HOW IT WAS! KUNSAN AIRBASE VMF(N)-513 "FLYING NIGHTMARES" (1951-1954) Page 7 of 9

Award of Excellence USS Harlan Dickson (NR)

History Award Snyper (NR)

Acknowledgment: Special thanks to Ron Stout of Burien, Washington for his narratives and invaluable technical information. Special thanks to Paul Noel of Oak Harbor, Washington for his invaluable assistance in providing information, proofing the text, providing guidance in assembling the materials and contributing his narratives. Special thanks to Jack Kio of Oswego, New York for his narratives, photos, and invaluable technical information. Thanks to Jim Curzon for his narratives and photos of Kunsan. Thanks to Eugene "Mule" Holmberg for the patches of the VMF(N)-513. Thanks also to Ken Gates for his research materials and photos. Thanks to Ron Harribson for his narratives. Thanks to Bill Brennen for his narratives and photos. Special thanks to Robert Frankovich for his narrative of a 22d CRBS rescue attempt. Also thanks to Ray Bourgholtzer; Gil Garcia; and Ray Harvey for their contributions. Thanks to Joseph S. Rychetnik of Point Richmond, California for his narratives and technical information. Primary Source Material: The Flying Nightmares: A History and Assessment of VMF(N)-513 at War in Korea 1950 - 1953 by Benjamin Huston Kristy, History Thesis, Kansas State University, 1995; U.S.Marine Corps Aviation: 1912 to Present by Peter B. Mersky); Air Power, January 1986; Naval Fighters Number Four Douglas F3D Skyknight, by Steve Ginter.

F3D-2 Skyknight:

According to Air Power, January 1986, "When VMF(N)-513 received the Skyknights it had two primary missions. The first was night combat air patrols over the Yellow Sea under radar (CGI) control from a USAF detachment on Cho-Do island off the coast of North Korea. This was done at night, at the extreme northwestern corner of the Korean Peninsula, where North Korea and China meet. The second mission was that of B-29 bomber escort."

"The Air Force never lost a B-29 on an F3D escorted mission, but the MiGs sure tried to stop the Skyknights. The North Koreans would send out a team of four or five MiGs under very close ground control from Antung. Their tactics were to put one aircraft out in front of an F3D in the hope that the F3D would pick him up and start chasing him. Then, while the Skyknight was occupied with the first MiG, the other three or four MiGs would descend on the F3D in hopes of shooting him down. Luckily for the F3D crews, the Skyknights were equipped with an APS-28 tail warning radar which would pick up the tail chasers. The MiGs could pick up the Skyknights even though they were not equipped with radar because the F3D tail pipes were very short and the glow of the J-34 engines could be seen as a bright light from eight miles astern on a clear night. This would then split into two lights at about two and a half to three miles. The tactic developed to lose the MiGs if they got on a Skyknight's tail was to roll inverted and pull a split S." (NOTE: The statement that the "Air Force never lost a B-29 on a F-3D escorted mission" is clarified by Lance Haribson (who flew flew 50 missions in the F7F and 5 in the F3D from K-8) who wrote about an incident in Nov 1952 after the F-3D had replaced the F7Fs. He wrote, "As for the claim to never losing a B-29 during escort, on the night of 18, 19 Nov. 1952, one B-29 was lost. Their call sign that night was Tan. One of our planes kept calling them that their running lights were on after passing the MLR (main line of resistance). Finally, they were hit forcing them to bail out between N. Korea and Cho Do Island. I heard that only the commander landed on Cho Do and was saved.")

"At first the F3Ds flew the bomber escort duty every other night and would launch ten to fourteen Skyknights at very close intervals. Each aircraft would be assigned a specific duty station. One F3D would be put on TARCAP (Target Combat Air Patrol) north of the bomber stream and sometimes one on TARCAP south. Two F3Ds would run along parallel to the bombers on each leg of the flight. And one or two F3Ds would be sent way up toward Antung as barrier CAPS."

"VMF(N)-513 was famous for never letting the MiGs bust up the bomber formations, and since the USAF F-94Bs who had the duly every other night were not that successful, a famous message was issued from the bomber general in Japan. "No F-94 within 25 miles of my bombers - ever! All escorting to be done by Skyknights only." After that, the F3Ds escorted the B-29s every night."

"Skyknights were not just limited to night intercepts. On March 27, 1953, a section of Skyknights made a predawn attack on Chinese artillery positions using conventional bombs. Again, that same evening, the Skyknights continued the attack along with Corsairs from VMA-112 and VMA-323. This type of attack was again carried out on 10 April."

However, the F3D-2 was not without drawbacks. The J-34 engines had to be angled sharply in order to fit into the aircraft's fuselage. However, this pointed the exhaust directly onto the pavement and started "grass fires" -- or worse melted the thin tar caps over the taxiways turning them into tarholes. However, a more serious problem was that J-34 exhaust glow that was visible for miles making it an easy target to track from the rear-quarter. On a clear night, exhaust plumes could be seen as far as eight miles away. Though a stable platform that was easy to fly, its straight wings, large tail and small engines would have made the F3D-2 "duck soup" for the MiGs during the day. The MiG could climb faster than the F3D-2 could dive. Its only defensive maneuver was a hard split "S". The only edge the F3D-2 had over the MiG was its APQ-35 radar -- but it was a decisive edge at night. At night, this advantage would pay off in three MiG kills in Jan 53 as they could "see" their targets in the dark. The MiG 15, on the other hand, could only rely on their ground radar controllers for intercept information.

Their primary mission was to fly night escort missions for Air Force B-29 bombers. The unit proudly boasts that no Air Force B-29 was ever lost on a F3D-2-escorted mission. However, they also flew some night strike and interdiction sorties. On November 2, 1952, pilot Maj William Stratton and radar operator M/S Hans Hoagland shot down a North KoreanYak-15 Feather, the first jet-vs-jet night kill. In subsequent night actions, F3D-2s accounted for another Yak-15 and sixMiG-15 Fagot

Major Dunn and M/S Fortin's kill was unusual in that it used the APG-65 Gun Radar. B.H. Kristy's 1995, The Flying Nightmares: A History and Assessment of VMF(N)-513 at War in Korea 1950 - 1953 states, "On that night, Dunn and Fortin were delayed in reaching their control point because their assigned F3D-2 experienced mechanical difficulties on the flight line. "

"Quickly switching to another aircraft, the two reached their assigned patrol area in time to pick up the third B-29 element. Dunn positioned himself above, behind and to the port of the bomber stream as to be in an optimal position to "bounce" (dive upon) any MiG that should appear. After patrolling over the bomber stream for a few minutes, "KODAK," GCI controller at Cho-do Island, informed Dunn that a bogey had appeared and was approaching the B-29s. Fortin picked up the MiG on the APQ-21 at a remarkably long range of ten miles. The MiG crossed the F3Ds path and moved toward a cone of searchlight beams that was illuminating B-29s over the target."

News clipping of Fortin and Dunn

Probably the most remarkable NCAP (night combat air patrol) engagements made by a VMF(N)-513 crew occurred on December 10, 1952. According to Kristy's History Thesis, 1995 (p128-129), "lst Lt. J.A. Corvi and his radar intercept officer (R/O) M/Sgt D.R. George engaged and shot down two PO-2s using the APQ-35 radar system of his F3D-2 Skyknight. ... The F3Ds APG-26 gun radar locked onto the contact at a range of one and a half miles, and at a range of 1000 yards, Corvi opened fire though he could not actually see the target. After a second burst, the F3Ds radar unlocked from target, and Corvi and George flew under a PO-2 whose wings had separated from the fuselage. The two men watched the plane spiral into the water off Cho-do Island. Moments after this, "DUTCHBOY" vectored the F3D toward another target. In a repeat of the first encounter, George establish contact on the F3D's search radar and then locked in target on the targeting radar. Corvi only had time to fire a single burst due to his high airspeed, but "DUTCHBOY" had reported that this contact too had disappeared from his scope. ... Corvi's double kill (the second listed as "probably destroyed") marked the first time enemy aircraft had been destroyed without visual references, using only the lock-on capability of the APG-26 gun radar." This would be the only kills of the PO-2s by the F-3D. The flight performances were too different -- "the F3D moved too fast and required too much altitude for maneuvering to be consistently effective against a biplane designed in the 1930s."

In Kristy's History Thesis, it talks about a text-book case of good teamwork between the GCI and F3D. "On the night of November 8, 1952 Capt. O. R. Davis and W/O D. F. Fessler destroyed another Mig-15. Davis's kill was a text book example of good GCI/Interceptor team. "DUTCHBOY", the radar control center on Cho-do Island, vectored Davis to a prime engagement position behind and slightly below the Mig - 15. Fessler, using the APS-21 search radar, steered Davis toward a visual sighting just behind the MiG's glowing tail pipe. Davis squeezed off a short burst of only twenty rounds from the Skyknight's four 20mm cannon and then watched the crippled Mig plummet to the ground." Jack Kio remembered, "We had known about the kill before he got back to the base and some of us were waiting in operations, one of the first things he did was to tell the ordinance men to check the ammo. I am sure it was twelve rounds. We kidded them about it for a few days."

Aviators come up with "affectionate" nicknames for their aircraft, like "Thud" for the F-105 supposedly for the sound it made when it crashed as it was so heavy. The F3D-2/EF-10 had its nickname too. From U. S. Marine Corps Aviation, 1912 to Present by Mersky (p.213); "This type of big old jet (EF-10) was known as Willie the Whale, or more colloquially, DRUT, the derivation of which can be seen with the letters in reverse order."

Marine F3Ds were responsible for the destruction of more enemy aircraft than any other Navy/Marine Corps aircraft type. Scoring six confirmed and one probable kills. With no losses in these encounters, this gave the Skyknight an overall 8-0 superiority. However, two were lost on combat missions for unknown causes. One loss of the VMF(N)-513 C.O. Col. Lambert is still discussed by the nightfighters as to possible causes -- a blown turbine spraying shrapnel (though a "temporary fix" of armor plating surrounding the engine was installed on the aircraft) or possible anti-aircraft activity off the North Korean coast from small islands. (Go toDouglas F3D-2/F-10B Skyknight Specificationsfor technical specifications.)

Joseph S. Rychetnik wrote, "When not doing convoy duty for the big Air Force bombers, the Skyknights were launched regularly from forward flight strips to take on the many night invaders from the north. From wooden biplanes sent to heckle and harass to the latest MiG and Yak, new radar techniques had the night fliers busy every time the sun went down and the Gooks came out to play."

He continued, "An R/O had the duty to take bearings from the MGCIS operators and vector into a target using his radar until the pilot could see the target well enough to shoot it down. When this could not be done visually, the R/O could lock his plane on the target and the pilot would fire, never seeing the bogey at all. Many night kills were made this way with both the Tigercat and the Skyknight, the first evidence the plane crew had of a kill was the explosion of the enemy plane or pieces of burning enemy aircraft plunging to the ground around their plane. Evasive action from debris was often not possible. Plane strikes by debris was not uncommon."

It must also be noted that there was no procedure in place to recruit and train radar types for the F3D. Both Navy and Marine crews were manned by volunteers from the radar shacks. And their training was strictly OJT. The F3D definitely proved its worth in the skies of Korea, and much of its success could be credited to the performance of its radar. The APQ-35 could cover 170° in the F3D's nose and the tail warning APS-28 would cover 140°. This left only 30° on each wing tip uncovered. Unbelievable for 1950. Of course, keeping a radar set working which had 300 plus vacuum tubes in it, was another story in itself.

The following is a comment about one of the missions in the F3D byRon Stout, a Radar Operator who flew the F3D. In it he sends some nice kudos to the1973rd AACS (Aircraft and Airways Communications Service). They were the folks who provided Ground Control Approach (GCA) with their all-weather radar and navigational aids. He said, "One really important thing about Kunsan in those days was the AF GCA outfit there. Because of the intense night operations by AF and Marines they decided to give them the best GCA outfit around. I was told they were from the Berlin airlift (1948). Anyway, after we'd moved to K-6 we were briefed for CAVU weather so we stayed with the bombers until our return to base could only be accomplished by a ballistic arc approach (coasting in a parabola from 35,000 feet so that you coasted over the end of the runway just short of flameout). When we crossed the bomb line we were advised our base and all others in the area -- Kimpo, Suwon, Osan, Taegu, Taejon, and Kunsan -- were WOXOF." (Note: "WOXOF" was the weather term for "indefinite/obscured" meaning "zero/zero visibility and ceiling.")

"We were getting a little frantic and were about to take the aircraft carrier Essex up on its offer to take us aboard when the lads at K-8 GCA offered us a "gold approach". That was a GCA where you put yourselves completely in their hands because you wouldn't see the ground before your main gear kissed the runway. My pilot WO Stan (Gunner) Clark and I plus Major "Harv" Patton and his RO Mel "Murph The Giant Jew" Rothblatt took them up on it. We had to have a follow-me jeep lead us to the parking area. If I recall correctly, Patton and Rothblatt flamed out at the runway turnoff and had to be towed in."

"The AF guys had forgotten us RO's were enlisted toads so they invited us to a sumptuous breakfast in the officers mess (24 hours a day). When they asked us to sign the mess chits Murph and I had to confess we was lowly enlisted toads. The AF mess officer graciously erased our names from the mess log."

The ground crews also experimented with ways to "speed up" the relatively slow F-3D. Jack Kio, a Radar Tech, remembers, "...when we were at K-8 we tried to make the F3D go faster by wiping them down with oil. It worked too, but quit doing it when one of the pilots fell off and broke his arm trying to get into the plane."

Jack added, "I know we ... took off as much as we could. At one time the CO had us remove the landing lights. He said we were night fighters and shouldn't need landing lights. We also removed the autopilot for a time because sometimes when it was engaged it flipped the plane on its back. At onetime we had about 20 GE engineers come to K-8 to try to fix the autopilot. For a time, there was orders not to use it."

Jack also mentioned a modification to save weight that may seem a little strange. He mentioned that, "Going to the Essex might not have been possible, because we were always trying to find ways to make the F3D go faster (against all Navy regulations we took the tail hook off some if not all F3Ds) We were told that for every pound of weight you needed 10 more pounds of thrust to move the plane at the same rate of speed. I know we did this to some but I can't remember if we did it to all the planes." Being permanently land-based in Korea, this would seem reasonable and the biggest advantage would be to give the aircrews a little more of an "edge" in battle. In Kristy's History Thesis it states, "Starting in late September and continuing into October 1952, a series of test were run comparing the speed, climb rate, ceiling and combat radius of an F3D-2 in standard configuration; two external tanks hung on hard points under the wings and an arrestor hook (it was a naval fighter), and an F3D-2 with these and other heavy components removed. The results of the test were encouraging,. The stripped down F3D-2 at altitudes above 30,000 feet had the same ceiling and range of the standard configuration F3D-2, but it was eight knots faster and had a better climb rate. Based on the results of these tests, the squadron decided that from October onward, all F3D-2 that were sent on mission above 30,000 feet, common for B-29 escort missions, would fly in the stripped down configuration, while aircraft conducting missions below 30,000 feet, such as NCAP mission against PO-2 would continue to fly in the standard configuration. This was because fuel the rate for the aircraft increased below 30,000 feet and the additional fuel carried in the two drop tanks was required to give the aircraft the needed loiter time."

Jack also recalls how sometimes the crews had to "improvise." He said, "One mission that may or may not be in any log. One night we could get only one F3D up due to maintenance problems. The pilot and R.O. left there radio on and talked back and forth to each other pretending there was more then one F3D on the mission. They did this hoping to fool the enemy and to assure the B-29 crews that all was well. It must of worked because we didn't lose any bombers that night...or it was just luck."

Jack Kio remembered a story of the F3D being shot up. He said, "I only remember (as of now) one F3D coming back shot up. The tail warning wasn't working but they took it up any way. There was one 37 MM that went through the tail at the call letters WF down warded into the back of the plane about three or four foot short of the gas tank. Through the compartment where radios and the parts of the gun aim radar was, it then exited out the bottom right between the two engines. In fact if you used a tape measure you couldn't come any closer to the center. In fact I and a couple of others done this. After that the orders were if the tail warning wasn't working the plane didn't go on a mission."

"To my surprise about two or three weeks later the C.O. a light Col. and a buddy of his that was visiting also a light Col. came down to take a F3D up that that the tail warning wasn't working. I told him it wasn't working and he told me he didn't need it for what he was going to do. I heard later that he went to the Yalu and fired the 20 MM across at the air field on the other side. He would pull up or bank away before he crossed the Yalu. I doubt that he did much damage but I bet he felt a lot better."

In 1946, the Navy contracted with Douglas Aircraft Company for the development of a carrier based night-fighter. Specifications included twin-jet power, side-by-side seating for the pilot and radar operator, 500 mph top speed, 500 mile combat radius, an operating altitude of 40,000 ft, and an escape system that enabled the crew to depart downward through the bottom of the fuselage.

First flown in March 1948, the three prototype XF3D-1s confirmed the basic soundness of the design and led to the first production F3D-1s being delivered to the Navy in 1950. However, insufficient roll rate at high speed was a major deficiency of the F3D-1 and limited its production run to only 28 examples. These aircraft were delivered to the Navy's VC-3 and the Marine's VMF(N)-542 in late 1950 and were utilized primarily in a training role while awaiting delivery of the improved F3D-2 model. The "-2" models incorporated new electronic and radar equipment,  thicker bullet proof canopy, wing spoilers to improve rate-of-roll, an automatic pilot and provisions for air-to-air rocket weapons. Max speed and range were increased to 600 mph and 1200 miles respectively utilizing uprated versions of the basic model's J34 engines. First flown in February 1951, production of the F3D-2 totaled 237 examples including several conversions to special-duty variants.

Operational use of the F3D-2 was primarily by Marine squadrons. Deployed to Korea in August 1952, the Marine's VMF(N)-513 proved the effectiveness of the "Skyknight" by destroying both jet and prop aircraft in night engagements. Marine F3Ds were responsible for the destruction of more enemy aircraft than any other Navy/Marine Corps aircraft type. Scoring six kills and one probable, the "Skyknight" scored the first jet versus jet night kill in history and was later credited with the destruction of a MIG-15 jet fighter at night.

The Navy also deployed the "Skyknight" to the Korean theater, albeit in a more limited role. VC-4 Det 44N deployed four F3D-2 aircraft onboard USS Lake Champlain (CVA-39); the ship reaching Korean waters during the final months of the war. In the combat zone, the Detachment flew both carrier based and land based sorties (attached to VMF(N)-513) in support of the UN effort.

In the post-war years, missile and ECM versions were produced. In this capacity, the aircraft was utilized to train both all-weather pilots and Radar Intercept Officers, and as an electronic reconnaissance and countermeasure aircraft during the Cuban Missile Crisis and through much of the Vietnamese Conflict including combat missions in the latter. As a result, the "Skyknight" (redesignated the F-10 series in 1962) was the only tactical jet aircraft to see combat action in both the Korean and Vietnam War. The last of the "Skyknights" were retired in 1970. (NOTE: The last Marine EF-10B flight was from MCAS, El Toro to MCAS, Quantico where it was transferred to the Marine Corps Aviation Museum. The pilot was MAG C.O., Col. O.R.Davis. See VMF(N)-513 "Squadron Kills" chart above -- second F3D kill.)

F3D STORIES: Ron Stout wrote about the following tale, "This is the story of a bailout from an F3D-2 (Douglas Skynight) by a fellow R.O. Ed Edelin. Ed later had to eject from an F4 Phantom in Vietnam and ended up with a compressed spine injury.The F3D was unique in that instead of an ejection seat it had a door between pilot and R.O. that led to a tunnel to a hatchway out through the belly of the airplane. When a "T" handle on the center console was pulled both crewmans seats came apart so that they could rotate toward the escape hatch,grab a vaulting bar above the door and swing themselves out through the chute. Having to do all of this in a big hurry added considerable excitement to the procedure. Because the F3D carried 1500 gallons of high octane (115/145) gasoline in tanks right behind the cockpit a fire onboard required an urgent exit before the plane exploded. Several did explode, at one time or another, and many of our comrades lives were lost."

From Ed Edelin: "Circa 1958 or 59 (can't recall exactly and my log book is packed away) we were taking the last 3 F3D's from VMFTN 20 at Cherry Point to, I believe, Quonset Point after closing down the RIO school. Taking off to the southwest, making a left turn and raising the gear the cockpit filled with black smoke so thick we couldn't see the instruments or each other. My pilot, a lieutenant, whose name I can't remember, quickly assessed the situation and came up with the standard bail out command....."F--- it Ed, lets get out of here". Not having had time to even log take off time or turn on the radar before the smoke filled the cockpit, and not being one to argue in this situation plus being at low altitude, I made the standard reply...."See you on the ground"...as I made the turn from the RO's seat, grabbed the bar above the escape chute door and swung my body down the escape chute as I had done in static bail out drill. Everything was as practiced.....no hang ups. I can't remember who pulled the escape chute jettison handle or if a mayday call was made before I left. I don't recall doing either."

"As I cleared the a/c I pulled the D ring and the chute came out of the pack. I wanted to keep the D ring for my "I love me wall" but the shroud lines came out under my extended right arm as I tumbled and when the chute opened there was one hell of a jolt and I lost the ring, my helmet and oxygen mask and anything else that wasn't securely attached. After my chute opened and I was descending I recall seeing the a/c I just left go below the trees. I did not see another chute and was hoping the pilot made it out. I was descending below the trees myself and my attention was focused on landing which appeared would be in one of the lakes south of Cherry Point. I pulled on the risers hoping to steer away from the lake but it didn't do any good. I just had enough time to undo my harness so I could get rid of the chute as I hit the water. The next instant I was standing in the lake with my feet on the bottom and my nose just above the surface of the water. The lake was only about 5 feet deep. I immediately deployed my raft, climbed in and started paddling for shore to no avail. I found out later from the crew who was flying cap that my chute was hung up on a log or stump and was tangled with the harness attached to the raft by the lanyard. I can imagine what that looked like from above. After a time of paddling and getting nowhere I vacated the raft about the same time that I saw the rescue helo coming in over the trees. They dropped the pick up and I walked/swam to the horse collar, got it on and was hoisted up to the helo. As the crew chief pulled me inside he promptly informed me to hang on, they had to set down because of a hydraulic failure. Fortunately they made it to dry land and I didn't have to go swimming again. I was beginning to wonder if it was my day or what. A second helo was called and the crew of the downed helo popped flares and smoke which started a brush fire.....now I was really beginning to wonder. I was transferred to the second helo and was lifted to the hospital at Cherry Point where I was checked out and given my medicinal brandy.

"I heard at the hospital that the pilot had recovered the a/c and landed. It seems the smoke cleared after the escape hatches were blown and before he could get out he caught sight of the airfield, climbed back into the pilots seat and landed downwind more or less standing up."

"I also later heard that the windshield wiper motor had burned up and was the cause of all the smoke in the cockpit. My question was and still is...how many crews were lost because of that windshield wiper motor?"

TECHNICAL DATA

Manufacturer: Douglas Aircraft Corp.
Type: All-weather carrier-based fighter
Crew: Pilot and radar observer
Powerplant: Two 3,400 lb s.t. Westinghouse J-34-WE-36/36A
Dimensions: Span 50'; length 45' 6"
Weight: 26,850 lbs gross
Speed: 600 mph maximum
Range: 1200 miles
Armament: 4-20mm guns

VMF(N)-513 F3D Skyknights Lost in Korea: Extracted from Baugher Site

• 124623 (VMF-513) contact lost during night patrol Aug 15, 1952. Search result negative.
• 124625 (VMF-513) engines exploded, crashed into water Sept 1, 1952.
• 125817 (VMF-513) lost Jun 4, 1953.

Squadron "Kills":

The following information on the VMF(N)-513 kills was extracted fromAir Combat; Air Power, January 1986; and B.H. Kristy's,The Flying Nightmares: An Operational History and Assessment of VMF(N)-513 in Korea 1950 - 1953, (p191). The compilation has made minor corrections and added notes. The VMF(N)-513 "kills" are as follows:

Note 1: According to B.H. Kristy's,The Flying Nightmares: An Operational History and Assessment of VMF(N)-513 in Korea 1950 - 1953, (p191) , this is the "First enemy aircraft destroyed at night by the United Nations". It is not -- it is the second. InCrimson Sky: The Air Battle for Korea(pp120-122), it states that Dick Heyman of the 8th Bomb Squadron, 3rd Bomb Wing shot down the first Po-2 at night on June 23. (Go to the 8th B.S.Night Flyingand see "The Case of the Flying Bathtub".) It continues on to say (p122) that "on June 30, Captain E.B. Long, USMC, caught another Po-2 near Seoul and destroyed it with from from his Grumman F-7F Tigercat for the second Po-2 kill. On July 12, another Marine pilot shot down a third one. Following that final kill, the North Koreans quit running nighttime heckling missions for the rest of the summer. With their disappearance from the night skies, the pilots and crews of the B-26 wings again owned the hours of darkness south of MiG Alley."

However, it is the first night kill for the Marines and it first-blood for the F7F ever. A caption on an illustration (see above) read, " 1 July 1951, first night victory for the Marines in Korea and first ever for the F7F. CAPT E.B. Long and W.O. R.C. Buckingham of VMF(N)-513 intercepted an NKAF PO-2 'Bedcheck Charlie'. After overshooting on two passes, Long slowed enough to get into firing position and scored 20mm hits on the PO-2, which crashed in the hills north of Kimpo."

Note 2:Ron Stoutwrote, "F4U's carried 50 cal and 20 mm guns almost interchangeably. For uniformity with the other aircraft in our Air Wing ours carried 20 mm. Those operating off the carriers (Task Force 77) used whatever the Navy squadrons onboard used (Usually 50 cal)."

Note 3: The Marines first Ace of the Korean War was 1st Lieutenant John W. Andre (a former enlisted pilot) who flew a F4U-5NL (Corsair) out of Kunsan. Lt Andre had 5 kills (including 4 kills from WWII). He is listed in the Fighter Aces list co-authored list byAl BowersandDavid Lednicer.

Note 4: On November 2, 1952, pilot Maj William Stratton and radar operator Hans Hoagland shot down a North Korean Yak-15, the first jet-vs-jet night kill.

Note 5: First ever aircraft destroyed using lock-on radar gear.

Note 6: According to theJ. Baugher site, "On the night of January 30, 1953, an F-94B flown by Capt B. L. Fithian as pilot and Lieut S. R. Lyons as radar operator shot down an unseen Lavochkin La-9 piston-engined fighter, scoring first blood for the F-94B. The Korean-based F-94Bs destroyed three more enemy aircraft during the next six months, but one F-94B was destroyed on the night of June 12 when it collided with a Polikarpov Po-2 biplane."

However,Ron Stoutstates, "The F-94's were never attached to 513 as far as I know but flew out of Suwon." However, it is a fact that F-94s from the 319th FIS exercised with the VMF(N)-513 while escorting B-29s. Ron later used the term "exchanged crews" when he later added, "The 319th was at Suwon when I got to Korea (April 1953) and stayed there throughout most of the war as far as I know. We exchanged a crew with them as long as I was in 513 although, toward the end of the war, they got a little prickly about our sending enlisted R.O.'s up there. Nearly all of our R.O.'s were enlisted men until 1967 when Navy and Air Force pressures made them become officers." (Go to319th FISfor information on the unit.) Therefore, despite interservice rivalry, by USAF standards they would have been technically "attached" since crews and aircraft were "exchanged."

Note 7: During this period, four Navy F3D-2s from the VC-4 Det 44N flew land-based sorties while attached to VMF(N)-513. Lt (Jg) Bick and his aircraft were attached to the VMF(N)-513. According to the Command Diary, VMF(N)-513, February 1953 to July 1953, "Lt.(Jg) Bick reported a MiG-15 destroyed and then a tail-warning gear contact and a firing run against his aircraft. Lt.(Jg) Bick's aircraft did not return to base and was assumed lost."

Comments by Marines about the Navy's flying standards are pretty standard: Paul Noel contributed this note. "From a blurb from Roy "Moose" Simolin published in v. 1999-2000, #2, 531 News Letter, Ghost Lore: "About the detachment of Navy F3Ds flying with 513 in Korea, Moose remembers at least one incident where a Lt (jg) aborted a mission "for weather". The 513 Ops O. chewed some on them, specifically, "That no 513 pilot from S/Sgt to LtCol had ever aborted for weather and as long as they (Navy) used their (513's) call sign there would be no 'weather aborts'! They (Navy) should turn in their Wings if they couldn't hack it." ------they took off and flew the mission."

Ron Stout wrote, "We have had a continuing dialogue among us since the '91 reunion about the two kills claimed by the Navy guys attached to 513. All I can recall from that time was that we warned them over and over about wandering into the infamous "box" trap and our considered opinion at the time was that their two MIA's ignored our warnings. Now the Navy claims they were each credited with a kill because at the time of their disappearance they were "engaging" an enemy aircraft." He continued, "As I recall, no 513 crew was credited with a kill unless wreckage was observed at the site of the engagement. A similar dialogue takes place regularly about Guy Bordelon's five kills from K-6 in the F4U-5NL since several shoot downs in close proximity to the base failed to produce any PO-2 wreckage."

Note 8: Lt.Col. Conley is credited with a second MiG-15 kill in March 1953 by Air Power, January 1986. However, there is no corroboration in other source materials.

In Mar 2004, Lt. Col. Paul R. Bless wrote, "Anyway, I am a die hard fan of the F3D Skyknight and hope I can add some clarification to page 7 of your website. At the very end of theis page is a section entitled "Squadron Kills." I direct your attention to Note 8 of this section. It states that according to "Air Power" Magazine LtCol Conley was credited with a "second Mig-15 kill in March of 1953. This is often "quoted" as fact when it is indeed a misterpretation of facts. The first Marine kill of the Korean War by Maj Stratton/MSgt Hoglind (Nov 1952) and the last Marine Kill of the Korean War by LtCol Conley/MSgt Scott (Jan 1953) were both made by the same aircraft. It had the Modex (Nose Number) 23 and was known by its nickname "Julie Mae." A photo (obviously taken after Conley's kill on 31 January 1953) appeared in the March 1953 issue of "Naval Aviation News" with LtCol Conley standing by aircraft "23" while holding up two fingers, to indicate that the aircraft, "Julie Mae," had accounted for two enemy aircraft destroyed. Thus the misinterpretation of him personally accounting for two enemy aircraft destroyed. I know this to be true as the official record and the combat action report filed at the time and on file in the archives of the Marine Corps Historical Center, makes absolutely no claim of any such ckill in March 1953.

Note 9: Robert Becker wrote on 1 Jul 2004: "Just a quick note about an error on the list of kills in the 513 web site. I am listed as "J.P." Becker -- it should be "R.P." Becker. My pilot. J.R. Weaver and I got our Mig on 28 Jan 53. Semper Fi Bob"

• Marine Squadron VMF(N)-513 (1952-1953): "The Flying Nightmares"
  • Flying Nightmares:
  • On the Move: From WWII to Arrival in Japan to Itami to Wonsan, North Korea
  • On the Move: To Yonpo, North Korea to Itami to Kangnung to Kunsan to Pyongtaek
  • Arrival at Kunsan:
  • The Way We Did Business:
    • Close Air Support:
    • Flare-drop Mission:
    • Ground-level Friction between the Services:
  • F4U-5NL Corsair:
  • F7F-3N Tigercat:
  • F3D-2 Skyknight:
  • Squadron "kills":
  • Air-to-Ground Results:- A review of the "Final Air-to-Ground Results: Aug 1950 - May 1953"
  • Germ Warfare: -- The VMF(N)-513 is accused of using germ warfare from Kunsan
  • Departed Kunsan for K-6:
  • After Korea:
  • Footnotes:
  • 319th Fighter Interceptor Squadron: -- F-94 Squadron from Suwon providing B-29 air cover with VMF(N)-513 and Specifications of the Lockheed F-94 Starfire
  • B-29 Superfortress:-- Night bombing strikes on the North Korea (June 1952 - July 1953)

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