KUNSAN, Korea -- The first meeting of a new Base Community Council was held here last week.

The council was formed to help maintain and promote friendly relations between the people of the area and the military personnel based at Kunsan and is composed of leading citizens and the base commander and members of his staff.

The Kunsan AB commander, Col, William J. Feallock, was host at the initial conference which met in the base headquarters and later dined at the officers' club. Kunsan City was represented by Chief Prosecutor Yi Keun Su, Mayor Kim Yong Chul, Ministerial Association President Reverend Yi Soon Yun and members of the police, fire and city health departments.

KUNSAN AB, Korea -- Pied Piper II, the second anti-rodent campaign that makes rat-killing competitive sport as well as sanitary necessity, was underway here last week.

A follow-up to last fall's drive -- in which 1,173 rates died in the interests of an estimated $13,000 saving to the Air Force -- Pied Piper II offers prizes to two-man teams turning the greatest number of rodent corpses in to the preventive medicine section.

Contest rules prohibit killings by poison, explosives or firearms. And only rats killed within the confines of the base will count toward the prizes.

The team turning in the most dead rats before noon, Mar. 26, will receive $50 and an extra seven-day R&R. Second-running team will earn $25 and an R&R, and the third-place pair will divide $15.

Special thanks to Mr. Cheol-Kyun Shin for providing the following photos of Kunsan from his archives. Go to Cheol-kyun Shin's Photos of Kunsan City for panoramic views of Kunsan City (1960s). (5) Go to Cheol-kyun Shin's Photos for photos of Kunsan's people in the 1960s.

Panoramic view of Kunsan from Wolmyong Mountain looking towards Changhang -- Note the smoke from the smelter stack in Changhang. To the right Korean houses with thatched roofs. Also note how barren and void of trees the area was in the 1960s. Panoramic view from Wolmyong Mountain looking towards the old center of the city -- Note the Korean houses with thatched roofs at the base of what is now Wolmyong Park. To the right is the ferry station and inner port area. In the distance the river winds towards where the present Kumgang Estuary Dam is located. Panoramic view from Wolmyong Mountain looking east towards the Iksan (Iri) -- To the left is the inner port area. Note all the houses with thatched roofs. Panoramic view from Wolmyong Mountain looking south-east towards Chonju. -- In the 1970s, the city expanded in a southerly direction following the new Taehaek-ro (University Road). The route followed the old road shown on the map leading across the rice paddies off to the middle-right of the photo. (This road was in existence from the 1920s.) In the distance on the right is what would be called "Gumho Town". Panoramic view from Wolmyong Mountain looking south towards Okku -- Over the hills are present-day Naundong. Note the Wolmyong reservoir (yuongi) to the right. Kunsan harbor looking towards Changhang's smelter smoke stack. -- Note the shallow-draft fishing junks in the harbor...a sight no longer seen. The familiar smoke from the smoke stack was a land mark sight. Though the smoke is now gone, the smoke stack above the Lucky-Kumsung (Goldstar) copper smelter still dominates the Changhang skyline -- though no longer used.

Human Interest Story: Mr. Pyong-Han Choe There is a human interest story during 1960 related by Mr. Pyong-Hyan Choe (Johnny Choe) of the 8th SPS at Kunsan AB in 2002. (6) Johnny was searching for a Dr. Crawford (first name unknown), 121 Evac Hospital, Pupyong, March 1961. At that time Johnny was a "street kid" living a rough life after he left the orphanage in 1960. He also spoke "street English" and was able to communicate with the Americans.

In 1960, he was outside the Kunsan Main Gate when he noticed a blind kid -- about 5 years older than himself -- was being pushed away repeatedly by the ROK guards in his attempts to enter the base. He went up to offer his help and found out that the kid had learned that an operation done free by the US Army could return his sight. However, he had to first receive a letter of recommendation from the nearest US military base. He had traveled a long way from Chongnu only to be rebuffed at the gate. Johnny, the street-wise kid, took him around to the North Gate and snuck under the fence (barbed wire strands at that time). He took him to see the Base Chaplain and pleaded Noh Chin-Woo's case and received a letter from the Chaplain and Base Hospital.

However, because of the non-availability of eyes for transplants, there was a long waiting period. According to Mr. Choe, he offered one of his eyes and this act came to the attention of Dr. Crawford. He was stunned by this act of generosity and took action up the channels to make this a special case. Johnny didn't have to lose his eyesight as other "eye material" was used. On March 1961, Johnny was there when the bandages were removed from Mr. Noh's eyes and Johnny translated that he could see the 16 flourescent lights through the welder's glasses. The Doctor was overjoyed.

Later Johnny accompanied Mr. Noh returned to his village and everyone was stunned to see the blind-boy now sighted. A celebration was immediately held for the miracle. In 2002, Mr. Noh was 65 years old and lived in Chungno while Mr. Choe was 60 years old and resided in Kunsan City. After all these years, Johnny would like to thank Dr. Crawford for his kindness and humanity

Korea Military Situation According to the CINCPAC Command History, pp 124-128: "The U.S. Military enjoyed considerable prestige with the Republic of Korea Armed Forces and the Korean people in 1960. The Korean economy, though still weak, was improving in its own right and as a result of U.S. military procurement in Korea in connection with the military MA Program. The insistence on quality competitive merchandise improved the ability of Korea to compete in world trade. The internal political rearrangement was completed with minimal stir, and in general the new government was considered sound."

The Military Assistance Program was important because the ROK was fully sustained by the US at the time in the maintenance and support of its 600,000 man force. The CINCPAC Command History stated, "The main problems facing the MAP in Korea in 1960 were: (1) getting the Korean government to take a bigger share of the cost of the Armed Forces; (2) the high cost of maintenance of Korean military equipment; and (3) the long range problem of reducing Korean armed forces within the capability of the Korean economy." The US considered the maintenance of the ROK military at 600,000 troops and provided T-28 and T-6 aircraft to the military. The COMUS Korea (Commander US forces Korea) advised the opening of another base to support jet fighter aircraft in Southern Korea. Three sites were under consideration. COMUS-K also advised that the logistics and materiel facilities were completed in Taegu in 1960. (Source: 1960 Commander in Chief Pacific Command, pp124-128).) (NOTE: As the ROK were equipped with F-86Fs, there was no push to upgrade them to F-100s and F-104Bs as the Taiwan was doing under the MAP.)

In May 1960, US Special Forces from Okinawa were air infiltrated into the ROK and received by US/ROKA reconnaissance forces. In June 1960, SEA HAWK held amphibious forces landings in the Pohang area. Air support was provided by the Ist MAW from Japan. ROK accepted the invitation to participate.

Exercise COUNTER PUNCH (similar to Exercise STRIKE BACk) was held in Mar 1961 as a CPX/FTX to test the posture of the UN/USFK forces to defend Korea in case of resumed localized hostilities. (NOTE: This would become the USFK LENS Exericse and later joined with the ROK Ulchi Focus Exercise to become Ulchi Focus-Lens.)

In Feb 1960, CINCPAC concurred on the draft for use of facilities and areas by the USFK in Korea submitted to the State Department by the US Embassy, Seoul. In early March, the ROK pressed for an early settlement of the facilities issue and stated that they were under pressure to complete a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The Embassy stated to the ROK Foreign Minister that the US would only consider facilities and areas at this time. COMUS-K recommended that the ROK not be required to compensate for any improvements or construction by the US because no such provision was included in the Japanese agreement. In addition, the draft stated that the US would not be bound to restore the areas to their original condition upon release. COMUS-K was doubtful that the ROK would accept any demands for compensation of improvements. If the negotiations were successfully completed, the US would then discuss exit/entry, customs duties and taxation. However, criminal jurisdiction was NOT to be negotiated. (SITE NOTE: The issue of the return of the areas without restoring them to original condition would crop up 45 years later under the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) when camps were returned and the ROK claimed that the US should pay for pollution cleanup. The SOFA was negotiated in 1963 and jurisdiction did not become a major issue until 1991 when the SOFA was renegotiated for the first time since 1963. It was also the first time that the ROK agreed to contribute to its defense costs.)

1961

1963

Negotiations for a status of forces agreement with the ROK, resumed in mid-1962, were conducted during 1963 under a US stiupulation that an agreement would not become effective until a constitutional government was re-established in Korea. A growing feeling of nationalism and independence among the Koreans, especially the younger generation, was behind the Korean desire for a SOFA with the US, especially after Japan, a former enemy, had such an agreement.

US and Korean negotiating teams met 37 times during 1963, and reached agreement on the wording of the preamble and 12 of the articles. Howeve,r neither side submitted a draft on the controversial article on criminal jurisdiction, and no agreement was reached on the important articles concerning procedures for handling claims, foreign exchange, customs, military post offices, and severral other areas in which there was a wide gap between the positions of the negotiating teams. Because the more controversial subjects were not discussed during the year, CINCPAC had few comments. He did, however, express strong opposition to a proposed revision of the US draft of the criminal jurisdiction article, suggested by the US Ambassador in Seoul to the Departments of Defense and State. This proposed draft was designed to appeal to the Koreans becuase of its similarity to the comparable article of the Japanese SOFA. Although the Embassy draft was in many respects similar to the original COMUSK draft, CINCPAC considered the proposed reisions a premature retreat, and recommended to the JCS that strong efforts be made to secure acceptance by State/DOD of the original COMUSK draft as amended by changes that CINCPAC previously had recommended. The JCS replied that they would advocte the CINCPAC position in the discussions with DOD and State. (Source: 1963 CINCPAC Command History, pp154-155)

1964

In 1964 China became the fifth nation to possess nuclear weapons. Because of China's emergence as a nuclear power, it appears many clandestine operations may have originated from Kunsan flown by the Republic of China (ROC) U-2s -- especially after China exploded its first nuclear weapon at its nuclear weapon facilities in Shanxi. The following information is from ROCAF U2 Operations. The ROCAF first received two U-2s in July 1960. From 1961 to 1972, ROCAF U-2 had flown at least one hundred missions into Communist China. "Penetrating" flights ended in 1968, but operations continued until U-2 were withdrawn to the US. Some of these missions originated from Kunsan.

Two of the known missions from Kunsan:

March 28, 1963: "Tai-Yow Wang took off from K-8, ROK, for a mission over Paotow and Lanchow. The U-2 was tracked by SAM guidance radar. Wang took evasive maneuvers and escaped without harm."
December 19, 1964: "Shi-Jue Wang took off from K-8 (Kunsan), ROK, but aborted prior to penetration due to a failure of the ECM jammer self-test. Wang landed at Taoyuan and the support crew followed in a USAF C-130. This mission was to have flown Kunsan-Baotou-Lanchow-Taoyuan."
A later note added about the Dec 19 mission, "Chang took off from K-8 (Kunsan), ROK on a mission over nuclear weapon facilities in Shanxi. Correlated with Chinese sources, this was not true. There WAS a night mission attempted from Kunsan but this took place on or about Dec 19, 1964 and Shi-Jue Wang aborted prior to penetration due to a failure of the ECM jammer self-test." (1)

In 1964, Nelson Mandela was imprisoned for opposing apartheid, and Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.. received the Nobel Peace Prize. The next year U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announced that the United States would rely upon the threat of "mutually assured destruction" to deter Soviet attack.

However, at Kunsan these historic events seemed light years away...except for China gaining nuclear weapons. The nuclear alerts continued at Kunsan AB. James G. Mitchell(MSgt, USAF, Ret) of Louisburg, North Carolina recalls his tour with the 6175th Air Police Squadron (Sept 64 - Oct 65) on his Geocities homepage. (2) In there he states, "It was one long flight from CA to Korea. Well, I arrived in Korea at an air base called Kimpo. This was the first time that I had ever been so far from home. The big plane that I came in on wasted no time on the ground at Kimpo. That crew had no intention of getting stuck in that place. My bag was put on a wagon with some other junk so I pulled it off. I watched the big plane as it went down the runway and leapt into the early morning sky, and there I stood with everything I owned in a bag, only to turn and see myself back in time. Since it was on the weekend and nothing was going on, I had to stay there until Monday. Monday morning I checked in at the terminal and they put me on the mail plane out to Kunsan. All the time every thing seemed like some kind of bad dream. Kind of like going back it time. The food tasted bad; eggs and milk were no good at all. It was powered stuff, but after a while I could handle it. They wasted no time in putting me to work. This was work I had only heard about before. Security. This was for real -- there was no joking around here. Instead of 8 hours standing on the front gate to an air base looking like Mr. Clean, it was 8 hours standing and walking in front of alert aircraft or something else. The weather had nothing to do with anything. It would get so cold that the heat from your body would melt the snow and the water would get into the weapon, freeze and you could not fire the thing. My thirteen months went by slow at first. I guess the kimchi kicked in and winter was back again and time to pickup that bag and go for another plane ride. This was not an uneventful assignment. I was standing on top of somebody's grave in the photo below."

Freezing in Korea (Feb 1965)
Click on photo to enlarge

In front of Ammo Dump igloo
Click on photo to enlarge

Standing on graves (1965);
In front of 6175th Air Police HQ Building
(Click on photo to enlarge)

Jim Mitchell in Kunsan (Oct 1964)
(Click on photo to enlarge)

1965

Kunsan AB Aerial View (Aug 65) (Courtesy William E. Dickert)

Kunsan Main Gate (Aug 65) (Courtesy William E. Dickert)

He stated that the CES compound was just North of the Base Theater, basically in the same general location it is now, however, the CES compound extended all the way out to Avenue C. The main gate to the compound opened onto Ave C, directly across from the east-west street running out to the runway. The orderly room was located where the current Community Center is located on the corner.

He continued, "My first home was a cube in an "H" shaped set of quonsets on the South-center area of the compound. There was a 7 man NCO quonset next door to the East. My shop , Equipment & Pavements/Grounds was just inside the compound and to the North."

He went on, "As I mentioned, I lived in a quonset in the CE compound. The main base facilities were to the West (steam bath, barber, BX, airman's club). To the South west was the mail room ( a small, tin building)." The infamous steam bath became the base beauty shop in 1987. Both the Beauty Shop and Barber Shop -- which were structures from the Korean War -- were torn down in 2002. The BX was the current Food Court which had been in use as the Post Exchange since the Korean War. The entrance to the BX was on the east end. The Post Office he mentions had been in existence since the Korean War. It was torn down around 1967 and a new cinderblock structure took its place.

He later wrote, "Toward the end of my tour, CE troops were moved into a brand-new dorm immediately South of the then NCO club . The dorm was just Northwest of the current Laundry/Cleaners (that used to be a NCO dining hall). Anyway, my room was on the second floor, East-end/corner, North side. Two man rooms and after the quonset hut, it was "uptown". Walk out the front door, cross the street and into the South door of the NCO club. (not far to crawl to get home)." The NCO Club he mentions was Bldg 1100 which was the old AAFES Manager's office/Shoppette before it was torn down in 2002. The NCO Dining Hall is now the base Linen Exchange.

The military working dogs remained the backbone of the base defense as the perimeter was still undermanned and the fence line in poor condition. Franklin Lamca wrote on Classmates.com, "I remember how disappointed I was that I had to leave my six month old baby behind in the states while I was sent to Korea for 13 months. (3) I remember the thrill of becoming a dog trainer and how much that assignment helped the time to pass. I remember good friends like Giles W. Cox, Fred Barnes, Bob Columbe, Biliduex and others. I remember the pine covered hills and the low tide of the Yellow Sea. The gentleness of the Korean people and hundreds of orphans that seemed to be everywhere."

Kevin McQuade who was an A2c with the 6175th MATRON (Bomb Dump) between Feb 1965-Mar 1966 wrote about his experiences. (4) During that time the 39th Air Division handled the nuclear alerts out of the tree area. However, as far as munitions storage, we should point that the "special weapons" were stored in an extremely secure area off by themselves and should not to be confused with the conventional area of the bomb dump. Kevin makes a valid point that he is still bound by a document he signed to not talk about the nukes in specifics. Although the nukes were withdrawn from Korea in 1992, to this day the USFK will "neither confirm nor deny" anything about nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. He stated:

It's been so long that I would be hard pressed to fill you in from memory and it's unfortunate that I never really took many photos of the base! I wouldn't be at liberty to discuss nukes, but, hypothetically..., I would assume that they would be stored in concrete block houses, maybe two of them with eight bays, four per side. And..., maybe holding two weapons per bay. With the bays wired so that the weapons could be destroyed if the base were about to be overrun. Naturally, this would be a secure area where only a handful of personnel would have access. (NOTE: Kevin later wrote, "BTW, if the base were to be overrun..., the Munitions Specialists would have been the last to leave because it was our responsibility to blowup all munitions and the runway before exiting the base!")

And..., maybe they rolled out a few to be taken to the flightline to be loaded on F-100's when the Marines landed at DaNang in Feb/Mar of 65. And..., sat there at the end of the runway, prepared to rev up and taxi over to take off on a moments notice. They might even have sealed the base and waited to see what was going to happen. (SITE NOTE: The Nukes would have been aimed at China. When the Marines first landed in Vietnam, there was a great concern that the Chinese would enter on behalf of the North Vietnamese. Later the North Vietnamese stupidly "invaded" Chinese territory and were beaten severely which eliminated this worry of the Chinese entering the war. See Nuclear Alerts: 356th TFS for more details on the alerts in the "tree area" at the end of the runway.)

Well..., at least we know that F-100's out of Okinawa and/or Japan rotated in for 90 day TDY's to guard the Yellow Sea facing China during that time period!

Of course F-100's could also carry conventional munitions which were stored in igloo like structures or open revetments. The usual assortment of conventional munitions for its time. You know..., GP (general purpose) bombs, 20MM, rockets, napalm (which we mixed, before Dow Chemical ever got a contract). (SITE NOTE: When the Pueblo Crisis hit, the first thing the 6175th Tank Farm had to do was divert their crews to start mixing up napalm.)

When speaking about the nukes, Kevin used the wording about "assume" to "talk around" the point. We first thought it was from the nuke security being "beaten into their heads" of anyone associated with the "special weapons" so that talking about the nukes was a major "no-no." Kevin wrote to correct us that "it was not so much that it was beaten into our heads! Anyone connected with "Special Weapons" (which was their real designation) had to sign the standard form which bound them to NOT acknowledge anything with regards to their mission! Having never been released from that document, I can neither confirm nor deny any personal involvement or any information in my possession regarding "Special Weapons" in the Korean theater of operations!" After 1992 when they were pulled out, it has become an open topic -- but to this day, the USFK maintains a "neither deny nor confirm" policy on nuclear arms in Korea.) The last nukes left Korea in 1992 and the USFK still retains a "neither confirm nor deny" policy dealing with nukes.

Kevin continued, "It always was a kind of a small Air Base where you knew most of the personnel, sort of like a small town in America where everybody knows everyone else! BTW, the ROKAF guys had F-86's and we had the F-100 (Lead Sleds) at the time. It was a semi active base. I think that the main runway was concrete, but, I also remember landing on PSP that was leftover from the War. That was only 10 years later at the time! (SITE NOTE: Go to ROKAF: 1960s for more information on the ROKAF at Kunsan AB.)

Kevin continued, "At the time..., we lived in concrete cinder block barracks, 2 men to a small room. Better than the tent I lived in in Viet Nam and the Quonset hut I lived in when I came back to Osan when the Pueblo was snatched by the North Koreans!"

He went on to state, "If memory serves me correctly, our barracks were directly across from the main parking lot in front of the Base HQ. And, we needed access to our trucks because we were on the Alert Force every other night and had to respond to any base alerts. Whether they were real or practice alerts. Half of us on one night, half of us on the other. That meant you couldn't drink or leave the base, you had to be prepared..., for anything!" (SITE NOTE: The barracks that he speaks of were to the south of Avenue B between what was the now demolished NCO Club (Bldg 1000) and the post office. The parking lot he mentions still exists next to the NCO Leadership school next to the base library. See the photo above of the "New Barracks" in 1961. These structures remained until the late 1990s when they were replaced by the new 1x1 four story barracks.)

B Battery 44th ADA Site on Hawk Hill outside Kunsan AB (Aug 65) (Courtesy William E. Dickert)

Kunsan 44th ADA Hawk Billet Area next to the ROKAF Ramp (Billets transferred to ROKAF still exist in 2004) (Aug 65) (Courtesy William E. Dickert)

Ron O'Keefe wrote in Feb 2008, "Kunsan nov-'64 - dec-'65 Det2, 39th Air Div. A2C Supply Guy with a TSgt Supv. (Ellis then Cole). CMSgt Chester Volle (correct spelling) was Line Chief and had about 4 years there. Had gone native. Col. Harry Sealy was Cmdr and got his star on rotation to Hickam. Don't remember his predesessor who also got a star. Weapons Officer was a kindly old CWO and the Maint Officer was a 1/Lt Ron something and a really good guy( went to Clark). Max Baer was orderly room clerk and another good guy. Ops officer was Maj. Lowell E. Ward, former Navy and also a Lead Sled Driver. He was from Maine and had the personality to match......funny guy. went to O'Hare as Flying Safety Off."

"I had come from Loring AFB, ME and went to Eglin to finish my 4 years.....Why I remember all this is beyond me. Of course you have a tendency to remember people you like....Oh, Volle had 24 years in at that time....he would be about 82."

Demolition of Korean War Structures: Gib also talked about the demolition work to remove a "pillbox" bunker on the CES grounds. (1) This bunker was used in the Korean War by the 3rd Communications Squadron for it crypto work. It was located just west of his quarters, in what is now the Army Corps of Engineers building. It is on the corner of Avenue C and the road leading to the Civil Engineering compound. Gib wrote, "It had been pretty well demolished by '65, but still had 3 foot thick walls, approx. 7' high. Us equipment operators would beat on it with a crane "headache" ball for days, just to get a slight crack in it. Actually, it was not completely removed until I got back there in '69."

This structure was the old 3rd Communications Squadron, 3rd Bomb Wing "bunker". It was assumed that this was built by the Japanese and taken over for the Cryptography section and surrounded with a barbed wire fence. Gene Newman, a former 3rd Comm Squadron member, wrote, "I don't remember anything that looked like gun mounts . I do remember roof holes for our stove chimneys. One officer thought he could keep us from baking in summer by installing a rim around the roof and filling it with water, but it didn't work. It was still very hot and the water seeped down into the rooms. I assumed it had been some kind of command post or even a comm. center. But why would the Japanese make it so impregnable? Who was going to attack it?"

3rd Comm Squadron Bunker Area
Bunker is behind the barbed wire fence
(Courtesy Gene Newman)
Click on image to enlarge

Gib continued later, "I guess I left off with some of the airfield landmarks. About the cement pads I mentioned in an earlier message. They were located on the North side of the secondary runway/taxiway, East of the Base Ops/Weather Buildings and covered most of the area of what now looks like taxiways/revetments. I seem to recall each one being approx. 25-30 feet wide and 15-20 feet deep in a semi-octagon shape. The cement was only about 6 inches thick because I could bust through it with a single drop of a "headache" ball from 25 feet in the air. I probably broke up 20-25 of them." These pads were situated around the base ops area and in a "loop" that was used for the Marine VMF(N)-513 aircraft.

F3D being hauled out of the mud (1952)
Note the cement pad large enough for two aircraft
(Courtesy Jack Kio)
Click on photo to enlarge

He went on, "Another thing I seem to recall around the pads were several cement lined "ditches" about 3 feet wide by 3 feet deep and they ran in a North-South direction across the area." The reason for these "ditches" was the drainage problems. In the rainy season during the Korean War, any Marine F-3D that turned too wide and got off the cement pad would sink in the mud and have to be winched out with a crane.

He continued, "Another thing we spent a lot of time getting rid of was REAL "PSP' along the primary North-South taxiway, especially in the ROK hangar area. Tons of it, and as fast as we could cut it up, a "crew" from the village outside the North gate would hall it away on an a-frame." This was the PSP laid for the B-26 parking area. The ROK hangar area was where the 474th Fighter-Bomber Group parked their jets on the PSP (Perforated Steel Plate). NOTE: Gib's remarks about "REAL PSP" refers to what was used in the early days of the Korean War known as "Masden planking". It was thicker gauge steel than the PSP that was used later.

F-84 parked on PSP with sandbag revetment
In background is the F-84 quonset
maintenance hangar that became the ROKAF hangar
(Courtesy Dave Day)
Click on image to enlarge

Gib continued, "Speaking of those villagers. virtually all of the airfield "low grassy" areas were allowed to grow to a height of 5-6 feet. When it got to high, we would take a tractor and open trailer to the North village and pick-up about 20 of the villagers to come in and cut it. They would use hand sickles and squat as they mowed through a swath. Each villager would make their own bundles and identify them with different colored pieces of cloth. (all hell would break loose at the gate when they unloaded it and someone tried to take another's bundle.) Two of us GI's from CE usually watched over one crew, picking them up and then returning them to the gate. I was led to believe that the villagers were either North Korean refugees or related to North Koreans, therefore, each GI carried an M-2 carbine while pulling the duty."

It is very possible that they were North Korean refugees. Many of the refugees remained in Kunsan after the Korean War. It is also possible that if they did not have a farm -- as the North Koreans would be -- to get rice thatch, the grass bundles could be substituted for roofing materials on the mud wattle houses. The North Korean village was on the side of the hills in the present day Wolmyong park area. It should be mentioned here the favorite trick used by the "grass cutters" throughout Korea in getting bits-and-pieces of various items off-base. They were packed in the bundles of grass. This trick was mentioned in John Moench's book, Taking Command, of life at Kunsan in 1959. For example, after grass cutters cleaned near taxi lights, the taxi lights disappeared.

New SOFA: Gib continued, "Life at the "KOON" was a lot of pinochle, "sake" (rice wine) on cold nights , small "jeepster kimchi cabs" to town (max 3 passenger & driver, even though I can recall putting 6 of us in one in order to meet curfew). Until 01 Jan 66, we had a curfew of midnight, then the Status of Forces Agreement came into being. Before then, the main gate would open at 0800 and close at 2400. On the day the Agreement went into effect, the base commander had to close the base at 1000 and restrict everyone to the base, recall those who were in town and then bail at least 13 GI's out of the Kunsan jail. It was a couple of days before the gates reopened. No more "hell raisin', kick down the walls" parties." The curfew was not only for GIs. It was a nationwide curfew that applied to all of Korea under the National Security Act. This was part of the declaration of martial law under Park Chung-Hee's iron-fisted rule.

With his election, President Park became a virtual dictator -- though on paper the ROK was a democracy. Before Park Chung-Hee, the U.S. did basically as it pleased and treated Korea as its personal territory. However, with Park Chung-Hee, the situation was completely different. As a result, the U.S. saw the need for a Status of Forces Agreement to protect its political interests and military forces.

The SOFA was something that had NEVER been in existence in Korea. Unlike other countries where the SOFA document is one of the FIRST things negotiated, Korea had none until 1966. Before then, the Americans treated Korea as "their property" -- and in some sense, it was. If a GI got in trouble in Korea for a major crime, he was simply shipped out. In many cases, GIs got away with murder -- literally. The corrupt Korean government of Syngman Rhee (Lee Syng Man) never pushed for a SOFA agreement. Remember that the ROK government was at that time drawing 100 percent of its support from U.S. government funds. President Rhee didn't want to rock the boat. (NOTE: In Japan, the 1952 Administrative Agreement with the new Japanese democratic government under its Peace Constitution was implemented. This was the forerunner to the 1960 Japanese SOFA. However, Korea which held its first democratic elections in 1949 had nothing even started.)

However, in 1960, Syngman Rhee was overthrown in a student led demonstration that ousted him from office and sent him into exile in Hawaii. After that, Park Chung-Hee led the military overthrow of the Second Republic in May 1961. However, nothing could be done on the SOFA as the dictatorship of Park did not set well with the John F. Kennedy administration. After Park was elected as a "civilian" President and his agreement to send Korean troops to Vietnam "negotiated" by Lyndon Johnson, the SOFA issue was brought up. The reason was that the U.S. started on a course of improving the ROK military so that it could replace the U.S. forces -- thus releasing them for Vietnam duty. As such, the U.S. saw a need to delineate the cost sharing as the U.S. started to pour millions of dollars in direct monetary aid and equipment into the ROK to upgrade its forces. (NOTE: The end result was that the ROK in 1970 was able to take over full control of the DMZ except for Panmunjeon.)

However, in reality, the 1966 SOFA was a rather unsubstantial document as far as legal protection. (5) Basically codified America's continued use of Korea with impunity -- though it curtailed much of the destructive abuses by the U.S. military. The U.S. still retained custody of all USFK personnel -- even for serious offenses. In many cases, they were simply shipped out of country. Korea had little jurisdiction over GIs -- and what was stated was seldom exercised. It would not be until the late 1980s before the SOFA was renegotiated with substantive changes. The "official line" states the delay in signing a SOFA in Korea was because of "gaining experience" in Japan and Europe. It seems a little far-fetched.

The official statement on SOFA reads: "The US-ROK SOFA was signed in 1966 after the US gained experience with the 1960 US-Japan SOFA and the earlier 1952 Administrative Agreement upon which it was based, and with the NATO SOFA. The US-ROK SOFA provisions are modeled on various provisions of pre-existing agreements including the US-Japan SOFA and the US-Federal Republic of Germany Supplemental Agreement to the NATO SOFA. The US-ROK SOFA is not, nor was it ever intended to be, identical to the US-Japan SOFA. It is based on mutual accommodations recognizing different systems, some of which remain quite different today. The Japan labor provisions, for instance, recognize that in Japan there is an "indirect hire" system for local national labor (the Government of Japan is the employer for Japanese nationals who work for USFJ). In Korea, USFK has a "direct hire" system (USFK is the employer of its Korean employees)."

In the 1980s, the "Miracle of the Han" had arrived and Koreans could now pay more towards their "fair share." There is a balance here that is negotiated. If the Koreans wanted more control over the USFK forces, they needed to pay more of the defense cost share. The SOFA now states: "Under current burden sharing agreements, Japan pays virtually 100% of the cost of all USFJ local national labor, including non-appropriated fund organizations (clubs, military exchanges, etc.), while the ROK currently contributes approximately 70% only to USFK appropriated fund Korean national labor costs." (NOTE: There is a growing movement in the U.S. over the inequitability of the cost sharing as the U.S. spends the SAME amount as Korea (approx. $15B a year) on Korea's defense. Many feel the Koreans are getting a free ride.)

Ferry to Changhang 44th ADA (Aug 65) (Courtesy William E. Dickert)

Korea Military Situation There were about 80,000 military personnel in Korea, while Vietnam still only had 25,000. In 1963 consideration was given by the JCS and DOD to withdrawing both of the US divisions from Korea as a gold flow measure. In May of 1964 the President signed a National Security Agency (NSA) memorandum which asked the Secretary of State to coordinate a joint STATE-AID-Defense study which would enable him to "weight and resolve the choices facing us with respect to the possible redeployment -- to Hawaii -- of one of the US divisions" stationed in Korea. "The memorandum directed that the study should explore what sequence of US actions -- involving economic assistance, military assistance, diplomatic communications and public statements -- would minimize the negative effects and maximize the benefit of such a redeployment. The study was to take into account Korea's military security and short-term political stability, and the long-term US objectives of stimulating sustainable economic expansion and and strengthening Korea's social and political institutions. Some of the other guidelines concerning study were: assess the value to the US military posture to be gained from the redeployment; to estimate the balance of payments gain to be realized from withdrawing a division; and estimate the amount of gain which would be offset from an increase in military assistance to the ROK." (CINCPACOM Command History, 1964, pp7-8)

CINCPACOM stated that: "There had been no decrease in the threat to Korea, hence, militarily, there was no basis for decrease in the overall defensive force requirements; using accepted standards for an infantry division, a US division was equivalent in effectiveness to two ROKA divisions."

There were two major deficiencies existing in the Korean Armed Forces. First, the Korean Navy had only a limited capability to control the waters adjacent to the Korean peninsula. In addition to existing naval forces, there was a need for additional Coastal Patrol and Mine Warfare ships, as well as mondernization of existing Coastal Patrol ships. Second, there was a need for a semi-automated Aircraft Control and Warning system because of the proximity of modern North Korean Air Force jets to United Nations Command units and depots. Additionally, lack of modernization of certain army equipment was seriously affecting combat capabilities of Korean Ground Forces, especially in tank units. Also, more artillery and communications equipment was needed. However, all of these needed improvements had been deleted from MAP Plans and Programs because of drastic MAP ceiling reductions. (NOTE: In 1963 there was a $12 million cut in MAP funding for Korea. and $20 million FY65 reduction.) (ibid, p140)

The FY65 reduction was predicted to leave War Reserve Ammunition at inadequate levels; fail to provide for needed runway repair and improved air depot facilities; significantly impair shore establishments as well as high seas capability for the ROK Navy; seriously impar Strategic Long Lines Communications and Tactical Communications of the Infantry Divisions; and Vehicle mobility improvement, urgently needed by the Infantry Divisions, would not be achieved. (ibid, p145)

Between FY65-FY69 PACOM planned to convert 5 ROKAF squadrons to F-5 aircraft. 100 aircraft at a cost of $100 million. A modest fire control and radar ranging capability was recommended for development for the F-5 and that all PACOM interceptors be equipped with improved, inexpensive, infrared air-to-air missiles. The reductions of USAF fighter strength due to more and more aircraft being siphoned off for Vietnam (CLEARWATER actions) created a critical deficiency in ROK air defense. This was aggravated by the cancellation of programmed mondernization of ROKAF all weather fighter capabilities and semi-automation of the AC&W system in Korea, weighed against reducing programmed US/ROK SAM force leels by five battalions.

The first two HAWK battalions in Korea MAP were awaiting shipment to Korea -- and modifications were to be made in Korea to prevent a 90-day delay. During 1964 one and one-half US Nike Hercules and four US HAWK battalions were operational in Korea. In addtion, two Nike Hercules and three HAWK battalions were programmed for delivery to the ROKA during the period FY65-68. Because of the high-cost of repair of the SAM equipment, COMUS-K recommended that the program for providing five SAM battalions to the ROK be cancelled and that the ROK forces take over the equipment of the five and on-half US SAM battalions then existing in Korea. As part of the proposal, four SAM batteries would be relocated to the Pusan area to provide defense of the Pusan logistic complex.

The defense budget of the ROK was to be held at about 22 billion Won, except that the ceiling was to be adjusted to allow for price increases affecting dense costs, cost-of-living pay adjustments, and the amount of the MAP Transfer Program. US Defense Budget Support was to be planned at approximately two-thirds of the ROK defense budget. The expansion and improvement of light industry in Korea would enable the ROK to assume a progressively greater responsibility for providing commercial-type items and light military hardware for its armed forces from its economy. (ibid, pp189-190)

In May 1964, the US Ambassador and ROK Minister of Commmerce and Industry signed a new Petroleum Operating Agreement which shifted supply of POL for ROK civil requiements to KOCO. In the meantime, during April, the Ulsan Refinery began producing and supplying the ROK civil economy requirements. A decision was made, dependent upon competitive prices, to begin supplying ROK MAP POL from the Ulsan refinery in the first quarter of 1965. Incremental transfer of funding from MAP to theROK government would begin n Jan 1966 and be completed at the end of FY68. The US terminals in Japan would only supply US and UN forces requirements in Korea.

The Status of Forces Agreement negotiations continued in 1964. After the coup, the State department wanted the situation to "return to normal" before starting negotiations. According to the 1964 CINCPAC Command History, pp 244-248:

Early in the year the negotiating teams agreed to an article related to the Military Post Offices. However, both sides found it more difficult to reach agreement on certain of the fundamental, and consequently more controversial, subjects such as criminal jurisdiction and labor policy.

In February the negotiators exchanged drafts ofthe criminal juridiction article for the SOFA. One of the key issues in the subsequent discussions was whether the certificate of a United States commander would be accepted as conclusive evidence that an alleged offense arose out of an act done in the performance of "offical duty." (NOTE: This is the portion dealing with an act committed while the individual is performing official duties , and therefore is under the jurisdiction of the military.) The Koreans soon proposed that if the US would agree to a very restrictive definition of the term "official duty" they would accept the certificates as a valid basis for determining which country should have primary jurisdiction in a specific case. To break a September stalemate in discussions, the State Department negotiators proposed to offer a "package deal" that would grant limited concession to the ROK in exchange for ROK agreement to certain terms the US considered most significant. CINCPAC (Admiral Sharp) wanted the "package deal" to be modified to reserve to the US the right to deny the ROK custody of a US serviceman accused unless it was mutually agreed that all fair trial safeguards speificed inthe SOFA had been applied.

At the 67th meeting of the SOFA negotiating teams, held in Seoul on 16 December, the US representatives tabled a proposal that reflected the CINCPAC's recommendations that the ROK automatically waive primary jurisdiction except in cases involveng ROK security, forceable rape, malicious killing. In those cases, there was to be a joint US-ROK consultation prior to determination of jurisdiction. The US offer also provided that disputes related to "official duty certificates" would be resolved in diplomatic channels. The modified US offer was made contingent on the ROK accepting the American position on custody of defendants and fair trial safeguards. In that offer the US was adopting the same approach taken in the SOFA negotiations with the GRC (Taiwan).

Another issue in the cirminal jurisdiction was a Korean proposal that the US surrender jurisdiction over US civilians except to the extent that they were subject to military law. CINCPAC objected to this because such an agreement could interfere with the exercise of authority which might be granted by future legislation tha would subject civilians to US judicial processes.

In the area of labor policy, the US negotiators favored a labor policy wherein US agencies would hire Korean employees and observe the general provisions of Korean labor practice. Conversely, the Korean proposal, apparently based on the labor provisions of the Japanese SOFA, sought authority for the ROK to hire, fire, and pay their nationals employed by the US with the US later paying the cost of the process. DOD accepted the view that the US would resist any trend which would require compliance with ROK labor law or limit the US right to discharge Korean employees. Later in the year, the Korean negotiators agreed, in principle, that the US could continue to hire Koreans directly and further indicated agreement with the premise that the US, even as an employer of South Korean nationals, could not submit to the jurisdiction of ROK courts or labor tribunals. (Source: 1964 CINCPAC Command History, pp244-248)