• Off-Base Issues: Prostitution and A-Town - Wolf Pack to combat prostitution -- an object lesson in futility -- and on-base rapes increase; A-town Off-limits -- the makings of a scandal (Updated: January 2004)
  

• Military Affairs (2003) -- USS Carl Vinson arrives in Pusan; Elmendorf F-15s at Osan; Marine FA-18s arrive at Kunsan in May; Low-key buildup; End of May return to normal. (Updated: 3 June 2003)
• Military Affairs (2004) -- Seoul Courts Rule Against USFK Land Use; Vehicle Registration Policy Change; Crime Reports on USFK Soldiers; Continuing ROK-US Prosecutions; Bonus to Soldiers for Extension (Updated: 14 January 2004)
  
  
• Relocation of USFK Bases (2003) -- In March USF announces it will relocate off the DMZ and south of the Han River; Renegotiations of Restructuring of 50-year old alliance; U.S. to invest $11 billion in Korea defense; Korea forced to increase its Defense spending; Enmeshed and entangled, the ROK drags its feet and attempts to shift the financial burden to the USFK; U.S. playing hardball and negotiations hit major snag in September 2003. 15-17 Jan continuation of meetings on relocation and reduction in forces. The first bases Camp Greaves and Giant to be returned in Nov 2004 under the LPP instead of 2011. (Updated: 31 Dec 2003)
  
  
  • Stryler/LAVIII: Our Opinion -- Details on the Stryker SBCT (3d Bde 2d ID) that will be replacing the 2d ID on the DMZ as part of a global repositioning strategy. Included are short sections on current USFK weapons systems that may augment the Stryker units in Korea after all the smoke has cleared. Stryker headed to Iraq in mid-October; US wants future forces to have a "regional" role; Stryker unit in Iraq in 2003 and blooded in Jan 2004. Stryker with its jerry-rigged LPG protection screens undergo the acid test of combat. Strykers success in Iraq for urban warfare role, but still questions about use in mountainous terrain unanswered. Decision to return the Interim Brigade Combat Team to Korea appears to be still up in the air as of 2004. (Updated: Jan 2004)
  
  
  
• Relocation of USFK Bases (2004) -- 15-17 Jan continuation of meetings on relocation and reduction in forces. The first bases Camp Greaves and Giant to be returned in Nov 2004 under the LPP instead of 2011. (Updated: Weekly)
  
  
  • Proposed ROK FY2005 Military Budget -- Is It the Last Straw??? (OPINION) -- ROK Promised Defense Spending increase of 3.2 percent of GDP in 2004, but delivered a 2.8 percent of GDP. ROK Spending has now passed 1997 levels. The US position is that the ROK has the ability to increase its defense spending, but the ROK has not shown the will to do so. ROK "self-reliant" defense is delusional, but the ROK is maintaining the "free-ride" using the US High-tech warfare umbrella. Cursory look at why the ROK "Self-reliant" Defense is delusional. Though stated as reasons for Budget increase, the truth is that the E-X program will be sent out for bids in Nov 2004 and the SAM-X (Patriot) will NEVER be procured as long as President Roh is in office. The ROK is developing weapons programs that offer technology transfer or benefit industrial growth -- not necessarily what is essential to the defense programs. The ROK continues to be a thorn with its refusal to fund the Yongsan move and disputes over land use with the end result possibly being an explosion that destroys the US-ROK Alliance. (Posted: June 2004)
    
  • Dangerous Game the ROK is Playing (OPINION) -- Indepth look at the US Perspective on the evolving US-ROK alliance. Look into the r reasons for the ROK "Stall-and-Conquer" Negotiation strategy. Look at the growing American anti-Korean opinion; USFK and Department of Defense strategy; Head-on collision resulting in reduction in forces and pull-out of troops (Posted: June 2004)
    
    
• Korea Continues to March to Its Own Drummer -- Korea upgrades its military and seeks technology transfer. However, Korea aims to control its own destiny. Korea now has OFFENSIVE missile capability. Its indigenous-designed fighter-trainer is ready for production and the KDX-II "stealth" destroyer has been launched. German-designed submarines are rolling out of shipyards and KM1A1 Korean Main Battle Tank is being produced in Korea. The next-generation fighter has been selected as the F-15K. Whether unrealistic or not, President Roh is seeking "self-reliance" for South Korea's defense by 2010. (Updated: 4 Sept 2003)
  
  
• Military Affairst: North Korean Crisis: -- Equipment changes; Korea-wide Exercises; Force Positioning; Policy changes; North-South military dialogue. (Updated: Monthly)
  
  
  • Food for Thought: The Military Option in North Korea: -- Short comparison of a views on military parity: Korean versus U.S. view. (Posted: 26 April 2003)
    
  • Food for Thought: The Mythical North Korean Threat: -- An article building a case for U.S. withdrawal from Korea. (Posted: 20 June 2003)
  
  
  
• Spies, Espionage & Infiltrators: -- Personal Opinion on the Spy Situation in Kunsan. Covers the spy organizations and the abuses by Presidents from Syngman Rhee to Roh Moo-hyun. Covers cases of captured infiltrators and deep-cover spies discovered in recent years to back up conclusions. (Sources footnoted) Covers history of communism in Cholla Provinces; list of coastal infiltration with methods of infiltration and vehicles used. (Posted: 24 May 2004)
  

• Reviews of Books on Kunsan AB (Updated: 3 June 2003)
  
• Reference Sources/Links: -- Links to Pro-USFK/Anti-US sites and online Korean newspaper links. General, Military and USFK links. (Updated: 8 August 2003)

• Background
  
  • Subtopics -- Pro-American Demonstrations or really Anti-Sunshine Policy Demonstration? -- Anti-American Protests Waning? NO!!! -- Split in NGO Group Strategies and Shift to Pacifism -- America Responds -- Backlash of Anti-American Demonstrations -- Anti-American and the Generation Gap -- NGO Tactic to Boycott American Goods Backfires -- NGO-Initiated Polls Increasing and USFK Poll in response -- Roh wants to revise SOFA, but U.S. and MOJ Sees No Need -- Danger of Getting What they Want -- Considering the Improbable: What if the U.S. Leaves? -- OUR OPINION (Updated: 3 June 2003)
• Jan-Mar 2003
  
  • Iraq War & Korean Perspective of Iraq War (Mar-Apr 2003) -- Iraq and Korea DAILY events with emphasis on anti-War -- but in reality a continuation of the anti-American protests of 2002. President Roh tells nation that he is forced to send non-combatant troops to Iraq in order to protect the nation -- i.e., U.S. blackmailed him. Roh then rewrites the text of his speech for English publications. Coverage is a day-by-day chronology of events in Baghdad and Seoul. (Updated: 16 April 2003)
    
• Apr-Jun 2003
  
• Jul-Sep 2003
  
• Oct-Dec 2003
  
• Jan-Mar 2004
  
• Apr-Jun 2004
  

• North Korean Crisis Background and Reference Materials -- Background on events leading up to Nuclear Crisis; Materials from Selected Sources on Nuclear Crisis; OUR OPINION (Updated: 8 August 2003)
• For Your Information: North Korea-US Meeting: -- Special Report on Upcoming North Korea-China-US meeting and U.S./North Korean options with our comments. (Posted: 8 August 2003)

• Reformist Policy:
• Lack of Coordination within Government:
• Alienates Career Bureaucrats:
• Continuing Education Problems over NEIS:
• Attacks on the "Gangster" Press:
• Environmental Policy and Saemangeum Project:
• Nuclear Waste Dump Protest:
• Farmers Problems, Opening of the Rice Market and Surplus Rice:
• Chaebol and Business Reforms:
• Korea Under Attack for Dumping and Govt Subsidies:
• Korean Outlook Dims as Companies Leave Korea:
• Privatization Plans Put on a Hold:
• Financial Reform Turns into a Quagmire:
• Conciliatory Position to Union Strikes:
• 40-hour Work Week:
• Political Scandals:
• Political Harassment from GNP:
• Split-up of MDP:
• Autonomy: An Old Answer to New Problems -- Pass the Buck!:
• NIS and National Security Law:
• Exiled North Korean supporter, Song Du-yul, Returns:
• Peace and Prosperity Policy:
• Trusted U.S. Supporter during Iraq War?:
• NGO groups anti-Americanism and Opposition demonstrations:
• Roh Questions Removal of USFK:
• ROK-US Summit (May 14) Impacts:
• Can a Leopard Change its Spots?:
• Resurgence of Anti-Americanism:
• Resurgence of Anti-Japanese Protests:
• Radical Students Protest Roh:
• Roh's Falling Popularity starts in Third Month in Office:
• End of 2003: Roh's Leadership Vacuum:
• Roh Impeached: March 2004

Korea Continues to March to Its Own Drummer:

According to the news article, "the Bush administration's go-it-alone decisions have helped make Japan and South Korea, the staunchest U.S. allies in Asia, increasingly uneasy about following the American lead, according to political officials and analysts in both countries. Neither South Korea nor Japan is about to seek a divorce from its close U.S. alliance. But doubts about U.S. leadership in the world are amplifying voices in both countries calling for more independence from Washington, and complicating domestic politics."

In an article on Yonhap News on 1 Oct 03, President Roh called for stronger military power. "The U.S. military in South Korea has greatly contributed to safeguarding our nation," Roh said in a speech at an Armed Forces Day ceremony that preceded the parade."The role of the U.S. military on the Korean Peninsula will continue to be very important in the future," Roh said, referring to the 37,000 American troops stationed in the country. But Roh said South Korea's military should be ready to play a greater role in defending the country saying that the role of the United States and the U.S forces should evolve so that they support Korean troops while Korean troops handle the leading roles. "The time has come for us to assume the core responsibility for our national defense," he said at a pre-parade ceremony. "It is beyond question that as an independent nation, a nation should have enough strength to defend itself on its own."

"If South Korea, which has the world's 12th largest economy and has sent peace-keeping forces to various countries, has no power to defend itself, our people will feel ashamed before the international society," he said. The president said his government will implement a 10-year force improvement program to make South Korea's military more self-reliant and independent in defending the country. The president said that "up to now, Korea has not been a main party in deciding its security policies and has been swayed by changes in the external environment." Self-defense capabilities would settle this problem and enhance Korea's ability for security. Koreans should prepare for self-defense over 10 years step by step, he said. During my term in office, I intend to lay the foundation for such self-defense capabilities."

Since its founding in 1948, Korea's military has grown so that today it ranks as the sixth most powerful force in the world. But if military spending is used as the measure, Korea ranks 10th in the world. Critics say Korea still has a long way to go to realize "full self-defense." The country receives more than 90 percent of its strategic military information from the United States, and more than 40 percent of its defense budget is used for military personnel expenses.

In Jan 2004, the USFK decided to remove all of its forces from Yongsan and then began the major hassle that was there all the time. The RoK did not want to pay for the move. In addition there appears to be a ground-level movement to attempt to prevent the RoK from moving to Pyongtaek.

According to the Associated Press on 1 Mar, ROK President Roh Moo-hyun called for a foreign policy more independent of the US and criticized Japan for its militaristic past, targeting his country's two biggest allies in the DPRK nuclear crisis. Giving a nationally televised address marking Korea's March 1, 1919, uprising against Japanese colonial rule, Roh dismissed criticism that his foreign policy has fueled anti-Americanism among young South Koreans.

"Let's not talk about whether we are pro-American or anti-American," Roh said to rousing applause. "Whether we are pro-US or anti-US cannot be the yardstick to assess ourselves." "Step by step, we should strengthen our independence and build our strength as an independent nation." Roh hailed a recent US-ROK agreement to pull US troops out of the Yongsan district of central Seoul, reminding people that Yongsan has been occupied by foreign forces for more than a century and calling the area "a symbol of foreign intervention, invasion and dependence."

USFK Relocation from Yongsan and Reduction in Forces On 25 April 2003 announced USFK announced its plans to relocate to Osan/Pyongtaek and Taegu/Pusan. U.S. pushed for relocation of 2d ID from the DMZ to positions south of the Han. The U.S. position was that relocation was NOT dependent on nuclear issue outcomes, but the ROK continued to try to tie it to the settlement of the crisis. The repugnant term "trip wire" was used by the ROK to keep the troops on the DMZ to ensure the follow-on troops would appear. However, this outdated concept was rejected by the U.S. (See Relocation of USFK Bases for details on the renegotiations of restructuring of the 50-year old alliance)

Because the ROK and U.S. views were so divergent, the Second Meeting on the Future of the US-ROK Alliance Initiative was postponed and the matters to the Bush-Kim Presidential summit on May 11-17.

Roh would return from the summit as apparently a changed person with a pragmatic viewpoint. However, it was only to paper over the differences between the U.S. and the ROK. After the Summit, the Ministry of Defense admitted that relocation would take place, but started to drag its feet on negotiations. The second meeting to be held in late May was shelved until Korea could figure out a new strategy. Korea kept seeking a return to the status quo, but the U.S. was bound and determined to proceed with the relocation.

The Third Meeting on the Future of the US-ROK Alliance Initiative was inconclusive. However, it was very clear that the US was determined to move off of the DMZ. However, the problem was the time table.

The U.S. promised to bolster Korea's defense with 150 programs totalling $11 billion dollars. Many people keyed in on the "$11 billion" figure without asking the question of whether the "150 improvements" over the "next four years" would benefit the U.S. overall (world-wide) fighting capabilities or actually be a direct benefit to Korea. Though not privy to the complete plan for the improvements, we would guess that the $11 billion figure was the lump sum of EXISTING programs -- but released to give the impression they were something NEW. For example, the multi-million dollar Apache AH-64A upgrade was something ALREADY in the mill.

Shortly before the Third Meeting, Donald Rumsfield announced that a Stryker Interim Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) -- a medium infantry brigade -- would replace the 2d ID. The 3d Brigade 2d Infantry Division had would be certified in August for world-wide deployment. However, as of October 2003, the 3d Bde 2d ID seemed bound for Iraq instead of Korea. Once in Iraq, it would be stuck there until 2004. However, other options of getting international troops to take over "peaceful" Shite muslim areas of Iraq to free up American soldiers to move to the "hostile" Sunni muslim areas, former strongholds of the Baathists. If international troops can be provided, the movement to Korea may take place as scheduled. In Sep 2003, Shadow-200 UAVs were tested along the DMZ. These would be part of the SBCT organizational structure in a Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron. (See Stryler/LAVIII: Our Opinion for details on the Stryker.)

The "Future of ROK-US Alliance" meetings would be concluded just prior to the ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) scheduled in October. At the SCM, the ROK-US alliance of the future would be laid out. The Pentagon would decide on a major realignment - and perhaps a substantial withdrawal - of forces in South Korea.

The third and fourth meeting of the Future of the US-ROK Alliance Initiative gave the distinct appearance of the U.S. "telling" the ROK what would happen. It was hard-nosed negotiations.

• In the Third Round, both sides agreed to the transfer of 9 of 10 missions to the ROK. Among them are guard against North Korean special forces' seaborne infiltration, elimination of contaminants in the rear area in time of CBR (chemical, biological and radioactive) warfare waged by NK. The two sides discussed the planned timeline of transfer of missions from US military to ROK forces. ROK will prepare to take over counter-artillery operations against DPRK's immediately, the two sides agreed. US and ROK will form a joint evaluation team for two annual assessments, starting in August 2005, in order to determine the timeline.
  
  The significance is that this frees up the 2d ID field artillery units for removal from the DMZ immediately. The other heavy armor -- M1A1 main battle tanks and Bradley Fighting vehicles -- are still up for discussion. In Rumsfield's vision, these would be in "follow-on" packages with the equipment prepositioned on transport ships.
  
  Because the Stryker SBCT (replacement for the 2d ID) may go to Iraq instead of Korea as planned, Washington may have changed its strategy and implemented plans to slow down the removal of the heavy armor off of the DMZ. DoD has asked for Congressional approval to deploy the 3d Bde 2d ID SBCT to Iraq in July. Once in Iraq, the SBCT would be stuck there until 2004. However, if the Stryker SBCT should enter Korea earlier that 2004, it will change these negotiations dramatically. As of Oct 2003, the 2005 time frame for relooking at the heavy armor issue may be realistic.
  
  However, what might be considered a major breakthrough is that the ROK for the first time has stated that there will be "reductions" along the DMZ. Even the U.S. was mum on the issue of "reductions" pending the appearance of the 3d Bde 2d ID Stryker unit.
  
  
• The plan for Korea to single-handedly guard the Joint Security Area from 2005 was agreed upon in the Third Round. However, it was discarded in favor of "reducing the U.S. military presence" by reducing the numbers of US guards at the Joint Security Area, an 800 meter (1/2 mile)-wide enclave. On the part of the U.S., the decision to reverse itself and remain in the Joint Security Area is NOT a major move. The positions are more "symbolic" that anything else as the UNC Security Battalion is only a 550 man unit of which 60 percent is ROK Army. Actually it is to the U.S. advantage to have members in the symbolic unit to retrieve the remains of U.S. soldiers in the on-going search in North Korea for Korean War dead. They postponed the schedule that would have ROK soldiers defending the southern half of the JSA alone.
  
  
• Also discussed was the "environmental issue" which the ROK wishes added to the SOFA. However, the USFK has already stated that it will clean up the bases -- including Yongsan -- before return the bases to the ROK. Though it was not a specific provision of the SOFA, the USFK agreed to the item to speed up the relocation process. The ROK is pressing for more changes in the SOFA and the USFK has been "passive" on this issue -- meaning they don't want to discuss it at this time.
  
  
• Another outcome from the meeting was that the ROK will not have to make up for the financial losses to AAFES contractors. It appears that the USFK has agreed to foot the losses. However, the losses projected for the life of the contracts are probably minimal. In addition, as 7,000 personnel are slated to move to Pyongtaek, there will be an increased need for many of the services. One would expect that the USFK will be offering new contracts to the companies to continue providing their services in Pyongtaek. Losses will be minimal.
  
  
• The USFK stated in July that "163 acres would NOT be turned over to civilian control." However, under its "force protection" policy, all the USFK personnel and dependents should be within one camp. The USFK envisioned the Hanam Village area being returned to the ROK control, but in exchange they would need more area within Yongsan. The United States sought to retain about 327 acres of the South Post for housing for the 1,000 military personnel who will remain at Yongsan. In addition, the USFK sought to eliminate the ROK road separating the Main and South posts. The ROK balked on these items.
  
  The U.S. demanded that ROK build housing for U.S. soldiers who will remain. If the U.S. military and dependents are moved within the Yongsan area, South Korea would have to pay for the construction of residential units for the soldiers and their families. This is covered under the cost-sharing provisions under the SOFA. "But whether ROK will pay for it or not is a separate matter," according to General Cha Young-koo, deputy minister of policy at the Ministry of National Defense and Seoul's chief negotiator for the talks. This is a sticking point.
  
  The announcement by the Ministry of Defense that U.S. needed "10-20 percent" of Yongsan is a negotiating stance. The lower figure means the ROK is going to attempt to downsize the USFK land requirements through negotiations -- entering the negotiations with a low figure of "90 acres" (10 percent) for USFK use.
  
  
• The USFK has never waivered on the costs being around $9.5 billion, but the ROK wishfully thinks the relocation costs can be in the $3.2 billion range -- and wants to renegotiate the costs. Under the agreements, the South Korean government was held responsible for all relocation costs for the U.S. garrison in central Seoul. However, government officials have argued that no specific means of calculating the moving costs which were stated in the original agreements. The ROK government claimed that the U.S. had unilaterally estimated the cost and they had no way of confirming a final figure ($9.5 billion) calculated by the U.S. This remains open.
  
  Both sides agreed to ask "an outside, independent institute" to draft a master plan to relocate the Yongsan base. This most likely a contractor to handle all the planning, engineering and implementation work -- much like the system used to create the Inchon International Airport.
  
  The ROK wanted to renegotiate the entire package, but the U.S. stood firm on an "umbrella agreement" to modify conditions. "The two sides agreed to draw up an umbrella agreement to modify the flaws, and we will ask the Assembly to ratify it before the end of this year." The umbrella agreement will stipulate the outline of the policy involving the relocation of Yongsan Garrison.
  
  Any new agreements will not override the existing 1990 pacts, which will remain binding. The U.S. negotiators "demanded that the legal structure of the agreements be kept." The U.S. negotiators wanted to have "an umbrella agreement" that would generally modify the two pacts -- without affecting the legal force. On the other hand, the ROK continues to desparately seek ways to renegotiate the costs down -- as well as slow down the relocation process.

Counting Cost of USFK Relocation

by Heo Yong-beom (heo@chosun.com)

If the U.S. Army's 2nd Infantry Division is withdrawn from its positions near the North-South border, the costs to replace its equipment will total W5.5 trillion ($4.6 billion), if the South is to maintain the war-fighting potential there. The figure is about 31.5 percent of this year's defense budget of W17.4 trillion.

A Grand National Party lawmaker and member of the National Assembly's defense committee, Park Se-hwan, said Monday that the equipment of U.S. forces that would need to be replaced included $2.6 billion in ground equipment, $1.8 billion in air equipment and $51.9 million in anti-air weapons such as missiles. This includes M1A1 tanks, M2 armored vehicles, 155? self-propelled guns, MLRS/ATCMS (multi-engine rockets), AH-64 Apache helicopters, OH-58D scout helicopters, UH-60 helicopters, stinger missiles and avenger missiles.

"If we include emergency ammunition, entrainment equipment, support brigades and engineering brigades, it will take at least minimum of $5 billion," Park said.

Park pointed out that the Ministry of Defense has estimated that it would cost $3-5 billion if the 2nd Division moves south of the Han River. But that represents only pure transition costs, not costs for replacing the military capability.

"The Ministry of Defense presented a defense budget that is 3.2 percent of the GDP," Park said. "However, the government reduced this to 2.8 percent because of a lack of funds. Taking into consideration the tremendous costs for substitute equipment, we should consider postponing the repositioning of the 2nd Division for as long as possible."

North Korea is Overrated.

There is a lot of talk about how North Korea poses a threat to South Korea, and about how powerful the DPRK military is in relation to the South Korean army. While the Democratic People's Republic of Korea(DPRK--commies) has a WMD capability, and Seoul is within range of medium range missiles, in a head to head conventional conflict, the Republic of Korea(ROK--good guys) could wipe the floor with their northern neighbors, without any US help whatsoever. Taking a look at the matchup between the two nations point by point shows that the DPRK advantage in numbers is easily lost by their aging equipment and poor training.

Air Force

The DPRK air force has about 550 fighter aircraft. Forty of these aircraft are Mig-29 Fulcrums, 45 are Mig-23 Floggers, 150 Mig-21 Fishbeds, and nearly half of the combat strength of the DPRK air force consists of Mig-17s and Mi-19s, with a smattering of Su-25s and Su-7s. So basically, of the 550 fighter aircraft the DPRK posesses, only 40 are truly modern, another 45 are getting on in years, and 150 are obsolete but capable. The rest are essentially junk, and would have difficulty intercepting a B-52, let alone an F-16.

As far as training is concerned, the DPRK likewise must have a serious problem training these pilots. The fuel shortages that are affecting the rest of the country have to be affecting the air force as well. That means less hours in the cockpit. Less hours in the cockpit means lower quality pilots means more dead DPRK pilots in combat and accidents. Now compare this with the ROK air force. The ROK have 468 fighter aircraft. They have 160 F-16s(roughly equivalent to the Mig-29 in capability), 130 F-4s(marginally superior to the Mig-23), and 195 F-5s (marginally superior to the Mig 21). So, if there is a major air action, the DPRK air force is going to lead a short and violent life--and that is without any assistance from the USAF or USN.

Army

The situation on the ground is different than that in the air. There is a lot more parity between the DPRK and ROK on the ground. The DPRK has much more artillery than the ROK(about twice to three times the number), and even though much of it is obsolete, if it can throw a shell a few miles with the accuracy of a WWII weapon, that is good enough to disrupt operations and make life hell for the grunts and any soft targets out there. They might be vulnerable to counterbattery fire from more modern/accurate ROK weapons, as well as ROK airpower, but there are enough of them, in enough prepared positions to make the first weeks of war rather bloody, especially in Seoul itself.

As far as armor is concerned, the situation is much like that of the respective air forces. The DPRK has more, but the quality isn't that good. Their best tanks are the Type 59(Chinese) and the T-62(Russian). There are about 200 Type 59s in service, and 1800 T-62s. The rest of the Tank force consist of T-55s(you saw them as burning wrecks during Gulf War I), PT-76s(an amphibious tank with a 76mm gun and thin armor), and T-34s, which are a WWII design. In other words, half of the DPRK tank force is of obsolescent design, and the other half are little more than targets on a modern battlefield.

The ROK army is much better equipped than their northern neighbors. First of all, half of their armored force uses the K1/K1A1 tank, which is roughly similar in capabilities to the M1. The other half of their armored forces consist of the M-47/M-48 Patton tanks, which are about as effective as the T-62. They also have a smattering of T-80s from the Russians as well. (About as effective as an early M1 or an M60A3, but that is a WAG on my part).

Again, training is probably an issue for the DPRK. Proper training of all those mechanized forces is a fuel and spare parts intensive activity. Given how thirsty a main battle tank is for fuel, and the weakness of the DPRK economy in general, I can't believe that the bulk of the DPRK army does the sort of training necessary to have an effective force. The resources just aren't there.

The one advantage the DPRK has over the ROK is that the DPRK is forward deployed, and always on alert. That means that it is possible for the Kim Jong Il to get his army moving on short notice. However, to counterbalance that, I think it is doubtful that they could achieve anything better than tactical surprise. The South Koreans are just too ready for just that eventuality, and the defensive belt along the DMZ is so crammed with mines and emplacements that I find it doubtful that the North Koreans could advance quickly enough to prevent a calling up of reserves in the south. The longer the campaign went, the worse off North Korea would be. Their aircraft would be methodically shot down in the air or destroyed on the ground, their advantage in artillery would hit by air raids, and their armored columns cut to ribbons. Then, inevitably, the tide would shift, and the North Koreans would be forced into retreat.

So basically, I guess is what I am saying is that South Korea could stand on its own two feet if it wanted to. The big question is can the South Koreans withstand the initial onslaught? I think they can. I don't think we should withdraw our forces, but if a conventional conflict came to the Korean penninsula, I don't think we'd be in as bad shape as people have been led to believe. The problem is that if the communists attacked, there would be a lot of civilian casualties in Seoul.

To think that the South could handle the North by itself is hypothetical -- and no one wants to test this hypothesis. I -- like John Bono -- feel the South could handle it alone. However, strength in arms is a careful balance in which the 37,000 USFK troops are mixed in with the ROK forces. As of Jan 2003, the removal of the USFK forces would be inadvisable as it would upset the mix. However, IF and when the U.S. settles the Iraq situation, the USFK forces along the DMZ could be proposed for removal. The withdrawal would have to be negotiated as sort of taking pawns off a chessboard -- with North Korea removing their units in response to the USFK pullback. It must be a tit-for-tat game.

But what if the North attacks? Could the South withstand the initial onslaught? The ROK forces must withstand the North's attack during the initial 5-15 days of offensive actions. They must continue to hold the North along the DMZ while US and ROK forces are mobilized for the counteroffensive, which could take another 15-20 days. It is a given that the North will concede the air war early on -- without any assistance from the USFK forces. The North's naval forces will be primarily used to infiltrate the special forces into the South behind the lines and after that it will fall back into a defensive posture. The latest improvements in the South's naval forces has upgraded their defense capabilities, but the insertion of DPRK special forces will be almost unstoppable. These DPRK special forces will disrupt the transportation and communications systems in the country. Unfortunately they will be unstoppable -- and the ROK gave up trying to prevent their entry over ten years ago. These DPRK special forces will create havoc, but if the ROK forces along the DMZ holds, the ROK will have time to recover.

Most of the North's artillery is deployed so far forward as to be vulnerable to air attack. However, the artillery is mobile and will fire their salvos and move forward. Seoul will be inflicted with severe damage and enormous casualties in the initial hours of the attack. This is a given. How effective the ROKAF attack on the mobile artillery will be is simply conjecture, but the advantage is that there are only three corridors for entry due geographic constraints. The South has constructed a defense perimeter (Forward Edge Battle Area: Kaesong-Munsan, Kumwa, and Chorwon corridors) -- FEBA A, FEBA B, and FEBA C -- which are three long, thin lines of defense designed to stop -- or at least slow significantly -- the North's advance. Once in the corridor, the North's forces enter a turkey shoot as the ROKAF will have air superiority.

What is bothersome is that the North has recently opened up a new corridor with the railway/road systems -- by joint consent -- between the two nations. However, the USFK has most certainly adjusted their strategies as the USFK commander voiced his concerns about this corridor being used as militarized zone. However, this area is still a corridor even if it has been demined by both sides. Once the North's forces enter the corridor, they are subject to air attack by the South and it would turn into a turkey shoot.

The USFK has maintained as its goals at the local level as:

• 1. "Defend the Base" meaning the USFK is in a defensive posture during Phase 1, the defense of Seoul;
• 2. Phase 2 is when the U.S. forces in Japan start arriving and a counterattack to secure its positions and stop the invasion;
• 3. "Accept the Followon" is Phase 3 where the added forces -- an additional 640,000 troops -- promised to launch an attack on the North are integrated into the various organizations across the peninsula.
• 4. "Take the Fight North" is when the invasion of the north will take place with the aim of a regime change.

ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty

Mutual Defense Treaty, the Republic of Korea and the United States of America

Signed at Washington: October 1, 1953
Entered into Force: November 17, 1954
The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area,

Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any Party towards the United Nations.

Article II

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self-helf and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and agreement to implement this Treat and to further its purposes.

Article III

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Article IV

The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.

Article V

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of Korea in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington

Article VI

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.



IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done in duplicate at Washington, in the Korean and English languages, this first day of October, 1953. For the Republic of Korea: (signed) Y.T. Pyun For the United States of America: (signed) John Foster Dulles

Understanding of the United States of America

[The United States Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the treaty subject to the following understanding:]

It is the understanding of the United States that neither party is obligated, under Article 3 of the above Treaty, to come to the aid of the other except in case of an external armed attack against such party; nor shall anything in the present Treaty be construed as requiring the United States to give assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed attack against territory which has been recognized by the United States as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the Republic of Korea.

[The United States communicated the text of the understanding to the Republic of Korea in a note of January 28, 1954, acknowledged by the Republic of Korea in a note of February 1, 1954. The text of the understanding was included in the President's proclamation of November 17, 1954.]

(1) TIAS 3097, 5 UST 23602376. Ratification advised by the Senate Jan. 26, 1954, and ratified by the President Feb. 5, 1954, subject to an understanding; entered into force Nov. 17, 1954.

(2) Ratifications were exchanged Nov. 17, 1954.

(3) TIAS 3097.

SOFA The first Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was signed in 1966 after intial negotiations started in 1963 after Park Chung-hee established himself as the President of Korea. The lame excuse by the USFK was that it took time to pattern it after Japan and Europe.

This SOFA agreement was highly advantageous to the U.S. military and basically gave the USFK control over all offenses by U.S. military committed on base, while capital offenses off-base were in the jurisdiction of local authorities. In truth, the local authorities rarely exercised their jurisdiction. This SOFA agreement remained basically unchanged until Korea started to realize the Miracle of the Han and resurrected its nationalistic viewpoints.

In the late 1980s the ROK started to clamor for a renegotiation of the SOFA. However, it was done at a price. The ROK had contributed very little to the USFK over the years and was now subjected to increased cost-sharing. Every new demand for increased control over the legal prosecution of "criminal acts" by USFK personnel came at a price. (See SOFA Documents for current documents dealing with the various areas dealing with the SOFA coverage. Protest: Roh Wants to Revise the SOFA for details of the current actions and protests.)

A special agreement was negotiated in 1999 relating to the Article IV of the MDT regarding "facilities and areas" and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The agreement was for a duration of three years expiring in 2001. The 1991 agreement has been superceded, but it gives one the idea of the particulars in the agreements affecting the transfer of Yongsan and cost-sharing for housing costs at Pyongtaek:

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING SPECIAL MEASURES RELATING TO ARTICLE V OF THE AGREEMENT UNDER ARTICLE IV OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA REGARDING FACILITIES AND AREAS AND THE STATUS OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Signed at Seoul February 25, 1999
Entered into force January 1, 1999

The Republic of Korea and the United States of America(hereinafter referred to as "the Parties") have agreed to take the following special measures relating to Article V of the "Agreement under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America regarding facilities and areas and the status of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea" (hereinafter referred to as "the Status of Forces Agreement"), signed at Seoul on July 9, 1966, which sets forth the principles on the sharing of expenditures incident to the maintenance of the United States Armed Forces in Korea:

Article I

The Republic of Korea will bear, for the duration of this Agreement, in addition to those costs stipulated in Article V, Paragraph 2 of the Status of Forces Agreement, an equitable part of the expenditures for the employment of Korean employees of the United States Armed Forces in Korea and of other expenditures associated with the stationing of the United States Forces in Korea.

Article II

The duration of this Agreement shall be three years. The cost-sharing contribution of the Republic of Korea for 1999 is 141.2 Million U.S. Dollars plus 257.5 Billion Korean Won. The 2000 and 2001 contribution will be determined by adjusting the previous year's contribution to reflect both the change in the National Statistical Office's official Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the change in the Bank of Korea's real Gross National Product (GNP) (won based) during the twelve month period ending on September 30 of the previous year. Contributions will be provided in both cash and in-kind support. Each year's labor cost-sharing contribution will be made in two equal payments, on or before March 1st and July 1st. ROK Funded Construction payments will be made in two equal installments with 50% paid on March 1st of the program year and 50% paid one year later (March 1st). Implementation of this Agreement will be in accordance with the separate implementation instruction approved concurrently with the execution of this Agreement.

All materials, supplies, equipment and services provided as part of the in-kind contribution will be exempt from Republic of Korea taxes, or provided on an after-tax basis. Such materials, supplies, equipment, and services procured by the Government of the Republic of Korea will be exempt from special excise tax and value added tax. In case of value added tax, the zero rate will be applied. If taxes are levied against any such materials, supplies, equipment or services, payment of such taxes will not be made from cost-sharing funding.

Article III

This Agreement shall enter into force effective January 1, 1999, upon exchange of written notification by the Parties that this Agreement has been approved in accordance with their respective domestic legal procedures, and shall remain in force until December 31, 2001.

Article IV

This Parties may consult on all matters regarding this Agreement through the Joint Committee provided for in Paragraph 1 of Article XXVIII of the Status of Forces Agreement, or through the Joint Cost-Sharing Committee, which is composed of representatives appointed by the Parties.

Article V

This Agreement may be revised or amended in writing by mutual consent. The revision or amendment of this Agreement shall enter into force on the date when the Parties exchange written notifications that their domestic legal requirements for such revision or amendment have been fulfilled.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized for the purpose, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Seoul, this 25th day of February, 1999, in duplicate in the Korean and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.



FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Section 4 of this treaty, which is composed of preface and six sections, stipulates that the Republic of Korea provides and the United States of America accepts the right to deploy the US army, navy and air force in and around the territory of south Korea. The article is construed that South Korea is obliged to and the United States has the right to station American troops here. (...)

Section 6 stipulates that the treaty is effective for an indefinite period. After all, the unequal treaty legalizes indefinitely the US military presence in south Korea. It is a general custom in the international community to conclude an agreement or a treaty on the condition of time limit. (...)

The controversial mutual defense treaty was concluded by the anti-people Syngman Rhee regime which was framed by the United States. After it occupied south Korea, the United States enforced a military government for three years and then formed the "separate government" of Syngman Rhee through the "separate elections" in south Korea in spite of the strong protest of the south and north Korean people.

2004 Budget

Defense Ministry requests huge funds for new arms

The Defense Ministry requested 22.3 trillion won (about $18.6 billion) for next year's budget, up 28.3 percent from this year, to strengthen its war capabilities against North Korea, officials said yesterday.

The moves followed the announcement late last month by the United States that it will spend an additional $11 billion over the next three years to reinforce its forces in South Korea.

The ministry said it called the Ministry of Budget and Planning for a drastic increase of its spending to launch a set of new arms buildup projects such as the deployment of the Patriot missile and airborne reconnaissance systems. The expanded budget represents 3.2 percent of the gross domestic product, an increase of 0.5 percent compared with last year. The 2004 budget breaks down into 8.1 trillion won allocated for arms build-up projects and 14.2 trillion won for current outlay, up 42.1 and 21.5 percent from the 2003 spending, the ministry said.

Of the 8.1 trillion won, the ministry said it allocated 285 billion won for the introduction of 30 new military build-up projects as a "retaining fee," the ministry said.

By items, it said it put 148 billion won for six aerial defense systems ranging from the Patriot missile system, code-named SAM-X; upgraded tanker planes; to Global Positioning System-guided missiles.

Ministry officials added that they have awarded 32.5 billon won for spending on four electronic warfare fields including an early airborne warning system, known as AWACS and the joint Command, Control, Communication, Computer and Intelligence system, or C4I.

They also said they distributed 42.6 billion won as a "research fund" for 12 other projects, including Korean-made fighters and spy satellites.

The ministry said it allocated 7.8 trillion won for what it calls "continuing" 202 projects such as F-15K fighters, K1A1 tanks and unmanned patrol planes.

Among the 7.8 trillion won are 340 billion won for the relocation of the 37,000 American troops stationed here and 738 billion won which the Korean side should bear under the Seoul-Washington combined security of the peninsula, ministry officials said.

The 14.2 trillion won of current expenditure focuses on improving military residence and the overall welfare of the rank and file, they said. "We believe the national consensus has touched on the need to increase the military spending in view of the current security situation," said a ranking ministry official. "We expect the government to accept our request."

Meanwhile, the ministry's announcement came 11 days after the United States said it would make an additional investment totaling $ 11 billion. At present, the U.S. Forces Korea spends about $3 billion a year.

Since then, top Washington officials demanded Seoul increase its defense budget in tandem with the U.S. additional investment. Earlier this week, South Korean Defense Minister Cho Young-kil said the ministry was considering raising the annual defense spending gradually to a level that represents 3.5 percent of the GDP.

(khj@heraldm.com) By Kim Hyung-jin, Korea Herald, (June 11, 2003)

Counting Cost of USFK Relocation

by Heo Yong-beom (heo@chosun.com)

If the U.S. Army's 2nd Infantry Division is withdrawn from its positions near the North-South border, the costs to replace its equipment will total W5.5 trillion ($4.6 billion), if the South is to maintain the war-fighting potential there. The figure is about 31.5 percent of this year's defense budget of W17.4 trillion.

A Grand National Party lawmaker and member of the National Assembly's defense committee, Park Se-hwan, said Monday that the equipment of U.S. forces that would need to be replaced included $2.6 billion in ground equipment, $1.8 billion in air equipment and $51.9 million in anti-air weapons such as missiles. This includes M1A1 tanks, M2 armored vehicles, 155? self-propelled guns, MLRS/ATCMS (multi-engine rockets), AH-64 Apache helicopters, OH-58D scout helicopters, UH-60 helicopters, stinger missiles and avenger missiles.

"If we include emergency ammunition, entrainment equipment, support brigades and engineering brigades, it will take at least minimum of $5 billion," Park said.

Park pointed out that the Ministry of Defense has estimated that it would cost $3-5 billion if the 2nd Division moves south of the Han River. But that represents only pure transition costs, not costs for replacing the military capability.

"The Ministry of Defense presented a defense budget that is 3.2 percent of the GDP," Park said. "However, the government reduced this to 2.8 percent because o