NOTICE/DISCLAIMER: The content of this page is UNOFFICIAL and the views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of anyone associated with this page or any of those linked from this site. All opinions are those of the writer and are intended for entertainment purposes only. Links to other web pages are provided for convenience and do not, in any way, constitute an endorsement of the linked pages or any commercial or private issues or products presented there. Neither the DOD, the Air Force, the 8th Fighter Wing nor Mickey Mouse has endorsed any of this site. All Air Force links are publicly accessible through the worldwide web. If there is any discrepancy between eye-witness accounts and OFFICIAL DOD records, this site opts to lend credence to the eye-witness views.

This site has little in the way of technical information on Kunsan AB's tactical planning, weekly exercises, or technical specifications on the aircraft. Our position is that Kunsan AB has been promising to "kick ass" for over thirty years and not a speck of bomb iron has hit North Korean soil yet. These tactical plans change from week to week, if not daily, but the point is: NO ONE from Kunsan has dropped a bomb on North Korea or shot a MiG from the sky. All the plans are simply plans -- not reality. HOWEVER, the hard work and ability of the airmen to carry out the war game planning in the face of a hardship tour speaks loads of their caliber and dedication. The PEOPLE is what we want to cover -- not the GAME. The second item we wish to cover is the base which has served the airmen -- who served the mission. Over the years, organizations have come and gone from the face of Kunsan AB -- but the base has always remained to serve. The third item covers those Korean events that affect the life of the airmen or mission at Kunsan. This ranges from main gate protests to the ever-mounting efforts of Korea to wean itself away from American military dependency.

HOW IT WAS! KUNSAN AIRBASE 8TH FIGHTER WING (2001): Part II

• Heavy January Snows -- Heavy snows in Kunsan stop operations. First time in recent memory that Lake Eunpa freezes over.
• Quality of Life Issues -- Facilities, Slot Machines, Base Retention Rates, Sexual Assaults in Barracks
• Community Service -- Clearing Ditches, Habitat for Humanity, article on Community Service, Graves on base
• Decal Scandal Continues -- Decal scandal of 2001 still around. Allegations that still in operation.
• Kunsan Revisited (Sept 2001) -- Lt. Col. Cheek (USMCR, Ret) returns to Kunsan.
• Aircraft Loss in June -- Korea upgrades its military hardware at a lightning pace under an ambitious program.
• Protests at Kunsan AB -- Protests continued, Video links to protest footage, Fair-weather Protestors, Strategy of combining groups, Activists on Internet, article.
• Sept 11, 2001: America Under Attack -- After the initial shock and lock-down, the base increased its security, and slowly returned to normal.
• The New Military -- In July 2001, the "win-win" policy is now dead. Military will "win on ONE front." Smaller military with less emphasis on coping with several crises at once. The Bush vision modified the wording in documents that will determine the size, shape and goals of U.S. forces around the world. And then came September 11th. The Bush administration had to step back and regroup for the War on Terrorism. His vision had to be modified and reshaped.
• SOFA Agreement -- Link to English text. Labor, Environmental Issues, Cost Sharing.
• Land Partnership Plan: Is The U.S. Presence in Korea Changing? -- U.S. will remain, but locations will change. Return of lands becomes a heated issue. Should Kunsan be considered as a potential family relocation site? Never, but should be considered as the rail, land, sea and air transportation infrastructure is in place.
• Hope for Peace and Rising Tensions between the U.S. and Korea -- Sunshine Policy in trouble because of Bush administration stance on North Korea
• North Korea's Acceptance of the U.S. Military Presence in South Korea -- Former President Jimmy Carter's conversation with Kim Il-Sung.
• The "Win on One Front" policy and the Korean Worry of America's Euro-centric viewpoint -- Historically the U.S. has been "euro-centric" (worried about Europe first) and this has caused some concern to Asian allies with the new "win on one-front" policy. Will Asia be thrown to the dogs?
• Korea's Move to be Independent Militarily from U.S. Support -- Korea upgrades its military hardware at a lightning pace under an ambitious program.
• Bio-terrorism Suddenly a Concern in Korea -- After U.S. anthrax attack, Korea starts agency for biological terrorism -- though North Korea has been known to have anthrax for quite some time.
• Is the South Korea Civilian Populace Prepared for a Chemical Attack? -- Our answer is "no." The Korean answer is "silence."

Acknowledgement: Thanks to HQ PACAF History Office and the 8th Fighter Wing Wolfpack Warrior for their source materials. Another excellent site used to trace the history of the 8th Fighter Wing is 8FW Lineage of the Air University.

The New Military:

Bush Victory

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released in September 2001 -- three weeks after the terrorist attack in New York -- once had been expected to call for sweeping changes in the size and scope of the nation's military forces and weaponry in line with early Bush administration pledges to reshape the armed forces. However, after the September 11th attack, the document was toned down quite a bit. The QDR in the past normally went into great detail of the who, what, where and cost. Before the NYC terrorist attack, it was being revised and re-revised as it did not meet the criteria of the Bush Administration for a SMALLER but more technically advanced military. After the attack, it was re-re-revised and hastily assembled for presentation to Congress. It provided only the basic guidelines and Secretary of Defense Rumsfield admitted that it was a work-in-progress because of the new strategies dealing with homeland defense.

According to a senior defense official, Pentagon leaders have dropped language that said America should base enough troops overseas to deter aggression by "swiftly defeating an enemy's effort with minimum reinforcement." Bush hated the favorite Clinton-term "nation-building." Under that concept a military force would enter a fray and remain until the infrastructure for building a nation was in place. Haiti, Bosnia, etc. were places that the U.S. military became mired down in the Clinton era. Under this concept the force would go in, do the job, and depart the area.

The DoD planners have also revised sections using the term "concurrency," which refers to the need to be able to perform several major military missions simultaneously, rather than one after another. Earlier this summer, the planners decided to eliminate the formal requirement that the military be able to fight two major wars in different parts of the globe at nearly the same time. In other words, the Pentagon "win-win" philosophy is officially D-E-A-D -- something the whole world, including the Korean military, has known for quite some time.

President Clinton Signs Defense Authorization Bill (1999)

The new reality is that downsizing of the military in the Clinton years has left it incapable of "winning on two fronts." VP Dick Cheney admitted this on Nightline in July 2001. This is not new...the world has known of this since 1992 when the military announced a downgrading of the "win-win" policy to a "win-lose" proposition. Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration continued to mouthe the "win-win" philosophy. Though allies like Korea also mouthed the words, no nation in the world believed the "win-win" words -- and all U.S. allies made plans based on the reality of a downsized U.S. military.

In the "win-on-one-front" policy, the U.S. will not even try to attack on the second front (as was planned for under the "win-win" policy), but rather will attack on one front and defend on the other. The QDR explains it slightly differently. According to the Washington Times, the QDR "adjusts a two-war capability that has guided the strategy of the armed forces since the end of the Cold War. The new requirement calls for defending American soil, first and foremost, winning one regional war decisively and repelling a foe in another theater." In other words, home defense becomes priority one. Priority two is winning a regional war. Bottomline is that someone WILL "suck hind-tit" or be left out in the cold.

The biggest problem that some Pentagon specialists see is that the QDR was promised to be a "strategy-based" document, but rather has turned out to be a "budget-based" one. In other words, strategy is not driving the forces manning, the "almighty dollar" in the budget will determine the shape of the forces. Though the document recommends looking to more futuristic weapon systems, the Pentagon is screaming for funds to upgrade the weapons that were neglected over the past decade. There were not enough funds to go around to rebuild the neglected military infrastructure; invest in new technology; AND implement a totally new concept that calls for highly mobile forces with a newly-added home defense mission.

8th Fighter Wing Exercises
Crew Chief radios for help for "unconscious" pilot
(8FW Photo) (Click to Enlarge)

The military today is roughly built around 12 Navy carrier battle groups, 10 active Army divisions, 12 active Air Force fighter wings and three Marine Corps expeditionary forces. The QDR maintains the troop strengths at CURRENT levels FOR NOW, but it is evident that hard choices will have to be made in the future between spending money on people or hardware.

It had been rumored that the Bush administration was looking towards eliminating one active Air Force wing, two Army divisions and one carrier battle group. Over the past 10 years, the force has shrunk to its current 1.4 million men and women from 2 million. The last time the force was cut substantially was when former Defense Secretary Les Aspin reduced it from about 1.6 million in 1994 to the current level. Many critics feel that the U.S. cannot maintain its current responsibilities around the world with an Army smaller than 485,000 men and women. Over the long term, more and more of a strain will be placed on Reserves and ANG units -- the "follow-on" elements that Kunsan will rely on to heavily to perform its wartime taskings.

To the military as a whole, the DoD statement of "swiftly defeating an enemy with minimum reinforcement" means smaller-sized highly-mobile units able to be quickly deployed and withdrawn after the initial strike. To the very cynical, the above statement can be interpreted as meaning, "Get in quick, strike a death blow and get out of Dodge...because your follow-ons ain't coming." As Afghanistan started to develop, this is exactly what has started to evolve as the strategy for U.S./British forces -- using special forces and helicopters for swift invasion and extraction. But for the long term, the policy is still being kicked around as September 11th changed the rules of everything. Truthfully, no one is really certain what this statement means as this concept is still under development.

In addition, the terrorist attacks in Sept 2001 forced everyone to reevaluate the role of the military in the defense of the nation. As the latest Afghan operations has proved, conventional forces were still required and must be maintained. New roles and strategies will flow out of this in the future. The Cold War may be dead, but there were still requirements for conventional forces with heavy armor...but there appears to be more and more of rationale for increasing special operations units and light infantry. Unfortunately, what I've just written means MORE forces...not less as the Bush Administration visualized. In addition, the new role of Home Defense still needs to be put together...and it is only a concept with a new Presidential Cabinet position as of October 2001.

Though the military in all services have met their recruitment goals, all services still have an exodus of qualified personnel. Shortfalls in pilots, mid-level NCOs and high-tech specialties continue. Though no one in official government channels was talking, the military newsgroups were filled with people warning that on the next crisis, there would be a severe shortfall in U.S. forces manning -- requiring massive callups of Reserve and ANG. After the New York terrorist attack, the newsgroups warnings were realized when the military suddenly faced severe shortfalls to take on such a daunting mission. The U.S. Air Force implemented "STOP LOSS" in October 2001 which placed discharges and retirements of critical skills on a hold. The DoD contemplated recalling of inactive reserve in critical skills.

8th Fighter Wing Exercises:
607th Combat Communications Squadron
sweep their area at Wolf Pack Park.
(8FW Photo) (Click to Enlarge)

At the beginning of his administration, Bush pledged to revamp the military with increased emphasis on technology to prepare for threats of the 21st century. However, the administration's tax cut and other spending priorities appear, however, to have sharply curbed chances for any large boosts in Pentagon spending to pay for those goals. Though Bush wants to transform the military, it can't be done on the current budget. As a result, the administration has sought an $18.4 billion increase for the 2002 fiscal year Pentagon budget of $328.9 billion.

Bush is going to need a lot of money...and that is going to be an uphill battle with a Democratic Congress. Those who wish to keep the status quo of the old conventional forces intact were claiming that Bush is like Clinton in "eviscerating" (gutting) the military. Thus Bush has some opponents already in the Conservative ranks. Even within the Pentagon thinkers there is some division with some feeling the Bush/Rumsfield strategy requires a much larger force than the present-day force -- rather than the smaller force the Bush wants. Bush is also after chopping such sacred (though useless) cows such as the B-1B and going after base closures to free up manning and resources.

In the wake of the NYC terrorist attack, the Congress was fully behind any request for increased funding. However, there were signs that the initial bi-partisan support for the President's plans were already being strained just a month after the attacks. The central battle now is focused on terrorism, but sooner or later, it must refocus on the nation's long-range military plans. There must be infrastructure rebuilding after a decade of neglect -- equipment must be upgraded or repaired; facilities must be fixed; people programs must be added to; new equipment must be procured to meet the new strategies of the U.S.; and the list goes on. One thing is certain though that the strategy will now focus on America's defense as priority one. What does all of this mean to Kunsan AB??? No one knows, but it is always certain that when funds were increased in one area, it must go down in another. Who will feel the cuts first is anyone's guess. Just hold your breath, kids. The roller-coaster ride is just starting.

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SOFA:

As to the SOFA, it was announced in April 2001 that an agreement had been reached. (See SOFA: 2000) In the newest revision, those accused of serious crimes (rape, murder, arson) will be held in Korean custody. For those who think is some sort of major change, it is not. The revision back in 1987 (the first revision since 1963) gave the Koreans the right to DEMAND custody of an individual if they so deemed. They never have. The change is that now the Koreans do NOT have to ask. The Americans retained custody of Americans accused of lesser non-violent crimes.

(To view or download the 2001 SOFA, go to 2001 SOFA: English Text. File requires Adobe Acrobat Reader.)

However, activists were still denouncing the USFK through deceptive Korean editorials and articles that lump five-year statistics together to make it appear that there is a "crime-wave" from military in Korea. The activists also continue to blame the SOFA over the custody issue, though that was resolved in this latest round.

A Korea Times article dated 21 Sep 2001 read:

Only 7 Pct of US Crimes Handled by Seoul Courts

South Korea has exercised its jurisdiction over only 7.2 percent of the crimes committed by U.S. soldiers here.

According to Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry statistics submitted for parliamentary inspection, South Korean courts exercised their jurisdiction over only 19 of the 263 crimes committed by U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) soldiers between January and July.

The percentage is a slight reduction from the 7.4 percent recorded last year when 27 out of 366 USFK crimes were dealt with in Korean courts.

Ninety cases of traffic violations topped the list of crimes committed by U.S. soldiers, followed by violent behavior with 86 cases. Other crimes involved 22 theft cases and 4 customs violations.

Meanwhile, South Korea spent approximately 1 trillion won annually from 1997 through 1999 in direct and indirect subsidies for the United States Forces Korea (USFK).

The Seoul government granted the USFK more than $700 million in direct subsidies and in waiving rents, fees and taxes. Direct subsidies in 1999 totaled $324 million while indirect subsidies amounted to $397 million.

(NOTE: The U.S. DIRECT costs for maintaining their troops in Korea all told is about $15,000,000,000 annually. The Americans spend as much to defend the ROK as the South Koreans do. Indirect costs have never been estimated, but that would be astronomical. For example, indirect costs would include shipping of goods to Korea for commissary stocks, BX and troop comfort; troop rotation costs; costs for TDYs for "follow-on" forces annual reserve training in Korea; costs for storage of assets in Japan and Guam flagged for Korea in case of war; etc. The Korean costs seem miniscule in comparison.)

SOFA and Labor: There is a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in the 2001 SOFA that specifies that the USFK will hire Korean Nationals ONLY for those positions specifically designated for Korean Nationals. Though dependents (A-3 visa status) may be considered for those positions, they would only be hired if NO Korean Nationals available or qualified for the positions.

Perhaps we are reading something into this that was not there, but in recent years it has appeared that the faceless "dependent" group had gained control of the Korean Civilian Personnel Office (CPO) -- atleast out of Osan -- and it seemed definitely weighted towards dependents. In the past at Kunsan, one could be considered for a U.S. citizen civilian position at Kunsan AB if one had SOFA status...BUT in order to get SOFA status, you had to have a SOFA position on base. Huh??? The CPOs justification was an outdated Osan CPO policy letter. This is a fact. But if you were a dependent, of course, you qualified as you had SOFA status. We were never able to figure out this screwball policy.

In this same MOU, it allows dependents to be employed in E-1 through E-9 visa categories (teaching positions) without losing their SOFA status. This is not a big deal as the dependents have been working in these categories all along throughout Korea. In fact, up to two years ago I marveled at the amount of books for teaching English to kids which were available in the BX -- though Kunsan is an unaccompanied tour location. It was also rather surprising that immediately following the appearance of these books on the on-base book shelves, they would also appear downtown in various English bookstores. No comment.

(NOTE: In the past, there have been many fine English teachers in Kunsan who were dependent wives on an E-2 visa. In fact, many used the space-A services on base to go to Japan to get their visas and return in three days. The teaching visa provisions has been in existence all along. However, the bigger problem that is NOT addressed for the military were those GIs who "moonlight" teaching English at hagwons or in apartments for pocket money. It is illegal from a Korean tax perspective -- and under U.S. SOFA regulations, but it's been in existence for as long as I've been in Kunsan. We personally have no gripe with them. These "moonlighters" were not real teachers, but rather were more like "friends" to their students specializing in "happy talk" and taking them on outings to the movies on base. They pose no real threat to English hagwons downtown.)

Supposedly the above was granted in return for the agreement that Korean employee terminations would be submitted to Korean arbitration under Article XVII, Labor. The terminations of Korean employees has become a major issue as more and more are terminated (or given forced early retirement) due to force reductions or camp closures.

SOFA and Environmental Concerns: The Koreans were still pressing for an environmental agreement under the SOFA, but the U.S. has thus far refused to be baited into this area. Instead, the 2001 SOFA contains a Memorandum of Special Understandings on Environmental Protection. The basic Korean premise is to have the Americans pay for past "wrongs" dealing with environmental damage. The 1966 SOFA states that everything is given as is when transferred back to Korea. If one considers the "Superfund" set to pay for the cleanup of bases in the U.S., you will understand the massive monetary impacts if the U.S. agrees to be baited into this item. In addition, the Koreans themselves have been notorious for polluting their own environment -- much more so than the Americans. However, there is no mention of the Korean culpability as well to this environmental pollution. The agreement still has not been reached in this area as of July 2001. In the interim period, the U.S. is returning its unused sites to the Koreans as fast as it can. Once returned to Korean control, they were no longer negotiable as environmental concerns.

In addition, U.S. forces in Korea were now accused of groundwater and soil contamination around U.S. installations. Oil leaks from storage tanks have been discovered, but most underground tanks (i.e., service stations) were replaced in 1999-2000 throughout Korea to bring them up to stateside standards. The biggest problem is that the environmental claims were all "retroactive." When the "crimes" were committed, no one considered dumping oil on the ground as hazardous. It was the standard operation of the day...including in the U.S.

The Korean activists claim U.S. military "mismanagement" of toxic wastes is laughable. For years Korean companies have repeatedly violated environmental laws in their rush to garner profits. There have been continual abuses of the "green belt" designated areas by people secretly dumping toxic waste into rice fields to allow the protected property to be reclassified for commercial use. Truckers have been found dumping their toxic waste in the forested areas. Cement trucks or "potty wagons" (septic tank trucks) were commonly seen along the irrigation ditches on the side of the road washing out their truck tanks. Korea has continually used chemicals banned by the United Nations for years. Toxic chemicals (insecticides) and fertilizers from the Seoul area golf courses have been consistently detected in the Han River. Pollution with toxic chemicals were routinely reported in the press. Throughout the country, wells have been found to be polluted and in many the water unfit for human consumption.

One incident that immediately comes to mind about Korea's environmental negligence occurred about five years ago. The people of Pusan complained of the foul smell of the drinking water, but the government said there was nothing wrong. The government simply disregarded the matter hoping it would disappear. However, the complainants took their case to the newspapers. Finally the government admitted that a company had dumped toxic waste into the Naktong River...a situation that had been occurring for years. It was only when the Naktong water levels dropped that the concentration of toxic waste increased to a level that it was discovered. Of course, the company owner didn't go to jail, but rather the underling manager was sentenced with a pitiance of fines. However, how much confidence would you have in a government water agency. Try to imagine that how much waste has to in the drinking water before you can SMELL it. After this incident, filters on apartment water taps or bottled drinking water became very popular.

In August 2001, the anti-American sentiments over the environmental issues came to a head. Earlier in the year, Mr. Albert McFarland of Yongsan Army Garrison, Mortuary Services was found responsible for the illegal release of toxic chemicals into the Han River when he directed Korean employees to dump 20 GALLONS of toxic chemicals into the drains. The problem was that the Korean Courts demanded he be turned over to Korean authorities. Though what he did was wrong, it was rather obvious that they were intending to hang him as a scapegoat for all perceived ills caused by the U.S. military. As they cannot touch the military since the environmental issues were NOT covered in the SOFA, they needed a scapegoat. The U.S. military refused to accept the indictment under the SOFA stating that MacFarland was acting as a U.S. military employee and that they were responsible. However, the USFK cannot be touched because of the SOFA. McFarland will not stand trial in a Korean court much to the anger of many Korean activists. They feel the SOFA has been used as an affront to national pride and sovereignty.

Another wrinkle in the environment issue is that the South Korean courts allowed residents of Pilsung Bombing Range to sue the Korean government for "noise damage" in June 2001. Anti-U.S. protests have been on the rise since early May when a U.S. Air Force fighter jet dropped six bombs on the Koon-Ni Range near the west coast village of Mae Hyang, 80 kilometers (50 miles) southwest of Seoul. Villagers say six people were slightly injured and walls were cracked and windows shattered by the impact. Together with activist groups, the villages have been staging sometimes violent rallies, demanding the relocation of the range.

This is a multi-billion DOLLAR suit that has dragged on for years. Though the Korean courts were free to render their decisions without coercion, they were still political. They make decisions that the government will support.

The Korean government will in turn ASK the American government to pay its "share." There is not much chance of that happening. If the U.S. agrees to appease the protesters, it will open up a Pandora's box on environmental issues and all the other things the Koreans want the U.S. to pay for. This is another Korean stick-in-the-eye.

The following is an article from the Korea Times dated 8 Jan 2002. It details how the Defense Ministry is setting up a proposed fund to compensate people, but the problem comes with USFK ranges such as Kooni Range. These would be discussed in future SOFA negotiations.

$6.8 Billion Eyed to Compensate People Near Ranges, Airfields

By Sohn Suk-joo
Staff Reporter

The South Korean government plans to create a 9 trillion won ($6.8 billion) fund to compensate for damage inflicted on about 380,000 residents near about 30 military ranges and airfields across the country.

Unveiling a set of measures to improve living conditions near such military facilities, the Defense Ministry said yesterday that it would wrap up its evaluation of the impact of the military's major airfields and ranges on the environment by 2004 and push for the enactment of a special law on noise by 2005. But the ministry's plan came under fire for not addressing the Kooni Range in Maehyang-ri, Hwasong, Kyonggi Province, where residents claim U.S. military exercises have caused physical injury, loss of hearing and property damage to their homes and livestock.

Though acknowledging that the Maehyang-ri residents' victory in a court battle two years ago touched off such compensation measures, a senior ministry official drew the line at the controversial issue, saying that the Kooni Range is a U.S. facility.

``The government should consult with the U.S. because the Kooni Range is a USFK facility,'' said Kim Yong-nam, chief of the environment section at the ministry.

He added that the two sides would determine whether to include the Kooni Range in the compensation package by the end of this year, after they hold talks in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

In April 2000, the court ordered the government to pay 132 million won in compensation to 14 Maehyang-ri residents, which led to another lawsuit in August last year by another 2,200 residents seeking 20 million won ($15,500) each from the government.

The ministry will embark on field research on about 20 airfields and 10 ranges, where a total of 380,000 residents in the affected areas are known to suffer from noise above 80 WECPNL (Weighted Equivalent Continuous Perceived Noise Level).

With that level of noise, people have difficulty communicating with each other during personal conversations, experts said.

Under the special law, the ministry would set up a 9 trillion won fund with state subsidies and noise burden donations from airline companies using military airfields.

Drawing upon the massive fund, the authorities would finance compensation for moving, soundproof facilities and public facilities, ministry officials said.

``Given the security situation, we will push for the special law because it is difficult to apply the existing law to military airfields and ranges,'' Kim told reporters. ``Talks on the issue with relevant ministries are proceeding smoothly, and we will meet the deadline for the plan.''

Increased Cost Share for ROK: In December 2001, negotiations concluded that increased Korea's "share" of the cost for continued American presence. (NOTE: For an enlightening 1999 article that covers the equitability of the ROK cost sharing over the years, go to Korea Should Start Paying Their Own Way.) The following article is from the Korea Herald, 4 December 2001:

Korea, U.S. work out details on payment for USFK upkeep

South Korea has agreed with the United States to pay 5 percent of its contribution to construction work for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) in kind, which was previously paid entirely in cash, the Defense Ministry said yesterday.

The ministry said it also secured a USFK promise to increase investments in environmental protection and use more of the upkeep costs for Korea-U.S. joint facilities.

The accord was struck during a two-day negotiation meant to finalize details of the three-year defense cost sharing for U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, which ended last Thursday.

The two sides agreed to split the Korean payments for South Korean nationals hired by the USFK, which accounts for almost half of Korea's share, into three installments from the current two, said Maj. Gen. Cha Young-koo, deputy minister for defense policy.

The two sides would also enhance coordination on the issue by convening the joint committee for defense budget sharing on a regular basis.

In mid-November, Korea agreed to increase its budget for the USFK by 10.4 percent next year from $444 million to $490 million during the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in Washington. The two sides set the growth rate in South Korea's portion for 2003 and 2004 at 8.8 percent with adjustment for inflation.

Critics said the increase in the subsidy was too high given the current Korean economic situation and the fact that the nation's annual defense budget has only increased by 6 percent on average in recent years. During the follow-up meeting last week, the two nations discussed other details, including the method of payment and usage of Korean subsidies for the maintenance of U.S. forces.

The Defense Ministry said Korea was able to reduce the actual growth rate in Korea's share to far below the 10.4 percent through follow-up agreements.

Korea will pay 5 percent of a total of $140 million to be used for military construction in kind. So far, South Korea has paid all costs in cash.

The agreement means that South Korea will reduce its actual military construction subsidies by bidding among suppliers, Cha said.

In addition, the two sides had already agreed before the meeting that Korea's payment denominated in won would be increased from 62 percent to 90 percent, with the exchange rate set at 1,245 won per dollar, in comparison to 1,300 won currently.

The increase in payment in won and the exchange rate adjustment should offset the annual foreign exchange loss of 22 billion won that South Korea has incurred over the past five years, Cha said.

The payment is due to begin in March after an approval by the government and the National Assembly.

8th Fighter Wing F-16s over city
(8FW Photo) (Click to Enlarge)

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Hope for Peace and Rising Tensions between the U.S. and Korea:

An editorial in the Korea Times on March 3 stated, "The South Korean government, obviously, was not too happy with the outcome of the presidential elections in the United States. The main reason for the lack of enthusiasm with the Bush-camp has been the very cordial relationship Kim Dae-jung had developed over the years with President Clinton. Seoul's reservations regarding the Republicans have an additional explanation: Many a comment coming from people close to the Republican front-runner were all but supportive of the South Korean policies. One of the more senior advisers of the Republican President, who may be called the master-mind of an alternative strategy vis-vis the communist regime in the North, even suggested, the use of the term "Sunshine Policy" be discontinued. Contrary to this, Kim Dae-jung and Bill Clinton were in full harmony in regards to North Korea: there was a fundamental consensus that engagement was the most effective strategy to deal with Pyongyang."

Kim Jong-Il and Kim Dae-jung
Happy with Sunshine Policy

Tensions seem to be escalating between Korea and the U.S. on the reapproachment stance of both countries to North Korea. One of the first acts of the Bush Presidency was having a high-level visit from Kim Dae-jung. Prior to Kim Dae-jung's visit to the U.S. in March 2001, President Kim stated that the U.S. and Korea were "in agreement" over the North Korean peace process. Unfortunately, that was left-over from when Clinton was in office. A new President was in place.

Kim Dae-Jung and George Bush
(Korea Herald photo)

In March 2001, Gen. Colin Powell, U.S. Secretary of State, told a Senate hearing, "The US has no illusions about North Korea that is despotic and a rogue nation, and the authoritarian regime in the North will collapse whether it adopts an open-door policy or not." DJ Kim's tour for selling Sunshine policy to the new US Administration was doomed to a failure. No matter how much South Korean media hype, the Sunshine Policy was in danger. Though the US-Korean alliance was never in danger, the opening of the dialogue between the North and the U.S. has some new game rules.

The following is an answer to a press question during a briefing by US Secretary of State Colin Powell and ROK Foreign Minister Han Seung-Soo after their meeting in Washington, DC, on June 7, 2001. Powell's comments followed an announcement by US President George W. Bush on June 6 that he had decided to undertake "serious discussions" with North Korea on issues such as North Korea's nuclear activities and missile programs.

Q: Could you explain the basic difference between your policy and the Clinton Administration policy, if any?

SECRETARY POWELL: I think we have expanded the areas of dialogue by putting conventional forces on the agenda and by making it clear to the North Koreans that we want to talk about missiles and missile technology and missile sales and nuclear weapons programs, but also we want to talk about humanitarian issues. We want to talk about other issues that affect relationships between North and South Korea, but especially between North Korea and the United States. So I think we're expanding it in a more comprehensive way, and I think that I would list as one of the major changes.

The bottomline from the beginning of the Bush Administration was that it did NOT agree with the give-away policies of the Clinton Administration. Basically, the US will not provide two light-water nuclear power plants that they promised in 1994 Agreed Framework at Geneva with the North Korea. 2. The US will demand four concessions from the North: a. a reduction of the North Korean army b. the discontinuation of long-range missile programs c. an end of Scud missiles exports to Iraq, Iran and other rogue nations d. an abrogation of the nuclear weapons of mass destruction. They would reconsider the implementation of the Geneva Agreement, if these concessions were met with full verification and transparency. 3. The Bush Administration maintained the skeptical view of the North Korean regime that Kim Jong-Il's words are worthless without verification or reciprocity. 4. The US objects to Kim Dae-jung's free aid to North Korea. Specifically, the U.S. was not happy with the Hyundai Asan Group paying $12 million per month to the North, $1 billion until 2005.

"Taking the Fight North" is not a "Sunshine" Policy
(8FW Photo) (Click to Enlarge)

In the meeting by Kim Dae-jung with Bush, Bush outlined his views of North Korea being a terrorist state. He was at odds with Kim's "sunshine" policy that saw peace as being just around the corner. However, this confrontational policy cause North Korea to state that it was being "forced" to increase its military might in response to Bush's "hostile policy." North Korea told the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum in Hanoi, Vietnam, in July 2001 that it had no choice but to increase its military power in North Korea. To defuse this situation, Bush sent an envoy to carry his message to Kim Dae-Jung in August 2001 that he supported his "engagement policy."

However, it appears to many Koreans that Bush is using North Korea as a pawn in his plans for a Missile Defense plan. Lee Jong-Suk, research fellow at the Sejong Institute, said, ``The U.S. government has treated North Korea as "rogue state" for the pursuit of the MD (Missile Defense) plan, rather than attempting to genuinely talk with the North. Therefore, the resumption of talks with North Korea implies that the U.S. took a two-track approach in which the MD plan is compatible with the NK-US talks." In other words, the opening of talks would be to buttress Bush's missile defense plan.

The actions taken by the Clinton staff to sign a treaty with North Korea was swiftly...and permanently erased. The treaty that the Clinton administration thought was just around the corner was shelved. The North Korean leader's visit South Korea in the middle of the year did not materialize...partially due to Bush's policies of retaining North Korea on the terrorist nation list. Instead of the planned visit to South Korea in mid-year, the North Korean leader visited Russia -- via train -- for a state visit. Substance of the talks are unknown at present, but there are fears that Russia may provide North Korea with highly sophisticated equipment and missile technology -- though avoiding any bilateral military cooperation agreement to avoid an international furor.

On the domestic front one of Kim Dae-Jung's ministers allowed 300 people to attend a rally in North Korea and some made statements contrary to the South's views. These people were arrested when they returned. This caused Kim Dae-Jung to completely reshuffle his cabinet...resulting in a loss of prestige for his government. Having gained what they wanted in the press, the North Koreans resumed discussions with the South in Sept 2001 but the talks results seems to be very tentative. The end result of the talks was the agreement for further family visits...a media event with positive results on both sides. However, major discussions have been shelved.

The Bush Administration's approach to dealing with North Korea is very different from Clinton's. In Clinton's approach, it was one of appeasement in exchange for promises. The Bush Administration wants to see "substantive" improvements before any commitment. In essence, the Bush Administration is playing "hard ball." However, the U.S. is stressing that it is will to meet with the North Koreans "anytime, anywhere." Currently, the Korean government is trying to put the best face on this situation.

Most Korean editorials fear that the Bush Administration policies will lead to heightened tensions on the peninsula. To the Koreans, Bush's confrontational stance is very worrisome. However, from the Bush Administration viewpoint, the North Koreans never made any changes on missile development or nuclear weapons development. They only promised not to do it temporarily...or atleast until they could use it as another bargaining chit for more aid money. In addition, they continued to sell their missiles to Iran. The U.S. review of its North Korean policy was completed in May 2001 and the negotiations between North and South continue.

However, with the new American stance for "substantive" changes, the North is balking. Kim Dae-jung stated that there was a "time line" for these talks to precede the visit of Kim Jong-Il to South Korea in May-June 2001. The deadline was passed and the visit was shelved. Even after U.S. officials visited North Korea after Bush's "top-down review" but the negotiations still remained stalled on substantive matters. The most recent discussions in Sept 2001 only resulted in agreement for further family visits...however, that too got side-tracked and postponed by the North in October 2001. Disgustedly, South Korea threatened to delay of food and monetary aid and cancel meetings at Kumgang Mountain in North Korea.

From the moment of Bush's election, the U.S. was slated for a head-on confrontation with China over its missiles -- quite capable of reaching the U.S mainland -- and the erection of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system. The thing that irked its allies was that the U.S. was unilaterally removing itself from missile proliferation treaties. The reason was that non-signatory "rogue" nations -- like China -- with ballistic missiles capable of reaching the U.S. were not bound by the treaty. South Koreans indirectly criticized Washington's plans to erect the NMD system in February 2001. As a spokesman of the South Korean Foreign Ministry stated, "We cannot support Washington's NMD system that designates Pyongyang as rogue nation, just as we are planning the second inter-Korean summit."

However, as one US-expert put it about the North Korean missile treaty recently, North Korea is but the "poster child to deploy missile defenses", the true rational is "to pick a fight with China." That opportunity came when a EP-3 "spyplane" was damaged and forced down into China in April. Shortly thereafter an arms package was released to Taiwan with the statement from Bush that the U.S. would defend Taiwan. The stage for confrontation is set. The prisoners were released and the U.S. apologized for the incident. The plane was shipped home in pieces and China tried to tack a humonguous million dollar "handling charge" to the U.S. -- which the U.S. immediately refused to pay. The confrontation continues, but now at a low level -- with China asserting that it wishes to be "friends" with the U.S. based on economic ties during a visit by Secretary of State Powell in July.

However, this anti-China stance of the U.S. is NOT a Korean stance. Korea wishes good relations with China -- especially with its ever-increasing economic ties to its powerful neighbor. Also the South Korean government has a clearly defined national interest in Beijing's continued support regarding Korean reunification. Korea is very keen on developing closer relations with the Chinese.

8th Fighter Wing Exercises
8th Civil Engineering Squadron Fire Protection
prepare to fight a simulated fire at Seabreeze
(8FW Photo) (Click to Enlarge)

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Land Partnership Plan: Is The U.S. Presence in Korea Changing?

So will the U.S. troops be removed? No. They will remain. However, a DoD news release in June 2001 stated that the U.S. intended to give back many bases to the Koreans while NOT reducing the force strength. The news release emphasized that the current numbers of U.S. military in Korea would NOT be reduced, but rather CONSOLIDATED in another location. In October 2001, the plan was publically released as the "Land Partnership Program" which consolidated the functions of 41 sites into 22 sites. General Schwartz, USFK commander, announced that this was a "win-win" situation between the USFK and the Koreans. At present this looks like a long-overdue measure by the USFK to rid itself of unused or under-utilized facilities.

The Korean newspapers previously reported that there were 94 U.S. military bases across South Korea. Thus with this reduction, we are assuming that the total was reduced by 19. Thus that now leaves 75 sites/camps/bases left in Korea. It is readily apparent where this "win-win" situation is leading. It is the opening to real estate development of formerly protected military lands. In the Donga Ilbo on Nov 7th, an article stated,

42.63 million pyongs of land over the nation including the area of 29.34 million pyong in Kanghwa Island and 35 other places will be discharged from the military protection area. In addition, once 3.72 million pyongs of 34 places such as Pyongchang-dong in Seoul and Gadeok Island in Pusan, were included in the restriction-alleviated areas, the height restriction of the construction will be drastically eased.

The Defense Ministry announced yesterday that the Ministry would discharge or ease the restrictions of 46.35 million pyongs of 70 places over the nation to increase the property rights of the citizens, as long as it does not negatively affect the military operation. The new policy will be applied from next month and the administrative offices will place the map showing the discharged areas for the convenience of the inquirers.

The discharged areas included 29.34 million pyongs of 2 places in Kanghwa Island that does not affect the coast guard operations, 430,000 pyongs of 5 places in Munsan, Paju, Kyonggi, 9.13 million pyongs of 24 suburban and residential areas in Koyang and Ilsan, Kyonggi, and 3.73 million pyongs of 5 mountain areas such as Mt. Soyo in Dongduchon, Kyonggi.

Consequently, the residents of the discharged places will recover their property rights. They do not have to discuss with the military authorities to re-construct or renovate their houses or construct their business buildings. They are only to receive a permit from the local administrative office from now on.

Around Seoul or Inchon, there were many small "camps" scattered in the middle of prosperous business districts. Some of these small "camps" have their own NCO clubs and small shoppettes. The bulk of these "camps" were simply small storage facilities or repair facilities -- inefficiently located in the center of the city. In truth, most of these sites would be hard pressed to be justified.

Other examples would be small camps behind the DMZ that were no longer required. The U.S. turned over the DMZ defense line to the RoK Army in the 1970s and operate a short distance behind the DMZ in areas like Uijongbu. Many of these small sites -- isolated in the hills -- were leftovers from when the U.S. forces in Korea were much larger. Some have equipment pre-positioned, but not the manning to operate the equipment. For example, about a year ago AFKN did a special on a decontamination unit that was undermanned by U.S. military -- and relied on supplemental manning from the RoK Army. These small sites would be ideal for return to the RoK -- along with the full transfer of the equipment and defense responsibilities.

With the latest round of environmental concerns, it would be wise to get rid of these small sites. Once returned to the Korean military, the U.S. cannot be attacked for "reparations" or clean up costs over environmental issues. The Korean government has thus far readily accepted them as is. When one recalls the cost of U.S. military base cleanups in the the continental U.S. which were under the "super-fund", it is imperative that the U.S. get rid of its "dirty" oil storage bases as soon as possible. Remember that under the current SOFA, the Koreans accept the land back as is -- without any claims from the ROK for returning the land to the previous condition.

Another consideration in recent years is that the U.S. military personnel have been constantly targeted outside the Yongsan compound for Korean protests over a lot of perceived wrongs. Upon entering or exiting a USFK compound, they were immediately recognizable as targets for any terrorist attack. Under force protection concerns, these small sites were a handicap.

But in a long-range view, the ideal would be to remove the 8th Army Headquarters out of Seoul -- if for no other reason than Seoul being one of the highest cost of living areas in the WORLD. Where would the USFK forces be consolidated? Osan AB is NOT a player as it was proposed for this type of consolidation in 1992, but it could not handle the on-base dependent housing and buildings required to relocate 8th Army Headquarters. Pyongtaek is out of the question as the Mayor and key civic leaders flatly refused to accept more military in their area during 1992 discussions. The military then looked south. In 1993, Pusan made a ridiculous offer of an even exchange (without monetary compensation) of a flood plain without any infrastructure for Camp Hialeah with all its infrastructure intact. Of course, it was emphatically refused. This led to a status quo arrangement about Yongsan Garrison (and other tiny "camps" in the Seoul area) staying put as there was no reasonable Korean offer. So where?

USFK Land Useage in Korea: A story that has some bearing on the land use of GIs in Korea follows. It is from the Korea Herald dated 29 July 2001. It covers some of the areas of the Land Partnership Plan that the US-ROK are in agreement on.

USFK Uses Half Million Acres of Land in Korea

By Oh Young-jin Staff Reporter

The United States Forces Korea (USFK) has recently returned about 5,000 acres (6.065 million pyong) of military training areas to Korea, the USFK said.

The USFK statement comes on the heels of an increased number of requests by Korean people for the return of real estate which is currently being used by U.S. forces. Land is in short supply in Korea amid the rapid expansion of urban areas.

In its background data released to the press yesterday, the USFK said that it was not the first time that it had released land granted to it under the ROK-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), despite the widespread public belief to that effect.

``Over the past 29 years (since the establishment of the SOFA), out of the 348,000 acres (425.952 million pyong) of land originally granted to it, the USFK now retains only 0.292 million acres (35.740 million pyong),'' the data said.

According to USFK watchers, it is very rare for the USFK to speak up on the land return issue, which is considered to be an increasingly vexing problem to both sides. For instance, in the early 1990s, the return of land occupied by U.S. camps in Seoul was agreed to in principle but the agreement was left unconcluded because of budget problems concerning the relocation of the bases in question. In the process, the Korean public was angered at what it saw as a lukewarm attitude on the part of the USFK. An additional 0.231 million acres has been provided to the USFK on a temporary basis and is being used for military training such as tank maneuvers, artillery firing, aerial drops, weapons qualification tests and major combat simulation exercises, the USFK said.

``The land granted for USFK use is less than one percent of the developable land in Korea,'' it said. About 57,000 U.S. soldiers, civilian employees and their dependents are stationed in Korea. It cited a few recent cases of land returns.

The USFK said that following an agreement between the Defense Ministry and the USFK in 1992, an overpass that spans Camp Walker in Taegu was constructed and greatly eased congested traffic conditions. In return, the ministry replaced housing and facilities on Camp Walker that had to be removed for the road construction.

It also pointed out the 1992 revision of a 1970 agreement permitting the use of Kunsan Air Base by Korean carriers, increasing their flight frequency. The USFK said that such arrangements, which permit regular commercial airlines' access to U.S. Air Force bases outside U.S. territory, exist only in Kunsan and in Misawa, Japan.

It concluded that the number of mutually beneficial solutions to real estate issues in Korea is a testament to the strength of the ROK-U.S. alliance and the commitment of both nations to provide for the socio-economic needs of civilians while ensuring a strong defense posture.

Relocation of Yongsan: Though the City of Seoul would dearly love to have Yongsan vanish from its environs, it won't be happening anytime soon. In December 2001, the issue of the Yongsan garrison relocating surfaced again in the Korean community when the USFK announced the building of a new apartment complex for the military in Yongsan South Post in 2002. Immediately there was a public outcry from both anti-American activists as well as civic leaders. The USFK wants to build 20 eight-story buildings housing a total of 1,066 apartments on an area of about 148,500 square meters, to replace dilapidated officers' quarters. The Ministry of Defense initially ok'd the plan, but immediately came under fire. It backpedalled and said, ``We will consider mapping out a set of long-term measures on the level of national security and will closely consult with USFK and relevant ministries.'' But Seoul City is determined to push ahead with a plan to build a park and a new city hall near the Noksapyong subway station in the South Post, where USFK is to build the apartment complex. The city vowed to block the construction by invoking the law on the purpose of the land. The controversial South Post area is currently zoned as a ``natural green'' region where construction of more than five-story buildings is banned under the Construction Law.

However, according to the Korea-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the USFK is not required to receive formal approval regarding the construction plan from the South Korean government. Local laws do not apply to USFK's construction on its military bases. SOFA stipulates that USFK is required to only "notify and consult" the Korean central government "in sufficient time to allow a coordinated review of planned construction with local governments." "The United States will give due consideration to the views expressed by the Republic of Korea," says the agreement that governs the legal status of U.S. forces in Korea.

The following is from the Korea Herald on 12 December 2001.

Korea, U.S. resume talks on relocation of Yongsan base

South Korea and the United States yesterday launched a high-level consultation meeting to deal with issues related to the relocation of the U.S. military base in central Seoul, officials said.

The meeting will also discuss a recent controversy over U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)'s plan to build a new apartment complex on the Yongsan base, which triggered angry protests from civic groups and Seoul City officials.

In the early 1990s, the United States agreed to return the Yongsan base by 1996 on the condition that the Korean government offer alternative land and shoulder relocation costs, which was estimated by USFK to reach $9.5 billion.

Negotiations were suspended in June 1993 as both sides concluded that they could not meet the schedule largely because of budget problems.

"The two sides are resuming talks on the relocations issue for the first time in eight years," said Maj. Gen. Cha Young-koo, deputy minister for defense policy.

Cha is South Korea's chief delegate to the consultation meeting. His U.S. counterpart is Maj. Gen. Daniel R. Zanini, deputy chief of staff of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC).

During the first round of talks yesterday, the two sides agreed that they would meet frequently to discuss the relocation of the military base. The topics will include Korea's provision of alternative land, according to Brig. Gen. Kwon Haing-keun, chief of Yongsan Project Office at the Korean Defense Ministry.

They also agreed to work out procedures and other details on USFK's project to build a new apartment complex by Jan. 15 next year, Cha said.

USFK officials affirmed that they would push ahead with the plan despite opposition from civic groups and the Seoul city government, which want U.S. forces to move out of the capital city.

"The reason (that both sides launched the meeting) is to ensure that all aspects of the construction proceed under consultation at the highest possible level," Col. Robert E. Durbin, CFC assistant deputy chief of staff, told reporters.

USFK officials said they would earmark about 1.1 percent of South Korea's subsidy for U.S. military construction programs to the new apartment project for the next 10 years, Cha said.

Last Friday, USFK said that it would build apartment buildings to replace old housing for the U.S. military personnel in its Yongsan military base. The construction work is expected to begin next summer. Under the new Korea-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which took effect in April, USFK is required to notify and consult with the Korean government at an appropriate time when considering any changes in existing facilities granted by the Seoul government.

(jjhwang@koreaherald.co.kr) By Hwang Jang-jin Staff reporter

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A followup article appeared on 27 December 2001 in the Korea Herald . It stated:

Korea to ensure relocation of Yongsan base: ministry

The Defense Ministry said yesterday it will try to ensure that a new land swap agreement with the U.S. military to be signed in March includes a written U.S. pledge to relocate the main U.S. military base in central Seoul. Last month, the two sides signed a letter of intent (LOI) on a large-scale land exchange plan, called the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), to allow for the consolidation of U.S. bases and training grounds. They plan to finalize the agreement in March.

"We will propose that the LPP agreement clearly stipulate the relocation of the Yongsan base," said a ministry spokesman.

The spokesman's statement followed reports that the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) plans to organize the Yongsan base into the key command headquarters that would exercise command and control of all U.S. forces in South Korea in its 10-year LPP project.

The plan was unveiled in an article in the October issue of the USFK community bulletin, "Let's Go Together."

The Korean official said the article was written before the LPP plan was finalized.

"Now things are different. USFK has recently reaffirmed its willingness to relocate the Yongsan base should some conditions be met," he said.

Early last week, the two sides launched high-level consultations to deal with issues related to the base relocation and a recent controversy over USFK's plan to build a new apartment complex on the Yongsan base.

In the early 1990s, the United States agreed to return the base by 1996 on the condition that the Korean government offer alternative land and shoulder relocation costs, which were estimated by USFK to reach $9.5 billion in 1992.

Negotiations were suspended in June 1993 as both sides concluded that they could not meet the schedule largely because of budget problems.

Under the LPP accord, signed by the defense ministers from the two nations in Washington, USFK will return a total of 130 million sq. meters of land to South Korea over the next 10 years.

In return, the Seoul government will grant the U.S. military 2,475,000 sq. meters of new land in and around existing U.S. installations to help merge small U.S. bases and compounds with nearby larger ones.

The two sides are conducting negotiations over details and plan to sign a final agreement by March 15.

From my past observations, the Koreans really haven't changed. The Seoul City government wants the Yongsan Garrison land but can't touch it because of the failed negotiations to relocate it to another part of the country. The Korean government really doesn't want to handle this hot potato as they will have to offer some SIGNIFICANT monetary assistance in the billions to relocate the units. The Japanese did this in the 1970-1980s to regain such bases as Tachikawa AB near Yokota AB and recently at Yokota to regain the dependent housing and BX land in Fussa outside the base. However, the difference is the Koreans are too cheap. The story continued into January and February 2002 but soon died down. The reason was that no city in Korea wants the GIs to move into their area. Everything is back to the 1993 status.

Could Kunsan Be Considered as a Site for Moving 8th Army HQ from Seoul? NEVER!!! Probably the biggest vote against the move would be from the USFK themselves. Anyone in the voting chain would immediately veto Kunsan from consideration. Who would want to move from the bright lights of a metropolis like Seoul to a "country town" like Kunsan? A sought-after assignment to HQ USFK in Seoul would be relegated to a death-sentence assignment in Kunsan. In addition, the "last of the warrior bases" would have to change its style as it would become immediately dependent centered entailing massive amounts of monies to procure housing and infrastructure. Kunsan would not be a good place to consider this at this time.

Kunsan's consideration though might be considered to fill some other functions -- unspecified at this time. Kunsan seems to be the only place that a major expansion could take place without the hassles prevalent in other locations. Even before the negotiations were complete, Green Korea was protesting the granting of lands to the USFK over environmental concerns. The non-government organizations (NGO) groups have been a constant source of irritation to the military because they deal with oil contamination or pollution of the rivers. In selecting sites, the Korean government is bound to face a lot of protests. The rest of Korea seems to have a problem accommodating the USFK forces with the NIMBY complex (Not In My BackYard).

Understandably, almost all the large scale land usage areas that the USFK desires are located near Pusan because of the present war plans. The critical OPLAN tasks include "strategic deployment and reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of US augmenting unit, each year." Basically, in time of war, the follow-on forces will enter through Pusan and be staged nearby at Ulsan or another area to be announced. All equipment would be prepositioned in this area -- tanks, APC, etc. awaiting the follow-on troops. In addition, "All theater level exercise training is conducted in a joint and combined environment to improve cooperation, coordination, communication and interoperability." Because of this, there must be a large training area nearby which ROK, USFK and follow-on troops can exercise with their equipment. This area should be in the south east section of Korea.

However, if there are any hassles over areas that are NOT REQUIRED TO BE NEAR PUSAN -- then Kunsan can be considered. Kunsan, however, is located directly on the Yellow Sea so has escaped all of this NGO venom. It is the only base left with an INTACT three-mile exclusionary area...meaning that no major industries or cities have encroached on its boundaries through exceptions -- except for the Kunsan Airport.

There is going to be a lot of areas that will ultimately turn out unfit for habitation or planned usages -- especially if all the reports from the protest groups are true. Sooner or later, someone will consider Kunsan and the expanded tidal reclamation areas as a possible area for land swaps. The land that is unfit for use could be turned into ROK Military training area -- with portions set aside for the U.S. The reclaimed land in the Kunsan area belongs to the Korean government and could be transferred without encumberances.

The NGOs at Kunsan are only claiming the base has used the land illegally, but the new areas to be considered would be in the tidal plain reclamation areas. (Go to 2002: Kunsan AB Protests for coverage of these protests by NGO groups.) As the protests are about EXISTING land usage and NOT the newly created land, this may be an area to consider.

In 2000, the Korean government overturned the two-year work stoppage (based on environmental concerns) on the massive tidal reclamation project going on in the area. Since then, the project has surged forward and the dike is now complete to Puan. The West coast highway connecting Kunsan to Inchon in TWO HOURS -- versus the three hour ride to Seoul -- is open. Land areas will be built up on both sides of the present Kunsan Air Base in the Kunsan Free Trade Zone to the Kunsan side and the Saengmangun Tidal Reclamation Project towards Puan. According to environmentalists, there were potential pollution problems in the Puan area due to the push for speedy construction versus the implementation of preventive measures.

As the tidal reclamation project will expand land area -- and enclose the base except for the southern tip extending into the West Sea -- the use of the land surrounding the base by the military is possible. The base signed off on this expansion about three years ago. Under the LPP, the Korean government promised to grant the U.S. military 2,475,000 sq. meters of new land in and around existing U.S. installations to help merge small U.S. bases and compounds with nearby larger ones. Time will tell where this base consolidation issue leads.

During the discussions in 1992-1993 of relocating Yongsan and other camps, Kunsan was never considered as it was still in the process of building its Industrial Area. There was no space to accomodate the movement from Yongsan. Since that time there has been a massive amount of construction going on round-the-clock. The tidal reclamation project has been restarted again. Now there is space for the expansion.

North Korea's Acceptance of the U.S. Military Presence in South Korea

What do the North Koreans have to say about the continued U.S. presence? Despite the rhetoric, the North seems resigned to the fact that the U.S. is required to maintain some sort of stability in the area. In an interview with the state-run Korea Broadcasting System (KBS) during his visit to Korea in August 2001, former U.S. president Jimmy Carter said that late North Korean leader Kim Il-sung approved of the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea in Carter's meeting with Kim Il-sung in June 1994. The former U.S. president visited North Korea at the height of the nuclear crisis between North Korea and the U.S., voluntarily assuming the role of mediator. His visit paved the way for what could have been the first inter- Korean summit on July 25-27 of the same year.

At that time, the elder Kim recognized the need for the USFK's presence for regional security, and pointed out the necessity of a mutual armed forces reduction. ``He (Kim Il-sung) also said that North Korea should reduce 50 percent, South Korea should reduce 50 percent, and the U.S. should reduce 50 percent, but to allow U.S. forces in Korea, that's what he promised,'' Carter said.

Two months after the elder Kim's death on July 8 in 1994, Carter said that he received a letter from Kim's son, the incumbent North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, who made it clear that he would carry on his father's promises. Since 1992, North Korean officials and scholars, including Chairman Kim Jong-Il himself, have said more than once that they were willing to endorse the USFK's presence on the Korean peninsula -- even after unification.

8th Fighter Wing Exercises:
MSgt Paula Harris and SSgt Teril Hodge
are apprehended as Prisoners of War by Opposing Forces
(8FW Photo) (Click to Enlarge)

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The "Win on One Front" policy and the Korean Worry of America's Euro-centric viewpoint:

The "win-on-one-front" strategy under the QDR will be to attack on one front and repel on another. This poses the serious question: "If an all-out aggression breaks out in Europe or Isreal at the same time as Korea, which one will the U.S. support whole-heartedly?" To Koreans -- great lovers of history -- the answer is plainly Europe or Israel. From WWI onward, the U.S. policy has ALWAYS been Euro-centric. In fact, the Korean War broke out because Truman and Dean Acheson were more worried about the Communists in Greece than the threat from North Korea. This is a fact...and the position repeated often in Korean newspaper editorials.

In July 2001, the DoD announced that it was decreasing forces in Europe...which was immediately applauded by all Senators and Congressmen from the Pacific-rim states who saw money coming their way. The DoD quickly backpedalled and said only "equipment" was being removed...and backpedalled again to say only "tanks" were being removed (possibly to Diego Garcia)...and backpedalled again to say it was still under review. The status quo has been maintained...the U.S. is STILL Euro-centric in the eyes of Asia.

Though the DoD continued to speak of the importance of Asia in its military strategy, its actions all pointed to the Middle East. After the terrorist attack on America and the first priority for U.S. military forces to be home defense, the Asian community is more nervous than ever.

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Korea's Move to be Independent Militarily from U.S. Support:

The movement away from U.S. support was slow at first but deliberate. Their forces took over the majority of the DMZ areas' defense in the 1970s but still relied heavily on the U.S. for military training and hardware through Foreign Military Sales (FMS). But as Korea gained status as one of the four dragons of Asia, it started to view itself in a different light. After Korea became one of the four dragons of Korea and had enough financial power, it started on its upgrade programs to improve its military strength.

It also should be noted that there has been increasing criticism that the Koreans did what the Japanese did -- they built their economic empire at the expense of defense as the U.S. foot the bill under its "umbrella." Patterned on the Japan model, Korea gambled and let the U.S. umbrella provide Korea's protection while all its resources were funneled into the chaebols to foster economic prosperity. Up until 1990, the U.S. provided the bulk of the ROK military funding. After the 1990s, the U.S. spent about $15 billion annually on the ROK defense -- the same amount as the ROK itself. (NOTE: For an enlightening 1999 article that covers the equitability of the ROK cost sharing over the years, go to Korea Should Start Paying Their Own Way .)

After Korea had become one of the four dragons of Asia, it started to build its our home-grown military industry -- partially as a matter of national pride and partially from an irrational fear of Japan's growing military strength. Contracts were let to start building fighters in Korea -- primarily to get the technology to start a home-grown aircraft industry. It became apparent in the early 1990s that the U.S. would be unable to pursue a "win-win" policy (win on two fronts). The Clinton administration started its cutting of the military defense budget in the 1990s.Soon afterward, the Korean government in 1992 started an aggressive upgrade program for their military. The impression was that for all the rhetoric, the U.S. could not be relied upon in the future to provide for the Korean defense.

The biggest shift was in the perception of the relationship between the two nations. Previous to this Korea had viewed the U.S. as their "big brother." After 1992, the relationship with the U.S. became more of that of an equal. As Korea moved into G-12 nation status in the late 1990s, they swiftly shuttled aside their subordinate role to the U.S. and the Korean military relationship with the U.S. changed significantly.

Defense spending increased with large contracts let to keep the shipyards fully employed after the shipbuilding boom died. The government is a true example of protectionism, let the contracts to the various chaebol (conglomerate) shipyards to make things "equitable." Their first home-grown submarines (based on German design) were launched. Their first home-grown destroyers were launched -- and the Korean shipyards were busy upgrading their fleet to a blue-water navy -- from a strictly coastal navy. The destroyers were equipped with Aegis-type electronics from the French. In the 1990s, they even tried to circumvent the treaties by buying a Soviet carrier for scrap, then trying to get it refurbished as an active carrier. However, it proved unfeasible...but Korean motives were readily apparent. It is intent on having a "blue water fleet" equal to Japan in the near future. The Korean navy started participation in naval PacRim exercises in Hawaii in 2000.

The Korean-manufactured KFP F-16 variants were in place. Currently there is a international contract bid out for the next generation Korean fighter causing much consternation as the government attempts to ensure that no "bribery" or corruption is involved in the purchase -- unlike past fighter and arms purchases. At this time, Boeing's F-15 seems to have the edge -- based upon "historical" ties to the U.S. -- but Eurofighter and the Russians have made very lucrative offers of technology transfers. If I were the U.S., I'd look to history. The Koreans don't honor "historical" ties...it's all a matter of business in who is giving the best deal.

Armored personnel carriers and other military equipment were now home-grown products. In October 2001, the new K1 main battle tank upgrade, the K1A1, was rolled out by Hyundai Mobisi Changwon plant. In addition, 67% of 320 pieces of equipment including the ATC and gun sights have been localized. 11 more tanks will roll out before the year ends. These will replace the U.S. M-series tanks.

For all the rhetoric of U.S.-Korea partnership in the Combined Forces Command, the Korean military has been pursuing their own goals since the early 1990s. In addition, Korea has steadily looked to Europe and others for technology to wean itself away from U.S. dependence on its military hardware. The "official" Korean line always says something like "we will give the U.S. first preference," BUT... the submarines are of German design and the Aegis destroyers had French electronics. Actions speak louder than words.

The following is an excerpt from Asian Aerospace 2000 in an article, "Asia-Pacific Economic Recovery Speeds Arms Procurement Revival" by John Fricker:

Republic of Korea

After a remarkable economic recovery, FY2000 RoK defense budget requests have increased to W14.439 trillion ($12.69 billion), including W5.34 trillion for procurement, as part of a W26.7 trillion four-year military modernization program. Main procurement proposals include RoKAF requests for another 20 license-built Lockheed Martin KF-16C/Ds. These supplement previous RoKAF orders for 110 F100-PW-220/229-powered Block 32/52 F-16Cs and 50 F-16D-32/52s, delivered between 1986-2000 through the Korean Fighter Program.

After two years' delays through economic problems, the F-X requirement for replacement of RoKAF's 18 MDC RF-4Cs, 115 F-4D/Es and 195 Northrop F-5E/Fs by an initial 40-60 new twin-turbofan fighters is receiving priority. Service entry now planned from 2004-05 requires an early choice between such contenders as the Boeing F-15E(K), Dassault Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon, and Sukhoi Su-35/37. Deferred RoK requirements include four AEW&C aircraft costing $3 billion, aerial tankers, 20 Lockheed Martin C-130J transports, 30-40 new attack helicopters from a relaunched AH-X program to replace 60 Bell AH-1S, and follow 138 KAL-built Sikorsky UH-60Ps, and surveillance UAVs. Delivery starts in April of eight twin-turbofan Hawker 800XPs modified by Raytheon and Lockheed Martin for RoKAF ELINT/SIGINT and radar surveillance roles.

Lockheed Martin and KIA Heavy Industries (formerly Samsung Aerospace), plus Daewoo and Hyundai, were involved through the Korean Aerospace Industries Corporation (KAIC) in the RoKAF's F404-GE-402-engined KTX-2A/B next-generation supersonic advanced-trainer/lead-in fighter program. Costing $2 billion from its 1997 start, KTX-2 development has been delayed by economic problems. Its configuration has now been finalized, however, and first flight is planned for June 2002. LMTAS is developing KTX-2 avionics, fly-by-wire flight-control system and wings, while Messier-Dowty is supplying the landing-gear. In addition to RoKAF requirements for 97 KTX-2s, replacing 30 USAF Northrop T-38As leased from early 1999, up to 600-800 more could be exported. RoKAF students will graduate to the KTX-2 from 85 indigenous PT6A-62A-powered Daewoo KT-1 turboprop tandem trainers now being built, plus 20 armed KO-X forward air control versions.

SAM-X and M-SAM requirements emerged late last year for 48 launchers to re-equip two RoK Nike Hercules air defense battalions and 110 I-Hawk launchers with new 100/60 km range SAM/ABM systems, for 2003 deployment. A four-target simultaneous engagement capability is also sought from short-listed SAM/ABM contenders, which include 14 Raytheon/Lockheed Martin Patriot PAC-3 fire units costing $4.2 billion, EUROSAM Aster-based Land system, and Russia's Antei S-300V (SA-12 "Gladiator").

For shorter-range air defense, K-SAM development of Thomson-CSF's Crotale NG was started jointly in 1989 by Daewoo, as prime contractor, with Samsung Electronics contributing the fire control system, and Lucky Goldstar Precision the missile. In January, Thomson-CSF confirmed a 50% shareholding in Samsung Electronics' military business, plus a $230 million contract for Crotale NG surveillance and fire-control radars for the K-SAM Chonma program. Other recent RoK missile procurement includes 100 AGM-142C/D Popeye ASMs costing $1 million each.

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U.S. Department of State on January 17, 2001 released the following:

New Republic of Korea Missile Guidelines

Earlier today in Seoul, the Government of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) announced new guidelines governing the Republic of Korea's possession and development of missile and rocket systems. The Republic of Korea will be able under its new guidelines to possess missiles with range/payload capabilities up to the Missile Technology Control Regime threshold (missiles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km).

While addressing its legitimate defense and deterrence needs, the Republic of Korea is simultaneously respecting Northeast Asian security and global nonproliferation principles by remaining within the Missile Technology Control Regime threshold.

Before announcing its new missile guidelines, the Republic of Korea consulted extensively with the U.S. This is because of our alliance relationship and the U.S.'s leading role in nonproliferation.

The U.S. fully supports the Republic of Korea's new missile guidelines. The U.S. believes those new guidelines strike the right balance between bolstering the Republic of Korea's security and respecting regional stability and global nonproliferation principles.

Taking account of the new guidelines, the U.S. will be supporting the Republic of Korea's immediate membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime.

In related news, CNN News reported on November 22, 2001 that, "South Korea has admitted to having test-fired a missile with a 62-mile range that landed in the Yellow Sea between South Korea and China on Thursday. In a brief statement, the South Korean Defense Ministry said its Agency for Defense Development launched the missile from a launch station on its western coast Thursday as part of its "regular tests for missile development". After flying its full 62-mile range, the missile hit a target 31 miles off Pyonsan, a town on South Korea's western coast about 125 miles south of Seoul, air force Col. Kim Ki-ok told a news briefing."

It went on to say, "South Korea had expressed its intention to develop missiles with a longer range. After months of negotiations, Seoul obtained U.S. approval in January to develop missiles with a range of up to 187 miles. Missiles with a 187-mile range were capable of striking Pyongyang and other key North Korean cities. Under a 1979 accord with the United States, South Korea had been barred from developing missile with a range longer than 112 miles. Washington agreed to revise that accord on condition that South Korea join the Missile Technology Control Regime. The United States, Russia, Japan and 30 other countries have signed the 14-year-old agreement. Holdouts include Middle Eastern countries, India, Pakistan, China and North Korea."

NOTE: The M-SAM program is aimed at developing a missile which has a striking range of 30 to 60 km. Current plans call for the investment of a total of 200 to 300 billion won in the development of the M-SAM by 2008. An article by Oh Young-jin in the Korea Times stated, ``The model we are trying to emulate in our M-SAM development is Russia's S-300 missile,'' the source said. ``If everything goes as planned, the final product we desire would be like the S-300 but shorter in range.''

For further information, refer to 2000 Report to Congress on the Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula .

For the most comprehensive report we've seen on the ROK-USFK forces and the North Korean Situation, go to 2000 Part Two Defense Policy and Posture for Peacekeeping . The source is the ROK Ministry of National Defense, but the materials have also been used for inclusion into the U.S. "2000 Report to Congress on the Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula." The files can be downloaded. Information can also be reviewed by years. This resource is the best we've seen to cover every minute detail of the military situation in Korea.

Bio-terrorism Suddenly a Concern in Korea

Korea is one of the more densely populated countries in the world, and is considered particularly weak to biochemical attack. The Korean press has publicized that the military is in the midst of a five-year plan that began in 1999, one that includes spending W350 billion in equipment and personnel for fighting biological attacks. However, what is not said is this was a United States initiative -- and the equipment being procured is American decontamination equipment. A Korea Herald note on 16 October stated, "U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) plans to deploy new equipment to detect biological agents at its military installations in South Korea in preparation for possible bioterrorist attacks, the South Korean Defense Ministry said yesterday. The ministry said South Korean and U.S. militaries have agreed to strengthen their joint training against chemical, biological and radiological warfare." (NOTE: Equipment is already in place around Kunsan AB with the sensors from the ChemCo contractor. These sensors detect chemical agents, but their ability to detect biological agents is unknown.)

In the past, it has been reported that North Korea might have an estimated eight biochemical factories, tons of sarin and other poison gasses, plus biological weapons such as anthrax, cholera, and bubonic plague. Unfortunately, there is still some confusion on the part of the Korean press in differentiating between chemical and biological threats -- creating more confusion with misleading numbers on quantities in North Korea in the press. For example, the Korea Herald stated, "The ministry believes that North Korea possesses up to 5,000 tons of chemical weapons, including anthrax and other biological agents." Chemical and biological agents are different categories, but this statement gives the impression that anthrax and biological agents are accounted for in "tons."

North Korea's BIOLOGICAL weapons program is discussed in the North Korea Special Weapons: FAS . It states:

North Korea continues to have the scientists and facilities for producing biological products and microorganisms. The North has the ability to produce traditional infectious biological warfare agents or toxins and biological weapons. Acting on orders of Kim Il-sung, in November 1980 North Korea accelerated the development of biological weapons, organizing research institutions and plants with specialists from other countries.

North Korea has been pursuing research and development related to biological warfare since the 1960s. Pyongyang's resources presently include a rudimentary (by Western standards) biotechnology infrastructure that is sufficient to support the production of limited quantities of toxins, as well as viral and bacterial biological warfare agents. In the early 1990s, an open press release by a foreign government referred to applied military biotechnology work at numerous North Korean medical institutes and universities dealing with pathogens such as anthrax, cholera, and plague. North Korea possesses a sufficient munitions-production infrastructure to accomplish weaponization of BW agents. North Korea acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1987.

Biological warfare has not received the same attention as chemical or nuclear warfare. This could be because North Korea lacks the technical expertise or because the difficulty in controlling biological warfare makes it a less desirable option. North Korea realizes that biological weapons are as dangerous to its own forces as they are to South Korean or US forces, and the North's limited medical services would make the agents more lethal. Therefore, using biological agents is not a likely option. However, if North Korea did choose to employ biological weapons, it probably could use agents like anthrax, plague, or yellow fever against water and food supplies in the South's rear area.

The work done at the National Defense Research Institute and Medical Academy (NDRIMA) included studies of disease pathogens such as anthrax, cholera, bubonic plague, smallpox, yellow fever and others.