continuing to make improvements in doctrine, training and equipment to further increase detection capabilities for potential future conflicts. The following is a 21 Mar 2001 UPDATE.

Updated Paper Provides Insights of Fox Vehicle Capabilities

The Department of Defense released today an updated version of its Fox NBC Reconnaissance Vehicle information paper. The paper provides details on the capabilities and limitations of the Fox Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance vehicle, during the Gulf War. At the time of the Gulf War, the Fox vehicle was the most sophisticated, technically complex piece of chemical warfare agent detection equipment to be used by U.S. forces.

Since the information paper was published in 1997, the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness and Military Deployments, has received new information from other investigations involving Fox vehicles that updates some of the material presented in the original paper. The updated version contains more in-depth technical information obtained from Fox vehicle experts and better explains the use of Fox vehicles during the Gulf War.

The heart of the Fox system is the MM-1 Mobile Mass Spectrometer. It analyzes air or ground samples for the possible presence of liquid chemical warfare agents by drawing air through the air/surface sampler positioned on the outside of the vehicle to the MM-1 detection unit, which then analyzes the substance and displays the results on a video screen. The Fox vehicle surveys for chemical warfare agents on a target list most likely to be present given the threat. This target list usually included sarin, soman, mustard, lewisite, cyclosarin, and fats, oils and wax to name a few. An alert during an initial survey is a warning and indicates the need for additional testing known as a spectrum analysis. The more time-consuming - yet more accurate - spectrum analysis is necessary to determine possible chemical warfare agent presence with a higher degree of confidence.

Military leaders and MM-1 operators recognized that the Fox improved the ability to protect U.S. personnel from the possible presence of chemical warfare agents during the Gulf War. The critical need for better detection capability during the U.S. forces build-up resulted in accelerated fielding of the Fox vehicle and a short training period so most troops who used the Fox did not understand many of the Fox's capabilities and limitations. Further, operating tactics of employment sometimes did not allow the Fox to stop to conduct the more detailed spectrum analysis. U.S soldiers and Marines used the Fox as a mobile vapor detector to search for the possible presence of chemical warfare agents during the Gulf War.

Although the Fox can detect chemical warfare agent vapors in the air, it was designed primarily to detect liquid chemical warfare agents on the ground. Pre-war testing and evaluation indicated that when used as a mobile vapor detector, the Fox systems might not indicate the presence of certain chemical warfare agents in time to prevent casualties among unprotected servicemembers. Contaminants, such as oil well fire smoke, hindered the MM-1's detection capabilities. Limited MM-1 operator training restricted their ability to analyze detections.

Since the Gulf War, the United States has improved Fox doctrine, training and equipment. This includes the addition of the Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm - the M21 - a device that alarms to the presence of nerve and blister agent vapors from outside the boundaries of ground contamination. Training for Fox crews has also been increased. The Army now provides more than 38 hours of MM-1 training and a certifying exam to operators. Procedures for the retention and archiving of the printed tapes are now in place. The Army is continuing to make improvements in doctrine, training and equipment to further increase detection capabilities for potential future conflicts. With these improvements and better understanding by Defense Department leaders of its role in the Gulf War, the Fox vehicle should continue to enhance U.S. force protection from emerging threats in the 21st century.

Information papers are reports of what DoD knows today about military equipment and/or procedures used in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. They are part of the Defense Department's effort to inform the public of its investigations into the nature and possible causes for the illnesses experienced by some Gulf War veterans.

This paper and all other reports published by the special assistant's office are posted on the GulfLINK Web site at http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/fox_vehicle_ii .

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Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA)

RQ-7A (Shadow 200) Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) The Shadow air vehicle has a wingspan of 13 feet and can carry a payload of 60 pounds. It has a gross takeoff weight of just over 300 pounds and has significant range and loiter capabilities. The air vehicle is equipped with an electro-optic/infrared suite to support day or night operations. A Block I Shadow 200 system is comprised of three air vehicles with payloads, two ground control stations, one portable ground control station, one air vehicle transport vehicle, launch/recovery equipment (a hydraulic launcher, arresting gear, and automatic landing system), one troop carrier for personnel and equipment, and logistics support elements for system deployment. The complete system can be transported to and within a battlefield in two C-130 cargo aircraft. (See September 2003 for Shadow deployment along the DMZ.)

The Shadow is part of the Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron element for the SBCT. One of the key features of the teams is the RSTA element, equipped with Shadow unmanned aerial vehicles - a type of drone - to "see the enemy over the hill," the Prophet electronic intelligence system and the Javelin portable anti-tank missile. In traditional combat, soldiers typically first found the enemy in a direct encounter and then maneuvered on the enemy. But with units such as the RSTA Squadron, the unit will know before they come in contact with the enemy, where the enemy is.

RQ7 Shadow UAV

The following is from UAV World on 27 Dec 2002.

US Army awards contract for Shadow UAV

27 December 2002 - The US Army announced today that a US $86 million contract was awarded to AAI Corporation, Hunt Valley, Md., for nine RQ-7A (Shadow 200) Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) systems, six attrition air vehicles, ground control and maintenance equipment, and initial spares. Each Shadow 200 system consists of four air vehicles and two ground control stations.

The full-rate production contract award is a first for any Department of Defense unmanned aerial vehicle program and is a key event for the Army’s Transformation into a rapidly deployable, lightweight force. The contract award is the result of a fast-track acquisition program to provide a much-needed capability to the soldier. The contract with AAI Corporation includes options for additional procurements to FY 2007.

The Shadow TUAV will be employed by ground maneuver brigade commanders to gain a tactical advantage against adversaries. The system provides a near real-time, sustainable capability for reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition and battle damage assessment. It will significantly improve commanders' ability to detect and engage the enemy by having dominant situational awareness so commanders can "see first, understand first and act decisively." The images and telemetry from the air vehicles can be used by the brigade commander and his staff, the brigade's subordinate maneuver battalions, supporting artillery units and supporting aviation assets.

The Shadow air vehicle has a wingspan of 13 feet and can carry a payload of 60 pounds. It has a gross takeoff weight of just over 300 pounds and has significant range and loiter capabilities. The air vehicle is equipped with an electro-optic/infrared suite to support day or night operations.

The Shadow TUAV programme went from programme initiation through Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) to a full-rate production contract award in just 36 months. The Shadow TUAV system met or exceeded all key performance parameters specified in its Operational Requirements Document during the April-May '02 IOTE. During the past two years, there have been more than 1000 Shadow flights totaling more than 2000 flight hours, with an operational availability rate of more than 95%.

Anti-Tank Protection

Javelin

The round consists of the Javelin missile and the ATK (Alliant Techsystems) Launch Tube Assembly. The range of the missile is 2,500m. Javelin is a fire-and-forget missile with lock-on before launch and automatic self-guidance. The missile is equipped with an imaging infrared seeker which is based on a cadmium mercury telluride (CdHgTe) 64 x 64 staring focal plane array in the eight to twelve micron waveband. The tandem warhead is fitted with two shaped charges: a precursor warhead to initiate explosive reactive armour and a main warhead to penetrate base armour. The propulsion system is a two-stage solid propellant design which provides a minimum smoke soft launch.

The Javelin's CLU provides battlefield surveillance and target acquisition capabilities. The Javelin night vision sight (NVS) is a passive I2R system. The NVS enables observation of things that are not normally visible to the human eye. It receives and measures IR light emitted by the environment. The NVS converts the IR light into an image for the gunner. The IR image also allows the gunner to identify enemy armor targets, his first priority to engage and destroy. Javelin gunners must identify battlefield combatants at night based on the images seen in the NVS. The gunners must distinguish friends from foes to preclude fratricide. The Night Vision Laboratory has developed materials to train Javelin gunners to identify friends and targets based on their IR images.

M-220 Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided missile (TOW) The TOW anti-tank missile was introduced for service in the US Army in 1970. Current versions are capable of penetrating more than 30 inches of armor, or "any 1990s tank," at a maximum range of more than 3,000 meters. In the ICBT, it will use a Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) as the launch platform. (See the "Anti-Tank Guided Missile Vehicle" under "In-lieu-of Equipment") (See M-220 Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided missile (TOW) for details.)

It can launch 3 missiles in 90 seconds. It is primarily used in antitank warfare, and is a command to line of sight, wire-guided weapon. TOW is used to engage and destroy enemy armored vehicles, primarily tanks. Secondary mission is to destroy other point targets such as non-armored vehicles, crew-served weapons and launchers. This system is designed to attack and defeat tanks and other armored vehicles. The system will operate in all weather conditions and on the "dirty" battlefield.

The TOW 2 launcher is the most recent launcher upgrade. It is compatible with all TOW missiles. The TOW 2 Weapon System is composed of a reusable launcher, a missile guidance set, and sight system. The system can be tripod mounted. The missile has a 20-year maintenance-free storage life. All versions of the TOW missile can be fired from the current launcher.

The TOW is a crew portable, vehicle-mounted, heavy anitarmor weapon system consisting of a launcher and one of five versions of the TOW missile. It is designed to defeat armored vehicles and other targets such as field fortifications from ranges up to 3,750 meters. After firing the missile, the gunner must keep the cross hairs of the sight centered on the target to ensure a hit. The system will operate in all weather conditions in which the gunner can see a target throughout the missile flight by using either a day or night sight.

The ITAS will operate from the High Mobility Multi- Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and the dismount tripod platform. The ITAS will be fielded at battalion level, replacing TOW 2 in light infantry units. The TOW Improved Target Acquisition System low- rate initial production (LRIP) I contract was awarded September 30, 1996, with a production quantity of twenty- five units. LRIP II was awarded March 1998 for a quantity of seventy-three systems for the 1st BDE Fielding in September 1999. First unit equipped (FUE) was conducted in September 1998. The TOW system is used on the HMMWV, the M151 jeep, the armored personnel carrier, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) COBRA helicopters, the ITV, and the US Marine Corps light armored vehicle. Considerable improvements have been made to the missile since 1970. There are six missiles available for the TOW. Three of the five TOW missile versions--Basic TOW, Improved TOW and TOW 2--are no longer being produced for US forces. However, these versions are still used by 40 allied countries.

Field Artillery

M777 Howitzer

Later the gun system will be incorporated into the Stryker concept: "The final member of the MAV family will be a new 155-mm self-propelled howitzer. Requirements reflect that the howitzer component "will integrate the lightweight 155-mm (M777) cannon system with capabilities equal to or greater than the lightweight 155 (M777) on a common chassis within the IBCT and be capable of firing all currently fielded and developmental U.S. and NATO standard 155-mm munitions and propellants. In addition, the system must be able to achieve a range of 30 kilometers (assisted) and be able to achieve a maximum rate of fire of not fewer than five rounds per minute for three minutes in low angle (less than 800 mils elevation) indirect fire." (See Army Transformation for more details.)

Criticisms of Stryker/LAV III: The first General Motors LAV III entered the service in 1999 and immediately there was criticism. In 2001, an article from Jane's Armour and Artillery (JAA) (LAV-III to provide US Army with rapid-response capability) stated that the Army sought to provide itself with a stronger rapid-response capability and decided to equip its Interim Brigade Combat Teams with the Light Armoured Vehicle III (LAV-III) (8x8). Following extensive trials, a consortium formed by General Motors Defense (GM) of Canada and General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) of the US was awarded the lucrative contract, and will provide the Army with 2,131 LAV-III vehicles at a total cost of $4 billion.

The Army's decision to select the LAV-III was contested by GM GDLS competitor United Defense LP. In the Foreword to JAA, Foss writes that, "According to United Defense LP, its solution was half the cost of the LAV-III and its M8 Armored Gun System was already a type classified by the US Army. In the end, however, the US Army stuck with the LAV-III solution."

According to LAV III Fails, "The LAV-III 8x8 armored car is a 20-ton (combat-loaded) metal box suspended on top of 8 rubber tires which press down hard on the earth; 40 PSI to be exact. A vehicle pressing down on just 8 small areas can roll fast on pavement, but it cannot drive at will off-road in mud where it must grip. Except in the firm soil desert areas and roads, the LAV-III will get stuck often, ruining the tactical integrity of units and result in route selection where only clearly defined roads and paths will be selected. What we can anticipate is "GO" terrain for wheeled vehicles is also "GO" locations to set up an ambush and wait for vulnerable wheeled targets appear."

It continued, "We still live on the same planet where soft mud, rain, vegetation, obstacles and enemy fire effects make it just as necessary today as it was in WWI when we stopped trying to drive wheeled armored cars through the mud and barbed wire of "no man's land" and armies adopted the track-laying tank. What was good ground combat maneuver mobility for 1917 is essentially the same for 2017: the low-ground-pressure track. That we can fully exploit this with modern material "band-track" technology to be stealthy, facilitate high road speeds, and low-maintenance has been lost to those suffering from the heavy M1/M2 tank "hang-over" of the Cold War. That tracked armored vehicles are 28% more space/weight efficient than wheeled armored cars, and are fully C-130 aircraft transportable, and superior in armored protection (defeating Rocket Propelled Grenade anti-tank missiles), armament and mobility is lost on those officers who simply have not done their "homework"."

Is the Stryker a "Death Trap"? Are the Strykers in Korea potential death traps? Is Rumsfeld purposely fielding the Strykers simply for political reasons? We don't think so. We believe that the Stryker has many faults -- BUT if you position it to where it is best suited, the liabilities are minimized.

As we said before it appears to be BOTH political and a function of global restructuring. The Stryker fits ideally into the concept of reduction of forces in Korea. A Stryker "medium" brigade would be about 3,700 personnel and would replace a significant amount of the now 14,000 strong U.S. Army element of the USFK. At the same time, an SBCT INCREASES the amount of infantry when compared with the "heavy" brigade that it is replacing. With the current global military restructuring, the ROK cannot object to the Stryker as this would be part of a global plan -- not simply a Korean plan. Though the ROK is attempting to drag its feet and place stumbling blocks into the USFK relocation plans, the U.S. is playing hardball and simply dictating the changes. The movement south of the Han ideally suits the Stryker's operational environment -- and movement south of the Han ideally suits the removal of the "tripwire" function of the 2d ID and in turn facilitates the reduction of forces in Korea.

The Stryker and the political plans of the Rumsfeld DoD team go hand-in-hand. But what about the problems that may impact on its operations in Korea.

PROBLEM: Field tests of the Stryker vehicle demonstrated by 6 Aug. 2002 document produced by the Army's Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), has detailed information on the the Stryker failures. For example, "RWS (Remote Weapon Station): Ineffective in engaging targets. HMS (Height Management System): The HMS was intended to allow the too-tall vehicle to 'kneel' down to reduce its height and get the top clearance needed to fit in a C-130. It still needs development. Tires: 13 replaced within the first 96 hours! Fuel: On some vehicles, fuel consumption was excessive because the APUs couldn't be used for safety reasons. No reason given for the safety concerns." (See Don Laughlin: "Stryker Findings: Tuesday, August 06, 2002" for details.)

In addition, the Stryker brigade does not have the logistical support structure and must rely on other units for support. "The brigades by design do not have the level of supply and transportation support personnel or the necessary equipment to move and distribute the fuel, water and other materiel [they] would need for extended operations," William M. Solis, the GAO director for defense capabilities and management, wrote in the letter. "External logistics support personnel are needed to configure, transport and distribute these supplies to the brigade."

• Solution: (1). Permanently eliminate the C-130 transport requirement that is causing everyone to lie through their teeth (or get tons of waivers) to cover up the fact that the Stryker is NOT C-130 transportable. With this the HMS failure becomes irrelevant as the transport will be on the C-17 or C-5. (2). The RWS was operational during the last JRTC tests, but it does need more stabilization work. (See next PROBLEM-SOLUTION) (3). Employ the Stryker in Korea where it will not have to be airlifted. By moving south of the Han, the USFK will turn over the defense three main "supply" routes to be used by the North to enter the south to the ROK. The Strykers will be located south of Seoul in a defensive role in case of a breakthrough. (4). The tire problem will be reduced greatly if operated on paved surfaces instead of off-road conditions. Operations south of the Han should reduce this problem significantly. (5). Criticisms on fuel consumption indicate the Stryker must be used near a source of resupply. The GAO also pointed out this problem. Being south of the Han it will be near support bases at Pyongtaek and Taegu.

Stryker Budget (Includes all Stryker versions (infantry carrier, reconnaissance, medical evacuation, mortar carrier, engineer, command, fire support, NBC and mobile gun system).) SEE Stryker Funding Details FY03-FY05.

Procurement** (Number in parenthesis include total number of vehicles for that year.)
FY03 $774,800,000(302)
FY04 $955,000,000 (301)
FY05 $969,800,000 (340)

RDT&E
FY03 $124,000,000
FY04 $46,000,000
FY05 $53,000,000

ICV
FY03 $171.691,000 (118)
FY04 $20,605,000 (14)
FY05 $200,955,000 (132)

RV
FY03 $69,103,000 (51)
FY04 $161,735,000 (115)
FY05 $74,537,000 (51)

ATGM (0)

MC
FY03 $52,186,000 (36)
FY04 $43,741,000 (25)
FY05 $58,424,000 (38)

FSV
FY03 $19,145,000 (14)
FY04 $37,717,000 (27)
FY05 $20,412,000 (14)

ESV
FY03 $26,067,000 (10)
FY04 $45,047,000 (17)
FY05 $27,469,000 (10)

CV
FY03 $39,850,000 (22)
FY04 $44,011,000 (28)
FY05 $42,025,000 (22)

MEV**
FY03 $23,123,000 (18)
FY04 $24,714,000 (19)
FY05 $24,488,000 (18)

NBC
FY04 $35,356,000 (17)

MGS
FY03 $120,786,000 (33)
FY04 $131,225,000 (39)
FY05 $202,576,000 (55)

3d BDE 2d ID

Infantry dismounted from Stryker during April 2003 exercise at Fort Irwin. (Associated Press)

October 1999

January 2000

June 2000

November 2000

January 2001

February 2002

June 2000

July 2002

August 2002:

Pentagon considers end to Stryker: Questions loom over limits in airlifting vehicle

August 23, 2002
By Vago Muradian and Sean Naylor
Special to the Times -- Times staff writer

The days of the Stryker infantry carrier vehicle, shown here returning to the tactical operations center at Fort Irwin, Calif., from a night battle, appear to be numbered. - Times Staff Photo by Jud McCrehin

Senior Pentagon officials, considered that the Army's multibillion dollar Stryker armored vehicle may be too difficult to airlift, are questioning the program's future, according to top officials.

"We've got a lot of questions the Army needs to answer," one senior official said.

The Stryker is the centerpiece of the Army's Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, designed to usher in the Army's transformation to a lighter, more mobile force. Army leaders want to buy more than 2,000 Strykers to outfit six brigades - at a cost of $1.5 billion per brigade - the first of which would be fielded in January 2003 and be designated "combat ready" four months later.

Senior Army officials said they were unaware of any move to kill the Stryker program.

"I am certainly aware of no effort to cancel Stryker," said Army spokesman Maj. Gen. Larry Gottardi. "As a matter of fact, I think we have all been very impressed by the Stryker Brigade Combat Team and Stryker vehicle performance during Millennium Challenge 2002. The performance and the improvements in capability that it gives the Soldiers in [brigades] is pretty impressive. I personally, as a combat arms officer, have been very impressed by its performance."

"I'm stunned," said another senior Army officer in the Pentagon. "This is the first I've heard about it."

Stryker, which will come in two main versions - an infantry carrier and a mobile gun version equipped with a 105 mm weapon - is being developed by GM GDLS, an industrial team comprising General Motors Canada, and General Dynamics Land Systems, Sterling Heights, Mich.

The ability to transport Stryker by C-130 is a top requirement given the plane is the Air Force's key airlifter, sources said.

"It barely fits into a C-130 [Air Force transport plane] with inches to spare. Plus, it's so heavy that most of the time we may need two 130s to carry each Stryker - one for the vehicle and the other for fuel, ammunition and crew. One [Stryker] with all that stuff can go on a 130, but then the plane can't fly very far.

"It's not that it won't perform well when it's on the ground," the official added. "It's actually pretty good. But if we can't move it easily, that's a big handicap."

Timetable still uncertain

It remains unclear when Pentagon officials will rule on Stryker's fate, sources said. The program is among a number of major weapons efforts now under review by Rumsfeld and his staff for cancellation or major cuts, among them the Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter, the V-22 tiltrotor aircraft, and the F-22 fighter jet.

Senior Pentagon leadership met with President George W. Bush on Aug. 21 at his ranch in Crawford, Texas, to discuss defense strategy, including long-range defense spending, military transformation efforts and program cancellations.

Should Stryker be terminated, it would be the second major Army weapons program to be snuffed out by Rumsfeld. In April, he canceled the service's Crusader self-propelled howitzer program for a variety of reasons, among them that the vehicle was too heavy to be easily airlifted.

Rapid deployment is a key criterion for Rumsfeld as he works to transform the U.S. military into a more powerful and flexible force, a requirement that has gained importance as the United States fights a global war against terrorism.

Pentagon officials have asked the Air Force for data on the cargo capabilities of the C-130 and C-17, sources said. A central Pentagon concern is whether Stryker is simply too large for the C-130. Because Stryker takes up virtually all the space inside a C-130's fuselage, the Air Force has issued a waiver to enable the planes to move the vehicle.

Once aboard the plane, the Stryker uses its "height management system" - which includes tire inflation - to lower the vehicle to allow aircrew members to move more easily over the top of the vehicle to gain access to the rear of the airplane, a key consideration in the event of an in-flight emergency.

No stranger to skepticism

Controversy has swirled around Stryker since it was selected as the winner of the Army's Interim Armored Vehicle competition in 2000. Some critics were pessimistic because Stryker is a wheeled combat vehicle, the first in decades. Others questioned whether the new vehicle could be easily air transported and whether its chassis was strong enough to absorb the recoil from the 105 mm gun some models are to carry. Because of structural limitations - Stryker is based on GM's Light Armored Vehicle that was introduced three decades ago - a 105 mm "soft recoil" gun will have to be used that may require new ammunition.

A senior Army officer in the Pentagon said ammunition wasn't the only issue regarding the Stryker's mobile-gun system. "On the 105 program, the frustration everybody has is that right now it's not C-130 transportable," the officer said. "It's too tall."

Army officials and industry executives stress that the vehicle exceeds the service's requirements, and amply demonstrated its capabilities at the three-week Millennium Challenge 02 war game that recently concluded. Stryker debuted during the war game at exercises at the National Training Center Calif.

Army officials and soldiers operating the vehicles lauded their new mounts' capabilities, particularly its ability to rapidly cross rough terrain, achieving speeds as high as 68 mph, and for its long operating range.

To address questions regarding the air transportability of the Stryker, during the exercise one vehicle was delivered to the National Training Center aboard a C-130, rolling smoothly off the aircraft and joining other vehicles already there.

"Stryker has been tested by the Army and the Air Force, and both are satisfied that it can be transported by a C-130," said General Dynamics spokesman Kendell Pease. "And we have repeatedly transported it by C-130 and have had no issues.

"When we started development, we conducted tests to see how well Stryker would fit on a C-130. We saw it would be tight and the Air Force asked us to drop the height of the vehicle once aboard to allow its loadmasters to get to the back of the plane, and our height management system allows us to do that. We meet or exceed all requirements, including transport on a C-130."

Another general in the Pentagon said that a move by Rumsfeld's office to kill Stryker would not be a bolt from the blue. "I would not be surprised if that were the case," he said. "My guess is it would be couched in terms of 'why put money in an interim solution if that money could be used to bring forward the Objective Force quicker?' Now our own analysis says you can't get there quicker than you're going. You have a requirement right now, and you need to invest in fulfilling that requirement. That was the reason for buying the Stryker to begin with. Regarding accusations that the Stryker is a tight fit on the C-130, the general answered "What isn't?"

"If you're gonna stick a vehicle on a C-130 it's gonna be a tight squeeze," he said. "Either it fits or it doesn't fit. To the best of my knowledge, there isn't a 'kinda fits' category."

The general said that although the original version of the mobile gun system that GM/GDLS had been marketing to other countries did not meet the C-130 transportability requirement, he understood that these technical hurdles had been overcome in the version that the Army had agreed to buy.

Canceling the Stryker would be a major snub to the Army leadership. "It flies in the face of what we have defined [as a requirement]," the general said.

Stryker ICV

October 2002:

November 2002:

The Stryker brigades were envisioned to be especially well-suited for small-scale, regional conflicts. The idea was to get a force to one of these hot spots quickly and get the conflict under control.

With each combat team comes 309 Strykers, eight-wheeled, armored vehicles that can be outfitted in 10 different ways, with everything from a 105 mm cannon for a mobile gun system to a completely wired command center. The 19-ton Stryker vehicles are named for two soldiers, Pfc. Stuart S. Stryker, who served in World War II, and Spec. Robert F. Stryker, who served in Vietnam.

As an infantry carrier vehicle, the Stryker promised a 60 mph top speed and could hold a nine-man squad and a two-man crew, meaning that soldiers don't have to expend all their energy walking. With the extensive complement of digital communication and surveillance gear that allows information-sharing like never before among those in the field, soldiers will spend a lot less time on the radio, asking, "Where are you?"

Information is critical, but the soldiers are more so, said Col. Mike Rounds, commander of the 3d Bde 2d ID Stryker Brigade. "These are a tool. It's still the boots on the ground that win the fight," he said. "We're an infantry-centric organization. If we step away from the infantry ethos, we're missing the point."

The Stryker brigades is aimed at filling a gap in the Army's capabilities between heavy and light forces and also serve a precursor for the new combat capabilities the Army wants to start deploying by the end of the decade. The Stryker's also giving the Army the capability the Marine Corps have had for roughly two decades with its light-armored vehicles. The Stryker brigades are currently the Army's flagship transformation initiative.

One of the key features of the teams is the Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron, equipped with Shadow unmanned aerial vehicles - a type of drone - to "see the enemy over the hill," the Prophet electronic intelligence system and the Javelin portable anti-tank missile. In traditional combat, soldiers typically first found the enemy in a direct encounter and then maneuvered on the enemy. But with units such as the RSTA Squadron, the unit will know before they come in contact with the enemy, where the enemy is.

July 2003

Army Puts the Stryker on a Fast Track
Light armored vehicle to prove its value in urban, peacekeeping operations

by Roxana Tiron

In anticipation of extended peacekeeping duties in Iraq and future contingencies in urban areas, the Army is stepping up efforts to field its first Stryker light-armored vehicle brigade.

Despite a string of controversies that plagued the program in its early going, Army officials strongly support the decision to move forward with the $4 billion program.

A critical test took place in April, when a Stryker Brigade Combat Team participated in a series of mid- to high-intensity exercises at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, Calif. Following that, the brigade was transported by rail, sea and air to the Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk, La., where, for two weeks in May, it conducted operations, primarily in urban terrain.

The first SBCT—the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division, based at Fort Lewis, Wash.—is now entering the Initial Operational Testing and Evaluation phase.

"The IOT&E Strykers are the configuration that we want to get to," said Steven Campbell, the Stryker systems coordinator for the Army.

The Stryker is a 19-ton, eight-wheeled armored vehicle with two variants—the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (which comes in eight configurations) and the Mobile Gun System. The configurations for the ICV are: mortar carrier, reconnaissance, commander's vehicle, fire support, medical evacuation, engineer squad, anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) and the NBC reconnaissance vehicle, which is going to go into low rate production this December. The other configurations will enter full-rate production, once the program achieves Milestone III, said Campbell. Milestone III is a go-ahead to enter full-rate production. The SBCT has 3,614 soldiers. In addition to the headquarters, it has three infantry battalions—each with 65 Stryker vehicles; a cavalry battalion in charge of reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition—with 53 vehicles, and an artillery battalion equipped with M198 155mm howitzers and counter-fire radars. The brigade also has a support battalion, a military intelligence company, an engineer company, a signal company and an anti-tank company.

The Army is planning to write an Operational Evaluation report to Congress, which is due this fall. The service is looking at converting five more brigades into SBCTs. The Army budgeted for six brigades.

Urban Combat

The Stryker's high-tech sensors and communications systems would have proved invaluable in operations in Iraq, said Col. Robert McClure, chief of war plans at the Army Staff. "It would have been phenomenally useful in those populated areas," McClure said at a Pentagon news conference.

The vehicle also would have been useful, "wherever you wanted to bring in more capable forces than light infantry and airborne," said Col. William Grisoli, deputy director for Army transformation.

The Stryker brigades are designed to be "fast-entry" units. The vehicle can travel 300 miles at 60 miles an hour before needing refueling.

It is also transportable on a C-130 cargo aircraft. It was not clear earlier in the program whether the Stryker would be able to meet the 38,000-pound weight requirement.

After some modifications to the vehicle by contractor General Dynamics Land Systems, the Stryker is light enough to load inside the C-130 cargo bay, but it can't fly very far without air refueling. Campbell said the farthest the Stryker has flown in a C-130, without refuelling, was 200 miles. But during a recent congressional hearing, Stryker critics complained that the range is only 60 miles.

Several factors affect C-130 transportability, said Campbell. One of them is the armor protection that the Air Force added around the crew compartments, which ups the weight of the cargo plane itself.

"The Air Force will say, 'depending what the mission is, we'll give you the kind of aircraft to meet your mission requirement,'" Campbell said.

"Most people that I have talked to will say that they can't see a C-130 going that far [1,000 miles] to drop off the Stryker. You fly it in a C-17," Campbell added.

How far the Stryker can fly in a C-130 also is a function of air temperature, elevation and runway, said Brig. Gen. Jack Gardner, the Army's deputy commander for transformation.

"If it is a lot of weight, high elevation, short runway, it may be 100 miles. If it is different elevation, different runway and different temperature it may be 700 miles," he said.

It ultimately becomes an operational decision to figure out how far the Stryker could be flown versus how far it would have to drive. "It may go into a runway that has better protection," Campbell said.

Lt. Col. Mick Nicholson, a military assistant to the secretary of the Army, explained that the C-130 metric is a basic transportation requirement, "but it is not always the preferred way to go. ... The Stryker can also be deployed by ship to a certain point of entry and be driven for hundreds of miles to the objective."

Once they get to the battle, the Stryker brigades only can operate for a short time without additional logistics support. The General Accounting Office raised this issue in a letter to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

"The brigades by design do not have the level of supply and transportation support personnel or the necessary equipment to move and distribute the fuel, water and other materiel [they] would need for extended operations," William M. Solis, the GAO director for defense capabilities and management, wrote in the letter. "External logistics support personnel are needed to configure, transport and distribute these supplies to the brigade."

The brigades' support battalion, as currently designed, has about one third of the maintenance support capability of an Army heavy brigade, said GAO. The brigades also rely heavily on contractors to service and maintain the vehicles and their complex digital suites.

The letter was meant to bring to Rumsfeld's attention that the Army was not planning to formally assess external logistical support as part of the operational evaluation. Instead, the Army would conduct separate, informal assessments of support concepts, said Solis.

Army officials briefed GAO on its logistics support plans. "The officials assured us that the results of the assessment will be included in the Army's final report on the operational evaluation," said Solis. "If the Army executes its plan as now envisioned it will meet the intent of our recommendations."

The bottom line is that the Stryker will not be deployed this summer, as Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki has hoped. A more realistic goal is to have the Stryker fielded by fall, at the earliest.

Survivability Concerns

Soldiers who participated in tests at JRTC generally gave the Stryker favorable reviews.

"The reason they have designed [the Stryker] is for us to get closer to the fight quicker," said Sgt. John Noel, from the 520th Infantry Battalion of the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division. "Once you get in the urban fight, the vehicles for the most part will stay on the outside until we get more or less cleared."

But he cautioned that even though the Stryker offers more protection than other armored vehicles, such as the M-113, crews are still vulnerable. The Strykers now being evaluated have 14.5 mm armor protection. Starting with the third brigade, add-on armor plates will be provided to protect against rocket propelled grenades. The previously fielded brigades can be retrofitted.

The extra armor would add 8,000 pounds to the Stryker, but Army officials said the armor would be transported separately from the vehicle. The first 50 armor sets are scheduled to arrive in July 2004, said Campbell.

Maj. Nick Mullen, with the brigade coordination cell, noted there are more infantry soldiers in an SBCT than in a heavy brigade or a light brigade. "This increases the lethality of the SBCT," he said.

The companies are combined arms teams that consist of a mobile gun platoon, mortar platoon (120-mm, 81 mm and 60 mm mortars), forward observers, a sniper team and three infantry line platoons. Eventually, they will also have TOW anti-tank missile launchers, said Campbell.

For urban combat, the plan is to have a bunker buster weapon, said Campbell. This type of round would be able to go through double reinforced concrete walls.

Urban combat was one of the main focuses of the operational evaluation at JRTC's Gordon-Shughart training center, a site specifically designed to simulate operations in urban terrain.

The Army also is building a new urban warfare training facility at Fort Lewis.

Special Operations

The Stryker brigades are intended to work closely with Special Operations Forces, who typically would be the first to arrive to a combat zone.

Col. Bob Brown, the commander of the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, said the SOF would give the Stryker brigades "situational understanding."

One of the problems that SOF teams encounter as a first entry force is limited maneuverability. "We would come in as an early entry, and we would be able to maneuver and expand the area with the Stryker," said Brown. The Strykers would bring "more communications capability, bring more fighting capability. ... There is a liaison with the SOF, and they are constantly sharing info back and forth," said Brown.

At the JRTC tests, SOF teams had to collect information and pass it on to the SBCT. The Stryker brigades also had to operate under SOF command, said Gardner. "We think that all the future fights will be very joint, and it will be a combination of conventional and unconventional SOF, and we wanted to make sure that the SBCTs, and the Army can work effectively in that environment," he said.

One of the most significant technical advances that Stryker brigades bring to the fight is the RSTA (Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting Acquisition) unit.

"It is what every Stryker leader always wanted, the eyes and ears," Brown told National Defense. "You have 450 soldiers that are your eyes and ears gathering info all over the battlefield."

For the first time ever, he said, the Army used the Shadow 200 unmanned air vehicle for targeting, including indirect-fire calls. "We have had UAVs before, of course, but we have never had them in the brigade," Brown said. An organic UAV enhances the brigade commander's targeting options, he added. "Before, the UAV was flying for us, but 50 units have access to it, so I couldn't tell it where to go."

The Shadow worked better at night, he said, because it has infrared sights.

"When you are looking through the Predator it's like looking through a soda straw," Brown said. The Shadow offers better angles. "When I used a Predator in Bosnia, I had a lot of trouble figuring that out, I needed an expert to tell me what was going on the ground," he said.

Traditionally, artillery has been called in by voice. "They would call in a coordinate by voice and then would start the chain," said Spc. Richard Munroe, who manned the Shadow ground station at JRTC. "Now we have the capability to detect the target, sending an e-mail" to the fire-control operators. "Then it comes back to me saying, 'Verify the variable, because we are going to shoot at the target,' and they would shoot at the target as I am watching it. ... I do not have to worry about calculating," he said.

Soldiers still need to improve their ability to quickly write e-mails with the targeting information. "Speaking is a lot faster than typing, in my opinion," he said. "But you can get more pertinent data in those e-mails compared to what I would be able to say in the voice transmission."

The Shadow has remote-viewing terminals, so soldiers on the ground can "look at exactly what it sees," Brown said. "You have three remote viewing terminals, so if I want to send it to a company, if I want to give it to a captain—say he was going to a attack a village—I can give him the remote viewing terminal."

The availability of multiple sensors, meanwhile, makes information processing a challenge, said Brown. "Just because you have the technology you get lots of info, [but what] you need is lots of useful information."

The abundance of information makes soldiers train differently. "In the past, ... nobody was going to second-guess you," said Brown. Now, the situation has changed, because the same lieutenant gets 100 pieces of information that he needs to analyze. "When he goes to attack the hill, everything from his company commander to a four-star general can second guess him and say 'wait a minute,'" Brown noted.

"Some folks will just be overwhelmed by the information," he said. Stryker brigade commanders want to train soldiers how to decide what is useful. "You have to teach folks priority of messages," Brown said. They also are taught how to take the initiative, and "know that your chain of command supports you and backs you." That way, he said, initiative improves.

Mobile Gun System

The MGS is the piece of the Stryker program that is farthest behind in development.

General Dynamics had to modify the original design of the MGS to make it C-130 transportable. Now, the company is dealing with other MGS problems, such as the ammo handling system for the 105mm gun, according to Campbell.

"The requirement is that we should be able to recycle 54 rounds ... broken up in three groups of 18" while the vehicle goes through a bumpy ride, Campbell explained. "Now we have got to a point where we are able to go through a complete 54 cycle of rounds, and it is starting to work."

The ammo handling system has a complex alignment, said Campbell. "So you transfer the rounds from one level to another level, and then you transfer it into the gun," he said.

Another problem was with the muzzle break, designed to soften the recoil of the gun, said Campbell. "Initially on the 105, you have openings on the edges of the barrel to let the blast go out," he said. "What was happening though is that the blast was going out and damaging a part of the vehicle."

The solution is a lightweight tube and the elimination of the muzzle break at the end. "Because the way the vehicle was built, it could still take the additional recoil," Campbell said. "Without the muzzle break, there is about a 3 percent increase in recoil but the system is able to handle that without additional problems."

Also, without the muzzle break, the Stryker is 200 pounds lighter, he added.

Another concern in the MGS is the space available for the crew. In the earlier design, "the areas were too small for the average soldier," said Campbell. "The intent is to have you want to get above the 90-percentile soldier to get into the vehicle. We are finding that out now, because we are in testing. We have taken several corrective actions to fix the problem."

The Army must have all these fixes completed before next year's user test, scheduled to begin in May. According to Campbell, in January, the Army will brief the Defense Acquisition Board and recommend limited procurement of the MGS. The Army is moving into full-rate production for the eight Stryker basic configurations and is going to ask for limited rate production on both the MGS and NBC version.

Some performance shortfalls in the Infantry Carrier Vehicles surfaced last year, during the Millennium Challenge exercise at the NTC. Campbell said several problems have been fixed, while some still need attention, such as the Remote Weapons Station. The RWS operates the .50 caliber weapon.

"We have got three improvements already on Remote Weapons System from different variations of software they have put in it," said Noel. He was a squad leader at the NTC exercise last year.

"We had a lot of problems last year. The heat would freeze up the RWS," he said. "When they revised it, they had another problem with it. It was freezing to the rear. [Now], with the third version, we had no problems at NTC this year." He said that the RWS has been reinforced with extra beams, "so that it does not come down on its own," he said. Despite the extra hold, "the RWS has not been stabilized enough," said Spc. Scott Borowski. "Every movement the vehicle makes, it makes as well, so you can't really effectively shoot on the run and the picture isn't that good."

He said that he was not impressed by the images from the thermal sight. And he complained the vehicle lacks a range finder. Several soldiers interviewed at the NTC last year had complained about the thermal sights in the RWS (National Defense July 2002). However, according to Noel, changes have not been made to the sight.

"Some of the changes come sooner, some are later," he said. "Thermal and stabilization are very expensive, so whether that ever happens I do not know."

The antennas on the MGS have been moved around for better placement, said Noel. "They have reinforced a lot of things down and it is a little bit better."

During the operational evaluation, both at the NTC and the JRTC, the tire damage is still very high, soldiers said. "The outer wall is still thin, there is not much they can do about it," said Noel.

Additionally, the squad leader's digital display needs a keyboard rather than have a touch screen, which "just isn't phenomenal," said Borowski.

Sometimes, there are communications problems, he said. "On a lot of these communications, we are on line of sight and they are very temperamental. If you do not have line of sight, then you do not get communications."

Among the novel devices on the Stryker is the Force XXI battle command computer for brigade and below, called the FBCB2. It displays the location of every vehicle in the brigade. "It runs pretty decent, but we have software problems. Overall, the small bugs need to be worked out. Nothing major," he said.

In hot-weather exercises, it is common to hear soldiers say they would like better air conditioning systems in the vehicle. "That is something that would be nice to have but not necessarily readily available today," said Campbell. Modifications to the air conditioning would cause a change to the engine. "That is not programmed in the funding right now," he said.

Delivery Schedule

As the first SBCT gets closer to deployment, the second brigade is scheduled to be operational in 2004. That will be the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis. The third SBCT is slated for the 172nd Infantry Brigade at Forts Wainwright and Richardson, in Alaska, to become operational in 2005.

The fourth SBCT, slated for 2006, will be the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, based at Fort Polk. The 2nd Cavalry regiment has helicopters and a huge reconnaissance organization, said Lt. Col. Kathy Jennings, a program officer on the Army Staff. "We are not going to take that away from them," she added. Tankers that were stationed at Fort Polk will have to change location, because none of the tank units will be converted to SBCTs, she said.

The fifth brigade is planned for the 2nd Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, in 2007, while the sixth SBCT will be the 56th Brigade of the 28th Infantry Division of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard, in 2010. "At any given time, we'll have two Stryker brigades in transition," said Jennings.

New U.S. combat team to train here

The United States will dispatch a high-tech, rapid-response military unit to South Korea for its first overseas training deployment, the U.S. 8th Army said yesterday.

A U.S. Army Stryker platoon from the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division will arrive from Fort Lewis, Washington, on Friday. Although the bulk of the division is located in Korea, part of it is billeted in the United States.

The platoon will be transported from the U.S. base to South Korea's Osan Air Base aboard a C-17 aircraft, military authorities said in a press release.

The U.S. Army has been streamlining its units to emphasize rapid deployment, and the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, as this type of unit is called, is one of the results of those efforts. Lieutenant Colonel Steven Boylan, an 8th Army public affairs officer, said the unit can be deployed anywhere in the world within 96 hours of receiving an order to pull out.

After the platoon - 65 men and six Stryker vehicles - arrives in Korea, it will move to the Rodriguez Range Complex in northern Gyeonggi province for a live fire training exercise that will last 10 days.

"The training exercise will afford the soldiers and leaders of the Stryker platoon the opportunity to conduct realistic training and familiarize themselves with terrain and conditions on the Korean Peninsula," the 8th Army public affairs office said in its press release.

The unit will return to the United States after the exercise is completed.

Five of the six vehicles are infantry carriers and the other is a command and control vehicle, Colonel Boylan said. Only four of the infantry carriers will be used in the exercise; the fifth will be on display while the team is here. All infantry carriers coming here are equipped with 50-caliber machine guns as their heaviest armament; another version of the vehicle carries a 105-millimeter mobile gun.

Colonel Boylan said Korea was selected as the Stryker's first overseas training location because United States Forces Korea asked for them. "We asked for their training here to display the new capability to our soldiers here as well as to our South Korean allies," Colonel Boylan said. "It also demonstrates our commitment to deterrence on the peninsula."

by Ser Myo-ja

August 2003:

Monday, August 04, 2003

STRYKER PLATOON DEMOS CAPABILITIES

RODRIGUEZ RANGE, South Korea – A platoon of Strykers put on a capabilites demonstration at the Korea Training Center in North Gyeonggi Province, Aug. 4.

"We here are here to showcase the U.S. Army's new Stryker capabilities," said Capt. Eric Beaty, commander of Co. C, 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Wash. "It is a new way of fighting."

The Stryker is an eight-wheeled fighting vehicle designed to get soldiers in and around the combat zone with lethal firepower. With speeds clocking over 60 miles per hour, infantrymen say they are happy with the power it gives them.

"Troops love this concept," said Beaty. "We are still a dismounted infantry force, this just gets us to the fight faster, and with more protection." Three years ago, the U.S. Army identified a capabilities gap between its heavy and light forces. So, the Army built the SBCT, which is centered around the Stryker vehicle.

The Korea Training Center is located in a rural area about 20 miles northeast of Camp Casey. The Stryker soldiers are here for about a week to demonstrate the new vehicle. They are scheduled to return to Fort Lewis on Aug. 8.

The Stryker platoon demonstrated an attack on a built-up target. Dismounted infantrymen approached from the side and secured three buildings on the range. The Strykers moved into position with authority and speed.

Beaty said the basic armor will protect against light machine gun fire. Different armor packages offer even higher protection.

There are many different versions of the Stryker. They vary from command vehicle to infantry carrier vehicle. Beaty said his command vehicle carries a remote weapon system: a 50mm Machine Gun or a Mark 19 40mm Grenade Launcher.

The infantry carrier vehicle can carry 2 crewmembers and a 9-member squad. It has an operating range of 330 miles.

The Army's vision of a lightning fast, powerful and mobile assault force will soon be a reality as more Stryker Brigade Combat Teams are fielded across the Army. Eventually a total of 2,112 Strykers will be fielded to 6 brigades and a training base.

The Stryker brigades are designed to operate anywhere in the world," said Brig. Gen. Jack Gardner, I Corps and Fort Lewis, deputy commanding general for transformation. "This exercise practices deployment, and the ability to train in different terrains."

With this demonstration, officials showed how this capability could deploy to the Korean peninsula. The Strykers can be deployed on the entire range of U.S. Air Force transport aircraft.

There are no plans to permanently forward station Strykers in Korea.

Stryker Brigade Combat Teams visit Rodriguez Range at the Korea Training Center
for a demonstration of the new fighting vehicle, Aug. 4. (Photo David McNally)

Capt. Eric Beaty, commander of Co. C, 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Wa.,
demonstrates the capabilities of the new Army Stryker fighting vehicle at Rodriguez Range, Aug. 4. (Photo David McNally)

Stryker Brigade Combat Teams visit Rodriguez Range at the Korea Training Center
for a demonstration of the new fighting vehicle, Aug. 4. (Photo David McNally)

College Students Attempt to Break Into U.S. Firing Range (Go to College Students Attempt to Break Into U.S. Firing Range for full story.) On 4 Aug a group of 140 college students clashed with police after trying to break into a U.S. Forces Korea firing range near the DMZ. The student activists held a rally in front of the Rodriquez Liver Fire Range in Pocheon, Gyeonggi Province, calling on the U.S. military authorities to stop a training exercise being conducted by the Stryker Brigade, the U.S. Army's mobile force specializing in rapid combat-ready deployment. The platoon size element of Strykers are in Korea for "familiarization training" and are to return to Fort Lewis, WA on the 8 Aug after the exercise. This was its first overseas training. The students were not aware that the Stryker was NOT at the location -- having moved to another area.

Students at Rodriquez Range (7 Aug 03)

See Tongil News for video of break-in to the Rodriguez Live Fire Range. Shots of burning of U.S. flag as is popular with students. One small group did enter the range and were chased down as they ran around with their banner. The Army showed great restraint in ejecting the students and cameraman from the range by simply tossing them out. The students tried to climb the fence again.

The Stryker platoon is part of the 3d Bde 2d ID which Donald Rumsfeld has stated would replace the 2d ID. The students are sending some mixed messages -- Stryker go home to keep the 2d ID on the DMZ, but at the same time saying the 2d ID should go home -- as they proclaimed on their banner. The unit from the 3rd Bde, 2nd ID from Fort Lews is Charlie Co, 5th Battalion 20th Infantry.

According to the Chosun Ilbo, the USFK and the foreign community in Seoul urged the government to mete out punishment and ensure such an incident does not reoccur. According to the Korea Times on 8 Aug, the USFK yesterday denounced the students' act as a violent crime while urging the Korean authorities to punish them to the fullest extent possible. ``It is unfortunate that U.S. soldiers who are conducting high levels of training to defend the Republic of Korea are disrupted by a student radical group,'' Lt. Gen. Charles Campbell said in a news release. ``We expect the Korean authorities to prosecute those who break their laws to the fullest extent possible.''

In reaction, a small group staged a peaceful rally near the U.S. Embassy on 8 August demanding an "interview" with the U.S. Ambassador and the 8th Army Commander over the Stryker usage in Korea. Their contention was that it was to be used in preparations for a preemptive strike on North Korea. Of course, there will be no interview until the U.S.-ROK Military Alliance meetings are complete. However, it does show that some Koreans are taking the Stryker seriously.

Protest against Stryker during anti-war rally (12 Aug 03)

Criticism of Stryker grows as Army Seeks Deployment to Iraq: The following is an article in the Washington Times on 26 Aug. It concludes what we and a group of other folks have already decided -- that the Stryker is fine in a peacekeeper role, but as a combat vehicle it is severely lacking. When the news of the movement to Iraq surfaced we questioned the feasibility as the armor plate retrofits were not due out until July 2004. In the interim period it appears the Army has slapped together a "slat armor" system where an RPG round will detonate away from the body of the vehicle. Despite this "improvement" -- which we question

Study finds new Army vehicle too vulnerable

By Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Army's new state-of-the art infantry vehicle slated to make its combat debut in Iraq in October is vulnerable to the kind of rocket-propelled grenades now being used by Saddam Hussein's guerrillas, a consultant's report charges.

The Army, which rebuts the report's findings, plans to send 300 Stryker armored vehicles and 3,600 soldiers to Iraq. This first Stryker brigade will help put down the resistance that has killed more 60 American troopers since May 1. It will also be a preview of a lighter, more mobile Army for the 21st century.

But a report prepared for Rep. James H. Saxton, New Jersey Republican, says the vehicle is ill-suited for such warfare.

"Poorly armored and entirely vulnerable to RPGs," states the glossy, 108-page report prepared July 18 by consultant Victor O'Reilly. An Army spokesman, however, said the Strykers are being fitted with added armor. This will "drastically increase their protection against kinetic energy weapons and increase RPG protection," said Lt. Col. Stephen Barger, spokesman for 1st Corps at Fort Lewis, Wash., where the brigade is being developed.

As part of an accelerated development, the Army did not require Strykers to immediately feature anti-RPG armor. The brigade going to Iraq is now being fitted with slat armor. It works like a big catcher's mask, stopping a grenade before it reaches the Stryker's main body, thus keeping the explosion at a distance. Eventually, the Strykers will be fitted with more permanent armor now being tested. (SITE NOTE: From what we have read, the armor was reduced to lighten the vehicle so that it would meet the C-130 airlift requirement -- not because of "accelerated delivery.")

The Stryker has successfully passed live-fire tests against rifle and machine-gun fire. The slat armor system has also shown in tests that it protects against grenade blasts.

Mr. O'Reilly, who said he did the report at his own expense, says even with the added armor the Stryker's top and wheel wells are susceptible to RPGs that could kill all 13 soldiers inside the Stryker's infantry carrier version.

The Pentagon this year signed off on a plan to procure enough Stryker vehicles to equip the first four of six brigades, which would become the vanguard of a lighter, quicker deploying Army. Despite Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's program approval, a number of Stryker skeptics remain within the active Army, and among former soldiers and members of Congress.

None is more vocal than Mr. Saxton, a House Armed Services Committee member. He succeeded during debate on next year's defense budget to "fence" $300 million in procurement funds until the Army answers operational questions.

Mr. Saxton fears the Stryker is not only vulnerable to RPG fire, but is also overweight and cannot easily fit into a C-130 transport plane — a feat that is supposed to be one of its best selling points.

The Stryker is actually a family of 10 vehicles that gets around on wheels, not the traditional rolling tracks. They include the infantry carrier vehicle, the mobile gun system, the anti-tank guided missile, the mortar carrier and the reconnaissance vehicle.

After the Army took weeks to deploy a relatively small Apache helicopter unit on the Kosovo border in 1999, Gen. Eric Shinseki, then the chief of staff, moved to lighten the force. One of his answers was to develop a family of light, wheeled vehicles that eventually became the Stryker family.

Mr. O'Reilly's report, "Stryker Brigades Versus the Reality of War," is being circulated on Capitol Hill and among the active force and retirement community. Among his conclusions on the eight-wheel, 20-ton infantry carrier version:

• •"Poorly armored and entirely vulnerable to RPGs."
• •"Wheels & wells extremely vulnerable to small arms."
• •"Bought to be C-130 deployable but too heavy."

Mr. O'Reilly is an author and counterterrorism authority who has written about military affairs. He said much of his information on Stryker comes from within the Army itself.

"I have a passion for the Army, and when I see it going in the wrong direction, I get upset," he said. He said the Stryker is fine for light peacekeeping duty and policing, but he contends it is too vulnerable for land combat.

Col. Barger, the Army spokesman, rebutted these criticisms. He ticked off a list of Stryker tests and exercises. These included loading the system on the C-130 and C-17 transport planes, as well as on ships and trains. The vehicle also has cleared readiness training at Fort Irwin, Calif., and Fort Polk, La.

"For the past three weeks, in California's barren Mojave Desert, the Stryker Brigade Combat Team proved its speed, versatility and lethality against a world-class opposing force at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin," an Army press release said earlier this month.

Built by General Dynamics, the Stryker is designed as a medium-weight armored system to fill the gap between light infantry units such as the 82nd Airborne Division and heavy armored units that can take weeks to get to battle.

"It does fit on a C-130," said Kendall Pease, vice president of communications for General Dynamics in Falls Church. "It's been on a C-130. They have deployed it on exercises in a C-130. It fits. It meets all the requirements that the Air Force has given. Yes, it's true that it is fast, mobile, survivable, deployable and lethal. It meets all the expectations of the young soldiers that are required to use it in battle." (SITE NOTE: This is true about fitting on the C-130, but they had to use TWO C-130s to transport the Stryker. As to meeting the requirements of the USAF, it was with waivers.)

Gen. John Keane, the Army vice chief of staff, told reporters last month that the Iraq-bound Stryker brigade faced "the toughest opponent our forces have ever faced" at combat training centers. "We've put them through their paces and they're ready to go," he said.

The Army plans to buy 2,100 vehicles, enough to put about 300 in each brigade. Mr. O'Reilly says it will cost between $12 billion and $15 billion to equip six brigades. The Pentagon has funded the first three and made a down payment on the fourth. The Stryker is a pathway to the Army's ultimate transformation goal: a family of high-tech vehicles and aircraft called the Future Combat System. (SITE NOTE: The DoD has stated that the Stryker is NOT the transformational vehicle of the Future Combat System.)

The objective is to get a Stryker brigade any place in the world in four days. But a June General Accounting Office report said that benchmark is not being met.

The GAO credited the Army with reducing the logistics load, as compared with a 68-ton M-1A1 tank. "However, meeting the 4-day worldwide deployment goal of a brigade-size force would require more airlift than may be possible to allocate to these brigades; at present, it would take from 5 to 14 days, depending on destination."

The Army announced last month it was sending the first Stryker unit, the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, from Fort Lewis to Iraq.

The Stryker unit will join the 3rd Cavalry Regiment in October. The regiment will leave Iraq in April and May, leaving the Stryker Brigade in Iraq until October 2004.

Retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul Vallely said he has been following development of the Stryker for several years.

"It's been a very controversial issue," said the Fox News military analyst in an interview. "This report really calls in to question whether this is the combat vehicle for the Army in the future."

Gen. Vallely said the Stryker seems designed more for peacekeeping operations than for combat. He noted that the Army still has not decided what size gun to deploy on the Mobile Gun System variant.

"The other thing is that it does not appear to be as efficient and effective as a tracked vehicle in combat operations," said Gen. Vallely, an infantryman. "It is also very vulnerable to [rocket-propelled grenades] and sniper fire at its wheels."

Gen. Vallely said retired Gen. Shinseki initially wanted the 19-ton Stryker to be lighter and more mobile than current combat vehicles.

"But it's a heavier vehicle and harder to move than what is required for very speedy mobility and transportability to areas of combat operations," he said.

•Bill Gertz contributed to this report.

The opposite side of the coin is that the troops of the Stryker Brigade were psyched up and ready to go to Iraq to prove the capabilities of the Stryker. The following is an Associated Press release that appeared on 4 Aug 2003:

Stryker brigade ready for Iraq duty

By Robert Burns
Associated Press

FORT LEWIS, Wash. — Cool mountain air whispers through a window in Col. Michael Rounds' office at this Army post in the shadow of the Cascades. The setting could hardly be more unlike what Rounds' soldiers will face shortly in hot and chaotic Iraq.

Soldiers with the Army's first Stryker brigade underwent intensive training at Fort Irwin, Calif., last spring to prepare them for their first combat mission. The unit, formed from the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division out of Fort Lewis, Wash., learned July 23 that it will be going to Iraq as part of a troop rotation plan.

Rounds commands a newly formed Stryker brigade combat team — the first of its kind, intended as a model for the Army of the future and scheduled to make its combat debut in Iraq within two months. "The brigade is ready to go," Rounds said.

Rounds' unit, formed from the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, has trained intensively this year in anticipation of being certified combat-ready by October. It was not until July 23, however, that the soldiers learned they will be going to Iraq as part of a troop rotation plan.

Although President Bush declared on May 1 that major combat was over, commanders in Iraq have said repeatedly that they still are in a war zone, one in which the advantage they prize most — timely information about the enemy — is the very one that Rounds' soldiers are equipped to provide.

The Iraq mission is a milestone for the Stryker brigade, which itself represents a first step in the Army's effort to become a force more relevant to 21st-century missions.

It may one day be recognized as the most telling legacy of Gen. Eric Shinseki, who retired this summer after four years as the Army's chief of staff. In October 1999, Shinseki outlined a plan for remaking the Army by 2010 into a more versatile force that can move quickly onto distant battlefields, armed with unparalleled ability to dictate the pace of fighting.

Coincidentally, it was the Army's experience in the Persian Gulf in 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and seemed poised to grab the oil fields of eastern Saudi Arabia, that led to the Stryker model.

Shinseki often recalled that the Army's only answer to Iraq's threat to those Saudi oil fields was to send the 82nd Airborne Division. The division, while quick to respond, was too lightly armed to sustain an effective defense if the Iraqi army were to have crossed the Saudi border and raced for the oil fields.

It was that gap between light and heavy forces that Shinseki and others realized must be closed. Army officials are still waiting for a final decision from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on whether to proceed with plans for a Hawai'i Stryker brigade.

The plan is to convert a Schofield Barracks brigade into a fast-strike Stryker unit, equipped with about 300 eight-wheeled, 19-ton armored vehicles. Tentative plans call for six such brigades around the nation.

Lt. Gen. Edward Soriano, commanding general of Fort Lewis and the Army's I Corps, said Friday that he has no doubt that Rounds has prepared his soldiers for the challenges of Iraq.

"They are pumped up," Soriano said. "They are psyched up."

The Stryker, the Army's first new combat vehicle in two decades, actually is intended as a stepping stone to the ultimate goal: a high-tech family of fighting systems known as the Future Combat System, which still is on the drawing board and is expected to include unmanned ground and aerial vehicles.

One Stryker can be flown aboard an Air Force C-130 cargo plane, which is designed to land on short, substandard airfields in remote areas. Thus the Stryker brigade is capable of reaching areas, including the deserts of western Iraq, that units built around tanks could not reach by air.

Gen. John Keane, the acting Army chief of staff, announced a plan last month to maintain troop strength in Iraq while allowing those who have been there longest to go home. To do that, the Army is calling on the National Guard as well as active duty units such as the Stryker brigade.

Asked what gave him confidence that the first Stryker brigade is ready for combat, Keane pointed to the training sessions that the Strykers underwent last spring at Fort Irwin, Calif., and Fort Polk, La.

"We put it through its paces against the toughest opponent our forces have ever faced," Keane said, referring to competitions at the training centers. "They are ready to go."

The Stryker is a 19-ton, eight-wheeled armored vehicle built in the United States and Canada. It comes in two variants — an infantry carrier and a mobile gun system. The infantry carrier, in turn, has eight configurations, including a reconnaissance vehicle, a mortar carrier and a vehicle for the brigade commander.

September 2003:

Rapid deployment of Strykers by Airlift Questionable The following is from Strategy Page: Air Transport

September 23, 2003: The army has overlooked the problems of getting a Stryker brigade on and off air transports at an air base.

The Stryker brigades were created to get mobile American combat units to far off places in a hurry. Each Stryker brigade contains 3494 troops and over 300 Stryker LAVs (of various types.) The total weight of the brigade is about 13,000 tons. In addition, you need a steady flow of supplies (about 600 pounds per man per day) to keep the brigade in action. That adds another 1,000 tons (or more) a day. You want to have the Stryker brigade go in with a least three days of supplies, and have another 30 days worth stockpiled nearby.

No problem moving a Stryker brigade by ship. It takes about 40 hours to load, or unload, the brigade from typical ships. Getting a Stryker brigade to Korea (the port of Pusan), from Washington State, would thus take about 11 days (loading, sea travel, unloading).

The original concept was to airlift the Stryker brigades to distant combat zones. But this has never been practical because of a shortage of transports, higher priority users (like the air force supporting their warplanes overseas) and the difficulty of getting all that stuff on and off the transports. One recent RAND study calculated that a Stryker brigade could get to Seoul, Korea (from Seattle, Washington) faster by ship (by a couple of hours) than the same brigade could do by air (from Washington State to Osan, Korea), mainly because of the operational difficulties of moving a ready-for-combat ground unit. It takes a lot of time, and precious airbase space, to load a Stryker brigade onto transports, and then unload them at the other end.

The basic problem is that the air force has never seen it's transports as practical transportation for any ground combat units except paratroopers and small numbers of armored vehicles. Sure, the specs for air transports always list what kinds of armored vehicles they can carry, but that's mainly for show. The air transports are much more useful, and valuable, moving spare parts for armored vehicles, crews for armored vehicles and just about anything but the armored vehicles themselves.

But sometimes fantasies come to life, and that's what seems to have happened with the concept of moving Stryker brigades by air.

---

Shadow Unmanned Spy Plane Deployed in Korea An AFP report on 23 Sep indicated that the USFK had deployed the Shadow UAV unmanned spy planes in the ROK as part of a 11-billion-dollar defense build-up plan against the DPRK. The 8th US army said in a statement it would test-fly its new "Shadow-200" unmanned surveillance planes from a military base near the border on 26 Sep. It said the system was to "contribute to the overall deterrence US forces brings to the alliance" with the ROK by offering "real time, accurate and relevant intelligence of the battle field." It is "part of the planned 11 billion dollar investment over the next several years in some 150 programs to enhance US defensive capabilities in support of...US forces (in) Korea," it said.

"The maiden flights ended in success," The exact number of the Shadows deployed in the ROK was not released but the spokesman said "several" were put into operation. The new spy plane, already operational during the US-led war in Iraq, is designed to fly for up to five hours, providing "real time, accurate and relevant intelligence of the battle field," he said. The deployment of the surveillance planes in the ROK is part of an 11 billion dollar US defense build-up plan against the DPRK.

We find it interesting that the Shadow has shown up for "testing" already as it is part of the Stryker Interim Brigade Combat Team (SBCT). The Stryker was planned to replace the 2d ID along the DMZ, but the plans for the deployment of the 3d Bde 2d ID SBCT to Korea was switched to Iraq. Approval is still in Congress. The deployment of the only certified SBCT to Iraq would slow the transition in Korea until atleast 2004.

The Shadow is part of the Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron element for the SBCT. One of the key features of the teams is the RSTA element, equipped with Shadow unmanned aerial vehicles - a type of drone - to "see the enemy over the hill," the Prophet electronic intelligence system and the Javelin portable anti-tank missile. In traditional combat, soldiers typically first found the enemy in a direct encounter and then maneuvered on the enemy. But with units such as the RSTA Squadron, the unit will know before they come in contact with the enemy, where the enemy is.

However, we also believe that it was to "show the flag" as the Koreans have just developed their own UAV, the Nighthawk, and will equip its DMZ units with it. However, this demonstration was to show how inferior it would be compared to the Shadow.

---

Stryker Readies for Deployment This move was generated more from the pressure the Pentagon is receiving over bringing the forces home. The pacification process has not gone as planned and the U.S. forces seem stuck in Iraq -- taking losses from the guerilla warfare that is being waged. Getting the troops who have been over in Iraq since March-April is essential. The 3d Bde 2d ID SBCT is pyched up and ready to go. The 3d Bde 2d ID were undergoing intensive training in preparation for deployment.

Though it is a great gamble to place the Stryker "in harm's way" it is also a way to "blood" the untested combat vehicle. Remember that the full-combat field test was put off until 2005 when the MGS and NBC variants of the Stryker were supposed to be ready. This deployment is a sink-or-swim trial. It will be the perfect test under "real combat" conditions to see how it fairs. If the Stryker comes out of this relatively unscathed, then its entry into Korea as a combat-veteran unit cannot be used against it by the ROK. It will have proven itself.

The higher-ups were all enthusiastic that the Bde was ready. However, there were dissenters of this opinion. On a Flame Turns Blue bulletin board on 19 Sep 2003, "This unit is very well not ready to deploy to Iraq. These troops can't get weapons and equipment fixed, the stryker is very weak, gets stuck in dirt easy, easy to rooll the vehicle over. The whole vehicle is really not ready to goto war it just needs more time! I work in this unit that is going to Iraq and i think we are really not ready, but the army keeps pushing that were ready but we are not, not by a long shot. Whats the deal on them cutting separations pay and danger pay in Iraq? We are putting our lives on the line for this goverment and we get this in return! That is bad and i think it should be the same. thanks rob."

There are dozens of faults already pointed out that will make the Stryker a less than ideal vehicle -- the heat of the Middle East with an airconditioner that is barely functional; dust getting into the engines/gears; exposed fuel tanks with road-side bombs going off; and snipers shooting at its tires. However, even if it fails in combat, the DoD is in a win-win situation. It has been a bug-bear from the start and if it fails, the DoD can just cut its losses and stop the FUTURE Stryker units -- as only two have been funded so far. Even if the Stryker fails in combat, the lessons learned will be invaluable in developing the transitional vehicle for the 21st Century.

The following article is from the The Olympian on 6 Sep 2003.

During a training exercise, soldiers are unexpectedly ambushed after allowing a truck carrying fellow brigade members -- playing the roles of Iraqi citizens and soldiers -- through a roadblock without fully searching for weapons. When the unit is deployed in Iraq, such a mistake could be fatal. "We learn from each exercise," said Lt. Col. Buck James, the unit's commander.


(Tony Overman/The Olympian)

Pvt. Colby Buzzell of San Francisco, a member of the Army's first Stryker unit, peers over binoculars as his platoon moves into a fictional Iraqi village during urban patrol exercises at Fort Lewis on Friday morning. Buzzell's unit is preparing for deployment to Iraq with the new Stryker combat vehicle.

(Tony Overman/The Olympian)

Pfc. Kevin Gearhart (left) plays the role of an Iraqi soldier and Pvt. Geoffrey Miller plays the role of a scared Iraqi civilian as the two hide inside a bullet-riddled building used for live-fire training during an exercise Friday morning at Fort Lewis. The urban training in the mythical village is aimed at putting soldiers in real-life situations, facing both friends and foes.

(Tony Overman/The Olympian)

Members of the Army's first Stryker unit move from the combat vehicle into a simulated Iraqi village during Friday's training exercises. The new Stryker combat vehicle is designed to use high-tech communications to coordinate troops and vehicles on the ground.

(Tony Overman/The Olympian)

A Stryker churns up dust as it rolls quickly up a gravel road on the Fort Lewis complex, while soldiers from the Stryker Brigade prepare to set up a traffic-control station during training Friday.

(Tony Overman/The Olympian)

---

Stryker teams train for combat in Iraq

Fort Lewis plays role of urban village in final tests before deployment
Originally published Saturday, September 6, 2003

SCOTT GUTIERREZ THE OLYMPIAN

FORT LEWIS -- The soldiers' mission was to find a cell of armed guerillas hiding in a small plywood-faced town without harming innocent civilians.

As the Army's Stryker Brigade combat team inched closer to the town -- eight-wheeled armored vehicles backing them up -- gunfire erupted from an AK-47.

The urban combat exercise that followed was part of the final weeks of training Stryker Brigade teams undergo before a scheduled yearlong deployment to Iraq late next month.

The enemies were actually fellow U.S. Army comrades who had donned street clothes or turned fatigues inside-out to fake armed resistance.

"Our (mock) enemies give us better training than we hopefully will see," said Lt. Ben Williamson, 23, of the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, who had just finished a sweep through the mock village, searching for enemy fighters. Friday's training focused on preparing soldiers from the Army's first Stryker Brigade for combat situations similar to the urban conflicts U.S. forces face in Iraq.

'Not just an experiment'

Stryker Brigades, a central part of the Army's plan to transform into a more versatile fighting force, are readying for their first combat deployment.

Fort Lewis houses two of the Army's Stryker units, including the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division.

The brigades are named for the 8-wheeled, 19-ton troop carriers intended to bridge the gap between the heavy armor of tank units and the mobility of light infantry.

"We feel that we're ready," Williamson said. "We just want to get out and show what we've got and prove that we're not just an experiment."

Faster than a tank but more heavily armored than a Humvee, the Stryker can rapidly transport troops into battle with more protection than light infantry.

'Like a Cadillac'

Major Chuck Hodges, executive officer of the 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, said those characteristics make the vehicles suitable for urban combat, especially, for instance, when soldiers need to be dispatched quickly to an uprising. Strykers come in several varieties, including command vehicles, infantry vehicles, reconnaissance vehicles and anti-tank vehicles. They can be armed with .50-caliber machine guns, .40-caliber grenade launchers or anti-tank missiles. They're also equipped with some of the latest in digital and communication technology.

"I have no qualms about going into harm's way in a Stryker," said Lt. Col. Buck James, the unit's commander. "The ability it gives us to move tactically is unmatched."

Stryker vehicles can reach top speeds of 60 mph, and the suspension system makes for a relatively smooth ride, soldiers said. "It rides like a Cadillac," said Spc. Tim Cornelius, 27, of Florida. "When you ride in a Humvee, you feel every bump. You get in one of these, you wouldn't know it's the same road."

Friday's exercises were geared toward preparing soldiers for the difficulty of distinguishing threats from innocent civilians in a crowded urban environment.

Soldiers from the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, also practiced setting up checkpoints and monitoring human traffic from another mock village.

Temporary chink

Stryker leaders took time Friday to address questions about a potential problem with some of the armor plating recently discovered during tests.

Stryker armor plates are designed to withstand machine gun rounds up to 14.5 mm in size, but a plate on one vehicle was penetrated by a round during a test, Brigade spokesman Lt. Col. Joseph Piek said. Finding additional faulty plates and replacing them shouldn't be difficult, because each is marked with a serial number. Potentially faulty plates will be switched out or reinforced before the Stryker brigades are deployed, Piek said. "We're not going to deploy any of the vehicles with substandard armor," he said.

The Army also will equip the vehicles with special "slat-armor," which is a metal cage fitted around the exterior to explode incoming rocket-propelled grenades before they strike the vehicle.

Scott Gutierrez writes for The Olympian. He can be reached at 360-754-5465 or sgutierr@olympia.gannett.com.

Newsweek reported on the faulty armour on 5 Sept 2003. At this point, the General Dynamics contractors were scrambling to fix the Strykers; the German manufacturer of the tile was claiming foul; and Pentagon planners were ducking for cover. Fingers were pointing everywhere with hints that this defect had been known since February. Army experts at Aberdeen have been working frantically since early summer to test every batch of tiles, and figure out how to fix the faulty ones. The Army brass has demanded daily progress reports from Aberdeen.

Faulty Armor?

The Army's prized Stryker wheeled troop carrier is supposed to spearhead America's lighter, go-anywhere-fast force. But NEWSWEEK has learned that the vehicles may be flawed—and that the military has known about the problem for months

By John Barry NEWSWEEK WEB EXCLUSIVE

Sept. 5 — The Bush administration's military predicament in Iraq has suddenly gotten worse. JUST A MONTH before the next U.S. Army unit is due to deploy in Iraq to relieve the hard-pressed forces already there, the military is confessing to a potential showstopper. The deploying unit's new armored vehicles may have faulty armor which would leave them vulnerable to machine-gun fire and to the rocket-propelled grenades that are the Iraq insurgents' favorite weapon.

The vehicle is the prized new Stryker wheeled troop carrier, advertised as the first fruit of the Army's plan to transform itself into a lighter, go-anywhere-fast force.

Worse still: the Army has known it might have a problem since February, but has kept quiet about it. An Army memo sent yesterday to the head of the Stryker program, and obtained by NEWSWEEK, reports: "Evidently this issue was first raised in February 2003. Am unsure how this issue escaped public scrutiny for six months." Not even Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was told, NEWSWEEK has learned. "Understand that ARSTAF [Army Staff] have been told to treat this issue as if it were 'classified'," says the memo, which is addressed to Lt. Gen. John Riggs, the head of the Stryker program. At a recent Army meeting to discuss the faulty armor, the main topic on the agenda, according to a DOD source, was: "How do we tell Secretary Rumsfeld?" Rumsfeld is now in Iraq. According to the memo to Riggs, the Army briefed "selected staffers" on Capitol Hill yesterday.

Unlike the massively thick steel that tanks are made from, the 19-ton Stryker has a light steel and aluminum structure. But this is clad in 130 ceramic tiles, supposedly tough enough stop heavy machine-gun fire and deflect the blast of incoming RPGs. More than 600 Strykers have been built by General Dynamics, which has a $4 billion contract to produce 2,100 in all. But the ceramic armor tiles are produced for GD by a German subcontractor. The problem arose when the German firm apparently changed the mix of ingredients in the tiles. (The firm could not be reached for comment.)

The Army discovered this in February, sources say, when, as standard quality control, some tiles were X-rayed. Further tests revealed that, on some batches of tiles, the subcontractor had changed not only the ingredients but parts of the manufacturing process too. In August, a tile from one of those errant batches failed to stop machine-gun bullets in a live-fire test at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in northern Maryland, according to Army sources.

But which Stryker vehicles are carrying the defective tiles? The Army and GD have been combing databases on the Stryker construction program to track those tiles among the close to 80,000 delivered so far. The findings are bad news. "All Strykers in combat brigades and at test sites—more than 600 vehicles—are equipped with some [potentially faulty] armor panels" and will need retesting, says the memo to Riggs.

The Stryker unit that is to deploy to Iraq in October is the Third Brigade of the Second Infantry Division. The division, based at Fort Lewis in Washington, is one of the Army's two testbeds for the Stryker. The Third Brigade has 309 Strykers—their deployment to Iraq was to be the Stryker's combat debut. But the database has found that most of those Strykers may be carrying one or more faulty tiles. "My understanding is that 225 of the 309 Strykers in the brigade will need to be examined," says the memo to Riggs. "The number to be fixed will most likely be less than that but it is TBD [to be determined]."

Army experts at Aberdeen have been working frantically since early summer to test every batch of tiles, and figure out how to fix the faulty ones. The Army brass has demanded daily progress reports from Aberdeen. The only long-term fix, Aberdeen has concluded, is to replace all the faulty tiles. But that cannot be done in time for the Iraq deployment. So the emergency fix that the Army has decided for the Strykers bound for Iraq is to glue a sheet of ultrahard steel behind each faulty tile. But that could cause further problems. A memo to the Army from contractor GD, also obtained by NEWSWEEK, warns: "The steel reinforcement … increases the Stryker's weight."

Weight is already a controversial issue for the Stryker. The vehicle was designed to be air-mobile, which the Army defined to mean transportable by a C-130 aircraft. But the vehicle is already so heavy that a C-130 can in fact carry it only for a short distance. Extra steel plates will only compound this problem.

The Stryker program has been under critical fire since its inception five years ago. Many of the Army's most senior officers privately consider the Stryker far too large—it's as big as a school bus—and far too vulnerable either in open combat or in the confined spaces of urban warfare. (Even with its ceramic cladding, certain spots on the Stryker remain unprotected against an accurately aimed RPG or even rifle fire.) The project was the brainchild of Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki. With Shinseki's retirement a few weeks ago, there is speculation whether the new chief of staff, Gen. Pete Schoomaker, will re-examine the Stryker program. The revelations about faulty armor means Congress will almost certainly intervene. The memo to General Riggs warns: "The possibility of congressional hearings on this issue must be considered."

Army spokesman Maj. Gary Tallman said: "The Army discovered this through our testing process, and we have a plan in place to fix it. The vehicles will be certified [as fixed] before they deploy to Iraq." The only long-term fix, Aberdeen has concluded, is to replace all the faulty tiles. But that cannot be done in time for the Iraq deployment. So the emergency fix that the Army has decided for the Strykers bound for Iraq is to glue a sheet of ultrahard steel behind each faulty tile. But that could cause further problems. A memo to the Army from contractor GD, also obtained by NEWSWEEK, warns: "The steel reinforcement … increases the Stryker's weight."

Stryker during Korea deployment (Aug 03)

The following article appeared in the Seattle Times on 16 Sep 2003 that revealed that there were problems with the protective tiles. Immediately General Dynamics (GD) dispatched 20 two-man teams and had an additional 100 people standing by to ensure the metal plate was added in September, in time for the 3,600 members of the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, to be deployed to Iraq. GD spokesman Pete Keating said the company was working with the Army to develop a permanent replacement for the ceramic armor tile that would not require the 3-mm steel backing and would be retrofitted on all Strykers later.

Some Stryker tiles fail under fire; maker rushes to fortify vehicles

By Ray Rivera and Hal Bernton
Seattle Times staff reporters

New live-fire tests by the Army have found that almost one-third of the ceramic armor tile used to protect troops inside the new Stryker carriers failed to meet the minimum requirements to stop heavy machine-gun fire. The new disclosure from sources close to the program comes just weeks before 3,600 members of the Fort Lewis-based 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division are scheduled to debut the Stryker vehicles in Iraq.

The vehicle's maker, General Dynamics Land Systems, is now rushing about 20 two-man teams to Fort Lewis to fortify the unit's 309 Stryker vehicles. The plan is to add a 3-mm steel backing to the armor, a fix expected to be completed by month's end.

Just two weeks ago, the Army confirmed only one flaw in the 39 major tile types that make up the vehicle's armor plating. But more live-fire tests completed yesterday in Aberdeen, Md., revealed that 12 of the tile types could not stop a 14.5-mm round, slightly bigger than a 50-caliber bullet.

"The bottom line is these vehicles will not be deployed" until they have the promised protection, said Army spokesman Maj. Gary Tallman. The $1.5 million Strykers, the Army's first new combat vehicles in 20 years, are covered by about 130 armor panels per vehicle. Each of the shaped panels is composed of numerous smaller ceramic tiles and other material pieced together like a jigsaw puzzle.

The Strykers, which have eight wheels and carry up to 11 soldiers, are a cornerstone in the Army's efforts to transform itself into a faster and more agile fighting force. An entire brigade — including its full contingent of about 300 Stryker vehicles — is designed to be airlifted anywhere in the world in less than a week.

As home of the Army's first two Stryker brigades, Fort Lewis has become synonymous with the Army's transformation initiative. The vehicles can be equipped to fire mortars and anti-tank missiles, plow trenches, evacuate wounded soldiers and detect chemical and biological agents. A variation with a 105-mm cannon is in the works.

The Army and General Dynamics, meanwhile, are examining how the problem went undiscovered so late into production.

Army officials say that they first discovered problems with the ceramic panels in February, when an X-ray revealed that the armor's German designer, IBD, had changed the way the armor is made. The testing revealed changes in the ceramic composition, the size of the ceramic pieces within the panels, and other deviations.

In all, the Army has said it found 39 variations of the armor as opposed to the six it had approved.

But Ulf Deisenroth, president of the Bonn-based IBD, said he did not know until this month that the Army only authorized six variations. Deisenroth said he was surprised to learn of the Army's concerns from a Sept. 5 report in The Seattle Times. Deisenroth said his company disclosed last year that there would be 26 tile variations. That information was reported to the lead Stryker contractor, a joint venture between General Motors Defense and General Dynamics Land Systems, he said. When design changes pushed that number up to 39, the new number was also passed on to the joint venture, Deisenroth said. The joint program is now controlled by General Dynamics.

"We feel we are being very unfairly treated," Deisenroth said. "This was not our fault."

The Army declined to comment on Deisenroth's comments.

Pete Keating, a spokesman with General Dynamics, said that Deisenroth's comment about the variations "doesn't track with any information I have," but he declined to go into detail about the corporation's dealings with the German subcontractor. "The important thing to know is that our team is going to ensure that no troops from Fort Lewis deploy without 14.5-mm protection," Keating said. "And that IBD, General Dynamics and the Army are working to achieve that."

The Stryker concept has been controversial ever since its inception in 1999. Critics, including some within the Pentagon, have said the vehicles are difficult to transport by air, lack accurate firepower and are vulnerable to rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), which Saddam loyalists have used with deadly effect against American forces in Iraq.

Recent news of the armor problems have helped to further stoke the controversy. The Army defends the vehicles, saying that they are meant as troop carriers, not fighting vehicles, and that no vehicle in the inventory except M1 tanks are fully protected from RPGs. The vehicles also are being outfitted with an outer cage of slotted armor to protect against rocket-propelled grenades.

General Dynamics said the added weight of the steel panels and the slot armor would not hinder the vehicle's performance. Ray Rivera: 206-464-2926 or rayrivera@seattletimes.com; Hal Bernton: 206-464-2581 or hbernton@seattletimes.com

However, with the latest flaw, the old criticisms were resurfaced and dusted off for publication. The following appeared int he Post-Gazette on 28 Sep 2003.

Fate of Stryker, Army's new combat vehicle, will be set in Iraq

Expensive armored car has many doubters

Sunday, September 28, 2003
By Jack Kelly, Post-Gazette National Security Writer

The Army is scrambling to fix a flaw in its newest armored vehicle -- the already troubled Stryker -- before sending it to Iraq next month for its first test in real combat conditions.

The Stryker is a 19-ton armored car that was supposed to combine the speed and quick deployability of light forces with considerable firepower and armor protection.

Supporters say the Stryker will do just that, and will also give soldiers an unprecedented understanding of the battlefield with its advanced communications system.

Critics say the Stryker is too heavy for easy air transport, too lightly armed, too lightly armored, too expensive and a hazard to U.S. troops. The latest pre-deployment glitch has only raised the volume of their complaints.

The 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division, based at Fort Lewis, Washington, is scheduled to deploy to Iraq next month with 309 Strykers, an eight-wheeled armored car that has 10 variants built on a common chassis.

Recent live fire tests showed that some of the ceramic tiles that are supposed to protect the vehicle from heavy machine gun fire, are defective. An Army spokesman said 5,800 of the 40,000 tiles on the 309 Strykers are being replaced. This can be done, he said, without delaying deployment of the 3rd Brigade to Iraq.

The Stryker is the brainchild of Gen. Eric Shinseki, who retired as Army chief of staff in May. Shinseki wanted to equip some of the Army's light formations with an armored vehicle light enough to be transported by air, but heavy enough to provide these units with significant firepower and tactical mobility once they got to a combat zone.

Shinseki chose the Stryker, a larger, heavier version of the Canadian-built armored car the Marines have been using for years, for two reasons, Pentagon sources say. He wanted to "shake up" the Army by proposing a radical departure from its historic reliance on tracked vehicles, and he was embarrassed that Russian wheeled personnel carriers got to Kosovo in 1999 faster than the Army's Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles.

"The Stryker is exactly the kind of system we need for the kind of environment we face in Iraq," said Daniel Goure, vice president of the Lexington Institute, a defense think tank. "It provides the kind of armor, mobility, and connectivity we need in these kinds of situations."

By "connectivity," Goure was referring to the Stryker's state-of-the-art communications system which, Army spokesmen say, will give Stryker units a sweeping awareness of the battlefield situation. The Lexington Institute gets a small portion of its funding from General Dynamics Land Systems, the U.S. contractor for the Stryker.

The communications system is about the only thing that works on the Stryker, and it could be installed in a better vehicle, said defense consultant Victor O'Reilly. He recommended in a report to Congress that the Stryker program be canceled and replaced with an upgraded version of the Army's venerable M-113 armored personnel carrier.

O'Reilly's concerns are shared in part by Col. Douglas Macgregor, an armor officer and veteran of the first Gulf War who is one of the Army's most respected thinkers.

"The Stryker is simply a wheeled armored personnel carrier that provides some useful mobility on roads for light infantry," Macgregor wrote in his new book, "Transformation Under Fire." "It does not provide the firepower or protection to transform Army light infantry units into a medium-weight force... In addition, at a time when the lethality of modern weapons would seem to dictate fewer soldiers in smaller, more survivable platforms, the Stryker-equipped units concentrate 11 soldiers in one very large platform with poor off-road mobility that is hard to deploy with strategic airlift."

Designed for peacekeeping

The Stryker was chosen more with peacekeeping than with combat in mind. Armored cars go faster on roads, are gentler on roads, and (in theory) are easier and cheaper to maintain than tracked vehicles of comparable weight. But tracked vehicles are much better off roads and at climbing over or crashing through obstacles. They also can carry more armor and heavier weapons.

The Stryker was supposed to be an "interim" vehicle utilizing "off the shelf" technology. But it rapidly gained size, weight and expense. The average cost of a Stryker variant now exceeds $3 million. The LAV III, on which the Stryker is based, weighs far less and costs only $900,000, despite carrying more powerful weapons.

The 3rd Brigade's Strykers will travel to Iraq by sea, so one of the Stryker's primary reasons for being -- air mobility -- will not be tested in its first combat operation. The Army has shown that the bulky vehicle can be squeezed onto a C-130, the Air Force's primary tactical airlifter. But the Stryker is so heavy that it can be flown only for the tactically insignificant distance of 100 miles or so, O'Reilly charged in the report he prepared for Rep. Jim Saxton, R-N.J.

Peter Keating, a vice president for General Dynamics Land Systems, disputes this. With no ammunition or troops, the personnel carrier version of Stryker can be flown between 475 and 800 nautical miles, he said. He acknowledged a "fully combat-loaded" Stryker would be "optimally deployed" on a larger C-17.

Lt. Col. Joseph Piek, an Army spokesman at Ft. Lewis, said the longest flight of a fully loaded Stryker on a C-130 that he knows of was from Macguire Air Force Base in New Jersey to Andrews Air Force Base in suburban Washington, D.C., a distance of about 175 miles.

The Stryker will gain weight when it gets to Iraq. Its steel armor protects against small arms and shell fragments. The ceramic overlay will protect certain places on the vehicle from weapons as big as the Russian 14.5 millimeter heavy machinegun, a slightly larger version of the American .50 caliber machinegun. Neither protects against rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), a ubiquitous threat to U.S. troops in Iraq.

To guard against RPGs, slat armor will be added. This is a steel mesh that will extend several inches to a foot beyond the skin of the Stryker (the actual distance is classified).

When an RPG strikes an armored vehicle, the explosive charge in the warhead forms a blowtorch which burns a hole through the vehicle's skin. If the RPG warhead can be detonated before it reaches the skin, its destructive force will be dissipated before it can do serious damage.

Slat armor will add more than two tons to the weight of each Stryker. Maj. Gary Tallman, an Army spokesman, said this will have no impact on the Stryker's performance. But O'Reilly has his doubts.

At 19 tons empty, the Stryker already strains an engine, drive train and chassis designed for a much lighter vehicle. When a Stryker is loaded with fuel, ammunition and soldiers, it'll weigh two tons more. And now the slat armor will add another two tons. The additional weight will have a "hideous effect" on the Stryker's road speed and off-road performance, and it will increase fuel and maintenance costs, O'Reilly said.

Maintaining the Stryker already is costing the Army more than five times original estimates, O'Reilly said. So far, according to Army data, the Stryker has cost $52 per mile to operate, a figure the Army thinks it can reduce to $25 a mile. This compares with a cost of $3 per mile for the latest version of the M-113.

Keating challenged this claim, saying annual maintenance costs for at least one variant of the M-113 would be nearly four times as much as the Stryker.

The Army plans to equip six brigades -- including one from the Pennsylvania National Guard -- with the Stryker. Two have been outfitted so far.

Stryker procurement should end with the first two brigades, O'Reilly and other critics contend.

O'Reilly would replace it with a new version of the M113 called the Mobile Tactical Vehicle Light (MTVL). Equipped with band tracks (which increase road speed and track life) and a hybrid electric engine (which increases acceleration and reduces fuel consumption), the MTVL would be vastly superior to the Stryker in firepower, tactical mobility and air deployability, and still be less expensive to acquire and maintain, he said.

Critics overstate the Stryker's vulnerabilities and understate those of the M-113, Keating said. The Stryker's armor can protect against heavy machinegun fire, for instance, while the basic armor of the M-113 can protect against only small arms, he said.

The new Army chief of staff, Gen. Peter Schoomaker, is said to be reviewing the Stryker program, but has said nothing publicly about it. The fate of the Stryker likely depends on how well (or how poorly) it performs in Iraq.

October 2003

Stryker to Deploy to Iraq? The 3d Bde 2d ID SBCT was due to deploy to Iraq in October. However, after criticisms appeared in the press, there was some speculation. Despite the problems with the armor, the deployment seems still to be underway in October. The Associated Press reported that 180 soldiers of the 367th Maintenance Company headed to Fort Lewis to provide support to the 3rd Bde 2nd ID. From news reports from Fort Lewis, the Brigade was busily training for the year-long deployment and ready to go.

The DoD is taking a big chance with this deployment. The Stryker brigade also is heading off to Iraq without a separate outer layer of plates designed to protect against rocket-propelled grenades, which insurgents have used again and again to deadly effect against U.S. troops in Iraq. These plates are not scheduled to be ready for use until sometime next year. So the Army is installing an interim system a steel cage that surrounds the sides of the vehicle. It's designed to explode grenades away from the vehicle. But the armor is far from perfect protection. An initial rocket-propelled grenade, for example, could destroy the armor, exposing the two-member crew and up to nine soldiers riding inside to deadly fire. If even one Stryker is taken out by hostile fire, the critics will be quick to pounce on failure.

Remember that the original parameters C-130 transportable was the standard for the ICBT Stryker in 2000. According to Army Transformation (Feb 2000), "Planners explain that "to be C-130 transportable, the MAV must enter and exit the aircraft capable of immediate combat operations (does not require a full basic load) and not exceed 13,000 pounds maximum axle weight on the treadways of C-130 aircraft, and its combat-capable deployment weight must not exceed 38,000 pounds (19 tons) gross vehicle weight to allow C-130 transport of 1,000 nautical miles without requiring an Air Force waiver for maximum aircraft weight on a fixed runway. A C-130 with MAV must be capable of an assault strip landing with a waiver for maximum aircraft weight." The Stryker as it is now with the current modifications meets NONE of these parameters.

According to an article in The Seattle Times on 6 Sep 2003, "The Stryker's performance in war games also has sharpened the debate. Last year, during a "Millennium Challenge in California," a $250 million joint military exercise, 13 of 14 Strykers were taken out by small-arms fire, grenades and guns mounted on enemy vehicles, during ambushes and other "enemy" encounters. On one of the simulated missions, the Strykers failed to kill a single enemy vehicle, according to an initial performance review by the Army's Test Evaluation and Command Center. Pease said the Stryker has had many improvements since the California test."

Though the SBCT had been certified for world-wide deployment, it had not completed its combat-certification training. This training was supposedly put off until SBCT received its MGS and NBC Stryker units in 2005. A Congressional waiver would be required for deployment. Deployment of a 293-vehicle Stryker Brigade -- the Army's newest weapon system -- would be the highest-profile action in any rotation order signed by Rumsfeld, who is under pressure to return the division in Iraq to the U.S. amid concerns that U.S. troops may be stretched too thin around the world. The U.S. has attempted to gain international support to send troops to take over "pacified" areas leaving the U.S. in the "hot spots" in the Sunni and Baathist Party strongholds. However, this will not stop the 3d Bde 2d ID from deploying. Only a Congressional action -- which is highly unlikely -- could stop the deployment.

The following is an article that appeared on 5 Oct 2003 in the Tacoma News Tribune that describes the who, where, when of the deployment. The Brigade will deploy in the middle of the month (ship for vehicles and aircraft for personnel to Kuwait). The unit will be deployed in Ar Anbar province whose largest city, Ar Ramadi, is about 60 miles west of Baghdad. The defective tiles are being shored up by 3mm plates. RPG slat protection will be installed in Kuwait.

Stryker brigade prepares to move out IN HARM'S WAY

MICHAEL GILBERT; The News Tribune

In a few weeks, Fort Lewis will see the largest deployment of a combat unit since Vietnam. The Army's first Stryker brigade is about to leave three years of incubation at Fort Lewis for its real-world debut in Iraq. The 3,600 soldiers of the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division are scheduled to move out later this month and in early November. They'll pioneer a new armored vehicle and a new way of operating that represents the Army's first steps toward transforming itself into a more mobile, technology-driven fighting force. Observers from around the world will watch closely to see if the Stryker concept and its namesake troop carrier can deliver on high expectations while keeping its soldiers safe.

The troops know they'll be testing the hardware under unusually trying conditions.

"Kosovo was a piece of cake. Bosnia was all right. This is going to be a firefight," said Sgt. Steve Stroub, a veteran of two deployments.

Today, The News Tribune answers 12 questions about the Stryker brigade as it starts down the road to Iraq.

Where are they going?

Brigade officials say they still don't know for sure. When the Pentagon announced the deployment in July, the Army's No. 2 general said the brigade would go to the area in western Iraq where the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment operates.

The province of Ar Anbar is a 55,400-square-mile expanse of desert dotted with villages. Its largest city, Ar Ramadi, lies about 60 miles west of Baghdad. It's at the southwest tip of the so-called Sunni Triangle, where resistance to the U.S. military presence has been the most deadly.

Troops in nearby Khaldiyah called in tanks and helicopter strikes in an eight-hour battle with insurgents there Monday. At least one U.S. soldier was reported killed and three others wounded.

When are they leaving?

The brigade is scheduled to load its vehicles and equipment aboard at least two cargo ships at the Port of Tacoma in the middle of this month. While the ships make the two- to three-week voyage to Kuwait, the soldiers will begin the trip by air.

It will be the largest deployment of a Fort Lewis combat unit since 1966, when 9,000 soldiers from the 4th Infantry Division went to Vietnam.

The soldiers will link up with their vehicles in Kuwait, where they will spend two to four weeks preparing for the trip up into Iraq, Army officials said.

How long will they be gone?

The Pentagon's current plan is for units to stay in Iraq at least a year.

Who will lead them?

The brigade commander is Col. Michael Rounds, 44, a small-town New York native who has spent much of his career at Fort Lewis.

Rounds graduated from West Point in 1981 and has a master's degree in East Asian studies from Yale. The military taught him to speak Chinese, then sent him to the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong from 1990-92 and as assistant Army attache at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing from 1996-98.

He was the operations officer of an infantry battalion in South Korea, and commanded Fort Lewis' 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment on a six-month peacekeeping assignment in the Sinai Peninsula in 2000. By reputation he is quiet and low-key but intense, inclined to talk things over with his subordinates one-on-one or in small groups.

Kent Troy, the Fort Lewis protocol officer, was a West Point classmate of Rounds. He didn't know him then, but has worked with him often in the last couple years arranging visits by VIPs interested in seeing the Stryker brigade.

"He is very quiet and very methodical, very conscientious, and really thinks through issues," Troy said. "He doesn't just react."

Rounds and his wife, Julie, live on post with their children, Kaitlin and Alex.

Will the soldiers be safe?

Naturally, that question is foremost on the minds of the soldiers' families. And it's been the subject of considerable speculation since the inception of the Stryker program.

Shannon Thompson of University Place, whose husband, Lyle, is an infantryman, said she didn't have a good feeling when she read recent news stories about Stryker armor panels that failed ballistics tests.

"I thought, 'Oooh, my baby's going to be riding around in one of those,'" said Thompson, whose dad is ex-Army and later worked in a tank factory in York, Pa.

But she said she'd worry a lot more if her husband was going to be riding in a Humvee or a 5-ton truck, with little or no armor.

What's the difference between this and the Army's other armored vehicles?

The Army's M1 Abrams battle tank is a heavily armored, 70-ton tracked behemoth. Until the Iraq war, none had ever been destroyed by enemy fire. The Iraqis knocked out two.

Likewise, the Bradley fighting vehicle is more than 25 tons, more heavily armored than the Stryker and has a bigger gun - a 25 mm cannon compared to the Stryker's .50-caliber machine gun or Mk-19 grenade launcher. The Army acknowledges the Strykers can't take a hit like the much heavier Abrams and Bradley vehicles. That's one of the vehicle's many deficiencies, said Victor O'Reilly, an Irish writer of military thrillers who compiled a 108-page critique of the Stryker in August for U.S. Rep. Jim Saxton (R-N.J.).

"The (after-action reports) from Iraq show very clearly, to be blunt, the need to be able to take the first hit," O'Reilly said.

But other analysts say that's an unfair comparison, especially now that the main ground assault phase of the Iraq war is over.

The Army says the Stryker's infantrymen have the anti-armor missiles to fight enemy tanks, but the unit is really built for lower-intensity missions like Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti and Somalia.

Compared to the Abrams and Bradley, "the Stryker would, of course, look like a death trap," said Ralph Peters, a retired Army intelligence officer and widely published military analyst.

"Of course, any soldier would rather go into all-out combat in a Bradley. But Stryker is for the in-between conflicts, where we've been relying on Humvees and trucks, which offer considerably less protection and firepower than the Stryker."

The Army says it is buying the Strykers, at about $2 million apiece, to build a force that can be put into action more quickly and require less logistical support than tanks and Bradleys.

Stryker brigade officers say the vehicles are meant to carry infantrymen rapidly over great distances. They're supposed to stay concealed or out of rocket-propelled grenade range, but close to enough to provide cover fire.

Misunderstandings about the Stryker's role are not confined to civilian critics. Even as late as the final training tune-up last month, senior commanders were chiding their juniors for driving the Strykers too deep into a mock city before troops on the ground had a chance to clear the buildings.

It will be a constant concern of the brigade's leaders that the vehicles aren't used like tanks.

"It's not a fighting vehicle. It's a carrier vehicle," said Maj. Chuck Hodges, executive officer of one of the brigade's three infantry battalions.

"This vehicle is not designed to be leading with its chin through cities."

What other bells and whistles do the Strykers have?

The brigade has ground sensors, satellite links, unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic eavesdropping gear, lots of intelligence analysts and the Army's most advanced communications equipment.

It's all meant to help the Stryker soldiers find the enemy first, without having to ride up and get shot at first.

The approach is easy enough to understand when the enemy is another military unit assembled over in the next valley, or a band of gunmen in a convoy of pickup trucks.

But how will it work when the enemy is a solitary suicide bomber? Or when an improvised mine is planted in the road overnight - like the one that killed a soldier in Ar Ramadi Sept. 20?

"I think that's a good question," said Peters, the military analyst. The answer will come only over time, he said. "This is really, genuinely a new organization, and there will be a learning curve," he said. "Parts will be pretty steep."

What's wrong with the armor?

The Army said samples of some Stryker ceramic armor failed tests to ensure it can stop 14.5 mm bullets - about the size of an adult's thumb, and larger than those fired from most heavy machine guns.

Army and Stryker manufacturer General Dynamics Land Systems identified about 5,800 pieces of potentially defective armor on the 3rd Brigade's 309 vehicles.

Over the past two weeks, General Dynamics crews installed a 3 mm steel plate behind each of the faulty panels. About 15 of the 132 panes on each Stryker were shored up, officials said.

"All the Stryker vehicles will have the promised armor protection before they deploy," said Maj. Gary Tallman, an Army spokesman at the Pentagon.

Will they withstand rocket-propelled grenades?

The ubiquitous RPG is one of the most prolific small-arms weapons in the world and one that Iraqi fighters have used to deadly effect against U.S. troops.

Army contractors are working on lightweight armor for the Strykers that can stop RPGs, but it isn't scheduled to be ready until next year at the earliest.

So each of the 3rd Brigade's Strykers will be outfitted with a low-tech solution: a steel cage known as slat armor. The cage is supposed to "catch" the RPGs and cause them to explode 10-18 inches away from the vehicle.

General Dynamics crews and Stryker soldiers will install the slat armor on the vehicles in Kuwait. Still, critics note the slat armor won't protect the roof or the wheels and wheel wells from RPG strikes.

How do the soldiers feel about the mission?

There's no polling data or anything like that, but soldiers who talked to reporters during training last month seemed generally positive.

Many have been with the 3rd Brigade since it began the Stryker transformation in early 2000. For them, it's been a long three years of learning new equipment, constant training and lots of attention from senior Army leaders.

"I've been so ready to do my job it's insane," said Christian Johnson, a fiery first sergeant in one of the brigade's infantry companies. He said he's managed to avoid orders that would've sent him to other units in Germany, Alaska and Kansas.

"After all this, a real-world deployment - I figure at least you're owed that," he said.

Others are not so fired up. Some soldiers say privately they're worried about whether all the new stuff - especially the vehicles - is up to the challenge. They gripe about rumor after rumor the past year about imminent deployments. Some even question whether they're really going to Iraq now.

Others worry more about getting mail or good food to eat.

Most said they're anxious to get on with the job before them.

"I'm ready to get this over with, to get the show on the road," said Sgt. John Andrews, 22. "We've been talking about this for too long."

For his part, Rounds, the brigade commander, said there's no doubt the soldiers are up to the task. "It's always a challenge when you leave your loved ones for a year," he said, "but we're absolutely confident the brigade is ready to go."

What will they do over there?

Rounds, deputy commander Lt. Col. Rob Choppa and the rest of the brigade's command team will likely find themselves thrust into demanding roles in Iraq.

All over the country, American officers are the de facto mayors of the cities, towns and neighborhoods where their troops are stationed.

They're trying to create local governments and, fix utilities, broker peace among rival clans, ensure security, win the goodwill of the locals and root out remnants of Saddam Hussein's regime.

The job puts a premium on leaders at all levels who are flexible, said Col. Ralph Baker, who commands a brigade of the 1st Armored Division in Baghdad. He previously commanded one of the Stryker brigade's three infantry battalions.

Many of the soldiers under his command learned their leadership skills in Kosovo and Bosnia.

From the first days of the Stryker brigade in 2000, commanders have been trying to teach independent thinking to leaders up and down the chain of command. Baker designed exercises so that if soldiers followed orders to the letter, they'd fail.

Will they be in cities or in the desert?

The brigade may be assigned to urban operations, border patrol or convoy escorts. The soldiers are prepared for any of these, or all of the above.

At training ranges here, near Yakima, in Southern California and in Louisiana, virtually every exercise has included some kind of urban operation. The soldiers practiced moving house to house, clearing buildings of would-be attackers, running road blocks at busy intersections and gathering information from civilians. Elsewhere, along Iraq's long borders with Syria and Jordan, the brigade's mobility, long-range optics and night-vision gear, aerial vehicles and communications network could be useful in tracking movement. Muslim extremists continue to "flow in on ratlines" across the border to fight U.S. troops, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez told reporters last week.

The Strykers may help escort some of the food, water and supplies that are trucked into Iraq from Kuwait. Tracked Bradleys are chewing up treads at an unprecedented pace providing security for these and other convoys.

The wheeled Strykers may be "a better fit for convoy duty than the Bradleys," Gen. Paul Kern of the Army Materiel Command told Knight-Ridder Newspapers. "They have good armor, good weapons, good speed and a good ride."

Michael Gilbert: 253-597-8921 mike.gilbert@mail.tribnet.com

How the Stryker brigade is organized

The 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division from Fort Lewis - known as "the Arrowhead Brigade" - includes 3,614 soldiers and more than 1,000 vehicles. It's structured like this:

The commanders: Headquarters company, 121 soldiers

The main fighting force: Three infantry battalions - 1st Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment; 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment; and 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment - of 691 soldiers and 65 Strykers each; includes scouts, mortars, snipers, Javelin anti-armor missiles and medics

The scouts: 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment, with 428 soldiers and 53 Strykers; reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition with unmanned aerial vehicles, seismic ground sensors, electronic intercepts and other means

The long-range artillery: 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, with 290 soldiers and 12 towed 155 mm howitzers

The logistics: 296th Brigade Support Battalion, with 388 soldiers and more than 42 trucks The information gatherers: 209th Military Intelligence Company, with 67 soldiers; pulls together all the data the brigade gathers about the enemy, local conditions, weather; civil affairs and information operations

The engineers: 18th Engineer Company, with 120 soldiers, nine Strykers and other engineer vehicles; mine-clearing equipment, earthmovers to build and breach defensive positions

The communication technicians: 334th Signal Company, with 74 soldiers; operates the brigade's information network - computers, hubs, satellite links and radios

The protectors: C/52nd Anti-Tank Company, with 53 soldiers and 10 Strykers; protects brigade from tanks with TOW guided missiles

(Published 12:01AM, October 5th, 2003)

Both Korea and Japan were being pressured to send forces in their "national interest" -- which meant that some forces may be removed from the countries to be sent to the region. Japan has acquiesed, but Korea still waffled on the issue attempting to tie it to the nuclear crisis -- while trying to appear to consider it options. The Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) held on 28 Oct and Korea ended in the ROK still vacillating on its decision to send combat troops. By this time, the Strykers were already enroute to Kuwait. The Strykers arrived in Kuwait in November and entered Iraq on 3 Dec. By December, the U.S. was showing its frustration with the ROK in its reluctance to send combat troops to allow the U.S. soldiers to be freed up and sent into the key hot zones around Tikrit.

After the capture of Saddam Hussein in December, the ROK started making plans to join the fray, but it was motivated by the potential for increased contracts for reconstruction. The U.S. seemed reserved at this point about its support. It made its point clear to ambivalent nations. Those who opposed the U.S. would not get a piece of the reconstruction pie -- and cut out Russia, France, Germany and Canada altogether. By this time the Stryker had already entered action in Iraq and any ROK support to relieve the 3rd Infantry Regiment in Mosul was a moot point.

According to the Defense Daily (Stryker Brigades Have Potential To Do ‘Amazing’ Things: Schoomaker, October 9, 2003, Pg. 1, ) Gen. Schoomaker said the Styrker brigade, if used the right way, could do “amazing” things on its first operational deployment to Iraq. The Christian Science Monitor (New Army ‘Stryker’ Combat Vehicle Nears Iraq Test It’s fast. It’s lethal. And now it’s going to Iraq. But is this new U.S. weapon ready for combat?, October 9, 2003], repeated this vote of confidence. According to the article, Army officers for the past year have been writing the book on how to leverage the Army’s first Stryker brigade. The article went on to say, "Understanding the Stryker, Army officials stress, means first of all knowing what it is not: "It is not a fighting vehicle like a tank or a Bradley," says General Soriano. Instead of rumbling into enemy territory like the army tank units that charged to Baghdad in April, the strategy of the more lightly armored Stryker brigades is to scope out opponents and sneak up on them at speeds of up to 60-miles per hour."

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U.S. Seeks a Regional Role for USFK Forces According to the Joongang Ilbo on 10 Oct, the U.S. was seeking a regional role for the forces in Korea.

We were wondering when the U.S. would get around to addressing this issue. The new global strategy for the U.S. has the Stryker Brigades being highly mobile so that they could be deployed rapidly to hot spots. In June the idea was the Stryker to be stationed in Korea on a "rotational basis" but that was really out of the question if you're using it to justify reductions in USFK forces. If the SBCT is stationed at Pyongtaek, it would have to be committed to a regional role -- as well as forming the backbone of the USFK defense force.

"Regional" covers an area stretching from Taiwan to Russia -- but this is just the opening card. 7th AF assets have been deployed with regularity to South East Asia for exercises such as Cobra Gold in Thailand. Thus the term "regional" may be expanded later. Korea is a member of ASEAN and it could be argued that Korea is part of a much larger "region."

The ROK has agreed on the condition that the ROK defense is not degraded. The U.S. stated that it will replace any units removed with like defense coverage. The U.S. has done this for years to maintain the critical balance of power in the area -- though there have been periods when forces were split between Taiwan and Korea during simultaneous flareups in threatened hostilities.

Seoul also set forth conditions that South Korean forces must not be involved in overseas conflicts unrelated with South Korea. This is