Long load times. Graphics intensive page due to loading of photos. Please be patient... Information on this page dealing with the 38th Fighter Group falls into the "best guess" category. Because of the ROKAF's stringent rules dealing with the release of information on their units, any unit information is "classified." Therefore all information is drawn from sources outside the ROKAF chain.
 
Must have Windows Media Player or equivalent installed.
RETURN TO MAIN TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTS
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS: Time Line of Korean War -- Tanner Publication Co.
 POW/MIA in Korea -- Current articles and links to POW/MIA issues
 ROKAF (Republic of Korea Air Force) for President Syngman Rhee during the latter's visit in early 1954" (3rd Bomb Wing 1954 Welcome Brochure) Original Aircraft: The original aircraft of the South Korean Air Force were discarded aircraft that were left behind by the Japanese after the war. Charles Euripides of Charlotte, North Carolina wrote, "I have collected photographs of the following Japanese aircraft in service in Korea, 1945-1950: 1. Ki-55 "Ida" (NKAF, overall gray); 2. Ki-54 "Hickory" (NKAF, overall green); 3. Ki-86 "Cypress" (SKAF, overall silver); 4. Rufe (float only); 5. Ki-9 Spruce (overall green, South Korean markings." Charles' observations of the Japanese aircraft in use by the SKAF is corroborated by the website Japanese Aircraft in Foreign Markings. It says, "South Korea: By force of circumstance, this "new" nation had to develop an air force from scratch at the end of the war. Initially, they operated Tachikawa Ki-9 "Spruce" machines, that appear to be in red - orange trainer colours. Markings consisted of a large Korean red / blue roundel, outlined in white, carried at least on the fuselage and upper wings. A broad white fuselage band was carried in front of the tail section." At Kunsan Air Base, when the 63rd Infantry Division, 3rd Battalion came to Kunsan, the Captain Robert Grenig reported seeing a "Zero" abandoned on the base. This aircraft was slowly stripped of any usable parts by the Koreans (with the knowledge of the Americans) until it was nothing but a skeleton. The Japanese had simply laid down their arms at the end of the war and walked away. (NOTE: The "Zero" was most likely a Ki-55 "Ida" as the "Zero" was a naval aircraft and Kunsan Aerodrome was an Army Advanced Training Base.) The Ki-55 "Ida" was a single-engined dual seat Army Type 99 Advanced Trainer and Ki-54 "Hickory" was a dual-engine Army Type 1 Advanced Trainer/Transport. Both of these aircraft may have been used at Kunsan by the 12th or 23rd Advanced Air Training Units who operated in the area. The 19th Air Training Unit was also in the area and may have used the Ki-86A "Cypress"; Ki-9 "Spruce"; and Ki-17 "Cedar" aircraft. These were Army single-engined two-seat biplane primary trainers.  
    Later Charles wrote of a photo of Kimpo c.1945. He said, "The photo shows a number of Ki-84's, Ki-55's, Ki-54's, Ki-79b's and a few P-38's and one C-47. Another photo shows a number of Ki-46's, a Fokker Super Universal, and the same aircraft listed above." Thus Kimpo appears to have been the "collection point" of the Japanese aircraft after the war. Charles also mentioned that the Japanese aircraft left in North Korea were taken to Russia by the Russians after they drove down to the 38th Parallel. He said, "I sent a number of vivid, color photos of Japanese aircraft in North Korean markings to No Kum-Sok, the North Korean pilot who defected in September, 1953 to Kimpo. Even after reviewing the photos, he wrote me and said that the Russians took all Japanese aircraft back to Russia following WWII and that the Koreans had no Japanese aircraft." According to an article in Code One Magazine celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean Air Force, the history of the ROKAF predates the official 1949 formation date. It states, "...Korea can trace its aviation heritage back to 1922 when An Chang-nam became the first Korean pilot to fly in his country's air space. Military aviation started about the same time. Korean expatriates desiring to support the independence movement in their homeland went through flight training at aviation schools in other countries. Korea's first six military pilots received their training in Curtiss JN-4s in 1920 at the Redwood flight school in northern California."  J-1 Jenny (From Code One Magazine)  Old ROKAF (From Kimsoft) It continued, "Choi Yong-duk, who later played a leading role in establishing ROKAF, set up an organization called the Air Force Foundation Committee in 1943 to train Korean pilots in China to fight in the independence war against Japan. When World War II ended, thousands of other Koreans involved in the independence war returned home. Yong-duk and several others set up several private organizations that promoted aviation. Yong-duk, Lee Young-Moo, and Chung Jin-Il integrated these organizations in August 1946 to form the Korean Aviation Establishment Committee. As relations between the north and south became more confrontational in the late 1940s, the committee began negotiations with US forces in Korea to establish an aviation unit under the control of the ministry of national defense. The unit, equipped with L-4 and L-5 liaison aircraft, was activated in May 1948. An air force academy was established at Kimpo Air Base eight months later." "As the communist forces of North Korea strengthened their airpower with Soviet equipment and as US forces withdrew from the peninsula in June 1949, South Korea asked for more military aid, including fighter aircraft. The United States denied the request to avoid increasing tensions in the region. Republic of Korea President Lee Seung-Man went about finding other avenues for procuring military hardware to respond to the North Korean military build up. A nationwide donation campaign called "National Flag" collected money for aircraft. The funds raised were used to buy ten T-6 trainers. The aircraft were rolled out in ceremonies at Yoido Air Base in May 1950 and named "National Foundation Aircraft" to commemorate the public's part in providing them for the country's defense. The timing could not have been more portentous — the war began less than six weeks later." By mid-1950 the ROKAF had some T-6 Texan trainers and L-4 Piper liaison aircraft -- though the reports of the numbers of these aircraft vary from 20 to 60. These were all World War II surplus aircraft -- and all trainers. According to The United States Air Force in Korea by Robert Futrell (p17), "The ROKAF's 16 planes (8 L-4's, 5 L-5's, and 3 T-6's) were located at Kimpo and Seoul airfields, and it had detachments at Suwon, Taegu, Kwang-ju, Kunsan and Cheju-do." The ROKAF was not up to the task for the war ahead.
The original 1,900 man ROKAF was decimated in the first days of the war. A few of the survivors became the fighter pilots who would later form the nucleus of the ROKAF 51st Provisional Squadron under Major Hess. According to Air War Over Korea by Robert Jackson (p13) states, "...one critical deficiency in the South Korean defences became apparent when two North Korean Yak-9 fighters appeared over Kimpo and Seoul Airfields and circled leisurely for several minutes at low altitude before flying away northwards. The South Korean had nothing capable of intercepting the the enemy aircraft; in June 1950, the Republic of Korea Air Force consisted of 60 aircraft, all trainers; 8 L-4s; 5 L-5s and 3 T-6 Texans. These were based on Kimpo and Seoul Airfields."  (NOTE: All Japanese aircraft (i.e., Tachikawa Ki-9 "Spruce") have been "officially" erased from ROKAF history.) (From ROKAF 50th Year History) The following is excerpted from 'On Guard for Peace and Labour' (Short History of North Korean Air Force 1948-1996). It stated, "The NKAF was "opposed" by the ROKAF, by the middle of 1950 it had in its inventory eight Piper L-4 liaison aircraft and three T-6 Texan trainers. A southern pilot defected to the North in another Piper in May 1949. All remaining aircraft were destroyed on the ground during the first days of the war. The ROKAF was caught at the early stage of its formation; in fact Kimpo was the only air base it had available and none of the five airfields that were under speedy construction was ready by the start of the hostilities. One flight school was founded in Jan.1949 and it had insufficient time to train enough cadres." "The overall strength of the ROKAF on 2 June 1950 was 1,899 officers and men, including at least 100 pilots, and all this force during the opening days of the war was killed, scattered or taken prisoner. Thus when it became necessary to commit to combat some South Korean aircraft, at least for outward show, "Project Bout One", planned before the outbreak of war, was put into effect: ten re-activated F-51D Mustang fighters of USAF with ROKAF markings. The pilots were Americans under Maj. D. Hess, ground crews were also American. In operations during the summer and autumn of 1950 these planes saw much combat, demonstrating that the "...South Korean Air Force, wing by wing with UN aviation, defends the sky of the Motherland". The Americans had no choice in this matter because there were not enough native South Korean pilots." According to Coalition Warfare: Considerations for the Air Component Commander by Peter C. Hunt, "The ROKAF was virtually nonexistent when the war erupted--it had less than twenty trainer and liaison aircraft, none of which were suitable for combat. Shortly thereafter, the USAF transferred ten F-51Ds to the ROKAF, accompanied by flight and ground crew instructors. As the RAAF transitioned from the F-51D to the Meteor, they gradually turned over their extra Mustangs to the ROKAF as well." "Any real disagreements about airpower between the US and the ROKAF occurred before the war. In its effort to establish an air force, the Korean government was supported by General Claire Chennault, who recommended a 100-plane force (including 25 F-51s) for the Republic. The US initially eschewed any commitments of this nature for two main reasons. First, the US Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) was not prepared for such an undertaking because they had limited resources. Second, the weak ROK economy could not support the cost of an air arm. When the Korean government in October 1949 established the ROKAF despite US resistance, the KMAG gradually formed an air advisory group." When the tensions with North Korea increased before the Korean War, President Syngman Rhee requested F-51 Mustangs that the U.S. were scrapping in favor of the F-80 Shooting Stars. In Air War over Korea (p13) it states that, "The pitifully inadequate state of the ROK Air Force was a direct result of United States policy; following repeated pleas by President Syngman Rhee, Major-General Claire L. Chennault had drawn up a plan for a South Korean Air Arm consisting of 99 aircraft, including 25 F-51 Mustang fighter-bombers, but this had been rejected by General MacArthur, who believed that the build-up of such a force would serve to increase the tension that already existed between North and South Korea and would lend weight to the Communists' claim that the United States was deliberately seeking to promote an arms race in the area." The transfers were reluctantly approved and started to the ROKAF in 1949. However, after the invasion of Korea a new problem popped up. The jet fighters in Japan could not operate from the undeveloped airstrips in Korea. The F-51s were hastily pressed into service by the Americans during the initial days of the war...leaving the Koreans with nothing. After the initial shock in June 1950, the F-51s were handed over to Major Hess' "Bout One". According to South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (p17), "The South Korean Air Force in June 1950 consisted of a single flight group of 12 liaison-type aircraft and 10 advance trainers (AT6). Maj. Dean E. Hess, KMAG adviser to the South Korean Air Force, had a a few (approximately 10) old F-51 (Mustang) planes under his control but no South Korean pilots had yet qualified to fly combat missions. These planes were given to the ROK Air Force on 26 June 1950." It states in Air War Over Korea (p25), that there was a plan to deploy a proportion of the F-51s recalled from the Air National Guard on the South Korean airfields as soon as possible after their arrival in the Far East. However, it continued, "Before the deployment could take place, however, steps would have to be taken to remedy the deplorable condition of the South Korean airfield still held by the Allies. In July 1950 the only airfield suitable for operations even by piston-engined combat aircraft was Taegu, and even that had little to offer; the runway was a bumpy pilot's nightmare of packed earth and gravel, and amenities consisted of a few ramshackle buildings. Since June 30th Taegu -- known also under the military designation of K-2 -- had been the home of the ten worn-out Mustangs supplied to the Republic of Korea on the request of President Rhee. This unit, manned by a mixed bunch of South Korean and American pilots under the command of Major Dean Hess, was in action almost continually during the early days of July, although in effectiveness was hampered by the fact that many of the South Korean pilots lacked sufficient experience to handle the F-51 and also by the lack of a suitable tactical air control system. Nevertheless, because of its location the Mustang squadron was the only Allied unit capable of ranging along the whole length of the front and of patrolling the battle area for between two and three hours at a stretch. It was comforting for the commanders of the hard-pressed 24th Division and ROK forces to know that a flight of Mustangs could be overhead within minutes of a request for help being sent out." This first battle-weary unit of the ROKAF was absorbed by the Mustang-equipped ROKAF 51st Provisional Fighter Squadron at Taegu. It flew its first ground attack mission on July 15th.  (Courtesy Ken Creasy) According to Major Hess in his autobiography Battle Hymn (pp75-76), "At Itazuke my excitement increased. The instructions called for command of a new project, a classified organization with the nebulous title "Bout I." I was to take ten American pilots, four ground officers, and a hundred enlisted men to Korea, where we would train a number of South Korean pilots in the F-51 (Mustang). Some of these Korean were veteran flyers who, ironically had flown for Japan in World War II -- an indication of how during their forty-five-year occupation of Korea the Japanese had attempted to absorb these people. But now their country was independent once more after forty years of subjection, and these Koreans were waiting to be taught how to fight for their freedom with our modern weapons." He continued (p76), "I was told it was to be a training mission only. We would be located on a field near the town of Taegu and thus be the only friendly air power in Korea. But we Americans were to stay out of combat. The men we were to instruct would become the nucleus of what might prove to be a valuable addition to the United Nations forces. They in turn would teach more of their compatriots to fly the F-51s." Later Major Hess would get a "reinterpretation" that would allow he and his pilots to lead the combat missions. Major Hess stated that many of the original Korean pilots had previous flying experience with Japanese aircraft during World War II. Because of this one pilot with a few confirmed American kills under his belt felt that the Americans had nothing that they could teach him. Unfortunately, he was used to a much more maneuverable Japanese aircraft and was not accustomed to the F-51s flight characteristics. On an attack on a tank, his angle of attack was too steep and he plowed into the ground. These and other problems frustrated Hess' originally. Language barriers were probably the greatest obstacle to his training program. However, after the arrival of the 6002nd Fighter Bomber Squadron from the Philippines flying F-51s, the ROKAF 51st Provisional Squadron was absorbed into the unit. The ROKAF aircraft ceased to exist. However, Maj. Hess made an impassioned plea to General Timberlake to maintain the unit and was given permission. Most of the American pilots voluntarily chose to remain with the 6002 FBS and only Maj. Hess, Lt. Mike Bellowin and about thirty enlisted volunteered to remain with the ROKAF. The fledgling ROKAF unit under Maj. Hess moved to K-4 (Sachon) near Pusan to continue flying and then on to K-10 (Chinhae) in July. By this time, there were only six F-51s. The unit remained small with three American pilots and only eight of the original ten ROKAF pilots. After the recapture of Seoul, the unit moved to K-24 (Youngdungpo) on Sep 27, 1950. It followed the drive north and was at K-24 (Pyongyang) between Oct 28 - Dec 6, 1950. It arrived at K-5 (Taejon) on Dec 6. The training cadre was sent on to Cheju Island (K-40). It departed Taejon and moved back to K-16 (Youngdongpo).
 ROKAF Training (From Code One Magazine) The following was excerpted from Coalition Warfare: Considerations for the Air Component Commander. "After the war began, the US initiated a special project called "Bout One" to assist the development of the ROKAF. Bout One provided the ROKAF with ten F-51s, spare parts, and US instructors for aircrew and maintenance personnel. Even after General MacArthur announced that the decision to establish Bout One was final, Lieutenant General Earle Partridge, the 5th Air Force (5AF) commander, harbored doubts about the project because of inadequate ROKAF logistics and "entirely incompetent [Korean] F-51 pilots." "Led by USAF Major Dean E. Hess, Bout One's airpower objectives largely reflected the desires of US commanders, on whom the unit depended for guidance and leadership. Hess had unique insight into ROK political objectives as well as ROKAF airpower goals, since he had close personal relationships with President Rhee and General Kim Chung Yul, the ROKAF Chief of Staff. The South Korean pilots wanted to serve their country in any way possible--when the US considered dissolving Bout One, the South Korean crews volunteered to join the army so they could continue to fight. In fact, a major airpower objective throughout the Korean War was to support the outnumbered UN ground troops through close air support (CAS). In this mission, Korean cultural beliefs occasionally undermined the capability of airpower to achieve its objectives effectively. The ROK Army was sometimes reluctant to call for CAS, fearing the perception of weakness and a corresponding loss of face." "With about two dozen aircraft, mainly Canadian-built, North American T-6 trainers and L-4 and L-5 liaison aircraft, the ROKAF organization had virtually no combat capability. In the early days of the war, Korean pilots used the liaison aircraft to drop small homemade bombs that they kept on their laps. The allocation of ten F-51s for Major Hess's Bout One project eventually grew to twenty fighters by the end of 1951. This expansion was closely monitored by USAF leaders who wanted to control the post-war ROKAF capability without signaling a US commitment for long-term support." "Operationally, Bout One diverted much-needed USAF aircraft and pilots to the ROKAF during a critical phase of the war. USAF plans to dissolve the project were shelved when President Truman specifically authorized the initial F-51 transfer. Additionally, because most of the Korean pilots could not speak English, CAS was not feasible due to communications problems. At 5AF, the political significance of Bout One forced commanders to attend to the smallest matters personally. General Partridge was distracted by the need to oversee specific details about pilots and missions when the ROKAF and USAF flew together."  (From Mig Alley Skin Central) "Practically speaking, the ROKAF had to integrate into the US command structure because they depended on Major Hess's instructions from the USAF. American instructor pilots normally led mixed flights of US-ROKAF crews, and ROKAF pilots simply followed the leader. The language barrier essentially precluded the ROKAF from leading flights, because the JOC and the American instructors spoke only English." "Commanders should question the assumption that language differences do not affect airmen, since English is the common language of aviation. American, British and Australian crews spoke English as their primary language, and the Afrikaaners in the SAAF spoke fluent English as well. Although the ROKAF contribution to the war was small, the inability of their pilots to speak English created significant operational hurdles that were never fully solved over the three years of war."  ROKAF Training (From Code One Magazine) But this problem of language was not only South Korean. The following is excerpted from 'On Guard for Peace and Labour' (Short History of North Korean Air Force 1948-1996). It states, "By the middle of 1953 the NKAF had not been rebuilt as a true fighting force. The brunt of air combat over Korea was borne by Russian and Chinese pilots. As can be concluded from recollections of Soviet participants of the war, North Korean pilots were few and far between and, because they couldn't speak Russian or Chinese, they were hard to teach. According to some recollections (not without expletives) the Koreans were simply avoiding combat under the pretext of 'preservation of national cadres'." As the Korean War stabilized, the ROKAF increased its aircraft numbers with transfers from the USAF which now was transitioning back to F-80, F-84 and F-86s. The ROKAF units moved to Kangnung to be closer to the front lines which now had stabilized along the 38th Parallel. As other RAAF-associated units transitioned to the Glouster Meteor their F-51 aircraft was transferred to the ROKAF. For example, 2Squadron (SAAF) records indicate that many of the South African Air Force (SAAF) F-51Ds were transferred to the ROKAF in 1953-1954 as well. Starting in 1955, F-86F being discarded by the USAF were transferred to the ROKAF to replace the F-51s.  ROKAF F-51 (From Code One Magazine) According to an article in Code One Magazine celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean Air Force, "In the first days of the war, ROKAF pilots made heroic but vain attempts to turn back North Korean forces by dropping hand grenades on enemy tanks from their liaison aircraft. The day after the initial invasion, ten ROKAF pilots were rushed to Itasuke Air Base in Japan to receive conversion training for the F-51 Mustang. They returned to Taegu Air Base in South Korea less than two weeks later to take part in the war. ROKAF operations were soon moved to Jinhae Air Base near Pusan as ROKAF pilots supported the Naktong River defense line around that city after the initial retreat."  ROKAF F-51 (From Code One Magazine) It added, "From its first mission in July 1950 to the armistice in July 1953, ROKAF F-51 pilots completed about 8,500 combat missions. Thirty-nine out of a total of 115 ROKAF combat pilots flew 100 combat missions or more. Seventeen ROKAF pilots lost their lives during the war. The service grew from a meager force of twenty-two liaison aircraft and 1,100 troops at the beginning of the war to 118 aircraft and about 11,500 troops at war's end." FIRST ROKAF UNITS AT KUNSAN (1953): The first ROKAF units at Kunsan consisted of a ROKAF Detachment. The 1954 Welcome Brochure of the 3rd Bomb Wing read, "ROKAF DETACHMENT. The ROKAF has had personnel on K-8 since the fall of 1953. Under the command of Captain Kim Chong Yul, this Korean organization has been undergoing intensive OJT with various Air Force units, including the 3d AIO and 3d Air Police Squadrons, learning various Western techniques in installations and security. Too, they have worked with the 1973rd AACS receiving instruction in such aerial matters as The Ground Control Approach System and traffic control. To promote the learning rate of the Koreans, English classes have been started which have removed the language barrier somewhat. Continuing progress has been made, and the ROKAF personnel have been of great assistance to us. It has been another example of the close cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Korea which started in 1950 after the invasion, and has been growing since that time." (Go to Kunsan Air Base: 1954 and Now.) However, though the words above reflect the politically correct phrases, the truth was that the USAF "owned" the Kunsan in a real sense. There was no Status of Forces Agreement and only the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 to guide the U.S. forces. (See Mutual Defense Treaty to view the document.) Because of the difficulties with Syngman Rhee encountered during the war, this document had to be approved by the U.S. Congress. The treaty "morally commits" both nations to come to the other's defense in case of attack, although it does not -- as in NATO -- require an automatic response by the U.S. President. Korea was too weak to defend itself and needed the U.S. It was more than willing to make concessions. Remember that 100 percent of the ROK government budget in the 1950s was from U.S. aid funds alone. James Wade in his book One Man's Korea, 1967, (pp105-107), it states that American soldiers in the mid-1950s complained about "sensitivity" manuals that say Koreans were "proud and dignified." "All the people we've seen so far have been filthy beggars, or farmers living in huts worse than animals. They're not even civilized, let alone dignified or proud." This provides some insight into how the Americans military in Korea felt towards the Korean people at the time. Remember that at that end of the Korean War, the threat of another invasion from the North was real. For example, Mr. Oh Tae-Il, who worked for the 808th Engineering Aviation Battalion during the Korean War, destroyed all his pictures of himself taken on base before he entered the ROK army. He feared if the North Koreans invaded and discovered his pictures, his family would be endangered. To him -- and to millions of Koreans -- an invasion was a real possibility. (NOTE: Mr. Oh Tae-Il still lives on his farm in Okku outside of the base.) Koreans and Americans seemed to keep their distance from one another. Doug Hutchison, who was with the 77th Royal Australian Air Force Squadron at K-8 in 1954, "We had very few ROK troops at Kunsan and I am certain we had no ROK aircraft. The ones I remember were mostly MPs and Guards. We were not flavour of the month with the ROK in 1954 over the cease-fire signing so never had much to do with them,they sort of kept their distance and we liked it that way as people were very touchy in those days." The surrounding area of Kunsan had returned to some semblance of pre-war conditions as the war-time population of 100,000 was reduced to around 40,000 as people gravitated to Seoul or the bigger cities to find a better life. (See Kunsan 1951-1953 for photos of Kunsan City at that time.) Around the base, the hill outside the north gate bore the scars of the quarry work done to build the new north-south runway. The hills were denuded and bare with a few clusters of scrub pines. The road to Kunsan City was a dirt road that followed the Okku reservoir and then the irrigation canal straight into Kunsan. The base still had not fallen into a state of utter disrepair that would follow after the 3rd Bomb Wing left in 1954. But soon after the Wing left, the fences were stolen and anything that wasn't nailed (or bolted down) disappeared. Kunsan Air Base became a dismal location in the 1950s. The first unit to take over was the 6170th Air Base Group while the UN Truce Monitors were still on the base. At this time, there was only one C-47 on the base. The base slowly deteriorated. The South Korean government was not happy with the truce. Remember that South Korea never signed the Armistice. However, there were UN Inspection team members stationed at Kunsan. Spearhead of Logistics, A History of the United States Army Transportation Corps stated, "Following the truce, the port also hosted a United Nations Inspection Team to monitor compliance with armistice restraints on the imports of war materials." The Inspection Team was headquartered at Kunsan Air Base and the Korean government caused a lot of troubles while this team was there. Both sides paid no attention to the Inspection Teams and openly did as they pleased. In 1955, the teams were withdrawn from two locations and reduced in size in all the others -- including Kunsan. In the Korean War Anniversary, Raymond G Loynes of Ontario, Oregon tells of serving with the 6170th Material Squadron at Kunsan from Jan 6, 1954 to Oct 21, 1957. He states, "There were no aircraft on the base at this time except for one lonely C-47. I was in the 6170th Material Squadron at the time. We were having a lot of disruptions from the South Koreans because of the Truce Inspectors housed on the base. They seemed to think they were spies or something." (Note: Under the Armistice agreement, Truce Inspectors were to be stationed at Kunsan. The Armistice Agreement, Vol I Paragraph 43 states, "Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following ports of entry: Territory under the military control of the United Nations Command Territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers ... KUNSAN (35° 59'N, 126° 43'E) ... These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full convenience of movement within the areas and over the routes of communication set forth on the attached map (Map 5)." However, South Korea never signed the Truce Agreement and under President Syngman Rhee (Yi Sung-man 1875-1965) threw up many stumbling blocks to the peace process.) However, Travis Hughlett of Raymore, Missouri provided a hand-printed threat notice written by "Anti-Red Citizens" that was posted on the 14th Trans Port Co. HQ building at Kunsan Port. It was aimed at the Truce Inspection Team and read, "1. Russia's Puppets, Czecho-Slovakia and Poland Delegates!! Get Away at Once!! 2. Czecho-Slovakia and Poland Delegates, Reds' Spies Disguised as Neutral Truce Observation Group!! Run Away!! 3. Our Enemy Czech-Slovakia & Poland!! Get Out or No Guarantee of Life Anti-Red Citizens" This was definitely not a warm greeting. The U.S. position on Korea after the Korean Conflict was simple. In Korea's Place in the Sun, A Modern History by Bruce Cummins, 1997, it states (p305), "The United States was willing to indulge certain countries, especially places like Korea sitting on the fault lines of the Cold War, so that they could become self-supporting and compete in world markets. If that meant hothouse protection for their cement industry, so be it. The Joint Chiefs of Staff has still other ideas: posting huge armies like that in South Korea along these same fault lines, in order to contain communism. ... The 600,000-man armies in Korea and Taiwan were expensive, to be sure, but they were the sandbags holding back the onrushing waters for a disarmed Japan and a stretched United States." In a nutshell, the United States subsidized the protectionism, cronyism, the abuses of democracy, and all the other ills that have plagued the country ever since. Corruption was rampant in Korea and the U.S. simply accepted it as the way things were done in the "oriental cultures." It could have made a significant input as it was providing 100 percent of Korea's GNP during the early years of Korea's government. However, the U.S. approved and subsidized corruption and the abuses of democracy. It pretended that everything was all right as long as they were containing Communism behind the expensive defensive wall in Formosa and Korea. PROBLEMS DEALING WITH TRAINING A TECHNICAL WORKFORCE AFTER THE KOREAN WAR: 1950s: The problems associated with training a technical workforce were immense. Up to the Post-World War II period, the Japanese had reserved all technical positions for the Japanese -- with Koreans filling the lower menial positions. When the Japanese went home, they took with all the managerial level or highly-skilled workers. If a Korean was trained by the Japanese, he was painted with a broad brush of "collaborator" and persecuted. In a nut shell, the common Korean was basically only suited for menial labor. Though there were semi-skilled labor to varying degrees, the highly-skilled technicians were nil and professionals such as engineers were at a premium. After the war, the ROKAF started from scratch building their workforce under the guidance of the US military. In 1953, the first ROKAF at Kunsan started their OJT with the Americans in base security and tower operations. The first step was the learning of English to communicate and to be able to read the technical manuals that were all in English. The first personnel involved in OJT programs with the Americans were naturally the least technical of the fields -- base security, weather and airfield operations. Later these were extended into the aircraft maintenance fields. As Korea in the years after the war was desperately poor, they relied heavily on US aid and materials to build their organization. We have run across personal accounts from Americans during this early period that relate how Korean Airmen would ask USAF personnel outside the Service Club if they would teach them English. These students were described as diligent, hard-working, and eager to learn English. However, they would be taught in cramped rooms sitting on floors with poor lighting and ventilation without proper materials. However, these contacts were the exception. On the whole, the Americans kept their distance from the Koreans. Prior to the F-86, the ROKAF conducted their F-51 flight training out of Kangnung. However, in 1955 the USAF started the first transfers of the F-86 to the ROKAF. This entailed training the ROKAF on a completely different technology to bring them into the jet age. "An Open Letter to my Buddy" by a retired USAF MSgt states, "I went back for a second tour in 1956. I was stationed at K-13 Suwon as an advisor to the Republic of Korea Air Force. (ROKAF) We were teaching the Koreans how to fly and maintain the F-86." Prior to the F-86, the Koreans were noted as "band-aid mechanics." Basically, they were miracle workers who could temporarily fix things with bubble gum and bailing wire. However, jet engines were not tolerant of these old-fashioned techniques. Suwon became the training base for the F-86 to train the ROKAF personnel.  (From ROKAF 50th Year History)
|
 HTML Toolbox |