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HOW IT WAS!

Eagle

KUNSAN AIR BASE

3RD BOMB WING

(1919-1950: WWII)
(1951-1954: Korean War)
(1954-Present)

3rdBG

Page 1 of 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

America

KUNSAN AIR BASE:

dot Kunsan Aerodrome (1938-1945)
dot Camp Hillenmeyer (1945-1949)
dot Kunsan Aerodrome (1949-1951)
dot Kunsan Airbase (1951-1954)

dot Kunsan Airbase (1954-1974)
dot Kunsan Airbase (1974-Present)

MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS:

dot Douglas B-26 Invader Specifications -- The A-26 was redesignated the B-26 after the B-26 Marauders were taken out of service.
dot Republic F-84 Thunderjet Specifications -- The F84D was the first of the series to see action in Korea.
dot Vought F-4U-5NL Night Corsair Specifications - Night fighter variant of the famous Corsair
dot Grumman F7F-3N Tigercat Specifications - Fast powerful prop fighter that entered just as the jet age began
dot Douglas F3D-2/F-10B Skynight Specifications - Fighter that made the first night jet aircraft kill
dot McDonnell Douglas F-4D Phantom II Specifications
dot General Dynamics F-16C Falcon Specifications
dot Time Line of Korean War -- Tanner Publication Co.

RELATED PAGES:

dot Camp Hillenmeyer & Kunsan City (1947)
dot Korean War Reference

dot Welcome Brochure for King Eight (K8) (1954) -- A comparison of 1954 and Now
dot Welcome to Kunsan City -- Facts of the city and a Pictorial History from 1947-Present
dot POW/MIA in Korea -- Current articles and links to POW/MIA issues

POW/MIA
POW/MIA Honour Plaque
Tibbo's POW/MIA Honour Page (N/A)
106 Field Battery RAA Assoc.
Peter of Queensland, Australia

POW/MIA
Burt's Patriot Award
Burt's Place (N/A)

Some of the awards this site has received. To view our awards, go to Awards.

8th Attack Sqdn Assoc. hat and Award


Kalani O'Sullivan (2000)

However, the biggest award I've received was the honorary membership bestowed on me in May 2000 by the 8th Attack Squadron Association. The citation read "8th Attack Squadron Association, Adrian Kalani O'Sullivan is an honorary member of the 8th Attack Squadron Association in recognition of his superb contributions to the history of Kunsan Air Base and the 8th Bomb Squadron. San Antonio, Texas 13 May 2000 -- Hans J. Petermann, Lt.Col, USAF (Ret) Treasurer -- David D. Bradburn, Maj Gen, USAF (Ret), President" This was truly a great honor indeed. Mahalo nui loa!!!

Kalani O'Sullivan, Kunsan City, Korea

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HOW IT WAS:
KUNSAN AIR BASE
(1951-1954)

Acknowledgment: Many thanks to Mr. Marv G. Weidner of Narrows, Virginia for providing much of the following information. In addition, grateful thanks to Mr. Lou Segaloff of Tucson, Arizona and the 3rd Bomb Group (L-NI) Homepage for photo links and information. (The early history was excerpted almost verbatim from the 3rd Bomb Group Homepage.) Thank you to the 13th Bombardment Squadron (L-NI) Homepage for allowing the use of their photos on this page. Thanks to Mr. Walter Campbell of Brewer, Maine for permission to use his photos from the Unofficial Homepage of the 13th Bomb Squadron Association. Also thanks to Hans Peterman of San Diego for his technical notes on the B-26 and narratives on the 8th Bomb Squadron. Thanks to Jack Boyer of Santa Clarita, California for his photos. In addition, we are grateful to the late Mr. Jack Barclay of Bohemia, New York for his invaluable reference materials. (Godspeed, Jack.) Finally, we are grateful for information from the 3rd Wing site whose detailed history of the unit cannot be equalled.

3rd Bombardment Wing:

5af3rdBG

Click on the 5th AF or 3rd BW image to enlarge

The 3rd Bombardment Wing (the 3rd Fighter Wing activated in 1964 and the 3rd Bombardment Group deactivated in 1965) and its component squadrons are among the oldest in the United States Air Force having seen action in the Mexican War, World War I, World War II, the Korean Conflict, and Vietnam. If one looks at its heraldry in the 3rd Wing Emblem above, there is a blue stripe, cactus and Maltese crosses. These represent the earliest missions performed by the wing's predecessors. The blue stripe represents the Rio Grande River. The cactus represents the desert over which the squadrons patrolled. The Maltese crosses represent the enemy aircraft brought down by the squadrons in World War I. ("Per bend Vert and Sable a bend Azure fimbriated Or in sinister chief a prickly pear cactus of the like, all within a bordure Argent semi of nineteen crosses patee Black and fimbriated Yellow.")

Motto: NON SOLUM ARMIS -- Not by Arms Alone. Approved for 3d Group on 17 Jan 1922 and for 3d Wing on 22 Dec 1952 (KE 6707).

Nickname: "Grim Reapers". Adopted from the 13th Bombardment Squadron -- "The Devil's Own Grim Reapers". Adopted in World War II and used in news articles in the Korean War. Lou Segaloff of Tucson, Arizona wrote, "Actually, from the mid 1930' until the end of WWII, the whole 3rd Group called themselves "The Grim Reapers" and used a modified version of the 13th emblem on the noses of the planes."

The 3rd Wing has a long and distinguished career. From the 3rd Wing History (1999), "...it remains the only wing level organization which can claim to have served every moment. Indeed, the 3rd Wing, in one form or another, has served the United States on a continuing basis since its activation as the U.S. Army Surveillance Group on 1 July 1919--almost 78 years. Including squadrons active in World War I (the 19th and 90th Fighter Squadrons) the wing and its organizations have participated in virtually every major U. S. conflict of the 20th century. The U. S. Army Air Service emerged from World War I with three distinct missions, pursuit, bomber, and attack/observation. These organizations became today's 1st Fighter Wing, 2nd Bomb Wing, and 3rd Wing." (NOTE: There is some confusion about whether the wing was deactivated in 1964 or not. Some claim it was deactivated after 46 years of continuous service -- and reborn in 1970 as the 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing with all honors intact. However, the truth is that the 3rd Bomb Group was deactivated and all its honors bestowed on the 3rd Bomb Wing. The 3rd Bomb Wing was never deactivated. Though the Wing has not been in existence as long as the Group, it can claim lineage.)

Formation of the Army Surveillance Group

All squadrons of this group were established in mid-1917 by the United States Army and designated as numbered "Aero Squadrons." During World War I, the individual squadrons which eventually became the 3rd Bomb Group were assigned to various Army Corps in France, primarily as observation units. (See the individual squadron's histories for this period.) However, the 104th Aero Observation Squadron (13th Squadron) was briefly assigned to the 2nd Pursuit Group at the end of the war, an assignment which accounts for most of the iron crosses in the insignia of the 3rd Bomb Group.

After World War I, the U. S. Army reorganized. The impact on the fledgling Air Service was slight. However, on 1 July 1919, the 8th, 12th, 90th, and 104th Aero (Observation) Squadrons were brought together and formed into the Army Surveillance Group, later renamed the 1st Surveillance Group, at Kelly Field, Texas. The newly designated group was given the mission of patrolling America's coasts and borders. The 1st Surveillance was quickly moved to Fort Bliss, Texas, for training.

1st Surveillance Group

Three months later, they were assigned to patrol the Mexican border from Brownsville, Texas, to Nogales, Arizona. After many months of patrol in DH-4 aircraft, often at very low levels, no border incidents had been observed. General Billy Mitchell halted the border operation as useless and had the group returned to Kelly Field.

deHavilland DH-4
(National Aeronautical & Space Museum)

Mitchell decided that the group was the one best qualified to test his concept of low-level bombing and strafing attacks in support of ground forces. The 1st Surveillance Group was renamed the 3rd Attack Group, reorganized, and re-equipped with the new B-15 (a specially designed version of the old DH-4).

The 104th Squadron was redesignated as the 13th Squadron. The 12th Squadron was replaced by the 26th Squadron.

3rd Attack Group (1922)

The 3rd Attack Group insignia was formally approved by the Army in the spring of 1922. Shortly thereafter, on September 4, 1922, Lt. Jimmy Doolittle, a member of the 90th Squadron, became the first person to cross the United States in a single day when he flew from Pablo Beach, Florida, to San Diego, California, in just 22 hours.



Lt Jimmy Doolittle with 90th Fighter Squadron
Click on photo to enlarge.

Others members of the 3rd Attack Group who later achieved some measure of fame included Lewis Brereton, Earl Patridge, Hoyt Vandenberg, Howard Hickam, and James "Big Jim" Davies.

Aircraft utilized by the 3rd during the 1920s and 1930s included the DH-4, B-15, Curtis 0-1 Falcons, Curtis A-3B Falcons, Curtis A-8 Shrikes, Curtis A-12 Shrikes, Northrop A-17 and A-17A, and twin-engined Curtis A-18's.

Curtis A-12 Shrikes
(3rd Wing photo)
(Click to Enlarge)

Northrop A-17A
(3rd Wing photo)
(Click to Enlarge)

B-18 Bolo Bomber
This aircraft never saw action in World War II

The 13th and 26th Squadrons were deactivated in 1924 because of a shortage of funds and aircraft. The remaining squadrons were utilized for flood relief missions in Texas and morale suffered severely.

In 1926, the units received new planes and resumed combat training. Three years later, the 13th was reactivated and the group was again assigned to patrolling the Mexican border to watch for expected revolutionary activity. When the patrolling again proved unproductive, the group returned to Fort Crockett, Texas, and combat training.

Top: Curtis A3B Falcon of the 3rd Attack Group during Army Air Corps Manuevers in 1930 at McClellan Airfield, CA.
Middle: 13th Attack Squadron from Ft. Cockett, TX during AAC Manuevers.
Bottom: A3B Falcon of the 13th Attack Sqdn.
(Courtesy of Tom Hegre)
Click on image to enlarge

In 1930, the entire group informally adopted the name and insignia of the 13th Squadron and became known as the Grim Reapers. At about the same time, tail colors were adopted to distinguish the aircraft of the various squadrons - yellow for the 8th, white for the 13th, and red for the 90th - which were carried through World War II. The colors for the 13th and 90th Squadrons became reversed during the Korean War.

3rd Attack Group (1922)

3rd Attack Group (1922)

The 1930s saw the 3rd engaged in delivering the air mail in the Central District. Two group members were killed on the route between Salt Lake City, Utah, and Cheyenne, Wyoming.

A-20 Havoc


Late in 1940, the group moved to Hunter Field, Georgia, and received the Douglas A-20 Havoc. They sharpened their low-level skills with practice utilizing off-shore shipping as mock targets. In August of 1941, the 89th Squadron joined the group, which was then redesignated as the 3rd Bomb Group (Light).

As the first organized attack group to form within the Army Air Service, the 3rd Attack Group was instrumental in developing close air support doctrine in the inter-war period. The group pioneered dive bombing, skip-bombing, and parafrag attacks in the 1920s--the earliest forms of precision guided attack from aircraft--and put this work to good use in World War II. Notable alumni include the immortal Hoyt Vandenberg, Jimmy Doolittle, Lewis Brereton, Richard Ellis, John "Jock" Henebry, Paul I. "Pappy" Gunn, and Nathan Twining.

3rd Bomb Group (Light) in World War II

In the confusion following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the 3rd Bomb Group was stripped of all its planes and all officers above the rank of First Lieutenant - they were needed for training other units, it was said. Finally, in January of 1942, the group received orders to proceed to Australia under the command of 1st Lt. Bob Strickland. They were told that new A-20s would be waiting for them when they arrived. It turned out not to be true. Several months of pure frustration followed while the group tried to secure the promised aircraft.

A-24B Dauntless

The 27th Bomb Group had arrived in the Philippines in November 1941, without aircraft. They had been evacuated to Dutch East Indies, where they had managed to secure Douglas A-24 Dauntless dive bombers. As the war progressed to the Indies, the 27th had been overwhelmed by the superior Japanese forces and been forced back to Australia with their remaining A-24's. On arrival, the survivors of the 27th Group were assigned to the 3rd Bomb Group and their commander, Lt. Col. John "Big Jim" Davies, became the new commander of the 3rd.

A-24 Dauntless
(Click to Enlarge)
A-24B Dauntless
(Click to Enlarge)


Group personnel discovered that B-25 aircraft had been sent to Australia and were temporarily being stored in Melbourne for the virtually non-existent Dutch Air Force, which had no pilots in the area. In a daring and unorthodox foray, 3rd Group personnel "requisitioned" twenty-four B-25 aircraft and made them the backbone of the American air effort in New Guinea and South East Asia for the remainder of World War II.

B-25 Strafer


B-25 Mitchell Bomber

The group forged a peerless record in World War II, and emerged the most highly decorated unit in the Pacific Theater. Under the inspired engineering improvisations of Maj Paul "Pappy" Gunn, the 3rd Group converted conventional medium bombers into fearsome, deck-level commerce raiders that struck terror wherever the group appeared in combat. In attacks on Japanese freighters and troop transports in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, 3-4 March 1943, the 3rd Attack Group's aircraft scored one of the most decisive aerial victories of all time sinking at least 12 Japanese ships on the way to relieve beleaguered New Guinea garrisons.

90th Sqdn Fliers who participated in the Battle of the Bismark Sea


From that time forward, the 3rd Attack Group has never ceded air supremacy in its operations. The 3rd Bomb Group (Light) utilized their B-25s and their A-24's, as well as later A-20's and A-26's, to compile a combat record second to none. In 41 months of combat, the Grim Reapers of the 3rd Bomb Group sank 642 ships, destroyed more than 2,000 planes, destroyed 200,000 tons of supplies and 1,500 buildings, and killed an estimated 40,000 Japanese troops. They were awarded three Distinguished Unit Citations, one Presidential Unit Citation, and the Philippine Presidential Citation.

These honors cost the 3rd 1,634 men killed in action, 28 who died of disease, and 2,500 personnel who were wounded. The group lost 174 aircraft. The selfless valor of Maj Raymond H. Wilkins earned him a posthumous Medal of Honor.

B-25 Strafer Attack


By September 1945, the 3rd Bomb Group was a part of the American Occupation Force in Japan. They were in place and ready when the North Koreans launched their invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950.

3rd Bombardment Wing (Light Attack) in the Korean War

According to the 3rd Wing site, "The majority of the Douglas Invader models that the 3rd Bombardment Wing flew were manufactured in 1944. A few aircraft were 1943 vintage. Originally built as A-26s to replace the Douglas A-20s in the daylight ground attack role, its designation was changed to bomber after World War II. The B-26B flown in Korea and generally referred to as a "hard nose," was generally equipped with 12 forward firing 50-caliber machine guns. They were configured either six to eight in the nose and two to three in each wing. A gunner operated the remotely controlled top and bottom turrets, each equipped with two 50-caliber machine guns. The pilot could also lock the top turret in the forward firing mode. The B-26B carried ordnance internally in bomb bays and externally on wing racks. With the capability of firing 10,000 rounds a minute, the B-26B proved awesome in the strafing role. It accommodated a crew of three, pilot and navigator who sat beside each other in the cockpit and gunner who sat in the rear of the bomber. The B-26C, also referred to as "glass nose," was generally equipped with four to six 50-caliber machine guns mounted in the wings and four others mounted in the two turrets. It also carried ordnance internally and externally. While the B-26B was designed for low-level attack, the B-26C was primarily a medium altitude bomber. The bombardier and bombsight were located in the nose. A jump seat behind the pilot and navigator's position in both provided another cockpit position that could be used to accommodate an observer or crewmember needing familiarization training. Neither the "B" nor "C" models were pressurized or equipped with internal oxygen and heater systems since they had been designed for low and medium altitude operations. In addition, both provided limited room for the crew and were difficult to bail out of, especially from the gunner's position. (Frederick A. Johnson, Douglas A-26 Invader, Specialty Press, North Branch, MN, 1999; Warren Thompson, B-26 Invader Units Over Korea, Osprey Aviation, Oxford, England, 2000.)"

After the 3rd Bombardment Group took up Occupation duties at Yokota AB, Japan. It trained as a bombardment and reconnaissance wing prior to Korean war. "After the formal independence of the United States Air Force, 18 September, 1947, groups were realigned into a new wing structure; the 3rd Attack Group became the 3rd Bombardment Wing (Light, Attack). The 3d Bombardment Wing, Light, was established on 10 Aug 1948 and activated on 18 Aug 1948.

According to the 3rd Wing site, "Because of a reduction in force and the shortage of aircraft, the wing was forced to inactivate the 90th Bombardment Squadron on 1 October 1949, and redistributed its assets between the other two squadrons. Navigators and bombardiers remained a critical shortage. There were one navigator and five bombardiers assigned to the 8th Bombardment Squadron and three navigators and three bombardiers to the 13th Bombardment Squadron. The average sortie ratio for bombardiers and navigators was typically three to one compared to other flight personnel. Because of the shortage, aircrews flying the initial missions often consisted of only the pilot and his enlisted gunner. Unfortunately, gunners were also manned at critically low levels and personnel with that specialty had to be pulled from other jobs and returned to gunnery duty. To overcome the shortage of bombardiers and navigators, the 3rd Bombardment Wing used observers who had some experience in the two skills. (Hist, 3BG, May-Jun 50, Ch 4, p. 2.)"

The Chaos after the Initial Attack: On 27 June 1950, the 8th was called on to aid in the Korean police action from their TDY location at Ashiya, Japan. Their home base was Johnson AB, Japan and initially they had 26 B-26s assigned with 18 combat-ready. The first combat mission of the 3rd Bomb Group was flown by the 8th on June 27, 1950 against the rail yards at Munsan. The first losses were due to adverse weather conditions rather than to enemy action. On the 28th of June, the 3rd Bomb Wing had recorded the first Korean war combat casualties, a crew from the 13th Bomb Squadron was killed when their B-26 crashed on landing at Ashiya, Japan. Lost were lLt Remer Harding, and SSgt William J. Goodwin. On the same day, the 8th lost two men south of Seoul, lLt Raymond J. Cyborski and SSgt Jose C. Campos. In addition, 1Lt Vernon A. Lindvig and 1Lt Derrell B. Sayre of the 339th Fighter Squadron (All Weather) from Yokota AB, Japan were lost flying cover for the evacuation of Korea. These six men were the first casualties of the Korean Conflict. The 7th Air Force erected a stone monument outside the Osan AB Chapel in their honor in June 2000.


Ceremonies at Monument Ceremony (10 June 2000)


Ceremonies at Monument Ceremony (10 June 2000)

In recognition of the wing's distinguished service in the Korean Conflict, the 3rd Bombardment Wing was granted the privilege of conducting the last bombing mission over North Korea minutes before implementation of the ceasefire of 27 July 1953."

The Pacific Stars & Stripes caption under this photo in 1952 read,
"NAPALM ATTACK -- One of the 3d Bomb Wing "Grim Reapers"
clobbers a Communist-held observation point with napalm
during the early months of the Korean war."

The 3rd Bombardment Group (Light-Night Intruder) was crucial to the United Nations effort throughout the Korean Conflict. On June 28, 1950 B-26 aircraft of the 13th and 8th Bomb Squadron attacked the enemy with 12 aircraft and had the first fatalities of the Korean Conflict that day when an aircraft crashed returning to Ashiya, Japan. The first missions were flown against North Korean troops in the Han river area and other targets of opportunity. At that time the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army was in full retreat. From June 28 to 29, 1950 Seoul was captured by the advancing North Korean Army. The ROK was destroyed. On June 29, 1950, planes of the 3d BG attacked the North Korean field at Pyongang making it the first United Nations strike at the Communist forces above the 38th parallel. Within days, the 3rd had recorded the first Korean war combat casualties, a crew from the 13th BS was killed when their B-26 crashed on landing at Ashiya, Japan. The 3rd BG also scored the first B-26 aerial kill of the Conflict, a Yak fighter shot down by Sgt Nyle Mickly.

In The Korean Air War by Robert Dorr and Warren Thompson (p13), it states, "Douglas B26 Invader crews were in the conflict almost immediately, as recalled 1st Lt. Hammond H. Bittman, a navigator/bombardier for the 13th Bombardment Squadron:

"(At the beginning of the war), our 13th BS was at Iwakuni, Japan, on maneuvers. Our mission was photographing shipping between Japan and Korea. When we were ordered back to Yokota, Japan, our home base, we were told to pack a bag for 30 days and go back to Iwakuni (which is closer to Korea).

"We could not fly on 25, 26 or 27 June 1950 because of bad weather. The 28th was also bad but clear on top of heavy clouds. Off went Monte Ballew, pilot, and me, bombadier/navigator. It was clear enough beyond the 32nd Parallel to see the ground. We spotted a train going south and proceeded to drop 500lb (227kg) bombs in front and back of the train, stopping it. We strafed up and down into the stalled train.

"That's when we got hit by heavy machine gun fire that shot up one engine and left the aircraft with just one flyable engine. We left the area while we could still control the aircraft. On the way back, we landed at Suwon and were elated to see American eagles on the personnel who ran to our airplane. We were introduced to a General Church (Brig. Gen. John H. Church, an Army ground commander). He was as confused as everyone. When he asked his aides how many troops he had, how many tanks, etc., there was no coherent answer. Things were a mess."

Later Bittman recalled after returning from Suwon, "I returned to our temporary base at Iwakuni and being unshaven, tired, and needing a bath, was asked, where had I been? I was scheduled to lead the squadron to Pyongyang, North Korea. I cold not believe it, but that was how short we were of flying personnel. There had been a RIF (reduction in force) a few months before that. Flying crews had to load, fuel, and fly the aircraft. That's how short we were.

"We bombed the runway at Pyongyang and some buildings, doing damage to some extent. When the war settled into place, we flew two missions a day over North Korea starting at 0500hr. What with a briefing, flying, debriefing, and briefing for a subsequent night flight, it was a long, long day and there was not much time for sleep."

In "B-26 Invader Units Over Korea" (p14) by Warren Thompson, it states that Lieutenant Bittman recalled how after landing from his scheduled mission on 28 June, he then had to fly the mission over Pyongyang with no crew rest. He remembered that the squadrons were so short handed due to an earlier reduction-in-force that the flight crews had to assist in refueling and weapons loading of their aircraft. He also remembered that the original crews had flown so many missions back-to-back, that by early August they had already met the 50-mission requirement.

According to The Three Wars of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, His Korean War Diary, edited by William T. Y'Blood, 1999, (p50) stated in Gen. Stratemeyer's words on 2 July 1950, "Morale of 8th Fighter Wing and 3d Bomb Wing "superior". In spite of strenuous flying and fighting that has been done, they were all raring to go."

According to "The United States Air Force in Korea, (p87), Futrell, although the B-26 had proved highly effective in low-level operations, the crews found it difficult to maneuver at low-level in the mountainous terrain of Korea. Additionally, small-arms fire took a heavy toll. Those responsible decided that the light bomber should operate at medium altitude. The 3rd Bombardment Group possessed seven or eight glass nose B-26Cs at the time capably of bombing from medium altitude. Various options were tried, including having the B-26B crews bomb on command from a B-26C bombardier. Lieutenant General Stratemeyer, at this junction, ordered the 3rd Bombardment Group to focus on destroying rail and road bridges south of the Han River to slow down the steadily advancing North Koreans. The B-26B pilots devised new tactics, which required them to execute the attack in a shallow dive and align the bomber with the target allowing for drift and angle. The tactics proved successful.

On 2 July 1950, the Fifth Air Force ordered the 3rd Bombardment Group to move from Ashiya Air Base to Iwakuni Royal Australian Air Base. "Since the Australians occupied the base, the group had to solve logistical and housing problems without the support of a US host unit. In addition, half the personnel conducted the move while the other half continued to support 24-hour combat operations. (Hist, 3BG, 25 Jun-31 Oct 50, Ch 1, p. 3.)"

From 1 Jul 1950-19 Jul 1950, the 3rd Bombardment Wing performed reconnaissance and interdiction combat missions from Iwakuni AB, Japan. From 20 Jul to 1 Dec 1950 the tactical group and its squadrons served under operational control of the 8th Fighter Wing. The wing assumed a supporting role, initially from Johnson AB, Japan, but later from Yokota AB, Japan. The wing returned to Iwakuni AB on 1 Dec 1950, regained control of its combat units and performed night intruder combat missions.

According to the 3rd Wing site, "Between 27 June and 31 July, the 3rd Bombardment Group destroyed 42 tanks, 163 vehicles, 39 locomotives, 65 bridges, 14 supply dumps and killed or wounded nearly 5,000 enemy troops. The 3rd Bombardment Group had effectively made the transition from the peacetime training environment to combat. It had fully exploited the versatility of the B-26, flying 676 effective day and night sorties that included interdiction, low-level attack, close air support and night intruder. The achievement earned the 3rd Bombardment Group its third Distinguished Unit Citation and the Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation."

Pusan Perimeter Defense: In July, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) continued their advance and the Fifth Air Force concentrated on interdicting North Korean supply routes by destroying major road and rail bridges. The outnumbered U.S. forces retreated into the defensive line called the "Pusan Perimeter." The defense line was horseshoe-shaped with Taegu at the apex. The remnants of three defeated U.S. regiments (the 21st, 34th & 19th) -- each one little better than a battalion in size -- fell back to make their stand at the Naktong River and Taegu. The condition of the troops were dire.

U.S. Air Force in Korea (pp135-136) states, "Late in July a few 3d Bombardment Group crews who had been assigned to the 47th Group began to fly night-intruder sorties." (The 47th BG (Light) flew B-26s in World War II in Italy's Po River Valley.) "The 3d Group B-26's were quite different from the planes they had flown in the 47th Group, for they had no radar altimeters, short-range navigation radar (shoran), or AN/APQ-13 blind-bombing radar, but in their initial employment over Korea the 3d Group crews met apparent success. They could see the lights of a Red convoy and even though the hostile vehicles almost always blacked out before the B-26's could make a pass the light-bomber crews felt that they could remember the convoy's position well enough to get in one good strafing pass."

In August, the North Korean Army continued to launch attacks against the Pusan Perimeter, achieving some success, but at the same time becoming steadily weaker. The Fifth Air Force had succeeded in crippling its armor capability and forcing it to move supplies at night. With air superiority achieved, the Eight Army enjoyed the ability to move its forces within the perimeter without fear while the Fifth Air Force pounded the North Korean Army on a 24-hour basis with interdiction and close air support strikes. In the mean time, UN reinforcements were arriving through the port of Pusan.

At the start of the Korean Conflict, the USAF possessed no night-intruder organization. During July, the 5AF used some F-82s for offensive night operations, but General Partridge (5AF Commander) did not think these planes had much value. Early in August, when the VMF(N)-513 began to operate from Itazuke, the all-weather Corsairs provided eight to ten sorties per night, but more effort was needed. The F-80s tried their hand, but they found it impossible to strafe enemy road traffic. F-51 Mustang pilots had "almost nil" results in night-harassment missions.

U.S. Air Force in Korea (pp135-136) states that though Lt. Gen. Stratemeyer (Commander FEAF) was reluctant to reduce his daylight attacks in August 1950, he "directed the 3d Group to place half its effort on night operations. The 8th and 13th accordingly alternated in the night-intruder role, one squadron flying night missions one week and day missions the following week. By using the light-bomber squadrons in addition to the all-weather squadrons the Fifth Air Force managed to fly an average of 35 night-intruder sorties each night during August."

The book continued, "Each intruder organization dispatched its crews singly at periodic intervals during the night to reconnoiter prebriefed transportation routes -- the assigned mission being to harass enemy convoys and force them to move without their lights, thus increasing the enemy's problem of resupplying his combat forces."

In August 1950, the 13th Bomb Squadron flew the first night intruder mission and alternated with the 8th Bomb Squadron. On average, 18 aircraft were scheduled for night intruder work each night, with aircraft taking off every 15 minutes. The group dispatched missions on a 24-hour basis. (Hist, 3 BG, Aug 50, p. 4)

U.S. Air Force in Korea (pp135-136) states "As August wore on 3d Group night intruders, who had begun to supplement their strafing attacks with 160-pound fragmentation bombs, reported that they were sighting fewer and fewer lighted convoys. Communist night convoys were now creeping and not speeding to the front lines. Other evidence indicated the North Koreans, already hypersensitive to daytime air attack, had an unreasonable fear of the night intruders."

On 14 August 1950, Colonel Virgil L. Zoller assumed command of the 3rd Bombardment Wing, replacing Colonel Strother B. Hardwick, Jr. The 3rd Bombardment Wing moved to Yokota Air Base. The 3rd Bombardment Group remained at Iwakuni Air Base. 23 August 1950: Colonel Donald L. Clark assumed command of the 3rd Bombardment Wing, replacing Colonel Virgil L. Zoller who moved to setup the 452d BW operations.

On September 6 General Vandenberg (USAF Chief of Staff) suggested that the 3d Group be completely converted to night attack. As soon as it reached the theater, the 452d Bombardment Wing could make up for the lost daytime effort. General Stratemeyer was completely in agreement as one of his main requirements was "equipment and tactics to seek out, see, and attack hostile ground equipment at night."

By mid-September, the NKPA forces had paid a terrible price in trying to overcome the Pusan perimeter. "This Kind of War -- The Classic Korean War History" (by T.R. Fehrenbach, 1963) put it this way, "The NKPA had overrun all South Korea except one tiny toehold in the southeast corner -- but the toehold had given it unexpected trouble. Its timetable calling for the Communization of all Korea by 15 August had been wrecked. Worse, the Inmun Gun, the People's Army, had left the bones of its best men scattered along the Naktong River, and the survivors were rapidly bleeding themselves to death against American guns ..." Less than 30 percent of the old China veterans remained, and these were dirty, tired, hungry, and in rags. The NKPA had suffered about 60,000 casualties, most of which had been inflicted by ROK's. Its total combat strength could not have been more than 70,000 with only forty tanks left. On the other hand, the United Nations force had 141,808 of which some 82,000 were ROK's. American combat ground strength was 47,000. (For a detailed history, go to The Pusan Perimeter.)

Inchon Invasion and Pusan Breakout: On September 15, 1950 the US 1st Marine Division, ROK marines and 7th Infantry Division troops led the "surprise" attack at Inchon. Despite this lack of secrecy, the landing met with little resistance and was resounding success with few casualties. As word of this spread to the North Korean forces, their forces completely shattered. On September 18, the U.N. broke out of the Pusan Perimeter. By September 23 the NKPA (Inmun Gun) was everywhere in full retreat. US, ROK, and UN forces launched counterattacks against the North Korean forces from the Pusan Perimeter in order to link with the UN forces at Seoul and Inchon

On 16 September 1950, the Eighth Army launched an offensive to break out of the Pusan Perimeter and link up with the Inchon forces 150 miles away.

(Click on photos to enlarge)

Top Right: An F-80 leads a formation of 3d BG B-26s against targets near Iri on September 16. White spots just to the left of the fighter and under its wing mark rockets just fired at some enemy tanks. Top Left: The bombers attack the Iri rail yards. Bottom Right: A parabomb floats toward a bridge near Iri. The North Koreans have spanned a destroyed portion of the bridge with a crude but effective earth and timber structure. Bottom Left: 3d BG Invaders wheel around to attack flak installations near Iri.

According to "The U.S. Air Force in Korea" (p136), Futrell, in September 1950: General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, recommended to Lieutenant General Stratemeyer that the 3rd Bombardment Group be converted completely to night operations. He also suggested that the 731st Bombardment Squadron (Light-Night Attack) be attached to the group since it had been trained low-level night operations. The 452nd Bombardment Wing would assume the daylight mission and the 3rd Bombardment Wing would fly night missions.

On 1 September 1950, four crews and aircraft from the hastily activated 731st Bombardment Squadron departed George AFB, California for Japan. The 731st BS was detached from the 452d BW and ordered to join the 3rd BW. When they arrived, they were attached to the 3rd BG and began flying operations the next day to gain combat experience until the arrival of the rest of the squadron. The remainder of the squadron arrived at Iwakuni on 17 November 1950.

According to the 3rd Wing site, "During the month of September, the 13th Bombardment Squadron flew 60 medium altitude, 99 low-level, and 298 night intruder sorties. During these missions they dropped 422 tons of explosives. The 8th Bombardment Squadron flew a similar number of sorties. The 3rd Bombardment Group reported three crewmembers missing in action from the 8th Bombardment Squadron and three missing in action from the 13th Bombardment Squadron. The group lost three aircraft destroyed and two damaged. (Hist, 13BS, Sep 50, p. 1; Hist, 3BG, 25 Jun-31 Oct 50, Ch 2, p. 6; Summary of Events, 3BG, Jun 50-Mar 51.)"

"The night intruder missions taxed the B-26 crews to their limits because of the distances that had to be flown. The crews had to land at Taegu (K-2) to refuel. Because the field was not adequately equipped, their return to Iwakuni was delayed, further hampering operations. The problems increased as the North Korean withdrew in the face of the United Nation’s offensive. Bombers often returned to Iwakuni with their fuel tanks almost empty. (Hist, 3BG, 25 Jun-31 Oct 50, Ch 1, pp. 1 and 7.)"

"Between 25 June and 31 October, the 3rd Bombardment Group lost 42 B-26s directly and indirectly to enemy action, of these 29 were combat, 3 were used for parts and 10 had to be sent to depot for major repair. In return, the group received 50 replacement B-26s of which 44 were assigned to the two squadrons. (Hist, 3BG, 25 Jun-31 Oct 50, Ch 5, p. 4.)The 3rd Bombardment Group reported two killed in action, twenty-five missing in action and seven wounded in action since the start of hostilities. (Hist, 3BG, 25 Jun-31 Oct 50, Ch 2, pp. 5-6.)"

Chinese Lay a Trap The UN forces including three ROK divisions pursued the fleeing North Korean forces. But unknown to the UN forces, the Chinese 40th, 39th and 42d armies -- the equivalent of nine U.S. divisions -- under Commander-in-Chief Peng had marched under the cover of darkness into North Korea on 19 October. They went undetected by American fliers and MacArthur was convinced there was no threat of Chinese intervention. This is what he told President Truman in his meeting with him on October 15 at Wake Island.

On October 21 Pyongyang fell to UN forces. The race to the Yalu continued despite the warnings of a Chinese presence. On October 24 The Eight Army crossed the strategic Chungchon River and one division, the ROK 6th Division had reached the Yalu River on the Manchurian border. MacArthur rejoiced and authorized the use of "any and all ground forces to secure all of North Korea." On October 26, the X Corps landed at Wonsan on the east coast.

On November 2 Peng sprang the trap to wipe out the U.S. 2nd Division. By November 5 MacArthur, without consulting Washington (but later approved by Truman), gave the orders to bomb the Korean end of the Yalu River bridges. He now realized that the Chinese intervention was serious, for the Chinese had driven Eighth Army back across the Chungchon River.

The Chinese had annihilated 15,000 of the ROK & UN forces and foiled MacArthur's plan to occupy all of Korea by Thanksgiving. But then suddenly the Chinese withdrew back across the Yalu on November 7. By suddenly withdrawing, Mao guessed that MacArthur, assuming he had beaten the Chinese, would push his troops farther north. MacArther fell for the trap. Between November 10-24, X Corps advanced toward the Yalu River in the east, while the Eight Army closed in on the west.

On 18 November 1950, B-26's from the 3d and 452d BGs flew from Japan to drop incendiaries on enemy troop barracks at Masan in far northeastern Korea. This raid was the first massed light-bomber attack of the Korean war, and it successfully destroyed at least 75 percent of the barracks area.

The Chinese simply waited to spring the trap, then on November 25 the slaughter began. Three Volunteer armies suddenly attacked the western front of Eighth Army along the Ch'ongch'on River. The ROK II Corps was in disarray after both its divisions collapsed. The road to retreat was jammed.

At the Chosin Reservoir, eight Chinese Volunteer divisions lay in wait for 1st Marine and 7th ID. On November 27 the Chinese struck and the rest is history. The debacle, the misery, the heroism, the fighting and the frozen retreat.

General Walton Walker of the Eighth Army ordered a general withdrawal of the Eighth Army -- in order to save his men. By November 28 MacArthur woke up to reality and authorized Walker to fall back to Pyongyang and there to go on the defensive, while X Corps was to withdraw to the Hungnam-Wonsan area. (For a detailed history, go to Korean Constabulary: The Push North and the Chinese Lay their Trap.) (For a detailed history, go to The Push North and the Chinese Lay their Trap.)

The wing flew medium level bomb runs, low-level attack, and night intruder missions at the maximum range for the B-26 covering the 8th Army withdrawal. The 3rd Bombardment Group flew close air support night missions in support of the 25th Infantry Division, which was being attacked by Communist forces. The B-26 crews arrived within 30 minutes of being notified and strafed within 50 yards of the front lines of an Infantry company under attack.

Elsewhere, the B-26 crews flew their first "Tadpole" sorties, dropping bombs 1,000 yards of the front line. According to the 3rd Wing site, "The 3rd Bombardment Wing began limited operations using tactical air control posts to control (TACP) night intruder missions. The 502nd Tactical Control Group had established TACPs behind each Eight Army corps area to provide radar direction to B-29 and B-26 crews using the AN/MPQ-2 directional radar. Ground controllers acquired the bombers on the narrow beam radar and specified speed, heading and altitude. The controllers gave the orders to open the bomb bay doors and arm the bombs. At about 10,000 yards from the target, they began a countdown to zero at which time the bombardiers released the bombs. The Eighth Army provided the target list and coordinates. Its units reported good results from the so-called "Tadpole" missions. One veteran recalled that a B-26 crew usually received a "Tadpole" mission when the weather was bad and there was no place to drop the bombs visually. The missions were generally flown at around 16,000 feet. While the winter weather caused discomfort, the sorties were much safer to fly."

The extended range from Iwakuni caused numerous mechanical problems. According to the 3rd Wing site, "Mechanically the aircraft often had to land at Taegu (K-2) Korea for refuel on the return mission. They also experienced a high rate of spark plug failure due to the low RPM range used to extend the fuel range enroute to the target. The winter weather caused icing problems, which also severely hampered mission effectiveness, and flight crews began suffering mild cases of frostbite. Additional cold weather gear solved this problem. (Hist, 13BS, Nov 50, p. 2.)"

The 3rd BG began staging 16 of its B-26s along with maintenance from Taegu (K-2). Although this caused considerable logistical problems, the benefit of being closer to the targets and the increased sortie generation rate far outweighed them. This allowed the group to depart Iwakuni, fly a mission, land at K-2 and them have a replacement crew launch another mission and return to Iwakuni.

Chinese Drive South In December 1950, the Communist forces continued their drive southward, trapping the 1st Marine Division in the Chosin Reservoir area and forcing it to fight its way out to the port city of Hungnam on the east coast. There, it joined other American and South Korean units in evacuating North Korea by ship in mid-December. In western Korea, Communist forces pushed the Eighth Army across the 38th Parallel.

The Far East Air Force flew interdiction and reconnaissance missions that helped slow the enemy’s advance. When, the Chinese forces attempted to move at daylight north of Pyongyang in their pursuit of the Eighth Army, the Fifth Air Force struck, killing and wounding an estimated 33,000 enemy troops. The Chinese switched back to moving at night.

According to the 3rd Wing site, "December weather and severe icing conditions hampered B-26 operations. The Invaders assigned to the group were not equipped with the "hot wing," and field modifications were not practical. In addition, de-icing chemicals and products proved ineffective due to the high speed of the B-26. Many aircraft had to abort prior to reaching the target due to icing conditions. No aircraft were lost based solely on icing problems; however, aircraft were lost for unexplained reasons in conditions prevalent to icing. (Hist, 3BG, Dec 50, Ops Ch, p. 3.)"

The Communist forces continued their advance in December. On December 5th, the UN forces were driven from Pyongyang and on 25 December, the Communists crossed the 38th parallel. The Communist forces advanced to a position roughly 50 miles South of the 38th Parallel where U.N. forces stopped them on a line that ran from Pyongtaek on the west coast to Samchok on the east coast. On 25 January, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, who had replaced General Walker as Commander, Eighth Army, when the latter was killed in a December jeep accident, launched the first U.N. Counteroffensive. By now the Communist forces were worn down and their supply lines overextended and under constant air attacks.

On 1 December 1950, as part of a reorganization of the Fifth Air Force, the 6133rd Tactical Support Wing at Iwakuni was inactivated and the 3rd Bombardment Wing was administratively moved from Johnson Air Base to Iwakuni Air Base where it rejoined the 3rd Bombardment Group and assumed responsibilities of base functions. Colonel Virgil L. Zoller assumed command of the 3rd Bombardment Wing, replacing Colonel Donald L. Clark.

According to the 3rd Wing site, "Weather, lack of trained personnel and shortage of supplies hampered operations during the month. The B-26s were not equipped for winter operations and experienced icing problems. Due to a shortage of navigators, observers were pressed into service to provide another set of eyes for the pilot. Additionally, there was no set policy on how many missions needed to be flown before a crew member could be assigned to less dangerous duties. (Hist, 3BG, Jan 51, Ch 4, pp. 2-3.) The 8th Bombardment Squadron possessed an average of 16 aircraft, the 13th Bombardment Squadron had 17 B-26s, and the 731st Bombardment Squadron had 10 aircraft. (Hist, 3BG, Jan 51, Material Maint Sec, p. 2.)"

In January 1951, technicians began installing SHORAN (short-range navigational system) and the 3rd BW began training personnel in its use. However, it was proven that the ground based AN/MPQ-2 radar used by the Tactical Air Control Post provided better target definition and increased accuracy. Regardless, in February 1951, the first combat SHORAN mission was flown. By the end of March, combat missions had increased to 12 per night.

On 4 January 1951, Chinese Communist forces occupied Seoul. According to the 3rd Wing site, "The 3rd Bombardment Wing increased its operational tempo. In the past, B-26 crews would fly to the target from Iwakuni, then land Taegu, spend the day resting there before returning to Iwakuni. The new plan required them to turn around at Taegu after the night mission and fly a daylight mission before returning to Iwakuni. The new operational commitments required the 3rd Bombardment Wing to fly approximately 38 sorties per day, while experiencing a high loss of aircraft and an insufficient number of replacements. Weather and icing continued to plague operations. The wing was heavily committed during the month and flew missions as far north as the Yalu River. (Hist, 3BG, Feb 51, Ops Ch, p. 3.)"

Starting in the spring of 1951, the 3d Bomb Group was charged with night interdiction. Targets for their nocturnal missions included road crossings, rail lines, truck and vehicle convoys, and troop concentrations. Occasionally, airfields were also attacked. When the first interdiction effort of the year began, the 3d Bomb Group pioneered night intruder tactics through painful experimentation. It tried all sorts of "wild" ideas as tactics were worked out and optimal ordnance loads and types of bombs were determined. They tried dropping roofing nails and "tetrahedrons" (similar to jacks) to puncture truck tires...bad ideas. Finally they settled on things like the 500-pound "butterfly bomb" (similar to "cluster bombs") with bomblets that lay on the road until detonated by passing trucks.

Initially, when the 3rd Bombardment Wing began flying night missions as far north as Sinanju on the Yalu River, the enemy vehicle drivers had kept their headlights on. With experience, they learned to shut them off, making locating and attacking targets difficult.

In January 1951, crews of the 3rd BW tested using C-47 “Lightning Bug” transports to drop U.S. Navy Mark VIII flares over targets north of Seoul. Previously M-26 parachute flares had been used, but proved unreliable. Based on the result of several nights of operation, the 3rd Bombardment Wing had six C-47 aircraft modified for flare operations in February 1951. One C-47 was generally employed with two B-26s and acted as the control plane. This allowed the crews to concentrate on their low level bombing of an illuminated target. It also assisted artillery units in identifying targets at night and kept enemy movements at night to a minimum.

On 10 February 1951, Eighth Army forces captured Kimpo Airport and the port at Inchon. The forces continued north, bypassing Seoul.

According to The U.S. Air Force in Korea (pp325-326), during the early months of 1951, the 5AF "usually required the 3d Wing to fly 38 sorties each night, an effort which could include ground-radar controlled strikes against fixed targets, ground-support missions, as well as intruder sorties. The 3d Wing staged all its missions through Taegu Airfield, a practice which was not entirely satisfactory since communications with Iwakuni were poor, gasoline and bombs were often in short supply at the forward base, and the deteriorating pierced-steel plank runway at Taegu shredded critically short B-26 tires. In the ground emergency, beginning on 23 April, the Fifth Air Force required the 3d Wing to fly 48 sorties each night, and the wing met the requirement by using each aircraft for two sorties a night from Taegu -- one intruder and a second ground-support sortie."

"Intruder crews of the 3d and 452d Wings varied their tactics according to the model of planes they flew, the terrain they flew over, and the availability of natural or artificial illumination. Even if an intruder crew had flare support, Korea's rugged terrain hazarded low-level operations. Since aerial charts were frequently inexact, B-26 crews usually pulled up from strafing attacks at altitudes not less than 1,000 feet higher than the highest published height of terrain features in the vicinity of a target. One pilot further added that the "safe" pull-out altitude was actually 1,000 feet higher than the published altitude of the highest obstacle, plus an additional 500 feet for each married man on the crew. When night-intruder crews could secure flare support, they could work closer to the ground."

Col. Virgil Zoller (later Brig Gen), 3d BW Commander
Iwakuni AB, Japan
(From 731st BS (L-NA) Homepage)
Click on Photo to enlarge

The book (p326) also stated, "To find answers to certain problems which are peculiar to night-attack operations, " stated Colonel Virgil L. Zoller, commander of the 3d Bombardment Wing, "we have often groped as we have operated in the darkness." The tactics employed by the 3d Wing intruder crews were influenced by the rough and mountainous terrain of North Korea, where changes in weather made positive identification of landmarks difficult and low-level attacks hazardous. Intruder tactics were also influenced by Communist actions, which varied according to their straits for supplies up forward. And, of course, intruder attack methods were different on moonlight nights, when Communist vehicles ran without lights but trains, which never used lights, could be spotted. The degree of natural illumination thus influenced intruder attack. In addition to all these factors, the night-intruder crews also experimented with "wild ideas" which might, or might not, pay off in terms of destruction to the enemy."

It continued, "Fundamental to any understanding of night-intruder tactics employed in Korea, however, is the recognition that the night-intruder crews, who flew alone in the dark, were unable exactly to determine what damage they were inflicting on the enemy. The Fifth Air Force counted automotive equipment destroyed if it exploded or burned violently or left the road at high speed and collided with some other object. Railroad equipment could be claimed as destroyed if it exploded, burned intensely, or was derailed in an area where recovery was doubtful or improbable. But in the dark night-intruder crews were seldom able to score the results of their strikes in such positive fashion. Lacking an ability to assess, the night intruders could only hope that the tactics they used were the right ones."

It further stated (p459), "Although the night intruders were undoubtedly more effective than usual against the streams of Communist vehicles which jammed the roads in the autumn months of 1951, it was all too evident later on that claims of the night-intruder crews were exaggerated. Flying alone at night, unable to secure photographic verification of their claims, the night-intruder crews were understandably unable to determine the exact results of their missions. Apparently several factors determined the extent of claims turned in by night-intruder crews. As early as September 1951 some Fifth Air Force operations analysts noted that night-intruder crews did not indicate that any one type of bomb was better than another for destroying hostile vehicles and suggested that crews were claiming vehicles destroyed in proportion to the number of vehicles sighted and the number of B-26 sorties flown. General Weyland also attributed the increased night-intruder claims of August and September to the fact that the B-26 wings were flying more night-intruder sorties than ever before. The number of Communist vehicles sighted showing headlamps had some correlation with night-intruder claims, for B-26 crews to some extent measure the success of their missions in terms of the size of the enemy convoy sighted and attacked."

B-26B "Shook Up Shark"
(Courtesy Lou Segaloff)
Click photo to enlarge

According to The Three Wars of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, His Korean War Diary, edited by William T. Y'Blood, 1999, (p355) gives a clue to the type of munitions they used. General Stratemeyer stated, "The 3d Bomb Group is in immediate need of 260 lb frag bombs. They like to use them on practically every mission. Action will be taken and a letter prepared for my signature to Colonel Zoller, 3d Bomb Wing commander, giving him all necessary information on their arrival." It continued that about a visit to Iwakuni on 16 January 1951 (p393). Gen Stratemeyer stated, "...then proceeded to Iwakuni where we were met by Colonel Zoller and his staff; listened to his briefing of the officers for the night missions which was conducted by Major C.C. Hill, my former pilot. General Vandenberg appeared to be extremely well pleased what what he saw -- and with the operations of the 3rd Bomb Wing."

Praise for the efforts of the 3d Bomb Wing (and other B-26 wings) was unanimous. However, in February 1951, Lt. Gen. Stratemeyer was concerned about the attrition rate of the B-26s due to combat losses. According to The Three Wars of Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, His Korean War Diary (p412), "Light bomb units of my command are severely reduced in combat effectiveness thru lack of aval acft. Present auth(orization) is 112 UE (unit equipment) B-26s. We have recently asked that this be increased to 144 to provide 24 UE acft per sq. This requ was based on the fact that the B-26 has proven to be our best day-night support-interdiction weapon. The increase will considerably enhance our combat capabilities. At present we have a total of 110 B-26s in FEAF, of which 16 are ineffective in FEAMCOM. ... We are losing 6 B-26s per month in operations. ... Delivery of B-26s must be advanced if our rqmts are to be realistically met."

However, the B-26's that were sent were "shocking disappointments." According to The U.S. Air Force in Korea (p461), "Some of the old planes still had "flat-top" canopies, which disqualified them for combat since crewmen who wore winter flying equipment and survival gear could not squeeze out of them in bail-out emergency. Even with the nonstandard B-26's, moreover, USAF ultimately had to recognize its inability to bring the 3d and 452d Wings up to war strength. In the spring of 1952, a final USAF programming action allocated 24 B-26's to each 3d Wing squadron and 16 B-26's to each 452d Wing squadron."

It continued, "The supply of B-26 replacement crews was also deficient. Geared to produce 45 crews every 5 weeks, the combat crew training school at Langley Air Force Base could not satisfy FEAF's attrition and rotation requirements which went from 58 crews a month to 63 a month, and then to 93 a month in the last half of 1951. USAF had to obtain the additional crews by levying on zone of interior commands for casual crew personnel who were formed in crews for training in the Far East."

3rd Bomb Wing ("Grim Reapers") B-26B aircraft.
Note "Oscar" the "Grim Reaper" on the nose.

In May 1951, the Chinese launched the Fifth Chinese Campaign in which the Chinese suffered a major defeat with 17,000 dead and 10,000 captured. With the Chinese no longer capable of mounting another major offensive, Mao ordered his troops to turn the war into one of sheer endurance. The Chinese were used to guerrilla warfare and were not used to tunnels and trench warfare.

On May 31, 1951, the negotiations began -- shakily at first because of the insistence on it being held at Kaesong in North Korean territory. General Ridgeway told the JCS he would refuse to attend at Kaesong -- even if directed. However, finally it was agreed to hold it at Panmunjon.

At the outset of the Korean conflict the 3rd was at two Squadron level (8th BS and 13th BS) with the 731st Bomb Squadron (L-NA) from the USAF Reserves attached to it. On June 25, 1951, the 731st was redesignated the 90th Bombardment Squadron (Light - Night Intruder) and absorbed all aircraft and personnel of the 731st. Simultaneously, the 731st Bombardment Squadron was inactivated.

In June, Captain Heyman of the 8th Bombardment Squadron became the first 3rd Bombardment Wing B-26 pilot to score an air-to-air victory in shooting down a "flying bathtub" -- a Papov Po4 heckler commonly called "Bed Check Charlie." (Go to 8th BS for details.)

In June 1951, Detachment 1, 3rd Bombardment Wing, stationed at K-2 (Taegu), inactivated and all personnel and resources were sent back to Iwakuni AB, Japan or K-8 (Kunsan), the future home of the wing. A primary reason for discontinuing operations from K-2 came from a critical shortage of tires for the B-26. It was noted that the poor conditions of the K-2 runway, notably the steel planking, caused considerably higher tire failure rates. In one 10-day period at K-2, 56 tires required replacement. (Hist, 3BG, Jun 51, Ops Section, p. 2.)

The truce talks began on July 10, 1951...and the war dragged on...and on...and on.

Partial list of B-26B/Cs Crashes with 3rd BG:

Joe Baugher site: 1943 S/N

  • 22306 (13th BS, 3rd BG) hit by gunfire on strafing pass in Korea and crew bailed out. 2 killed, 2 taken prisoner.
  • 22390 (8th BS, 3rd BG) MIA 12/4/52 after night mission in Korea.
  • 22411 (13th BS, 3rd BG) crashed into mountain at Shikoku while attempting to land at Iwakuni 1/26/51.


Joe Baugher site: 1944 S/N
  • 34098 (3rd BW, 8th BS) crashed into Yellow Sea Apr 19, 1952.
  • 34200 (13th BS, 3rd BG) MIA after night mission Jan 6, 1952.
  • 34218 (8th BS, 3rd BG) crashed I bay near Iwakuni due to fuel shortage 3/3/51.
  • 34221 (8th BS, 3rd BG) MIA in night mission 5/21/51.
  • 34222 (8th BS, 3rd BG) lost 12/6/50 during night mission due to fuel exhaustion.
  • 34223 (8th BS, 3rd BG) MIA after night mission 10/19/50.
  • 34233 (13th BS, 3rd BG) MIA after night mission 10/3/50.
  • 34234 (3rd BW, 13th BS) shot down by AAA near Chong-Ju, Korea Jul 28, 1950
  • 34236 (8th BS, 3rd BG) shot down during night mission 1/21/50.
  • 34237 (13th BS, 3rd BG) MIA after night mission 10/4/50.
  • 34238 (8th BS, 3rd BG) crashed into Yellow Sea 6/28/50 after returning from mission.
  • 34240 (13th BS, 3rd BG) destroyed 7/6/50 on bomb run by own bomb explosion.
  • 34244 (8th BS, 3rd BG) crashed and burned during takeoff at K-2 4/19/51. Napalm tank accidentally released and damaged flap, causing loss of control and crash.
  • 34247 (13th BS, 3rd BG) MIA after night mission in Korea.
  • 34254 (13th BS, 3re BW) damaged by AAA and landed at K-6 and w/o as total loss Feb 23, 1951.
  • 34257 (8th BS, 3rd BG) crashed 3/20/51 during night training mission. KORWALD database has this plane having been shot down by AAA on night intruder mission Mar 5, 1951.
  • 34263 (13th BS, 3rd BG) crashed 7/28/50 near Chonju after engine fire caused by small arms fire.
  • 34265 (13th BS, 3rd BW) crashlanded at Suwon Jan 24, 1951 and was destroyed to prevent capture by the enemy.
  • 34266 (3rd BW, 8th BS) crashed near K-2, Korea Jan 3, 1951.
  • 34267 (3rd BW, 8th BS) hit by ground fire and crashlanded at K-13, Korea Mar 4, 1951.
  • 34277 (13th BS, 3rd BG) Class 26 6/30/50 due to enemy ground fire, repaired.
  • 34279 (8th Bs, 3rd BG) crash landed 8/14/50 on beach near Miho, Japan due to fuel exhaustion and was destroyed.
  • 34281 (13th BS, 3rd BG) MIA after night mission 2/20/52. 34286 (3rd BW, 8th BS) hit by AAA and landed at K-13, Korea Jul 7, 1951.
  • c/n 27566 With 13th BS, 3rd BG, crashed due to fuel exhaustion on final approach 12/14/50. Aircraft repaired.
  • c/n 27576/27577 34297 (13th BS, 3rd BG) lost 2/21/51 when bomb exploded prematurely on bomb run.
  • 34300 (13th BS, 3rd BG) MIA Apr 4, 1952 after night mission in Korea. 34301 (25th BS, 3rd BG) class 26 6/28/50 due to enemy ground fire. 34304 (13th BS, 3rd BG) hit tree on strafing run 11/3/50. Left at AB in Korea
  • 34314 (8th BS, 3rd BG) shot down by ground fire during night mission 9/14/51. Medal of Honor for John S. Walmsley, Jr.
  • 34317 (90th BS, 3rd BG) MIA 12/26/52 after night mission in Korea.
  • 34325 (90th BS, 3rd BG) MIA on night mission in Korea.
  • c/n 27610. Shot down by flak (8th BS, 3rd BG) 2/17/51.
  • 34336 (13th BS, 3rd BG) crashed in target area 10/15/51.
  • c/n 27618. 8th BS, 3re BG Crashed into mountain during strafing run 6/29/50.
  • c/n 27619/27621 34342 (90th BS, 3rd BG) MIA after night mission 9/2/51.
  • c/n 27626. 13th BS, 3rd BG crashed on takeoff 8/26/51.
  • c/n 27630. MIA on night mission with 13th BS, 3rd BG 1/13/51. One crewman evaded and returned.
  • 34357 (90th BS, 3rd BG) crashed and burned 10/21/51 at K-8 during landing after return from combat mission. 34358 (8th BS, 3rd BG) MIA after night mission 1/26/52.
  • 34373 (8th BS, 3rd BG) hit over target Seo 2, 1950 and exploded. 34374 (13th BS, 3rd BG) MIA after night mission 7/3/51. 34375 (13th BS, 3rd BG) crashed near Taejon 7/6/50 after being hit by small arms fire. 3 parachutes seen.
  • c/n 27656. 8th BS, 3rd BG Class 26 7/29/50 due to major wing spar damage from small arms fire. Lost near Singye, North Korea (728th BS, 452nd BW) Sep 7, 1951 on night intruder mission.
  • 34378 (8th BS, 3rd BG) crashed near Taegu (K-2) 11/29/50 due to fuel exhaustion and battle damage
  • 34379 (13th BS, 3rd BG) damaged by ground fire June 28, 1950 at Kimpo. Abandoned and destroyed by enemy ground fire
  • 34385 (8th BS, 3rd BG) hit by flak and crashed 11/11/50 34386 (13th BS, 3rd BG) MIA on night mission 2/11/51.
  • c/n 27684. 13th BS, 3rd BG hit obstacle on strafing run Wonsan, Korea and crashed into sea 5/5/51.
  • c/n 27692. MIA on bombing mission with 8th BS, 3rd BG 2/25/51 near Sunan, Korea.
  • c/n 27699. (90th BS, 3rd BG) MIA 5/30/52 after night mission in Korea.
  • c/n 27757 with 13th BS, 3rd BG. Crashed in bad weather near Ashiya AB, Japan June 28, 1950.
  • c/n 27793. 90th BS, 3rd BG MIA on mission 12/8/51.
  • 34529 (8th BS, 3rd BG) shot down by ground fire 2/19/52. Crew captured and returned in Big Switch.
  • 34531 (3rd BW, 8th BS) crashed on takeoff Oct 9, 1951.
  • 34542 (8th BS, 3rd BG) MIA after night mission in Korea.
  • 34582 (13th BS, 3rd BG) MIA after night mission 12/8/52.
  • 34600 (8th BS, 3rd BG) MIA after night mission 1/14/51. Crew captured and returned with Big Switch.
  • 34601 lost 6 April 1952 over North Korea 3rd Bomb Wing Aircraft , 90th Bomb Sqdn Pilot Joe Long Jr. + crew of 4 Listed MIA
  • 34623 (3rd BW, 13th BS) crashed into Yellow Sea on takeoff Jun 23, 1952.
  • 34655 (13th BS, 3rd BG) crashed on takeoff into Yellow Sea 6/7/52.
  • 34685 (8th BS, 3rd BG) damaged by flak 9/30/50 and exploded in water in ditching near Wonsan, Korea
  • 34689 (13th BS, 3rd BG) MIA after night mission in Korea Jul 8, 1952.
  • 34692 (13th BS, 3rd BG) MIA after night mission 5/30/52.
  • 34698 (13th BS, 3rd BG) MIA after night mission in Korea.
  • 34704 (90th BS, 3rd BG) MIA after night mission in Korea 12/18/51.
  • 34707 (8th BS, 3rd BG) MIA in night mission 3/25/51.
  • 35210 (3rd BW, 90th BS) MIA on night intruder mission Korea, Jul 1, 1953.
  • 35355 (3rd BW, 8th BS) shot down by AAA on night intruder mission, Korea Jul 1, 1953.
  • 35388 (13th BS, 3rd BG) struck by ground fire during night mission 9/3/51 and crashed into hill.
  • 35402 (13th BS, 3rd BG) MIA after night mission in Korea.
  • 35618 (3rd BW, 8th BS) crashed near K-47 due to icing May 21, 1953.
  • 35758 (3rd BW, 8th BS) MIA in night intruder mission Dec 28, 1950. 35760 (3rd BW, 13th BS) lost on night intruder mission Jun 5, 1952.
  • 35771 (8th BS, 3rd BG) crashed on takeoff 9/26/50.
  • 35817 (3rd BW, 13th BS) lost on night intruder mission between Sinanju/Phongyang, North Korea Jul 14, 1953.
  • 35869 (3rd BW, 8th BS) aborted takeoff and overrran runway Dec 13, 1952.
  • 35882 (3rd BW, 13th BS) shot down by AAA May 17, 1953. 35884 (13th BS, 3rd BG) lost in accident 6/11/52 over Chodo Island. Crew bailed out.
  • 35939 (13th BS, 3rd BG) crashed during night training flight 10/2/51.
  • 35958 (90th BS, 3rd BG) destroyed on take off 8/31/1951 at K-8 Kunsan Korea killing 90th Bomb Sqdn CO. L/Col James H. Moyer 35961 (3rd BW, 90th BS) hit by AAA and landed in paddy Apr 1, 1953.
  • 35971 (3rd BW) crashed at K-9 in Korea Oct 1952. 35972 (731st BS, 3rd BG) MIA after night mission 2/12/51. 35974 (731st, 3rd BG) MIA 4/26/51 in night mission.
  • 35985 (13th BS, 3rd BG) crashed at K-13 on single-engined GCA approach 7/29/51.

KUNSAN AIR BASE:

dot Kunsan Aerodrome (1938-1945)
dot Camp Hillenmeyer (1945-1949)
dot Kunsan Aerodrome (1949-1951)
dot Kunsan Airbase (1951-1954)

dot Kunsan Airbase (1954-1974)
dot Kunsan Airbase (1974-Present)

MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS:

dot Douglas B-26 Invader Specifications -- The A-26 was redesignated the B-26 after the B-26 Marauders were taken out of service.
dot Republic F-84 Thunderjet Specifications -- The F84D was the first of the series to see action in Korea.
dot Vought F-4U-5NL Night Corsair Specifications - Night fighter variant of the famous Corsair
dot Grumman F7F-3N Tigercat Specifications - Fast powerful prop fighter that entered just as the jet age began
dot Douglas F3D-2/F-10B Skynight Specifications - Fighter that made the first night jet aircraft kill
dot McDonnell Douglas F-4D Phantom II Specifications
dot General Dynamics F-16C Falcon Specifications
dot Time Line of Korean War -- Tanner Publication Co.

RELATED PAGES:

dot Camp Hillenmeyer & Kunsan City (1947)
dot Korean War Reference

dot Welcome Brochure for King Eight (K8) (1954) -- A comparison of 1954 and Now
dot Welcome to Kunsan City -- Facts of the city and a Pictorial History from 1947-Present
dot POW/MIA in Korea -- Current articles and links to POW/MIA issues

RETURN TO MAIN TABLE OF CONTENTS

For inputs or comments, contact Kalani O'Sullivan.

NOTICE/DISCLAIMER: The content of this page is unofficial and the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of anyone associated with this page or any of those linked from this site. All opinions are those of the writer and are intended for entertainment purposes only. Links to other web pages are provided for convenience and do not, in any way, constitute an endorsement of the linked pages or any commercial or private issues or products presented there. None of this site has been endorsed by the DOD, the Air Force, the 8th Fighter Wing or Mickey Mouse. All Air Force links are publicly accessible through the world-wide web. When eye-witness accounts conflict with OFFICIAL DOD materials, this website opts to lend credence to the people who were there.

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Links Purged: June 5, 2000
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