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OSAN AIR BASE AND THE SONGTAN AREA

1960-1964

Eagle


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Acknowledgement: Special thanks to Jack Terwiel , Capt, USAF (Ret) of the Osan Retired Activities Office and Harry Tezlaf (1965) for his photos of his first tour at Osan. Thanks to photos and narrative of Jim Denham (1961) and Doug Lewis (1962) for coverage of the Matador period. Thanks to Edward A. Lewis for his comments on the start of the Pueblo Crisis; Bill Bayless for his narratives and photos of Songtan during the Pueblo Crisis; and Robert Utts for his photos of the 18th TFW F-105s at Osan during the period. Thanks to Neil Mishalov for his photos of the Bob Hope Show (1968). Special thanks to Jackie Turner, 7th AF Historian, and John Okonski, 51st FW Historian, for their assistance with photos and guidance on the history of Osan AB. Thanks to Gib Foulke, SMSgt, USAF (ret) for his accounts of a "train guard" in 1965. Thanks to Kiyo Noriye, SMSgt USAF (ret), for his narratives and photos of the 8th TFW nuclear alerts (1958-1960). Thanks to Richard (Dick) Seely at USAF Memories for photos and narratives of nuclear alert from Itazuke and the Osan nuclear alerts. Thanks to the 36th Fiends site for the use of its materials dealing with the 36th TFS. Thanks to the 51st FW History Office for use of their photos. Special thanks to Ms. Jin Dal-lae of the Jisan-dong Ward Office for taking the time to research and provide historical materials on Songtan and Pyongtaek. Much of the information on Pyongtaek and the Songtan area extracted from the Pyeongtaek History, Pyeongtaek Si Sa. Thanks to the Songbuk Elementary School for permission to use their photos from their private collection.


View of Osan AB (USAF Photo)


THIS IS A WORK IN-PROGRESS AND FACTS ARE BEING ADDED/DELETED DURING THIS PROCESS. THIS IS NOT A COMPLETED HISTORY.


1960:


Congregation in front of Shin Hung Presbyterian Church in Seomi-ri. Shin Hung Church is the oldest church in Songtan. (1960) (Songtan Shin Hung Kyohwi 40th Anniversary Edition (1952-1992))



From 1960-1962, the Shin Hung Church operated a kindergarten for local area children. (1960) (Songtan Shin Hung Kyohwi 40th Anniversary Edition (1952-1992))






(L) Pony Cart in front of Han Song Tailor Shop located three shops down towards the Main Gate from the Stereo Club. (Circa 1960) (NOTE: Shops are on an incline. Mr Hwang Song-gi, employee of the Asia Hotel, stated he worked at the shop for a year. Mr. Son Kwang-chil, owner of Hanyang Kalbi, stated his father was head of the "union" of these "delivery" men who were North Korean refugees. His father had seven ponies used in his business.) ; (R) Used Lumber Yard in Shinjang area (Circa 1960) (NOTE: Lumber of any sort was a precious commodity. Many of the new stores were being built with the scrap lumber. According to Kwon Oh-hoon the major salvage yard/garbage dump was in Ojwa-dong (Ojwa-gaol) behind Are Konji-ni. (Source: Verbal conversation Kalani O'Sullivan and Kwon Oh-hoon, 24 Aug 2005.))


Shinjang Mall Road near where the Stereo Club is today. Seoul Barbershop, Shoe Repair Shop and Mijin Custom Shoe Shop (NOTE: Mr. Sun Shing-Chyi, Tae Ho Lou Restaurant owner, identified this as being in the Mall area near the Stereo Club. Mr. Lee Kwang, Barbershop owner, also stated it was in the Mall area. Residence above Shoe Shop made of recycled wood and corrugated iron roof. Stovepipe next to Barbershop sign. Electric pole in rear of barbershop indicates more buildings in rear.) (Circa 1960) (51st FW Archives)

MSR-1 leading towards Osan-ni (NOTE: Jinwi-myeon hills in distance as road curves and goes down incline towards Farmers' Market. Electric poles to rear of buildings indicate that other buildings were behind the stores on left. Use of stones to construct stores on right indicates availability of concrete.) (Circa 1960) (51st FW Archives)

Drugshop and Tai Kuk Bakery. (NOTE: Mr. Sun Shing-Chyi and his wife identified this drug shop and bakery being near the intersection of the Shinjang Mall Road and the MSR-1. However, the Drug shop construction indicates it is built on an incline with the drugshop at streetlevel with the living quarters to the rear. Most likely this was on Shinjang Mall Road probably near the Main Gate.) (Circa 1960) (51st FW Archives)

Shinjang Mall Road. (NOTE: Though the road at first appeared too wide to be Shinjang Mall Road, local residents confirmed it was a two lane road. This appears to be the curve near the present Victoria Hotel before the straight length to the Main Gate. The Hill 170 can be seen in the upper right hand corner.) (Circa 1960) (51st FW Archives)

The Growth of Chicol Village Area In the early 1960s, housing was at a premium and soon more houses were spreading up the side of the hills towards the "town center" in Songbuk dong. The houses were still a mix of mudwattle houses (choga chip) and mudbrick and stucco houses. However, the shanty town look of the area was slowly disappearing -- though the buildings were still not the sturdiest construction.


Benjo ditch between houses (Circa 1960) (51st FW Archives)


(L) Chicol Village area with houses encroaching on rice fields. The rice fields is supposed to be where the Young Chon Hotel would later be built. (Circa 1960) (51st FW Archives) (R) Another view of the houses encroaching of rice fields. Notice the mix of mudwattle homes and more modern mudbrick and stucco houses. The one home with a tile roof stands out while others are with transite (corrugated concrete/asbestoes) or corrugated iron roofs. Notice that most have outdoor cooking areas. (Circa 1960) (51st FW Archives)


The houses now spread up the hill to the Milwal-dong area and right towards the Hill 180 gate. In this area, the houses were tightly packed with small alleyways.

In the Chicol Village area to the left as one exited the Main Gate, the large Haesong Dance Hall (and later pool hall) that was the first large building outside the gate was replaced by a hotel. In the low lying areas, the rice fields were slowly being reclaimed and houses built upon the old rice fields. This was the Jae Yok-dong area. The communal well was covered over as bars started to line the Shinjang Mall road.

The Namsan Village area next to Hill 170 had returned to being an agricultural area. However, it appears that there was no real perimeter as paths were well-worn from the top of the hill down to the base of the hill. The areas past Namsan Village were all rice fields.

To the right as one exited the Main Gate, the "Front Gate Town" (Chongmun eup) now was crowded with buildings fronting on the three main roads (1) Shinjang to Mokcheon Road; (2) Shinjang to MSR-1 on the Ridgeline and (3) Milwal-dong Road. By the 1960s, the area adjacent to the road leading to the Hill 180 Gate was crammed with houses of those employed on the base or in the service industry (bars, restaurants, beauty shops, general merchandise stores, tailor shops, and small inns). According to Oh Sun-soo, he started the GQ Tailor Shop in 1962. (NOTE: The GQ Tailor Shop is now under new ownership in 2005.)

Shinjang Road to the overpass was not constructued until 1978. There were four paths into the Shinjang 2-dong area. (1) The first was the present Jungang Market Alley that starts at the Shinjang Mall Road and curves left to the Jungang Open Market. (2) The second starts at Shinjang Mall Road and Fashion Alley (Myongdong Road) and curves to the overpass area to the area of the Songtan Tourist Hotel. After about 100 feet it veered right and followed a curving path to the front of the Shinsong Elementary School in the Songwang area. (NOTE: None of the landmarks that were mentioned existed in 1960s, but many 1960s-era homes still exist that mark this path.) (3) The third path first went behind the house of Mr. Oh Sun-soo to the right outside of the Main Gate. (Source: 1957 Photo of Main Gate area) It continued across to the alleyway at the rear of the Asia Hotel parking lot. It ran along the side of the Milwal hill at the present Prince Hotel and continued down to the area of the Songwang Church (Onnori Church). The path continued until the end of the housing at the base of the hill where the Jaeil Church is now located. (NOTE: The path near the Main Gate remains as the diagonal alleyway from the behind the 7-11 to the Shinjang Overpass Road. The narrow alley at the rear of the Asia Hotel Parking lot intersects with Milwal Road coming down from the Capital Hotel. Older residents say the path went up side of the hill at this point. One street down, there is a narrow side road on the side of the hill to mark this route to the Songwang area. Along this route, 1960s era houses are still seen, though upgraded.) (4) The fourth was a road that started at the Main Gate and went behind a farm house. (Source: 1957 photo of Main Gate area) The path cut diagonally to the base of Milwal Road, then a narrow dirt path rutted by water runoff. At the top of the hill, it veered right as the Hill 180 Gate Road that followed the perimeter. The houses started to be not so cramped along this narrow dirt path until one reached the Hill 180 Gate at Makum-ni. (NOTE: Milwal Road was "straightened to cut directly to the Main Gate. All that remains of the diagonal path is the alleyway just outside the Main Gate today. The road at the Y near the Capital Hotel leading to the Songtan Subway Road would not be built until the late 1970s.)

Though the brothels in the area were a major industry, historically, this is not an especially welcome topic for Koreans. Though the Koreans differentiated between the Chicol Village and Chongmun-eup (Front Gate Town), the Americans called the entire area "Chicoville," including the areas in Songbuk-dong near the bus depot and Jaeil theater.

By the early 1960s, many of the business structures were made from recycled wood (i.e., scrap lumber and pallets from the base) -- as wood was a precious commodity at the time. (NOTE: There were plywood plants in operation throughout the country, but the supply could not keep up with the demand. The same was true of concrete as the country struggled to rebuild its infrastructure.)

The increasingly authoritarian rule of President Syngman Rhee, along with government corruption and injustice, added to the discontent of the people. The elections of Mar 1960, in which Rhee won a fourth term, were marked by widespread violence, police brutality, and accusations by Rhee's opponents of government fraud. A student protest march in Apr 1960, in which 125 students were shot down by the police, triggered a wave of uprisings across the country. Because the US had supported Rhee, there were protests at the front gate of the "Yankee Go Home" variety.

"The election had been held in March and Rhee was re-elected as a dictator, but a lot of the Koreans didn't buy it and rioting broke out all over the country including at Chicol Village. Mobs of people gathered outside the gate and shouted anti-American slogans, "Yankee go home" and that sort of thing, and the ROK Army and police would wade into the crowd and beat hell out of them. We went down to the main gate to watch a couple of times. It was weird to see some of the people we knew in the crowd." (Source: Ed Stirling's narratives (1960) from Retired Activities Office)

An Osan AB Couple Joe Fitzpatrick of Yongsan, Korea wrote in Nov 2005, "I came to Osan in 1959, after radio maintenance school at Keesler and an aborted attempt at Snark missile school at Lowery. NCO's retraining into those schools left us airmen without an assignment. We were sent to Korea for OJT in whatever. I was lucky enough to be assigned to the 6314th Support Squadron, 314th Air Division, under 5th AF."

"I was assigned as a 62030 Cook. After making toast in a white uniform for a few days at 3 AM, they discovered I had a score of 90 in Electronics! The CWO put me in charge of the storeroom at Dining Hall # 2. I stayed there 3 years, 8months and 10 days. It was a great job -- no cooking, just supply inventory, typing and writing performance reports and correcting spelling and admin things for the squadron."


Joe Fitzpatrick (1960) (Joe Fitzpatrick)


"I had two Koreans to do the daily inventory and labor, and another airman (John Brister) to share the other work with me. We were able to work our own hours, as long as we covered 12 hours a day, 7 days a week. Quite often I worked every other day, and spent a lot of off duty time hunting pheasants and taking pictures in the local area." The two Koreans were Yi Chong-Nam (deceased) and Song Tong-Su, who later retired from Base Supply.

"I retired in 1981 as an AF Captain also. I knew Maggie Mc Pherson and her crew! I suppose you know of her. A saint, who devoted her life to the Osan Service Club." (NOTE: Maggie V. McPherson is who the McPherson Recreation Center is named for. Starting as a Red Cross volunteer in WWII, she served as a USAF Service Club Director from 1949-1976.)

As a Captain, Joe was stationed at ROKAF HQ, Seoul JUSMAG-K from1972-1973 and then served at Camp Red Cloud from 1975-1976. In 2005, he was a civilian at Yongsan.



Top Left: John Brister in fashionable Korea embroidered jacket, with Mr Yi.Chung-nam; Top Right: Christmas Party -- John Brister (left), Airman Dean(?) Miller (center), the backside of boss, TSgt. Erastus T. Minter (right), and Yi Chung-nam (right); Bottom Left: Terry; Bottom Right: Joe Fitzpatrick and John Brister in Chow Hall Supply Room. (1960) (Joe Fitzpatrick)


Along the way, Joe met the former Chae Yon Im (Terry Fitzpatrick). He wrote, "My wife was a telephone operator at Osan, and later worked at the Airman's Club, Officer's Club and Dining Hall # 2. I was a two striper airman who ran the storeroom in Dining Hall #2. We married at the Base Chapel in 1961 and have been in love for 45 years! Most were not as lucky as we have been!"



Top Left: Chae Yon-Im (Mrs. Terry Fitzpatrick) at Dining Hall; Top Right: Terry; Bottom Left: Terry (center) with friend Irene (right) at Airmen Club Party; Bottom Right: On Airman's Club Employee Picnic. Supervisor, Mr. Han, in rear. Girl seated in rear was a housegirl. Seated from left: Rosie (1st from left); Iris (4th from left); Frenchie (5th from left) with others unknown. (1959-1961) (Joe Fitzpatrick) (NOTE: See Rosie and Frenchie in Airmen Club photo in 1961)

Life at Osan AB Sam Welder of Spring, Tx wrote in Nov 2005, "I was stationed at Osan AB in 59-60, was officially control systems maintenance on the Matador, also was the one who painted several the navy blue that were used for display. I previously painted 57 Chevies at the Norwood plant."

"Cross trained as a launch team member and was trained to arm the nuclear warhead. Lived in the last row of quonset huts just behind the chapel.I also supplied much of the equipment at the Stereo house, by buying through the hobby shop as Bx sales were monitored. Hobby shop was not (monitored). Mamason paid for it, I took no money, but did not turn down the free services of her employees. lol. (NOTE: The Stereo Club is one of the oldest clubs on Shinjang Mall.)

"My houseboy loved me, he never had to make my bed as I pretty much lived in town. Wish I still had the 100s of photos I took, but my ex destroyed them in a fit of jealousy, even though I didn't meet her till after I returned from Korea. WOMEN!"

In Oct 2006, Kenneth Wolfe of Columbia, PA wrote: "I was at Osan AFB from 1959 to 1960. I was in the transpotation squadron. I was then assigned as the Staff car driver for for Brigadier General James B. Tipton (314th. Air Division Commander) and his family. His house was on the top of Hill 180. My Room was also there." We had heard that the best job in the Transportation Squadron was washing the general's car early in the morning because one would get the rest of the time off.


Matador Missiles Arrive Matadors came to Osan, Korea, when the 310th Tactical Missile Squadron and 58th Support Squadron were activated under the 58TMG. The Matadors were capable of carrying nuclear tipped weapons under the 58th TMG. The 310th TMS operated out of the "Diamond" area.

Matador Launch (Early 1960s) (USAF Photo)

(SITE NOTE: (SPECULATION) A question is posed as to why would the USAF deploy a nuclear system to Korea -- that was being phased out starting in 1959 and replaced by the "TM-76A Mace-A." By 1962 the Matador missile had been replaced with the superior Mace and it was removed from service. The nuclear deterent aimed at China was posed by the 3rd BW's B-57s and 8th and 18th FW's F-100s.

The idea was that the Army was given point defense surface-to-air missiles (Nike-Zeus); the Navy and Marine Corps were assigned responsibilty for weapon systems to carry out their functions; and the Air Force was to have area defense missiles (Matador).

Thus this deterent by the Matadors may have been simply a threat to North Korea that nukes were pointed at them if they tried to attack Seoul. At the time, there were also tactical nuclear warheads for the US Army artillery but they were mainly a last ditch measure to stop an all-out North Korean invasion. In the 1957-58 time frame, infiltrations to the South had increased dramatically and there were fears that the North was again planning an invasion -- while the US' attention was focused on China.

In addition, there was an abnormal amount of rivalry over the development of the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) because it had been left as a joint area of responsibility. In 1956, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson allowed the Army to continue development of surface-to-suface missiles with a range of about 200 miles; the Navy was assigned responsibility to employ ship-borne IRBMs, while the Air Force was confirmed in its operational employment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICMMS) and given the joint assignment with the Army of land-based IRBMs. The apportionment was not clear cut, but it sanctioned the extensive work already undertaken by the Air Force. (Source: Beyond the Wild Blue, History of the USAF, 1947-1997, Walter J. Boyne, pp110-111)

In addition, in January 1958, the US Army deployed the Honest John nuclear capable missiles and 280mm nuclear cannons ("atomic guns") capable of firing tactical nuclear warheads to Korea. (Source: Robert S. Norris, William N. Arkin and William Burr, "Where They Were," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 6, November/December 1999, p. 30; Michael J. Mazaar, North Korea and the Bomb (New York: St. Martin's Press, May 1995), p. 20. and "Time to End the Korean War" by Bruce Cumings, Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 279, No. 2, February 1997 and Michael J. Mazaar, North Korea and the Bomb (New York: St. Martin’s Press, May 1995), p. 20.) Supposedly, on February 3, 1958, the U.S. forces exhibited to the press two 280mm atomic guns and nuclear-tipped Honest John missiles on an I Corps airfield in the vicinity of Uijongbu. (Source: Orient Press, Reuters and Hapdong News Agency)

Given these facts, the Matadors were redundant and makes the Matadors' presence simply for show -- or perhaps it had more to do with the USAF prestige on the line and in showing the US Army that it too had nuclear missiles to play with.)

Matador Launch (Early 1960s)

This is the Martin Aircraft (now Lockheed Martin) Matador Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM). The Matador was developed starting in 1947, and was the first missile ever deployed by the Air Force. The first launch took place on January 19, 1949 at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. By 1951, testing was moved to Patrick Air Force Base in Florida (south of Cape Canaveral).

There were two production models of the Matador: Matador A (also known as the B-61A and later the TM-61A) and Matador C (TM-61C). The "TM" in the missile's designation identified its role as a "Tactical Missile." The only major difference between the two was a new guidance system on the Matador C. The Air Force decided to build a considerably enhanced "Matador-B", but development took longer than expected. As an interim measure, the USAF implemented a modestly improved version of the original Matador, designated "TM-61C". This "Matador-C" used the same airframe but had an improved "short range navigation vehicle (Shanicle)" guidance system that allowed it to plot its own course by mapping its position from a network of microwave transmitters. The Matador-C was introduced in 1957 and eventually replaced all Matador-As in service. It is unclear if Matador-As were converted to Matador-Cs.

Matador (30 Dec 1958)

About 1,200 Matadors were built, with production ending in 1957. The weapon was deployed to West Germany, Florida, and Taiwan, and remained in service until 1962. (NOTE: The deployment in Korea falls under the "neither confirm nor deny policy" of the US due to international concerns with the Korean Armistice agreement banning the introduction of any new weapons system into Korea.) The Matador-C was retroactively redesignated "MGM-61C" in 1963.

(NOTE: Even as the Matador was being deployed, there were concerns that it was simply too troublesome to move around and fire, and that its radio guidance system was too easy to jam or spoof. This led to an improved version, originally designated "TM-61B", with initial test flights of "YTM-61B" prototypes in 1956. The new missile was clearly derived from the Matador, but it had a shorter wingspan and a longer blunt nose, and so it was redesignated "TM-76 Mace" in early 1958. It entered operational service as the "TM-76A Mace-A" in 1959. The phaseout of the Matador began in 1959 when it was replaced by the more advanced TM-76 Mace missile. By 1962 the Matador missile had been replaced with the superior Mace.

During this same time period, the U.S. Army’s was deploying the surface-to-surface Honest John missile, fitted with either the W-7 or the W-33 nuclear warhead, was designed to be field assembled under combat conditions. Honest John was 26 feet long with a diameter of 2 feet, 6 inches and a wingspan of 11 feet. The missile weighed approximately 6000 pounds and used eight spin rockets to assure accuracy. Approximately 2000 Honest John missile systems were deployed between 1953 and 1989.)


Matador (30 Dec 1958)

Matador specifications and performance

Length 39 ft. 6 in.
Wingspan 28 ft. 7 in.
Thrust Sustainer: 4600 lbs.
Booster: 55,000 lbs.
Speed Mach 0.9
Ceiling 35,000 ft.
Range 700 miles
Warhead Conventional or nuclear (W-5 fission warhead, 40-50 KT yield)
In Asia, the 310th TMS at Osan, the 868th TMS at Tainan, Taiwan; and 498th TMG at Kadena, Okinawa helped pioneer the missile organizations in the USAF.


6929th RSM Arrives Syd Kahre of Quincy, CA belonged to a secretive unit that monitored the radio transmissions of the Chinese. The 6929th RSM was part of the USAF Security Service (USAFSS). (See 1963 for photos.) Syd wrote in the Guestbook in Mar 2006:

"Brought back a lot of memories. I was at Osan from March '59 until April'60 in 6929th RSM - Chinese. We started work in converted semi trucks. My first night they put me on "guard duty" at the back gate - handed me a .45 and there I was. I spent all night figuring how to operate the thing. They soon had the facilities completed on Hill 170 - "The Hill" .

We lived in the same quonset huts as in the photos. When I left in '60 they were working on concrete block barracks across the road.

Our House Boy was Pak Su San. Ten bucks and a carton of Salems every two weeks. He swabbed the deck of the quonset hut with the diesel stove oil to keep the dust down. We caught him one day spitting water on our fatigues in order to steam iron them. My friend Dick had a fit. In the morning when Pak walked into the hut I immediately woke up - the kimchee fragrance. I could never get past it although most guys liked it.

The Chow Hall was terrible, especially the reconstituted milk. I never ate so many grilled cheese sandwiches (at the snack bar) in my life. We had just arrived and went to the Airman's Club in our civies for dinner and a beer - the waitress said to us in Chinese, "Please be seated". Somewhat of a shock. Were we wearing signs?

I remember the beautiful mornings walking up the backside of "The Hill" to work and seeing the slickie boys carting off tip tanks from the storage area at the east end of the runway. Some security! Then in a few minutes you could hear them pounding them into whatever.

I enjoyed my tour - hated the cold though. I liked the job and had wonderful friends. The NCO's would shut our translation section down at midnight to mop the floor. We'd get so mad. "How'd we ever win a war?" we asked a Master Sargeant who had been on the Bataan Death March. He said they turned it over to the civilians. Maybe a good answer at some time, but now???

Would hear the rats running down the walls of the huts between the metal outer walls and the plywwod inner. One night heard a strange noise an turned on a light to see a rat dragging a bayonet down the hut which had been used to dut a fruit cake at Christmas time.

We managed to talk the NCO's out of working the graveyard shift which we all hated. There was no "business" anyway. Per agreement we were "on call".

I was asked to work on "Blue Sky" but that was right after the Navy ELINT plane from Japan was shot up off the North Korean coast - I declined, thinking of the C-47's and where they flew. The Captain in charge of the Morse section disappeared the day after the ELINT incident. Good to read the site. Thanks



8th Tactical Fighter Wing

"BLACK PANTHERS"
35th TFS

"FLYING FIENDS"
36th TFS

"HEADHUNTERS"
80th TFS

Nuclear Alert Returns to Osan: The 8th TFW had been standing nuclear alerts at Osan on a rotational basis since 1958. However, when new facilities were opened at Kadena AB, Okinawa, the alert moved and operations in the Diamond area were closed at Osan and by the spring of 1959, the 8th TFW alerts were held in Kadena on a rotation basis.


Map of Osan AB Flightline (NOTE: The Diamond A-D where the nuclear alerts were pulled.)


Dick Seeley stated a few years back on his old site, how the conditions had changed for standing the nuclear alerts at Osan after their return from Kadena. He stated, "Upon returning to Osan, AB Korea we found a nice new alert facility waiting for us. It was totally self contained and air conditioned too. The alert pads were now enclosed with steel buildings. No more pre-flights in the rain or snow and each pad had a phone. Practice scrambles during inclement weather no longer required us to sit in open cockpits during a monsoon or blizzard depending upon the season. It was a great improvement over our previous facilities. Practice scrambles were initiated with the ringing of a bell. It is interesting see how conditioned one becomes to responding. I had just returned from a tour at Osan and was waiting for a movie to begin in a downtown Fukuoka movie theater. A bell would sound a minute or two before the movie would start. Yep, I came right out of the seat!"


Kiyo Noriye's aircraft F-100D 564 36th TFS (1958) (Courtesy Kiyo Noriye)

The alert crews lived in a thirty-two man barracks on the alert pad with latrine and shower facilities. The barracks consisted of four bays with a central shower and latrine. The nuclear weapons bunker was across the street. The alerts would remain at Osan under the 8th TFW until 1964 when the 8th TFW rotated to George AFB, CA to transition to F-4s. The 35th, 36th and 80th had transitioned to F-105s at the time. The Osan nuclear commitment never went away, it only switched units using the 35th, 36th and 80th under the other cover units.

It should be noted that the 3rd Bomb Wing of Misawa AB was standing nuclear alerts at Kunsan AB with their B-57s. In 1963 when the 3rd BW departed and the 39th Air Division at Misawa picked up the Kunsan AB tasking until 1968 when it was turned over to Det 1 475th TFW of Misawa until 1974.




Korea Military Situation According to the CINCPAC Command History, pp 124-128: "The U.S. Military enjoyed considerable prestige with the Republic of Korea Armed Forces and the Korean people in 1960. The Korean economy, though still weak, was improving in its own right and as a result of U.S. military procurement in Korea in connection with the military MA Program. The insistence on quality competitive merchandise improved the ability of Korea to compete in world trade. The internal political rearrangement was completed with minimal stir, and in general the new government was considered sound."

The Military Assistance Program was important because the ROK was fully sustained by the US at the time in the maintenance and support of its 600,000 man force. The CINCPAC Command History stated, "The main problems facing the MAP in Korea in 1960 were: (1) getting the Korean government to take a bigger share of the cost of the Armed Forces; (2) the high cost of maintenance of Korean military equipment; and (3) the long range problem of reducing Korean armed forces within the capability of the Korean economy." The US considered the maintenance of the ROK military at 600,000 troops and provided T-28 and T-6 aircraft to the military. The COMUS Korea (Commander US forces Korea) advised the opening of another base to support jet fighter aircraft in Southern Korea. Three sites were under consideration. COMUS-K also advised that the logistics and materiel facilities were completed in Taegu in 1960. (Source: 1960 Commander in Chief Pacific Command, pp124-128).) (NOTE: As the ROK were equipped with F-86Fs, there was no push to upgrade them to F-100s and F-104Bs as the Taiwan was doing under the MAP.)

In May 1960, US Special Forces from Okinawa were air infiltrated into the ROK and received by US/ROKA reconnaissance forces. In June 1960, SEA HAWK held amphibious forces landings in the Pohang area. Air support was provided by the Ist MAW from Japan. ROK accepted the invitation to participate.

Exercise COUNTER PUNCH (similar to Exercise STRIKE BACk) was held in Mar 1961 as a CPX/FTX to test the posture of the UN/USFK forces to defend Korea in case of resumed localized hostilities. (NOTE: This would evolve into the USFK's LENS Exericse and later joined with the ROK's Ulchi Focus Exercise to become Ulchi Focus-Lens.)

In Feb 1960, CINCPAC concurred on the draft for use of facilities and areas by the USFK in Korea submitted to the State Department by the US Embassy, Seoul. In early March, the ROK pressed for an early settlement of the facilities issue and stated that they were under pressure to complete a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The Embassy stated to the ROK Foreign Minister that the US would only consider facilities and areas at this time. COMUS-K recommended that the ROK not be required to compensate for any improvements or construction by the US because no such provision was included in the Japanese agreement. In addition, the draft stated that the US would not be bound to restore the areas to their original condition upon release. COMUS-K was doubtful that the ROK would accept any demands for compensation of improvements. If the negotiations were successfully completed, the US would then discuss exit/entry, customs duties and taxation. However, criminal jurisdiction was NOT to be negotiated. (SITE NOTE: The issue of the return of the areas without restoring them to original condition would crop up 45 years later under the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) when camps were returned and the ROK claimed that the US should pay for pollution cleanup. The SOFA was negotiated in 1963 and jurisdiction did not become a major issue until 1991 when the SOFA was renegotiated for the first time since 1963. It was also the first time that the ROK agreed to contribute to its defense costs.)


F-102s deploy to Suwon and Osan The F-102s of the 16th FIS, 51st FIW of Naha AB, Okinawa deployed to Korea on a TDY training mission for the first time on Dec 18. On 25 Jan 1960 the F-102As once again deployed to Suwon. On 1 May 1960, F-102As of the 16th FIS returned once again to Suwon AB, Korea and conducted twelve days of night operations. On 8 Aug 1960 the 16th FIS deployed six F-102A's to Osan AB, Korea for day and night training, and local familiarization sorties. On 11 Sep 1960 an additional six F-102A's were deployed to Osan AB. (Source: 51st Composite Wing (Tactical) Chronology (30 Nov 1940-31 Dec 1980))


Korea Economic Situation The level of per capita national income remained well below $100, roughly of the same order as India's and compred with about $400 for Japan and $150 for Taiwan.

Roughly two-thirds of the Korean working population were dependent on farming for their livelihood but produced less than two-fifths ofthe GDP in 1959 and 1960. Moreover, South Korea remained a net food importer, in marked contrast to the years of Japanese occupation when it was the "rice bowl" for North Korea and Japan.

There was rising unemployment, estimated in 1960 at one-fifth of the total labor force, or some 2 million people, and at all times quite beyond anything the industrial sector could begin to absorb. Manufacturing, mining, and construction together employed not much more than 2 percent of the labor force even after an increase in production in these fields between 1955-1960 at an average annual rate of 12 percent. Throughout the industrial sector progress was seriously inhimbited by shortages of electric power and of capital.

At the same time there was over-production and excess capacity most notably in textiles. Other industries such as cement, that utilized local resources were lagging behind. Delays in putting admittedly costly domestic fertilizer plant into production contributed significantly to the chronically large excess of imports over exports since long-established intensive cultivation in South Korea demands huge quantities of chemical fertilizer to maintin the fertility of the soil. The value of exports remained exceedingly low.

At the end of the Korean War virtually all ex-Japanese property (both gvernment and private) was still in the hands of the South Korean Government, including 90 percent of all industrial plants. First, the public utilities and monopolies (ginseng, tobacco, salt) directly under ministers and departments. Second, five nationalized corporations either government-owned or with government holding a controlling share, i.e. the mint, the Bank of Chosen (later Bank of Korea), the Daehan Coal Corporation, the Korean Shipping Corporation, and the less important Daehan Shipbuilding Corporation. Third, the so-called "central" vested properties, including the tungsten mining company, the electric power corporations, irrigation concerns, and various other fairly large industries, all subject ot overall control of one of the iministries but in fact a very loose control. Finally, the "local" vested properties, consisting of some 200 smaller ex-Japnese enterprises, which it was decided to sell to local entrepreneurs. Most of the last named, including all cotton textile factories, were indeed disposed of in 1954, but the key enterprises all remained under government control. (SITE NOTE: Some of the key industries were granted to family groups as "chaebols" under Park Chung-hee whereby they were subsidized and given special protection -- including the advent of protectionism to protect their domestic market. Some of these key industries remained under government control until the mid-1990s.)

What has characterized all Government-controlled enterprises, with the exception of the monopolies, is that they have not operated on a commercial basis. The National Assembly refused to set realistic rates for the products. Thus the products were subsidized to keep the costs artificially low. Foreign aid materials were sold to the companies at below-cost rates. The bottom line is that that many of the books were juggled or operating costs not reported altogether. Other industries were not even mentioned in the budget.

Land reform in 1948 and 1949 allowed tenant farmers to procure their land and by the autumn of 1957 an estimated 1.5 million farmers had acquired some 1-2 million acres of land where previously they had been tenants or farm laborers. The farming population increased to over 14 million, of whom 43 percent were under 15 years of age. The average size of the farm family was six and the average size of land-holding per household only about 2 acres. The farms are usually worked by hand, except that oxen are employed for plouyghing and harrowing. Unorganized, lacking capital and living on tiny fragmented hodings, the peasant was facing rising expenditures and was exploited by money-lenders who charged rates of interest sometimes exceeding 60 percent, or even as high as 100 percent.

In 1959 rice production exceeded 3 1/4 million tons allowing for a small amount to exported for the first time. However, because of the rice in production, there was a fall in domestic rice prices -- thus ironically in the end, the farmer suffered from his increased production. (NOTE: The government subsidized rice system to buy the farmers' rice and high prices and sell to the public at low prices still had not come into being.) The planting of fruit trees in the uplands greatly increased and there was a revival of sericulture (silkworm).

Almost two-thirds of the "forest land" is practically denuded of trees, not leeast becasue of Japanese over-cultting during the Second World War, and there is a severe shortage of timber. Winters were cold, demands for heating fuel high, and supplies had been gathered by the villagers from forest land. But wood fuel was also used in the cities and by military establishments. In 1960 the rate of annual growth versus annual cut, experts feared that most forests would disappear within a few years. (NOTE: The forests were saved when the Chonju Paper Company (Hansol Paper Co.) received the contract to reforest the nation in 1975. What one sees in Korea now is a result of this contract.)

The solution to the lack of timber in 1960 depends on importing timber and spreading the the use of domestically produced substitutes for firewood, such as coal and peat. (NOTE: From this came the manufacture of the cylindrical charcoal briquettes lighted with a sulfur starter used in homes.) In the absence of indigenous oil resources, the rehabilitation and modernization of coal mining was an obvious major target of policy, all the more so in view of the loss at the time of the North Korean supplied electricity. Until the end of the Rhee regime privately owned coal mines only were permitted to sell at open market prices, whereas the government mines (formerly Japanese property) had to sell at controlled prices and appreciably below coast -- a policy instituted against the advice of the US aid mission.

In 1960 fishing amounted ot 340,000 metric tons. Exports of fish and fish products, though not large in value, remained importatnt in the very limited Korean export trade.

Installed electric power capacity in March 1960 was 372,780 kilowatts, nearly double that of 1945. However, it was still insufficient to meet the needs of the nation and acute power shortages occurred.

One of the main complaints of the Koreans was the lack of emphasis in American aid programs on expanding heavy industry and the manufacture of producer goods. Lack of progress in this spere was partly due to inefficiency and mismanagement. Thus at the end of 1960 there was only one fertilizer plant completed, and another uner construction with assistance of a German contractor. (NOTE: Fertilizer was still being imported to fill the shortfall.) There was an UNKRA-finance cement plant in Mungyang, supplying three-quarters of the total output and another large cement factory in Samchok. A limited amount of pig iron and steel ingots was produced in ex-Japanese installation. A number of small foundries and machine shops had sprung up. (Source: The Republic of Korea, W.E. Reeve, 1963, pp125-142)

Social disorder and hostility to the government complkiicated the already staggering problems created by the war. There were many thousands of war widows, more than 100,000 orphans, and thens of thousands of unemployed, whose ranks were swelled by farmers leaving their land to seek work in the cities. Exact statistics are not available, but in 1961 it was estimated that there were aout 279,000 unemployed, of whom 72,000 were university graduates, and 51,000 discharged soldiers and laid-off wrkers. This provided a powerkeg of anger and resentment that waited only for a spark to set it off. (Source: A Handbook of Korea, 1999, p115)


Fall of Syngman Rhee government (1st Republic) The increasingly authoritarian rule of President Syngman Rhee, along with government corruption and injustice, added to the discontent of the people. The elections of Mar 1960, in which Rhee won a fourth term, were marked by widespread violence, police brutality, and accusations by Rhee's opponents of government fraud. A student protest march in Apr 1960, in which 125 students were shot down by the police, triggered a wave of uprisings across the country. The government capitulated, and Rhee resigned and went into exile.

While it is clear that South Korea had the machinery of government of a modern state, it is evident that President Rhee could tightly control the running of the state and the civil service. It is also evident that certain government institutions, in particular the Office of General Affairs and the National Thought Improvement Institute, lent themselved to prar-naxi methods -- methods which were also greatly facilitated by the centralized organization of the state police. The members of this force were appointed by the national Government and were not subordinate to local officials. One example among many of the way in which the organization of state could be made to serve the interests of the President occurred before the notorious presidential elections of 1960. The Minister of Home Affairs was then reported as demanding that "all his subordinates should publicize the accomplishments of President Syngman Rhee through theri families to assure his re-election"; any employee who did not wish to do so was told to leave government office. At the same time all heads of local authorities were told that they must resign from any political parties they belonged to. The objective was to edge opposition leaders out of office and replace them by Liberal nominees. Again on 16 April 1959 thirty police officials notably those in constituencies won by the opposition in the 1956 elections, were sacked "in order to establish stricter discipline in the national police force." (Source: The Republic of Korea, W.E. Reeve, 1963, pp69-70.)


Syngman Rhee inaugurated as First Republic President on 24 Jul 1948. (Pyeongtaek City) (Source: Pyeongtaek History (CD), Pyeongtaek Si Sa)

The downfall of the corrupt government of President Syngman Rhee (Yi Syng-man) came about in 1960. The last straw was the New National Security Law which gave all power to Rhee's party, abolished the election of local officials, and appointment of Police Chiefs from Rhee's supporters. In March 1960, the Liberal Party managed to reelect Rhee and to elect Yi Ki-bung vice president by the blatant use of force. Rhee was reelected by default because his principal opponent had died while receiving medical treatment in the United States just before the election. As for Yi, he was largely confined to his sickbed-- a cause of public anger -- but "won" 8.3 million votes as against 1.8 million votes for Chang Myon (Dr. John M. Chang).


Syngman Rhee


The fraudulent election touched off civil disorders, known and celebrated as the April 19 Student Revolution, during which 142 students were killed by the police. Thousands of university and high school students, as well as professors, teachers, parents and others, staged one of the most spectacular demonstrations against the government. This became known as the "Righteous Student Uprising of April 19th." Martial law was declared and troops were mobilized -- however, the troops remained neutral refusing to take action against the students. Riots continued every day until April 26 when President Syngman Rhee tendered his resignation followed by the members of his cabinet. The First Republic collapsed in a violent uprising. Foreign Minister Chung Chung-huh becomes head of a caretaker government.

The next day all four members of the Yi family died in a suicide pact. This account has been challenged by some who believed Yi's family was killed by his bodyguards in hopes of enabling Rhee to stay on.

On April 28, 1960, a DC-4 belonging to the Civil Air Transport (CAT was operated by the US CIA) spirited Rhee out of Korea barely one step ahead of a lynch mob. Kim Yong Kap, Rhee's Deputy Minister of Finance, revealed that Rhee took $20 million of the government fund. Rhee, his wife and an adopted son lived at 2033 Makiki St., Honolulu, Hawaii.

Yoon Bo Soon took over as interim President on 1 Aug 1960 until new elections could be held. (Source: Kimsoft: Who Was Syngman Rhee?, Lee Wha Rang, 20 Feb 2000.)


Yoon Bo Soon assumes Presidency on 1 Aug 1960. (Pyeongtaek City) (Source: Pyeongtaek History (CD), Pyeongtaek Si Sa)

But instead of a rebirth of the nation in the Second Republic, it too spiralled downward and became mired in nepotism, corruption while crime grew out of hand. The police were powerless. Under the leadership of President Chang Myun (Dr. John M. Chang), a new government was unable to correct the economic problems or maintain order. The military had remained out of the politics in the downfall of Rhee and only intervened when Chang's regime went from bad to worse.

At the first meeting of the cabinet of the new interim Government, it declared its intention of reforming abuses and eradicating corruption. It took action by removing from office the provincial governors apporinted by Rhee, by issuing warrants for the arrests of Rhee's Minister of Home affairs, his director of police, his campaign manager, and the chief of his bodyguard. The new Minister of Justice declared that election frauds would be investigated throughout the country, and the student defense force formed by Rhee in September 1949 was abolished. But still the sutdents were not satisfied. They demanded the resignation of the Assembly -- which had contentented itself with the half-measure of purging six Liberals -- and the removal of former government supporters from the staffs of the universities and colleges.

On 22 June 1960 a new election law was passed to regulate elections to both houses, and a general election took place in July, when the Democrats won an overwhelming majority. Dr. John Chang (Chang Myun), a graduate of Manhattan University and first Korean Ambassadorto Washington in 1949, was elected premier and Mr. Yun Po-sun, President. At these elections it was reported that no fraud or intimidation took place. Dr. Chang faced immediate difficulties in forming a cabinet because of a widening split between the new and old factions of his party -- followed by reshuffling the cabinet 7 September. On 11 Oct, more demonstrations by the students caused the resignation of the Minister of Home Affairs as well as his successor. Internal cleavages made firm government impossible. The new regime was faced with the aftermath of years of political repression, with a bankrupt exchequer, and a police force so discredited that it could no longer maintain order. Moreover various measures the government either adopted or attemted to adopt made it increasingly unpopular -- such as the currency devaluation, the new US aid agreement, anti-Communist decrees, and measures to reduce the size of the armed forces. (Source: The Republic of Korea, W.E. Reeve, 1963, pp144-148.)

The new US aid program added to anti-Americanism. Since US funds contributed 52 percent of the Korean budget, it was believed that the agreement would permit the US to play a part in drawing up the new aid agreement. There were student and other anti-American demonstrations as well as strong opposition in the House of Representatives.By the beginning of April anti-American sentiment was such that relations between the American military command and their Korean employees deteriorated. Chang endeavored to counter it by demanding a "status of forces" agreement and the right of the Korean courts to try American servicemen for crimes committed outside barracks. This anti-Americanism was accompanied by increasingly vocal demands for unification. (Source: The Republic of Korea, W.E. Reeve, 1963, pp144-148.)

The Chang regime had promised to eliminate corruption. Public disgust mounted when on 26 May 1960, some Democrats admitted accepting bribes of 300,000 hwan each from the Liberal Finance Minister to vote Liberal in the elections. In addition, the Chang regime aimed at reducing the military budget, and there was thus some enforced retirement of army generals beginning with General Song Yo Chan, who was widely respected for his action in persuading Rhee to resign. This set up the military coup and the formation of a military junta including Park Chung Hee in May of 1961 when the South Korean armed forces seized power in a bloodless coup. (Source: Kimsoft: Who Was Syngman Rhee?, Lee Wha Rang, 20 Feb 2000.)

As the economic situation worsened, the backgrounds of many of the younger army officers made them especially angered by the plight of the peasants. This was because opportunities for talented children in the universitites were much limited by meagre scholarship funds, and thus the only chance of a higher education was via the military schools. These schools had thus been turning out bright young officers from the poorer classes, who were filled with disgust and resentment at the corruption and inefficiency of the regime. Moreover this young officer group was also discontented because the way to promotion was blocked by older officers, most of whom once served with the Japanese army. By June 1960 dissension in the army was such that Colonel Magrunder was reported as saying, "I trust that the Army will continue to face north -- against the Communists."

The military junta established tight control over civil freedoms, the press, and the economy, somewhat relaxing restrictions as its power solidified. Park was elected president in 1963, reelected in 1967, and, following a constitutional amendment permitting a third term, again in 1971.

Rhee died on July 19, 1965 at the age of 90 of a stroke. His 65-year old wife Francisca and adopted son Rhee In Soo were at his bedside. A US Air Force plane carried his body to Seoul for a family funeral. Park Chung Hee, who had plotted to topple Rhee, planned a state funeral but decided against it in face of mounting opposition. Rhee's body was interned at Dougjak-dong National Cemetery near Seoul. Francisca Rhee returned to her native country and lived out her tragic life with a relative, Miss B Donner, at Laurenzgasse 4/6, 1050 Vienna, Austria. (Source: Kimsoft: Who Was Syngman Rhee?, Lee Wha Rang, 20 Feb 2000.)




World Becomes Nuclear After the US and Russian, China joined the nuclear club in 1958 -- with the help of Russia. (NOTE: At this time, the nuclear alerts in Korea were NOT focused on North Korea, but rather on China. China had invaded Burma in 1957 and seized disputed lands -- and there were fears that China would do the same with Formosa (Taiwan). Because of this threat, President Eisenhower authorized the forward positioning of nuclear weapons to offset the time it would take to respond to an off-shore threat. As the nuclear weapons could not be positioned in Japan because of the growing distaste for nuclear weapons by the populace, Korea was the logical choice.

As the ROK government was almost 100 percent supported by the US funds, it was easy to obtain their acquiescence -- BUT Article 12 of the Armistice stated that no new weapons systems could be introduced into Korea. The US chose to ignore this article and proceeded with the deployment of the Matador to Osan AB, Korea -- along with the Honest John missile and 280mm atomic cannons. At the same time, nuclear alerts were being maintained by B-57s of the 3rd Bomb Wing at Kunsan AB and the F-100s of the 8th TFW and 18th TFW at Kadena AB, Okinawa.)

The 1960s began with France joining the nuclear weapons "club," testing an atomic weapon on February 13, 1960. Children in the US grew up in the shadow of the "bomb."


1961:


Songbuk Elementary School (1961) (Songbuk Elementary School)


Seojong Elementary School. (1961) (Seojong Elementary Photo Display (2005)) (NOTE: Christian religious education)

Seojong Elementary School. (1961) (Seojong Elementary Photo Display (2005)) (NOTE: Christian religious education)

Seojong Elementary School. (1961) (Seojong Elementary Photo Display (2005))


Seojong Elementary School. (1961) (Seojong Elementary Photo Display (2005)) (NOTE: Christian religious education)


Seojong Elementary School. (1961) (Seojong Elementary Photo Display (2005))





Chicol Village It was purported that Chicol Village provided about 80 percent of the income for the area through its bars and prostitution. The remainder of the income came from subsistence farming. Approximately 70 percent of the population was clustered within 1km of the base.

The main agricultural center was in Sojeong-ni which had the railhead connecting it to Pyongtaek and Suwon. Intercity buses was the norm for transportation as cars was a luxury item that only the wealthy and Americans could afford. Oxcarts and a few Korean-pony carts were seen transporting items in the streets. In the fields, the oxen were used to till the soil. The following from Jim Denman's Korean Tour.





(NOTE: Left: Notice the ox-cart that was a common site. Right: These buses were the newer intercity express buses. The older country buses were school bus types that had tires mounted on the rear in case of a blowout -- a common occurrence.




(NOTE: Right: For another view of theater go to "1958.")



Life on Osan AB The following are from Jim Denman's Korean Tour. Jim Denman was with the 310th TAC Missile Squadron (TMS) in 1961. The 310th Tactical Missile Squadron and 58th Support Squadron were activated under the 58TMG. The 310th operated out of the "Diamond" area -- which is the same location that the 8th TFW of Yokota AB, Japan had previously performed their nuclear alerts.

The Matador was designed to carry the W-5 warhead (MGM-1). The warhead came in a variety of yields:+ 6, 16, 55, 60, 100, 120 kilotons. It could be either airburst or surface detonated. It was produced by modifing the MK-5 bombs. The warheads for the Matador were retired between Jul 1961 - Jan 1963. There were 65 Matador warheads produced. (Source: Complete List of All U.S. Nuclear Weapons

The Matador possessed about the same size and looks as a contemporary jet fighter. A booster generating 57,000 pounds of thrust for 2.4 seconds got the 12,000-pound missile airborne and up to a flying speed of 200 mph from a zero- length launcher. Powered by a 4,600-pound-thrust J33-A-37 engine, the missile (designated TM-61A) carried a 3,000-pound warhead over 650 mph to a maximum range of 620 miles.

The Matador missile, unfortunately, never performed adequately. Throughout its service, observers criticized the Matador for its low in-flight reliability, high CEPs, and questionable control over long distances. A 1956 study noted that USAF did not develop Matador according to procedures and military requirements, but rather devised the missile around existing components and techniques. Further, at the time the Air Force initially deployed the Martin missile, the weapon had not demonstrated operationally acceptable performance and required major modifications. The Matador's guidance system presented another problem because the guidance radar's range proved less than the missile's flying range. This guidance system required a ground-based operator to track and guide the missile, which, with line- of-sight communications, limited guided range to 250 miles. In late 1954, USAF added a guidance system called Shanicle and re-designated the missile TM-61C. In this system, the missile automatically flew a hyperbolic grid. Based upon results of 74 TM-61Cs launched on the Atlantic missile range between April 1957 and September 1960, USAF calculated the missile's overall reliability at 71 percent and CEP at 2,700 feet. However, these accuracy figures included student launches; instructors achieved CEPs of 1,600 feet. But Shanicle still limited the range of TM-61C to that of line-of-sight transmissions; moreover, this guidance system could be jammed. To break this dependence, the Air Force installed a third guidance system. ATRAN in the TM-61B variant, nicknamed Mace. (Source: GlobalSecurity.org: Matador

The Matador surface-to-surface missile came into use with the 1st and 69th Pilotless Bomber Squadons, the designation anotther artless attempt to make the roles and missions more palatable to the Army. About 1,000 Amatadors we4re built; they were succeeded by the Mace, which was retired in 1966. (Beyond the Wild Blue, History of the US Air Force 1947-1997m Walter Boyne, p128.)

Jim Denman's corrugated iron barracks was located on Hill 180 -- and was later replaced by a two-story barracks with latrines at the ends. The unit operated from two hangars adjacent to the Diamond area. He has some interesting comments attached to his photos of Chicoville (Chicol Village).



(NOTE: Left: Picture taken just outside the Main Gate into "Chicoville." Right: Jim's complaint of no hotwater was common at ALL bases/camps.)







(NOTE: Left: The old structure appears to be a plywood Jamesway building. Only the roofs were corrugated iron. Sides were normally covered in layered wood slates, but these appear to be completely covered in corrugated iron sheets. The new barracks were poured concrete slabs on the ends with prefab walls and floors. These structures were susceptible to fire because of the prefab construction materials. One end was the entrance and the other end was a fire exit. Latrines were at the end. Right: The comments of Hill 180 are an urban legend. See "1951" above for story.)











38th ADA Bde Established The 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade Headquarters was established at Osan AB on 25 May 1961. The unit was deactivated on 31 July 1981. Controlled the Nike-Hercules and Hawk batteries under the 44th ADA around the peninsula. Deactivated when the last of the Hawks were turned over to the ROK.


38th Brigade Patch: Hand of Power, but according to Kenneth Wisz (E Btry 2/44th ADA 38th AD Bde, Kimje, Korea), "it was better known as 'the fist of shit'." The partition line represents the division of the Korean Peninsula by the Demilitarized Zone. The gauntlet represents the protection offered by the brigade, the lightning bolt the swift retaliation against any hostile air attack.





US Military Aid The US military aid to South Korea from 1950-1959 amounted to $1.292 billion. On 8 Feb 1961, the US and the ROK concluded agreements with respect to US economic, technical, and related assistance to Korea. These agreements (which supersede the 1948 aid agreement, the 1952 economic coordination agreement, and the 1953 reconstruction and financial stabilization agreement) provide for a special mission to Korea to discharge the responsibilities of the US stipulated therein. (The agreements were to be entered into force on 28 Feb 1961.) (Source: The US Military Experience in Korea 1871-1982, p109, Command Historian's Office, USFK/EUSA)


Korea Military Situation As in previous years, the major expenditures for PACOM under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) was to Korea. The 1961 objectives was to supply the ROK with conventional artillery, small arms, anti-tank weapons, surface-to-air missiles and to replace obsolete tanks. Training was provided to two ROK SAM battalions during FY61.

The US asked the ROK government if it was willing open discussions on providing Nike and Hawk equipment to ROK units. The US ambassador favored going ahead with Hawk units, but wanted the Nike deferred. However, despite the COMUS-K agreement with the 8th Army Commander that the ROK should be provided only Hawk units, at the end of FY 61 provisions were for one Nike battalion and three Hawk battalions. (1961 CINCPAC Command History, p97)

In Aug 1961, SHARP EDGE held amphibious forces landings in the Pohang area. The ROK was asked to provide air cover for the landing which was widely publicized in the ROK to garner public support of the US forces.

Exercise COUNTER PUNCH (similar to Exercise STRIKE BACk) was held in Mar 1961 as a CPX/FTX to test the posture of the UN/USFK forces to defend Korea in case of resumed localized hostilities. (NOTE: This would evolve into the USFK's LENS Exericse and later joined with the ROK's Ulchi Focus Exercise to become Ulchi Focus-Lens.) Exercise Turn Back was conducted in Nov and affected all US/UN and ROK units down to the division level. Exercise Korea 61-II took place in Oct and Nov to practice the establishment of a combined Special Forces operating base to support guerilla and counter-guerilla operations.

The Status of Forces Agreement became a "hot potato" with the Commander US Forces Korea unwilling to discuss the matter, though the State Department stated that "in principle" it was committed to negotiations. After the coup, the State department wanted the situation to "return to normal" before starting negotiations. According to the 1961 CINCPAC Command History, pp 154-159:
In 1960, when the Republic of Korea raised the question of a Status of Forces Agreement, the US reluctant to discuss it. The question, including the matter of criminal jurisdiction over members of US Forces, came up again in March 1961. CINCPAC favored negotiations to establish formal agreement on matters of exit and entry, customs and taxation, but recommended against any action that would give the impression that the US was willing to discuss criminal jurisdiction. However, after a high level decision that the US should no longer refuse to negotiate full Status of Forces Agreement with the ROK, the US Ambassador to Korea informed the Korean Prime Minister that the US would open such negotiations. However, the Ambassador was told to warn the Koreans that the US would not pay for any facilities used by US Forces in Korea, and that the subject of criminal jurisdiction was a delicate matter on which no agreement could be reached unless there was assurance that US personnel would have rights comparable to those afforded in the US. In actual practic, the US would expect to exercise jurisdiction over most cases involving members of US Forces.

Several meetings -- the first on 17 April -- were held before all negotiations were broken off after the May military coup. These meetings were devoted to studying the overall issues and never reached the specific problems.

The US Ambassador to Korea asked the State Department for a copy of hte Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between the US and Japan to be used as a basis of the US negotiatitng position. CINCPAC askasked the JCS for an opportunity to comment on this draft agreement, and suggested that a study of Korean law might indicate that the more restrictive terms of the US draft Status of Forces Agreement for Taiwan would be a better basis than the agreement with Japan.

After reviewing a study of Korean Law made by Eight US Army Korea, CINCPAC advised the JCS that Korean justice and confinement systems were totally unacceptable by US standards. Pointing out that treaty provisions could not prevent bribery of judges, insulate Korean courts from susceptibility to mob pressures, or insure compliance with Korean constitution or statutes, CINCPAC claimed hat no arrangements which might be worked out would insure US personnel of adequate trials by US standards. Therefore, this fundamental condition for negotiating agreement on criminal jurisdiction set forth in the State Department decision could not be met.

On 5 May, the JCS asked for CINCPAC comments on a DOD proposed draft agreement covering the use of facilities and areas, one provision of which would make the Status of Forces Agreement inapplicable in a "defense area" contiguous to the DMZ. After obtaining the views of COMUS-K, CINCPAC told the JCS that because of the peculiar situation of US forces Korea, he favored the idea and thought such a "defense area" should include most of South Korea. Should a compromise on that point prove necessary, CINCPAC recommended that the "defense area" extend back to the rear corps boundary. Negotiations were broken off before this concept could be presented for consideration.

During July the Korean Foreign Office proposed that negotiations with the US be resumed. Although the US recognized the fact that it was committed to the principle of negotiation, the State Department considered that even preliminary talks would be premature until the governmental organization and legal system of the ROK had returned to normal. (Source: 1961 CINCPAC Command History, pp154-159)

Military Junta Seizes Power The plan to seize power was stated by the intelligence chief of the junta, Colonel Kim Chong Pil (later Premier and one of the three Kims in Korean politics) stated that the plan to effect the coup originated with nine officers, subseuently enlarged to twenty-four, who succeeded in winning the support of some 90 percent of the entire strength of the armed forces. The plan was first made before the May 1960 "student revolution," but when this occurred it was decided to give the regime of Dr. John Chang a chance. When it became evident that this Government was incompetent, two earlier dates were fixed for teh military coup, but it was twice postponed. The 7,000 troops taking part were mainly reserves, none being moved from thefront line. It ws claimed that competent US sources" had advance information about the coup but disbelieved it, and after the subsequent arrest of General Chang Do-yung, he was alleged to have confessed that he asked the UN Commander, Colonel Carter B. Magruder, to use American troops to suppress the revolution, deciding to participate in the coup only at the eleventh hour and at that, according to some reports, at gunpoint. (Source: The Republic of Korea, W.E. Reeve, 1963, pp148-149.)

In May 1961, a group of military officers carried out a coup and overthrew the ROK's Second Republic. Led by Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen Chang Do-yung, the junta seized power in a pre-dawn coup. Gen. Carter B. Magruder, Commander-in-Chief of UN and US forces in Korea, calls on all forces under his command to support the only recongized government of the ROK. On the morning of May 16, some 1,600 troops, spearheaded by the Marines, moved into Seoul and occupied strategic points after minor clashes at the Han River bridge. The revolutionary junta suspended the constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, forbade all political activities, imposed press censorship, and banned student demonstrations. (For a more detailed account of the coup, refer to The Republic of Korea, W.E. Reeve, 1963.)

The Park "spin-doctor" version read: "Military Revolution Committee: A group of Armed Forces officers led by Gen. Park Chung Hee staged a bloodless revolution at dawn on May 15, 1961, and overthrew the Democratic regime which had exposed its extreme inability. The revolutionary force, which declared its public pledges that the military was determined to save the nation from the imminent danger it faced and solve the livelihood of millions of people who were on the verge of starvation, assumed the legislative, judicial, and administrative powers for two years and seven months, while launching a drive to purify social discipline, reinforcing the nation's anti-Communist posture, and undertaking development programs for the national land which had long been left unattended due to the indifference and enervation of the successive regimes, thereby providing a turning point for the modernizattion of the fatherland. This committee was reorganized into the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction three days after the revolution or on May 18 and existed until the establishment of a civil government on Oct 15, 1963, as the highest ruling organ of the state. (Source: The Road to National Survival, The Maeil Kyungje Shinmun, 1977, p26)

Park Chung-hee. (Pyeongtaek City) (Source: Pyeongtaek History (CD), Pyeongtaek Si Sa)

On 23 May 1961, the militry junta rejected part of a draft agreement ot return Korean military forces to UN operational control. The UN Command, headed by US Gen. Magruder, demanded that the Korean troops pulled from combat units to take part in the coup be returned to their positions at once. Korean forces technically are under Gen. Magruder's authority, and the UN Command terms their withdrawal mutiny. On the same day, Premier Chang Do-yung, leader of the military regime, announced that he would leave immediately for Washington for talks with President Kennedy. the move was seen as a step to bypass the US Embassy in Seoul which opposed the coup d'etat. On 25 May a joint statement by the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) and the UNC returns operational control of ROK armed forces to CINCUNC who would use OPCON only to defend Korea from Communist agression.

On 14 Nov 1961 President Kennedy and Lt. Gen. Park Chung Hee, Chairman of the SCNR, who was visiting Washington at the invitation of President Kennedy, issued a joint communique following their discussions on the situation in Korea and the Far East. President Kennedy expresses satisfaction with the intention of the Korean government to restore civilian rule at the "earliest possible date" and the two leaders reiterate "their resolve to continue to serve the couse of freedom and democracy, and to strengthen the friendly ties between their two peoples." (Source: The US Military Experience in Korea 1871-1982, pp 109-112, Command Historian's Office, USFK/EUSA)

The failure of the attempts by both sides to unify the peninsula by force only deepened the division between North and South, making any contact with each other impossible. To make the situation even more complicated, another historical mistake was made by the North Korean leader, Kim Il-sung, in 1961. He misinterpreted the military coup by General Park Chung-hee and young officers in South Korea on May 16, 1961 as an attempt by the US and South Korea to invade North Korea. Within two weeks after the military coup in the South, Kim Il-sung rushed to Moscow and Beijing, and signed security treaties with these socialist countries. (NOTE: This was revealed in the confidential documents of the former East German government. East German intelligence reported to East Berlin that Kim Il-sung was overreacting to the domestic development in South Korea.) Consequently, these moves were viewed in South Korea and the US as an evidence of North Korean determination to invade and spread communism to the South by force.

Anthracite coal substituted for oil as part of the new energy policy. However, the coal mining industry could not keep up with the increasing demands for energy. From this point on, the circular charcoal became a standard fixture as part of Korean life.


World Events President Eisenhower left office in January 1961, warning of the threat of unwarranted influence by the military industrial complex. The Cold War continued under President Kennedy, with an unsuccessful invasion of Cuba, the "Bay of Pigs," and the East Germans constructing the Berlin Wall.


1962:


Congregation of the Shin Hung Presbyterian Church in Seomi-ri. Shin Hung Church is the oldest church in Songtan. (4 Aug 1962) (Songtan Shin Hung Kyohwi 40th Anniversary Edition (1952-1992))



Congregation of the Shin Hung Presbyterian Church. (4 Aug 1962) (Songtan Shin Hung Kyohwi 40th Anniversary Edition (1952-1992))





Songtan Central Presbyterian Church (1962) The Songtan Central Presbyterian Church (Songtan Jungang Kyohwi) was founded in 1962 on the present site at the top of Hobak Hill in the area known as Goo-chang-teo near the Kyongbu Railroad tracks.


The intercity bus terminal looking west. The MSR-1 runs left to right. (This area is now where the Kookmin Bank is.) Note on top of the hill on the far right is the area where the Songtan Central Presbyterian Church is located. (1971) (Edward Caler)


In the photo above, we believe the building on the top right is the Songtan Central Presbyterian Church. The photo is of the bus depot located where the present Kookmin bank is located. The MSR-1 runs from left to right with Pyeongtaek to the left and Osan-ni to the right. The photo looks west towards the Hobak Hill area were the Songtan Central is located at the top of the hill next to the railroad tracks at the base of the hill. To the right just outside the photo is the road to the old Mokchon crossing that is now closed.

In 1984, a new church was built on the site with the congregration services below and the Pastor's office on the second floor. Across the small parking lot are the church kitchen facilities with a day-care center above. As of 2006, the Pastor was Rev. Choi Byung-nam who resided with his family on the grounds. There are approximately 300 in the congregation (not including children) as of 2006.


Songtan Central Presbyterian Church (Sep 2006) (Kalani O'Sullivan)



Daycare Center (Sep 2006) (Kalani O'Sullivan)






Songbuk Elementary School (1962) (Songbuk Elementary School)


Education On 6 Jan 1962 the Songtan Godung Gomin Hakkyo (church school) (established on 11 Nov 1955) merged with the Songwang hagwon (academy). The Songwang hagwon (academy) then merged with the Songwang Middle School on 17 Mar 1962. At the time, this was set up in military tents alongside the Songshin Elementary School which was formally established on 1 Jan 1963.

(SITE NOTE: This would later become the Taegwang Middle School. The roots of the Taegwang Middle School are traced to the Kwangmyeong Gongmin Hakkyo (church school) that was established in 1953. We haven't established the location, but Taegwang Middle School authorities state it was in the same area as the Taegwang Middle School today -- probably near the high ground near the Songwang Church (Onnori Church) in Shinjang 2-dong as the remainder was still rice fields. Most likely it was set up in tents donated by the American military as building materials were scarce. On 12 Mar 1968, the Taegwang hagwon changed to the Taegwang Middle School and supplanted the Songwang Middle School with permanent structures next to the Songshin Elementary School.)



Life on Osan AB Ron Bound of Papillion, NE wrote in Nov 2005, "... Brought back lots of memories of my tour at Osan in '62 - '63. There was an orphanage out the 'back' gate at Osan. We used to go out there and make bricks and helped build new building." In the early 1960s, the common construction material for the farmers and poor was mud bricks to build mud-wattle houses with rice thatch roofs. We also have photos of an orphanage off-base taken by Dan Klopten in 1959. Our search continues. (SITE NOTE: See 1963: "Orphanage Off-base." As of 2006, we have not been able to locate this orphanage nor do any of the longtime residents we have interviewed remember such an orphanage. However, we have photos of this orphanage.

Jim Collyer of Boston, MA wrote in Nov 2005, "Was in korea at Osan stationed with the 2184th Comm Group from 1964-1965. Did a lot of work at the Garden of Children Orphanage." However, the Garden of Children Orphanage was located in Pyeongtaek in 1970 -- not immediately off the base. This suggests that the orphanage had moved.



Convair F-102A Delta Dagger: 68th Fighter Squadron, Itazuke, Japan (1962) (Courtesy Frank Foulke)


Frank Foulke and Jim Adle, TDY Osan AB (1962) (Courtesy Frank Foulke)

In 1961, the 8th TFW received the F-102 Delta "Dagger" which it flew until 1964 along with the F-100s. The F-102 was flown by the 68th Fighter Interceptor Squadron of Itazuke AB, Japan from 1957 to 1965 after which the unit transitioned to the F-4C in 1965. Frank Foulke was a MG-10 Weapons Specialist.



Matador Missile (Early 1960s)

310th TAC Missile Squadron The 310th TAC Missile Squadron (TMS) handled the Matador Missiles in 1962. The following is from Doug Lewis' Pictorial:

A little explanation is in order if you weren't in Korea around 1960-62. Osan was about 10 minutes south of the DMZ via Mig-19. It took 15 minutes to do an alert countdown by the book so technically we were dead 5 minutes before we got the first bird off the pad. So, you have to improvise. The crews got so good and knew there birds so well that from a no power situation, they could have the first one off in 45 seconds!! That included starting up the 60kw generator which had the throttle preset to the proper speed and the overspeed switch tied down (to keep it from overspeeding on startup). I was on a maintenance crew so I didn't go out on A diamond very often.


Crushing Matador at Osan AB (1962) (Doug Lewis)


Tearing Down Matador at Osan (March 1962) (Doug Lewis)


Tearing Down Matador at Osan (March 1962) (Doug Lewis)

(Source: Photos of Doug Lewis at Osan Retired Activities Office)


Assault by American K-9 Handler According to the Pyeongtaek History, an American K-9 handler in Jang-ri on 3 May 1962 set his K-9 on a female farmer, Shin Dok-san who he claimed was attempting to steal something. Allegations that he then assaulted her with a knife requiring her hospitalization. Outcome of this incident unknown. (Source: Pyeongtaek City History CD, "Pyeongtaek Si Sa.")

Military Junta Eliminated: Park Chung-hee Elected PresidentIn 1962, Park Chung Hee attempted to extend the military junta for four more years. However, the direct opposition of the move by John F. Kennedy caused Park to back down. On Feb 21, Chariman Park Chung-hee announced return of power to civilian government in 1963. On July 27, he announced that the transfer of government to the civilians would be made within the year. At the same time, he made it clear that he would retire from active military duty and run for the office of president in the forthcoming election. In the election 84.9 percent of the 13 million eligible voters elected Park Chung Hee as president. (Source: Park Chung-Hee History))

ROK Development 1 Jan 1962, the Chistian Era Calendar formally replaces the Tangun-era calendar.

Ulsan Area designated as special industrial area (development plan announced February 1). Ground breaking on 3 Feb 1962.

On 6 Dec 1962 martial law is rescinded.




Cumulative Costs to US in Assistance and Supplies As of 1 Jan 1962, the US government had provided Korea with foreign assistance amounting to $4.62 billion since the end of hostilities in WWII. This help included $3.056 billion for economic and technical assistance and $1.564 billion for military supplies and services. (These figures do not include the costs to the US of maintaining its own military forces in Korea either during the post war occupation period or during the period of UN action and involvement.) (Source: The US Military Experience in Korea 1871-1982, p112, Command Historian's Office, USFK/EUSA)


Korea Military Situation In the past, the major expenditures for PACOM under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) was to Korea. However, in 1962, the major expenditures went to the Republic of China due to growing tensions in South East Asia. The revised MAP program strengthened the Republic of Vietnam and Thailand, but seriously impaired the program for Korea, and especially crippled the programs for China, the Philippines and Japan.

The revised program contained practically no force improvement and had grave implications for the US and UN defense posture in PACOM. No provision was made for the GPA-57 radar, which was desparately needed for air defense. Overall, there was a $12 million cut in MAP aid to the ROK.

The issue of the War Reserve Supply Ammunition -- Korea (WRSA-K) was surfaced and Korea, China, Republic of Vietnam and Thailand were set to the following level: Army smal arms -- 90 days; Other Army ammunition -- 60 days; Navy and Air Force ammunition -- 60 days. For Korea the predominant factors were the size of the North Korean threat, the common border between North and South Korea and the time required because of the long supply lines. (SITE NOTE: The WRSA-K was eliminated for Korea in 2004, but the ROK did not react to support its own WRSA-K requirements -- hoping that the US would somehow continue to supply them their ammunitions at cut-rate costs. In 2007, there were negotiations still ongoing, but the ROK had only 10 days of ammunition if a real shooting-war broke out.)

SAM for Korea had the FY62-67 MA Plan for Korea provided for one HAWK battalion in FY 63, one in FY64, and one in FY67. It also provided for one NIKE Battalion in FY63, and one in FY66. This program was delayed until the DOD authorized the release of classified information to the ROKA. In Nov 1961, the OSD authorized the release of HAWK system classified information and in May 1962, the US and ROK government signed an agreement on the security of information -- thus enabling CINCPAC to release secret NIKE and HAWK material to the ROK. It was discussed whether US military should man the two Nike battalions in the ROK, however, the JCS recommended that the US NOT assume responsibility for the SAM in Korea planned under the MAP.

The F-5A was scheduled for introduction into Korea in place of the previously programmed F-104G. However, The ROK claimed their capabilities would be degraded by substituting the F-5As for the F-104Gs and CINCPAC recommended reinstating the F-104Gs. But OSD overruled this and stated that decision was firm and that the F-5As were programmed for Korea in place of the F-104Gs. (NOTE: This was a wise decision -- and the F-5Es are still flying in Korea.)

During 1962, US/ROK forces conducted seven combined exercises, three were command post exercises (CPX), three were fied training exercises (FTX), and one was an amphibious type.

The Status of Forces Agreement became a "hot potato" with the Commander US Forces Korea unwilling to discuss the matter, though the State Department stated that "in principle" it was committed to negotiations. After the coup, the State department wanted the situation to "return to normal" before starting negotiations. According to the 1962 CINCPAC Command History, pp 138-139:
When the Republic of Korea in 1960 reaised the question of a Status of Forces Agreement, the US at first avoided the issue but later relented, agreeing to negotiate certain matters, but specifically excluding payments for property claims and the delicate subject of criminal jurisdiction. Negotiations were interrupted by the 16 May 1961 military coup and threafter the US, although recongizing an obligation to negotiate, refused to participate in discussions until the ROK government returned to normal.

The ROK government announced early in 1962 its desire to resume negotiations. CINCPAC again advised the JCS that he opposed any agreement that would permit the ROKG to exercise criminal jurisdiction over US personnel. In March the ROKG indicated it was ready to discuss customs, taxation and other matters upon which agreement could be reached more easily than upon the criminal jurisdiction and property questions. The American Ambassador to Seoul suggested working level talks on these minor matters, commencing toward the end of Mar. On 12 May, however, COMUSK recommended that a US position, fully coordinated btween the State and Defense Departments be determined prior to any discussions with the ROK. In agreement with CINCPAC recommendations. COMUS-Korea opposed any negotiations on the issue of criminal jurisdiction or payment of property claims.

Meanwhile, the US Ambassador advised the ROK government that the US was prepared to negotiation all matters except those of criminal jurisdiction and property claims -- restrictions to which the ROK Foreign Minister objected. In a counter proposal, the ROK government offered to agree informally that negotiations begin with less complex problems, delaying the more delicate discussions until 1963. Having a choice between refusing to reopen negotiations or accepting the ROK offer, the US Ambassador to Seoul on 12 June recommended to the State Department that the US agree to resumption of SOFA negotiations, including the subject of criminal jurisdiction, with the understanding that an agreement would not be concluded until the ROK returned to an constitutional government and judicial procedures, and until it guaranteed that US personnel would be protected by justice and confinement systems comparable to US standards. State Department authorization was given two days later and, on 15 June, the US Ambassador informed the ROK Foreign Minister of the conditions under which the US was willing to begin negotiations at the working level.

US and Korean teams negotiating the Korean SOFA held nine working level meetings between 20 September and the end of 1962. During the last four of these meetings the two sides reached agreement on several of the less controversial articles of the draft agreements. (Source: 1962 CINCPAC Command History, pp138-139)

Cuban Missile Crisis Between October 16-29, 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis pushes the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war. It was described in Robert Kennedy's insider account, Thirteen Days, which ended in Premier Khruschev agreeing to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba.


1963:

Songtan Area Rises to Songtan-myeon January 1, 1963: Songtan-myeon (district) was raised to the status of Songtan-eup (town), Pyeongtaek-gun (county) by Law No. 1117 (Promulgated on November 21, 1962) This meant that a rural area of Kyonggi-do (Province) but was elevated to a main town. It was at this point, that Chicol Village ceased to exist and the name "Songtan" officially replaced it.

Sadly, this was only an administrative change and conditions did not improve much except for a minor improvement in educational facilities. Even sadder, one can see that the mechanics were in the works to create the legalized "kijich'on" (camptown) system. In June 1962, by joint action, the Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Social Welfare and related agencies established 104 "special districts" of prostitution. In this way, the American "camptowns" could be classified as "special tourism zones" which were off-limits to Koreans. At the same time, the red-light districts were off-limits to the Americans. The cultures were separated in the chase for the almighty dollar. At the time, the major source of foreign currency exchange for Korea came from the American soldiers spending their paychecks downtown. During this time, the prostitutes of Korea were praised by the Park Chung-hee regime for their actions to bring in much needed foreign exchange.

(NOTE: From smallest to largest elements of population centers: (1) A "chakun maul" is a farm hamlet; (2) a "chollak" is a rural hamlet; (3) a "ri" is a small administrative area within a town; (4) a "dong" is a village within a city's limits or an administrative district within a city (I-hwa dong). The "dong" is further subdivided into a "ga" on large districts (Yongsan-dong 5 ga); (5) a "myeon" is a sub-county (or a administrative subdivision of a "gun") (Seodan-myeon); (6) an "eup" is an administrative town (Songtan-eup); (7) a "gu" is a ward or borough administrative district within a city (Yongsan-gu); (8) "gun" is a county (Okku-gun) which may be larger in area, but smaller in population than a "shi" (city) (9) a "shi" is a city (Pyongtaek-shi).) (10) a "do" is a province (Kyonggi-do).

Do ("Province") A "Do" is one of the primary divisions of the country, along with "Teukbyeolsi" and "Gwangyeoksi." South Korea has 9 provinces: North and South Chungcheong, Gangwon, Gyeonggi, North and South Gyeongsang, Jeju, and North and South Jeolla. Each province is subdivided into cities ("Si") and counties ("Gun").

Si ("City") A "Si" is one of the divisions of a province, along with "Gun." Cities have a population of at least 50,000; once a county ("Gun") attains that population, it becomes a city. Cities with a population of over 500,000 (namely, Suwon, Cheongju, and Jeonju) are divided into wards ("Gu"); smaller cities are divided into neighbourhoods ("Dong").

Gun ("County") A "Gun" is one of the divisions of a province (along with "Si"), and of the metropolitan cities of Busan, Daegu, Incheon and Ulsan (along with "Gu"). A "Gun" has a population less than 50,000 (which would make it a city or "Si"), and is less densely populated than a "Gu," and is more rural in character than either of the other 2 divisions. Counties are divided into towns ("Eup") and districts ("Myeon").

Gu ("Ward") A "Gu" is the only division of Seoul, the metropolitan cities of Gwangju and Daejeon, and the cities of Suwon, Cheongju, and Jeonju; and one of the divisions of the metropolitan cities of Busan, Daegu, Incheon, and Ulsan. A "Gu" is similar to a borough in London or New York, and its government handles many of the functions that are handled by city governments in other jurisdictions. "Gu"s in Suwon, Cheongju, and Jeonju have fewer powers than those of Seoul and the metropolitan cities. "Gu"s are divided into neighbourhoods ("Dong").

Eup ("Town") An "Eup" is one of the divisions—along with "Myeon"—of a county ("Gun") and some cities ("Si") of less than 500,000 population. The main town or towns in a county—or the secondary town or towns within a city's territory—are designated as "Eup." Towns are subdivided into villages ("Ri").

Myeon ("District") A "Myeon" is one of the divisions—along with "Eup"—of a county ("Gun") and some cities ("Si") of less than 500,000 population. "Myeon"s have smaller populations than "Eup"s and represent the rural areas of a county or city. Myeons are subdivided into villages ("Ri").

Dong ("Neighbourhood") A "Dong" is the only division of wards ("Gu") and cities ("Si") that are not divided into wards. The "dong" is the smallest level of urban government to have its own office and staff, and typically encompasses only a few city blocks. Some populous "dong"s are subdivided into "Ga"s (?; ?), which are not a separate level of government, but only exist for use in addresses. (Many major thoroughfares in Seoul, Suwon, and other cities are also subdivided into "Ga"s.)

Ri ("Village") A "Ri" is the only division of towns ("Eup") and districts ("Myeon"). The "ri" is the smallest level of rural government to contain any significant number of people.

(See Administrative Divisions of Korea.))
Education On the positive side, there were increases in the amounts of middle schools for children in the area. In the Songtan area, the increase in population was also reflected in the change in status to Songtan City (eup).

The Songtan Girls Middle School was established in 1963 -- and later the attached Songtan Girls High School was formed.

The Songshin Elementary School (Kungmin Hagkyo) was established on 1 Jan 1963. On 28 Feb 1963, it received its first principal. On 16 Jun 1963, the school was established with 6 grades. (NOTE: By 1979, it had 63 classes as the population exploded. However, this influx of students was from the Miracle of the Han that moved factories and people into the area from the overcrowded Seoul area. However, by 2005 falling populations in the agricultural areas have caused rural school closures in the surrounding areas and the student population was split away to other under-utilized schools. In 2005, the classes had dropped to 24 classes.) Alongside the Songshin Elementary School in 1963 was the Songwang Middle School in tents. At that time, much of the surrounding area was still rice fields and had not been reclaimed. This would later be supplanted by the Taegwang Middle School in the same area after the rice fields were reclaimed. (NOTE See "1953: Education" for Taegwang Middle School history.)

The structures in the rural schools were normally two story concrete structures with a long open hallway leading into classrooms on each floor. The school conditions were primitive and the shortage of education materials was still a problem. Though things were improving educationally, the large percentage of the rural children were still not afforded the opportunity of a middle school education simply because of the lack of schools. In some rural areas, there were boarding facilities for those students who lived too far away.

In 1950, there were over 2,839 elementary schools, but by 1960 there were 2496. In 1950, there were 166 middle schools in the country, but by 1960 there were 1,053. By using two-year teaching degreed teachers for elementary schools, the numbers of elementary school teachers increased from 19,729 in 1950 to 61,605 teachers in 1960. In 1962, normal high schools were upgraded to two-year teachers colleges where elementary school teachers were trained. In the same year, institutions training secondary school teachers were upgraded to four-year colleges of education. In 1945 there were 1,186 middle school teachers but by 1960 there were 13,053. (Source: Ministry of Education: 1945-1950.)

The completion of the six-year compulsory education plan enabled all relevant age group children to enroll in schools, and the number of secondary school students tripled compared with that of previous years. With the trend toward the universalization of secondary education, the higher education population increased more rapidly than that of any other level of education. Such a rapid growth of school population inevitably resulted in over- crowded classrooms, oversized schools, a shortage of fully qualified teachers and educational facilities, and excessive competition in the college entrance exam. (Source: Ministry of Education: 1960s.)


Milwal-dong Area In 1963, the area was sparsely populated and there was still not many homes in the area. The lower areas that comprise the present day Shinjang 2-dong area were still rice fields. Later the rice fields would be reclaimed to form Songshin Elementary School in 1965 -- and later the other rice field would be reclaimed to make the Taegwang Middle School. Photos in 1965 showed that there was only the Jaeil Church on the hill and only few houses near the Hill 180 perimeter fence, but the base of Milwal-dong (Shinjang 2-dong) was filled with houses.

Marshall Parker stated, "The best I remember there were just two gates being used in 1964--1964. There was just a guard shack at the gate on hill-180. (NOTE: The main gate is the other gate.) And there were two Quonset Huts on top of 180 were the women that worked on the base stayed. ... I do rememb