HOW IT WAS! KUNSAN AIRBASE ROKAF (1949-1970) Page 2 of 5

1960s: By the 1960s, the ROKAF was expanding as more and more trained technicians filled their ranks. Training was still primarily through US assistance. Pilots and senior technicians attended military schools within the United States. Under the military aid programs, military hardware was transferred to Korea at no cost using the slight-of-hand tricks of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and US military "aid" dollars to purchase the FMS materials. As US units transitioned to the F-100 Supersabres, the F-86 Sabre jets were sent to the ROKAF. The ROKAF organizational structure in the 1960s was understandably a carbon copy US organizations. The ROKAF was heavily reliant on US aid.

However, there has been a dramatic change in the form of training provided to the ROKAF over the years. Years ago the USAF would train the ROKAF on the system and then transfer the system to the ROKAF. However, now systems are purchased "off-the-shelf" and contractors provide support/training. For example, let's consider the development of Air Traffic Control within the ROKAF. In 1952, the Taegu Air Control Center (ACC) was established in Taegu by USAF/MATCOM. However, by 1958, the ROKAF was sufficiently trained to take over the enroute control of aircraft. In 1968, the High-Control Service was established at Mt Palgong by USAF to provide radar service for flights at or above FL240. In 1973, the ROKAF took over High-Control Service. In 1986 a new computer-based enroute radar control system was installed at Taegu airbase by ROKAF. Thus one can see that the pattern in the past was that the USAF first established a system; the ROKAF was trained via OJT to maintain the system; and then the system was transferred to the ROKAF. This system of "training and transfer" was used in all areas. However, after the "Miracle of the Han River" came about, Korea has gone about developing her own electronic systems in cooperation with foreign companies.

Throughout the history of the ROKAF, American personnel would serve as transition trainers and advisors for new aircraft received. Most often these "trainer-advisors" would be USAF personnel from bases in Korea who would be sent to various ROKAF bases requesting assistance.

A History of the Korean People, Tradition and Transformation by Andrew C. Nahm (p505) states, "Following the signing of the armistice agreement in July 1953, south Korea strengthened its military, aiming at the construction of a self-reliant defense posture. Various new academies of the military branches and a war college were established, and after the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States on October 1, 1953 more U.S. military aid was received and troops became better trained and equipped. While training better qualified officers at military schools in Korea, the government sent a large number of officers to receive advanced training at U.S. military institutions."

It continued, "Although South Korea's military strength increased during and after the Korean War, it was not until after the emergence of the Third Republic in 1963 that the national defense posture was noticeably improved. The government adopted several important measures to strengthen national defense, increased the number of divisions and units in the armed forces, and improved the training programs."

1970s: Military expenditures grew steadily after 1963, particularly after 1972, due to the shift in U.S. Asian policy and international situation. To be more specific -- Vietnam blossomed after 1963. Lyndon Johnson escalated the Vietnam war in 1965 and 1966. The U.S. needed its troops...and international support as well. In order to get Korean involvement, the U.S. threatened to pullout portions of its troops from Korea if Korea did not contribute its troops. However, if Korea did acquiesce, the U.S. agreed to provide additional military assistance in the form of U.S. military aid dollars. Korea's involvement was blackmail, but the Korea really didn't have much choice, but to join the Vietnam effort. Korea sent its troops off to war. Though Park Chung-hee had volunteered troops before and sent a Korean MASH unit in 1964, 50,000 Korean soldiers were fighting in Vietnam after 1965 under the new agreement. By the time the ROK forces withdrew in 1973, as many as 300,000 Koreans had served there. Korea transferred most of its F-5A to Vietnam and in return had them replaced with F-4E aircraft.

However, after Vietnam fell, the U.S. needed Korea to maintain its image as the protector of democracy. With all the excess stockpiles of Vietnam materials, much of it ended up in equipping the South Korea forces. The first "Team Spirit" was born in the late 1970s and continued till the 1990s. But another trend was happening in the U.S. There was a strong push in America to reduce the size of the military after Vietnam. (This was shown by President Carter's plan in 1979 to reduce the American forces by 6,000 troops -- though it was discarded later.) With this new reality, it was essential to beef up the South Korean forces.

By these actions, the Korean military hardware was being upgraded by the U.S. Korea secured an increasing amount of military loans from the U.S. "Military assistance from the United States was a key factory in Korean military development. Between 1953 and 1961, the United States provided $1.6 billion; between 1962 and 1969, $2.5 billion; and between 1970 and 1976, $2.8 billion in grants and loans." South Korea spent an enormous amount of money for the military in its military modernization program. It purchased $2.1 billion worth of arms from the United States between 1975 and 1979. South Korea was the 4th largest buyer of U.S. military hardware.

Most of this spending was simply "slight-of-hand" tricks of Foreign Military Sales (FMS)...U.S. giving loans that were later "forgiven" after Korea had bought U.S. arms. By 1990, Korea's military expenditures had reached $9.18 billion and was increasing rapidly as Korea set out on its path to be militarily independent from the U.S. military. However, a key point of this modernization that should not be overlooked is that technology was being transferred along with this upgrade in military hardware. In 1969, the manufacturing of small arms, tanks, and guided missiles and rockets began, and Korean-made guided missiles, tanks and high-powered rockets were tested successfully in September 1978. The people trained in the military took this training in military technology and converted it to the civilian markets. The miracle of the Han was underway.

1980s - 1990s: By the mid-1980s, Korea had transitioned from low-tech industries (shoes, clothing) into mid-tech industries (petrochemicals, steel, automobiles), but it wanted to enter into high-tech areas (electronics, aircraft manufacturing). However, it did not have the technology. The only way to obtain this technology quickly with minimal risk was through partnerships. Thus was born the KFX (Korean Fighter Program) which gave birth to the KF-16. This was an aircraft "co-produced" in Korea in hopes of gaining the technology to "co-develop" at a later date its own aircraft (similar to the JSF Japanese Fighter Program). (NOTE: In "co-produce" Korea uses another company's designs and manufactures it in Korea, but in "co-develop" Korea participates in the design phases of the aircraft as well as production.) The Korean KTX-2 Advanced Trainer/Fighter is a step along this path. It is plain to see that Korea has already mapped out a long-range plan to be self-sufficient in design, development and production in its own aircraft systems.

The key item for the Koreans is "technology transfer." In the development of the KTX-2, David Ash, Lockheed Martin's program director for the KTX-2, said in July 99, "The supersonic KTX-2 will have the maneuverability, endurance and systems to prepare future pilots to fly advanced, front-line fighters like the F-16, F-22 and the Joint Strike Fighter. In addition, the team of engineers from Lockheed Martin and Samsung Aerospace are working together to make sure the design experience that comes from producing the world's most advanced fighter programs is transferred to the Korean industry." Korea aims to develop its own high-tech aircraft manufacturing capability.

ROKAF AT KUNSAN IN THE 1960s:

The ROKAF Detachment had personnel at K-8 starting in the fall of 1953. The glowing words in the 3rd Bomb Wing Welcome Brochure indicated the ROKAF were receiving training from the USAF in base operations, security, and tower operations. However, by 1959 conditions had deteriorated between the ROKAF and USAF to the point that there was no interaction between the two elements. The USAF personnel were highly demoralized and viewed being at Kunsan as a one-year punishment tour that had to be "endured". One former Commander commented to "go with the flow" in order to survive. The base by 1959 was a disaster.

ROKAF Airman (1959)

ROKAF Hangar (1959)

In 1955, the ROKAF started receiving the outdated F-86Ds discarded by the USAF after the war. By 1959, the F-86Fs had also been added to the ROKAF unit. Though the USAF records state that the ROKAF assigned a squadron of F-86F fighters to Kunsan in 1965, the F-86Ds and F-86Fs were reported at Kunsan in 1959 by USAF TDY personnel. Larry Doyle wrote about his TDY to K8 in 1959, "Now about the F-86's at K-8 when I was there I do remember 86D's not to many and the others I thought were 86E's. I don't remember the difference between the E and F..." (NOTE: Both the "E" and "F" looked identical except that the F-86F had a different wing root.) The F-86s presence at Kunsan would explain the USAF transferring some BOQs to the ROKAF. These units would have been required for the ROKAF flying officers.

ROKAF F-86D

The unit operated from one large hangar in the same general area that it operates from today. The hangar was very large rounded type construction. (See Photo above) John Moench (then the Commander of the 6175th ABG) recalled in his book Taking Command, that the roof had a hole in it from what he said appeared to be battle damage. (NOTE: This comment is impossible as the hangar was not built until after 1954 when the ramp was done.)

As was said before, there appears to have been little contact between the two occupants of the base -- though the ROKAF made attempts to bridge the gap by maintaining cordial relations. Moench mentions that the ROKAF Commander Colonel Lee invited him in 1959 to review the ROKAF troops. At the time, the ROKAF flew F-86D/Fs while the 6175th Air Base Group (ABG) of Col. Moench only a broken-down C-47and an old L-10 liaison aircraft. The ROKAF continued to fly the F-86s from Kunsan into the 1980s.

In John Moench's book there are a few enlightening statements about the ROKAF at Kunsan in 1959. At this time, the base was in a caretaker status with the 6175th ABG in charge of the base as the "host" with the ROKAF as "tenants." (Remember that the Status of Forces Agreement was not signed until 1966.) In fact, Moench mentions that the Americans "owned" the base in a real sense. The fact of life in 1959 was that the ROKAF did NOT control the base. The USAF treated the base as "theirs". The ROKAF at the time were considered "tenants."

The northern portion of the base was transferred to the ROKAF for family housing when the unit grew in size after the arrival of the F-86s. Moench's book mentions that some of the USAF BOQs were transferred to the ROKAF for use by their officers. This would be reasonable as they would have fighter pilots along with families. (NOTE: Moench calls these BOQ units "Japanese" built, but they were actually built by the 63d Infantry Division, 3d Battalion in the Occupation years using Japanese war reparations materials.) The times were poor and Col. Moench observed the ROKAF kids only having tires for swings. As a gesture of goodwill, Col. Moench directed that a swing set be built for the ROKAF family children.

According to the book, the base had a U.S. military population of about 500 but there was an on-base Korean population of about 1000. This large on-base Korean population is rather strange...even with ROKAF families. It becomes evident that the Americans allowed their "on-base employees" to reside within the base perimeter. (Go to Kunsan AB (1954-1974) for an expanded writeup of the base in 1959.)

The base was a backwater, rundown, neglected podunk of a base that the rest of the U.S. Air Force had forgotten about. It was far enough away from the prying eyes of the press that many of the "classified" or "clandestine" missions were flown out of there.

However, the North Korean threat of another invasion was real in the minds of the Koreans and Americans alike. For example, an incident in 1961 was related by Robert Koeser then of the 3rd BW from Yokota, Japan. He was TDY to Kunsan at the nuclear alert pad (C-pad) at the time. He mentioned that one of Kunsan's F-86s strayed over the border of North Korea and was shot up pretty bad. The Korean pilot limped home to Kunsan and landed safely. However, this incident put all the USAF aircraft in Korea and Japan on full alert until things died down.

The USAF provided all base security at the time...and it was a pathetic situation. The base perimeter was basically indefensible -- ten miles of perimeter with one USAF guard per mile. The ROKAF was given a small portion of the perimeter to defend around its areas. In most places there was no fence as it was stolen by the Koreans.

"Slicky boys" (thieves) would regularly raid the base for anything that wasn't nailed down. In fact, Col. Moench describes his footlocker as being bolted to the floor. Private guards were hired to protect the officers' quarters. On the north end of the base, the fence line was moved inwards by the Korean farmers to make available more arable land. The Ammunition Dump area had a fence around it, but there were holes big enough for a man to fit through.

The village of Haje sat right outside the fence. (NOTE: The village still sits right outside the fence.) There was no fence separating the base from the village and Haje was the center of a thriving blackmarket.

However, before one condemns the Korean populace for the black market conditions, one should consider what John Caldwell wrote in his 1953 book, And Still the Rice Grows Green. He wrote, "And there is a significant relationship between the degree of dishonesty and the number of Americans stationed in an area ... the magnitude of the black market operations varies in direct proportion with the American military population." For Americans to condemn the Koreans for the black market conditions is to smite themselves in the face -- as the Americans are just as much to blame -- if not more so as the "sellers" of the goods.

In 1958, the first of the nuclear deployments started from Kunsan Airbase by the 3rd Bomb Wing of Yokota Air Base. Their B-57Bs were located on the Contingency pad (C-pad) near the Base Operations. (See 3rd Bomb Group -- Nuclear alert (Aug 58 - Apr 64).) The ROKAF was not consulted on the appearance of this unit at Kunsan. In fact, the people of the 6175th ABG were really not consulted either. The operations were controlled directly out of Japan. As was mentioned before, the base was treated as an American preserve. The nuclear weapons were not allowed in Japan so they simply shipped them to Korea to stand alert. The nuclear alerts would remain at Kunsan until 1964 when the 3rd BW was sent to Vietnam. The nuclear tasking was then switched to Osan AB.

Offbase, the Kunsan City had returned to a population of about 30,000 - 40,000 people. The town had reverted to subsistence living as mud wattle houses dotted the sides of the hills in the town. The hills for the most part were denuded with few trees seen. It was a poor country town with two GI bars in Yah Hwah-dong. Thievery was rampant. The American opinion of the Constabulary was that they were corrupt and could be easily bribed.

When all things are considered, Kunsan was not a good assignment for anyone -- ROKAF or USAF.

The area surrounding the base was filled with rice farms and the smells of the "honey wagon" with its cargo of human "night soil" was everywhere. The dirt road from the base to Kunsan followed the same basic route that it had followed since the Japanese occupation days. It was a long dirt straightaway that ran into Wolmyong Mountain and then it veered to the left along the water front to Wolmyong tunnel.

By the mid-1960s, the ROKAF had the only flying commitment on the base. The Det 1 475th TFW from Misawa handled the nuclear alert. There was a ROKAF helicopter pad located near the ROKAF ramp. Though the contacts between the ROKAF and USAF were minimal, the atmosphere was cordial. The USAF had settled into being a caretaker base that was only used for typhoon evacuations.

During this time period, there were reports of some aircraft accidents by the F-86s. There were also rumors that an F-86 from Kunsan was shot down by MiGs as it was trying to get back to base. We cannot verify this last story, but two versions were heard from 6175th ABG personnel stationed there at the time.

However, the events of Pueblo Incident changed the face of Kunsan forever. After 1968, there was a massive buildup in Korea. Kunsan started to build to accept a fighter wing. The North and South loops were built starting in March 1969 and soon the project was going full blast. By the time the 3rd TFW arrived in 1971, there were 43 arches for the aircraft, barracks structures were in place and the base had grown in size to accept a full-blown wing.

Background History of Nation in 1960s Affecting Kunsan AB: The country of Korea was in turmoil in the 1960s. The corruption within the Syngman Rhee government was rampant. In 1958 legislation was passed that abolished election for local officials. Politically important local posts were filled with Rhee's Liberal Party members; Chiefs of police were replaced with Rhee supporters; and a National Security Law was passed that virtually killed any chance for democratization of politics. The end result was riots and student demonstrations that erupted throughout the country. It culminated in the April 19th Student Uprising. This toppled the Rhee government. Rhee resigned from office in April 1961 and left for exile in Hawaii. This was the end of the corrupt and oppressive First Republic.

However, the Second Republic was short-lived. On May 16, 1961, a group of military officers carried out a coup and established a military junta. A small group of young officers commanding 3600 men toppled a government that had authority over an army of 600,000. The reason was that President Yun had sided with the junta and persuaded the U.S. Eighth Army and the commanders of various South Korean army units not to interfere with the new rulers. President Yun stayed on for ten months after the military junta took over power thereby legitimizing it. The revolutionary junta suspended the constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, forbade all political activities, imposed press censorship, and banned student demonstrations. Major General Park Chung-Hee consolidated his power and retired from the military to become President of the Third Republic (1963-1972).

In May 1965, President Park visited the US at President Johnson's invitation, and soon after an agreement between South Korea and the US was reached regarding the dispatch of Korean troops to Vietnam. There was a great outcry and vehement opposition from a large number of National Assemblymen, students, and intellectual and political leaders in Korea. However, the die was cast and several thousand Korean troops left for Vietnam. Korea had been blackmailed into agreeing to this. If it had refused, some American troops with their modern weaponry would have been withdrawn for duty in Vietnam. But if Korea agreed, the U.S. promised to increase the monetary grants and loans to Korea.

Park Chung-Hee's regime has been colored as an "iron-fisted dictatorship", but his supporters claim the country needed a strong-willed leader with a vision at the time. Perhaps they were right as the "Miracle of the Han River" can be directly attributed to him. However, by the 1970s there were others who felt quite the opposite about his continued iron-fisted rule. Popular politicians such as Kim Jung-pil, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung openly criticized the regime. Later they would be arrested for their views.

In August 1965, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), an administrative agreement concerning the status of US troops in Korea, was signed thus resolving many thorny problems which had existed ever since the arrival of the American troops. However, the basic premise of the SOFA deals with percentage share. If you pay more for the support of the American troops, you get a lot more in concessions. The Koreans paid little to nothing in 1965 and the SOFA was heavily weighted towards the Americans' advantage. It was not until 1992 that the SOFA was renegotiated and Korea increased its share to $220 million. But in the early 1960s, the U.S. still spent $500 million a year to support the ROK and as such, the ROK had no negotiating power.

Then on January 21, 1968, the North Koreans dispatched Commandoes to the South to assassinate Park Chung-Hee, but failed. Two days later the North Koreans captured the USS Pueblo on the high seas east of the North Korean port of Wonson. The situation became worse when the North Koreans shot down a U.S. EC121 reconnaissance plane, which due to a navigational error flew over North Korea on April 15, 1969. Korea was on the brink of war. The USAF deployed successive units to Kunsan. (See the deployments of the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing (Jan 1968 - Jul 1968); 54th Tactical Fighter Wing (Jul 1970 - Oct 1970).) After the Pueblo Incident, the nuclear tasking was moved back to Kunsan. The 354th TFW was hastily assembled and the units stood alert at Kunsan and Taegu. (See 354th Tactical Fighter Wing (Jul 1968 - Jun 1970)).

F-86F SABRES

According to the Baugher site, "The Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) received its first Sabres when five F-86Fs were turned over to ROK pilots on June 20, 1955. Korea received 85 ex-USAF F-86F-25 and -30 fighters between June 1955 and June 1956. These replaced the F-51D Mustang fighters used previously, equipping units of the RoKAFs 10th Wing. In 1958, 27 more F-86Fs and ten RF-86F reconnaissance aircraft were delivered. Many of the ROKAF ex-USAF Sabres were retrofitted with the "F-40" wing with extended tips and slats. Many were modified to carry the AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missile. These ROKAF Sabres were replaced by Northrop F-5s beginning in 1965. At least three F-86Fs survived until 1987." Beginning in November of 1960, the Republic of Korea got sufficient numbers of F-86Ds to equip two interceptor wings.

According to F-86 Sabre,

F-86 SABRE JET

First Flight: 1947

More than 6,000 F-86s were manufactured by North American's Los Angeles and Columbus, Ohio, divisions.

The first swept-wing airplane in the U.S. fighter inventory, the F-86 scored consistent victories over Russian-built MiG fighters during the Korean War, accounting for a final ratio of 10-to-1. All 39 United Nations jet aces won their laurels in Sabres.

Four models of the craft (F-86A, E, F and H) were day fighters or fighter bombers, while the F-86D, K and L versions were all-weather interceptors.

Successive models of the daylight versions--all designed to destroy hostile aircraft in flight or on the ground--were equipped with more powerful engines and armament systems that ranged from bombs and rockets to machine guns and cannon. All are rated in the 650 mph class with a 600-mile combat radius and a service ceiling of over 45,000 feet.

The three interceptor versions sported black radome noses, replacing the yawning jet intakes of the other models. The K model, manufactured in Turin, Italy, by Fiat, was flown by NATO forces. The F-86L had added equipment for use in conjunction with the U.S. SAGE (semi-automatic ground environment) defense system.

Forerunner of the operational Sabre was the XF-86, first flown Oct. 1, 1947, by North American test pilot George Welch. A few months later Welch became the first pilot to fly the plane at Mach 1 (the speed of sound) in routine flight. Although technically rated as subsonic, the Sabre is no stranger to supersonic speeds.

Various models of the Sabre held world's speed records for six consecutive years, setting five official records and winning several National Aircraft Show Bendix Trophies.

In September 1948, an F-86A set the Sabre's first official world speed record of 570 mph. This mark was bettered in 1952 by an F-86D that flew at 698 mph. The "D" became the first model of a fighter to better its own record, in 1953, with a run of 715 mph.

The F-86E and subsequent models incorporated a unique control system, developed by North American, called the quot;all-flying tail." Where the F-86A contained a booster control system that called for the pilot to do part of the work of ontrolling the aircraft, the newer system added full- power operated control for better maneuverability at high speeds. An "artificial feel" was built into the aircraft's controls to give the pilot forces on the stick that were still conventional, but light enough for superior combat control.

U.S. production of the Sabre Jet ended in December 1956.

According to the Canadian Aces Homepage,

The Sabre first flew as the XF-86 in 1 October 1947, but it wasn't operational until 1948 as North American Aviation incorporated as much of the new jet technology captured from the Germans as was possible. Most important of which was the concept of the swept-back wing that enabled much higher speeds, approaching the speed of sound (Mach 1). It was first built as the FJ-1 Fury for the American Navy with a straight wing, but it was much slower, and therefore, less capable than the F-86. From the pilots perspective the major improvements were the ejector seat, powered controls, pressurized cockpits, and hard "bonedome" helmets. The seats and powered controls were required with the high speeds they were flying at, and a pressurized cockpit was a necessity flying and fighting from ground level to 40,000 ft. The major adversary they faced was the MiG-15 in Korea. Technically it should have been the Sabres falling to the ground in flames based on the flying abilities of the MiG-15. It generally had the edge on the Sabre, however, pilot training and willingness to engage in battle swung the pendulum way over to the United Nations (read Americans) side. They achieved a 15:1 kill ratio over their Chinese, Korean and Russian opponents. By the final stage of the Korean War Sabres were used in ground straffing as no opposition was encountered in the air.

Many thousands of Sabres were built in American, Australian, Canadian, Italian and Japanese factories. They saw wide-spread service in the Korean war of 1950-1953 and many were still in service with air forces outside the USA in the 1970's. More than a dozen versions were built, for use as tactical and interceptor fighters, all-weather fighters and fighter bombers. Many pilots claimed that the Canadian built Canadair Sabre 6 with an Orenda engine was the best aircraft of the series. Other variants were: the F-86H had a J73 engine instead of the J47. A radar nose and a 'beard' air intake characterized the F-86D, F-86K and F-86L single-seat all-weather interceptors. The TF-86 was a longer trainer version and the RF-86 was a recce version; bulges at the wing roots and under the cockpit housed the photographic equipment. For the US Navy North American developed the FJ-2, FJ-3 and FJ-4 Fury from the F-86.

Technical Details

The initial variant the F-86 A flew in 1948 with the General Electric J47-GE-13 turbojet engine with 2,681 kg (5,910 lb) of thrust. The maximum speed was 687 mph (1,106 km/h) at sea level, although it was most fuel efficient at it's ceiling height of 40,000 ft. Effective combat range was 925 miles (1,490 km) with a pair of drop tanks mounted under the wings. Initially armament was six 0.5 in machine-guns in the nose and two 1,000 lb bombs instead of the drop tanks. With bombs the effective radius of operations was a mere 50 miles, with drop tanks it was more like 250. The Americans were committed to the 0.50 in machine gun when most air forces had gone with at least one cannon and several machine guns on jet fighters. Eventually it was equipped to fire two Sidewinder missiles, to drop two 453 kg (1,000 lb) bombs or fire eight 5 in rockets mounted under the wings.

The F-86F was brought out in 1952 and saw extensive service in Korea. It was powered by the G.E. J47-GE-27 turbojet engine. The major improvement was to increase the maximum speed slightly to (1118km/h) The ceiling was (15200m). Armaments were unchanged.

The F-86D flew in 1953 as an all-weather interceptor and did not see service in Korea. It was powered by the improved G.E. J47-GE-17 with 3026kg of thrust. Maximum speed was boosted to (1,115 km/h). The ceiling was unchanged. Armaments were changed to a set of 24 70 mm rockets mounted in a retractable box, aimed and fired by computer. The guns were later returned.

• ROK Air Force Detachment/111th Fighter Squadron, 38th Fighter Group
  • Original ROKAF Aircraft:
  • Early Days of Korean War:
  • First ROKAF Units at Kunsan (1953):
  • Problems Dealing with Training a Technical Workforce After the Korean War:
  • ROKAF at Kunsan in the 1960s:
  • F-86F Sabres
  • The ROKAF at Kunsan in the 1970s:
  • Transition to F-4D/E:
  • F-5A/B Freedom Fighter:
  • The ROKAF at Kunsan in the 1980s:
  • F-5E Tiger II:
    • Specifications of Northrop F-5E Tiger II:
  • The ROKAF in the 1990S and into the New Millennium:
    • 38th Fighter Group:
    • Off Base Conflicts:
    • Offensive Strategy
    • Kunsan ROKAF's Role in Event of War:
    • Kunsan AB Strategic Defense:
    • Differences between USAF and ROKAF Perspectives on War Preparations:
    • The Enemy: North Korea
    • Nuclear Weapons:
    • Changes in the "Little Brother" Ideas:
  • Future ROKAF Programs

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