HOW IT WAS! KUNSAN AIRBASE Pueblo Incident (Operation Red Fox 23 Jan 1968 - 05 Feb 1969) 475th TFW (Jan 68 - Feb 68) 4th TFW (Jan 68 - Jul 69) 354th TFW (Jul 68 - Jun 70) 127 FIS/166 FIS (ANG) (Jul 68 - Jun 69) 334 TFS/335 TFS (Dec 69 - May 70) 54th TFW (Jul 70 - Oct 70)

Tanks (NR)

The Buffalo Barracks Historical Website Award Excellence Then and Now Buffalo Barracks (NR)

Acknowledgement: Special thanks to John Wilkerson of Osan, Korea for his narrative account of the Pueblo Incident period. Special thanks to Dan Decker (TSgt, USAF Retired) of Alpine, Texas for his narrative account of the 4th TFW deployment. Thanks to Bill Cosens for his narratives of the 4th TFW deployment.

USS Pueblo (AGER-2) is a Banner-class technical research ship (Navy intelligence) which was boarded and captured by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) on 23 January 1968 in what is known as the Pueblo incident or alternatively as the Pueblo crisis.

North Korea stated that she strayed into their territorial waters, but the United States maintains that the vessel was in international waters at the time of the incident. More recently, facts have come to light that indicate that USS Pueblo was captured by North Korea at the instigation of the Soviet Union, which was seeking a cryptographic machine onboard to match with a key provided to the Soviets by the spy John Anthony Walker.

USS Pueblo, still held by DPRK today, remains a commissioned vessel of the United States Navy. North Korean leader Kim Jong Il has specified that it be used to promote anti-Americanism.

Initial operations

The ship was launched at the Kewaunee Shipbuilding and Engineering Company in Kewaunee, Wisconsin, on 16 April 1944 as United States Army cargo ship FS-344. She was transferred to the United States Navy in 1966 and was renamed USS Pueblo. Initially, she served as a light cargo ship, AKL-44, but shortly after resuming service was converted to an intelligence gathering ship, or what is colloquially known as a spy ship, and re-designated AGER-2 on 13 May 1967. AGER (Auxiliary General Environmental Research) denoted a joint Naval and National Security Agency (NSA) program.

The USS Pueblo was an old commercial freighter that was converted in 1967 into a US Navy ship capable of gathering signal intelligence. Think of it as the US version of all the Russian fishing trawlers you hear about with antennas popping out all over the ship. After completing initial training on the US west coast in November 1967, the ship traveled to Japan in preparation for a future intelligence gathering mission. The USS Pueblo left the naval port at Sasebo, Japan on January 11, 1968 on it's first intelligence gathering mission. The mission was to gather intelligence on Russian ships traveling through the Tsushima Straits and intercept electronic transmissions from North Korea. (Source: Rokdrop.com.)

Activity and conflict near the DPRK

On January 5, 1968, Pueblo left for Sasebo, Japan. She left Sasebo on January 11 with specific orders to intercept and conduct surveillance of Soviet naval activity in the Tsushima Straits and to gather signal and electronic intelligence from the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea.

On January 21 a modified Soviet style sub chaser, SO-I class, passed within two miles (4 km) of the Pueblo. The next day, two DPRK fishing trawlers (Lenta Class) passed within 25 yards (23 m) of Pueblo. That day, a North Korean unit made an assassination attempt against South Korean leadership targets, but the crew of Pueblo was not informed.

The ship was under specific orders to not create an international incident and to stay out of North Korean territorial waters. However, an international incident had already occurred that didn't involve the USS Pueblo when 31 North Korean commandos infiltrated across the Korean Demilitarized Zone to assassinate South Korean President Park Chung-hee. The commandos were intercepted just outside the grounds of the Korean presidents home and all but one of the commandos was killed in a furious gun battle with South Korean soldiers January 21, 1968. Tensions were running extremely high at the time that the USS Pueblo was drifting in international waters only 30 miles from the coast of North Korea. On January 22nd the Pueblo transmitted a situation report to Japan explaining that a North Korean sub chaser and two fishing trawlers had come near the Pueblo in the last two days. Despite the increased tensions and the fact that North Korean vessels were conducting reconnaissance of the Pueblo the US Navy leadership in Japan felt no need to inform the USS Pueblo of the assassination attempt and mounting tensions in the area or increase the ships security level. Throughout the mission the ships threat level was kept at minimum by the Navy. They did make sure to radio the latest NBA scores to the Pueblo though. As far as the crew of the USS Pueblo knew, it was business as usual on the fateful day of January 23, 1968. (Source: Rokdrop.com.)

According to the American account, the following day, January 23, Pueblo was approached by a sub chaser and her nationality was challenged, Pueblo responded by raising the U.S. flag. The DPRK vessel then ordered her to stand down or be fired upon. Pueblo attempted to maneuver away, but was considerably slower than the sub chaser. Additionally, three torpedo boats appeared on the horizon and then joined in the chase and subsequent attack. The attackers were soon joined by two MiG-21 fighters. A fourth torpedo boat and a second sub chaser appeared on the horizon a short time later. The ammunition on Pueblo was stored below decks, and her machine guns were wrapped in cold-weather tarpaulins. The machine guns were unmanned, and no attempt was made to man them.

U.S. Naval authorities and the crew of the Pueblo insist that before the capture, Pueblo was miles outside North Korean territorial waters; the Koreans claim the vessel was well within the DPRK's territory. The mission statement allowed her to approach within a nautical mile (1.852 km) of that limit. The DPRK, however, claims a 50-nautical-mile (90 km) sea boundary even though international standards are 12 nautical miles (22 km).

The North Korean vessels attempted to board Pueblo, but she maneuvered to prevent this and a sub chaser opened fire with a 55 mm cannon. The smaller vessels fired machine guns into Pueblo, which then signaled compliance and began destroying sensitive material. The volume of material on board was so great it made it impossible to destroy all of it.

Just after lunch on the 23rd, three North Korean sub chasers were spotted approaching the Pueblo. The North Koreans signaled towards the Pueblo to identify themselves. The commander of the Pueblo, CPT Lloyd Bucher ordered his men to raise the American flag. After the flag was raised the North Koreans signaled that they were going to board the ship. CPT Bucher signaled back that the ship was in international waters. The North Koreans once again signaled that they were going to board the ship. At this time CPT Bucher ordered the crew to maneuver the ship away from the North Koreans. The North Koreans immediately tried to cut off the escape of the ship and opened fire on the Pueblo with their 57mm machine guns. Additionally two MIG-21s buzzed the Pueblo for added emphasis of how serious the North Koreans were. CPT Bucher ordered his crew to begin destroying all classified information and equipment and a distress call was radioed to Japan. Japan radio back that they acknowledged the distress call and that a rescue team would be mounted to assist them.

The North Koreans stopped firing and signaled towards the Pueblo to follow them. CPT Bucher thinking that a rescue team was enroute decided to comply, but only traveled at 1/3 speed in order to buy the ship more time for the rescue to come. However, no rescue was to come. It is important to remember that the United States was heavily involved in the Vietnam War at the time and the naval brass in Japan did not want to be the ones responsible for starting a second major war at the time that could have had disastrous consequences for the United States. They decided before they did anything they would have to get approval from the President of the United States. Before the US President even received word about what happened the USS Pueblo had already been captured.(Source: Rokdrop.com.)

Radio contact with Naval Security Group in Kamiseya, Japan had been ongoing. Seventh Fleet command was aware of Pueblo's situation. Help was promised but never arrived. More than likely, no one wanted to take responsibility for an attack on North Korean vessels attacking Pueblo. By the time President Lyndon Johnson was awakened, Pueblo had been captured and any rescue attempt would be futile.

Pueblo followed the North Korean vessels as ordered, but then stopped immediately outside North Korean waters. She was again fired upon, and an U.S. sailor, Fireman Apprentice Duane Hodges, was killed. She was boarded by men from a torpedo boat and a sub chaser. Crew members had their hands tied, were blindfolded, beaten, and prodded with bayonets.

While the naval brass were waiting for word from Washington the crew of the Pueblo continued to try and delay the North Koreans. However, the North Koreans again strafed the ship with machine gun fire and this time killed crew member Duane Hodges. CPT Bucher knew the charade was over and allowed the North Koreans to board the ship. The North Koreans quickly tied up and beat the crew and then drove the ship towards the port city of Wonsan. (Source: Rokdrop.com.)

Once Pueblo was in North Korean territorial waters, she was boarded again, this time by high-ranking North Korean officials.

Aftermath

Pueblo was taken into port at Wonsan and the crew was moved twice to POW camps, with some of the crew reporting upon release that they were starved and regularly tortured while in North Korean custody.

At Wonsan the 82 crew members of the Pueblo were taken off the ship and continued to receive brutal beatings from their guards as North Korean civilians cheered the capture of the Americans. The last time Americans had been at Wonsan was in 1950 when US Marines evacuated from the port after the Chinese military attacked the US military to aid their North Korean allies during the Korean War. The US Navy battleships had bombarded and destroyed the city before leaving. Wonsan was probably not the best location for an American to arrive in North Korea for the first time. (Source: Rokdrop.com.)

This treatment was allegedly worsened when the North Koreans realized that crewmen were secretly giving them "the finger" in staged propaganda photos. (SITE NOTE: The group photos showed members of the crew with their middle fingers against their face in a pensive pose or with the middle finger across their wrist. That the North Koreans did not catch it prior to releasing the propaganda photos to the world is a wonder.)

Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, Commanding Officer of the Pueblo, was tortured and put through a mock firing squad in an effort to make him confess. Eventually the Koreans threatened to execute his men in front of him, and Bucher relented. None of the Koreans knew English well enough to write the confession, so they had Bucher write it himself. They verified the meaning of his words, but failed to catch the pun when he said "We paean the North Korean state. We paean their great leader Kim Il Sung" ("We paean" sounds almost identical to "we pee on").

Following an apology, a written admission by the U.S. that Pueblo had been spying, and an assurance that the U.S. would not spy in the future, the North Korean government decided to release the 82 remaining crew members. On 23 December 1968 the crew was taken by buses to the DMZ border with South Korea and ordered to walk south across the "Bridge of No Return". Exactly 11 months after being taken prisoner, the Captain led the long line of crewmen, followed at the end by the Executive Officer, Lieutenant Ed Murphy, the last man across the bridge. The U.S. then verbally retracted the ransom admission, apology, and assurance. Meanwhile the North Koreans blanked out the paragraph above the signature which read: "and this hereby receipts for 82 crewmen and one dead body". Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, Commanding Officer of the Pueblo and all the officers and crew appeared before a Navy Court of Inquiry. A court martial was recommended for the CO and the Officer in Charge of the Research Department, Lt Steve Harris. But the Secretary of the Navy, John H. Chafee, rejected the recommendation, stating, "They have suffered enough." Commander Bucher was never found guilty of any indiscretions and continued his Navy career until retirement.

There is some debate as to whether Commander Bucher acted within his orders. It was clearly stated in his orders that Bucher was not to spark an international incident. The Americans allege that North Korea attacked and boarded Pueblo in international waters — a clear act of war, whereas the DPRK has stated the Pueblo was in violation of the territorial limit. Historically, U.S. ships engaged in the collection of intelligence would often approach the very limits of territorial waters and sometimes cross over for brief periods of time. Such actions would often prompt the target country to mobilize parts of their military and thereby provide more intelligence for the U.S. ship to capture. The question is posed whether or not Bucher should have kept Pueblo in the area after the first encounter of a gunboat. Those familiar with the operations of the ship point out that such encounters were routine while on station, and it was expected that Bucher would remain on station in spite of such events. Further, Bucher was not informed of escalating tensions between North Korea and the South Korean-U.S. bloc in the days leading up to the capture of Pueblo. Bucher died in San Diego on January 28, 2004, partly as a result of complications from the injuries he suffered during his time as a prisoner of war in North Korea.

Pueblo is still held by North Korea. In October 1999, it was towed from Wonson on the east coast, around the Korean Peninsula, to Nampo on the west coast. This required moving the vessel through international waters. No attempt to recapture the Pueblo was made. This move was done just before the visit of U.S. presidential envoy James Kelly to the capital Pyongyang. The present location of Pueblo is in Pyongyang, as a reminder to tourists of the North Koreans' strength.

The Pueblo (AGER-2) was the third ship named after Pueblo, Colorado. It remains today a commissioned ship in the U.S. Navy. It is widely, but incorrectly, believed to be the first American ship to have been captured since the wars in Tripoli. On December 8, 1941, the river gunboat USS Wake (PR-3) was captured by Japanese forces while moored in Shanghai.

Tourist attraction

USS Pueblo is one of the primary tourist attractions in Pyongyang, North Korea, having attracted over 250,000 visitors since being moved to the Taedong River. The Pueblo is now anchored at the very spot where the General Sherman Incident is believed to have taken place in 1866. Often tourists are led through the ship by a guided tour. Participants will first enter the ship for a 15-minute video shown from a small TV set mounted in the ceiling, explaining how the North Koreans captured the ship, with contemporary film footage. All areas of the ship are shown, including the secret communications room full of encryption machines and radio equipment, still in a partly disassembled state after they were inspected by North Korean technicians. One highlight of the guided tour is a photo opportunity where visitors may have their pictures taken while holding the rear-mounted machine-gun.

Operation Red Fox
23 Jan 1968 - 05 Feb 1969

On 23 January 1968 North Korean patrol boats seized the USS Pueblo, a US Navy intelligence-gathering vessel, in the international waters of the East Sea off Wonsan. One USS Pueblo crewmember was killed in the boarding and 82 were taken POW and held captive. The seizure, which took place a mere two days after a commando intrusion into Seoul, shocked the whole world, and there arose strong public demand in the United States for firm retaliatory action against North Korea. North Korea made the utmost use of the Pueblo incident in its crafty propaganda, believing that the United States, deeply involved in the Vietnam War then, would not be able to use the force of arms on the Korean Peninsula.


Crew of the USS Pueblo
(Click on photo to enlarge)

Between 26-31 January 1968 several 9th Air Force active units deployed to the Pacific in response to North Korea’s seizure of USS Pueblo: the 4TFW sent 72 F-4Ds, the 354TFW sent 18 F-100s, and the 363TRW sent six RB-66s. In addition, several 9AF-gained ARC units were recalled to active duty: the 113TFW and 107th, 113th, 121st and 177TFGs. The 334th and 335th Fighter Squadrons, equipped with F-4 Phantom II fighters, rushed to Korea to support operations during the Pueblo incident. The squadrons returned to Seymour Johnson in June 1968. F-106 fighters were briefly deployed to Osan AFB in Korea in March of 1968 to provide air defense during the Pueblo incident.

The 347th Tactical Fighter Wing was activated at Yokota Air Base, Japan on 15 January 1968 . The mission was to provide air defense for the islands of Japan. Units assigned were the 34th, the 35th, and the 36th Tactical Fighter Squadrons (TFS); and the 556th and the 6091st Reconnaissance Squadrons. Aircraft assigned were the F-105 Thunderchief, the F-4C Phantom II, the EB-57 Canberra, and the C-130 Hercules. Between 23 Ocobert 1968 and 05 February 1969 all of the 347th Tactical Fighter Wing's F-4Cs were deployed to bases in South Korea to participate in the US response to North Korea's abduction of the USS Pueblo.

Six Air Force Reserve units were mobilized in the wake of the Pueblo Incident. The 120th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Colorado Air National Guard was ordered into active Federal service as a result of the Pueblo incident, along with three other F-100 tactical fighter squadrons: 136th Tactical Fighter Squadron, New York, 174th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Iowa, 188th Tactical Fighter Squadron, New Mexico. The 120th Tactical Fighter Squadron entered combat in Vietnam on 5 May 1968, two days after its arrival, and completed its 1,000th mission 51 days later. During the Air National Guard's eleven months of service in Vietnam, the four F-100 squadrons flew 24,124 combat sorties and accumulated 38,614 combat flying hours.

The 445th Military Airlift Wing was activated after the Pueblo was seized, on January 26, 1968. The activation of the 445th found many support personnel stationed at eight different stateside bases and aircrews flying more missions to Europe, the Caribbean, South America, and Southeast Asia. The Wing remained activated in support of the Pueblo incident for seventeen months until released from active military service on June 2, 1969. For superior performance and dedication during the Pueblo incident, the 445th Military Airlift Wing received its first Air Force Outstanding Unit Award.

Eleven months after the seizure North Korea repatriated 82 Pueblo crewmen and one set of remains to the United States through P'anmunjom. Upon signature of the US admitting to espionage in the coastal waters of the Sea of Japan, the 82 POWs were freed. Upon their return on 28 December, 1968, the crew was treated poorly by the public and the military and only in 1990 did they receive the POW ribbons to which they were entitled. The ship remains in Wonson Harbor, North Korea.

USS Pueblo (AGER2): War Trophy in Wonson Harbor
(Click on photo to enlarge)

The following is from Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1968 by Major Daniel P. Bolger:

The air power arrived under the operation code-named Combat Fox. Spurred by Lieutenant General Seth J. McKee of Fifth Air Force, several air units arrived in Korea before 1 February 1968. Along with forces from Okinawa, these included the three, potent F-4D Phantom II squadrons of Colonel Charles E. ("Chuck") Yeager's 4th Tactical Fighter Wing. Yeager's "suitcase air force" flew in from North Carolina within seventy-two hours of notification, a truly remarkable performance. Altogether, almost 200 combat aircraft deployed.

At sea, the Seventh Fleet marshaled some thirty-five major surface combatants. Six aircraft carriers led the procession of naval might that comprised Operation Formation Star. Navy air furnished another 400 or so frontline combat jets.

The buildup looked impressive, but appearances could be deceiving. Bonesteel had asked for this show of strength, but he did not really command it. Narrowly defined command relationships strictly limited these contingency forces to a deterrent role. Thanks to his personal influence, Bonesteel received some help from the Fifth Air Force in prosecuting the Second Korean Conflict; the Seventh Fleet did not cooperate at all.

The Fifth Air Force's Advance Echelon took charge of the U.S. Air Force's (USAF) contribution. Senior USAF officers made it clear that these air units "[were] neither assigned nor attached to the command of General Bonesteel as Commander, US Forces Korea." In the event of an overt invasion, the Fifth Air Farce (sic) would come under UN authority. But until then, it responded to distant U.S. Pacific Air Forces and through them to U.S. Pacific Command.

Fortunately, Generals McKee and Bonesteel worked out practical arrangements to make use of the new air units in the ongoing low-intensity conflict. Combat Fox aircraft aided the ROKs in sea-approach coverage and provided strip-alert quick-reaction flights. Both American infantry divisions received and exercised new forward air controller teams and procedures, although no actual air strikes occurred. Squadrons and wings rotated to Korea at regular intervals, allowing some training for them from the commitment. Once the imminent danger subsided, the USAF component gradually pared back to its precrisis strength. In all, Combat Fox lasted sixteen months.

The U.S. Navy went its own way, with the Seventh Fleet anxious to reduce the task groups and speed ships to Vietnamese waters. None of the warships responded to General Bonesteel in any capacity, although he would gain some air sorties in the event of a major war. For Seventh Fleet, the Korean circuit mainly constituted a waste of time. According to one participating admiral, these activities "usually involved some rather innocuous air operations for a couple of days, using one of our aircraft carriers." By summer, the Seventh Fleet had moved on.

Although not fully orchestrated for maximum support of General Bonesteel's UNC, the contingency buildup worked. This tremendous show of force brought in ten times the amount of aircraft normally operated by the 314th Air Division. The 600 or so USAF and U.S. Navy (USN) jets completely negated the only real conventional edge the DPRK possessed their air arm. Any northern blitzkrieg would have to proceed under American-dominated skies. North Korea did not try anything. Even unconventional operations dwindled in the face of the U.S. air and sea armadas.

Thus, the contingency deployments did their job and guaranteed some breathing space for the Americans and South Koreans to settle their disputes. Apprised of the ROK intransigence and war fever, President Johnson wisely deferred to General Bonesteel and Ambassador Porter and sent an envoy immediately. Cyrus R. Vance arrived in Seoul on 10 February.

Vance possessed topflight credentials. A former secretary of the Army and deputy secretary of defense, Vance had spoken for Johnson and the United States in several delicate situations: Panama in January 1965; the Dominican Republic (that same year); in Detroit during the riots of June 1967; and on strife-torn Cyprus that autumn. He would speak softly enough to the Koreans, but his words would be blunt.

As usual, Vance traveled light. Only John E. Walsh, ambassador to Kuwait, and translator Daniel A. O'Donoghue accompanied the troubleshooter. Bonesteel and Porter met the trio at the airport, and they took off immediately for the secure confines of U.S. Eighth Army headquarters. Walsh experienced a frigid flight in a bubble-topped, little OH-23 while perched unceremoniously on Bonesteel's lap. With the Blue House raiders just run to ground, even the commanding general could not afford to borrow one of the few enclosed UH-1 Hueys. The cold flight said a lot about the resource situation in United Nations Command. Bonesteel might have done it intentionally, to make a point.

Vance wanted to meet immediately with President Park, but ROK Blue House staffers rebuffed his request with uncharacteristic rudeness. The officials told Vance that Park was meeting with his military planners and not to be disturbed. Unable to arrange a meeting, and looking ahead to a banquet that evening sponsored by the ROK Army, Vance and his men huddled with Bonesteel and Porter. The fivesome went over some hundred discrete issues, ensuring a unified front. Vance would do all the talking for the next few days.

At the ROK Army dinner that night, the Americans stuck to light conversation and banal, obvious toasts. Their excited counterparts talked with conviction about the mighty things to come as the allies avenged the Blue House and Pueblo incidents. The southerners seemed to think that Vance's arrival presaged the great march north. One boozy ROK general cornered Ambassador Walsh and confided in him: "We're blood brothers.... When you are hurt, we are hurt.", If Vance and his partners had any doubts about ROK belligerence, the banquet demonstrated just how wild things had gotten in Seoul.

When Vance met Park the next day, the South Korean president proved quite obstinate. But Vance did not compromise. Johnson's spokesman laid out his position frankly. First, there would be no wider war in Koreaperiod; the U.S. already had its hands full in Vietnam. Any ROK military action against the north would be cleared with General Bonesteel, and he was not empowered to allow South Korean cross-border reprisals without President Johnson's approval. Vance made it clear that he could foresee no circumstances-short of a full-scale North Korean invasion-that could garner such approval.

Second, with a military attack ruled out, the United States would negotiate as necessary in order to gain freedom for the Pueblo sailors. Vance reminded Park that America had a tradition of talking with groups and states it did not recognize, including such thorns as the Barbary pirates, the Filipino insurgents, and Pancho Villa. This matter was between the United States and North Korea.

Finally, Vance offered some sweetener with the bitter gruel. He promised Park $100 million in immediate military aid, to include F-4 series Phantom fighter jets for the ROK Air Force; additional assistance would follow. To get this equipment, Park had to vow not to go north.

For four days, Park equivocated. But he really had no choice. Without the United States, South Korea could never hope to defeat the DPRK at any acceptable cost. The ROK leader finally consented to reign in his generals. Vance left, his mission accomplished. Presidents Johnson and Park met in Honolulu in April to seal the deal. So the great crisis abated. A midintensity war had been averted. The low-intensity war, however, remained to be won. (Source: Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1968 by Major Daniel P. Bolger)

Operation Combat Fox (USAF Involvement):

• Fifth Air Force Advance Echelon to Osan AB (from Fuchu AS. Japan)
• 4th Tactical Fighter Wing to Kunsan AB (72 F-4Ds from Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina)
• 18th Tactical Fighter Wing I-) to Osan AB, Kwangju ROKAFB (36 F-105Ds from Kadena AS, Okinawa)
  • 12th Tactical Fighter Squadron (-) to Osan AB (12 F-105Ds from Kadena AB, Okinawa)
  • 334th Tactical Fighter Squadron to Kwangju ROKAFB (24 F-105-Ds from Kadena AB, Okinawa)
• 64th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron to Kimpo AB (24 F-102As from Naha AB, Okinawa)
• 82d Fighter-Interceptor Squadron to Suwon ROKAFB (24 F-102As from Naha AS, Okinawa)
• 318th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron to Osan AB (24 F-106As from McChord AFB, Washington)

475th TFW

The 475th TFW was a "paper" wing that was hastily put together for the Pueblo incident in January 1968. Because of the urgency of the event, the 475th TFW was formed of "borrowed" squadrons. They were the 67th TFS from the 18th TFW; the 356th TFS from the 354th TFW (This is disputed); and the 391st TFS from the 366th TFW. These units were "attached" to the 475th from January 1968 through about February 1971.

"Fighting Cocks" 67th TFS

"Green Demons" 356th TFS

"Bold Tigers" 391st FS

(Go to 356th TFS: Nuclear Alert for more info on this unit)

356th TFS (15 Jan-5 Feb 68): Kenneth M Crawford CMSgt, USAF (Ret.) wrote, "For your info I was the Line Chief of the 356th TFS which was assigned to Myrtle Beach S. C. when it was deployed to Misawa air Base Japan. in March 1965. Upon arrival we were required to send six of the F-100 Aircraft to Kunsan and man the Nuclear Pads. We continued to rotate Aircraft, Pilots and Maintenance personnel every ten days to and from Misawa A B. to Kunsan until I left Misawa in April 1968."

When the Pueblo was captured on the 23 Jan, the 356th TFS received deployment orders to report immediately to Kunsan. Kenneth M Crawford continued, "The 356th was holding down the alert pads when the Pueblo was captured. At that time the entire Squadron was sent to Kunsan and was the only deterrent at Kunsan until a Fighter wing From Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina came in to relieve us. I can arrange to get you in touch with other personnel who can provide even more updated info in order for the personnel of the 356th TFS (Green Demons) to get the proper credit for serving their country during this period."

Because of the sense of urgency to the situation, the 558th TFS of Cam Rahn Bay with their F-4Es was sent to augment the 475th TFW in Korea. At the same time, the 4th TFW was hustled to Kunsan.

The first of the 4th TFW support personnel arrived on 30 Jan and the first of the 4th TFW aircraft arrived on 31 Jan. After the 4th TFW arrived, the 356th TFS was relieved of its mission at Kunsan and returned to Misawa with the remainder of their F-100s. By this time, Kunsan was over-flowing with aircraft. The 558th TFS redeployed to Taegu in Mar 68 because of the overcrowded conditions at Kunsan. When that later became a permanent assignment to the 475th TFW, the 558th TFS and 391st TFS traded designations.

The 356th TFS continued to perform the nuclear alerts at Kunsan after the 4th TFW arrived. After the 4th TFW departed, the ANG units arrived to take over the nuclear alert duties of the 356th TFS. The aircraft returned to Misawa, but soon were recalled as the ANG units failed the weapons certification test. Richard Browning stated, "Anyway about the Kunsan issue, You were mostly right. The 356 TFS was the first to arrive and then came the mighty 4th TFW. And after things cooled down and they started to leave, Here came the bankers, insurance men, soda jerksa nd etc.known as the New York Air National Guard, [With 100s to relieve us on the pad,but after we had been back in Misawa for two weeks, the flunked their weapons test, and we ended right back on the pad at Kunsan, and was still there when we left. That's where the 100s played the role in Pueblo crisis." (NOTE: We are not certain about the New York ANG comment as we show only the Kansas and Ohio ANG F-100s at Kunsan.)

We are making an ASSUMPTION that the unit was attached to the 39th Air Division in Nov 65. Our assumption is corroborated by the statement of Ken Crawford who stated, "For the record, when the 356th Tactical Fighter Squadron was sent to Misawa it was transferred from the 354th TFW to the 39th Air Division at Misawa. The 354th Tactical Fighter Wing was not involved with the efforts at Kunsan." The 356th TFS as well as the 475th TFW are no longer active so it is hard to trace their historical roots online. According to Air Force Historical Research Agency: 354th Wing, the 356th TFS was attached to the 354th from 25 Sep 1957-29 Nov 1965 and from 15 May 1971-30 Jun 1992. In 1968, the squadron was NOT attached to the 354th TFW. Therefore, we ASSUME the squadron was attached first to the 39th Air Division in Nov 1965 -- though it deployed to Misawa in March 1965. Then it was stripped away from the 39th Air Division to hastily form the 475th TFW in Jan 1968 to be initially deployed to Kunsan until the 4th TFW from Seymour Johnson arrived. According to Air Force Combat Wings, Lineage and Honors Histories, 1947-1977 , 1984, (p264) the 356th TFS was assigned to the 475th TFW from 15 Jan 1968 to 15 Mar 1971. The F-100s were phased out in 1968 and the unit converted to F-4Cs in 1968.

After the 356th TFS was stripped away from the 354th TFW, the 354th TFW became a "paper" wing and would later form the cover group for the ANG F-100s at Kunsan that replaced the 4th TFW sent over for the Pueblo Incident. After the Kunsan nuclear alert was turned over to the 3rd TFW in 15 May 1971, the 356th TFS returned to the 354th TFW and returned to Myrtle Beach, SC without personnel or aircraft. (NOTE: The Misawa F-4 assets were transferred to form the 3rd TFW.)

67th TFS: The 67th TFS was first attached to the 39th Air Division at Misawa AB. Following the Pueblo Crisis, it was stripped away from the 18th TFW and transferred to the 475th TFW in 15 Jan 68. The 67th TFS transitioned from the F-105s into the F-4Cs in 1968.

At the onset of the Puebloc Crisis, the 356th TFS was initially rushed to Kunsan in Jan 68 and the 67th appears to have been held in reserve back at Misawa. The 4th TFW aircraft arrived at Kunsan on Jan 30. However, the crowded conditions at Kunsan AB soon forced the relocation of aircraft to other locations.

The 558th moved to Taegu (K-2) to start up operations there in March 68. When the situation dragged on, the 558th became the 391st and was relieved on rotations by the 67th TFS starting in Oct 68. The rotations lasted until Apr 70 when it started pulling rotations at Kunsan AB for nuclear alerts as part of the Det 1 475th TFW. The 67th TFS flew the F–4 between 1968–1979.

According to the Air Force Historical Research Agency: 67th Fighter Squadron, the unit belonged to the "39th Air Division, 15 Dec 1967; 475th Tactical Fighter Wing, 15 Jan 1968 (attached to Fifth Air Force ADVON, 7 Oct-8 Dec 1968, 3 Mar-3 Apr 1969, 2 Jun-2 Jul 1969, 30 Aug-1 Oct 1969, 1-18 Jan 1970, 16 Feb-2 Mar 1970, and 29 Mar- 8 Apr 1970; Detachment 1, HQ 475th Tactical Fighter Wing, 8-12 Apr 1970, 10-24 May 1970, 21 Jun-4 Jul 1970, 18 Jul-25 Aug 1970, 15-29 Nov 1970, 10-22 Jan 1971, and 5-15 Feb 1971); 18th Tactical Fighter Wing, 15 Mar 1971 (attached to 3d Tactical Fighter Wing, 2 Jun-28 Jul 1972 and 8 Sep-16 Oct 1972)".

According to the AFHRA, "Misawa AB, Japan, 15 Dec 1967 (deployed at Taegu AB, South Korea, 7 Oct–8 Dec 1968, 3 Mar–3 Apr 1969, 2 Jun–2 Jul 1969, 30 Aug– 1 Oct 1969, 1–18 Jan 1970, 16 Feb–2 Mar 1970, and 29 Mar–8 Apr 1970; Kunsan AB, South Korea, 8–12 Apr 1970, 10–24 May 1970, 21 Jun–4 Jul 1970, 18 Jul–25 Aug 1970, 15–29 Nov 1970, 10–22 Jan 1971, and 5–15 Feb 1971);

558th TFS

558th TFS (4 Feb–10 Mar 1968 and 26 Mar–22 Jul 1968): The 558th TFS with its F-4Cs was initially sent to Kunsan to temporarily augment the 475th TFW of Misawa AB, Japan until the 4th TFW arrived. After it became apparent that the assignment would become permanent, the 558th traded designations with the 39lst TFS (from the 366th TFW from Phan Rang) so that the 12th TFW could retain unit integrity. (SEE 4th Tactical Fighter Wing Below.)

The 558th at Kunsan is corroborated in the 12th TFW History . At the time of the Pueblo incident, the 558th TFS was permanently deployed to Cam Rahn Bay. In another 12th Wing history it states, "Following the capture of the USS Pueblo, the 558th TFS was sent to augment the 475th TFW in Korea. When that later became a permanent assignment, the 558th and 391st traded designations. Thus, initial wing integrity was maintained until the 12th ceased fighter operations at Cam Ranh Bay in 1970.The 389th and 480th TFS, both of which were previously components of the 366th TFW, were already assigned to the 37th TFW at Phu Cat AB when that wing was re-designated the 12th TFW. These two squadrons continued combat operations until the wing was inactivated in 1971."

When the 558th departed Vietnam, they were not told where they were headed. Frank Tacey wrote, "C-141 Nortbound from Vietnam to the unknown. I had worked C-141's at McGuire and I knew the layout of the navigation equipment. When we left Nam we had no idea where we were going. We only had jungel gear and some of us had field jackets. Once I got up on the flight deck and looked at the Lat / Lon it was easy to figure it out."

William R. Rogers of Naperville, IL wrote in 2004, "I was with the 412mms out of Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. We came to Kunsan in support of the 558 & 557 TFS. What I remembered about Kunsan is that it was very cold, we had no cold weather gear because we came from a tropical area. There was no housing for us, so we were housed in 12men tents on the golf course. We had people from Japan, Okinawa, stateside bases and other parts of Vietnam. I remembered unpacking crates of material from rail cars on the railhead. When we unpacked these crates, some of the wood would fall across the fence that was there. This little Korean girl would run and pick up the pieces, we would keep throwing wood to her. The next time I looked up, half the village was there picking up the wood that we threw over that fence. The old Sgt that was in charge hollered and told up not to throw that wood because that is what they pay the people with. I guess you know about young GIs, as soon as his back was turned we were back to throw wood over the fence in defiance. I could'nt help but notice looking around the area, that there was no trees. I saw one odd looking tree in the distant. I have always wonder about that. We were suppose be TDY to Kunsan for 90 days. But everything was built up in a month and a half. They wanted to send us to Tague. Some of the support troops did go to Tague, but they sent my group back to Cam Ranh Bay. It was the middle of March and Korea was not quiet as cold. I was happy to get back to Vietnam, because it was a lot warmer. I was there with a bunch of great guys. I still rememember a lot of them after 30 years, we were only 19,20,21, years old, but we did the job!!!"

A nameless veteran (Lear 1) wrote in 2004, "Found your web site by accident but what a flood of memories it brought back. I arrived in Cam Rahn Bay and was assigned to the 558th TFS as a weapons load crew member. Having only been in country 2 weeks I remember the morning well as the momasan was saying we were leaving. I thought she was crazy. We were a mobility squadron so maybe that's why 6 hours later with all our possessions put in the first shirts hooch we were getting on a C-141 going to ?? We arrived in Kunsan in jungle fatigues and it's 40 below. I still have the W.W.II Army Air Corps parka they threw me. Worked 48 hours no sleep. Living in tents on the football field. In March they told us we were making a secret move and to steal everything we could. We got on a C-130 and ended up in Taege (K2) Sleeping in mud huts with no windows or doors. The chow hall had won the trophy for the best chow hall in the armed forces for 3 or 4 years. We even met some nice girls from the university. Things were definitely getting better. In June, I think, we even did a practice move to Kwangiu. 8 hours in a weapons carrier over the mountains not my idea of fun. We worked hard and played harder and would have done anything for the old man Col. Billy. The 391st TFS who had been sent to Cam Rahn Bay when we left swapped on paper with us in July of 1968. Our F-4C aircraft stayed but many of our people went to Misawa or back to the states. As our crew were the new guys we were to be the last to leave. 391st people started arriving (pilots, crew chiefs etc. but no weapons people.) July went and Aug. came and all the 558th personal were gone but us and still no weapons people. 6 of us keep the aircraft loaded working around the clock sleeping on the flight line for 3 weeks. My crew chief finally went to the new commander (I don't remember his name) and begged to get some weapons people. ( A lot happened here that I won't go into) but finally some weapons people showed up and we were relieved and given orders to make our way back to Cam Rahn Bay by any means we could. We got on the C-130 Mail plane and left. Don't really remember how long it took us to get back to Cam Rahn but I do remember leaving Japan on the last aircraft out before the typhoon hit. Black and blue from the seat belt. Thank god Boeing builds them tough. A rocket attack at Ton San Nute, spooky shooting up the place, get the C-130 in the air and make it to Cam Rahn Bay, Report in and they say "Who are you guys and where did you come from? " They didn't even know we were in the Air force. The old 558th hooch's were all over grown in weeds and not only was our stuff not in the First Shirts hooch, but the whole hooch was gone. We lived in the weeds for a month until they put us in the new 558th TFS area which was really the 391 buildings. There was no one from the 558th left that we knew. Ended my stay in Vietnam in Dec. of 1969 and went to guess where, Misawa and TDY back to Kunsan. To say it had changed in 2 years would be an understatement. Never worked so hard and enjoyed it more but never want to do it again. Thanks again for the memories."

Cam Rahn Bay in February 1968; Leaving Vietnam and eating box lunches on ramp

McChord C141 transportation to Kunsan
(Courtesy Frank Tacey)

The crowded conditions at Kunsan AB forced the relocation of aircraft to other locations. The 558th moved to Taegu (K-2) to start up operations there. Because of the break in the 558th's assigned dates between March 10-March 26, we are assuming the major portion of the move was done then. Frank Tacey wrote, "It was still cold as hell when we went to Tague. I had a heater in a tent on the flightline overflow and catch file in the middle of the night after doing preflights. My parka caught fire. So it may have been March." The unit spent a 179-day TDY in the ROK supporting the Pueblo Crisis. Frank wrote, "We did go back on the 179 day, it had to do with something about fighter planes and support crews from the Armistice of the Korean war."

Glen Vorres wrote to Frank about his unit. Glenn stated on Classmate.com, "Flt Test Maint Off TDY to Taegu from there to set up ROK in F4." He was TDY from Homestead AFB in 1968. He wrote, "Good memory.. I was a combat ready Quality Control Flight Test Pilot (the Maintenance Officer in TAC RTUs) most of my 20 years.. but I enjoyed working with the troops on airplane problems as there was little ass kissing, if any, out there on the line.. had a different career than most in that I was able to do many different things that many others missed out on.. as I recall we came to Kunsan when it was warm, probably around April or May, and there was an outfit leaving which must have been yours.. The INS was quite a gadget when it worked right .. a matter of spares available, system knowledge, and good trouble shooting.. There weren't too many who knew the system even after completing training... Our INS main man was quite a story as he was one of about 30% of that were "drafted" into the squadron from the stockade.. I was very proud of all the troops and how well they performed under the extremes of being a low priority outfit with still a big job to do... Several missions logged combat time though it never made the news of course.. Myself, I flew a lot of missions but saw only ground fire and some SAM action once way above the parallel.." Note that Frank said it was cold so the unit that Glen Vorres refers to is NOT the 558th. The unit could have been the 336th TFS of the 4th TFW moving to Kwangju AB; or the 334th or 335th TFS departing for home as well. Also his comments to "set up the ROK in F-4" in 1968 indicates he was part of the first Korea Military Assistance Group (KMAG) Detachment set up at Taegu for the 11th TFW's receipt of 20 F-4Ds in 1969 -- in exchange for sending all their F-5s to Vietnam.

391st TFS (22 Jul 68 - 28 Feb 71): The 391st TFS was originally part of the 366th TFW of Phan Rang, Vietnam between 2 Feb 1966-21 Jul 1968. The unit was transferred to 12th TFW at Cam Ranh Bay AB, South Vietnam to replace the 558thth which had deployed to augment the 475th TFW during the Pueblo Crisis in Jan 1968. However, to preserve unit integrity, there was a unit designation switch that returned the 558th TFS -- in name only -- back to the 12th TFW. However, the 558th personnel did return to Cam Rahn. According to F-100 Super Sabre, the unit was originally an F-100D unit in Jul 68, but it immediately became an F-4C unit with the name change. The 391st TFS was assigned to the 475th TFW at Misawa AB between Jul 1968-Feb 1971. From Misawa it alternated between Taegu and Kunsan AB nuclear alerts. According to Air Force Historical Research Agency: 391st Fighter Squadron, the 391st was first stationed at "Misawa AB, Japan, 22 Jul 1968-28 Feb 1971 (deployed at Taegu AB, South Korea, 22 Jul-7 Oct 1968, 7 Feb-5 Mar 1969, 1 May-2 Jun 1969, 1-30 Aug 1969, 1-15 Feb 1970, and 15-29 Mar 1970; Kunsan AB, South Korea, 26 Apr-10 May 1970, 7-21 Jun 1970, 30 Aug-12 Sep 1970, 4-18 Oct 1970, 1-15 Nov 1970, 13-19 Dec 1970, and 1-15 Feb 1971)." After 1971, it went to Mountain Home, ID to transition to F-111D.

Ken Adams wrote, "I went to Vietnam, arrived Cam Rahn Bay on 2 December 1967, assigned to 12th TFW AEMS( aircraft electronics maintenance squadron) my specialty was weapons control systems(RADAR) on the F4C. In squadrons at the time assigned at CRB were 557th, 558th 559th and 391st. In January 1968, Pueblo crew captured and 558th squadron and other support troops required to support that squadron were sent to Korea. I was always led to believe they went directly to Taegu(K2) but it never came up in discussion. I only remember that the crew was not released, it was getting close to 180 days TDY and rules were rules, they could not extend. I then became part of the replacement group from CRB in July 1968 and my orders read Permanent Change of Station to the 475th Wing at Misawa Japan with a 30 day TDY to Taegu Korea (K2) before reporting to Misawa. At this same time the planes were being Re-assigned from the 558th to the 391st on paper and the planes back at CRB RVN were being assigned from the 381st to the 558th. I was new to Korea but some of my squadron mates returned from Korea packed their bags and returned with us as a PCS(permanent change of station), they really loved Korea."

In 391st Fighter Squadron History it stated, "On 22 July 1968, the 391st Tactical Fighter Squadron's direct involvement in the Vietnam conflict drew close with its reassignment to the 475th Tactical Fighter Wing at Misawa Air Base, Japan. Here the squadron mission changed to providing air defense to Japan. In addition, the 391st provided air defense to Korea through numerous deployments to Taegu Air Base and Kunsan Air Base in South Korea. This continued for almost three years, until the 1 July 1971 assignment of the squadron to the 347th Tactical Fighter Wing at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho."

Ken Adams continued, "The rules at the time were that Japan and Korea were a 24 month unaccompanied tour and Vietnam was a 12 month tour. I had spent close to 7 month in Vietnam so I had close to 10 month left in Japan/Korea before going stateside. After getting settled in and squared away in Misawa I went back to Taegu in October/November for another TDY of 30 days. I came back to Misawa in November and right after Christmas I returned to Kunsan(K8) for duty with Detachment1 of the 475th at the Nuc Pad. I can state that at the time it was very new, Christmas Tree with hangers for 8-9 planes and I was living down the road in a brand new 2 story barracks. I was never able to get off the base or go very far away from the alert hanger, we had one Broken Arrow(surprised readiness inspection) and what was to be a 2 week tour ended up to be 6 weeks (claim no one to replace me but they all new I was too close to returning stateside to do any more TDY's so they kept me there. What was most interesting about this timeframe was that I was on alert duty during the timeframe that President Lyndon Johnson was handing over the reins to Richard Nixon and tensions were heavy. I remember having to respond to 8-10 alerts a day from January 19-21, 1969. One reason I suspect the North Koreans returned the Pueblo Crew in December was that they didn't know what Richard Nixon would do. Nothing like watching pilots scramble into planes, start engines and a Nuc Tech under the plane ready to "pull the safety" .

"I don't remember any other US Air Force planes on the base at the time. I was in a restricted area and it was cold and a lot of snow."

"One of the other facts that was not mentioned was that at Taegu the F4's were always flying, many were 3+ hour MIGCap missions along the DMZ, as far as I know all the planes were from the 391st at Misawa while I was there. It has been many years since I thought of these things but I feel pretty confident. I actually do have a DET 1 475th patch if you'd like a photo."

"Other things I remember that might put a light on F4 movement around the Asian continent, Misawa and Yokota were both used as bases to correct the potting compound problem on the F4's that was being experienced by planes in Southeast Asia from the heat and humidity. We had a big civilian contingent from Litton Industries at Misawa, I don't know who had the contract at Yokota. Every F4 had to have all equipment removed to expose every plug on the plane, then they would put a liquid in a baggie and tie it to the plug. The fumes were designed to deteriorate the rest of the compound and make it easy to clean the plug for repotting. Planes were coming in to be stripped by Air Force personnel, handed over to the civilians and then when finished were handed back to us to put all the equipment back in to test and calibrate all the equipment. This took many hours with the RADAR system. I ended up working on a plane in which the crew chief misinterpreted the instructions and removed a piece of equipment by cutting a combination plug with 450 color coded wires. Needless to say I worked on this plane for weeks to get a new plug color coded, soldered short wires and put back in the confines of a rear cockpit."

The 4th Tactical Fighter Wing from Seymour-Johnson, NC flying the F-4D Phantom IIs arrived at Kunsan on 31 January 1968, as part of the buildup of forces in Korea in the wake of the 23 January 1968 capture of the USS Pueblo by the North Koreans. The unit was under the command of aerospace legend, Col. Charles E. "Chuck" Yeager.

(NOTE: The initial two squadrons in Jan 68 flying F-4Ds from Seymour-Johnson were the 334th TFS and 335th TFS. Though official histories don't note the 336th deployment, it was deployed according to eye-witness accounts along with the 334th and 336th. The official response from the 4th Wing Historian is that the 336th was deployed but to a "classified" location. Nathan Sturman, a Kunsan AB permanent party wrote, "Chuck Yeager (Charles E. Yeager) was 4th TFW commander and he came into out office on the tank farm on occasion. he told great war stories as we stood around the space heater in the tiny quonset office, March 1968." He went on, "At that time the 336th squadron went down to Kwangju, the first US presence there for a long time." Thus we know the 336th's "classified location" was Kwangju. In Jun 68, the 336th would rejoin the 334th and 335th at Kunsan for the return home. (NOTE: Others claim the 334th TFS was the unit at Kwangju in Feb 68.)

The 334th, 335th and 336th TFS had been at Seymour-Johnson since Dec 1957, but had deployed to various stations throughout the years. The 334th TFS had returned in 1966 from Takhli RTAFB, Thailand (2 Sep 1965–5 Feb 1966). The 335th TFS had returned in 1965 from Takhli RTAFB, Thailand (Nov–Dec 1965). The 336th had not been rotated to Southeast Asia as yet, but would after it converted to F-4Es. The 558th was brought up from the 12th TFW in Cam Rahn Bay, Vietnam.)

John Wilkerson, permanent party at Kunsan, recalled "When the 4th Wing took over the Kun in Jan-Feb 1968 it was commanded by "Col Chuck Yeager" (Charles E. Yeager). It was composed of four squadrons 2 from Seymore Johnson AFB NC, 1 from MacDill AFB Fla and the final squadron the 558th (I believe that was the number) than came from Cam Rahn Bay in Vietnam. I always thought it was very unusual that at the height of the 1968 "TET" offensive in Vietnam that the Air Force would pull a squadron and send it to Korea."

There seems to be an inconsistency here, but there really isn't. Dan Decker of the 4th TFW (Seymore Johnson AFB) stated that THREE squadrons of the 4th TFW deployed to Kunsan AFB, while John Wilkerson stated TWO. According to the official AFHRA records, the inconsistency is that initially only TWO squadrons deployed. FAS: Operation Red Fox comments of "The 334th and 335th Fighter Squadrons, equipped with F-4 Phantom II fighters, rushed to Korea to support operations during the Pueblo incident. The squadrons returned to Seymour Johnson in June 1968." The 334th and 335th deployed with the 336th held in reserve. The AFHRA records state that the 336th deployed to Kunsan in Jun 68. HOWEVER, this is disputed 4th TFW personnel who deployed with their aircraft. We had no explanation why the AFHRA records stated that the 336th deployed in June 68 while eye-witness accounts disputed this. Finally in 2003, the 4th FW Historian stated that the 336th DID DEPLOY, but its location was "classified." We know that the "classified" location was Kwangju AB from eye-witness reports presented in various sections of this history.

According to 336th FS, "Deploying to Korea in June 1968 they supported military operations associated with the seizure of the Pueblo." George E. Bryant, SMSgt, USAF (Ret) of West Chester, OH stated, "I deployed in Jan' '68 with the 4th (FMS Eng Shop) to Kunsan during the Pueblo incident and could swear that the 336th went with us at that time. I also believe that soon after we arrived at the Kun that the 336th redeployed from Kunsan to Kwangju. And, that we all came back home to SJAFB in Jun-Jul of '68." Later he wrote, "Because of the confusion about the dates that the 336th TFS was deployed to Kun during Red Fox I have asked the 4th FW to verify the dates. As you can see from my below statement I believe the 336th deployed right along with the 334 and 335. This is also born out by the fact that when we deployed from SJAFB we took every piece of engine support equipment and all of the spare engines with us. We left behind at SJAFB a bare 4th FMS Engine Shop." (SITE NOTE: The 4th TFW Historian responded to George's request for information on the 336th with the following statement, "The 336 FS departed in Jan 68 and returned on 11 July 68 from Korea. The specific location was classified.")

Dan Decker, TSgt, USAF (Ret) of Alpine, Texas stated, "Ours was the 4th Tac Fighter Wing, 3 squadrons of F-4Ds. The three squadrons were the 334th, 335th, and 336th Tac Fighter Squadrons and all their support personnel."

The "June 1968" deployment statement of the 336th is also brought into question by a statement from Walter Orellana of New Orleans, LA. He wrote: "Although I wasn't there, I reassigned to the 336TFS in April, 1968. All three squadrons of the 4th TFW were deployed since 28-31 January 1968 and all three, 334, 335 & 336 returned in July 68. I had the opportunity to fix the pigs when nearly all returned with Red x's." This means the 336th deployed simultaneously with the 334th TFS and 335th TFS -- and returned simultaneously.

George E. Bryant added, "Another interesting element of the deployment was that soon after the 4th FMS arrived at Kun it quickly re-deployed to Yakota. That is except for myself and about 6-8 other engine guys who stayed at Kun to setup and run the Test Cell and the SOAP Lab. I slept in a cardboard box the first 2 nights after my arrival because we didn't have any tents set up at that time. I could write a book on my Ubon and Kunsan experiences." (NOTE: We also noted that the 356th TFS of Misawa claims credit for holding down the nuclear alerts when the Pueblo Incident hit and that the whole squadron deployed to Kunsan until the 4th TFW showed up. We also note that Bill Cosens of the 4531st TFW from Homestead stated that as soon as the 4th TFW hit the ground, two aircraft from "Yakota" were cordoned off with concertina wire for nuclear alerts. As the 475th TFW was hastily being thrown together starting in Jan 68, the 4th FMS might have been pulled to Yokota to assist with the units as they had no maintenance assigned to it -- only the flying squadrons. This is only conjecture at this point.)

Later George would clarify why the majority of the FMS was sent to Yokota. He stated, "As for the FMS thing, we didn't have the maintenance or lodging facilities at the Kun to set up a lot of the FMS shops - we lived in tents for most of the deployment. I stayed because we wanted to keep a test cell capability available at the Kun. We also kept the SOAP lab there. My test cell crew actually repaired over 35 engines at Kun that without having the test capability would have gone back to Yokota for repair. That included opening the top compressor cases on a number of engines to repair FOD - not exactly a FOB task. And, for the most part we repaired them at the test cell out in the open. The Kun at that time was as good an example of a bare base as one could find."

We also have NOT been able to identify the initial squadron from MacDill AFB, FL that John Wilkerson mentions-- nor the unit from Homestead AFB that Dan mentions. The unit from MacDill may have been a "mistaken" identity as the 12th TFW -- deployed to DaNang from MacDill -- sent up the 558th TFW. According to Bill Cosens of the 4531st TFW from Homestead NO flying units were sent to augment the 4th TFW. It was not until the 354th TFW took over -- after the 4th TFW departed -- that the 4531st TFW sent units to Kunsan.

---

Support Personnel Arrive (30 Jan 68): Starting from 30 Jan 68, support personnel were arriving by the planeloads at Kunsan. Among the first to arrive was Bill Cosens with the support personnel from the 4531st TFW of Homestead AFB. Next came the support personnel from the three Seymour-Johnson squadrons. Bill Cosens wrote,

"I was in the Field Maint. squadron of the 4531st Tac. Fighter Wing at Homestead AFB, Fl. We left Homestead 1/28/68 on a C-141 Starlifter and were the first bird to arrive at Kunsan just as the sun was starting to come up the next day (unless crossing the itn'l. dateline made it 2 days later). No one at Kunsan even knew we were coming." (NOTE: The base was primarily for typhoon evacuation of aircraft and not prepared to house 5,000 people overnight. This is why a "tent city" had to be constructed -- in the middle of winter. It was not until Spring that the 557th CES (Red Horse) and Civil Engineer Prime Beef elements arrived to construct proper facilities for the troops)

Bill went on, "An extra bunk was put in each room of the barracks to accomodate our plane load. We started later the first day putting up 20 man tents, trying to drive wooden stakes into frozen ground. An Army MSGT. I talked to one day in the snack bar on base summed up my 6 mo. experience at Kunsan. "It's an experience worth a million dollars, but you wouldn't give fifty cents to do it again." I was "Aircraft Instruments" working on F-4D's. I was temp. assigned, graveyard shift, to the squadron that came up from Cam Rahn Bay (F-4C's) when they first got there. These birds were full of sand." (NOTE: This was the 558th TFS aircraft.)

558th F-4D taking off
(Courtesy Frank Tacey)

Bill continued, "I remember 2 of us going out on maint. troubles with parkas on, but you couldn't get in the cockpit with the parka on. One of us would take our parka off and get in the cockpit and start taking out components that needed replacing. We would work as long as we could stand it then switch off with the other man. That was cold. I have a lot more memories. One of my buddies that came from Homestead was with one of the 3 TFSs that came from Seymor-Johnson. The squadron was moved to Kwang Ju shortly after arriving." (NOTE: The squadron that moved to Kwangju was the 336th TFS.)

Gene Bonham was a weapons loader from Phan Rang who was yanked and sent to Korea to support the 4th TFW. Gene stated, "I got to spend 6 glorious months there in Kunsan in 1968 after the Pueblo was taken. This is a place that I can say is not a fond memory. I left Phan Rang in December of 1967 and went to Kunsan in January of 1968. Straight in to a tent pitched on the edge of the golf course, everything we owned froze. We were shipped out so fast the we were not issued any cold weather gear. All I had was jungle fatigues and boots and a standard field jacket. Froze my you know what off. The Air Force grabbed all the Ammo Troops they could put their hands on and off to Korea we went."

George E. Bryant, SMSgt, USAF, Ret. wrote, "Interestingly enough I was deployed to Kunsan in '68 with the 4th TFW in response to the Pueblo incident. Me and my guys set up the first J-79 (F-4C/D) Test Cell, a M37T-1A Mobil Cell, at Kunsan and like everything else I took photos of, they are all MIA except the for the one 1 I have attached." From the looks of the background, it appears to be the current "hot pad" and engine run-up area at the end of the runway.

Portable J-79 Engine Test Cell

1999 Photo of Kunsan AB with arrows to mark parking locations of aircraft and Test Cell

4th TFW Aircraft Arrive (31 Jan 68): Parking space was at a premium as Kunsan was just not equipped to handle three squadrons of aircraft -- plus all the transient aircraft popping in as well. The 4th TFW aircraft were parked along the old runway (what is now Taxiway Charlie) with the 558th being at the farthest end where the J-79 test cell was as they arrived last.

George E. Bryant stated that later on they started to use the the main ramp to the runway later on. George said, "We had a lot of A/C on the base and the usable ramp space at that time was limited. Remember the Kun had been in care-taker status for years before our arrival and the usable facilities were almost non-existent. As we began to get orientated we started using more of the ramp adjacent to the main runway but still kept A/C parked on the old runway. It looks like they have put up a lot of revetments on both sides of the old runway. In '68 none of those or the ramps there on existed."

Bill Cosens stated, "I don't remember the total layout of Kunsan. I only remember 1 runway. here was water (the China Sea I believe) on one side with a dyke which the ROK Army patroled with K-9, and the base on the other side. The 558th TFS birds were parked near the end of the runway away from the main part of the base.' When asked about the nuclear alert ability to perform with the crowded conditions, he wrote, "I'm not familiar with the term "Wonder Arch", but there were 2 single aircraft hangars there that were somewhat quonset hut shaped. Shortly after we got there, these 2 hangars were surrounded with layers of concertina wire and housed 2 F-4s detached from Yakota loaded with 1 neuc. (nuclear weapon) each hanging centerline. APs were posted around them. Thank God we didn't have to use them."

Dan Decker TSgt, USAF (Ret) of Alpine, Texas wrote in the Korean War Project,

"As part of the response to the USS Pueblo incident, the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing from Seymour Johnson AFB, NC was sent to Kunsan AB. I was a member of the 4th, an INS technician working on the F-4Ds."

He later wrote, "When the USS Pueblo was taken by North Korean on 23 January 1968, among the bases tasked to respond on an ASAP basis was Seymour Johnson AFB, from Goldsboro, North Carolina. My group departed SJ I think on the 28th and we landed on the 31st of January at Kunsan. The last group from SJ arrived a few days later. They ran out of transport and were stuck at Yokota Air Base for awhile before being loaded onto C-124s and flown the rest of the way on the Ol' Shakies. Scared our younger troops to death!

We stayed at Kunsan until the 4th of July when we were replaced by an ANG outfit flying F-100 Supersabers. (NOTE 2) Also at Kunsan were outfits from Homestead AFB, Florida. I don't remember their unit designation. (NOTE 3) Ours was the 4th Tac Fighter Wing, 3 squadrons of F-4Ds. The three squadrons were the 334th, 335th, and 336th Tac Fighter Squadrons and all their support personnel. (NOTE 1)"

Dan Decker's account of being stuck in Yokota was corroborated by Karl Goebel on Classmates.com. He said, "We came to rescue the Pueblo !!! Yeh right.... At least the crew got back. But it was quite the move. Taking a majority of the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing to Korea in a week. The POL guys were one of the last to leave for Korea and we even had a week lay over at Itizuke AB, Japan due to mechanical problems with our C-141. When we finally did depart for Korea, we did it on a C-124 Cargo Master. What a fun ride that was from Japan to Korea. And damn was it cold in Korea."

NOTE 1: Though the AFHRA shows the 4th TFW deployment, it doesn't show any deployments in January 1968 on the squadron records. The 334th and 335th are listed as being at Kunsan starting in December 1969 when they became part of the 354th TFW; and the 336th is not listed at all. However, the 336th was verified by Nathan Sturman, a permanent party with 6175th Air Base Group, as going to Kwangju. He went on, "At that time the 336th squadron went down to Kwangju, the first US presence there for a long time." John Wilkerson, another member of the 6175th ABG also confirms that a squadron had gone to Kwangju.

NOTE 2: The "ANG outfit" which replaced them were the 127th TFS and 166th TFS which were later attached to the 354th TFW of Yokota AB.

NOTE 3: The units from Homestead AFB, FL has been identified as the 67th TFS and 560th TFS of the 4531st Tactical Fighter Wing which were attached to 354th Tactical Fighter Wing, 29 Jun-15 Dec 1969. These units flew the F-4 Phantom IIs. According to the AFHRA, the 560th TFS was deployed at Kunsan AB from 29 Jun-15 Dec 1969 from Homestead AFB, Florida. The 67th TFS was deployed to Kunsan between 20 June - 9 December 1969 and attached to 354th Tactical Fighter Wing. The 560th TFS was deployed to Kunsan between 29 June – 15 December 1969 and attached to 354th Tactical Fighter Wing.

Dan Decker continued, "I recall that our backseaters were bored flying across the Pacific, so they kept their Fire Control Radar system in Operate mode. Consequently, when they landed at Kunsan, 74 of 75 aircraft had useless radar sets. The weather was miserable; 20 below zero and a 30-knot wind. And we had to get all the birds back to 100% ASAP. (NOTE: When we attempted to check out this comment about the inoperative FCS radar with a pilot who flew one of the aircraft over, he immediately took offense and ceased communication -- calling us some nasty names while at it. He was justified to call us those names -- and we should apologize if he ever stops by again. Probably this statement of Dan will never be corroborated.)

We came over in January and returned home in July. We left one crew in Korea somewhere. The enlisted folks never heard what happened to that one bird. It took off and never returned." (NOTE 4)

NOTE 4: The F-4 that never returned is is possibly the F-4 that was reported crashed in the southern mountains by Nathan Sturman. He said, "They lost an F4 aircraft and crew in the southern mountains, about the same time that Beveridge died." According to the 8th US Army Chronology 1 Jan 1968-31 June 1968, the UNC announced the loss of a USAF RF-4C photo reconnaissance plane over Taegu on 10 Feb. Then on 14 Feb, a USAF F-4D out of Kunsan AB crashed near the village of Yongan-myon, Ilssan-gun, Chollabukto killing three villagers and injuring another. The pilot and nav ejected safely.)

---

4531st TFW from Homestead AFB, FL: When the first troops from the 4531st TTW arrived in Jan 1969, there was no squadron deployed from the 4531st TFW.

Bill Cosens, of the 4531st TTW wrote, "There was no flying squadron sent from the 4531st TTW. We were sent as "augmentees", which was translated to us as casualty replacements if something was started. There were about 500 of us from the 4531st if my memory serves me, taken from the Field Maint. Sq. and each of the 2 flying squadrons' support troops. I do not remember the flying sq. designations."

He continued, "The 4531st was a F-4 pilot training wing, formally the 4531st Tac. Fighter Wing. ... Later in June 69, the 67th TFS and 560th TFS of the 4531st would be deployed to Kunsan and attached to the 354th TFW." Later this unit was redesignated as the 4531st Tactical Training Wing (TTW). (NOTE: The unofficial websites for the 67th TFS at 67th TFS and 67th TFS do not mention Kunsan.)

He went on, "I don't remember the total layout of Kunsan. I only remember 1 runway. here was water (the China Sea I believe) on one side with a dyke which the ROK Army patroled with K-9, and the base on the other side. The 558th TFS birds were parked near the end of the runway away from the main part of the base.'

When asked about the nuclear alert ability to perform with the crowded conditions, he wrote,

"I'm not familiar with the term "Wonder Arch", but there were 2 single aircraft hangars there that were somewhat quonset hut shaped. Shortly after we got there, these 2 hangars were surrounded with layers of concertina wire and housed 2 F-4s detached from Yakota loaded with 1 neuc. (nuclear weapon) each hanging centerline. APs were posted around them. Thank God we didn't have to use them."

"The 2 F-4s from Yakota" (Yokota) that Bill mentions would mean that the 347th TFW was handling the nuclear alert at Kunsan instead of the 39th Air Division -- which became the 475th TFW in Jan 68. The folks of the 356th TFS from Misawa claim credit for holding down the alerts at Kunsan. The individuals state that when the Pueblo Incident hit, their whole squadron deployed to Kunsan until the 4th TFW arrived. The 356th TFS would be stripped from the 354th TFW and assigned to the new 475th TFW thrown together hastily in Jan 68.

The reason this item is a little touchy is that people were "debriefed" and sworn to secrecy on this item. Even after all these years, old GIs still are reluctant to talk about it. Steve Gattis a Security Policeman at Kunsan up till Feb 68 wrote, "By the way, I was amazed about the information on alerts for the 39th AD and later the 475th. After I was debriefed, I never spoke about them again. It gives me chills to even acknowledge the information.") (See 6441st TFW/Det 1 347th TFW (1966???-1968???) for more details.)

334th TFS

335th FS

334th TFS and 335th TFS (Kunsan - Jan 1968 - Jul 1968): Though the AFHRA records don't indicate the mission to Kunsan in Jan 1968, the 4th TFW deployed with two of its squadrons -- the 334th and 335th TFS. According to the official records, the 336th TFS appears to have been held in reserve, though in fact it had deployed to Kunsan along with the other two squadrons. The official records state that in Jun 68, the 336th deployed to Kunsan AB. When the 334th and 335th returned home, the 336th (then at Kwangju) also returned home.

Again we state that though the official records state that the 336th deployed in June, it deployed to Kunsan in Jan 68. The AFHRA entries are disputed by maintenance personnel who state that all three squadrons deployed at the same time. Walter Orellana of New Orleans, LA wrote: "Although I wasn't there, I reassigned to the 336TFS in April, 1968. All three squadrons of the 4th TFW were deployed since 28-31 January 1968 and all three, 334, 335 & 336 returned in July 68. I had the opportunity to fix the pigs when nearly all returned with Red x's."

There are also minor notations that confuse the issue. The AFHRA records for the 4th TFW squadrons (334th, 335th, 336th) do NOT show any deployment in 1968, though it does show the wing did go to Kunsan from Jan-Jul 1968. The narrative under the AFHRA: 4th TFW records state, "Deployed at Kunsan AB, South Korea, following the Pueblo crisis, Jan–Jul 1968" but nothing for any of its squadrons.

The 334th converted to the F-4D Phantom II in 1967. According to 334th FS, "After a six-month tour of Southeast Asia, the 334th returned to Seymour Johnson in February 1966 and began instructing new pilots in F-105 operations. The Fighting Eagles rushed to Korea in January 1968, supporting operations during the Pueblo incident. The squadron returned to Seymour Johnson in June 1968."

The 335th TFS converted to the F-4D Phantom II in 1967. According to 335th FS, "In 1967, the Chiefs received the airframe they would fly for the next twenty three years--the F-4 Phantom II. Before this period had ended the Chiefs had deployed to Korea to support the Pueblo Incident, flew in the Vietnam Conflict out of Ubon AB, Thailand, became the first operational squadron to qualify with the GBU-15, and in doing so exceeded 100,000 consecutive accident-free hours."

In Dec 1969, the 334th TFS and 335th TFS became the permanent units of the 354th TFW at Kunsan. AFHRA records state that the time period for the 334th TFS (16 Dec 1969-31 May 1970) and the 335th TFS (8 Dec 1969-23 May 1970).

336th TFS/4TFW

336th TFS (Kwangju - Jun 1968 - Jul 1968): According to 336th FS, "In 1967 the Rocketeers received the McDonnell Douglas F-4D PhantomII. Deploying to Korea in June 1968 they supported military operations associated with the seizure of the Pueblo. Returning from the Far East, the Rocketeers transitioned to the updated F-4E in July 1970 and were the first operational squadron to use TAC's new modular bare base equipment."

Nathan Sturman, a permanent party with 6175th Air Base Group, confirmed that the 336th TFS went to Kwangju. He stated, "At that time the 336th squadron went down to Kwangju, the first US presence there for a long time." John Wilkerson, another member of the 6175th ABG also confirms that a squadron had gone to Kwangju.

A statement by Walter Orellana of New Orleans, LA brings into question when the 336th actually deployed. He wrote: "Although I wasn't there, I reassigned to the 336TFS in April, 1968. All three squadrons of the 4th TFW were deployed since 28-31 January 1968 and all three, 334, 335 & 336 returned in July 68. I had the opportunity to fix the pigs when nearly all returned with Red x's." This means the 336th deployed simultaneously with the 334th TFS and 335th TFS.

However, the plot thickens. David L. Hamlin wrote, "I was deployed with the 336th TFS to Kunsan Korea in January of 1968 and was on station at Kunsan until July of 1968 except for 30 day individual deployment to Yokota Japan. The 336th was never redeployed to Kwangju as stated in your article. I still have a copy of the blanket orders issued to me for this deployment, but of course all references to station are classified. Thought this might help to update the record." In addition, George Podmore of the 430th TFS from Homestead stated, "The 334th TFS was deployed to Kwanju in Feb 68 and not the 336th TFS." This has made this fact confusing as we are not certain which squadron was actually at Kwangju. Historical records during this period for all squadrons only state "a classified location."

According to 336th FS, "Deploying to Korea in June 1968 they supported military operations associated with the seizure of the Pueblo." George E. Bryant, SMSgt, USAF (Ret) of West Chester, OH stated, "I deployed in Jan' '68 with the 4th (FMS Eng Shop) to Kunsan during the Pueblo incident and could swear that the 336th went with us at that time. I also believe that soon after we arrived at the Kun that the 336th redeployed from Kunsan to Kwangju. And, that we all came back home to SJAFB in Jun-Jul of '68." Later he wrote, "Because of the confusion about the dates that the 336th TFS was deployed to Kun during Red Fox I have asked the 4th FW to verify the dates. As you can see from my below statement I believe the 336th deployed right along with the 334 and 335. This is also born out by the fact that when we deployed from SJAFB we took every piece of engine support equipment and all of the spare engines with us. We left behind at SJAFB a bare 4th FMS Engine Shop." (SITE NOTE: The 4th TFW Historian responded to George's request for information on the 336th in 2003 with the following statement, "The 336 FS departed in Jan 68 and returned on 11 July 68 from Korea. The specific location was classified.")

However, according to 336th FS, "Deploying to Korea in June 1968 they supported military operations associated with the seizure of the Pueblo."

558th TFS/12 TFW (Redesignated as 391st TFS)

558th TFS (4 Feb–10 Mar 1968 and 26 Mar–22 Jul 1968): John Wilkerson, permanent party with the 6175th Air Base Group stated, "the final squadron the 558th (I believe that was the number) than came from Cam Rahn Bay in Vietnam. I always thought it was very unusual that at the height of the 1968 "TET" offensive in Vietnam that the Air Force would pull a squadron and send it to Korea."

The 558th TFS with its F-4Cs was initially sent to Kunsan to temporarily augment the 475th TFW of Misawa AB, Japan until the 4th TFW arrived. After it became apparent that the assignment would become permanent, the 558th traded designations with the 39lst TFS (from the 366th TFW from Phan Rang) so that the 12th TFW could retain unit integrity. (SEE 4th Tactical Fighter Wing Below.)

Upon its airlift to Taegu between 10-26 Mar 68, the 558th set up their operations along the flightline in tents. After the units 179 day TDY ended, they returned to Cam Rahn Bay, Vietnam. On 22 Jul 68, the unit designation was switched to the 391st TFS assigned to the 475th TFW of Misawa with nuclear alert duties at Taegu and Kunsan. The 558th TFS unit designation reverted to the 12th TFW in Vietnam to ensure unit integrity.

---

41st ARRW, Det 11: Michael Sugg wrote about the 41st Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Wing, Detachment 11 operations with their HH43B Huskies helicopters -- known as "Pedro." He wrote, "I was there from 1968-1969. Rescue Helicopters. HH43B Rescue Helicopters. There was a Major Kakuna, he was one of my pilots. He was from Hawaii, but I have not been able to find him anywhere. ... I have a lot of stories from that period of my USAF life. I really enjoyed my time in Korea. I was in the Fire Dept; but attached to the Rescue Helicopters as an Airbourne Fire Fighter. Great duty!! I was involved in 13 downed aircraft and the rescue of most of the pilots. We did have some fatalities.The types of aircraft that were involved were, F-4's, F-100's, F-86's and T-33's." (NOTE: The F-86s were flown by the ROKAF.)

According to HH-43 Huskie, the unit stationed at Kunsan starting in February 1968 was the 1646 Provisional Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Squadron, Det 11. This became the MAC, PARRC, Det. 11 effective 8 Aug 68. Along with them, Kwangju was supported by PARRC, Det 10 starting in Aug 68. This unit was formerly the "1646 Prov Sqn, DET.Prov.4". The unit then became the 41st ARRW, DET.11 from 8 Feb 69 - 1 Jun 70. After 1 Jun 70, it fell under the 47th ARRS. (See 47th ARRS Det 11: 1968.).

---

On-base conditions: Dan Decker of the 4th TFW continued, "The base had facilities for about 900 personnel when we arrived. Practically overnight the population jumped to about 6,000 or so. We lived in tents for the most part, during a bad Korean winter. In the spring, Red Horse came in and installed half-walls and floors in the tents we had to put up ourselves. Considering none of us had ever had any experience with tents, we didn't do too bad of a job."

The "Red Horse" Dan Decker referred to was actually "Prime Beef" -- or Civil Engineering personnel -- who built up the tent cities and made sure the basic infrastructure was working for the troop buildup. The tent city was located on the Golf Course consisting of 12-man tents set up with a road running between the two rows of tents.

The following are photos by Frank Tacey, formerly of the 558th TFS from Cam Rahn Bay, Vietnam. He wrote, "Our first morning at Kunsan. We had to sleep in the movie theater." Quite sure everyone was jumping through the loops as troops were arriving in droves. He continued, "By the way my name was Frank Tocydlowski (Tski) back then." The photos are of the tent city erected to accomodate the overflow of personnel.

558th Bulletin Board in Tent City

Tent City (1968)
Frank is the one inside the darkened tent
and was known as "Frank Tocydlowski" (Tski) back then.
Note the kerosene space heater used in the tent for heat.
(Courtesy Frank Tacey)

Kunsan AB (1968) (Courtesy Frank Tacey)

The picture on the left is taken along Avenue C near to the intersection of the Base Hospital. Though it appears to be only a one-lane road, it is an optical illusion as on the other photo, the ox-cart is off to the other side. Note the use of carts to transport items from point to point. A-frames (chige) were still used to carry heavy loads on the backs of the Koreans. Notice the ox-drawn cart which is most likely is a "honey pot" wagon from the two large cauldrons on the cart. These "honey" wagons were used to transport the human waste (under contract) off-base to be used as fertilizer on the rice fields. Also note the Jamesway huts left from the Korean War. But what is most revealing is what appears to be drainage ditches along BOTH sides of the sidewalk.

Kunsan Winter (1968) (Courtesy Frank Tacey)

Notice in the upper left picture below, the "new" barracks built for permanent party personnel of the 6175th ABG in about 1961. Also note the new prefab buildings that were being erected at the time everywhere on the base through the combined efforts of CES Prime Beef and the 557th CES Red Horse personnel.

Kunsan Winter (1968) (Courtesy Gene Bonham)

Gene Bonham wrote, "It was always a nice touch when the Permanent Party folks would come over after and lend a hand after the wind blew your tents down. Notice the broom by the flap, one must keep your frozen grass floor clean. Their was no great chance of the stoves melting any of it. I don't remember them doing much of anything. After that I really have to hand it to the Ground troops that were in Korea during the Korean War. Tough folks!" The space heaters (stoves) operated on kerosene. These types of units were noted for causing fires if there was soot buildup in the pipes. These types of units were in general usage throughout Japan and Korea for military housing without steam heat.

---

557th CES (Red Horse)

Red Horse and Prime Beef: The Red Horse unit is a different breed from Prime Beef. Though the Prime Beef folks operate graders and other heavy construction equipment, their projects are normally small scale. The Red Horse were a true HEAVY REPAIR (HR) unit who undertook the massive construction projects, like building up bases from scratch and repairing the bomb damage to the Vietnam bases.

The Red Horse unit at Kunsan was a Detachment of the main unit at Osan AB. They did the heavy construction end of the building up the base facilities. In some cases, the Prime Beef and 557th CES combined their efforts as in the upgrading of the Contingency pad (C-pad) area. In a site guestbook, one former CES troop remarked about working with the 557th Red Horse on the C-pad and his amazement in how much concrete went into building up the area.

In March 1969 the 557th CES (HR) Red Horse started the construction of the Whiskey Arch area with the North and South loop. They also did a lot of work at Kwangju during the Pueblo Crisis. The 557th was subsequently deactivated and forgotten by everyone -- except the Korean CES folks of Kwangju AB who fondly remembered them as good friends. (See 557th CES (HR) for more details on this unit.)

---

Security Conditions: With the added presence on the base, the base perimeter became a priority. However, there were problems as the newly augmented forces sometimes couldn't find the guard posts to relieve the troops. Steve Gattis wrote, "I was in the 6175th Air Police Sq. from Jan 67 to Feb 68 when I left for Vietnam. ... I was there during the Pueblo crisis and am still amazed that we could go from 900 permanent party to 6000 in three days. It was an unbelievable experience. So many people we could only get into the messhalls twice a day. The TDY Security Police came in with a lot of rank and could not find our security posts on the perimeter. Consequently, we spent about 16 to 18 hours on post in the snow. My squadron sponsored a young boy in school from Haje Village. He knew where I was and brought me hot potatoes after dark. I ate two and used the other two as hand warmers. He was blind in one eye and went by the name of Chino (not Chingo). I also recall that there were two operations named during that period: Operation Palace Guard and Operation Combat Dragon."

Robert Grace, MSgt, USAF (ret), wrote, "Could not resist mentioning that the 6175/354th Security Police Squadron was highly instrumental in maintaining Air Base Ground defense during that volatile time frame. ... Everyone knows that Korean winters are especially cold. But no one knows better than Air Policemen who had to spend the night at guard post."

"Little Cayote;" this was the guard post from hell. Because it was right off of the Yellow Sea, the cold went wind always managed to cut to your bones--you just couldn't keep warm regardless of how many layers of clothes worn. For example, standard winter dress on a midnight shift included: socks, booties (large cotton inserts for foot wear), muckle-ups (canvas-sided laced and zipped boots that came up to your shins), thermal underwear, fatigues, OD green thermal sweater, long parka (w/fur and hood), parka mittens (with hand warmer if you were fortunate to obtain) and a parka hat (with fur/ear muffs). This in addition to your standard ammunition and appropriate weapon. The short and long of it all was that we had to encounter many infiltrations from thefts to possible saboteurs. If you weren't there, you probably wouldn't believe half of the things that really did happen."

---

Off-base conditions: Dan Decker later wrote, "An interesting incident occurred while we were there. The previous summer/fall the U.S. had paid for the construction of a blacktop paved road from Kunsan AB to Kunsan City. That winter the local indigenous peoples chopped up and burned the road to keep warm! They thought it was absolutely great, no ash to throw out and the resulting gravel was spread around their homes as landscaping!"

Taken from top of levee on the road to Kunsan -- Okku Reservoir (1969)
In 2002, the houses have been replaced by brick farm homes
with a restaurant and large church atop the hill.
The fishing boats are still docked in the same place.
This road is no longer the main road to Kunsan from the base.
(Courtesy Michael A. McFarland)

This problem of the Koreans tearing up the macadam (asphalt) in winter was not only at Kunsan. At Osan in the 1970s, the base had a hard time with a stretch from the back gate to the main road. The Koreans in winter would rip it up as fast as they laid it down. However, Jack Wilkinson stated that this did NOT occur at Kunsan as each village was tasked with building a certain portion of the road. Besides, up to 1969 only ONE section had been paved.

The scarcity of burnable fuel was a definitely a problem for the Koreans at Kunsan. When the Pueblo Crisis hit, the biggest problem was getting fuel for the aircraft. Getting a pipeline from Kunsan Harbor to the base was one of the hottest projects in Korea. The 697th Engineering Company (Pipeline) was brought in from Thailand. The pipeline ran underground from the Kunsan docks around Wolmyong Mountain (Haemang-dong) through the village (what is now the Kunsan fishery college). It continued up the long straightaway to base through Mimiyon and up the Okku Reservoir levee near the Okku village and then to the base.

However, the wooden pipeline supports for the pipeline proved to be an attractive fuel source. The After-action Report stated, "The design of the pipeline called for supports spaced every joint of the pipe. Wooden supports were made, however, after two miles of supports were installed the local Natives found that the wooded supports was the answer to their fuel shortage. This operation was eliminated." (Go to 6175th ABG: Off-base Pipeline for more details.)

If you review the Cheol-kyun Shin's photos of the Kunsan landscape in the links below, one will observe the absence of trees on the hillsides. There were mainly clumps of scrub pine on the hilltops, but very little vegetation of any sort.

Go to Cheol-kyun Shin's Photos of Kunsan City for panoramic views (1960s)
Go to Cheol-kyun Shin's Photos for photos of Kunsan's people in the 1960s

---

Off-base bars:On base, the NCO Club was located in Bldg 1100 -- left over from the 3rd Bomb Wing in the Korean War -- and the sudden explosion of personnel made it very crowded. The Airmens Club was an old Korean War relic as well.

Dan went on, "There was no American City outside the gate while we were there in 1968, and there were only two night clubs providing service to Americans, the Roman Club and the Venus Club (I think that was the name of the second one.) They permitted only 100 personnel a day to go to the city. I never even bothered to ask for a pass."

These were old clubs located in Yah Hwa Dong (near the inner port) in downtown Kunsan before "American Town" in Mimiyon was first constructed in 1969 -- with the CES help to construct the road in from the main road. A-town (Silvertown) was "incorporated" in 1971. However, prior to A-town, there was only the downtown bars. John Wilkerson added, "As far as Kunsan City there were more than two watering holes. In Young Hwa Dong there was the Venus, Roman and Stork Club also a place called Papasan's Store which was frequented by mostly the blacks/African Americans (at that time the entertainment areas were mostly segregated." We must qualify the "segregated" statement that in the mid-1960s there was a lot of racial tension in and outside the services. Throughout the Orient, it was common for Whites, Blacks, and Latinos to have their own preferred bars...and other races were not welcome in them.

Yah-Hwa-dong area of Kunsan (1968)

Bus Downtown (1968)
Outside the bus is the road in Yah-Hwa-dong heading back to base
just before the Wolmyong (Taebong) tunnel where the bus would turn left.
Click on photos to enlarge
(Courtesy Frank Tacey)

---

354th Tactical Fighter Wing
(Jul 1968 - Jun 1970)

</